DOCSLIB.ORG

Policy Department External Policies CITIZENS in DANGER HUMAN

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

BRIEFING PAPER

Policy Department External Policies

CITIZENS IN DANGER
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM
IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA

HUMAN RIGHTS

February 2008

JANUARY 2004

EN

This briefing paper was requested by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights. This study is published in the following languages: EN, FR (OR), RU Author:

Marie Mendras, researcher

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris

Administrator:

Andrea Subhan

Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department BD4 06 M 071 rue Wiertz, 60 B-1047 Brussels

Manuscript completed in February 2008. This study is available on the Internet at

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=FR

Brussels: European Parliament, 2008. The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

©European Communities, 2008

Marie Mendras is a researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Russia expert at the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI). She teaches at Sciences Po University in Paris. She runs the Observatoire de la Russie at CERI

and in particular has published Comment fonctionne la Russie ? Le politique, le bureaucrate

et l’oligarque, Autrement, 2003, and La Russie de Poutine, Pouvoirs, Le Seuil, 2005. Her

publications in English include: Russia and Europe. The Challenge of Proximity, Europa

Institut Zürich, Schulthess, 2004, ‘Back to the Besieged Fortress?’ in Putin’s Empire, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, 2007, ‘Authority and Identity in Russia’ in Katlijn Malfliet, ed.,

Elusive Russia, Leuven, 2007.

Marie Mendras studied at Essex University, Sciences Po Paris, Institut des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center, and Harvard University.

EXPO/B/DROI/2007/32 PE 385.539
February 2008
EN

Table of contents

  • Introduction
  • 4

  • 4
  • 1. Vladimir Putin’s succession: a non-starter

2. The deconstruction of the public institutions 3. The media and obstacles to freedom of information and expression 4. An uncivil society
79
10
5. Controlled elections: the administrative machine and the end of the opposition13 6. Violence and repression Conclusion
14 16

  • 18
  • ANNEX

iii

Introduction

In today’s Russia, political life is dominated by two issues: Vladimir Putin staying in power, and national identity. These two subjects, popping up in every possible shape and form in official discourse and in the media, are pushing aside other issues, in particular the crucial question of social policy. As for the issue of human rights and freedoms, this is hardly ever mentioned.

All current affairs issues are dealt with in relation to Putin, what he does, what he says, what he is planning, and more often than not, in relation to strengthening power and the ‘Russian national idea’. Advisors at the Kremlin and most of the candidates standing in the parliamentary elections on 2 December 2007 are hammering out three slogans: ‘Russia for the Russians’, ‘sovereign democracy’ and ‘Russian identity’. Their message is clear and can be summarised as follows: ‘Russia is back and is again becoming a country to be reckoned with in international politics. It no longer has to suffer interference and diktats from abroad. Russian leaders have the support of the people and know better than Western governments and experts what is best for their society. European "values" are subjective and Russians do not have to adopt them blindly.’

1. Vladimir Putin’s succession: a non-starter

A lack of alternation in political power is a feature of authoritarian regimes. Russia is a typical example. Since Vladimir Putin was re-elected head of the Federation in March 2004, the 2008 headache has been on everyone’s mind. Under the terms of the 1993 Constitution, the Russian President can serve two consecutive four-year terms. The outgoing President knew he would have to leave his post in March 2008 unless the constitution was amended. Putin has chosen not to launch a revision of the Constitution, though this would not have posed any problems since Parliament was under the executive’s orders. The Duma elected in December 2003 numbers only a few true opposition members, and sometimes the Communist Party opposes government projects. As for the Parliament’s Upper Chamber, the Council of the Federation, it no longer has any authority since the reform of the way it is constituted. In 1993 and 1995, the ‘senators’, as they were familiarly known at the time, were elected by direct universal suffrage. From 1999, the Council was made up of people sitting ex officio: the President of the Regional Assembly (elected) and the governor of the region or the President of the Republic (also elected). In 2003, the system was changed again. Each province (subject of the Federation, and there are 86 in 2007) still has two seats in the Council. The first seat is allocated by the provincial assembly, the second by the provincial administration. Neither has the direct legitimacy of the ballot box.

However, even with very conciliatory members, the President did not want to revise Article 81 of the Constitution. There are several interpretations. The most pertinent seems that Putin did not want to do what the dictators of Central Asia and Belarus were doing, granting themselves a third term and being able to stay in power as long as nobody else stopped them.

4
Putin is not keen on being compared to Islam Karimov, Nursultan Nazarbayev or Alexander Lukashenko. He is therefore taking care of his image by preserving, in appearance, the integrity of the text of the Constitution. The scenario he explained on 1 October 2007 to the Congress of the United Russia Party, which holds power, is nevertheless a crude subversion of the spirit of the Constitution text.

If the idea is to transform Russian into a ‘parliamentary republic’ in which the Prime Minister would be the head of the executive and the President a national figure without decisionmaking powers, this would require the adoption of a new Constitution. If the idea is to enable Vladimir Putin to buy some time by staying in power for a few months as Prime Minister and then taking over the Presidency again for two new consecutive terms, the operation is a veritable conjuring trick. The scenario would be as follows: Putin secures a massive win for the nomenklatura party United Russia on 2 December 2007. He makes full use of the ‘administrative resource’ (a Russian euphemism for ‘control’ of the elections by the electoral commissions and local administrations), and makes sure his ‘party’ gets 65-70% of the vote, giving him approximately 75% of the seats in the Duma. The parliamentary elections would therefore be transformed into a vote of confidence for the Leader, and the Duma would no longer be a ‘representative’ body at all; its only function would be to rubber-stamp government bills.

Three months later, on 2 March 2008, the presidential election will no longer be of any interest to the Russians, because Putin will be assured of remaining the true leader. The person chosen to occupy formally the post of President will be a very loyal man who has agreed in advance to resign from the Presidency when the time comes, for example because of ill health. In the meantime, Vladimir Putin will have obtained a ‘minor’ revision of the Constitution, setting the length of a presidential term at 7 years instead of 4. He has publicly stated on several occasions that he would prefer Russia to have a five-year or seven-year Presidency. He would then go to the polls in 2009 for a seven-year term. He can do this because the 1993 Constitution stipulates that the President may only serve for ‘two consecutive terms’. Once somebody else has been elected to the Presidency, the former head of state can once again aspire to the supreme office. On this basis, Vladimir Putin could be President until 2023!

This scenario raises a number of political and technical problems, in particular the absolute loyalty of the temporary successor. The Constitution gives the President very extensive powers, and the ‘loyal friend’ could be tempted to distance his mentor. However, in the current Russian system, where the intelligence services and forces of law and order play a prominent role with the help of judges under orders, it is highly likely that the successor will be ‘constrained’ by these authorities and will not take the risk of going back on his word.

The key thing here is to highlight the unconstitutional and anti-democratic nature of Vladimir Putin’s attempt to stay in power. On the one hand, universal suffrage is devalued. The elections are hijacked to Putin’s advantage. The Duma will be crushed by the dominant party, United Russia, and the other small party in power, A Just Russia, will simply be controlled by Putin’s people. The Communist Party will have a few deputies sitting in the Duma, who will sometimes vote for and sometimes against government plans. If Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party goes beyond the 7% threshold for entering the Duma, he will continue to fall in line with the executive. On the other hand, in the Russian system, the Prime Minister is not accountable to Parliament. He is appointed by the President and only the President can dismiss him. He must be accepted by the Duma, but as this will mainly consist

5of apparatchiks without free choice, they will vote for the name put forward. If – and this is highly unlikely – a problem arises, the Duma will be dissolved by the President (Article 84 of the Constitution).

So the generous interpretation made by some commentators of Putin’s intentions to slip from the Presidency into the government is not based on a very detailed analysis of the situation. The current Russian regime is strongly presidentialist and cannot change in one election into a parliamentary republic. To turn Russia into a British-style system, major institutional reform would be needed, even the adoption of a new constitution, and a reinstatement of the fundamental rights and freedoms without which voters are not citizens but subjects of a selfelected and self-appointed ruling class. If the Parliament is made up only of apparatchiks who belong to a nomenklatura controlled by the executive power, how can this be described as ‘parliamentarism’?

The preparations for this scenario have been in the pipeline for some time, probably in parallel with other scenarios. Keeping several irons in the fire is a good tactic when you have four years, from early 2004 to late 2007, to seek the right outcome and test a number of avenues.

The unexpected change of Prime Minister on 12 September 2007 can only be explained in the light of the declaration of 1 October. Everything then falls into place. Nothing could explain the urgency of introducing a ‘new government’, which has actually remained more or less the same since the cabinet reshuffle on 24 September. Why would a President preparing to leave his post six months later bother with this kind of manoeuvre? One of the explanations could lie with the personal finances of the regime’s leaders, and their need for protection. Viktor Zubkov, the new head of government, used to head up the government’s financial monitoring committee, officially a money laundering watchdog. He is therefore the person best informed on personal fortunes and the situation of private and public companies. One can imagine how much the question of immunity after leaving power matters to these men, who have all built personal fortunes and small financial empires under opaque and uncompetitive conditions.

Those in positions of power in the Kremlin and the government administrations are directly in touch with the financial interests of the major energy and industrial companies. The presidential succession is not just a change of man and team at the head of the executive, but it affects a vast and complex system of personal and corporate interests, the operation and sustainability of which depend on Putin’s sphere of influence. Mikhail Khordokovsky, head of Yukos, was arrested in October 2003 on the eve of the last parliamentary elections as pressure from the Kremlin was mounting on all independent political and economic players. In 2006-2007, the pressure was cranked up even more. The assassination of high-profile journalist and government critic Anna Politkovskaya on 7 October 2006 was the most tragic demonstration of this.

Putin wants to hold on to power at any price. Contrary to propaganda suggestions, he is not ‘tired of power’ and is showing that any means of continuing to exercise considerable power is fine. As the Russian political scientist Maria Lipman, editor of the Russian magazine Pro et Contra (Carnegie Centre, Moscow), explains so well, ‘the power travels with Putin’, so he can switch temporarily from the Presidency to the government. Vladimir Putin can succeed with this ‘kidnapping’ of the government at the Presidency’s expense simply because he is the head of an all-powerful organisation and holds all the cards for making people do what he wants. He does not even have to worry about the institutions any more. The last independent

6deputy of the outgoing Duma, Vladimir Ryzhkov, says that all the public institutions have been systematically weakened, or even emptied of all substance; they are not capable of constituting an obstacle to the consolidation of Putin’s system of power. Neither Parliament nor the Constitutional Court, nor the Central Electoral Commission exists independently of the will of the President. As has been well documented by the sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya1, power is in the hands of Putin, of those close to him and of the intelligence services; power will be concentrated wherever Putin is. The most obvious choice seemed to him the post of Prime Minister, which remains formally an executive role though subject to the authority of the President, with no accountability towards the deputies since the government is not answerable to Parliament.

For this institutional sleight of hand to be accepted, the regime needed to make sure three essential conditions were in place: public institutions stripped of their authority; firm control of the media and the public information system; economic and social players prepared to accept the ‘contract’ of power, which consists of submitting to certain rules in order to be able to function in peace. One of these rules is to stay out of politics and never criticise decisions made on high.

And we will see that a fourth factor fosters authoritarianism and is fostered by it: an ‘uncivil’ society, i.e. one that is indifferent to politics, individualistic, and prepared to tolerate the erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms.

2. The deconstruction of the public institutions

Since 2000, the objective of Putin’s team has been to restrict pluralism, competition and criticism in both politics and economic affairs. Yukos, Chechnya and the elections are three inseparable elements of a single phenomenon: the concentration of power within a small ruling class through the desertification of the public arena and control of the country’s resources. The results bear witness to the effectiveness of despotic methods and the fear they spread within society. There are few intellectuals, independent deputies or human rights activists who dare to challenge the regime loudly and clearly.

Putin says he is the guarantor of a strong government, but in reality he is weakening and discrediting the public institutions2. The structure he is relying on is the presidential administration, an extended cabinet that doubles up on the government and works closely with the intelligence services and business networks. How did the policy to restore the State, announced in 2000, lead to such damage to institutional processes?

To understand the mindset and methods that have dominated since the start of Putin’s Presidency, it is important to look back at the Yeltsin decade and the conditions that led to a lieutenant-colonel turned head of the FSB being propelled into the position of head of State.

The political history of the 1990s is the history of a State neglected by its own elite. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the defeat of the State, inseparable from the defeat of the

1

Olga Kryshtanovskaya, ‘Putin’s Militocracy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 19, 4, 2003, pp. 289-306, ‘Opasnye liudi v shtatskom’ (Dangerous men in civilian clothes), Ezhenedel’nyi zhurnal, 15, March 2004. 2 La Russie de Poutine, edited by Marie Mendras, Pouvoirs journal, No 113, 2005.

7
Communist regime, led to a rejection of the very concept of State and the rules of public government. The Soviet system was perceived as having done for itself through an overinflated State party and an ineffective hierarchy incapable of producing growth and wealth. The State was neither liked nor respected; the bureaucracies were considered predatory and inefficient. Since Gorbachev’s perestroika, all discourse on reform had been calling for the reduction of the role of the State. Hyperliberalism more than the spirit of democracy was blowing through political and economic circles.

In the early 1990s, everyone’s energies went into the economy: freedom of pricing and trade, new legislation on property, companies and finance. Privatisations enabled some of the old nomenklatura and young entrepreneurs to get rich; some built up colossal fortunes. Apart from a few legal experts and some intellectuals, nobody was thinking about the State. The Kremlin simply kept a roadmap for democratic institutions and the legislation necessary for the capitalist transformation, particularly the privatisations. Even the drafting of the new constitution in the end escaped public debate. After the acute crisis that brought Yeltsin into conflict with a large group of deputies in October 1993, ending with an armed attack that left around 200 dead, the draft constitution was revised on the quiet and was not subject to any more criticism until the December 1993 referendum.

Liberalisation and the tremendous opportunities opening up in the economic and financial domain were such that institutional policy and discussion of the future of society were not priorities. Economic interests and the habits of secrecy and lack of accountability to the public certainly allowed the anti-democratic and predatory behaviour by some of the elite. Yeltsin, his advisors and ministers did not safeguard the construction of a democratic State, or effective, accountable government, but they did not oppose the liberalisation of the country either.

During Boris Yeltsin’s first term of office, Russia experienced remarkable openness and genuine democratisation of public life, particularly the pluralism of the media and competitive elections. However, at the same time, in a manner that was still quite sporadic, damage was slowly being done to the democratic institutions, and this trend accelerated during Yeltsin’s second term, from the summer of 1996 to the end of 1999. Re-elected through the financial support of the oligarchs and the zeal of certain bureaucrats, though sick and rarely seen in the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin allowed a ‘courtly regime’ to become established; corruption and scandal went right to the top of the State. The financial crash of August 1998 exploded the Muscovite bubble and revealed the government’s deficiencies.

It was against this shabby background at the end of Yeltsin’s reign that Vladimir Putin was chosen as successor. He had to deliver on certain commitments, in particular guaranteeing ‘The Family’ (those close to Boris Yeltsin) immunity. The Bank of New York scandal directly touched the President’s family. So in 1999-2000 Putin was not chosen as successor for his personality or for his leadership qualities.

Despite Yeltsin having made him his successor, Putin went on constantly to criticise the disorder and negligence inherited from his predecessor. All the rhetoric of ‘order’ since 2000 has been built on devaluing the previous government. The moment the slightest criticism is made of the drift towards authoritarianism, defenders of the regime reply: it’s better than the chaos of before.

8
It is very easy now to oversimplify the situation and present Yeltsin’s government as a hostage to unscrupulous oligarchs, corrupt bureaucrats and provincial leaders serving their own interests, scornful of public spiritedness. Since 2000 Putin’s team has attacked the autonomy of the provinces and moved towards strengthening the Federation. The war in Chechnya and the terrorist attacks have provided the regime with justification for its authoritarian, centralising strategy: because the nation is in danger, the unity and integrity of the State must be strengthened. In an interview he gave in September 2004 after the dramatic Beslan school hostage crisis, Vladislav Surkov, deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration, was not afraid to say that in the face of the threat of annihilation of the integrity of the state, the President was obliged to use the constitutional principle of unity of the executive. The fight against terrorism required that federalism be pushed aside and executive powers concentrated in the Kremlin.

Vladimir Putin has become the Leader over all, including the institutions. Paradoxically, a chief over whom there is no institutional control finds himself at the mercy of backstage battles and struggles between private and corporate interests, in a world focused on securing votes. The battles taking place in the autumn of 2007 are even affecting the various intelligence services and security organisations. In early October, officials from the Federal Anti-Drug Service were arrested by the FSB, the successor of the KGB. The director of the Service condemned the ‘dog-eat-dog warfare’ between the different factions of the intelligence world. This provides another example of why the excessive concentration of power is no guarantee of stability.

3. The media and obstacles to freedom of information and expression

The Russian media, mainly the television companies and most of the major newspapers, are subject to increasingly tight control. President Putin and his team are starting to find it intolerable to hear or read critical opinions. The hunting out of any form of public opposition is intensifying as the parliamentary elections of 2 December 2007 draw closer. The president of the Russian Union of Journalists, Vsevolod Bogdanov, underlines the fact that the media are no longer made up of journalists, but of apparatchiks and ‘polittekhnologui’ or ‘political advisors’ working directly for the administration. ‘In the media, fewer than 12% of programmes and publications could be considered to be “journalism”; the rest is propaganda and “public relations” (PR in Russian), attacks and denunciations (kompromat) and advertising’, and of course, entertainment3. In a detailed study, Oleg Panfilov draws up a distressing assessment of the press and television in Russia. As expert Floriana Fossato explains, the total ‘bringing to heel’ of the two government television channels, ORT and RTR, gives Putin’s regime control of the political and social information broadcast to 80% of Russians. The vast majority of Russians are actually hostages to official television because they do not have access either to the Internet or to satellite channels or to the critical Muscovite press4.

Recommended publications
  • Russia's Soft Power Ambitions

    Russia's Soft Power Ambitions

    No. 115 y October 2006 he European Union thinks of Russia’s Soft Power Ambitions itself as a ‘soft power’, which is Tdefined by Joseph Nye as the Nicu Popescu “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion” redressed both inside as well as outside distinct from what the West understands and which can “be cultivated through Russia. as democracy. Thus, Russia’s relations with allies, economic democracy should not necessarily assistance, and cultural exchanges.”1 The first front for Russia’s new soft correspond to Western standards of Few would think that Russia has ‘soft power ambition is domestic. Putin’s democracy. As Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s power’ ambitions, but the truth is that administration, represented by its defence minister puts it, “if there is Russia has started to invest in the deputy chief Vladislav Surkov, has been western democracy, there should be an infrastructure of a soft power. working on the development of eastern democracy as well”.7 ‘sovereign democracy’5 as a concept The moment of truth for Russia came that should be the backbone of Russia’s On paper, the ideology of ‘sovereign with the ‘Orange Revolution’ in ‘national idea’. It is not easy to grasp democracy’ is presented as if it were not Ukraine, when the power of ideas was what ‘sovereign democracy’ means that different from what is understood revealed by events. Konstantin exactly. The concept is deliberately in the West by democracy. But the Kosachev, Chairman of the foreign vague, and the debate still ongoing.6 reality is different.
  • Religion, State and 'Sovereign Democracy' in Putin's Russia

    Religion, State and 'Sovereign Democracy' in Putin's Russia

    Religion, state and ‘sovereign democracy’ in Putin’s Russia John Anderson School of International Relations University of St Andrews, Fife, Scotland KY16 8EB (01334 462931; [email protected]) John Anderson is Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. He has published widely on religion and politics in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet states, on religion and democratisation, on Christianity and politics in Russia, Europe and the USA, and on the politics of Central Asia. His most recent book is Conservative Christian Politics in Russia and the United States (Manchester University Press, 2015). 1 Abstract This article explores the role of the dominant Russian Orthodox Church in the evolution of the post-communist Russian Federation. This is not a classic case where religion may have contributed to the democratisation of society because this has not been a primary goal of political elites, and the regime that has emerged might best be described as ‘hybrid’ with growing authoritarian tendencies. Having played little role in the ending of communism, having little historical experience of working within a democracy, suspicious of liberal- individualist visions of public life and committed to a vision of its role as the hegemonic religious institution, the promotion of democratic governance has not been a priority of church leaders. At the same time the political structures created by the Kremlin encourage a degree of conformity and support for the regime by key social actors, and in the wake of the political crisis of 2011-12 there have been further incentives for church and state to work more closely together.
  • The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology Or Internal Dissent?

    The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology Or Internal Dissent?

    The Political Clubs of United Russia: Incubators of Ideology or Internal Dissent? Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Eileen Marie Kunkler, B.A. Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies The Ohio State University 2010 Thesis Committee: Goldie Shabad, Adviser Trevor Brown Copyright by Eileen Marie Kunkler 2010 Abstract In 2008, three political clubs were officially formed within the United Russia party structure: the Social-Conservative Club, the Liberal-Conservative Club, and the State-Patriotic Club. Membership of these clubs includes many powerful Duma representatives. Officially, their function is to help develop strategies for implementing the government‟s Strategy 2020. However, a closer examination of these clubs suggests that they also may function as an ideology incubator for the larger party and as a safety valve for internal party dissent. To answer the question of what the true function of these clubs is an attempt will be made to give: a brief overview of Unity‟s and Fatherland-All Russia‟s formation; a description of how United Russia formed; a summary of the ideological currents within United Russia from 2001-2009; a discussion of the three clubs; and a comparative analysis of these clubs to the Christian Democratic party of Italy and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Based on this evidence, it will be argued that primary purpose of these clubs is to contain intra-party conflict. ii Dedication Dedicated to my family and friends iii Acknowledgements I wish to thank my adviser, Goldie Shabad, for all of her help, advice, and patience in working on this project with me.
  • An Essay in Universal History

    An Essay in Universal History

    AN ESSAY IN UNIVERSAL HISTORY From an Orthodox Christian Point of View PART 6: THE AGE OF MAMMON (1945-2001) Volume 3: From 1992 to 2001 Vladimir Moss © Copyright Vladimir Moss, 2017: All Rights Reserved 1 The communists have been hurled at the Church like a crazy dog. Their Soviet emblem - the hammer and sickle - corresponds to their mission. With the hammer they beat people over the head, and with the sickle they mow down the churches. But then the Masons will remove the communists and take control of Russia… St. Theodore (Rafanovsky) of Belorussia (+1975). In order to have a democracy in society there must be a dictatorship in power. Anatoly Chubais. We are on the verge of a global transformation. All we need is the right major crisis... and the nations will accept the New World Order. David Rockefeller. Globalization is all about wealth. It knows the price of everything and value of nothing. Without borders the world will become – is becoming – a howling desert of traffic fumes, concrete and plastic, where nowhere is home and the only language is money. Peter Hitchens. The best way to shake people out of their inertia is to put them in debt. Then you give them the power to realize their dreams overnight, while ensuring that they’ll spend years paying for their dreams. This is the principle upon which the stability of the Western world rests. A Serb. Israel is where Jews are. It is not a line on a map. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. The death of God does not mean that man will believe in nothing, but that he will believe in anything.
  • 10.1057/9780230282940.Pdf

    10.1057/9780230282940.Pdf

    St Antony’s Series General Editor: Jan Zielonka (2004– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Othon Anastasakis, Research Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford and Director of South East European Studies at Oxford Recent titles include: Julie Newton and William Tompson (editors) INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS AND LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN POLITICS Celia Kerslake , Kerem Oˇktem, and Philip Robins (editors) TURKEY’S ENGAGEMENT WITH MODERNITY Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century Paradorn Rangsimaporn RUSSIA AS AN ASPIRING GREAT POWER IN EAST ASIA Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin Motti Golani THE END OF THE BRITISH MANDATE FOR PALESTINE, 1948 The Diary of Sir Henry Gurney Demetra Tzanaki WOMEN AND NATIONALISM IN THE MAKING OF MODERN GREECE The Founding of the Kingdom to the Greco-Turkish War Simone Bunse SMALL STATES AND EU GOVERNANCE Leadership through the Council Presidency Judith Marquand DEVELOPMENT AID IN RUSSIA Lessons from Siberia Li-Chen Sim THE RISE AND FALL OF PRIVATIZATION IN THE RUSSIAN OIL INDUSTRY Stefania Bernini FAMILY LIFE AND INDIVIDUAL WELFARE IN POSTWAR EUROPE Britain and Italy Compared Tomila V. Lankina, Anneke Hudalla and Helmut Wollman LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Comparing Performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia Cathy Gormley-Heenan POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS Role, Capacity and Effect Lori Plotkin Boghardt KUWAIT AMID WAR, PEACE AND REVOLUTION Paul Chaisty LEGISLATIVE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC POWER IN RUSSIA Valpy FitzGerald, Frances Stewart
  • Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service

    Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service

    Briefing June 2016 Russia's 2016 elections More of the same? SUMMARY On 18 September, 2016 Russians will elect representatives at federal, regional and municipal level, including most importantly to the State Duma (lower house of parliament). President Vladimir Putin remains popular, with over 80% of Russians approving of his presidency. However, the country is undergoing a prolonged economic recession and a growing number of Russians feel it is going in the wrong direction. Support for Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and ruling party United Russia has declined in recent months. Nevertheless, United Russia is likely to hold onto, and even increase its parliamentary majority, given the lack of credible alternatives. Of the tame opposition parties currently represented in the State Duma, polls suggest the far-right Liberal Democrats will do well, overtaking the Communists to become the largest opposition party. Outside the State Duma, opposition to Putin's regime is led by liberal opposition parties Yabloko and PARNAS. Deeply unpopular and disunited, these parties have little chance of breaking through the 5% electoral threshold. To avoid a repeat of the 2011–2012 post-election protests, authorities may try to prevent the blatant vote-rigging which triggered them. Nevertheless, favourable media coverage, United Russia's deep pockets and changes to electoral legislation (for example, the re-introduction of single-member districts) will give the ruling party a strong head-start. In this briefing: What elections will be held in Russia? Which parties will take part? Will elections be transparent and credible? The State Duma – the lower house of Russia's parliament.
  • Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration?

    Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration?

    RUSSIA AND ARMS CONTROL: ARE THERE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION? Stephen J. Blank March 2009 Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publication enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts.
  • Russia Selective Capitalism and Kleptocracy

    Russia Selective Capitalism and Kleptocracy

    21st Century Authoritarians Freedom House Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Radio Free Asia JUNE 2009 FFH_UD7.inddH_UD7.indd iiiiii 55/22/09/22/09 111:221:22 AAMM RUSSIA SELECTIVE CAPITALISM AND KLEPTOCRACY Daniel Kimmage The Kremlin deploys the conceptual vocabulary of the new Russia—national renewal, anti-Western xenophobia, sovereign democracy—through a sophis- ticated domestic communications strategy that marshals both the traditional state resources and much-expanded control over virtually all mainstream mass media. This one-two punch, coming amid a period of rising prosperity, has had a signifi cant impact on popular opinion, and the Kremlin’s message has resonated with its intended recipients. introduction When Russian tanks halted their advance a few kilometers from Tbilisi in August 2008, with the Georgian army in full fl ight and Georgia’s allies in Europe and the United States reduced to fulmination, the global consensus on the meaning of the invasion was swift and bracing: Russia was back, a force to be reckoned with, and intent on reclaiming its lost share of import and infl uence among nations. This consensus is as wrongheaded and simplistic as the previous incarnations of con- ventional wisdom it has replaced: fi rst, that Russia was engaged in a rollicking, rollercoaster transition from communist torpor to liberal democracy and a free-market economy, and then, when that fi ne vision foundered in fi nancial crisis and sundry misadventures toward the end of the 1990s, that Russia had become mired in some intermediary phase of its supposed transition and might soon slink off history’s grand stage altogether.
  • “Sovereign Democracy” and Civil Society in Putin's Russia

    “Sovereign Democracy” and Civil Society in Putin's Russia

    CEERS Working Papers 1/2021 https://doi.org/10.47669/CEERS-1-2021 Managing Society: “Sovereign democracy” and Civil Society in Putin’s Russia Aram TERZYAN* This paper explores the interplay between “sovereign democracy” and civil society in Putin’s Russia, with a focus on the challenges of a vibrant civil society emergence. While a vibrant civil society is largely viewed as a key component of a democratic society and a crucial instrument for political change, the Russian civil society organizations have been characterized by organizational weakness, and marginality in terms of their social base, financial assets and influence over policy making (Evans, 2011, p. 46). Evans (2011) notes that this picture has much to do with the cultural legacy of the Soviet system with pervasive distrust of social organizations and even of the whole public sphere (p. 46). Indeed, it has not been uncommon for post-Soviet societies to perceive civic associations as threat to the power and stability of the state together with the conviction that the state bears the responsibility for the wellbeing of the Society. Meanwhile, the Putin regime has further reinforced such perceptions to thwart civic activism and prevent it from evolving into an issue-specific, value- driven and a robust civil society. * Aram Terzyan, PhD is research director of Los Angeles-based Center for East European and Russian Studies of Eurasia Institutes. Email: [email protected] . 1 CEERS Working Papers | 2021 – number 1 | eurasiainstitutes.org | DOI: 10.47669/CEERS-1-2021 In Russia, mistrust in NGOs is widespread. Only one third of the population trusts at least one sort of NGO, while only 8.9% trust civil society as a whole (Stewart and Dollbaum, 2017).
  • Putin's Youth

    Putin's Youth

    Putin’s Youth: Nashi and the Pro-Regime Youth Movement in Russia, 2000-2012 Angela Lee Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors in History May 2013 © 2013 Angela Lee Table of Contents page I. Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………………iii II. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………1 III. Background: The Komsomol, 1918-1991 ……………………….………………...…………4 IV. Chapter 1: Idushchie Vmeste, 2000-2005……………………………………...……………17 V. Chapter 2: Nashi Emerges, 2005-2008………………………………….…………………..31 VI. Chapter 3: Nashi Recedes, 2008-2012…………………………….………………………...55 VII. Conclusion.…………………………………………………………………………………..66 VIII. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………69 ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Nina Tumarkin for her patience, sound guidance, and endlessly good humor. I would also like to thank all my History professors at Wellesley for their dedication to teaching and their passion for the subject, and also to the Russian Language Department for making the process of learning Russian a joy during this past year. I am grateful to those who were part of the History Honors Thesis Seminar for the rich discussions and thought-provoking questions. I am thankful to Professors Mark Kramer, Ivan Kurilla, Valerie Sperling, and Elizabeth Wood for their willingness to direct me to the right sources for my research. And finally, I am indebted to the love and support of my parents and siblings for all these years. iii Introduction “The question for Russia now is what to do next. How can we make the new, market
  • THE DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM and DEMOCRACY in FRANCE and RUSSIA by Cole Joseph Harvey Submitted to the Dean of T

    THE DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM and DEMOCRACY in FRANCE and RUSSIA by Cole Joseph Harvey Submitted to the Dean of T

    THE DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA By Cole Joseph Harvey Submitted to the Dean of the University Honors College In partial fulfillment Of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh i 2008 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH UNIVERSITY HONORS COLLEGE This thesis was presented by Cole J. Harvey It was defended on July 14, 2008 and approved by Dr. Ronald Linden, PhD., Department of Political Science Dr. Alberta Sbragia, PhD., Department of Political Science Dr. Thomas Remington, PhD., Department of Political Science, Emory University Thesis Advisor: Dr. Jonathan Harris, PhD., Department of Political Science ii Copyright © by Cole J. Harvey 2008 iii The Double-Headed Eagle: Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy in France and Russia Cole J. Harvey University of Pittsburgh, 2008 It has become a commonplace observation in recent years that Russian democracy is in remission. Indeed there is a significant difference between the struggling democratic performance of Russia and that of a consolidated democracy such as France. The modern French and Russian states are both semi-presidential states, meaning that in each country executive power is shared between an elected president and an appointed prime minister who can (at least in theory) be voted out of office by the legislature. Despite this broad similarity, semi- presidential institutions are organized in significantly different ways in each country. This paper examines those differences in order to understand how they can help account for poor democratic performance in Russia and strong democratic performance in France. Four political institutions will be examined in each country: presidents, prime ministers, parliaments, and political parties.
  • Human Rights in Russia: an Overview

    Human Rights in Russia: an Overview

    HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA: AN OVERVIEW HEARING BEFORE THE TOM LANTOS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MAY 6, 2010 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.tlhrc.house.gov TOM LANTOS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts, Cochairman FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia, Cochairman JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey DONNA EDWARDS, Maryland JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota TRENT FRANKS, Arizona TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin AHN “JOSEPH” CAO, Louisiana HANS J. HOGREFE , Democratic Staff Director ELIZABETH HOFFMAN , Republican Staff Director LARS DE GIER , Fellow ALLISON McGUIRE , Fellow ALISON MUELLER , Fellow LESLIE DUDDEN , Intern II C O N T E N T S WITNESSES Karinna Moskalenko, Founder and Director of the International Protection Center in Russia ................................................................. 4 Professor Paul Goble, Director of Research and Publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy ................................................. 10 William Browder, Chief Executive Director of Hermitage Capital Management Ltd. ........................................................................... 15 Tanya Lokshina, Deputy Director Human Rights Watch, Moscow Office............................................................................................. 38 Sam Patten, Senior Program Manager, Eurasia at Freedom House .......................................................................................................