2005 How Hume Became a Sceptic c Jennifer McRobert Contents Preface 3 Introduction 11 1 Reading Hume's Treatise 12 2 The Hume Affair 29 3 The First Enquiry 42 4 Hume and the Revolutionary Lens 63 5 Dangerous Philosophy 77 6 Edinburgh Debates the Causal Relation 92 7 Spurious Connections 111 8 The Treatise Revisited 122 9 How Hume Became a Sceptic 139 Postscript 152 Appendix 172 Notes 227 Bibliography 241 2 Preface This book tells the story of how Edinburgh philosopher, David Hume, author of one of the most important works in the history of Western philosophy, became a sceptic. The account, which begins with the 1739-40 publication of A Treatise of Human Nature, draws together two plausible, but quite different, perspectives on Hume and his philosophy. One of these perspectives is philosophical; the other historical. Considered independently, neither gets at the whole of the truth. However, when taken together, the two perspectives yield a rich account of the development of Hume's philosophy and reputation that merits our careful consideration. The first account is that Hume earned his reputation as a sceptic when he wrote and published, in 1739-40, A Treatise of Human Nature. This book, so it was claimed, rejected widely accepted tenets of metaphysics. Book I, Part IV, for example, treats of scepticism with regard to reason and the senses. There, Hume questions the presuppositions that reason supplies a foundation for causal belief, that the senses give rise to notions of independent, continued, external existences, that the soul is immaterial, and so on. To Hume's early readers, these criticisms seemed to tear at the heart of many belief systems. Indeed, Hume was well aware that a negative assessment might follow the publication of his Treatise: \I have expos'd myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and even theologians; and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I have declar'd my dis-approbation of their systems; and can I be surpriz'd, if they shou'd express a hatred of mine and of my person?" (Hume 1978: p.264) In addition to the above considerations, it should be noted that Book I of the Treatise culminates in a discussion of scepticism. There, Hume doubts whether philosophy can ever justify claims to extravagant opinion, and expresses the view that philosophy \can present us only with mild and 1 2 moderate sentiments." (Hume 1978: p.272) This tendency to doubtfulness, is, of course, characteristic of the sceptical stance. These and other examples provide ample evidence to show, it would seem, that the content of Hume's Treatise is sufficient to explain his coming to be viewed as a sceptic. According to the second account, Hume's reputation as a sceptic followed upon his effort to secure a position at what was then variously styled `Edinburgh College', `Edinburgh University' &c.. Hume's 1744-45 application failed, but the proceedings themselves led to a pronouncement on Hume and his philosophy that had a lasting effect. William Wishart, Principal of the College, wrote a letter alerting Edinburgh's Town Council against the \Heresy, Deism, Scepticism and Atheism" of Hume and his philosophy. (Stewart 2001: p.12) Several influential figures of the day, including Francis Hutcheson, Glasgow's Professor of Moral Philosophy, joined in the assessment. With evaluations such as these, Hume's candidacy would have held little appeal. In the ensuing decades, as subsequent commentators followed the lead of Hume's early critics, his reputation as a sceptic was sealed. On this second account, understanding of the development of Hume's reputation as a sceptic requires considerable attention to the nuances of historical and contextual detail. While the former account locates the source of Hume's reputation in the philosophical content of his Treatise, the latter places emphasis on historical context. Which of the two accounts is correct? Perhaps neither. Indeed, it is arguable that Hume was not really a sceptic at all. For one thing, in the \Advertisement" to his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume distanced himself from the ideas expressed in his \juvenile" Treatise. He claimed to have become \sensible of his error in going to the press too early" and to have \cast the whole anew" so that \some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression" were corrected. (Hume 1975: p.2) While it is tempting to pass off these remarks as mere irony, Hume further insists that we are to regard only his Enquiry as authoritative, writing that \Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." (Hume 1975: p.2) In addition to this public disavowal, and to other instances in which Hume appears to soften his philosophical position, there is a case to be made to the effect that, philosophically, Hume was no more a sceptic than empiricist predecessors such as John Locke and George 3 Berkeley. On this account, Hume is to be viewed as a system builder who just so happened to draw out some obvious implications in the work of his predecessors. Seen in this light, the charge that Hume was merely a convenient scapegoat - someone against whom incendiary charges could be made to stick, and who surfaced at a time and place where a scapegoat was needed - gains in plausibility. Indeed, we may go even further and ask whether Hume's reputation as a sceptic was fairly earned at all? If not, then why continue to litter his statue with construction pylons, beer cans, empty packs of cigarettes, and the like? For, in doing so, we risk repeating an injury to the most maligned and misunderstood of British philosophers. The object of this book is not to deny that Hume was a sceptic; rather, it is to investigate the historical circumstances surrounding the reception of Hume and his philosophy, with the aim of setting these circumstances against developments in Hume's philosophical position and reputation as a sceptic. As I will show, Hume's considered view, his mitigated scepticism, was barely appreciated by his early critics. While this result will not shock readers already familiar with the story of Hume and his philosophy, it is here achieved in a new way. To date, no systematic effort has been made to demonstrate the proximity of the relationship between historical circumstance, Hume's philosophical development, and the legacy of Hume's person and philosophy. The account given here demonstrates the connections between these elements, bring together historical and philosophical details in an extended analysis. Both archival and published records are used to track how Hume was singled out, charged with scepticism, denied an academic career, given a reputation - and how these circumstances, perhaps more than Hume's texts themselves, affected the interpretation of his scepticism. Ultimately, the point is to show that an adequate account of the development of Hume's reputation and philosophy requires appeal to both the philosophical and historical accounts. In other words, the correct account of how Hume became a sceptic requires that the two types of explanation, the one emphasizing philosophical analysis and the other emphasizing historical context, remain fused together. The final result is that the lines between philosophical analysis and historical context are often crossed, and the notion that philosophical inquiry stands apart from the accidental circumstances of human lives is called into question. Introduction The story of the development of Hume's reputation as a sceptic begins in January 1739, with the publication of the first two volumes of his A Treatise of Human Nature. The book, in Hume's words, fell \dead-born from the press." (Hume 1985a: p.xxxiv) Over the course of the ensuing decades, Hume's Treatise would gain a great deal of attention - though most of this attention was, unfortunately, negative. Hume anticipated this negative reception, believing that the sizeable gap between his own system of philosophy and the metaphysical prejudices of his critics would present an obstacle to the book's receiving a fair reading. In a letter to Henry Home dated 13 February 1739, he speculates that, \Those who are accustomed to reflect on such abstract subjects, are commonly full of prejudices; and those who are unprejudiced are unacquainted with metaphysical reasonings. My principles are also so remote from all the vulgar sentiments on the subject, that were they to take place, they would produce almost a total alteration in philosophy: and you know, revolutions of this kind are not easily brought about." (Greig 1969: vol.1.,p.26) Apparently then, Hume was well aware of the novelty and controversy of his own ideas. As he pointed out in the letter to Home, were his own views to be accepted, they would produce \almost a total alteration in philosophy". It is conceivable, of course, that Hume was merely blowing his own horn when he made the claim to \total alteration" - succumbing to vain ambition in a way that he would later come to regret. However, there are good reasons to suppose that he was being entirely sincere. Indeed, in the Treatise, Hume had already predicted that his radical ideas would inspire a hatred of both his system and person. (Hume 1978: p.264) But, in contrast to what did Hume's views represent such a radical alteration? Taking the above remarks as our guide, we must suppose that Hume's 4 5 views were inimical to both the abstract doctrines of the tutored and the common sense beliefs of the untutored. In other words, Hume's conclusions resembled neither those of metaphysics nor those of common sense.