DOCSLIB.ORG

How Hume Became a Sceptic

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
How Hume Became a Sceptic 2005 How Hume Became a Sceptic c Jennifer McRobert Contents Preface 3 Introduction 11 1 Reading Hume's Treatise 12 2 The Hume Affair 29 3 The First Enquiry 42 4 Hume and the Revolutionary Lens 63 5 Dangerous Philosophy 77 6 Edinburgh Debates the Causal Relation 92 7 Spurious Connections 111 8 The Treatise Revisited 122 9 How Hume Became a Sceptic 139 Postscript 152 Appendix 172 Notes 227 Bibliography 241 2 Preface This book tells the story of how Edinburgh philosopher, David Hume, author of one of the most important works in the history of Western philosophy, became a sceptic. The account, which begins with the 1739-40 publication of A Treatise of Human Nature, draws together two plausible, but quite different, perspectives on Hume and his philosophy. One of these perspectives is philosophical; the other historical. Considered independently, neither gets at the whole of the truth. However, when taken together, the two perspectives yield a rich account of the development of Hume's philosophy and reputation that merits our careful consideration. The first account is that Hume earned his reputation as a sceptic when he wrote and published, in 1739-40, A Treatise of Human Nature. This book, so it was claimed, rejected widely accepted tenets of metaphysics. Book I, Part IV, for example, treats of scepticism with regard to reason and the senses. There, Hume questions the presuppositions that reason supplies a foundation for causal belief, that the senses give rise to notions of independent, continued, external existences, that the soul is immaterial, and so on. To Hume's early readers, these criticisms seemed to tear at the heart of many belief systems. Indeed, Hume was well aware that a negative assessment might follow the publication of his Treatise: \I have expos'd myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and even theologians; and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I have declar'd my dis-approbation of their systems; and can I be surpriz'd, if they shou'd express a hatred of mine and of my person?" (Hume 1978: p.264) In addition to the above considerations, it should be noted that Book I of the Treatise culminates in a discussion of scepticism. There, Hume doubts whether philosophy can ever justify claims to extravagant opinion, and expresses the view that philosophy \can present us only with mild and 1 2 moderate sentiments." (Hume 1978: p.272) This tendency to doubtfulness, is, of course, characteristic of the sceptical stance. These and other examples provide ample evidence to show, it would seem, that the content of Hume's Treatise is sufficient to explain his coming to be viewed as a sceptic. According to the second account, Hume's reputation as a sceptic followed upon his effort to secure a position at what was then variously styled `Edinburgh College', `Edinburgh University' &c.. Hume's 1744-45 application failed, but the proceedings themselves led to a pronouncement on Hume and his philosophy that had a lasting effect. William Wishart, Principal of the College, wrote a letter alerting Edinburgh's Town Council against the \Heresy, Deism, Scepticism and Atheism" of Hume and his philosophy. (Stewart 2001: p.12) Several influential figures of the day, including Francis Hutcheson, Glasgow's Professor of Moral Philosophy, joined in the assessment. With evaluations such as these, Hume's candidacy would have held little appeal. In the ensuing decades, as subsequent commentators followed the lead of Hume's early critics, his reputation as a sceptic was sealed. On this second account, understanding of the development of Hume's reputation as a sceptic requires considerable attention to the nuances of historical and contextual detail. While the former account locates the source of Hume's reputation in the philosophical content of his Treatise, the latter places emphasis on historical context. Which of the two accounts is correct? Perhaps neither. Indeed, it is arguable that Hume was not really a sceptic at all. For one thing, in the \Advertisement" to his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume distanced himself from the ideas expressed in his \juvenile" Treatise. He claimed to have become \sensible of his error in going to the press too early" and to have \cast the whole anew" so that \some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression" were corrected. (Hume 1975: p.2) While it is tempting to pass off these remarks as mere irony, Hume further insists that we are to regard only his Enquiry as authoritative, writing that \Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." (Hume 1975: p.2) In addition to this public disavowal, and to other instances in which Hume appears to soften his philosophical position, there is a case to be made to the effect that, philosophically, Hume was no more a sceptic than empiricist predecessors such as John Locke and George 3 Berkeley. On this account, Hume is to be viewed as a system builder who just so happened to draw out some obvious implications in the work of his predecessors. Seen in this light, the charge that Hume was merely a convenient scapegoat - someone against whom incendiary charges could be made to stick, and who surfaced at a time and place where a scapegoat was needed - gains in plausibility. Indeed, we may go even further and ask whether Hume's reputation as a sceptic was fairly earned at all? If not, then why continue to litter his statue with construction pylons, beer cans, empty packs of cigarettes, and the like? For, in doing so, we risk repeating an injury to the most maligned and misunderstood of British philosophers. The object of this book is not to deny that Hume was a sceptic; rather, it is to investigate the historical circumstances surrounding the reception of Hume and his philosophy, with the aim of setting these circumstances against developments in Hume's philosophical position and reputation as a sceptic. As I will show, Hume's considered view, his mitigated scepticism, was barely appreciated by his early critics. While this result will not shock readers already familiar with the story of Hume and his philosophy, it is here achieved in a new way. To date, no systematic effort has been made to demonstrate the proximity of the relationship between historical circumstance, Hume's philosophical development, and the legacy of Hume's person and philosophy. The account given here demonstrates the connections between these elements, bring together historical and philosophical details in an extended analysis. Both archival and published records are used to track how Hume was singled out, charged with scepticism, denied an academic career, given a reputation - and how these circumstances, perhaps more than Hume's texts themselves, affected the interpretation of his scepticism. Ultimately, the point is to show that an adequate account of the development of Hume's reputation and philosophy requires appeal to both the philosophical and historical accounts. In other words, the correct account of how Hume became a sceptic requires that the two types of explanation, the one emphasizing philosophical analysis and the other emphasizing historical context, remain fused together. The final result is that the lines between philosophical analysis and historical context are often crossed, and the notion that philosophical inquiry stands apart from the accidental circumstances of human lives is called into question. Introduction The story of the development of Hume's reputation as a sceptic begins in January 1739, with the publication of the first two volumes of his A Treatise of Human Nature. The book, in Hume's words, fell \dead-born from the press." (Hume 1985a: p.xxxiv) Over the course of the ensuing decades, Hume's Treatise would gain a great deal of attention - though most of this attention was, unfortunately, negative. Hume anticipated this negative reception, believing that the sizeable gap between his own system of philosophy and the metaphysical prejudices of his critics would present an obstacle to the book's receiving a fair reading. In a letter to Henry Home dated 13 February 1739, he speculates that, \Those who are accustomed to reflect on such abstract subjects, are commonly full of prejudices; and those who are unprejudiced are unacquainted with metaphysical reasonings. My principles are also so remote from all the vulgar sentiments on the subject, that were they to take place, they would produce almost a total alteration in philosophy: and you know, revolutions of this kind are not easily brought about." (Greig 1969: vol.1.,p.26) Apparently then, Hume was well aware of the novelty and controversy of his own ideas. As he pointed out in the letter to Home, were his own views to be accepted, they would produce \almost a total alteration in philosophy". It is conceivable, of course, that Hume was merely blowing his own horn when he made the claim to \total alteration" - succumbing to vain ambition in a way that he would later come to regret. However, there are good reasons to suppose that he was being entirely sincere. Indeed, in the Treatise, Hume had already predicted that his radical ideas would inspire a hatred of both his system and person. (Hume 1978: p.264) But, in contrast to what did Hume's views represent such a radical alteration? Taking the above remarks as our guide, we must suppose that Hume's 4 5 views were inimical to both the abstract doctrines of the tutored and the common sense beliefs of the untutored. In other words, Hume's conclusions resembled neither those of metaphysics nor those of common sense.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mathematics Is a Gentleman's Art: Analysis and Synthesis in American College Geometry Teaching, 1790-1840 Amy K
    Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Dissertations 2000 Mathematics is a gentleman's art: Analysis and synthesis in American college geometry teaching, 1790-1840 Amy K. Ackerberg-Hastings Iowa State University Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd Part of the Higher Education and Teaching Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, and the Science and Mathematics Education Commons Recommended Citation Ackerberg-Hastings, Amy K., "Mathematics is a gentleman's art: Analysis and synthesis in American college geometry teaching, 1790-1840 " (2000). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 12669. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/12669 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margwis, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. in the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.
    [Show full text]
  • Fallibilism and Organizational Research: the Third Epistemology
    FALLIBILISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH: THE THIRD EPISTEMOLOGY Published as : Powell, T.C. 2001. Fallibilism and Organizational Research: The Third Epistemology, Journal of Management Research , 4, 201-219. Correspondence to : Thomas Powell Professor of Strategy, Oxford University Said Business School Park End Street Oxford OX2 8BZ UK [email protected] 1 FALLIBILISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH: THE THIRD EPISTEMOLOGY Abstract Epistemology is the study of knowledge - of what is known and how we know it. Organizational epistemology is dominated by the dualist opposition of objectivist and subjectivist philosophies of science. Objectivists accept knowledge claims as potentially true and warranted on objective evidence, whereas subjectivists ground knowledge in perception, phenomenology and social construction. Though these two perspectives differ in their ontologies (the reality of constructs and relations) and methodologies (how these relations can be observed), both views accept that reliable organizational knowledge is possible. This paper introduces a third epistemological perspective - fallibilism - and shows how neglect of this third epistemology has constrained advance in the objectivist-subjectivist debate. Fallibilism, which challenges the foundations and reliability of knowledge claims, occupies a significant place in every major philosophical tradition, but contradicts the prevailing rhetoric of knowledge-claiming in organizational research, and has been systematically excluded from the debate. In this article we present the foundations and precepts of fallibilism, show how its absence has invited divisive and sectarian dogmatism, and explores its potential contributions to organizational research. 2 FALLIBILISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH: THE THIRD EPISTEMOLOGY Organization and epistemology It is customary in the philosophy of social science to depict organizational epistemology as a debate between objectivist and subjectivist perspectives (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Knights, 1992).
    [Show full text]
  • Publications • Reference Works O the Routledge Companion to Evidence
    Curriculum Vitae for Trent Dougherty POSITIONS Fall 2009-Present: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, tenure track, Baylor University Trinity Term 2014 Visiting Scholar, Oxford University Spring 2014 Visiting Scholar, University of St. Andrews Fall 2011-Spring 2012 Visiting Research Professor, University of Notre Dame Fall 2008-Spring 2009 Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Saint John Fisher College, Rochester, NY (while completing PhD) EDUCATION • PhD, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, Richard Feldman, advisor, May 2009. • MA, Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia, Director Jon Kvanvig • AB, Philosophy and Classics, University of Missouri-Columbia DISSERTATION • Against Pragmatic Encroachment: A Defense of Simple Moderate Invariantism. • Committee: o Richard Feldman, Chair, Earl Conee, Greg Carlson, Chairman, Department of Linguistics, University of Rochester, Jeff Runner, Department of Linguistics, University of Rochester AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION • Epistemology/Rationality Theory (Evidence/Reasons) • Philosophy of Religion • Philosophy of Language AREAS OF COMPETENCE • Philosophy of Science • Metaphysics and Mind • Decision Theory • Applied Ethics Publications • Reference Works o The Routledge Companion to Evidence. (ed) Routledge. In progress. • Textbooks o A Critical Introduction to Justification (with Kevin McCain, Jon Matheson, and Jason Rogers). Acumen. In progress. • Edited Collections o Skeptical Theism: New Essays, (with Justin McBrayer) Oxford University Press, (2014). Edited volume of leading philosophers of religion on epistemic response to the problem of evil. o Evidentialism and Its Discontents, Oxford University Press, 2011. Edited volume of leading epistemologists on the role of evidence in epistemology. • Books o The Problem of Animal Pain: A Theodicy for All Creatures Great and Small, (2014) Palgrave MacMillan. o God and the Mystery of Evil. Under contract with OUP.
    [Show full text]
  • History of Philosophy Outlines from Wheaton College (IL)
    Property of Wheaton College. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 311 Arthur F. Holmes Office: Blanch ard E4 83 Fall, 1992 Ext. 5887 Texts W. Kaufman, Philosophical Classics (Prentice-Hall, 2nd ed., 1968) Vol. I Thales to Occam Vol. II Bacon to Kant S. Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre (McGraW Hill, 3rd ed., 1982, or 4th ed., 1988) For further reading see: F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy. A multi-volume set in the library, also in paperback in the bookstore. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Diogenes Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology A. H. Armstrong & R. A. Markus, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy A. H. Armstrong (ed.), Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy Encyclopedia of Philosophy Objectives 1. To survey the history of Western philosophy with emphasis on major men and problems, developing themes and traditions and the influence of Christianity. 2. To uncover historical connections betWeen philosophy and science, the arts, and theology. 3. To make this heritage of great minds part of one’s own thinking. 4. To develop competence in reading philosophy, to lay a foundation for understanding contemporary thought, and to prepare for more critical and constructive work. Procedure 1. The primary sources are of major importance, and you will learn to read and understand them for yourself. Outline them as you read: they provide depth of insight and involve you in dialogue with the philosophers themselves. Ask first, What does he say? The, how does this relate to What else he says, and to what his predecessors said? Then, appraise his assumptions and arguments.
    [Show full text]
  • Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations Spring 2010 Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection Jason Skirry University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Skirry, Jason, "Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection" (2010). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 179. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/179 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/179 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection Abstract This dissertation presents a unified interpretation of Malebranche’s philosophical system that is based on his Augustinian theory of the mind’s perfection, which consists in maximizing the mind’s ability to successfully access, comprehend, and follow God’s Order through practices that purify and cognitively enhance the mind’s attention. I argue that the mind’s perfection figures centrally in Malebranche’s philosophy and is the main hub that connects and reconciles the three fundamental principles of his system, namely, his occasionalism, divine illumination, and freedom. To demonstrate this, I first present, in chapter one, Malebranche’s philosophy within the historical and intellectual context of his membership in the French Oratory, arguing that the Oratory’s particular brand of Augustinianism, initiated by Cardinal Bérulle and propagated by Oratorians such as Andre Martin, is at the core of his philosophy and informs his theory of perfection. Next, in chapter two, I explicate Augustine’s own theory of perfection in order to provide an outline, and a basis of comparison, for Malebranche’s own theory of perfection.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter One Transcendentalism and the Aesthetic Critique Of
    Chapter One Transcendentalism and the Aesthetic Critique of Modernity Thinking of the aesthetic as both potentially ideological and potentially utopian allows us to understand the social implications of modern aes- thetics. The aesthetic experience can serve to evade questions of justice and equality as much as it offers the opportunity for a vision of freedom. If the Transcendentalists stand at the end of a Romantic tradition which has always been aware of the utopian dimension of the aesthetic, why should they have cherished the consolation the aesthetic experience of- fers while at the same time forfeiting its critical implications, which have been so important for the British and the early German Romantics? Is the American variety of Romanticism really much more submissive than European Romanticism with all its revolutionary fervor? Is it really true that “the writing of the Transcendentalists, and all those we may wish to consider as Romantics, did not have this revolutionary social dimension,” as Tony Tanner has suggested (1987, 38)? The Transcendentalists were critical of established religious dogma and received social conventions – so why should their aesthetics be apolitical or even adapt to dominant ideologies? In fact, the Transcendentalists were well aware of the philo- sophical and social radicalism of the aesthetic – which, however, is not to say that all of them wholeheartedly embraced it. While the Transcendentalists’ American background (New England’s Puritan legacy and the Unitarian church from which they emerged) is crucial for an understanding of their social, religious, and philosophical thought, it is worth casting an eye across the ocean to understand their concept of beauty since the Transcendentalists were also heir to a long- standing tradition of transatlantic Romanticism which addressed the re- lationship between aesthetic experience, utopia, and social criticism.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 a Tale of Two Interpretations
    Notes 1 A Tale of Two Interpretations 1. As Georges Dicker puts it, “Hume’s influence on contemporary epistemology and metaphysics is second to none ... ” (1998, ix). Note, too, that Hume’s impact extends beyond philosophy. For consider the following passage from Einstein’s letter to Moritz Schlick: Your representations that the theory of rel. [relativity] suggests itself in positivism, yet without requiring it, are also very right. In this also you saw correctly that this line of thought had a great influence on my efforts, and more specifically, E. Mach, and even more so Hume, whose Treatise of Human Nature I had studied avidly and with admiration shortly before discovering the theory of relativity. It is very possible that without these philosophical studies I would not have arrived at the solution (Einstein 1998, 161). 2. For a brief overview of Hume’s connection to naturalized epistemology, see Morris (2008, 472–3). 3. For the sake of convenience, I sometimes refer to the “traditional reading of Hume as a sceptic” as, e.g., “the sceptical reading of Hume” or simply “the sceptical reading”. Moreover, I often refer to those who read Hume as a sceptic as, e.g., “the sceptical interpreters of Hume” or “the sceptical inter- preters”. By the same token, I sometimes refer to those who read Hume as a naturalist as, e.g., “the naturalist interpreters of Hume” or simply “the natu- ralist interpreters”. And the reading that the naturalist interpreters support I refer to as, e.g., “the naturalist reading” or “the naturalist interpretation”. 4. This is not to say, though, that dissenting voices were entirely absent.
    [Show full text]
  • Theory of Knowledge in Britain from 1860 to 1950
    Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication Volume 4 200 YEARS OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY Article 5 2008 Theory Of Knowledge In Britain From 1860 To 1950 Mathieu Marion Université du Quéebec à Montréal, CA Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/biyclc This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Marion, Mathieu (2008) "Theory Of Knowledge In Britain From 1860 To 1950," Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication: Vol. 4. https://doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.129 This Proceeding of the Symposium for Cognition, Logic and Communication is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Theory of Knowledge in Britain from 1860 to 1950 2 The Baltic International Yearbook of better understood as an attempt at foisting on it readers a particular Cognition, Logic and Communication set of misconceptions. To see this, one needs only to consider the title, which is plainly misleading. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as one August 2009 Volume 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy of the possible meanings of the word ‘revolution’: pages 1-34 DOI: 10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.129 The complete overthrow of an established government or social order by those previously subject to it; an instance of MATHIEU MARION this; a forcible substitution of a new form of government.
    [Show full text]
  • An Introduction to Philosophy
    An Introduction to Philosophy W. Russ Payne Bellevue College Copyright (cc by nc 4.0) 2015 W. Russ Payne Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document with attribution under the terms of Creative Commons: Attribution Noncommercial 4.0 International or any later version of this license. A copy of the license is found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 1 Contents Introduction ………………………………………………. 3 Chapter 1: What Philosophy Is ………………………….. 5 Chapter 2: How to do Philosophy ………………….……. 11 Chapter 3: Ancient Philosophy ………………….………. 23 Chapter 4: Rationalism ………….………………….……. 38 Chapter 5: Empiricism …………………………………… 50 Chapter 6: Philosophy of Science ………………….…..… 58 Chapter 7: Philosophy of Mind …………………….……. 72 Chapter 8: Love and Happiness …………………….……. 79 Chapter 9: Meta Ethics …………………………………… 94 Chapter 10: Right Action ……………………...…………. 108 Chapter 11: Social Justice …………………………...…… 120 2 Introduction The goal of this text is to present philosophy to newcomers as a living discipline with historical roots. While a few early chapters are historically organized, my goal in the historical chapters is to trace a developmental progression of thought that introduces basic philosophical methods and frames issues that remain relevant today. Later chapters are topically organized. These include philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, areas where philosophy has shown dramatic recent progress. This text concludes with four chapters on ethics, broadly construed. I cover traditional theories of right action in the third of these. Students are first invited first to think about what is good for themselves and their relationships in a chapter of love and happiness. Next a few meta-ethical issues are considered; namely, whether they are moral truths and if so what makes them so.
    [Show full text]
  • Mary Shepherd and the Causal Relation
    Mary Shepherd and the Causal Relation The 3rd Earl of Rosebery with his family outside of Barnbougle Castle. Painted by Alexander Nasmyth in 1788. Mary Primrose is second from the right. Jennifer McRobert © 2002 Jennifer McRobert (revised February 2014) Author’s note: This manuscript was written a dozen years ago and then set aside. In February 2014, the text was lightly edited to eliminate some typos and to improve readability. There is no new research here, but the material may be of use to historians and others interested in early modern women philosophers. Contents Preface 5 Part One 7 1 God and the King: The Primrose Ancestry 8 2 A Childhood in Dalmeny 18 3 Hume and the Limits of Moderation 32 4 London, Marriage and Society 44 5 Causality and the Revolutionary Lens 54 Bibliography 66 Preface Lady Mary Shepherd (1777-1847) was born Mary Primrose, on 31 December 1777. The daughter of an Earl, she grew up on an estate near Edinburgh during the Scottish Enlightenment. Mary Shepherd's life and work were shaped in important ways by the philosophical and political controversies that arose in connection with David Hume and his philosophy. In particular, she was strongly motivated to refute the `erroneous notions’ of cause and effect advanced by Hume and his followers, which she viewed as leading to scepticism and atheism: When she undertook a public refutation of these erroneous notions of cause and effect, it must be remembered it was at a time when they were most rampant and widely spread over the northern parts of Britain in particular.
    [Show full text]
  • Seminar in Epistemology: Fallibilism (PHIL 468)
    Seminar in Epistemology: Fallibilism (PHIL 468) Professor Baron Reed Spring Quarter, 2012 office: 3-225 Kresge Hall 2-345 Kresge Hall email: [email protected] T 4:00-6:50 office hours: T/Th 12:30-1:30 and by appointment Course Description: “We are all fallibilists nowadays,” says Michael Williams. This is almost entirely true. But, despite its near-universal acceptance, fallibilism remains poorly understood. There are significant problems that follow in its wake—e.g,. the Gettier problem and the Lottery Paradox. Moreover, some philosophers claim more for knowledge than fallibilism can deliver, tying knowledge to assertion, practical rationality, and epistemic possibility. Finally, some philosophers think that the very idea of fallibilism is suspect; if the view is correct, it means “the world must do us a favor,” as John McDowell puts it. But the whole point of knowledge, one might have thought, is that it puts one in such a position that favors are not needed. In this seminar, we will investigate whether fallibilism has the resources to meet some or all of these concerns. Required Texts: Readings to be posted on Blackboard. Required Work: Work for the course will include a short paper, a presentation, a commentary on a classmate’s paper, and a final paper: 20% Short paper (4-5 pages) 20% Presentation (4-5 pages) 10% Comments (2 pages) 50% Final Paper (10 pages) Excellent class participation may also factor into the final grade. Course Policies: (1) Regular contributions to discussion will be expected. (2) Extensions must be requested before the due date.
    [Show full text]
  • Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E
    University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology 1982 Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E. Leary University of Richmond, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/psychology-faculty- publications Part of the Theory and Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Leary, David E. "Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology." In The Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth- Century Thought, edited by William Ray Woodward and Mitchell G. Ash, 17-42. New York, NY: Praeger, 1982. This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E. Leary Few thinkers in the history of Western civilization have had as broad and lasting an impact as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). This "Sage of Konigsberg" spent his entire life within the confines of East Prussia, but his thoughts traveled freely across Europe and, in time, to America, where their effects are still apparent. An untold number of analyses and commentaries have established Kant as a preeminent epistemologist, philosopher of science, moral philosopher, aestheti­ cian, and metaphysician. He is even recognized as a natural historian and cosmologist: the author of the so-called Kant-Laplace hypothesis regarding the origin of the universe. He is less often credited as a "psychologist," "anthropologist," or "philosopher of mind," to Work on this essay was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant No.
    [Show full text]