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Ms. Buratti Francesca CHINA BLUF ASSESMENT N.1 MAY 2021 Executive summary The China BLUF Assessment from May 2021 confirms that the Chinese Communist Party’s comprehensive military modernization and expansion program is proceeding steadily. Relevant advancements from this month includes a live fire- exercise using new military capabilities and the testing of a new missile system from the military standpoint; on the other hand, the launch into Mars of a heavy rocket, which marks the first step in the construction of the China Space Station (CSS) is the highlight in the technological domain. Such events open reflections to better understand the China Military- Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, with special attention to be given to AI and EDT capabilities. This month’s monitoring also shows evidence of the Chinese increasingly aggressive foreign policy and of its assertive behavior aimed at threatening the safety of Beijing’s neighbors, as well as that of US’ partners. China’s role in the Gaza crises is identified as a political opportunity to bolster Beijing national interests and a wakeup call to better understand the wider Chinese strategy in the Middle East. Further, US withdrawal from Afghanistan opens reflections about China’s future role in the country and the implications of military scenarios that might define the post-US era. China's rapprochement with South Korea also deserves attention, as well as Beijing’s strategy towards the small Indo-Pacific Islands. In conclusion, latest development upholds how China’s wolf warrior diplomacy is undermining the western international order and its liberal values. Special focus is given to Beijing military aid in Africa in the aftermath of COVID; to China’s cooperation with countries that are showing reluctance over the QUAD in Asia, and to China’s anti-western maneuvers within the UN Security Council, including those related to Beijing’s increasingly alignment with Russia. Thematic assessment: Diplomacy 1. China keeps on taking advantage of its role within the United Nations’ Security Council to counter the west. China has been highly active within the United Nations throughout the month of May 2021. Beijing has initiated three signature events within the UN Security Council: a high-level briefing on “Upholding multilateralism and the United Nations centered international system”; a high-level open debate on “Addressing the root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa” and an open debate on “Improving the Safety and Security of Peacekeepers”.1 Further, China has hosted an Arria-formula Meeting2 on the impact of emerging technologies on international peace and security. According to the UN Security Council’s Monthly Forecast from May 2021, China’s focus on the peacekeeping issue is the reflection of its primary role as UN peacekeeper contributor (ninth in the category). On the other hand, it is recalled how the Arria-forumla meetings are becoming battleground for alternative narratives promoted primarily by China and Russia, on the one hand, and the P3 (France, the UK and the US) on the other. 3 1 Security Council Report Monthly Forecast, May 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2021-05/overview-31.php 2 An "Arria formula" meeting is an informal meeting of members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which must be convened by a member of the UNSC in order for the meeting to take place 3 Security Council Report Monthly Forecast, May 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2021-05/overview-31.php NOT CLASSIFIED 2. China’s wolf warrior diplomacy is becoming assertive in Africa and the continent is now the major recipient of the PLA’s military diplomacy. The interest over Africa is also in line with China’s foreign policy. Beijing interests in the Continent picked in the last years. In Africa, as well as in other part of the world, China has used the narrative to present itself as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ that sought to promote through its civilian (and military) aid diplomacy. China has been highly active in aiding Africa throughout the COVID crisis and is now evolving its diplomacy in the aftermath of the pandemic, from diplomatic visits to vaccines. On May 25th, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended and addressed the reception celebrating the 58th Africa Day, elaborating China-Africa friendship and cooperation from various aspects. According to the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian, China put forward four proposals, including one aimed at working together to quickly defeat the COVID-19 epidemic with mutual assistance, to pursue common development and advance practical cooperation in a steady and sustained manner, and to uphold fairness and justice and strengthen coordination and cooperation in international affairs.4 An interesting report from the IISS from this month, provides valuable insights on this matter, by assessing the evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy. In February 2021, the PLA began to donate COVID-19 vaccines to overseas militaries. Between March 2020 and April 2021, the PLA has provided military medical assistance or donations to 56 countries around the world, and a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In all but two cases, the PLA’s medical diplomatic activities were directed at countries belonging to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Geographically, the PLA mostly engaged with countries in the Asia–Pacific and Africa.5 Some assumptions from this analysis deserves NATO’s attention: the PLA’s military diplomatic activities relating to the coronavirus demonstrate that the PLA will increasingly play a greater role in China’s foreign diplomacy, in line with President Xi’s strategy; in addition, it is worth noting that little mention of the BRI’s Health Silk Road has been made through the narratives around the PLA’s military diplomacy related to COVID-19. This should be framed as Beijing’s intention to separate the PLA from the BRI, to avoid militarizing the narrative of China’s foreign policy. Interestingly, the International Federation of Journalist has also raised its voice on China’s tactic propaganda during COVID-19, by arguing, in a May Report, that Beijing has taken a more assertive and interventionist approach in shaping the Covid-19 narrative, conducting coordinated disinformation and misinformation campaigns across social media platforms at the very highest level. It is also recalled that China has both used the Covid-19 outbreak to burnish its own global image and further entrench its influence in the global media ecosystem.6 Military domain 3. China has conducted a live fire-exercise using new military capabilities and has tested a new missile system. Throughout the months of April and May China has conducted a live-fire exercise and has announced the expansion of the Aviation Industry Corporation. The exercise has been conducted using the new lightweight 122 mm self-propelled howitzer (SPH), which is being commonly referred to as PCL-171. Footage released on 23 April by China Central Television’s (CCTV’s) ‘Military Report’ program shows at least six examples of the SPH, which is based on a modified Dongfeng Mengshi 6×6 CTL181A, being deployed by a light combined arms brigade within the PLAGF’s 72nd Group Army at an undisclosed location in China. 7 Further, on April 27th, The Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) has released a strategy for its expansion. AVIC said in a recent press release that its development plans are aligned with Beijing’s 14th Five Year Plan (FYP), which runs 2021–25, and the country’s medium and long-term science and technology plan (MLP), which covers 2021–35.8 In addition, the South China Morning Post reports that the Chinese air force allowed the testing of a newly commissioned missile system, including electromagnetic interference to challenge the missile type. The exercise, according to state 4 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on May 26, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1878751.shtml 5 The evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy: from visits to vaccines, IISS Research Paper, 11 May 2021 6 China: The Covid-19 Story: Unmasking China’s Global Strategy, IFJ, https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/china- the-covid-19-story-unmasking-chinas-global-strategy.html 7Latest reporting on Chinese military and security affairs, Janes, https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence/janes-reporting-china 8 Latest reporting on Chinese military and security affairs, Janes, https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence/janes-reporting-china NOT CLASSIFIED media, involved the upgraded HQ-9B, a new vertical launch, medium and long-range ground-to-air missile defense system to intercept airborne targets up to 250km. 9 4. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) has released a draft report on the China’s defense posture. This month, The Chinese’s military has been in the spotlight of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA), which on May 16th , during the official Spring Session, discussed the preliminary draft report on “China’s defence posture: implications for NATO”.10 The report is highly detailed and must be read ahead of the coming NATO Summit. It reviews the dynamic of Chinese military modernization as a means for Beijing to defend its expanding global interests. As the draft analysis underlines, China’s military ambitions will likely increasingly impose upon Allied interests in three principal (and essential)
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