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Home , Missile defense, Space propaganda, Wolf warrior diplomacy, Zhao Lijian

Ms. Buratti Francesca BLUF ASSESMENT N.1 MAY 2021

Executive summary

The China BLUF Assessment from May 2021 confirms that the ’s comprehensive military modernization and expansion program is proceeding steadily. Relevant advancements from this month includes a live fire- exercise using new military capabilities and the testing of a new system from the military standpoint; on the other hand, the launch into Mars of a heavy , which marks the first step in the construction of the China Space Station (CSS) is the highlight in the technological domain. Such events open reflections to better understand the China Military- Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, with special attention to be given to AI and EDT capabilities.

This month’s monitoring also shows evidence of the Chinese increasingly aggressive foreign policy and of its assertive behavior aimed at threatening the safety of Beijing’s neighbors, as well as that of US’ partners. China’s role in the Gaza crises is identified as a political opportunity to bolster Beijing national interests and a wakeup call to better understand the wider Chinese strategy in the Middle East. Further, US withdrawal from opens reflections about China’s future role in the country and the implications of military scenarios that might define the post-US era. China's rapprochement with South Korea also deserves attention, as well as Beijing’s strategy towards the small Indo-Pacific Islands.

In conclusion, latest development upholds how China’s wolf warrior is undermining the western international order and its liberal values. Special focus is given to Beijing military aid in Africa in the aftermath of COVID; to China’s cooperation with countries that are showing reluctance over the QUAD in Asia, and to China’s anti-western maneuvers within the UN Security Council, including those related to Beijing’s increasingly alignment with .

Thematic assessment:

Diplomacy

1. China keeps on taking advantage of its role within the United Nations’ Security Council to counter the west. China has been highly active within the United Nations throughout the month of May 2021. Beijing has initiated three signature events within the UN Security Council: a high-level briefing on “Upholding multilateralism and the United Nations centered international system”; a high-level open debate on “Addressing the root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa” and an open debate on “Improving the Safety and Security of Peacekeepers”.1 Further, China has hosted an Arria-formula Meeting2 on the impact of emerging technologies on international peace and security. According to the UN Security Council’s Monthly Forecast from May 2021, China’s focus on the peacekeeping issue is the reflection of its primary role as UN peacekeeper contributor (ninth in the category). On the other hand, it is recalled how the Arria-forumla meetings are becoming battleground for alternative narratives promoted primarily by China and Russia, on the one hand, and the P3 (France, the UK and the US) on the other. 3

1 Security Council Report Monthly Forecast, May 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2021-05/overview-31.php 2 An "Arria formula" meeting is an informal meeting of members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which must be convened by a member of the UNSC in order for the meeting to take place 3 Security Council Report Monthly Forecast, May 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2021-05/overview-31.php

NOT CLASSIFIED 2. China’s is becoming assertive in Africa and the continent is now the major recipient of the PLA’s military diplomacy. The interest over Africa is also in line with China’s foreign policy. Beijing interests in the Continent picked in the last years. In Africa, as well as in other part of the world, China has used the narrative to present itself as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ that sought to promote through its civilian (and military) aid diplomacy. China has been highly active in aiding Africa throughout the COVID crisis and is now evolving its diplomacy in the aftermath of the pandemic, from diplomatic visits to vaccines. On May 25th, State Councilor and Wang Yi attended and addressed the reception celebrating the 58th Africa Day, elaborating China-Africa friendship and cooperation from various aspects. According to the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lijian, China put forward four proposals, including one aimed at working together to quickly defeat the COVID-19 epidemic with mutual assistance, to pursue common development and advance practical cooperation in a steady and sustained manner, and to uphold fairness and justice and strengthen coordination and cooperation in international affairs.4

An interesting report from the IISS from this month, provides valuable insights on this matter, by assessing the evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy. In February 2021, the PLA began to donate COVID-19 vaccines to overseas militaries. Between March 2020 and April 2021, the PLA has provided military medical assistance or donations to 56 countries around the world, and a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In all but two cases, the PLA’s medical diplomatic activities were directed at countries belonging to the (BRI). Geographically, the PLA mostly engaged with countries in the Asia–Pacific and Africa.5 Some assumptions from this analysis deserves NATO’s attention: the PLA’s military diplomatic activities relating to the coronavirus demonstrate that the PLA will increasingly play a greater role in China’s foreign diplomacy, in line with President Xi’s strategy; in addition, it is worth noting that little mention of the BRI’s Health Silk Road has been made through the narratives around the PLA’s military diplomacy related to COVID-19. This should be framed as Beijing’s intention to separate the PLA from the BRI, to avoid militarizing the narrative of China’s foreign policy.

Interestingly, the International Federation of Journalist has also raised its voice on China’s tactic during COVID-19, by arguing, in a May Report, that Beijing has taken a more assertive and interventionist approach in shaping the Covid-19 narrative, conducting coordinated disinformation and misinformation campaigns across social media platforms at the very highest level. It is also recalled that China has both used the Covid-19 outbreak to burnish its own global image and further entrench its influence in the global media ecosystem.6

Military domain

3. China has conducted a live fire-exercise using new military capabilities and has tested a new missile system. Throughout the months of April and May China has conducted a live-fire exercise and has announced the expansion of the Aviation Industry Corporation. The exercise has been conducted using the new lightweight 122 mm self-propelled howitzer (SPH), which is being commonly referred to as PCL-171. Footage released on 23 April by China Central Television’s (CCTV’s) ‘Military Report’ program shows at least six examples of the SPH, which is based on a modified Dongfeng Mengshi 6×6 CTL181A, being deployed by a light combined arms brigade within the PLAGF’s 72nd Group Army at an undisclosed location in China. 7 Further, on April 27th, The Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) has released a strategy for its expansion. AVIC said in a recent press release that its development plans are aligned with Beijing’s 14th Five Year Plan (FYP), which runs 2021–25, and the country’s medium and long-term science and technology plan (MLP), which covers 2021–35.8 In addition, the reports that the Chinese air force allowed the testing of a newly commissioned missile system, including electromagnetic interference to challenge the missile type. The exercise, according to state

4 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 's Regular Press Conference on May 26, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1878751.shtml 5 The evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy: from visits to vaccines, IISS Research Paper, 11 May 2021 6 China: The Covid-19 Story: Unmasking China’s Global Strategy, IFJ, https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/china- the-covid-19-story-unmasking-chinas-global-strategy.html 7Latest reporting on Chinese military and security affairs, Janes, https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence/janes-reporting-china 8 Latest reporting on Chinese military and security affairs, Janes, https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence/janes-reporting-china NOT CLASSIFIED media, involved the upgraded HQ-9B, a new vertical launch, medium and long-range ground-to-air system to intercept airborne targets up to 250km. 9

4. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) has released a draft report on the China’s defense posture. This month, The Chinese’s military has been in the spotlight of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA), which on May 16th , during the official Spring Session, discussed the preliminary draft report on “China’s defence posture: implications for NATO”.10 The report is highly detailed and must be read ahead of the coming NATO . It reviews the dynamic of Chinese military modernization as a means for Beijing to defend its expanding global interests. As the draft analysis underlines, China’s military ambitions will likely increasingly impose upon Allied interests in three principal (and essential) domains – sea, space, and cyber. The report also makes it clear that China’s military, foreign, and economic policies are increasingly entwined and provides clarification regarding ’s ambition of a modern PLA articulated by three military goals: mechanisation, informationsation, and intelligentisation. Worth considering are the recommendations made for NATO parliamentarians and governments: a strong political statement about what the Alliance stands for, rather than against, in the upcoming NATO 2030 initiative and Strategic Concept review, to position the Alliance in a world with a globally strong China; stronger inter-Allied and partner cooperation to garner a clearer picture of the size and scope of the China challenge in all domains; the expansion of NATO-China political and military contact; the identification of Allied strategic vulnerabilities.

Technology Domain

5. China has successfully put its Tianwen-1 mission in orbit around Mars, thus giving birth to a new era in . The main event worthy of attention this month, related to China’s technological development, is the launch into low earth orbit of the Long March 5B heavy rocket, the Tianhe 1 core module of China’s space station, on April 29. 11This event marks the first step in the construction of the China Space Station (CSS).12 On May 15th the Xinhua News Agency, has published President Xi’s congratulatory message full text, delivered in the aftermath of the event. 13The communication was released with the usual tone of the Chinese propaganda, recalling that China’s exploration of Mars is a noble cause aimed at discovering the mysteries of the universe and at promoting the peace and development of mankind. As the Chinese State Council’s 2016 white paper on space calls for China to become “a space power in all respects”, it is evident that NATO’s Allies and Partners are set to experience growing competition with Beijing in space. Chinese program has growth at a rapid pace in the last years, in terms of capabilities and aspirations.

The United States have been concerned both from scientific competition and from the civil-military intertwining of China's space projects, so are NATO’s Allies and Partners. Special concern is addressed to the anti- capabilities (ASAT). The NPA Defence And Security Committee (Dsc)’S report provides food-for thoughts on the impact that such capabilities have on arms control. The paper explains how anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons could undermine the modern military function, by deploying “non-kinetic” space weapons which utilize cyberattacks and robotic arms. In a nuclear crisis – or any other crisis between ASAT-armed militaries –summarize the report, the first use of ASAT systems to “blind” adversary C4ISR could severely undermine strategic stability and result in nuclear escalation.14

The dual use of China’s space programs is anything but unreal: Beijing considers space capabilities as vital to its plans for future power projection and its ability to defeat adversaries with high-tech capabilities. According to an October 2020

9 China puts upgraded HQ-9 missile system to extreme test, South China Morning Post, 21 May 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3134360/china-puts-upgraded-hq-9-missile-system-extreme-test 10CHINA’S DEFENCE POSTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO, NATO Parliamentary Assembly Preliminary Draft Report, May 2021 https://www.nato- pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-05/015%20DSCFC%2021%20E%20-%20CHINA%20-%20MARTINHO.pdf 11Tianhe Launch Marks a Key Step in China’s Growing Space Ambitions, The Jamestown Foundation, 7 May21, https://jamestown.org/program/tianhe- launch-marks-a-key-step-in-chinas-growing-space-ambitions/ 12China lands rover on Mars for the first time, Financial Times, 15 May21, https://www.ft.com/content/9dc0a641-fa34-4185-8d8f-a52764e9cfc3 13 Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping congratulating message for the Tianwen-1 landing on Mars,Source: http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2021- 05/15/content_4885445.htm 14 INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: CHALLENGES AHEAD, NATO PA, Preliminary Draft General Report, 17 March 2021, https://www.nato- pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-04/014%20DSC%2021%20E%20-%20ARMS%20CONTROL%20-%20PERRIN_3.pdf NOT CLASSIFIED report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), China’s military has designated outer space as a warfighting domain that it must fight for – and seize – if it is to win future wars.15

NATO should also be alert of China-Russia cooperation in space. Beijing is pushing Russia deeper into its geopolitical orbit. As evidence, in March 2021, Beijing and Moscow inked a cooperation agreement to construct an international lunar scientific research station. 16

6. China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy is particularly concerning in the field of AI and EDT. China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy final goal is to make the country an economic and military superpower at the same time.

Space technology is only the top of the iceberg. Artificial technology (AI) and emerging technology (EDT) are two additional fundamental components. Beijing is particularly interested in the development of AI, which it sees as key to its quest to become a “world-class military by 2049”. In April, the Chinese authorities have announced that the 14th Five- Year Plan (2021-2025) encourages the development of open-source algorithms in the context of AI innovation. The government sees open source as a strategic industrial policy tool, as well as a tool that will allow Beijing to set up an indigenous open-source community that is shielded from geopolitics and provides China’s tech industry with continuous access to key soft- and hardware.17

As stressed in a NATO PA Draft Report, China is also racing to develop key EDTs via a national technology strategy of Military-Civil Fusion.18 The report provides valuable recommendations for countering these challenges from the NATO side. It stresses the need to enhance the STO network, that allows both NATO member states and Partner nations to establish which EDTs will be crucial for future defense and security needs. Science and technology cooperation with NATO will also contribute to the early acquisition of important technologies and to ensuring technological superiority as well as the strengthening of the partnership between Partner nations and NATO. Finally, participation in the NATO STO network is an essential mechanism through which NATO and Partner scientists and researchers can build personal relationships with one another.19

Regional Assessment:

Indo-Pacific

7. China’s provocative military moves in the Indo-Pacific and the SCS have continued throughout the month of May, as well as the tension with the US. On May 4: The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has accused the China Coast Guard (CCG) of “shadowing” and “blocking” Philippine Coast Guard (PGC) vessels that were conducting what it described as “legitimate maritime patrols and training exercises” near Scarborough Shoal (between 24 and 25 April. (JANES).

On Sunday 23 the Chinese carrier Shandong and its naval support group have concluded an exercise in the South China Sea.20

15 Latest reporting on Chinese military and security affairs, Janes, https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence/janes-reporting-china 16 China’s New Space Station Is a Stepping-Stone to Achieving Broader Ambitions, CSIS, 29 April 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-space- station-stepping-stone-achieving-broader-ambitions 17 China’s Open-Source Tech Development, MERICS, May 2021, https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2021- 05/MERICS%20Primer%20Open%20Source%202021_0.pdf 18ENHANCING NATO S&T COOPERATION WITH ASIAN PARTNERS, NATO PA, Preliminary Draft General Report, April21, https://www.nato-pa.int/download- file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-04/023%20STC%2021%20E%20-%20ST%20COOPERATION%20-%20GHANI%20-%20FINAL.pdf 19 ENHANCING NATO S&T COOPERATION WITH ASIAN PARTNERS, NATO PA, Preliminary Draft General Report, April21, https://www.nato- pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-04/023%20STC%2021%20E%20-%20ST%20COOPERATION%20-%20GHANI%20-%20FINAL.pdf 20 Shandong aircraft carrier group concludes South China Sea Exercise, South China Morning Post, 2 May21, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3131977/shandong-aircraft-carrier-group-concludes-south-china-sea NOT CLASSIFIED On May 25th, the PLA protested US guided-missile destroyer’s passage through the Taiwanese Strait and accused the US of undermining peace and stability in the region.21

Further, this month the Chinese Government has reported its intention to plan and expand an airstrip on the island of Canton, part of the archipelago nation of Kiribati in the central Pacific Ocean.22

The above-mentioned events confirm an increasingly aggressive China’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific and an assertive behavior that threatens the safety of China's neighbors. Of special concern for NATO’s Allies and Partner is Beijing ’s strategy towards the small Pacific Islands: the dual use that might emerge from projects such as that one in the Canton Airport, could hamper NATO’s Allies and Partners C4ISTAR and AC/AD capabilities in the area, as well as the historically committed democratic systems of these isolated States, which have long sought to align with U.S. interests in international forums and at the United Nations. The U.S. and its partners should respond by assisting these Islands in the form of long-term relationships that protect their sovereignty and by guaranteeing the effectiveness of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.

8. Beijing is active in countering west-US/lead partnerships with an assertive wolf warrior diplomacy. China and Indonesia held a naval practice in waters off Jakarta on May 8. Military cooperation comes after China sent three ships to help in the search for the Indonesian submarine that sank in April.23 Moreover, China and ASEAN plan face-to-face talks in June, in the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of dialogue relations between China and ASEAN24. In conclusion, there has been an official renew of Ch-ROK relations, at security, economic and diplomatic level.25

9. -China tension over the South China sea created frictions. The Japanese government concerns over China's military expansion and growing activities in the East and South China seas have been reflected in an annual foreign policy report released in April. From its side Beijing accused Tokyo of stoking military tensions in the region after Japan’s announcement to speed up its military spending to counter China’s armed forces. Chinese Foreign Minister’s spokespersons declaration on this statement, reflect, if not a cooling of relations, a feeling of mistrust from Beijing: “ the Japanese side made these irresponsible remarks to blatantly advocate arms race, play up regional tensions, provoke military confrontation, and even attempt to interfere in the question and China's internal affairs. Such actions are extremely vile in nature. China is strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed to that.”26

10. China has rejected Taiwan’s participation as observer to the World Health Assembly (WHA). The Chinese General Committee and the Plenary Session of the 74th World Health Assembly (WHA) have respectively decided to reject the proposal of inviting Taiwan to participate in the WHA as observer. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian on a Press Conference held to comment the decision, used a warning language, recalling that “the Taiwan question is purely China's internal affairs that brook no foreign interference in any form. China must and will be reunified.”27 These actions are in line with China’s flexing muscles over the TW issue. Although the Taiwan’s 2021 quadrennial defense review (QDR) indicates the six-year timeline for Chinese invasion, urge a NATO Allies and Partners’ clear approach towards the Taiwan issue, in the event of a premature escalation and considering that NATO officially embraces the “One China Policy”.

21 China says U.S. threatening peace as warship transits Taiwan Strait, , 19 May21, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-warship-again- sails-through-sensitive-taiwan-strait-2021-05-18/ 22 China Wants To Revive A Strategically Located Airfield Deep In The Pacific: Report, The Drive, 6 May21, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war- zone/40471/china-wants-to-revive-a-strategically-located-military-airfield-deep-in-pacific-report 23 China and Indonesia conduct joint naval drill near Jakarta, SCMP, https://www.scmp.com/video/china/3132931/china-and-indonesia-conduct-joint- naval-drill-near-jakarta 24 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/16/c_139673342.htm 25 Fostering a high-quality partnership, , https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202105/11/WS6099c7e7a31024ad0babd104.html 26Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference, May 21, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1877667.shtml 27 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference, May 21, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1877667.shtml

NOT CLASSIFIED 11. NATO should keep monitoring China’s bilateral partnerships in the Asia-Pacific and should enhance cooperation with countries that are under Beijing’s “diplomatic attack”. This monthly monitoring of China’s diplomatic engagement in the Indo-Pacific gives proof of the China’s raising concern towards the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), supported by the United States, Japan, , and Australia. While publicly refusing to admit of being intimidated by this platform, it is safe to argue that Beijing is concerned about the expansion of what it sees as a tactic to contain its influence in the region. Therefore, China is trying to take advantage of the “strategic ambiguity” of those countries who are currently leaving pending their participation to the QUAD.

China’s effort to strengthen bilateral cooperation with the ROK in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic is just one example. The renewed progress in advancing bilateral relations with Beijing, has led Seoul to reject President Biden’s request to use a robust language in a joint statement issued during this month’s bilateral summit in Washington, as part of the US’ strategy to work with allies to counter China. More in detail, South Korea showed itself reluctant to include language about working with the “Quad”, preferring, instead, to agreeing only a passing reference in the statement, to avoid angering China.28

Another clear example is the case with India. The military clash over the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India last year is well known. The precise motive and reasons behind the escalations are less. Some experts noted that Chinese aggression occurred at a time when the U.S-India relationship was growing more aligned, and the U.S.-China relationship was rapidly deteriorating. The result has been to reinforce India’s growing ties with the United States, Japan, and Australia.29 The tensions have resumed in recent weeks: the main Indian newspaper reports that the Chinese forces are back to their traditional training areas for an exercise near Eastern Ladakh and that the Indian forces have also strengthened30 their deployment in the area, as they are keeping a close watch on the Chinese activities in the adjoining sectors.

Overall, NATO should expect an increase of China’s aggressiveness towards countries in the region that are increasing aligning with the United States. It is crucial to monitor this kind of activities and anticipate Beijing’s intention by establishing more resolute cooperation with countries in the area.

It would be particularly crucial to do so with Japan and the ROK. Japan is NATO’s longest-standing partner nation outside of the -Atlantic region. Despite this strong political relationship, however, Japan’s cooperation with NATO in military S&T has been relatively limited. In 2014, however, Japan adopted a new export control policy which enables Japan to identify and develop cooperative S&T opportunities with NATO. In this context, the Japanese Ministry of Defence established official dialogue channels with NATO and NATO member states to explore S&T cooperation opportunities on defence-related programs. Furthermore, NATO-Japan S&T cooperation has also been fruitful in the realm of cyber defences. One area of future collaboration with Tokyo could be maritime security and maritime related technologies, functional to strengthening the Alliance’s defense posture against China’s use of sophisticated means to destabilize the region (including the use of undersea autonomous drones to probe other countries’ sovereign waters).31

NATO’s relationship with the Republic of Korea is less intense than its relationship with Japan but has nonetheless been very fruitful and productive. Although not a member of the EOP programme, ROK has expressed a desire to work more closely with NATO on questions of military interoperability – especially exchanges of civilian and military personnel, joint trainings and exercises, and cooperation in standardization and logistics. Korea participates in several Multi-Year Projects (MYP) within the SPS framework. One important area of collaboration is the non-proliferation of WMD and WMD delivery systems. Cooperation with Seoul can be significantly deepened in areas of mutual interest. One clear area that ROK may be interested in would be the inclusion of more interoperability programs. Since NATO member countries purchase

28 Biden to push South Korea to take tough line on China at summit, Financial Times, 20 May 21, https://www.ft.com/content/94da1734-96b6-41a7-9da1- c30830f2cfdb 29 Positive Visions, Powerful Partnerships The Keys to Competing with China in a Post-Pandemic Indo-Pacific Stephen, CNAS, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/positive-visions-powerful-partnerships 30 Chinese Army returns to exercise areas near eastern Ladakh; Indian troops keep close watch, India Today, 18 May 2021, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/chinese-army-returns-to-exercise-areas-near-eastern-ladakh-indian-troops-keep-close-watch-1804123-2021-05-18 31 PRELIMINARY DRAFT GENERAL REPORT - ENHANCING NATO S&T COOPERATION WITH ASIAN PARTNERS, NATO PA, 2021, https://www.nato- pa.int/document/023-stc-21-e-st-cooperation-report-ghani NOT CLASSIFIED conventional military technology from ROK’s defence industry, any effort to improve standardization between ROK technologies and NATO would be of benefit to ROK’s defence industry and would also improve NATO’s own internal cohesion and integration.32

Eurasia

12. US withdrawal from Afghanistan opens reflections for China’s future role in the country. President Joe Biden’s announcement regarding the US troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in September 2021, opens for NATO serious reflections about not only the future of the country, but also on how neighbors’ powers such as China, Pakistan, , and Russia will redefine their own strategies to deal with the security vacuum that will arise in the aftermath of the US exit.

Afghanistan is a country of strategic importance for China33. Traditionally, over the years Beijing has declined to contribute with combat forces or logistical assistance to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and has refused to commit to support any NATO-led follow-on force, with the intention to avoid antagonizing the Taliban. In fact, China’s main interest is preventing Uighur and Islamic terrorist movement from using Afghanistan as a hub to conduct separatist or terrorist attack in the homeland.

On the other hand, China is, as much as NATO, interested in stability in Afghanistan, which is conducive to Chinese economic objectives. As of special interest to the Alliance is the military and strategic role that China might play in the Afghan territory after the US withdrawal, in the next months to come NATO will have to put effort in monitoring Beijing’s activities and in evaluating multiple scenarios that could arise once the US are gone. In the long run, stability in the country could enable China to open a direct route with Iran. Moreover, for Beijing more stability would enable to expand the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into Afghanistan.34 Conversely, if Afghanistan were to fall again into a spiral of war and terrorism China might decide to step up its military engagement, either by supporting a fragile Kabul government, or by strengthening its military presence across the country and the entire region, for example by setting up a naval logistic hub in the Pakistani Port of Gwadar through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Interestingly, last week, during a meeting with the Chinese in Islamabad, Prime Minister Imran Khan, reaffirmed top priority accorded by his government to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and its speedy completion of projects.35 This happens during the month that marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Pakistan.36

State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi elaborated China's position on the Afghan situation, in occasion of the second C+C5 foreign ministers meeting, held to discuss the Afghan situation and what role neighboring countries can play. China proposed an "Afghan-led and Afghan-owned" reconciliation model and recalled that the Afghan national governance structure in the future should conform to the country's unique national conditions and development needs and should not simply copy foreign models. Further, Beijing stressed that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should also play its due role for the long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan.37

One last consideration deserves attention for NATO. Beijing fears that the United States will now use the country to undermine China’s regional position and key interests. Chinese experts have analyzed how the US will continue to exert influence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal, through its sophisticated network of partnerships and relationship. Thus, they expressed concern over the US’s attempt to retain its central position in the future arrangement regarding the country.38 According to Yun Sun, director of the China Program and co-director of East Asia Program at the Stimson

32 rif.25 33 SPECIAL REPORT 2021: Afghanistan’s Year of Reckoning, Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/2021-afghanistans-year-reckoning 34 Rif. 29 35 Pakistan Committed to Speedy Completion of CPEC Projects: Imran Khan, NewsWeek Pakistan, https://www.newsweekpakistan.com/pakistan- committed-to-speedy-completion-of-cpec-projects-imran-khan/ 36Celebrating 70 Years of Pakistan-China Friendship, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1216976.shtml 37 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 's Regular Press Conference, May 12, 2021 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1875292.shtml 38Deep-sea commentary: It is true that the United States is eager to "untie", and it is false to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, https://www.163.com/dy/article/G9O98TI30512DU6N.html NOT CLASSIFIED Center, the prospect of Afghanistan becoming a battlefield for not only political influence but also security competition has grown significantly, within the framework of U.S.-China great-power competition.39

Overall, NATO should take in mind that China’s goal is to expand its influence in Afghanistan, where the Alliance has military and strategic implications. Whether one or the other scenarios outlined will occurs, it is essential that NATO ensures that the Afghanistan’s evolution post-US withdrawal will happen in line with the West’s values and interests.

13. China’s position on the Gaza crises was a political opportunity to bolster its national interests and to present itself as a responsible and moderate power in the Middle East. This month, China's position on the Gaza war was at the center of experts’ attention. Beijing has raised its voice against the US’s official human rights policy, accusing Washington of having turned a blind eye to Palestinian sufferings and even risked universal condemnation to stop the Security Council from speaking up on this.40 Further, China has been particularly though, compared to previous escalations, in condemning Israel's attacks.41

The Israel-Gaza crisis was an opportunity for China to position itself as peace broker. Further, it had the chance to elevate its moral behavior from the US with the offer to host talks between Israelis and Palestinians.

This event opens food for thought to understand the broader strategy that China is using to securing itself the role of favored partner in the Middle East. The overwhelming support given to Palestine in the United Nations Security Council could be part of Beijing's strategy to counter the United States by siding with Palestine. This would also be in line with other bilateral partnerships that China holds in the Middle East, such as those with Iran and Pakistan. However, it should be taken in consideration that the 2021 escalation is not the first occasion in which Beijing openly condemns Israelis’ attack to Gaza. A particularly good analysis from the James Town University recalls that in 2008, “China has always been a staunch supporter of the rightful cause of the Palestinians and the Mideast peace process”. By mentioning China’s Deputy ’s speech to the UN at that time: “China condemns any violence against civilians and is shocked and indignant at Israel’s attacks on UN schools, rescue vehicles, and a UN compound.”42

Furthermore, it cannot be left behind that China could have used the event for diverting media and political attention from the developments in , nor that the crisis might have been another occasion to reinforce Beijing’s tendency to hamper the US’ hegemony in the Middle East, by strengthening political ties with countries with shared interests, among them Russia, Iran, Muslim, and the Arab countries.

What NATO should focus its attention on is the greater role that China is trying to gain in the Middle East as well as its attempt to offset the US and, by extension, the Israeli influence in the region, by taking advantage of its role within the UN and other international bodies. To bolster its great-power aspirations and its position in the Middle East, as well in many other regions of the world, Beijing’s diplomacy is forging closer relations with key players and, in doing so, is challenging the status quo. Therefore, the geopolitics of China’s rise and its implications for the Arab world and the wider Middle East should be a topic of serious debate within NATO.

14. China and Russia strategic cooperation is widening. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between China and Russia. On May 18th China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that President Xi Jinping will join Russian President Vladimir Putin in witnessing the ground- breaking ceremony of the bilateral nuclear energy cooperation project on May 19. At a regular press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian noted that the event would be the first bilateral online interaction between

39 HOW CHINA VIEWS THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, War on the Rocks, 13 May 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/how-china- views-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/ 40 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference, May 14, 2021 , https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1875876.shtml 41 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference, May 17, 2021 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1876301.shtml 42 China’s Palestine Policy, China Brief, James Town Foundation, March 2009, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-palestine-policy/ NOT CLASSIFIED the two leaders in 2021 and would be significant in guiding the high-quality growth of the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in the new era.43

The cooperation in China-Russia civilian nuclear technology is clear evidence that the two countries are moving closer in the face of escalating US sanctions and restrictions. The reports that against the backdrop of an encirclement strategy by the US and its allies, the China-Russia energy cooperation will help boost the two country's energy security, and energy trade will provide more impetus to the two States' goal to further increase bilateral trade.44

Moreover, China and Russia are consolidating their alignment within the Security Council, taking advantage of their positions within the UN to counterbalance the US competing vision of multilateralism. Lats week, Foreign Minister Lavrov hailed Russia’s relations with China as “unique”, characterized by “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction45. As mentioned above, cooperation has also been strengthened in the space sector.

Outlook

15. This month monitoring of China’s military and diplomatic activities confirms a concerning trend for NATO’s Allies and Partners. Beijing aggressive foreign policy is relevant in the Asia-Pacific and is becoming increasingly assertive in the Middle East, while in Africa the analysis displays a high degree of sensitivity towards military aid and wolf warrior diplomacy. Moreover, in the short to medium term the military modernization of Chinese program in the space and the wider technological domain, clearly represent fields of competition with the West. Evidence also shows that the Sino- Russia relationship is widening and so should be NATO’s apprehension towards a Russian permanent pivot to Asia.

16. Thus far, NATO’s better approach would be strengthening partnership with countries traditionally loyal to the Alliance’s values and principles. This, as suggested in several reports, might mean both widening the cooperation that revising the partnership’s concept. The NATO 2030 Reflection Group stresses that “NATO should make more use of thematic rather only geographic groupings for advancing work on cross-cutting challenges”46. A good starting point would be, as proposed by Dot. Andrea Gilli from the NATO Defense College, to think about partnerships in terms of “security networks” (or “security complexes” if we consider the regional frameworks) rather than in terms of comprehensive approach. This scenario would guarantee more flexibility and a “security nexus” interconnected through formal or informal ties, that would produce an effect in the security domain that will mutually be beneficial for NATO and the countries and entities that engage with the Alliance47.

17. Next month NATO will be holding a crucial Summit. As recalled by Sec Gen, the NATO 2030 initiative is to prepare the Alliance for the future. This also implies the awareness that China represents both challenges and opportunities for NATO.48 It remains to be seen whether at this year’s Summit Allies will be in the position to agree a communiqué. If so, we will see agreement over a NATO 2030 agenda that will also reflect a higher degree of common understanding of the convergence of positions when it comes to the challenges posed by China and a joint perspective towards the increased global competition that affects NATO in the Asia-Pacific, North America and in .

43 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference, May 18, 2021 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1876623.shtml 44Xi, Putin to witness opening of nuclear energy project, Global Times, 18May21, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1223837.shtml 45U.S., Russia, China poke each other at U.N. Security Council, Reuters, 7 May21, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-russia-china-poke-each-other-un-security-council-2021-05-07/ 46 https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf 47 NDC RESEARCH PAPER: NATO 2030: new technologies, new conflicts, new partnerships, file:///C:/Users/utente/Downloads/NDC_RP_17.pdf 48 Press conference, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs and NATO Ministers of Defence, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_184341.htm NOT CLASSIFIED