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China's Great Propaganda Campaign During the COVID-19 Pandemic

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China's Great Propaganda Campaign During the COVID-19 Pandemic China's Great Propaganda Campaign During the COVID-19 Pandemic Alison Hsiao and Olivia Yang Summary Infected cases of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) as of July 23 have reached above 14.9 million with over 600,000 deaths globally. While the origin of the novel coronavirus remains under investigation, the epidemic was first reported in Wuhan, a city in central China. However, instead of alerting the global community in the early stages of the outbreak, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government under the lead of Communist Party of China General- Secretary Xi Jinping sought not only to cover-up the severity of the coronavirus, but also seize the opportunity to carry out a great propaganda campaign targeting both its citizens and the international community. The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy has compiled PRC government statements, news reports, and social media posts since the COVID-19 outbreak, and identified four main stages in China’s latest propaganda campaign: downplaying the severity of COVID-19, shifting responsibility, China being the savior, and the “shared fate” narrative. This report will demonstrate and analyze the components of each stage to shed light on the PRC government’s orchestration of a propaganda campaign amid the COVID-19 global health crisis. 1 Background: The start of the COVID-19 pandemic Awareness of a novel coronavirus started growing when Chinese Dr. Li Wenliang on December 30, 2019 sent a message in a WeChat group warning fellow doctors about a SARS-like virus among patients and urged them to wear protective gear to avoid infection. That very night, two official documents issued by the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission started circulating on the internet. The documents claimed that cases of an unknown pneumonia virus had started appearing from the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, a wet market in Wuhan, China. (Photo Caption: Chinese Dr. Li Wenliang on Dec. 30, 2019 sent a message in a WeChat group warning fellow doctors about a SARS-like virus among patients. / Photo Credit: Screenshot from Weibo.) The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission on December 31, 2019 issued a press release on its website revealing information regarding 27 infected cases of the unknown pneumonia. The press release claimed that all 27 cases were being treated in isolation and there were “so far no obvious signs of person-to-person transmission.” On January 1, the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market was temporarily closed. 2 China Central Television (CCTV), the primary Chinese state broadcaster, on January 3 reported that police had contacted eight people in Wuhan who had spread rumors about a new pneumonia, including Li. The doctor on the same day was summoned to the Public Security Bureau — a local police station — where he was told to sign a “letter of admonition” which accused Li of "making false comments" that had "severely disturbed the social order." The letter warned Li that he would be “punished by the law” if he continued conducting such “illegal activity.” The doctor signed and fingerprinted the letter which he would take to his deathbed on February 7, after contracting the virus he alerted his colleagues of. The virus was later coined officially as Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), an infectious disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). (Photo Caption: Dr. Li’s “letter of admonition.” / Photo Credit: Screenshot from Weibo.) In months following Li’s warning, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government would 3 launch a great propaganda campaign of four phases which this report will analyze. 1. Downplaying the severity of COVID-19 Though the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government’s awareness of the new coronavirus can be traced back to late December, it refused to acknowledge the severity of the virus, especially the possibility of human-to-human transmission, during the early stages of the epidemic. This downplay would be reinforced through state media, social media, and government statements. The PRC government consistently gave vague responses regarding person-to-person transmission of the “unknown pneumonia” after it first publicly addressed the “unknown pneumonia” on December 31, 2019. Wuhan Municipal Health Commission reports from January 6 to January 17 claimed there had not been an increase in the number of infected cases (standing at 59 cases since January 5). The commission also emphasized in multiple reports during this period that “no evidence of obvious human-to-human transmission” had been found. However, infected cases had been confirmed around January 12 in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzeng, with the patients having no contact history with the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. The Global Times, a state-owned English-language newspaper, on January 19 ran an article with the headline, “Wuhan virus preventable, controllable: commission.” The article assured that the coronavirus was under control, according to the National Health Commission. It also quoted Zhou Zijun, a professor at Peking University's school of public health, saying “the SARS virus and the new coronavirus do not share much in terms of medical pathology,” “the coronavirus in Wuhan appears to be far less serious than the virus that caused the SARS or the Middle East respiratory syndrome, known as MERS,” and “the coronavirus was not spreading as rapidly, and the death rate was not as high.” The following day, on January 20, Dr. Zhong Nanshan, a respiratory expert and head of China’s 4 National Health Commission team investigating the outbreak, confirmed in an interview with China Central Television that there was “definitely” person-to-person transmission of the new coronavirus. Xi Jinping, general-secretary of the Communist Party of China, on the same day made his first public address of the coronavirus, emphasizing “the strengthening of leading the conversation” and “maintaining social stability” while “strictly controlling the outbreak.” Jumping ahead of time, it was on May 8 reported in German publication Der Spiegel, which cited intelligence from Germany’s federal intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), that Xi in a January 21 conversation with World Health Organization (WHO) Director- General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus pressured the organization to “delay a global warning” about the coronavirus outbreak and “hold back information on human-to-human transmission of the virus.” The WHO on May 9 released a statement calling the allegations “unfounded and untrue.” The statement also included a note saying, “China confirmed human-to- human transmission of the novel coronavirus on 20 January.” Following Xi first public address of the coronavirus on January 20, the WHO on January 22 released a statement saying on a field visit to Wuhan from January 20 to January 21 to investigate COVID-19, the delegation found that a “new test kit nationally suggests that human- to-human transmission is taking place in Wuhan.” China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian on the same day made his first mention of “Wuhan pneumonia” on his Twitter account. Zhao claimed that “Chinese society made a big step forward compared to SARS outbreak in 2003” and “news of Wuhan pneumonia was reported earlier” which promoted “understanding of the pneumonia.” Zhao also re-tweeted China Ambassador to India Sun Weidong’s post saying, “#China will continue to deepen international cooperation and work in concert with the international community to deal with the epidemic and safeguard regional and global health security.” Early next morning, on January 23, Wuhan City announced lockdown. 5 On January 28, WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus met with Xi Jinping in Beijing and exchanged information regarding the novel coronavirus. Xi said in his remarks, “Chinese government has released information about the epidemic in a timely, open, transparent and responsible manner, responded to concerns of all sides actively, and enhanced cooperation with the international community.” In his remarks, Tedros said the WHO “appreciate the seriousness with which China is taking this outbreak, especially the commitment from top leadership, and the transparency they have demonstrated, including sharing data and genetic sequence of the virus.” The WHO director- general also said “China's measures are not only protecting its people, but also protecting the people in the whole world,” according to a PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release. Two days after the meeting in Beijing, the WHO on January 30 declared the COVID-19 outbreak constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). However, members of the WHO Emergency Committee did not recommend “any travel or trade restriction based on the current information available.” The committee “emphasized that the declaration of a PHEIC should be seen in the spirit of support and appreciation for China, its people, and the actions China has taken on the frontlines of this outbreak, with transparency, and, it is to be hoped, with success.” China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian also posted multiple tweets in late January sharing China’s success and efficiency in building hospitals within days to control the epidemic. It is also worth noting Xi Jinping on February 3 gave an internal speech regarding the COVID-19 outbreak to the Politburo Standing Committee, the core leadership of the Communist Part of China, which was later made public on February 8 through Chinese state media. Xi said, “Propaganda work must be strengthened. We must coordinate online and offline, domestic and international, small and major news, to warm and unite people’s hearts, to better maintain social stability.” 6 “We should actively respond to international concerns, tell the story of China’s fight against the epidemic well, to show the spirit of the Chinese people’s unity and mutual help,” said the PRC general secretary. With other countries expressing their concern about the novel coronavirus, the PRC government was quick to “reassure” the global community of the severity of COVID-19.
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