Single-Party Rule in a Multiparty Age: Tanzania in Comparative Perspective
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SINGLE-PARTY RULE IN A MULTIPARTY AGE: TANZANIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement of the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY by Richard L. Whitehead August, 2009 © by Richard L. Whitehead 2009 All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT Title: Single-Party Rule in a Multiparty Age: Tanzania in Comparative Perspective Candidate's Name: Richard L. Whitehead Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Temple University, 2009 Doctoral Advisory Committee Chair: Richard Deeg As international pressure for multiparty reforms swept Africa during the early 1990s, long- time incumbent, such as UNIP in Zambia, KANU in Kenya, and the MCP in Malawi, were simultaneously challenged by widespread domestic demands for multiparty reforms. Only ten years later, after succumbing to reform demands, many long-time incumbents were out of office after holding competitive multiparty elections. My research seeks an explanation for why this pattern did not emerge in Tanzanian, where the domestic push for multiparty change was weak, and, despite the occurrence of three multiparty elections, the CCM continues to win with sizable election margins. As identified in research on semi-authoritarian rule, the post-reform pattern for incumbency maintenance in countries like Togo, Gabon, and Cameroon included strong doses of repression, manipulation and patronage as tactics for surviving in office under to multiparty elections. Comparatively speaking however, governance by the CCM did not fit the typical post-Cold-War semi-authoritarian pattern of governance either. In Tanzania, coercion and manipulation appears less rampant, while patronage, as a constant across nearly every African regime, cannot explain the overwhelming mass support the CCM continues to enjoy today. iii Rather than relying on explanations based on repression and patronage alone, I locate the basis of post-reform CCM dominance in a historical process whereby a particularly unique array of social and economic policies promulgated during single-party rule culminated in comparatively affable social relations at the onset of multiparty reform. In Tanzania, this post- independence policy mix included stemming the growth of vast regional wealth differentials, a rejection of ethnicity as a basis for organizing collective action, and the construction of a relatively coherent national identity. By contrast, in most other African cases, policies under single-party rule acted to reinforce many of those economic and ethnic divisions inherited at independence. These divisions in turn, acted as material and moral capital for organizing dissent against incumbency, and the consolidation of opposition parties following political reform. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I first want to give recognition to some of the folks and institutions in East Africa that helped make this project a reality. I give special thanks to Professor Rwekaza Mukandala, from Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), for his unique insights into politics in Tanzania generally, and the CCM specifically, as well as his help in fieldwork arrangements and collect data. Professor Ruth Shayo, from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Dar es Salaam, also deserves special mention here, as she organized a seminar at the IDS, where I was able to present my work in progress to some thoughtful and perceptive students. More generally, I would like to thank all the folks at REDET, IDS, and the Media Institute of Southern Africa in Tanzania, along with the staff at the Institute for Education and Democracy and the Kenya Human Rights Commission for their warm welcome, hospitality, and assistance. Finally, I give thanks all those party leaders that were kind enough to take the time to meet with me as I prodded for interviews. I also pay tribute to my friends and colleagues at the University of Bergen (UiB) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). I am especially appreciative of the continual assistance from Professor Lars Svåsand, of the Comparative Politics Department at UiB, who helped shape so much of my graduate work on political parties in the developing world. I am likewise appreciative to Professor Thorvald Gran, from the Institute for Public Administration and Organizational Theory, also at UiB, for his remarkable assistance in grappling with the research questions for the dissertation. v The members of my dissertation committee also deserve special acknowledgements. Professor Richard Deeg, at the Department of Political Science at Temple University, and Tony Lucero, at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Seattle, encouraged and challenged me to excel in my studies from start to finish. I likewise want to thank Professor Elke Zuern at Sarah Lawrence College, for her invaluable insights into social movements along with her methodological critiques and suggestions. Finally, I want to pay tribute to Professor Niyi Akinnaso, from the Anthropology Department at Temple University, for jumping in at the last minute to offer brilliant feedback as an external reader for my dissertation defense. Finally, I reserve the most solemn gratitude to my wife, Wenche Snekkevik, and son, Marius Snekkevik, for tolerating my complicated work schedule while researching and writing this piece. I could never have done this without the support from you both. My thanks also goes to Wenche for assisting me with some of the tables, figures, and proof reading. I am forever grateful. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................................................................................................... v LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................... xii LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................................................. xvi CHAPTER 1. CONTENDING ACCOUNTS OF REGIME TENURE ......................................................................... 1 Probing the Basis for Incumbency .......................................................................................................... 5 Explaining Party Dominance................................................................................................................. 10 2. TOWARD A THEORY OF REGIME TENURE ................................................................................. 19 Toward a Theory of the Micro-Macro Making of Party Dominance .................................................... 21 Ideational and Material Resources and Macro-Structural Divergence.................................................. 27 Micro-level Actions in the Formation of Party Dominance.................................................................. 32 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 48 Data Analysis: From ‘Discrete Causality’ to Casual Process................................................................ 50 Case Selection: Finding Robust Comparisons ...................................................................................... 58 4. REJECTING DISSENT – REPRESSION IN TANZANIA.................................................................. 62 Repression and Dominant Parties.......................................................................................................... 64 Batons, Guns, and Prisons: Repression Under Single-Party Rule......................................................... 66 Repression after Multiparty Reform...................................................................................................... 90 Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 101 vii 5. SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS AND SINGLE-PARTY RULE ....................................... 103 The Material and Ideational Substance of Political Contestation........................................................ 105 TANU Dominance in Comparative Perspective ................................................................................. 109 The Colonial Background ................................................................................................................... 115 Political Factions and the Rising Party Leadership Stratum ............................................................... 123 The Structural Underpinnings of the Rising Leadership Stratum ....................................................... 125 Race, Class, and the Crisis on the Isles ............................................................................................... 133 Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 144 6. AFRICAN SOCIALISM, IDENTITY AND EQUALITY ................................................................. 146 Collaboration and Coercion: The African Post-Colonial State ........................................................... 148 Collaboration and the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania....................................................................... 153 Consent and the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania...............................................................................