V4 – 25 YEARS THE CONTINUING STORY OF THE VISEGRÁD GROUP 1991 – 2016 5 INTRODUCTION

e are honoured to present you with a special publication on the 25th anniver- sary of the Visegrád Group. This book brings together the finest, contempo- Wrary political minds to discuss eleven of the most important issues affecting Visegrád today. Ranging from the values and history of the V4 to the future growth and in- frastructural development in the region, it covers the most fundamental and pressing rea- sons for the continued cooperation. We hope that, through the views shared by these dis- tinguished voices and opinion-leaders, readers will gain insight into the Central European perspective on a variety of issues which are currently dominating discussions in the Euro- pean as well as global arenas.

The Visegrád Group has always had the goal of being an active participant in the interna- tional, European and transatlantic communities. Today, it has accomplished and continues to reinforce its strong stance within these forums. Therefore, this book should be read not only as an account of the accomplishments of the last twenty-five years, but also as a possi- ble guide for the future hopes and potential dilemmas of the region. ARE THE IDEAS ON WHICH THE VISEGRÁD GROUP WAS FOUNDED STILL RELEVANT IN TODAY’S EUROPEAN POLITICS? The Visegrád Group signing ceremony in February 1991. V4 – 25 YEARS 10

A powerful symbol of the changes in 1989 – the cutting of a wire fence – has returned; an image which was supposed to belong to the past

RUDOLF CHMEL

(b. 1939) is a Slovak politician and literature professor, former Minister of Culture of Slovakia (2002-2005, 2006) and the last ambassador of Czechoslovakia in Hungary. Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights and National Minorities in the government of Iveta Radičová (2010-2012). 11 ARE THE IDEAS ON WHICH THE VISEGRÁD GROUP WAS FOUNDED STILL RELEVANT IN TODAY’S EUROPEAN POLITICS??

y relationship to Visegrád is a bit (IVF) can be definitely perceived as a pos- sentimental. It is not only due to itive step; however, culture—on which the Mthe fact that I inherited a Central IVF focuses most—represents only one European identity from my ancestors, but segment of a much larger system. also because we, the future ambassadors of At the time when Visegrád was cre- the Visegrád countries, assisted actively in ated, Central Europe did not realize that the birth of Visegrád. Our intention was to this predecessor to the European Union convince politicians, who were represent- was established with the aim to avoid con- ing the “national egos” of their countries, flicts originating from nationalism, racism, that Visegrád should also have a spirit of xenophobia and intolerance. We wanted cooperation, based on similar historical to use Visegrád to accelerate our return experiences and the anti-communist ideas to Europe, but we lacked a deeper politi- which were forged through years of strug- cal or intellectual discourse about our Eu- gle and dissent. ropean future. For a significant part of the This concept of comradery could be population, the benefits connected with exemplified by one of the most notable and the integration to the EU are reduced to potent slogans of the Czecho-Slovak Vel- euro-funds, subsidies and strengthened vet Revolution of 1989, “The return to Eu- national egos and less to a celebration and rope”. It had quite a mobilizing effect and development of meaningful cooperation focused attention on the shared goal which and values. was omnipresent in the Central Europe- After twenty-five years, just on the oc- an atmosphere at that time. Of course, the casion of the anniversary, the V4 countries Europe we had in mind was more ideal and have finally found an agenda that unites virtual than concrete and realistic. them unanimously: immigrants. I do not We wanted a think tank that would intend to describe the reasons for this uni- support the cooperative spirit of Central ty. Nevertheless, these reasons show that Europe leading to the integration of the re- the differences between Western and Cen- gion with the West, and, at the same time, tral Europe are still greater than we ex- we wanted to support and foster the inter- pected them to be. Also, we are witness- nal cohesion of the region since we were ing a reality when a powerful symbol of well-aware of its history, full of conflicts the changes in 1989 – the cutting of a wire and contradictions. fence – has returned; an image which was Twenty-five years after its establish- supposed to belong to the past. That is ment there are not that many achieve- why the “return to Europe” is more scep- ments the V4 can be proud of. The cre- tical and bitter, partly in thanks to our ation of the International Visegrad Fund contribution. V4 – 25 YEARS 12

Borders may change, but the underlying values which gave birth to the Visegrád Group will last. They can be rediscovered or neglected depending on which way the political winds are blowing

MIROSŁAW FILIPOWICZ

(b. 1963) is a polish historian, professor at Katholic University of Lublin. Director of the Institute of East-Central Europe. 13 ARE THE IDEAS ON WHICH THE VISEGRÁD GROUP WAS FOUNDED STILL RELEVANT IN TODAY’S EUROPEAN POLITICS??

n 1991, when the presidents of Poland, of the world—remembered mostly for be- Czechoslovakia and Hungary created the ing underneath the shadow of the former IVisegrád Group, the political situation USSR—a nook which was just about to re- in the three countries did not indicate any claim its European membership. A natu- great surprises. Parliamentary democracy ral threat for the region was the so-called as well as constitutional and legal orders “lacrimogenetic” attitude (i.e. each of the were being developed, and clear goals—to nations of the Group had its own over- strive towards EU and NATO member- sensitive areas, sense of hurt or feelings of ships—were set. Nevertheless, reality al- betrayal). ways has the power to surprise, and two The track towards the EU and NATO years later, the Group grew number without was meant to break those mental chains expanding territorially. Two new countries and increase the sense of security and so- emerged—Slovakia and the Czech Repub- cial contentment. And again it seems that lic. I remember recalling Milan Kundera’s nothing can be given or granted forever. words from his splendid essay “The Trage- Everywhere in Europe now, including in dy of Central Europe”: our region, one can observe the rise of na- “It would be senseless to try to draw tional egos, so unwilling to support com- its [Central Europe — MF] borders exact- mon values, especially if their own par- ly. Central Europe is not a state: it is a cul- ticular interests were to suffer. A few years ture or a fate. Its borders are imaginary ago, when I was giving a lecture and I men- and must be drawn and redrawn with each tioned the idea of a rebirth (or an “evil” new historical situation”. mutation) of Central and Eastern Europe Precisely stated—the political situa- as an alternative to the EU, a nationalistic tion, or even states’ borders may change, alliance of Poland, Czech Republic, Hun- but the underlying values which gave birth gary, and Slovakia. At that time, I thought it to the decision of establishing the Viseg- was just a political fiction or a gloomy joke, rád Group will last. That being said, these but some jokes should never be told. same ideals can be rediscovered or ne- It should be noted that such surpris- glected depending on which way the polit- ing social mood swings are not only pres- ical wind is blowing in a particular coun- ent in our local climate. Similar tendencies try at any given time. It would be trivial to are arising in the countries of the West, recall again that the whole of our region is the South and the North. It would be na- definitely European, and this fact has, and ive to say that our part of Europe follows should have, its consequences regarding the same values in its social and political the preferred values. strategies as when the Visegrád Group was However, we must not forget the fate first started. However, the values have not Kundera mentioned. It needs stressing died, nor disappeared, and they will return. that the publication of the essay in The New They have to if Europe is to mean anything York Review of Books was, along with the in the future. It is important to remem- earlier election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope ber that our region has experienced much and the “Solidarity” revolution, one of the tougher ordeals and finally prevailed, al- more memorable moments when the West though many times not without accruing shifted its attention to this forgotten nook great losses in the process. V4 – 25 YEARS 14

Many of the present apparently deep political divisions in Europe can be bridged with both determination and goodwill. The V4 could initiate such a discussion

GÉZA JESZENSZKY

(b. 1941) is a founding member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (1988) and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990-1994). Former ambassador of Hungary to the United States (1998-2002), and to Norway and Iceland (2011 -2014). 15 ARE THE IDEAS ON WHICH THE VISEGRÁD GROUP WAS FOUNDED STILL RELEVANT IN TODAY’S EUROPEAN POLITICS??

he immediate, though unan- likely to turn away from them. The present nounced, aim of the Visegrád sum- controversy over how immigration and the Tmit meeting in 1991 was to complete threat of Islamic fundamentalism should the dismantling of the institutions which be handled is about practical politics and embodied political and economic depend- not about values. It is wrong to assume that ence on the Soviet Union. But the more ba- the disagreement represents an East/West sic purpose was to set aside old rivalries divide. At present there is indeed a split be- and the memory of conflicts between the tween several European governments and four nations as well as to (re)establish eco- their public over the migrants issue, but nomic and cultural cooperation. All this that should be mended, as its consequenc- was meant to facilitate becoming part of es are fraught with danger. The differing the West and the Euro-Atlantic structures. views should be discussed openly and sin- Those ideas and hopes have been achieved, cerely, going beyond the constraints of “po- and they should be upheld. litical correctness.” Who can deny that all The economic strength of this asso- the values of Europe go back to the three ciation is also considerable, with the po- hills: the Acropolis, the Capitolium and the tential for substantial growth. The stra- Golgotha? Hungary’s late Prime Minister, tegic significance of the territory of the József Antall used to say that in Europe V4 has been proven time and time again. even the atheists are Christians. By that This gateway was used by numerous mil- he meant that the messages of both the itary leaders: Roman Emperors, Ottoman Old and the New Testament are universal. sultans, Russian and Prussian monarchs. Many of the present apparently deep po- Both Hitler and Stalin tried to dominate litical divisions in Europe can be bridged it. What matters today is the proximity with both determination and goodwill. of Russia, Ukraine and the Balkans. The A hundred years ago most of the ter- Visegrád countries understand their east- ritory of the V4 was a common econom- ern and southern neighbours rather well; ic space, with no internal borders, with they have much to offer on the problems a common currency, a common foreign related to the periphery of Europe. policy, even with a common army. The Based on the tragedies of the 20th Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had many century, the once victims of successive to- shortcomings, but it also had many posi- talitarian dictatorships were strongly com- tive aspects. Europe should never become mitted to Atlanticism, to a continued close a new edition of the Carolingian Empire, collaboration with the United States and covering only Western Europe (the old Europe. They should remain so. But what Common Market), leaving out the lands is essentially tied to this is a commitment which once comprised the Habsburg Em- to the traditional values of Europe. Free- pire. Narrow political and economic inter- dom and political liberties were the battle ests and short term thinking can ruin all cry of the opponents of communism. Re- the achievements of the last twenty-five grettably today, we are witnessing a digres- years, and the V4 countries could easily sion from those values in many countries, end up in a new version of the Soviet Em- but the majority of the population is not pire. Caveant consules… V4 – 25 YEARS 16

Rather than our common features or similarities, it is perhaps the challenges we are now facing that will make us appreciate our mutual differences

PETR PITHART

(b. 1941) – the first Prime Minister of the Czech Republic (1990-1992) and the First Deputy Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (2004-2012). 17 ARE THE IDEAS ON WHICH THE VISEGRÁD GROUP WAS FOUNDED STILL RELEVANT IN TODAY’S EUROPEAN POLITICS??

or someone who was involved from its Nevertheless, the weak yet growing very inception with Visegrád (indeed, civil societies in our four countries, which Fone of those who helped conceive it were able to take advantage of the modest intellectually, well before the “institution” resources provided by the Visegrad Foun- came into being) and was personally ac- dation, have proved their mettle. They quainted with all its protagonists, it is very have remained loyal to the founding idea. difficult to presently provide a spontane- Regardless of all the disappointments ously encouraging answer to the question of recent months, I would still insist that all at hand. channels of Visegrád communication be kept Back then, we believed that our com- open, even if, at this moment, they seem to mon contemporary history placed an obli- be dragging us out of Central Europe. Rath- gation upon us to share our unique expe- er than our common features or similarities, rience with others, should they show an it is perhaps the challenges we are now fac- interest. And that we should proceed joint- ing that will make us appreciate our mutual ly whenever appropriate and beneficial. differences. However, this will happen only However, it turned out that our if our politicians and media elites do not try still-living countries’ past is somewhat to spare us too much and speak their minds “older”, dating back as it does to the era openly. After all, the one thing we still have between two World Wars, a time when in common is the awareness of our own past our countries did not have all that much descent into perdition stemming from the in common. Furthermore, it is an era that loss of freedom, which we continue to car- could not be openly discussed for a long ry within us. This gives us hope that, even if time. In short, it is mainly the memory of we may not be able to see clearly at this mo- what had been swept under the carpet by ment in time, we will open our eyes eventual- previous regimes that has come back to ly, even if it is at the last minute. haunt us with a vengeance. For we are surely still the same peo- Another thing that has become evi- ple who, along with the Charter 77 philos- dent over the past few months is that our opher Jan Patočka, understood that the shared feature is a collective and individu- things one suffers for are precisely those al selfishness; one that evolved, quite natu- worth living for. “The rest of Europe”, on rally, as a response to the collectivism that the other hand, knows this only from read- the state had imposed on us. ing about it. V4 – 25 YEARS 18

The project has probably been the most coherent and successful incarnation of the European ideal in recent history. We need a return to the initial inspiration of the Visegrád project

JACQUES RUPNIK

(b. 1950) is a French political scientist, specialized in Central and Eastern Europe affairs. An advisor to the former Czech president Václav Havel (1990-1992). Director of Research at CERI (Centre for International Studies and Research) and Professor at Sciences-Po, Paris. 19 ARE THE IDEAS ON WHICH THE VISEGRÁD GROUP WAS FOUNDED STILL RELEVANT IN TODAY’S EUROPEAN POLITICS??

hat is alive and what is dead in Eastern Europe associated with the dem- the Visegrád project? Perhaps ocratic changes of 1989 was removed. Wit would be helpful to remem- Regardless of these troubles, the pro- ber that the collaboration came about ject, on the whole, has survived and has immediately after the fall of the Com- probably been the most coherent and suc- munism, and that it was forged with the cessful incarnation of the European ideal democratic ideals, aspirations and lead- in recent history. If we consider the EU ac- ership of the former dissidents in the late cession of the V4 (2004) as the main goal 1980’s. of the cooperation, in the subsequent years It also represented a strong opposi- many people thought that the Visegrád tion to nationalism which had stemmed Group suffered from a lack of purpose. from that great lesson of Central Europe- What used to be seen as the positive an history: nationalism had been the poi- discovery of Central Europe, as part of son that had prepared the ground for the a greater European liberal project, is now demise of democracy in the region. positioning itself as a region abandon- And thirdly, there was a European ing the values it had previously ported, dimension—the common goal was to join and even opposing further European Europe, to create a new Central Europe integration. while simultaneously integrating it with It should be a matter of thought and the broader European project. perhaps for action for intellectuals and in That was the initial goal and I need civil society actors, who want to return not over-stress the fact that it did not to the initial inspiration of the Visegrád flourish once the early “leadership” in project. V4 – 25 YEARS 20

Visegrád was as much about transformation towards Western democracies and economies as it was about enhancing the security and long-term stabilisation of the region

DANIELA SCHWARZER

(b. 1974) is European Affairs expert, Director of Europe Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin. Senior Research Professor at the Department for European and Eurasian Studies at Johns Hopkins University. 21 ARE THE IDEAS ON WHICH THE VISEGRÁD GROUP WAS FOUNDED STILL RELEVANT IN TODAY’S EUROPEAN POLITICS??

he Visegrád Group was formed in oppose Moscow’s efforts to undermine the 1990s to eliminate the rem- the Western rule-based security order Tnants of the communist bloc in and the violation of Ukrainian sovereign- Central Europe, to overcome the histor- ty. Of the four Visegrád members, only ic animosities between Central Europe- one country, Hungary, entertains a close an countries, to accomplish a social met- relationship with Moscow though it still amorphosis and to join both the EU and upholds sanctions. NATO. So, Visegrád was as much about With regards to the migration crisis, transformation towards Western liber- the Visegrád countries’ decision to close al democracies and functioning market national borders and refusal to join the economies as it was about enhancing the quota system for the relocation of refugees security and long-term stabilization of has brought about the question of wheth- the region by integrating it with the exist- er the V4 understands itself as a regional ing Western structures. subgroup that functions to strengthen the Today, integration with the EU and EU and its values, or whether it under- NATO has been formally achieved and mines the core principles and joint solu- with the growing number of internal and tions of the union. external challenges, the significance of Thus, the migration crisis has high- this membership should not be underesti- lighted the need and importance for all mated. Also, the founding idea of Visegrád EU member states to revisit and rebuild - to stabilise liberal societies and democ- a shared understanding of their joint prin- racies - remains crucial, in particular as ciples, to exemplify European solidarity, the current governments in Hungary and to define which expectations are accept- Poland are challenging this assumption. able and which too burdensome for our In terms of geostrategic orienta- European societies and to underline when tion towards the West, the EU and NATO it is necessary to take external action. WHAT DOES THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE MEAN FOR THE V4? GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE 1990–2015

Number of kilometers of new borders created in the V4’s vicinity 520 km 34 NEW COUNTRIES Breakup 215 km of Yugoslavia Breakup of Czechoslovakia 1381 km

NRD/RFN

1991 2006 2008

NEW BORDERS SINCE 1990

1990 1992 1993

9636 km Kosovo Dissolution of the Soviet Union 352 km

339 km 273 km 939 km Serbia Estonia | Russia 679 km Lithuania | Russia 959 km Ukraine | Moldova Latvia | Lithuania Belarus | Russia and Montenegro

203 km

282 km 453 km Latvia | Russia Lithuania | Belarus

339 km 173 km 1084 km 1576 km Estonia | Latvia Latvia | Belarus Belarus | Ukraine Ukraine | Russia V4 – 25 YEARS 26

By focusing on short- term national interests, Visegrád governments play into Moscow’s hands and encourage Putin’s ambitions in restoring Russia’s regional hegemony

JANUSZ BUGAJSKI

(b. 1954) is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington DC and author of 20 books on Europe, Russia, and trans-Atlantic relations. His newest book, co-authored with Margarita Assenova, is entitled Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks (Washington DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2016) 27 WHAT DOES THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE MEAN FOR V4?

he original purpose of the Visegrád leaders display sympathy toward a more initiative was for the four re-emerg- authoritarian political model or view Ting Central European democracies Moscow as a potential counterbalance to to coordinate their pursuit of NATO and Brussels. EU membership. However, since achiev- By focusing on short-term nation- ing its primary targets, the V4 has proved al interests rather than more significant unable to coordinate the disparate foreign strategic imperatives, Visegrád govern- policies of its members and lacks a clear ments play into Moscow’s hands and en- geopolitical identity. courage Putin’s ambitions in restoring While competitive geopolitics has Russia’s regional hegemony. The parti- returned to Central Europe with a ven- tion of Ukraine did not convince Buda- geance through Russia’s pursuit of a new pest to terminate the contract with Rosa- Moscow-centred “pole of power,” the V4’s tom for the modernization of the nuclear response has been tepid and rudderless. power plant in Paks, as Prime Minister Worse still, the region has exposed itself Viktor Orbán avoided confrontation with to Kremlin inroads through economic, po- Moscow. Similarly, the Czech Prime Min- litical and intelligence penetration. In sum, ister Bohuslav Sobotka opposed strength- Visegrád has become a microcosm of EU ening NATO forces in Europe while Slo- disunity. vak Prime Minister Robert Fico protested Warsaw remains more assertive in fo- against increasing America's military cusing EU and NATO policy on Russia’s presence in Central Europe. aggression and has viewed transatlantic Unless it can adopt a more assertive relations as paramount. In contrast, Hun- Atlanticist and Europeanist position to gary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic re- help defend the continent against Mos- main circumspect. After Russia’s attack on cow’s subversion, the V4 will remain divid- Ukraine, all three governments were hesi- ed and defunct. Without a new impetus, it tant in supporting sanctions against Mos- will be unable to play a constructive role in cow partly for economic reasons, espe- the geopolitical struggle for the future se- cially where there is high dependence on curity and independence of Central and Russian energy. In some cases, political Eastern Europe. V4 – 25 YEARS 28

While it is appropriate to talk about the concerns of ordinary people over migration issues, anti- migrant sentiments spread by officials can appear counterproductive

MARTIN BÚTORA

(b. 1944) is Slovak sociologist, writer and analyst. Since 2014 he has been the foreign policy advisor to the Slovak president Andrej Kiska. He was also the human rights advisor to the former president of Czechoslovakia Václav Havel (1990-1992). Co-funder of Slovak Institute for Public Affairs and Ambassador of Slovakia to the United States. 29 WHAT DOES THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE MEAN FOR V4?

he recent resurgence of geopoli- engagement of the V4 in promoting the tics, in particular in this part of the Eastern partnership has yet to be realized, Tworld, is connected with Russia’s though progress has been made And last- aspirations to return to the stage as a glob- ly, although the Visegrád countries differ al power, and accompanied by the histori- in their views about the nature of the Rus- cally highest levels of negative public opin- sia-Ukraine conflict and on methods and ion towards the West, which itself is being tools of help and support, all of them have supported by the assertive anti-Western been trying to contribute to positive devel- propaganda. It is a different picture from opments in Ukraine. that of twenty-five years ago when the As for the behaviour of Visegrád Visegrád Group was born. countries concerning the recent crisis At that time, there were two key geo- caused by migration, even if at first sight political challenges lying ahead for the there does not appear to be any immediate Central European leaders. The first one relevant geopolitical consequences, it can was to complete the departure from the weaken their position in coping with fu- zone of Soviet supremacy, especially hav- ture challenges, uncertainties and threats. ing in mind the fragile political situation in There are three possible problematic Moscow and the unpredictability of any fu- areas which could stem from the V4’s at- ture developments. The second challenge, titude towards the migration crisis. First, expressed both officially and informally, it does not strengthen their positions in was to fill the vacuum, to seek a firm politi- shaping future EU policies: with attitudes cal anchoring and security for its members and behaviour expressing a limited per- in the Euro-Atlantic community. spective, it is difficult to imagine how these After its creation, the Visegrád Group countries could promote their national in- has been repeatedly involved, direct- terests and priorities within the EU. ly and indirectly, in attempts to influence Secondly, while it is appropriate to the geopolitical architecture of its neigh- talk about the legitimate concerns of ordi- bourhood. The first action has proved nary people over migration issues, anti-mi- to be a success: the three frontrunners grant sentiments and fear disseminated by in accession to NATO and the Europe- officials can appear counterproductive. an Union—Poland, the Czech Republic Thirdly, there is one country encour- and Hungary—helped Slovakia, after the aging—both openly and secretly support- favourable political change in the 1998 ing—fragmentation, nationalism and Eu- general election, to accelerate its course roscepticism within the EU in efforts to towards integration. Secondly, in accor- undermine the Union’s capacities to act. dance with its wish to find its own place in It is the Russian Federation, and any steps shaping EU policies, the V4 has contribut- undertaken by the EU members that are in ed to the pro-European moves in the Bal- accordance with this Russian goal should kan countries. Thirdly, a more ambitious be closely watched and discouraged. V4 – 25 YEARS 30

From Brussels's point of view, strengthening the internal ties in Central Europe is going to be seen more and more as acting against general EU cohesion

PAWEŁ KOWAL

(b. 1975) is Polish politician and historian, Member of European Parliament since 2009. From 2006 to 2007 he was a secretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31 WHAT DOES THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE MEAN FOR V4?

entral Europe has not made the Berlin and Paris, without the intermediate most of its stellar time post-1989 stage of stronger regional integration. This Cto strengthen its political or eco- was reflected in the poorly-developed, re- nomic situations. Historians will analyse gional economic relations, which do not why, but today it seems that there were consider Visegrád cooperation to be of the several major mistakes made during our utmost importance to the individual mem- contemporary history when consider- bers of the V4. The key accomplishments ing the preservation and future of the V4. of the V4 cooperation are the fact that, de- Firstly, they were often focused excessive- spite their conflicting interests, Central Eu- ly on nationalism, thinking at times exclu- ropean countries did not quarrel too much sively in terms of one’s own small coun- on their way to the EU and NATO, and the try. Secondly, and in the other extreme fact that they have created a number of in- – thinking in terms of "the EU as a whole", stitutional cooperation mechanisms – not without bearing in mind the regional con- just the International Visegrad Fund, but text. Thirdly, there was a lack of region- also bilateral funds that allow for youth ex- al leaders who were able to convince the changes, working with the elites, etc. people of the Visegrád countries that it The problem is that under the reign of could really be economically strong and bare geopolitics this is not enough. The at- competitive in its own right, and that it mosphere of Russia’s frenzied rivalry with held the key to successful integration for the Western members of the EU and the the entire continent. USA does not encourage the integration References to their shared history of Central Europe. Rather, it increases the turned out to be of little inspiration even risk of it being torn apart – some countries though the region had not always been will consider the Kremlin’s offer, while weak. Few believed that the region’s glo- others, like Poland and the Czech Repub- rious past could become the foundation lic, will not be able to do so. Under such for a new, modern greatness. Similarly, the circumstances, strengthening the inter- strong ties forged during the communist era nal ties in Central Europe – even if it sur- (i.e. mainly stemming from relationships vives the conflicting interests between the between the Polish-Czechoslovak and Pol- individual countries (for example, in the ish-Hungarian dissident movements) were power industry) – from Brussels’s point not enough to promote a regional aware- of view, is going to be seen more and more ness or emphasis. An excessive integration as acting against general EU cohesion. of the region would probably not have suit- There are even experts who want to see ed the West either as from the point of view a strengthening of NATO’s so-called "east- of the Western European capitals, it seemed ern flank", but the Visegrád Group is not more effective to build direct ties between ready to thrive in the midst of aggressive the individual V4 capitals and Brussels, geopolitical competition. V4 – 25 YEARS 32

The rising importance of geopolitics in Europe means rising geopolitical importance for the V4 countries and their cooperation

JÁNOS MARTONYI

(b. 1944) is Hungarian politician and lawyer. He served twice as Minister of Foreign Affairs - from 1998 to 2002 and from 2010 to 2014. 33 WHAT DOES THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE MEAN FOR V4?

he rising importance of geopolitics where we belong; in other words, what is in Europe means the rising geopo- our identity. Tlitical importance of the V4. Central Europe belongs to Europe, The Visegrád cooperation was found- ”Whole and Free”; it is an indispensable ed in a historic situation presented by actor of the European construction, and of a fundamental geopolitical transforma- the Transatlantic Alliance as embodied by tion. However, the foundations of the co- institutions like the EU and NATO. This operation were much deeper, rooted in must be the alpha and omega of any analy- such factors as the level of economic de- sis of our geopolitical role, importance, as- velopment, geography, political history, piration and interests. the geopolitical situation and interests, The V4 is anchored in the West. This but first and foremost, a common cultural is particularly important in the security heritage and the Central European identi- situation created by the ”return of history” ty. We may not be able to define all char- with a serious conflict between two ma- acteristics of this identity, but we share jor powers in our neighbourhood, includ- something that is more spiritual than ma- ing the violation of international law and terial. Central Europe is a more intensive its geopolitical and economic consequenc- Europe with a higher speed for revolution es. In this new geopolitical reality we have and a great diversity of traditions, languag- to underline that the V4 is not a bridge be- es and religions; with a legacy of the past tween two worlds, but a bridgehead firm- but also a sense of aspiration and responsi- ly fixed on the Western side. Neither is bility for the future. the V4 a mediator, or a ”shock absorber” What does this have to do with geo- in cases of conflict. We have a fundamen- politics? Economic, political and security tal interest in a peaceful environment, and interests are of fundamental importance, a special responsibility to enhance security but there is something we should never and promote understanding and coopera- forget. It is culture that matters—as has tion around us. been made clearer by recent developments This is the reason why the geopoliti- in the world and in Europe. cal importance of the V4 has been on the When identifying our geopolitical in- rise. In light of this harsh reality, it is indis- terests and deciding what strategy to im- pensable to have a clear vision of our val- plement, we have to answer the questions ues, our place in the world as well as of our who we are (including who we are not) and increased importance and responsibility. V4 – 25 YEARS 34

Twenty-five years have passed, and the Visegrád Four are still here, and I am convinced that their cooperation is more important than ever before

ALEXANDR VONDRA

(b. 1961) – foreign policy advisor to President Václav Havel (1990-1992) and the Czech Ambassador to the United States (1997-2001). He served several political posts in Czech Republic, including Defence Minister (2010-2012), Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs (2007- 2009) and Foreign Affairs Minister (2006-2007). 35 WHAT DOES THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE MEAN FOR V4?

wenty-five years ago, the Presidents, expression and other fundamental rights Prime Ministers, foreign ministers against the Soviet oppression. On the other Tand other leaders of Czechoslova- hand, we were convinced that only through kia, Hungary and Poland met at Visegrád our mutual cooperation would we be able Castle on the Danube river to sign a dec- to avoid the repetition of the "divide and laration of cooperation. The notion was empire" policy which plagued our region to establish a new group, the idea of which for centuries. had already emerged during a conference Twenty-five years have passed, and held in Bratislava in April 1990 by the in- the Visegrád Four are still here, and I am vitation of Václav Havel. However, the convinced that their cooperation is more ceremonial signing had to wait until Lech important than ever before. The U.S. is Walesa had become the Polish President. less interested in world affairs, the Euro- Thoughts of the Visegrád´s archi- pean Union has serious troubles and Rus- tects were framed by lessons of the past sia´s mounting assertiveness makes the as well as by challenges of the future. On idea of a Central Europe – standing unit- one hand, we have remembered how Jag- ed and undivided – an imperative for our ellonians and other ancestors together de- future success. We are sandwiched be- fended Europe against Ottoman invasions, tween Germany and Russia, and, to para- or how Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Pol- phrase Robert Kaplan, we cannot deceive ish dissidents defended their freedom of our geography. WHAT SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD GROUP CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON EUROPEAN PROJECT BEYOND BLOCKING POWER? The Warsaw Pact dissolution Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier (R) signs a document declaring the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, as Czechoslovakian Defence Minister Luboš Dobrovský (C) looks on. Budapest 25 February 1991. V4 – 25 YEARS 40

Visegrád can serve as an excellent political device if its relative weight is used in the proper international context. This is the main strategic question for its future

PÉTER BALÁZS

(b. 1941) is Hungarian economist and politician, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2010) and European Commissioner for Regional Policy (2004). He is a professor at the International Relations Department of the Central European University in Budapest. 41 WHAT SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD GROUP CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON EUROPEAN PROJECT BEYOND BLOCKING POWER?

he Visegrád Group was leading the of existence, Visegrád is a well-known polit- great systemic change in the east- ical brand-name. However, it does not con- Tern half of Europe. Western assis- stitute a “critical mass” within the EU. Un- tance targeted first Poland and Hungary, der the “double majority” voting system, the their initials were commemorated by the V4 represents only of the required 55% of PHARE program’s acronym in 1989. It is the member states and of the 65% of the a question of political philosophy, to what population. It can be the initiator of larg- extent the four nations contributed to the er actions if there are other supporters too, collapse of the Soviet empire by their con- but without that, the V4 would only func- sequent uprisings (1956, 1968, 1980), or tion as an opposition to the majority or as if they just gave adequate reactions to the a “veto player”. The emerging anti-Western weakening of the eastern power expansion and anti-modernisation tendencies, which generated by Russia. Another dilemma won the hearts of many voters in the Viseg- is whether the construction of the Viseg- rád region (and beyond) with its ingrained rád Group was initiated by its well-known nationalist rhetoric, do not enjoy a majority “founding fathers” – József Antall, Václav backing in Europe. The economic and geo- Havel, Lech Wałęsa – or did they just re- political focus of the continent is obviously act to the encouraging signals from their on Germany, being the greatest guardian of Western partners inciting them to frame the Visegrád idea. Taking an adversary posi- the dynamics of transformation through an tion to Berlin on behalf of the V4 countries intra-regional structure. Personally, I ex- seems a self-destructive strategy leading to perienced the first effects of this Western political isolation. “push” for closer cooperation at the ma- The Visegrád Group represents an in- jor economic meeting of the Conference tegral part of European economy and cul- on Security and Cooperation in Europe by ture and of the trans-Atlantic military al- early 1990 in Bonn, almost one year before liance. The founders of the V4 created the signing of the Visegrád Declaration in twenty-five years ago an adequate “four- Hungary on February 15th, 1991. wheel drive” structure, but the power of Fortunately, the internal cohesion of the engine should come from well-cho- the V4 did not decline under the challeng- sen external sources. Visegrád can serve as ing circumstances of NATO and EU acces- an excellent political device if its relative sion. On the contrary, Visegrád has survived weight is used in the proper international in spite of its loose, understaffed and under- context. This is the main strategic question financed structure. After twenty-five years for the future of the V4. V4 – 25 YEARS 42

It appears that the support shown before the downfall of the Iron Curtain – the revolution in Budapest in 1956, the Prague Spring and the time of martial law in Poland in the 1980’s – has been forgotten

ERHARD BUSEK

(b. 1941) is a chairman of the Institute for Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) and former Vice-Chancellor of Austria (1991-1995). He was a Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (2002-2008). 43 WHAT SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD GROUP CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON EUROPEAN PROJECT BEYOND BLOCKING POWER?

irst at all, it needs to be stated out- understanding and message for European right that the problem of creating democracy and to avoiding making hurtful Fa real European neighbourhood has announcements by an “illiberal democra- yet to be solved. Belonging to the Euro- cy” or any aggressive changes to laws con- pean Union, however, has been an es- cerning media (e.g. Poland). sential and necessary first step. Not only Admittedly, the contribution of Po- for the immediate and tangible benefits land has been, until now, very positive stemming from EU funds and invest- concerning the tumultuous situation in ment, but more importantly, the very Ukraine regarding Russia, but we need an real advantages derived from a burgeon- open European dialogue on this subject, ing cooperation with other European which can be positively influenced by the nations, so that, like neighbours, we can leadership of the Visegrád Group. collectively assist one other to overcome The Visegrád Group has to do more individual and shared problems. This to promote diplomacy, where the coun- sentiment has its root in the protracted tries and the representatives of the region refugee question where the V4’s under- and further afield can learn to work con- standing of the situation has not been structively together. Here, I would say, well-received by some neighbouring the civil society has been playing a very states. So too, it seems the notion that important role, so it is necessary to in- solidarity might not be the only solution clude not only churches and universities has yet to be grasped. Also it appears the but also focused organizations devoted to support shown in times before the down- the study and growth of these fields. It is fall of the Iron Curtain—the revolution in not only necessary to learn the intricacies Budapest in 1956, the Prague Spring as of the problems facing different countries, well as the time of martial law in Poland but also to have a mutual understanding in the 1980’s—has been forgotten if not a kind of empathy towards them as Apart from these issues, the Visegrád well. My proposal would be to create uni- Group has contributed greatly to the EU fied strategies on subjects of shared inter- with many impressive economic develop- est which can be pooled throughout the ments (most notably Poland and Slovakia). EU regarding any multitude of subjects They could use this experience to create from business, education, scientific devel- a dialogue not only concerning infrastruc- opment and so on. ture but also joint cooperation. But to be Neighbourhoods have to be devel- successful, we need to develop a common oped through action and not only theory. V4 – 25 YEARS 44

Besides looking outside the EU, we should also strengthen ties with the new members who share a similar history and culture like Slovenia and Croatia

KAREL SCHWARZENBERG

(b. 1937) is a Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic. 45 WHAT SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD GROUP CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON EUROPEAN PROJECT BEYOND BLOCKING POWER?

t appears today that the only means we the European Union is our policy towards have available to us is the lobbying for our eastern neighbours. There is a defini- Iour mutual interests in Europe and our tive need for essential, effective and pos- surrounding neighbourhood. Due to the itive work to be completed in the region. geographic proximity and a shared his- While the need for action is undisputed, tory, we have numerous common prob- the main deficiency of the Visegrád Group, lems and goals, which we can pull from to however, is the splintering of our opinions find a base for action whether they are fo- on policies concerning both internal Euro- cused on our own countries or more fur- pean issues and of our policy towards the ther afield. Promotion of these interests Russian Federation. We should formulate and solutions to these problems are the a cohesive understanding of the goals the best means the Visegrád countries have to Visegrád Group want to accomplish and be successful. Indeed, I think the Visegrád then actively work towards accomplishing Group should be more active in Europe- them. Furthermore, we should recognize an projects and in the formation of Euro- and analyse our common deficiencies and pean policies. The experience of the 20th strive to better ourselves in the process. century has taught the V4, as well as many And we should try to help those members other nations, the ramifications of division. who are not fully understood in Western Fortunately, we have overcome and defeat- Europe and try to bridge the misunder- ed those forces that were trying to keep us standing as for instance the current situa- out of the larger European theatre by be- tion concerning Poland. coming members of the European Union. Besides looking outside the EU, we We should not, however, forget those voic- should also strengthen ties with the new es still struggling to achieve this goal, spe- members who, again, share a similar his- cifically those neighbours to the south and tory and culture like Slovenia and Croatia. southeast who are not yet members of the In relation to the Baltic states, it is impor- distinguished group. It is our similar expe- tant to support them in their difficult po- rience which makes us ideal advocates for sition towards Russia. This should be an these countries, and we can complete our absolute priority because they are small- task by influencing many tiers (e.g. Euro- er states with tremendous problems, and pean Parliament and the European Coun- they should be supported by the larger as- cil) simultaneously. sociation of which they belong. It is our Another issue which presents the op- similarities which we should celebrate and portunity for us to demonstrate our impor- use as the platform to find common ground tance and the usefulness of our countries in to build unified policies of action. V4 – 25 YEARS 46

The central part of Europe is naturally obligated to make the rest of the continent familiar with the situation beyond the eastern border of today’s EU

KRZYSZTOF SZCZERSKI

(1973) Secretary of State in the office of the President of Poland. In the years 2007-2008 Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Office of the Committee for European Integration. He was a member of the Civil Service Council to the Prime Minister (2009-2010) and a deputy to the Sejm (2011-2015). In January 2015, he became the representative of the Polish Parliament in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. From 2013, he has been an associate professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. 47 WHAT SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD GROUP CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON EUROPEAN PROJECT BEYOND BLOCKING POWER?

rovided that the model of the EU monetarily driven, each having their own is consensus based, it is in many areas to develop in. Pways obvious that the perspective Thirdly, the central part of Europe of the Visegrád Group should play an im- is naturally obligated to make the rest of portant role in moulding the European the continent familiar with the situation point-of-view. beyond the eastern border of today’s EU. The first reason is that today Europe Without the V4 countries, Europe would needs the opinions of countries and societies still be discussing the migration situation like Poland, which on one hand is pro-Euro- on the southern border but perhaps not pean since the Poles want to actively be part the equally ignitable situation to the East. of the EU and support the notion of Euro- Our role is crucial as we need to show Eu- pean unity, and on the other hand, are sen- rope how to observe and understand our sitive about preserving their right to make larger environment. Therefore, the more decisions which reflect a more traditional competent the V4 is on eastern matters, vision and concept of their national identi- the more opportunities we should have to ty. In this Central European country, there mould European views, and such compe- is a layering of ideology—Poles believe their tence simply comes from territorial prox- pro-European stance can be combined with imity and our feel for local ecosystems. the maintaining of one’s own identity, that And finally, our part of Europe should the two are not mutually exclusive. This is mutually cooperate instead of block pro- the phenomenon currently at work in Pol- visions or policies based on our individ- ish society—a lesson which, if learned, can ual interests. We will only be able to sup- have numerous benefits especially with re- port European unity once we create one gards to the vying ideologies at work nowa- regionally. days in Europe. When looking at European poli- Secondly, the Visegrád countries cies within the European Union, it is rare need motivation to encourage social co- for a group of countries to share simi- hesiveness and the still much needed de- lar views in many areas. It cannot be said velopment. At the same time, they present about France, nor Germany, nor Italy. But a political challenge for Europe as it ex- when the issue was clear (e.g. regarding ceeds and shakes up the traditional north- energy security), the countries of the V4 south division where the latter are more agreed that the needs were the same for socially integrated and the former more everybody. V4 – 25 YEARS 48

What is remaining is our hope and strong belief that this hysterical anti-European mood will quickly blow over, and new intellectual leaders from the next generation will rise from within CE

MAGDALÉNA VÁŠÁRYOVÁ

(b. 1948) is a Slovak diplomat, politician and actor. State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia 2005-2006. She served as an Ambassador of Czechoslovakia to Austria and Slovak Ambassador to Poland. 49 WHAT SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD GROUP CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON EUROPEAN PROJECT BEYOND BLOCKING POWER?

uch beautiful ideas we had in 2004, anti-European mood—which is nowa- we – the people of Central Europe. days spreading through Hungary, the SWe should be one of the engines Czech Republic, Poland and is begin- of the European Union, we should share ning to take shape in the historical- with others the awful and deterrent ex- ly pro-European Slovakia—will quickly perience of two totalitarian regimes, we blow over, and new intellectual leaders should be the strongest defenders of de- from the next generation will rise from mocracy and particularly, we should be within Central Europe as the bearers aware and thankful to all the states of the of fresh ideas. We need them desper- “old European union” of what they were ately because to have just ideas is not and are still willing to do for us. After enough, their youthful zeal is also re- more than ten years, we have to admit sin- quired. More importantly, we have to cerely that instead of being an engine, we find them as quickly as possible because have become a problem. It is possible that they should be able to adopt these ide- civic forces, forces that had been at the as and push them forward in effort to forefront of pro-European efforts in our inspire a greater portion of the Central Central European countries, did not raise European population. This would pose their followers—the next generation—to a shift away from the threatening return assume their ideals, ambitions and ener- of isolationism, the proliferation of na- gy. Yes, it seems so far, we have not passed tionalistic ideas, the senseless attacks on on these values. Our countries have be- the values of liberalism through a criti- come an unambitious part of the Europe- cism of so called neo-liberalism (which an Union, and there is no doubt that the is now a common practice) and from ob- more able and ambitious members of the vious intensification of anti-Semitism younger generation are leaving for the lingering in the atmosphere of the Cen- more mature economies of the West. On tral European states. These were trends a related note, this development brings that in the 20th century plunged Central into question whether we are too pam- Europe into chaos and confined it to the pered by the European structural funds. Iron Curtain. Lastly, we have to change This is money which was not created by one more thing in our countries. We have us, nor was it earned by our work, and yet to finally get rid of that advantageous for many of us, this opportunity for devel- and comfortable feeling that in Europe opment is being taken for granted. Worse we are responsible for nothing “because, still, some do not feel we should even be after all, we are still just victims of those grateful for the coffers made available other and stronger powers.” through our neighbour’s toil. We still have the hope and the de- What is remaining is only our hope sire to search out and shape such a new and strong belief that this hysterical generation. WHAT ARE THE VALUES THAT BIND US TOGETHER? WHAT ARE THE VALUES THAT BIND US TOGETHER – KEY WORDS culture

education

PRAGMATISM TRUST demo cracy cooperation V4 – 25 YEARS 54

Citizen commitment to freedom and democracy varies across time and countries. What unifies us more is the dream of an ideal democracy; one with the ability to put the country back on the track

OLGA GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ

is a Slovak sociologist, currently a director of the Institute of European Studies and International Relations at the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University in Bratislava. She is founding member of a Slovak Institute for Public Affairs. 55 WHAT ARE THE VALUES THAT BIND US TOGETHER

isegrád cooperation became history often reveals that everyone feels a brand for solid regional co-oper- they are owed something, and everybody Vation that guarantees stability and did harm to someone else at some point. good neighbourly relations. Despite the On the other hand, the nations are unified fact that the commitment to V4 oscillated, by the closeness of their common destiny went through many “ups” and “downs”; de- which sets the grounds for mutual trust. spite the fact that it is far from being a com- Based on surveys, we see that the Czechs pact political entity which would be able to and Slovaks share the strongest ties of con- adopt joint strategies, find common polit- fidence. This level of trust and above-stan- ical instruments and to enforce common dard relationship seemed to be the utopian interests; despite these many failures, lost dream until around the split of the Czecho- ambitions and cynical doubts, the V4 has slovak federation in 1992-1994. But re- survived to celebrate twenty-five years of cently the commonalties and the joint his- existence. Happy birthday! So, there must tory represent a strong background for be something that binds us together, and it good relations –these two nations became must be deep enough not to be destroyed the most amicable of divorced couples. during the critical low periods. Embedded Poles have very balanced relations with values! But what values? the other three nations, and – of course - Democracy? For sure, the euphoria the most sensitive is the question of trust when the communist regimes collapsed was between Slovaks and Hungarians. Howev- authentic and shared. But we all know that er, many bridges have been built in recent implementation of democracy is one thing years to overcome the historically con- and maintenance of a stable democratic re- ditioned distrust. Okay, but what about gime which respects the rule of law, rights of the world beyond Visegrád and its allies? minorities, fairness to all citizens etc., etc., is The challenge came in 2015 with the big- another. The current look of the V4 shows gest refugee crises this part of Europe has that the path to a consolidated democracy ever faced. And another common ground is neither linear nor irreversible; moreover, has been found – the lack of solidarity with citizen commitment to freedom and de- the other EU team-mates more affected by mocracy varies across time and countries. the migration flows, limited displays of hu- What unifies us more is the idea of democ- manity towards the culturally distant “oth- racy. The dream about an ideal democracy ers” and hypocrisy when it comes to ex- which has the ability to put the country back cuses why we cannot help. In spite of all on the right track again. the consequences these V4 positions may But let’s continue exploring – trust? have, let us be optimistic (and romantic) The nations of the Central European re- - the shared idea of good democracy and gion carry a huge historical burden from mutual trust embedded in a common des- their common past. Interpretation of tiny will preserve the bonds. V4 – 25 YEARS 56

The East or West division is a fundamental issue of identity, determining the political reality not only of Central Europe but of the entire continent

JACEK PURCHLA

(b. 1954) is art historian and economist. He founded International Cultural Center in Kraków in 1991 and remains its director until today. 57 WHAT ARE THE VALUES THAT BIND US TOGETHER

entral Europe has never found it- The question of belonging to the East self outside European civilisation, or the West is not—at its core—a question Cbut it has retained its distinctive- of geography and borders, but primarily of ness – which today is a value. This specific an aesthetic sensitivity: belonging to a par- nature of Central Europe follows from its ticular cultural circle, economic zone and unique historical experience and location political system is a matter of philosoph- in the continent. ical outlook! Especially since, in the last This character became obvious in the century, the political borders in Central 20th century. The lingering impact of feu- Europe changed much more rapidly than dalism, delayed nation-building processes the cultural ones. and formation of new nation-states only In the 1970s and 1980s, intellectuals after the First World War, the Bolshevik from the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain Revolution in Russia, the Holocaust, the - György Konrád, Milan Kundera, Vaclav scale of destruction and looting of cultur- Havel, Czesław Miłosz - used the cultural al property during World War II, post- distinctiveness of Czechoslovakia, Hunga- war border changes coupled with the large ry and Poland to manifest the fundamental scale ethnic cleansing it entailed and final- differences between the Soviet reality and ly the almost half-a-century long “lesson of the traditional European values. communism” cannot be ignored when ana- It is obvious that the struggle of lysing the complex and unique situation of Central European nations against the the V4 countries. Soviet domination, which ended victori- The question of geographical location ously in 1989, was not only a fight with is essential and it has been toiled over with communism as a system, but also an ef- great enthusiasm and obsession. The answer fort to return to the Atlantic civilisation. to the question: East or West—seemingly of This strong attachment to the culture no great importance—for the Czechs, Hun- which these nations contributed to for garians, Poles and Slovaks is a fundamental an entire millennium, and the half-cen- issue of identity, determining the political re- tury long experience—unknown in West- ality not only of Central Europe but of the ern Europe—of resisting a totalitarian entire continent. This is where the notion of system, is not only a burden, but also an Central Europe takes its origins, conceived asset which the nations of the Czech Re- not only in geographical, but mainly in his- public, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia torical and cultural terms. can build upon. V4 – 25 YEARS 58

We wanted the values that were central to Western liberal democracies, those relating to human rights, civil rights, pluralistic democracy and the rule of law, to be the focus of our societies

LIBOR ROUČEK

(b. 1954) is a Czech politician, former Member of European Parliament (2004-2014). 59 WHAT ARE THE VALUES THAT BIND US TOGETHER

hen we look at the situation we are not very sensitive to those ques- twenty-five years ago, yes – we tions anymore, or we are less and less con- Wtalked about values. The val- cerned. So I think that we should go back ues that were of Western liberal democra- to our rules and values, and make it abso- cies which meant human rights, civil rights, lutely clear for ourselves, for our citizens pluralistic democracy and the rule of law. and for the rest of the world that yes - these We wanted these values to become the fo- are the rules we want to stick to. cus of our societies, and of course we want- These are aspects of our lessons from ed to join the institutions that were built the past, but now it is twenty-five years lat- on those values. That meant the Europe- er and we have a new generation coming, an Union and NATO. So these other val- one who has not had the experiences which ues of the western liberal societies are and taught us so much. In my opinion, we have should be the values of Visegrád Four be- not done enough to educate this younger cause that is what we aim for, and we also population. In comparison, I could give the know the alternative from the experience example of Germany starting after World we endured under communism. We know War II and still continuing today, there has that if we do not hold these values dear, if been a continual process of political edu- we do not have respect for human rights, cation: the bildung and the Bundeszentrale we could end up again under communist für politische Building, for instance. It has rule and the Soviet influence. been instructing the people and it has be- I think in the early years we were sen- come part of the framework of their socie- sitive to the breaches of human rights com- ty, and when we talk about refugees, it also mitted in the former communist countries educates the newcomers in those same of the “Eastern Block”, and also in coun- values. To become responsible democratic tries like Cuba, China and Vietnam. But citizens, I think we do not do enough in our my feeling is that as more time has passed, V4 countries regarding this matter. V4 – 25 YEARS 60

The Visegrád region, as much as Central Europe, is a heuristic notion that can aid us in comprehending ourselves better if it is applied adequately

BALÁZS TRENCSÉNYI

(b. 1973) is an Associate Professor at the Central European University in Budapest. 61 WHAT ARE THE VALUES THAT BIND US TOGETHER

he construction of “Central Europe- radically different terms over time. Conse- anness” as a community of values goes quently, there is no essential and metaphys- Tback a long way, but its substance has ical content that would timelessly bind these been repeatedly redefined over the past 150 societies together, independent of any histor- years. In the late 19th century, the region was ical context. They are connected since certain identified in opposition to the West, whereas political and cultural elites in various histori- in the interwar period it was seen as a specif- cal periods have adopted common discourses ic zone which is neither fitting the Western and framed certain experiences as shared, but normative framework nor is it completely the framework in which they sought to work Eastern. The Central European ideologeme together was redefined time and again. Their had a certain impact also during the immedi- cooperation is hence not so much value-based ate post-1945 years when the region was por- but intertwined with interests which can be trayed as a bridge between the East and the understood or isolated within a given geo- West. Conversely, the classic Central Europe- political or symbolically geographic context. an discourse of the 1970s and 1980s tried to From this perspective, the tie that binds the define a community of values based on the re- Visegrád cooperation, which managed to sus- gion’s reintegration with the West, and hence tain itself beyond the change of ideologies, ap- it seemed that the 1990s could move beyond pears to be nothing more than pragmatism. the metaphor of a “stolen Europe”, and the Though this pragmatism does have a certain Central European discourse even seemed un- historicity which (re-)arranges the coopera- necessary for some observers and historical tion, giving it its concrete framework. actors. Nevertheless, as territorial and cultural At the same time, while there is no obvi- connections did not allow solving certain mat- ous and particular set of values that bind spe- ters regarding the frames of the nation-states, cifically these four countries together (and it seemed to be worth maintaining a region- there are also a number of other countries al framework. The cooperation thus survived which have overlapping pasts and socio-cul- even when the Central European discourse tural affinities with the Visegrád Four), there became seemingly irrelevant, and some even are historical and cultural experiences which saw the collaboration as restraining and a pos- can be turned into a basis of empathy towards sible hindrance to swift EU accession, which each other. This “tacit knowledge”, originat- was the shared desire of the four countries ing from shared experiences, allows people at the time. Finally, over the past years, we to understand problems and interpret de- have seen the revival of the 19th-century Mit- velopments from a regional perspective that teleuropa concept, albeit without Germany at goes beyond their narrow scope of the na- its core. Interestingly, while before World War tion-state, but is still not as wide as a pan-Eu- I it was the “German” Mitteleuropa that de- ropean framework relativizing most, if not all, fined itself in contrast with the West, now the the contextual nuances. The Visegrád region, political elites of the Visegrád countries con- as much as Central Europe, is thus a heuristic struct their regional agenda in opposition to notion that can aid us in comprehending our- a liberal democratic West most consciously selves better if it is applied adequately, and its represented by Angela Merkel’s Germany. underlying values are not to be interpreted as This implies that the Central Europe- a common essence, but rather as a call for em- an community of values has been defined in pathy and mutual understanding. DOES THE V4 NEED THE EUROZONE? EURO TO V4 CURRENCIES EXCHANGE RATE 2002–2015 (for 1€) SOURCES:

PLN www.ukforex.co.uk/forex-tools/historical-rate-tools/yearly-average-rates HUF www.ukforex.co.uk/forex-tools/historical-rate-tools/yearly-average-rates PLN CZK CZK www.ukforex.co.uk/forex-tools/historical-rate-tools/yearly-average-rates HUF SKK SKK www.oanda.com/currency/average

AVERAGE:

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2002–2015 (2002–2008 for SKK)

4,07

3,83 4,39 4,49 4,02 3,89 3,76 3,51 4,32 3,99 4,11 4,18 4,19 4,18 4,18

271,44

242,98 253,84 251,41 247,4 264,14 251,64 251,33 278,66 275,33 279,21 289,07 296,78 308,56 309,85

27,68

30,81 31,83 31,88 29,72 28,34 27,73 24,98 26,43 25,29 24,58 25,13 25,97 27,53 27,28

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 37,86

42,68 41,47 40,05 38,58 37,2 33,77 31,28 V4 – 25 YEARS 66

In spite of turbulences and political problems, the euro is an economic reality; governments cannot postpone the decision for much longer

PÉTER ÁKOS BOD

is a professor of economics at the Corvinus University in Budapest and former Governor of the Hungarian National Bank. 67 DOES V4 NEED EURO ZONE?

he rationale behind establishing business is a risky political trade-off. Take the Visegrád Group was essential- the case of Hungary. The first time when Tly political, without reference to any this issue was seriously raised, in 2001, the monetary policy issues such as the choice then prime minister, Viktor Orbán, stood of exchange rate regime. Yet, given the sim- for the earliest possible entry. Less than ilarities in legacies and the comparable lev- a decade later, he and his party are again el of development of the V4, it is justifiable in power, only now they place economic to deal with the above question at this ele- sovereignty (or the illusion thereof) above vated, more general level. More precisely, any benefits derived from a more dynam- this could have been a policy issue at the ic economic growth rate. True, problems time of our accession to the EU. At pres- within the eurozone – or problems with ent, it should be rephrased: “does the V3 some eurozone member states – would need eurozone accession”, since Slovakia make even euro-enthusiasts cautious is already in, together with the Baltic na- about the timing of the decision to change tions and Slovenia. I am sure that as soon to the European currency. as Croatia and Romania meet the entry Wait and see, thus, looks like the com- criteria, they will join the eurozone as well. mon no-nonsense strategy. But the “out” This is not surprising. Small and position suffers from systemic weaknesses: open EU member states are particularly having a less-than-significant national cur- exposed to foreign exchange risks. Such rency exposes domestic agents to curren- risks may be reduced greatly by adopting cy risks not borne by their foreign compet- the currency used by the majority of their itors, plus you face additional transaction economic partners. If this is so obvious, costs. These handicaps might be managea- why do the remaining three stay out? The ble by richer nations, but we are not Danes Hungarian and Czech economies are ex- or Swedes. Make no mistake: market play- tremely trade dependent, and the Polish ers do use the euro extensively as a paral- is open to global standards, thus business- lel currency already in non-euro countries. men and economists of the “out” coun- In spite of these turbulences and po- tries can make a strong case for acces- litical problems, the euro is an economic sion to the eurozone. Political support is, reality. Thus the above question will not however, a different cup of tea. Giving up fade away, and governments cannot post- monetary sovereignty for the ease of doing pone the decision for much longer. V4 – 25 YEARS 68

The Central European countries need the eurozone as a compass to show them the direction and motivation for implementing their reforms successfully

MAREK CICHOCKI

(b. 1966) is philosopher and historian, former advisor to Lech Kaczyński, late President of Poland. Professor at Collegium Civitas Warsaw. 69 DOES V4 NEED EURO ZONE?

his was about six years ago, as the economic governance, common fiscal poli- wide spread opinion prevailed in cy and common political representation. If Tthe new member states that after the transformed economies and societies having become the member of the EU in of the CE countries are insufficiently pre- 2004, the next logical step would be to pared to compete effectively in the inte- complete the integration by adopting the grated eurozone, as the popular argument single currency. However, the financial goes in the Polish and Hungarian debates, crisis and the resulting new situation it they have to regain their competitiveness generated in the eurozone has changed before appropriating the single currency. this strategy of full integration originally There is a need for massive structur- envisaged in the association agreements al reforms which should be embarked on of the new member states. The approach by democratic governments and support- of the V4 to the euro has become even ed by democratic societies in those coun- more complicated: over the past decade, tries in order to be prepared for the com- Slovakia (and the Baltic States) decided mon currency. The fear is that adopting to join the eurozone, and during that same the euro without such efforts would lead time, the distance of Hungary, Czech Re- to a deeper peripheralisation of the CE public and Poland to the euro has been countries and the loss of democratic le- growing. There are several serious rea- gitimacy for the much needed economic sons why this has happened, but one rea- and social reforms. Thus, the CE countries son seems to be decisive. do not necessarily need to adopt the euro While the process of economic and to ensure development, competitiveness, political transformation of the Central innovativeness and productivity for the European (CE) countries and the Euro- post-transformation period. For this, they pean integration indicated a high level of surely need bold structural reforms and in- complementarity, this did not necessar- ternal democratic support. However, they ily happen in the case of the current con- do need the eurozone as a compass to show solidation of the eurozone, which should them the direction and motivation for im- actually be the tool to establish the real plementing their reforms successfully. V4 – 25 YEARS 70

It is reassuring in these uncertain times to share not only economic and defence policies, but also a currency with countries holding - or at least aspiring to acquire - similar values and interests

MARTIN FILKO

(1980-2016) was the chief economist at the Slovak Ministry of Finance and director of the Institute for Financial Policy, Minisitry of Finance´s research and policy department. He was an advisor to the prime minister Iveta Radičová, as well as to ministers of finance, health and education under different governments. 71 DOES V4 NEED EURO ZONE?

can see at least two possible answers to of the question. Yet, it is impossible not this question - economic and political. to notice that the voice of the Slovak fi- ILuckily, my answer is affirmative in both nance minister - whoever it may be – car- cases. Being a part of the eurozone helps ries more weight than those of her regional small, open, transition economies like Slo- colleagues just from the very fact that she vakia achieve robust economic growth. participates in the Eurogroup meetings. And having a seat at the inner table not It is reassuring in these uncertain only binds us closer to the continent’s core, times to share not only economic and de- but also give us a stronger voice and helps fence policies, but also a currency with us improve our own institutions. countries holding - or at least aspiring to In a forthcoming paper by the Institute acquire - similar values and interests. For for Financial Policy and the OECD, it will example, Slovakia will be pushing for more be reported that we have rigorously test- economic, especially more fiscal integra- ed the former component of the question. tion in the eurozone including common, Comparing a hypothetical Slovakia (based fiscal instruments and a shared budget to on the performance of similar countries) help it weather asymmetrical econom- with the actual performance of the Slovak ic shocks. It may be a long shot for a small economy after 2006, we find that the 2009 eurozone member, but it would be impos- euro-adoption increased the real GDP per sible without a membership. capita in Slovakia by approximately 10%. So too, after being shown examples Two thirds of the positive gain took place and pressured by our more mature peers, before 2008, emphasizing a strong antic- Slovakia had to build up institutions for ipatory effect. Nevertheless, the GDP per the stewardship of its economy better and capita grew between 2008 and 2011 by more swiftly than our regional neighbours. three additional percentage points. Not surprisingly, the subsequent tighter The effect is structural rather than cy- and more transparent government bud- clical: in line with the standard literature, gets led to a more rapid catching up with we find that had Slovakia kept the floating the core of the eurozone. currency regime during the recession in In Central Europe, no country is an 2009, the economy would have been tem- island. It is in the economic and political porarily better off by roughly 2%. interest of the Visegrád countries to join I have limited experience in Europe- the common continental currency, rather an politics to comment on the latter aspect than to continue to float. V4 – 25 YEARS 72

The V4 countries have the desire to be influential players in Europe, and to accomplish this, they should join eurozone as soon as possible

DANUTA HÜBNER

(b. 1948) is a Polish economist, academic and a former European Commissioner for Regional Policy (2004-2009). Currently she is the Chair of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) of the European Parliament. 73 DOES V4 NEED EURO ZONE?

e are living a crucial time in resolution. These reforms increase the re- the history of the European silience of the eurozone’ s economy and WUnion, when certain evident the crisis management capabilities of the truths are being questioned and some group. In order to be fully effective, howev- temptations are resurfacing. In the con- er, those reforms cannot be limited to one text of the V4, we can observe a tendency part of the European Union only. to distance ourselves from the core con- In order to gain as much advantage as cerns of the EU. possible from this effort to reshape the eu- Undoubtedly, this kind of isolationist rozone, it is in the vital interest of its mem- attitude, including the lack of confidence ber countries to include those that remain in the eurozone, has resulted, to a large ex- still outside of it and vice versa. For in- tent, from the euro area crisis and the aus- stance, it should be particularly advanta- terity policies implemented after the 2008 geous for these countries to join the Bank- crisis. The V4 countries’ reaction can, thus, ing Union since their banking systems are be psychologically understandable. But characterised by a large presence of foreign politically, it can have, in the long run, det- banks and have the associated potential of rimental effects on their growth as well as cross-border issues. Another point, of no on their overall position in the EU. less importance to the V4 countries outside It is in the interest of the V4 countries the eurozone, is their desire to be influential to have a politically strong and economical- players in Europe, and to accomplish this ly stable eurozone and, in time, become its they should join as soon as possible. full-fledged members. Only by being a part Even before their formal accession to of a coherent, inclusive and globally com- the eurozone, these V4 countries that do petitive group - sharing with it a common not yet share the common currency should currency as well as cooperating economi- have as their goal to become an indispen- cally - can our countries avoid the dangers sable partner and serious interlocutor in of lagging development and the middle-in- eurozone-related issues. come trap. The V4 group is facing a key chal- It is worth noting that the post-crisis lenge for its future: whether to be an agen- eurozone’s architecture is very different da-setter for the European Union as a ful- from how it looked before. Reforms have ly-fledged member of the eurozone or to been conducted to enhance fiscal policy remain a regional grouping of countries coordination and discipline on a nation- with ambiguous standing in the EU and al-level. A Banking Union has been cre- divergent strategies toward the outside ated, with two pillars having now started world. to operate: a single mechanism for bank I think that the choice should be pret- supervision and another one for bank ty obvious. V4 – 25 YEARS 74

Central European countries should be able to breathe both within the eurozone as well as outside of it

ZDENĚK TŮMA

(b. 1960) is a Czech economist and former Governor of the Czech National Bank (2000-2010). 75 DOES V4 NEED EURO ZONE?

here are two principal aspects we European countries entered the Europe- must address when we want to as- an Union with significantly lower econom- Tsess the pros and cons of euro adop- ic output per capita. Thus, it could have tion in Central European countries. One is been expected that these countries would the economic impact, the other is a politi- be catching up with their wealthier peers, cal issue. As a former central banker, I shall or converging in real terms as we say in the focus on the first one. economic jargon. And this process of real We can distinguish several monetary convergence has an impact on the real ex- policy regimes such as monetary, exchange change rate – which is a combination of rate, inflation targeting and some others. nominal exchange rate and differences in But when we speak about the exchange domestic and foreign inflation. rate in monetary policy, we have got just These countries were really growing two basic concepts, fixed and floating ex- faster in the previous period as compared change rates. We should realize that from to the average economic growth of the “old the central banking perspective, the euro EU members”. Therefore, their local cur- is a de facto fixed exchange rate regime. rencies mostly appreciated in real terms to Therefore, we can consider the (dis)ad- the euro; in some countries the apprecia- vantages of the euro in the context of the tion went primarily through nominal ex- debate over exchange rate policies. change rate, (i.e. in the Czech Republic); in Regardless of the choice of the mon- others it was channelled both via higher do- etary policy regime, the ultimate objective mestic inflation and the nominal exchange of central banks is to smooth over the vola- rate. Now, were the exchange rate fixed, or tility of the business cycle. Monetary poli- euro adopted, during the period of signifi- cy itself is a powerful weapon; nevertheless cantly faster growth, it would have led to it cannot change economic trends: they are higher inflation – as it would have been the based on fundamentals such as productiv- only channel for real appreciation. ity, labour market flexibility, legal frame- Looking towards the future, I tend to work, functioning state administration and believe that this process of fast real con- alike. In other words, monetary policy can vergence is over, and there is pressure influence the volatility of various economic on local currencies as well. It means that variables, such as inflation, exchange rates adopting the euro (i.e. fixing the exchange or output. The same holds true for the rate), should not boost inflation to signifi- choice of foreign exchange environment – cantly higher levels. if we fix the exchange rate, inflation will be My conclusion is that the Central Eu- more volatile, and vice versa. ropean countries should be able to breathe I believe it is straightforward in the both within the eurozone as well as outside aforementioned context that the euro it- of it. The economic impact of such a deci- self cannot change the economic perfor- sion would be very limited. Therefore, this mance or the growth of potential out- type of decision is really a political one – put. There is one caveat, however. Central but that is a different story. COULD INNOVATION BE THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE V4 REGION? INNOVATION CITIES BLOOMBERG GLOBAL INNOVATION INNOVATION INDEX 2014 GDANSK INDEX 2015 CZ INDEX 98 (out of 50) (out of 141) CZ Rank in Europe 31 (out of 153 cities) 235 24 Global rank (out of 445 WARSAW

benchmark cities) SK HU 50 42 PL PL 35 PRAGUE 109 PL 28 KATOWICE 25 HU 46 62 131 32

332 SK BRNO CZ Country's overall rank is the average of the six CRACOW measures: R&D, Manufacturing, High Tech 36 139 SK Companies, Education, Research Personnel, 133 and Patents 358 334

BRATISLAVA HU 97 KOSICE INNOVATION ONLINE LINKAGES CZ CREATIVITY CZ 235 (out of 141) RANKING BUDAPEST 135 (out of 141) 30 346 53 24 64

HU HU PL NESTA EUROPEAN DIGITAL CITIES INDEX WARSAW SK 83 32 37 24 69 PRAGUE PL SK 19 BUDAPEST 102 39

22 Based on the number of generic University/industry research collaboration, State of top-level domains’ links cluster development, GERD financed by abroad, BRATISLAVA JV–strategic alliance deals, Patent families 3+ offices All of the above are ordinal rankings. Global Innovation Index 2015 The lower the number the better the Global Innovation Index 2015 25 position of the city/country. V4 – 25 YEARS 80

Innovation is not just a possibility for the V4, it is the most powerful growth engine we will ever find

PÉTER ÁRVAI

(b. 1979) is a Swedish entrepreneur of Hungarian descent, CEO and co-founder of Prezi, presentation software company with the world’s largest database of publically available presentations, started from Budapest. 81 COULD INNOVATION BE THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE V4 REGION?

hree out of today’s five most valua- mistakes and are able to challenge their as- ble companies are companies built sumptions are also more likely to produce Ton innovative products. The com- creative thinking. This is the creative men- bined market value of Apple, Google and tality that often builds the companies of Microsoft is USD 1400 bn - ten times the future, and this mind-set we can prac- more than the expected Hungarian GDP tice and should teach in our educational for 2015. institutions. This is, however, not just a story of The creative movement is often led value creation but also a story about the by entrepreneurs who not only build great rate of change. In 2013, two other com- companies but can also influence whole panies in the very same business sector countries and create opportunities for had two completely different outcomes. others. On the eve of 1990, Estonia was in One of them, more than 130 years old and a very similar situation, with its shared his- very well-established filed for bankrupt- tory of communist rule and the Soviet oc- cy, while the other one, only a few years cupation, as the V4 countries are in today. old and run by 13 employees was acquired Over the past twenty-five years, this tiny for USD 1bn. The former was Kodak, the country with a population of 1.3m became latter was Instagram. Both helped people the leader of digital innovations. After its to share pictures, but the difference was earliest success story, Skype, was sold in that Instagram had an innovative solu- 2005 for USD 2.6bn, Estonia reformed it- tion--proving that creativity trumps expe- self. It created a new class of investors in rience. As a result of innovation, the life ex- the country, who have used this money to pectancy of the most successful companies finance innovative companies with fresh in the world has gone from over sixty years ideas. As a result, Estonia holds the world in the 1960s to a mere eighteen today. The record in start-ups per person. only way to survive in today’s economy is What aided this development was that by constantly reinventing who you are and the government adopted this approach to what you do. itself. Estonia was the first country to in- So can we in the V4 countries be glob- troduce online voting in 2007, and now the ally competitive with regards to creativi- whole government is online, which means ty? The reality is that creativity is more of they could even run the country from un- a mind-set than something you are born der the sea if it were necessary. with. I have found that people who are in- Innovation is not just a possibility for trinsically motivated, allow themselves the V4, it is the most powerful growth en- to be vulnerable and learn from their gine we will ever find. V4 – 25 YEARS 82

There is a high potential for growth in this field, especially in the cases of lower-level innovations or in the arenas of managerial, marketing or process innovations

RUT BÍZKOVÁ

(b. 1957) is a chairwomen of the Technology Agency of the Czech Republic and Czech nuclear energy specialist. 83 COULD INNOVATION BE THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE V4 REGION?

his question could hardly be an- centres are successful in attracting devel- swered in any other way than “of opment activities of multinational com- Tcourse it could”. However, it is im- panies or in supporting the formation and portant to know where the potential for in- growth of national (endogenic) companies. novation can be found, and where its use This idea can be illustrated by the success- could be most efficiently implemented. ful results of the large-scale project INKA Having observed the situation in the – the mapping of innovation capacities in V4 countries, there is a high potential for the Czech Republic – within which macro- growth in this field, especially in the cas- economic and microeconomic data were es of lower-level innovations or in the added by detailed interviews with manag- arenas of managerial, marketing or pro- ers of leading innovating companies and cess innovations. Regardless of any use of leading exporters. similar techniques and technologies, our Both increased challenges and op- labour productivity still remains below portunities lie ahead in the ongoing Next the EU average or that of other success- Production Revolution, which comprises ful national economics. Such innovations the change of production patterns towards could bring about some “low hanging fruit” digitalization, decentralization (especial- and may become the source of econom- ly in the energy sector) or the introduction ic growth based on growing national con- of 3D printing, which could become an sumption as well as an increasing of export important production tool. The internet opportunities. of things, facilities and labour are bring- Additionally, higher-level innovations ing about a new life-style including new often based on research and development types of services and approaches to these represent another issue. At present, there services. is great incentive for their expansion and I am deeply convinced that the citi- implementation in the Visegrád countries zens of the V4 countries that have under- – high research and development capac- gone many radical changes during the 20th ities have been built in all four countries century will be able to adapt themselves to with the support from the EU structur- this emerging change easier than others. al funds. In the Czech Republic, many re- A quick response to this challenge search centres have been built equipped will bring us a comparative advantage – with high-tech devices, which are difficult not only due to the fact that we live in Cen- to find elsewhere in Europe. This gives us tral Europe where all roads from the North an opportunity to base our future econom- to the South and from the East to the West ic growth on new solutions provided these are crossing… V4 – 25 YEARS 84

The past investments, we were once attractive for, were not very advanced or complex; they did not require a high level of specialised skills. Those opportunities no longer exist

JADWIGA EMILEWICZ

(b. 1974) is a Polish political scientist and manager, undersecretary of state in the Development Ministry. 85 COULD INNOVATION BE THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE V4 REGION?

nnovations are one of the pillars of too limited; guests from Ukraine and Bela- the Responsible Development Plan rus will also be welcome. Hopefully, it will Iannounced by the current govern- be successful in showing our common eco- ment, which was prepared by Mateusz nomic mission. Morawiecki, the Vice-Minister and Min- Within the Responsible Develop- ister of Economic Development. What is ment Plan, we have identified several traps more, he often uses a quote that Poland which Poland has fallen afoul. One of per- will either be great, or it won’t exist at all. sistent worry is the middle-income-trap. Personally, I paraphrase these words into Until recently the cheap labour force has thinking that Poland will either be innova- been our basic competitive advantage, but tive, or it won’t exist at all. this lead is coming to an end since there is We know that to be able to compete an even cheaper labour force further to the with the largest enterprises in Europe and East, and the reality of the situation is that the rest of the world, we need to increase it is not difficult to move a business 500 km our capital. We can either do it locally by away. The past investments we were once uniting forces, or a more advantageous attractive for were not very advanced or option would be to cooperate within the complex; they did not require a high level Visegrád Group. We have some plans for of specialized skills. Those opportunities the upcoming period of the Polish pres- no longer exist, and we can readily observe, idency in the group which are focused on in large cities, this shift towards more in- this issue. Currently, the Silicon Valley is novative competencies, but we still need to the ultimate dream for the young Polish increase the amount of modern and tech- talent in the IT field, and when they are nologically advanced investments. successful in their pursuits, we, of course, Our V4 partners are facing similar are proud of their accomplishments. How- problems, and we share the same concerns ever, we would like to create the conditions regarding the higher competency market. where some of them would wish to stay Again, if we stand together and show our and develop the Polish sector. Moreover, skills and capabilities, our power to attract we would like to build a scenario where the will increase. This is especially so if we fo- Polish market is attractive enough to en- cus our attention on the area between the tice promising foreign talent to relocate Baltic to the Black seas where the poten- here. By saying here, I do not mean just Po- tial for development is huge. Our diplo- land, but the whole of Central Europe. matic efforts should be united because to- Accomplishing this task will take years gether we will all achieve more. Surely, the of devotion, and while it is too soon to talk possibility to lose everything is present if about the “Visegrad Valley” as a compet- we continue competing with each other. itor to the Silicon one, we are planning to The most immediate solution would be es- organise a technological fair strictly dedi- tablishing cross-national production lines cated to V4 start-ups during our presiden- which would certainly benefit everyone in cy. Though, of course, our scope will not be the Visegrád Group. V4 – 25 YEARS 86

The very success of the V4 economic model is increasing its indefensibility. Success means higher growth, which then entails higher salaries, and would lead to a reduction in its competitiveness in this sector

IVAN MIKLOŠ

(b. 1960) is a Slovak politician, former Deputy Prime Minister for Economy (1998-2002) and Minister of Finance (2002-2006, 2010-2012). Co-founder and director of the MESA 10 think-tank (1992-98). Between 2015-16 he was working as a chief advisor to the Ukrainian Minister of Finance; currently he is a senior economic advisor to Prime Minister Volodymyr Hrojsman. 87 COULD INNOVATION BE THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE V4 REGION?

he simple and correct answer to production sector is not immune to this the posed question is that innova- trend. Yet, the V4 have found the path for Ttion not only could but will have to achieving these goals is to create precon- be the future of economic growth in the ditions for a fruitful restructuring of this V4 region if this region wants to be suc- production zone based either on a knowl- cessful. A sentiment which would car- edge-based or an innovation-driven econ- ry with it a better standard of living and omy. As a clue to the realisation of their quality of life for its people. models, the World Economic Forum in its When considering the new EU mem- Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) di- ber states, the V4 countries are among vides countries into three basic groups – the most developed and advanced of the factor-driven, efficiency-driven and innova- post-communist countries. The econom- tion-driven. In the latest GCI 2015 – 2016 ic models of these countries are based on listings, the Czech Republic and Slova- the highly competitive mass industrial pro- kia are among the innovation driven coun- duction (e.g. cars or electronics). The V4 tries while Poland and Hungary are placed countries have attracted a lot of foreign di- in transition stage between the second and rect investment in this area because they third groups. can offer a very qualified and still compar- The only way for the V4 countries to atively cheap labour force as well as a rel- avoid the middle income trap and build an atively mature business environment. The innovation-driven economy is to provide main problem is that the very success of the necessary reforms focused mostly on this economic model is increasing its in- the following areas – sound and sustain- defensibility—as success means higher able public finance, competitive business growth, which then entails higher salaries, environment, effective public sector and and would lead to a reduction in its overall knowledge economy. competitiveness in this sector. Countries that will thrive in complet- Global competition is steadily increas- ing this transition will be innovation-driv- ing everywhere, and the mass industrial en and successful. V4 – 25 YEARS 88

The V4 might continue to order what others already have had and put a lot ketchup on it to moderate the aftertaste, or they might invent leaner ways of managing their national economies and clusters of excellence

STEFFEN ROTH

(b. 1976) is a German academic, Professor-Chercheur of Management and Organization at ESC Rennes School of Business in France. 89 COULD INNOVATION BE THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE V4 REGION?

he answer clearly is: “Yes, but…..” it can be used to best the rest of the world, In the movie When Harry Met Sal- and the less competitive advantage it pro- Tly, actress Meg Ryan as Sally vivid- vides. There is hence no reason why the V4 ly fakes an orgasm during a romantic din- should remain preoccupied with importing ner in a crowded New York delicatessen to the best innovation practices, which neces- convince her date that men cannot tell the sarily keeps the V4 locked in a game where difference. The scene ends with her casu- they constantly have to catch-up with what ally resuming her meal as a lady at a neigh- others have already been achieving. This bouring table places her order with the catch-up logic corrupts the dynamics of iconic line, “I’ll have what she’s having”. a genuine innovation process as much as The V4 countries also seem to be busy ketchup spoils the flavour of a genuine with getting what others are having. Oth- meal. ers here refers to the most potent national The V4 might nonetheless continue economies or regional innovation clusters. to order what others already have had and This is not to say that, for example, the re- put a lot ketchup on it to moderate the af- cent New York high-tech climax – vividly tertaste, or they might invent leaner ways performed by the former Governor of New of managing their national economies York, George Pataki, during his keynote at and clusters of excellence. Since competi- think.BDPST 2016 – is fake. Yet bench- tion necessarily is not lean, this strategic marking no matter whether fake or real shift would involve a farewell to 20th cen- success stories often requires spending tury competitive strategies. Lean innova- a lot of time and money on “recipes” that tion strategies of the 21st century will be fo- have the same impact on our well-being cused on value innovation. Difference, not as the above meal had on the lady who or- competition, is the key to this future. Thus, dered it. Even if some recipes work some- innovation will be the future of economic times, copied recipes are often worse than growth in the V4 as soon as the V4 know original ones: the New York strategy of in- more about the value that innovations vesting public money in high-tech clusters “Made in V4” generate not only for the V4 of smart people and smart technologies so citizens, but also for a world full of custom- as to outsmart the rest of the world only ers who are desperately in need of alterna- works if you are among the first to apply it. tives to the “more of the same” with “catch- The more popular this manoeuvre, the less up” flavour. WHAT SHOULD THE CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE V4 REGION LOOK LIKE? NUMBER OF DAYS WITH EXCEEDANCES OF THE PM10 DAILY MEAN OF 50 µg/m³ 2013 75

based on the number of exceedances at the peak stressed monitoring station of a region (including traffic stressed stations)

SOURCE: Air Quality Data in 2013 The Comparison 64 of Cities and Regions in Europe, Municipality of Linz Environmental 60 and Technical Center 55 55 48

35

28

LONDON VIENNA BERLIN RIGA PRAGUE BUDAPEST WARSAW BRATISLAVA V4 – 25 YEARS 94

The renewable energy effort of the V4 has slowed considerably. In 2015, for instance, the Czech Republic and Hungary did not add a single new megawatt (MW) of wind power

DAVID BUCHAN

(b. 1947 ) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, former journalist at The Economist (1970-1974) and Financial Times (1975-2006). 95 WHAT SHOULD THE CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE V4 REGION LOOK LIKE?

he climate policies of the Visegrád in sharp contrast to the reduction in coal Four look reasonable at the mo- capacity everywhere in Western Europe Tment and will meet their EU tar- except for Germany.] gets for 2020, but they are badly posi- Renewables have never been very tioned to carry these countries towards popular in the V4 countries—and were the bigger emission reductions expected made even less so in the Czech Repub- of them by 2030. lic by the wildly over-generous solar sub- Twenty-fie years ago, the collapse sidies of the past. Nor has much progress of heavy industry in the V4 contributed been made in the alternative low carbon to a reduction in emissions. This general field of nuclear power, even though they breakdown also created a statistical jump all support it in principle. Hungary is ad- upwards for renewable energy because vancing quickly with its plans for the Rus- hydro-electric power and wood-burning sian-built additions to Paks; Poland’s first for heat did not suffer the same drop that nuclear plant will not be realised until the conventional coal and gas power did, and 2020s, and Slovakia is only adding a mod- therefore represented a larger share of the est amount to its nuclear capacity. total energy consumed when compared Until 2020, the V4 are allowed to in- with the communist period. In the EU’s crease emissions in areas outside the pow- energy and climate agreements of 2009, er and industrial sector covered by the the V4, like other, newer EU member Emission Trading Scheme, such as trans- states, were given relatively easy renewa- port, services and agriculture. But after ble energy targets for 2020; this was partly 2020, they will to have restrain or reduce in recognition of the fact that they adopt- emissions in these non-ETS areas. ed renewable subsidy schemes later than The V4 have clearly found the Viseg- Western European states. rad forum a useful tool to lobby the EU on However, the renewable energy ef- energy and climate policies, and now that fort of the V4 has slowed considera- regional cooperation is supposed to be the bly. In 2015, for instance, the Czech Re- building block of the new Energy Union public and Hungary did not add a single plan. Yet Visegrád would be more useful if new megawatt (MW) of wind power. Po- the four countries were to work closer to- land added 1.2 gigawatts (GW) of onshore gether as in their recent agreement to co- wind last year, but this is dwarfed by the operate on hydrogen technology as a way more than 4 GW of hard coal and lignite of storing electricity. Whether or not these capacity that Polish companies are cur- plans will come to fruition will depend on rently building. Furthermore, Czech coal how closely the V4 cooperate and extend capacity is also being increased. [This is their influence. V4 – 25 YEARS 96

Poland is the last country of the V4 group to still engage with coal mining. That’s one of major differences that directly relate to our disparate opinions on the climate treaty

MACIEJ BUKOWSKI

is a Polish economist, Research Fellow at the Warsaw School of Economics, president of WiseEurope think tank. 97 WHAT SHOULD THE CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE V4 REGION LOOK LIKE?

he Visegrád Group is an assorted col- of alternative energy production, and the sit- lection of countries, and since the fall uation could be dire as there have been ru- Tof communism, they have followed mours about some acts which would actually diverse paths when it comes to the question limit the development of wind power plants at hand. Poland is, for example, the only state in Poland. A large, modern wind power plant which does not have nuclear power. We are could be profitable and require no subsi- also the last country of the group to still en- dies. Those benefits notwithstanding, there gage with coal mining. Consequently, these is some deeply-rooted scepticism in Poland differences directly relate to our disparate towards renewable sources of energy. Part of opinions on the climate treaty. For the Czech the solution is to bring about gradual, effec- Republic, the climate policy is quite benefi- tive regulation. Unstable regulation would cial since they have a nuclear power plant and create a risky environment, but if we are too have become, therefore, its proponents. Fur- slow in acting, we may hit a wall around 2020 thermore, the Czechs and Slovaks have high- where there physically won’t be enough pow- er credit rankings (AA- and A+ respective- er produced in Poland. ly) than Poland (BBB+), which makes their However, if there is an external climate costs of financing lower. Investment with- policy which forces some reduction targets, in the energy sector always consumes a lot a state must cope with it. A large contribut- of capital, so obviously the lower the cost of ing factor to the Polish situation results from the capital, the easier it is to accomplish. The an inability to solve the problem of coal min- truth is that the other countries of the region ing. The coal industry in Poland is doomed, are less vulnerable to the consequences of and its participation must be decreased. The the climate policy because their investment problem is that current Polish energy policies markets are smaller. Regardless of these fac- are held hostage by coal. To be honest and tors, being part of the EU requires member blunt, it is time to say goodbye to coal in the states to adhere and fulfil policy initiatives. cities. What is more, politicians should start In our case, success depends on overcoming acknowledging the devastating environmen- hurdles in three areas – infrastructure, regu- tal impacts of coal and initiate developing gas lations and politics. power plants. The old power plants must go, The first issue of infrastructure relates and there are too few new ones being built. to both to the economy and technology. Eco- The problems of Poland are decisions nomically thinking, what pays off is nuclear and uncertainty. If you want my opinion, power and windmills. There have been tre- I would say the most rational choice for Po- mendous inroads made regarding increas- land is to seriously consider either a nuclear ing the efficiency of production as well as the project or a large network of windmills, sim- storing of energy; however, we know little ply because something must replace coal, about the proportions, good market settings a substance we are running out of and trea- and the organization of these sources of en- ty bound to diminish the usage of. My hum- ergy. Moreover, following this wave of tech- ble hope is for the Polish coal industry to go nological change is not enough as it may be bankrupt. Once it substantially decreases in gridlocked by local regulations. size, we would only have about 15,000 min- In Poland, many regional governments ers remaining, and then it will no longer be are actively trying to block the development a political problem. V4 – 25 YEARS 98

Instead of continued laments about our destiny, governments should learn from the Bundesrepublik, start viewing energy from a different perspective and get working

VOJTĚCH KOTECKÝ

(b. 1974) is a former campaign director at Friends of the Earth Czech Republic (Hnutí DUHA), an environmental group, works as an analyst in Prague-based Glopolis think tank. 99 WHAT SHOULD THE CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE V4 REGION LOOK LIKE?

hen Stocznia Gdańsk faced More than 100 people a year die a crisis in shipbuilding, it dis- prematurely due to local air pollution Wcovered an entirely new mar- from Hungary’s Matra coal power plant ket: the manufacturing of wind pow- alone – and there are several dozen simi- er plants. This peculiar story from one lar plants across the V4. Heating homes of the more storied and iconic industrial in Visegrád countries is, as it stands, plants in Visegrád pointed to possibly the largely a massive transfer of wealth from most reasonable course for developing Central European families to Gazprom. a sound V4 climate policy. Instead of en- The Slovak economy alone paid € 1.2 bil- gaging in bitter climate debates, perhaps lion for the net import of natural gas in we should start talking about something 2014. We need, and want, to deal with more productive. these problems. Few people view Zelená úsporám as Strangely enough, Energiewende a climate policy. Nevertheless, the highly might be an inspiration here. A Germa- successful scheme which helps Czech fam- ny-style nuclear ZAGATA 2012 ToPB ilies to insulate their homes and purchase phase-out is not exactly something the clean heating, is, in fact, an ambitious ef- Visegrád public strives for. But while we fort to cut household reliance on fossil fu- may disagree on objectives, key planks of els. And a recently adopted Polish law pro- the German energy reform – power decen- vides for at least 200,000 households to tralisation, robust investment in energy ef- buy their own solar roofs, launching a new ficiency, deep innovation in energy system citizen-based energy sector in the country. – are useful for V4 countries. Instead of Smart homes and micro-electrici- continued laments about our destiny, gov- ty production, nuclear reactors and farm- ernments should learn from the Bundesre- waste biogas, electric vehicles and munic- publik, start viewing energy from a differ- ipal windfarms may cut carbon emissions ent perspective and get working. substantially. But they also slash smog, en- This will help us to find approaches ergy bills and fuel imports while recharg- on climate – as well as energy – policy that ing the economy – none of which would unite us with our neighbours, instead of fo- count as controversial policy objectives in cusing on divisive issues. the Visegrád countries. V4 – 25 YEARS 100

Without overcoming this profound cognitive gap in our societies, no serious climate policies can emerge. The climate policies we have today only exist because of pressure from Brussels

JURAJ MESIK

(b. 1962) is a Slovak academic and environmental expert and activist, former Slovak Green Party Chairman (1990-1991) and World’s Bank Senior Community Foundation Specialist (2003-2008). 101 WHAT SHOULD THE CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE V4 REGION LOOK LIKE?

espite being a V4 enthusiast, I am how vast the level of human and political ig- rather sceptical when it comes to norance is regarding climate change. Dthe global responsibility of the V4 Contrary to subsidies, a carbon tax countries. For centuries, our region re- should be introduced to encourage people as mained on the periphery of the West, and, well as businesses to save energy and to invest due in part to this marginalisation, it con- in clean energy sources. Taxation is a well- tinues to behave in a rather provincial known and widely used instrument, which manner. Take our unfulfilled foreign aid has proved to be a very effective method of commitments, the lacklustre response to discouraging pollution. Unlike complicated, the migration wave which started in 2015 utterly artificial and corruption-prone car- or the issue at hand – climate change. bon-trading schemes, which have had essen- But let us dream! What would climate tially no positive effect on the climate, taxation policies of the V4 look like in an ideal sce- is simple and works. This can be demonstrat- nario? First of all, in such a scenario our cli- ed through a simple comparison of CO2 emis- mate policies would stem from both the in- sions per capita or per GDP dollar/ euro of ternal understandings of the citizens and EU countries with high fuel and energy taxes political elites of the Visegrád countries. and the USA, which has effectively no carbon Without overcoming this profound cogni- tax. Surprisingly, those countries show rates tive gap in our societies, no serious climate that are two to three times lower than those in policies can emerge and be implement- the USA. An added point is the Jevons para- ed. All the climate policies we have today dox which illustrates that energy must be ex- only exist because of pressure from Brus- pensive; otherwise it ends up wasted regard- sels. Their implementation, if any, is conse- less of any energy efficiency standards. quently lukewarm. An ideal climate policy for the V4 In order to bridge this perceptive gap, would indeed have many other features, but we must come to the understanding that we an integral component would also be adap- are not poor victims of someone else´s sins, tation. Whatever we do, 400 ppm of CO2 is but rather belong to the small group of cul- already in the atmosphere which means the prits who perpetrated the crime; indeed, we global climate will continue to get worse. It have benefited greatly from the reckless burn- will take time and an informed populous ing of fossil fuels in the past. Our cumulative to improve the situation, but the situation per capita energy-related CO2 emissions put is not hopeless. Without action, our Cen- Czechs, Poles and Slovaks among the twenty tral European world will be much warm- most polluting nations in the world. Hungar- er, much dryer, water in some parts will be- ians too made it to the top 30 list.1 come more precious, weather more extreme A must for any meaningful climate pol- and food much more expensive. Hopeful- icy will involve the cancelling of the rather ly the V4 people will realise the inevitable perverse subsidies for the extraction and changes we need to sustain our way of life; use of coal as well as any other fossil fuel. we do have the time and resources to make The very existence of such subsidies proves this adjustment, but we need to act now.

1 For details see https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7c/Cumulative_energy-related_per_capita_ carbon_dioxide_emissions_between_1850-2008_for_185_countries.png V4 – 25 YEARS 102

The V4 have the political blueprint from the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) system, as completed by the Paris Agreement. Nothing more, but nothing less!

JÁNOS ZLINSZKY

is a Hungarian academic and director of the Sustainable Development Academy of the Regional Environmental Center (REC) in Szentendre, Hungary. 103 WHAT SHOULD THE CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE V4 REGION LOOK LIKE?

he frames of this opinion paper ex- • Plan, budget, (re)build and (re)equip clude the presentation of bibliogra- for the transformation into a circular Tphy, or a system of facts, trends or economy. options. Even barest, laconic conclusions • Build - in this order of priority – so- cannot be comprehensive on one page, cial, ecological, infrastructural and fi- for large, complex systems can only be ad- nancial resilience. dressed simplistically at one’s own peril. At • Assist the poorest countries honestly, a certain tipping point of compression, the consequently, and generously to also message turns useless. With this caveat, here do the above. is my best summary advice, or rather, plea: At the brink of 2016, “Humankind ex- Supported by public goodwill and pects that every nation will do his duty”!2 the optimism that the Paris success gen- This duty is disarmingly simple: last year erated, climate change considerations we concluded an agreement about a trans- and measures must be now declared formative global development path for a lasting political priority, and conse- the next fifteen years – now “pacta sunt quently integrated into national and lo- servanda”! The V4 must “simply” hono- cal policies, strategies and planning as ur their existing international obligations, defined by the SDGs. adhering to the spirit and intent, willingly Changing the political agenda hing- and proactively. These nations – as all oth- es on a decisive, ongoing effort to build the ers – must transform their material flows capacities for the transformation in all age and social relations from within, as fast as groups. Finance flows will have to serve the possible, lest the heavy hand of nature im- new political goals unequivocally. National poses any changes. budgets and spending must support a path- Regarding climate change, the V4 way towards low GHG emissions and cli- have the political blueprint from the UN mate resilient development. And let us not Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) cheat ourselves! It will never work with- system, as completed by the Paris Agree- out doing away with fossil fuel subsidies ment. Nothing more, but nothing less! The - and without doing away with the com- parallel tracks of sweeping action that re- mercial advertisement of unsustainable quire attention are: goods, services and actions! Instead, open- • Mainstream climate change mitigation ness, learning, co-operation, engagement urgently throughout politics and media and altruistic actions are needed from all, • Launch a decisive, ongoing effort to statesmen included. The good news is that build the human capacities for the this is exactly the behaviour that leads to transformation. human happiness…

2 – to paraphrase Nelson. ENERGY SECURITY - WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE? SOURCES OF GAS IN VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES

37% 77% 7% 1% 4% PL 22% 52%

CZ 67% 2% SK

2% 98% 13% HU 18%

SOURCE: RUSSIA TURKMENISTAN DOMESTIC

Visegrad Insight 1/2012 GERMANY NORWAY OTHERS

SHARE OF GAS IN ENERGY MIX

12,8% 28,3% POLAND SLOVAKIA 15,6% 40,4% CZECH REP. HUNGARY V4 – 25 YEARS 108

Though they shared a similar historical experience, each country has taken different paths. Poland is striving to limit interaction with Russia while Hungary signed a deal with Russia to build two nuclear reactors

VÁCLAV BARTUŠKA

(b. 1968) is a Czech diplomat, politician and journalist, Ambassador-at-Large for Energy Security of the Czech Republic since 2006. 109 ENERGY SECURITY - WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

s soon as the Visegrád countries Regarding natural gas, the Czech Re- re-gained their independence in public fully privatised its companies and as- A1989, they were faced with the sets in 2001 while Slovakia (which originally problem of dependency on a single suppli- was following a similar course) partly re-na- er of oil and gas. The fact that this supplier tionalised its gas industry in 2013; Poland happened to be their former occupier un- never let go of its national champions (this is derlined the need for action. not limited to the gas sector), and Hungary We have achieved the most in oil sup- set itself a goal to create a state utility com- plies: at the moment, all four countries have pany which would be not-for-profit. In this access to the global market, despite three set-up, it is not surprising that most of what of them being land-locked. Whether it was the V4 does is talk: in June 2013, the four an oil pipeline from Germany to the Czech prime ministers signed a memorandum to Republic (built in 1996) or an upgrade of create a common Visegrád market for nat- the existing Adria pipeline from Croatia to ural gas, but nothing came out of it. Subse- Hungary and Slovakia (completed in the quently, the Czech Republic is now a de facto last two years), this is a story of success. part of north-western European gas market For the rest, it is remarkable how dif- (comprising Benelux, Germany and north- ferent the approaches to energy security ern France), while Hungary retains 100 per were. Though they shared a similar his- cent dependency on Russia. torical experience, each country took dif- In electricity, the Czech Republic, ferent paths. Poland is striving to lim- Slovakia and Hungary have a unified mar- it interaction with Russia to an absolute ket (including Romania), but Poland opted minimum, even excluding Russian com- not to be included. panies from certain areas of operation. I am convinced that for countries of In contrast, Hungary in 2014 signed an our size, regional cooperation is the best inter-governmental deal with Russia to way forward. Whether this will be under build two nuclear reactors at Paks. Visegrád banner, remains to be seen. V4 – 25 YEARS 110

Energy puts the V4 in the centre of Europe, not only geographically but also economically and politically

JERZY BUZEK

(b. 1940) is the Chairman of the Committee of Industry, Research and Energy of the European Parliament. Former president of the European Parliament and former Prime Minister of Poland. 111 ENERGY SECURITY - WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

nergy cooperation and a North-South one of EU’s priority investments in in- Energy Corridor to lower our de- frastructure. It will allow not only for the Ependence on the monopolized east- swift distribution of gas throughout Cen- west gas supply have been a core aim of the tral and Eastern Europe, but it will permit Visegrád Group mentioned explicitly in the gas supplies from new suppliers to other founding declaration of 1991. It has been, European states - thanks to the new LNG however, only in the last few years that we terminals. can see real progress in this area. Until re- Energy puts the V4 in the centre of cently, like in the EU more broadly, the mo- Europe, not only geographically but also mentum for aligning our countries’ energy economically and politically. It will suffice policies was simply not present. to note that the Energy Union, proposed The supply disruptions of 2006 and by Poland and brought to life by the Slo- 2009 forced us to revisit our approach. vak Vice-President of the European Com- Almost half of the EU was affected by the mission, began with the 3rd Energy Pack- latter of these supply crises, including all age which was adopted during the Czech Visegrád Group members. This situation, EU presidency, and receives indispensa- coupled with the unfolding economic cri- ble technological input from the Europe- sis, made us realize that ensuring a more an Institute of Innovation and Technology stable, affordable and diversified supply of headquartered in Budapest. energy is crucial for Europe’s overall secu- How to strengthen this central po- rity, welfare and competitiveness. We also sition of the V4? We should continue de- understood that no country is able to han- veloping infrastructure to bridge our re- dle this challenge alone. We had and still gion with the rest of the EU countries, as have to cooperate, both at the EU and re- well as non-EU neighbours (most nota- gional level. bly Ukraine). Secondly, we should strive The V4 managed to complement the for leadership in developing the low-emis- post-2009 liberalization of the EU ener- sion energy technologies that will allow for gy market with new bottom-up initiatives, a more efficient use of all our indigenous supported by EU funds including the Eu- energy sources. Thirdly, we should build ropean Energy Program for Recovery. Al- on solidarity - promoting and strengthen- most every year since then has seen the ing it. Our regional voice should be part of launch of new interconnectors and re- a single European voice in the energy field, verse flow capacities between the Visegrád particularly in relations with external sup- countries and on the V4’s external borders. pliers. This is a great challenge but also The North-South Energy Corridor is be- a great opportunity for Visegrád coopera- coming a reality and has been designated tion. We must make most of it. V4 – 25 YEARS 112

Visegrád countries laid a firm foundation for the EU’s current efforts to establish a single and unified European energy market

MATTHEW BRYZA

(b. 1964) is American diplomat and international relations specialist, Director of the International Centre for Defence Studies in Tallinn and former United States Ambassador in Azerbaijan (2010-2011). 113 ENERGY SECURITY - WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

he Visegrád countries recognized explored concrete countermeasures and the importance of decreasing their finally decided to build a liquid natural gas Tdependence on Russia for oil and (LNG) terminal in the Baltic Sea port of natural gas and diversifying their supplies Swinoujscie. several years before their larger European In Slovakia, the government resisted allies. While this thinking harmonized with a similarly hostile takeover of the Tran- Washington’s strategic calculus, it was of- spetrol oil pipeline by allies of Russian ten at odds with the conventional wis- President Putin who had gained control dom coming from Berlin, Paris and Rome. of the major Russian oil company, Yu- In the end, the EU energy security policy kos, following the arrest of Yukos found- evolved toward that of the Visegrád Four’s; er and CEO Mikhail Khodorkovskiy; the but this shift occurred only after nearly Slovak Government paid $240 million in a decade of belligerence from Moscow that March 2009 to buy back Yukos’s shares included three cut-offs of natural gas to in the pipeline, following a protracted le- Ukraine and the EU, and Russian military gal battle. More recently, Slovakia has invasions of Georgia and Ukraine. been playing a crucial role in providing When Russia cut natural gas sup- “reverse flows” of natural gas from the plies to Ukraine and the EU on January 1, West to the East, supplying Ukraine in an 2006, the Czech Republic’s government attempt to counter any threatened Rus- and energy companies had already been sian cut-offs. working for ten years to reduce their de- Finally, in late 2007, Hungary iden- pendence on Russian energy monopolies. tified a strategic vulnerability that is only The MERO-IKL oil pipeline, whose con- now becoming the focus of an EU energy struction was inaugurated in March 1996 security policy: insufficient north-south and completed in 2003, provided Central interconnections of natural gas networks and Eastern European countries with ac- in Central and Southern Europe. Hunga- cess to global oil suppliers via the Transal- ry’s state-affiliated energy company, MOL, pine Pipeline to the Italian port of Trieste proposed the New European Transmis- on the Mediterranean Sea. sion System (NETS) as a solution by uni- Similarly, representatives of Poland’s fying the regions’ natural gas transmission government and energy companies stra- systems to enable more liquid trading of tegically worked together to reduce vul- natural gas, and thereby provide compe- nerability to Russian energy supplies, tition to Gazprom’s monopoly. More re- even as larger European powers found it cently, Hungary has joined Slovakia in es- more convenient to view Russia as a “re- tablishing reverse flows of natural gas into liable energy supplier”. In 2006, short- Ukraine. ly after Russia and Germany announced These efforts by all four Visegrád their Nordstream natural gas pipeline, countries laid a firm foundation for the which was to connect the two countries EU’s current efforts to establish a single via the Baltic Sea, the then-Polish De- and unified European energy market via fence Minister Radek Sikorski dubbed the the Third Energy Package, the Connecting project the “Molotov-Ribbontrop Pipe- Europe Facility, Projects of Common In- line”. Beyond this tough rhetoric, Warsaw terest and the Junker Fund. V4 – 25 YEARS 114

The New EU Energy Strategy is a significant step forward on the way to creating an “Energy Union”. What is missing is a cohesive European energy plan which would harmonize energy policies within the EU

JÁN KLEPÁČ

is Executive Director of the Slovak Gas and Oil Association since 2007. Former vice-president of the Slovak parliament (1990). Former general director of the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic. 115 ENERGY SECURITY - WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

hallenges in the field of energy are new interconnector between Slovakia and quite similar for all four Visegrád Hungary was put into operation in the Ccountries. Slovakia and the oth- summer of 2015, while the preparatory er V4 countries have learned substantial- works for the Slovak-Polish interconnec- ly from the gas crisis of 2009, when Rus- tor are also quite advanced. Furthermore, sia stopped delivering natural gas through Slovakia—together with Poland and Hun- Ukraine. Though there was a sufficient gary—are active participants in the strate- amount of gas on the market at the time, gic reverse flow of gas to Ukraine. Thanks the main problem was the missing inter- to this scheme, Ukraine has been able to connectors. That situation led to the rep- avoid significant economic and social dam- resentatives of the V4 countries meeting age, especially during the winter time. to agree on the development of the North- The New EU Energy Strategy can be South gas corridor that would strengthen considered as a significant step forward on significantly the energy security of the V4 the way to creating an Energy Union. Still, countries. what is missing is a cohesive European en- Today the situation in the field of ener- ergy concept which would harmonize en- gy is totally different than that of twenty-five ergy policies among all the EU member or even seven years ago. Due to long-term states. Due to the lack of such a concept, contracts, Slovakia, for instance, is guaran- it is possible to pursue projects like Nord teed the delivery of both gas and oil for more Stream 2 by some member states, while than a decade. Together with the Czech Re- some others, including many Central Eu- public, Hungary and Romania, Slovakia ropean countries, feel uncomfortable with is part of the electricity market coupling the idea. The construction of the Nord project, which further enhances its ener- Stream 2 pipeline would delete Ukraine gy security. Other Visegrád countries are in from the list of important gas transit coun- similar positions, which means that the ir- tries while simultaneously creating ad- regularity of gas and oil supplies is no longer verse effects for other surrounding coun- a danger to their economies. Since the pric- tries, such as Slovakia. This does not mean es of gas, oil and electricity have dropped that alternative energy projects are not fea- recently to their lowest level in decades, the sible, but they should be beneficial for all situation seems to be quite profitable for the the countries in the region. The Eastring economies of the Visegrád countries. project developed by the Slovak transmis- Apart from these lower costs, anoth- sion company, for example, would improve er important aspect is the development energy security for Ukraine and the coun- of interconnectors. As for gas, the brand tries in Southeast Europe. V4 – 25 YEARS 116

If we continue to act under the umbrella of solidarity and partnership, energy security can be achieved in the Visegrád region

ANITA ORBÁN

(b.1974) is former Ambassador-at-Large for Energy Security of Hungary and author of "Power, Energy and the New Russian Imperialism" (2008). 117 ENERGY SECURITY - WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

nergy security has been on the Washington’s awareness about the ener- agenda of Visegrád cooperation gy security issues of the region. The Viseg- Esince 2006 when the first gas cri- rad governments have been instrumental sis took place, and it continues to be on in bringing this issue to the attention of the the agenda till this day. Energy security US Congress, and contributed to the expe- is mostly understood as gas supply secu- dited licensing of US LNG companies on rity even though other issues – like the sales to non-FTA countries. stability of the electric grid – have been The Visegrád countries have not lim- addressed, as well. ited cooperation to the Visegrád frame- The most important task the Visegrád work; they have been actively engaged countries had to achieve in this period was with the wider neighbourhood as well. to improve the physical interconnectivi- They convened the first foreign ministeri- ty between them. In September 2010, the al meeting of the V4+Romania, Bulgaria Visegrád energy ministers wrote a letter and Greece in Budapest in February 2014. urging the European Commission to es- This meeting planted the seeds on the ex- tablish the missing interconnections in the tension of the North-South corridor to North-South and the South-North direc- Greece via the Eastern Balkans. Some pro- tions in the region. Among others, this let- jects that today form the core of the EU’s ter led to the launching of the North-South Central Eastern and South-Eastern Euro- energy corridor in February 2011. Several pean Gas Connectivity (CESEC) initiative other elements of the corridor have been have already been identified at that meet- put in place since then; most notably, the ing. Cooperation in the energy field with Hungarian-Slovak interconnector and the Ukraine as well as with Croatia and Slove- soon to be commissioned LNG terminal in nia has also appeared on the agenda. Swinoujsce. We have a clear roadmap to Have we made significant progress commission the missing interconnectors in enhancing the region’s energy security? (like Polish-Slovakian) and the necessary The answer is a clear yes. Is the job done? upgrades. As soon as they are in operation, The answer is no. However, if we contin- the Visegrád countries will be well-con- ue to act under the umbrella of solidari- nected physically. ty and partnership, energy security can be The Visegrád countries have also achieved in the Visegrád and the surround- worked together on raising Brussels’ and ing region. HOW COULD THE IMPROVEMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURAL CONNECTIVITY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND COHESION IN THE VISEGRÁD GROUP? LNG terminal in Świnoujście (Baltic Sea) during the last days of its construction on 8 December 2015. V4 – 25 YEARS 122

The new connections would ease traffic congestions and will lead to significant decreases in driving-times, not to mention the cost savings that come along with such easements

ĽUBOŠ ĎURIČ

works at the Department for Road and Inland Waterway Projects at the Ministry of Transport of Slovak Republic. Implementor of the Road Sector Projects within Operational Programme Transport (2007-2013). Active in the High Level Working Group on transport connections between the Visegrád Group countries and NETLIPSE. 123 HOW COULD THE IMPROVEMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURAL CONNECTIVITY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT…

he completion of the trans-regional transport. Therefore, in my opinion, the transport corridors is one of the de- Visegrád countries should prioritise the Tterminate factors for the improve- completion of the missing links in the mo- ment of the national economies in the torway of the TEN-T corridors as they are Visegrád countries. the foundation stones of mutual connectiv- The new connections would ease traf- ity between the regional centres. However, fic congestion and will lead to significant it still remains a fact that in many West-Eu- driving-time savings along with the cost ropean countries the road sector is the most savings that come along with such ease- successful, and forcing the shift from road ments. This can boost the economy, make to rail has not been fully successful. On the the region more attractive to investors and other hand, following the continual growth activate new jobs in all four countries of of car passengers, the next parallel steps the Visegrád Group. should also focus on improving the railway Additionally, possible negative im- and regional mobility infrastructure in or- pacts on the environment may be reduced der to make it attractive for passengers. by careful traffic planning and design. Also And lastly, the implementation of Intelli- the plans for the recent development of gent Transport and Information Systems a fast-charging network for electric cars that could enable real-time traffic manage- seem to be another good example for the ment will be a key challenge for the future. mitigation of negative environmental im- I believe that continual enhancement pacts. Nevertheless, we have to bear in of the mutual transport connections with- mind the issue of road safety and focus on in the Visegrád countries as well as their a reduction in the number of accidents and neighbours will help improve the quality injuries. of life for their citizens and accelerate the Observing the changing trends in re- economic development of the entire re- cent years, it can be concluded that people gion. Moreover, the upgraded infrastruc- are travelling more, and in particular, they ture will make our region more attractive are using cars rather than other modes of for tourism. V4 – 25 YEARS 124

The bottlenecks on the borders have not deterred the dynamic development of trade within the group, but there is still significant economic potential to explore

MATEUSZ GNIAZDOWSKI

(b. 1974) is a Polish international relations specialist and assistant director of Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw. 125 HOW COULD THE IMPROVEMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURAL CONNECTIVITY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT…

n 1991, the V4 states declared they development of trade within the V4, there would pay special attention to the infra- is still significant economic potential to Istructural development within the re- explore and tap into once the connec- gion and cross regional co-operation was tions have improved. This also means that seen as crucial in Central Europe. The pre- broader infrastructure will create oppor- vious economic plans were to be erased tunities for the peripheral areas to become including any transport schemes from attractive for investors, especially the the old communist bloc, which had often mountainous regions so popular among served Soviet transit and military needs. tourists. That being said, the Carpathian Establishing connections with West- mountain range is where the most barri- ern Europe became the priority. Naturally, ers and bottlenecks are located in Central it resulted from the significant transporta- Europe; however, this issue has been ad- tion needs associated with the quickly de- dressed in the Common Spatial Develop- veloping economic co-operation; the V4 ment Strategy of the V4 + Romania and had become the greatest trade partner in Bulgaria. the world for Germany, and it also turned In recent years, territorial cohe- Vienna into one of the biggest Europe- sion has become an important element of an transport hubs. However, the strength- EU policy. Trans-European networks are ening of the internal cohesion of the indi- aimed at supporting the development of vidual countries was poorly synchronised internal markets and to increase the eco- with the consistency of the whole V4 re- nomic and social cohesion within the EU gion. Each V4 state needed to develop its (e.g. to connect the regions without access domestic links between its larger cities and to any sea and the more peripheral coun- importance was not placed on developing tries with the centre of Europe). More spe- the intraregional infrastructure. There is cifically, the V4 states are responsible for just one new motorway between the V4 developing connections between the Adri- members (between Poland and the Czech atic, Baltic and Black seas. Most of the op- Republic), and many of the rail connec- tions for Romania and Bulgaria go through tions seem to be poorer than in 1991. the V4, and Poland remains the main land Although the bottlenecks on the link which the Baltic States have with the borders have not deterred the dynamic rest of the EU. V4 – 25 YEARS 126

Homogeneous network planning, a sound modal balance and the interconnection of national networks will eliminate dead ends and isolated links in the current networks

MARTIN KVIZDA

(b. 1969) is a Czech economist, academic and associate Professor at the Institute for Transport Economics, Geography and Policy in Masaryk University of Brno. 127 HOW COULD THE IMPROVEMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURAL CONNECTIVITY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT…

he development of transport net- policies would offer an improved structure works and the strengthening of of transport services, a strengthening of Tfunctional cross-border connec- transport links in cross-border regions and tions are among the main priorities set the potential for their economic develop- by the European Union. The Visegrád ment to be revived. Group countries tend to approach this is- Homogeneous network planning, sue incoherently, and the absence of any a sound modal balance and the intercon- plan and coordinated development slows nection of national networks will eliminate down the improvement of the region's in- dead ends and isolated links in the current ternal cohesion. Due to numerous histor- networks. Improvement of the existing ical events which had affected the disper- system combined with additional, missing sion and structure of the population and connections and cross-border nodes be- due to the economic and political transfor- tween Visegrád Group countries will in- mation and restructuring of each nation’s crease the general mobility of the popula- economy and the economies of individual tion and the efficiency of freight transport regions, which are coupled with geograph- – not only between individual countries, ically difficult conditions (marginalized or but also among the border regions. Better structurally affected areas in mountains), accessibility to transport services will in vast peripheral districts were created in turn lower the transportation costs, which cross-border areas and sometimes even exerts positive influence upon the spatial between home regions. Harmonisation of distribution of populations and of eco- the Visegrád Group countries’ transport nomic and industrial activities. V4 – 25 YEARS 128

Ukraine is transforming and it is crucial for them to recreate and rebuild their road and energy infrastructures. This would help the stabilisation of their political situation as well as the region as a whole

PIOTR NAIMSKI

(b. 1951) is a Polish politician and professor. Head of the Office for State Protection (1992) and Deputy Minister of Economy (2005-2007). 129 HOW COULD THE IMPROVEMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURAL CONNECTIVITY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT…

roper communication between the investment—marked in Poland as S19—and governments of the Visegrád Group which will eventually connect the Baltic Pregarding their energy infrastruc- countries with Hungary, travelling through tures does not only boost the economic Slovakia and along the eastern border of cooperation between the countries, but it Poland. The first stage of the investment is also contains a political component as it to be built between Rzeszów and Barwinek. requires international cooperation and the Our mutual understanding is that each engagement of governments to make com- country will cover the cost of the motorway mon political and economic plans con- passing through their borders. cerning the expansion of road, pipeline and It is important that we look beyond the energy networks to name a few. Moreover, current boundaries of the EU, and in this it facilitates the consolidation of business- respect we could view Ukraine as a strate- es and interests strengthening the coop- gic partner. Ukraine is transforming and it eration in our region, which is one of our is crucial for them to recreate and rebuild strategic goals. their road and energy infrastructures, which We want all the Central and East- would help in the stabilisation of their po- ern European countries—this of course litical situation as well as the region as includes the Visegrád Group but also the a whole. For example, increasing the capac- Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania and the Bal- ity of the gas interconnector in Hermano- kans as well—to be important political wicze would enable the transmission of gas powers in the continent and in the Euro- from Swinoujscie, in Poland, to Ukraine pean Union, which currently seems to be and eventually Hungary. There are very real struggling with multifaceted crises and un- and existing plans to accomplish this, but it dergoing a visible and dramatic transfor- does require political support and stability. mation. It is because of these circumstanc- Although every country interested and in- es that our region must be united with volved in the project agrees that infrastruc- regards to our policies in both European tural issues are of the upmost importance, and broader contexts. these are mostly long-term investments and There are specific plans concerning projects, which will outlive any one govern- the development of the road infrastructure ment’s term of office. Therefore, the above in the region, spearheaded by the Hungar- mentioned political stability and continued ians, who are particularly focused on the commitment are necessary components if issue. We have had constant communica- we are even to consider the successful com- tion with Budapest about the motorway pletion of such plans. V4 – 25 YEARS 130

The more economically and physically secure the links are, the tighter the economic contacts, cultural exchanges and touristic interest will be towards each other’s countries

GYÖRGY WÁBERER

(b.1956) is a Hungarian businessman, chairman of the Hungarian Road Transport Association, Prime Ministerial Commissioner for the development of the Hungarian logistics sector. He was CEO of Waberer’s International until 2016. 131 HOW COULD THE IMPROVEMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURAL CONNECTIVITY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT…

n February 2016, the Hungarian and Pol- In Poland for example, due to the ish Prime Ministers, Viktor Orbán and quality of the network, daytime traffic bans IBeata Szydło respectively, agreed on are regularly imposed during the heaviest connecting the Eastern parts of the coun- summer heatwaves. Such measures force tries with a new four-lane highway. I am drivers of larger vehicles to drive over- convinced that the implementation of this night, thus increasing traffic safety risks. plan would not only strengthen the cooper- All this would theoretically call for the de- ation of the two countries but will also give velopment of a network of truck rest areas. an impetus to the overall economic coop- As long as there are no highways, setting eration of the V4 countries. The better the up rest areas more frequently would help connection’s quality as well as the more eco- significantly. nomically and physically secure the links In Slovakia, the technology of toll col- are, the tighter the economic contacts, cul- lection also slows the freight transport on tural exchanges and touristic interest will the road since the toll collection device be towards each other’s countries. there can only be used after having been The current state of the transport in- charged in advance. The introduction of frastructure does not support the improve- a posterior payment system would signifi- ment of relations. From the towns of East- cantly help transport companies. ern Hungary, which are otherwise easily Beside the improvement of technical and quickly accessible via highway, reach- conditions, the intensity of connectedness ing the industrial areas of Slovakia and Po- could be enhanced by the reduction of ad- land requires a lengthy and tiring drive to ministration as well. the North. Highways are sparse; therefore, Hence, when the two Prime Ministers quicker and safer travel often faces obsta- agreed on the seemingly technical ques- cles. Moreover, the substandard condition tion of road investment, they took a big of the roads increases travel time to the step towards improving the conditions that destination, which affects transportation can energize the Visegrád Cooperation. costs adversely. WHERE SHOULD THE EXTERNAL PRIORITIES OF VISEGRÁD GROUP LIE? EXTERNAL PRIORITIES OF THE V4 – KEY POINTS

unity migration EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Europe

Eastern Western crisis Balkans

infrastructure ENERGY V4 – 25 YEARS 136

Visegrád must have a policy about how they see Eastern Europe’s future. Once they agree on this they could begin to lobby for their policies inside the EU

JUDY DEMPSEY

is an Irish journalist, editor in chief of Strategic Europe webpage, former Financial Times, Irish Times and The Economist Eastern Europe correspondent and the author of several publications about Eastern Europe. 137 WHERE SHOULD THE EXTERNAL PRIORITIES OF VISEGRÁD GROUP LIE?

he Visegrád Group cannot have any policy toward the region. It should be fo- external policies or hope to wield cused on supporting independent civ- Tany influence in the EU unless they il society movements and individuals. It first iron out the fundamental differenc- should be about introducing packages es among each other. The Ukraine crisis, of scholarships to students, undergradu- Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine and ates and graduates to study in the Viseg- even energy policies, confirmed Visegrád’s rád universities. It should be about sup- inability to have a common position even porting much more enthusiastically the though these two crises should have had Endowment for Democracy. It should the opposite effect. Just because Visegrád be about strengthening the infrastruc- could agree on refusing to accept refugees tures, such as roads and trains and en- does not mean its unity and sense of pur- ergy, something that Visegrád could and pose has been strengthened. On the con- should do much, much better inside their trary, Visegrád is weak and verging on ir- own region. relevance. Identifying external priorities Above all, Visegrád must have a poli- makes it even harder. cy about how they see Eastern Europe’s fu- Realistically, the biggest external ture. Once they agree on this, they could challenge facing Visegrád is Eastern Eu- begin to lobby for their policies inside the rope. Visegrad has no strategy toward the EU. That means working very closely with region. This is short-sighted, disappointing Germany, Sweden and Finland. These are and dangerous. The lands between Russia the three countries that understand the re- and the EU are unstable and unpredict- gion – and Russia. able. They cannot be ignored. As neigh- And herein lies Visegrád’s biggest and bours, Visegrád should be the first to un- unanswered question: what does it want to derstand that. As neighbours that have had be? A small and regional group in Central to cope with all the challenges of political, Europe known mostly to the cognoscen- economic and social transition, they are in ti or one that is willing to expand and that the unique position to offer an “insider’s wants to make a difference. For Visegrád to perspective”. have an external policy means each one of Precisely because of these experi- them defining one’s national interests and ences and geographical proximity, Viseg- then finding a common aspiration. That rád has an opportunity to forge a strong has yet to happen. V4 – 25 YEARS 138

Prospects for the V4 countries internal stability and economic prosperity depend primarily on a well-functioning EU market

ALEXANDER DULEBA

(b. 1966) is a Slovak political scientist and analyst. He is director of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA) and lecturer at the Institute of Political Science of the Presov University. 139 WHERE SHOULD THE EXTERNAL PRIORITIES OF VISEGRÁD GROUP LIE?

he number one priority for the V4 A well-functioning EU is a guaran- countries external action should be tee-provider for equal-standing, sover- Ttheir cooperation within the Euro- eignty and national security of the all V4 pean Union. Prospects for the V4 countries countries in European affairs. In addition, internal stability and economic prosperi- V4 countries should aim at strengthening ty depend primarily on a well-functioning their infrastructural cohesion, especially EU market. The main task should be the in the field of energy and transport, which prevention of any emerging fundamental is the very basis of the EU investment pro- disruptions—that the current centrifugal grams. The main starting point for future tendencies in non-market EU policy are- V4 EU policies should be a clear under- as (e.g. the migration crisis) might cause— standing that there is no national interest, to the fundament of the EU integration of any of the V4 country that might be bet- and to the EU single market. The recent ter served or secured outside the Europe- financial crisis in the eurozone, including an Union. the so-called “Greek crisis”, posed the sys- The second priority should be a more tem a problem regarding the future shape traditional focus of the V4 towards East- of European integration, which has yet to ern Europe and the Western Balkans. be settled. Even though the Kroměříž Declaration The formation of the eurozone group was adopted twenty-five years ago, the within the EU—a group of member states process of post-war and post-communist that work closer and make decisions in the transformation of these two strategic re- area of fiscal policies without direct partic- gions, located in the Visegrád neighbour- ipation of the non-euro member states— hood, has not been completed yet. Special first, created two categories of member attention should be paid to Eastern Eu- states, and second, does have an impact rope, especially in the context of recent on the functioning of the EU market and Russian aggression against Ukraine. V4 thus on all member states. The emerging countries should aim at assisting Ukraine inequality among member states in deci- in building democratic institutions, fight- sion-making processes is one of the main ing corruption, implementing reforms and reasons for the eventual secession of the implementing an association agreement United Kingdom. Should it happen, it will with the EU. A successful, EU-oriented unbalance an already fragile geopolitical Ukraine will bring more stability, prosper- situation, a situation created within the ity and security to the whole of Europe, in- EU over the last forty years. cluding the V4 countries. V4 – 25 YEARS 140

The V4 has to use its limited resources wisely and effectively to stand as a role- model in order to reinvent and re-energize EU support for the European fate of the countries in the East and in the Balkans

MICHAL KOŘAN

(b. 1977) is a Czech political scientist and Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Masaryk University in Brno. Researcher at the Institute of International Relations. 141 WHERE SHOULD THE EXTERNAL PRIORITIES OF VISEGRÁD GROUP LIE?

he international environment has Secondly, it has become clear that the changed rather fundamentally since job of ending the division of Europe is far the Visegrád Group commemorated from finished. On the contrary, multiple Tth its 20 anniversary in 2011. Because of the schisms are deepening, and they cut across ever more assertive Russian aggressions geographic, national, socioeconomic and and turbulent developments in the Middle political lines. The V4 consists of coun- East, Europe has seen the return of tradi- tries that suffered heavily due to the con- tional geopolitics and the power-based un- ditions they endured while under Soviet derstanding of international relations. rule, and if any of these divisions widen or Throughout its history, the V4 en- become more rigid, then the countries will dorsed a world-view that stressed interna- suffer again. tionalism and multilateralism, encouraged It is in the vital interest of the Viseg- efforts to overcome national and mental rád countries to insist that the future of boundaries, nurtured notions of coopera- Europe cannot and will not be centred on tive security and with it a mutually shared power-based relations, sealed borders and stability, garnered prosperity and fostered deepening divisions within Europe and be- peace. tween Europe and the outside world. The Since late 2013, however, the Viseg- V4 has to find enough courage, strength, rad countries had to re-adjust to the new creativity and determination to withstand security and political environment within the tendency to close-off, into ever more and around Europe, caused by a two-fold narrowly defined confines and fortresses, security related crisis: assertive Russian and to promote and infuse solidarity and actions in Eastern Europe and an unprec- openness back into the project of Europe. edented flow of migrants fleeing from the The V4 has to use its limited re- conflict-stricken regions of the Middle sources wisely and effectively to stand East and Africa. as a role-model in order to reinvent and Thus, the first key question for the V4 re-energize EU support for the Europe- is how to strike the right balance between an fate of the countries in the East and in properly and credibly contributing to Euro- the Balkans. At the same time, it has to pean, regional and national security on the demonstrate solidarity with the countries one hand and not compromising its com- that feel most vulnerable to the challeng- mitment to cooperative security, to open- es coming from the Middle East and tur- ness and to internationalism on the other. bulent African regions. V4 – 25 YEARS 142

Preserving unity inside the V4 and avoiding situations where they could be played off of one another by those outside of the group should become the priority of all priorities

OLAF OSICA

(b. 1974) is a Polish sociologist and political scientist, chairman of the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) Board, director for risk assessment at Polityka Insight. 143 WHERE SHOULD THE EXTERNAL PRIORITIES OF VISEGRÁD GROUP LIE?

he real priorities of a foreign pol- At the same time, any room to ma- icy of any state should reflect the noeuvre in these external actions has nev- Toverall dynamics of the interna- er seemed so narrow as it is today. tional context (i.e. threats for national se- Strategic priority should be given, curity or opportunities for the expansion therefore, to the task of not being squeezed of the state’s role vis-a-vis other players). by the aforementioned arc of crisis to the This should also apply to alliances and in- extent in which the V4 member states ter-state groupings. would opt for individual ways to cope with Today, the V4 faces the sort of chal- the challenge. Poland may be inclined to lenges which lay at the very root of the focus on the eastern dimension with Slo- group emergence. The European politi- vakia, and to respond to an ever closer eu- cal and security system is again in a state rozone integration with Hungary and the of flux with the institutional framework is Czech Republic, while neglecting the mi- unfit for the present and future develop- gration and the Balkans issues of the south, ments in and outside of Europe. The V4 is an area of importance for the Hungarians, hence confronted with, or indeed put in be- Czechs and Slovaks. tween, three overlapping crises. The first is Preserving unity inside the V4 and the crisis of the west (i.e. European inte- avoiding situations where they could be gration), followed by the end of the east as played off of one another by those outside we know it (the Ukrainian Conflict and the of the group should become the priority of end of the post-Soviet model of socio-eco- all priorities. In these times of profound nomic development) and lastly the col- crises to the European order, nothing else lapse of the south (i.e. war, terrorism and is worth the time and energy of Central the refugee crisis). Europe. V4 – 25 YEARS 144

Instead of defining new external priorities, the Visegrád should keep focusing its existing resources on the Western Balkans and on the Eastern Partnership countries

ANDRÁS RÁCZ

(b. 1980) is a Hungarian historian, international relations specialist, Senior Research Fellow on Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) and Member of the Board at the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID). The views expressed here are his own. 145 WHERE SHOULD THE EXTERNAL PRIORITIES OF VISEGRÁD GROUP LIE?

n order to avoid the trap of wishful policy areas of traditional focus for the thinking, defining the external priorities V4. The migration crisis is heavily affect- Iof the Visegrád Group should start from ing the Western Balkans countries both taking a closer look at the resources availa- in terms of economy and stability. Con- ble. Two factors seem to be clear. First, it is sequently, there will be a great need to highly unlikely that the resources currently increase the resources dedicated to re- available for foreign policy in the Visegrád search into the core reasons and trends countries would significantly grow, main- of migration, preferably by supporting ly due to domestic economic reasons. This the already well-established migration re- applies to financial, personnel and infra- search centres in the region. structural resources alike. Second, and ob- So too, the Eastern Partnership re- viously not unrelated to the first element, gion is much more unstable than it has ever the same stagnation will apply to the Inter- been since the dissolution of the Soviet national Visegrad Fund; though the budget Union. We should not forget: there is an ac- of the IVF is gradually growing, there will tive war going on in the direct neighbour- be no strategic raise in the funding any hood of the Visegrád, namely the conflict time soon. in Eastern Ukraine. Due to the geographic All in all, the countries of the Visegrád proximity of these regions to Central Eu- region do not have the resources necessary rope, the Visegrád countries cannot afford for any strategic shift in their foreign pol- abandoning them and begin defining brand icy orientations. Opening a new consulate new foreign policy priorities. This is simply here or deploying a few more diplomats not the right moment to do so. there is not equal to setting a fundamental- Hence, in my opinion, instead of de- ly new foreign policy direction. No Viseg- fining new external priorities, the Visegrád rád country can suddenly become a major should keep focusing its existing resources player in Africa or a key actor in Asia just on the Western Balkans and on the East- because its leaders declare so. Such a shift ern Partnership countries, focusing main- would take years, if not decades. ly on Ukraine and Moldova from the latter. Another factor that may help define This is in our best interest, not only for rea- the external priorities is the geopolitical sons of coherence and visibility, but also changes taking place in the two foreign for the very security of the Visegrád region. HOW CAN V4 HELP DEMOCRACIES FLOURISH? Euromaidan 2013 V4 – 25 YEARS 150

We need to understand the local needs and context better, and find novel ways to support local actors. We must listen to new voices, even if they are surprising or critical

ÉVA BÖRDŐS

(b. 1981) is a lawyer (Eötvös Loránd University) and political scientist (Central European University). She is head of the development cooperation programs at the Foundation for Development of Democratic Rights (DemNet) in Budapest and a member of the board at the Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid (HAND). 151 HOW CAN V4 HELP DEMOCRACIES FLOURISH?

he promotion of democracy in de- and should not be imported from the out- veloping countries has been the side. Though, the question remains: to Tcentre of donor attention over the what extent can we make compromises last several decades, and after the success- and "expand" the meaning of democracy? ful democratization of Central and East- This debate will continue as the im- ern Europe, many expected the newly plementation of the new Post-2015 agen- emerging donors, especially the Visegrád da, which placed good governance at its countries, to lead the way. core, progresses. We must listen to those While the V4 designed their own na- encouraging us to be less timid about pro- tional development systems individual- moting democracy and capacity building. ly, experts advocated for closer coopera- We need to understand the local needs tion in sharing their transition experience and context better, and find novel ways with developing countries. Scholars, activ- to support local actors. We must listen to ists and officials urged for more joint proj- new voices, even if they are surprising or ects and pointed to possible synergies to critical, include original, non-formalized develop cooperation—specifically focused groups and move forward from a purely on the promotion of democracy—which project-based approach. could be brought into the V4’s internation- As this new era starts, the V4—often al affairs. Despite the similarities of their criticized for their “own” approach to de- development cooperation, history, values mocracy—has the chance again to unite and challenges, experts tend to agree that forces. Thanks to the core element of the the synergies have largely gone untapped. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Strong rhetorical commitments towards universality, such endeavours may serve democracy promotion have rarely been as an opportunity for the V4 themselves translated into practice. to discuss the meaning of democracy. We In the meantime, the discourse about need to remember that by adopting the the nature of democracy itself has also SDGs, all UN member states have com- changed significantly. It seems it is time mitted themselves to “build effective, ac- to go back to square one and ask: what countable and inclusive institutions at it is exactly developed countries in the all levels”, to ensure “public access to in- West, including the V4, wish to promote? formation and protect fundamental free- Why have so many attempts of transport- doms”, to “reduce corruption and brib- ing the Western type of democracy failed? ery in all their forms” and to promote “the Democracy, as known in the West, is not rule of law at the national and interna- a model that fits all, and as such it cannot tional levels”. V4 – 25 YEARS 152

As the natural bridge between the East and the West, we can offer insight into many of the controversial issues dividing Europe today

PAVOL DEMEŠ

(b. 1956) is a Slovak expert in civil society and international relations, a non-resident senior fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Director for Central and Eastern Europe of the GMF US (2000-2010), Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Slovak Republic (1993-97) and Slovak Minister of International Relations (1991-92). 153 HOW CAN V4 HELP DEMOCRACIES FLOURISH?

group of us who were involved in European identity and the European pro- organizing the February celebra- ject as a whole. A tion for the 25th anniversary of One of our greatest offerings to Eu- the Visegrád Group thought a pleasant rope is also being undermined through precursor to the festivities would be to a series of internal and external issues; is- meet with students and other young citi- sues which have the capability of weak- zens the day before the event. The reasons ening the democratic forces of the civil for the meeting were varied, but it seemed societies in the Visegrád Group. The con- appropriate to commemorate the anni- tribution I am referring to is that of the versary of our partnership with a discus- new, Central European narrative. As the sion which included the next generation, natural bridge between the East and the who must take up the charge and define West, we can offer insight into many of the the future uses of the organisation. It took controversial issues dividing Europe to- place at the Charles University in Prague, day. Sadly, the current state of our politi- a storied institution known for promoting cal and democratic institutions is less than discussion and a more fitting location for stellar, and this is one of the main road- conversing about the – at times turbulent blocks in our drive to become a more pre- – contemporary EU and V4 issues would dominant voice in Europe. While there be difficult to find. are times when we might disagree, large- It also afforded the opportunity ly due to differing historical perspectives, for us to deliver a report, which we had we have no desire to become isolationist been preparing, related to these impor- or detach from the larger European frame- tant issues of the day: migration, the ref- work. Further, I do not think the Visegrád ugee crisis and coordinated national poli- Group will destabilise the existing or fu- cies to mention just a few. It is our feeling ture European unity, nor do I think we will that the bonds that were named and so- build a “bad guy” reputation within the Eu- lidified a quarter of a century ago are just ropean Union. On the contrary, I think the as strong and important as they are to- people of the Visegrád Group value that we day. No matter the crises we are facing, are part of the larger European and trans- there is no tendency to dissipate, dissolve atlantic family, and we will be searching to or rearrange the group. Through our co- find new ways of adding value to these or- ordinated efforts, either nationally or re- ganisations, to protect the European pro- gionally, we can help each other overcome ject and values which we started to devel- issues which are splintering the basis of op after ‘89. V4 – 25 YEARS 154

People trusted Brussels because they believed that it was the ally of the people against the local corrupt elite. Now it is perceived as ally of the elite against the popular will

IVAN KRASTEV

(b. 1965) is a Bulgarian political scientist, Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia. 155 HOW CAN V4 HELP DEMOCRACIES FLOURISH?

emocracy is not the problem in Why are people not afraid that the govern- Central and Eastern Europe. What ment is going to dismantle, for example, ju- Dyou see in this region is a crisis, but dicial review? it is much more a crisis of liberalism than I think the reasons behind this be- a crisis of democracy. The crisis of liberal- haviour is a general resentment—peo- ism in my view takes form in several major ple have started to believe that the dimensions. separation of power is an excuse for pol- The first problem is the restriction of iticians not to deliver. Accountability be- national sovereignty, and the simple solu- comes nearly impossible because when tion would be to return to a sovereigntist short-comings or missteps occur, politi- view of politics and the state. In the be- cians use a myriad of excuses which they ginning of the transition to the EU, peo- argue block their attempts at making ef- ple trusted Brussels much more than fective progress. their own governments because they be- From this point of view, the separa- lieved that Brussels was the ally of the peo- tion of powers, instead of being regarded ple against the local corrupt elite. What as an instrument in the hands of the people changed is that Brussels is now perceived against the elite, transforms into an alibi as the ally of the corrupted elite against the for the elites’ inaction or ineptitude. This popular will. results in a strong anti-institutional sen- The following two issues—the bur- timent, and therefore, people become un- geoning resentment of the populous and interested in parties. This combination of migration and the unsettled and unequal factors has a unique influence on a much position of the second generation of mi- more active citizenship; an influence which grants—are linked, however indirectly, as can lead to the desire for a strong leader. Visegrád is not as homogenous a place as This notion seems to be prevalent many pretend it to be. in the Visegrád, but beyond the longing Evidently, Poland has once again be- for a strong leader, the populace seems to come an important country, and herein want someone brazen, someone ready to lies the problem—the success has incentiv- cross borders and take a stance against po- ised people to give up more power to politi- litical correctness. In fact, this very affront- cians while, paradoxically, still maintaining ing nature is becoming something essen- a general mistrust of politicians as a whole. tially important in itself. V4 – 25 YEARS 156

The Eastern Partnership was inspired by the Visegrád Group and it has taken on a similar functionality of another porch showing Europe that multilateral cooperation is possible

RADOSŁAW SIKORSKI

(b. 1963) is a Polish politician and journalist, former Minister of National Defence (2005-2007), Minister of Foreign Affairs (2007-2014) and Marshal of the Sejm (2014-2015), currently a Senior Fellow in the Center for European Studies at the Harvard University. 157 HOW CAN V4 HELP DEMOCRACIES FLOURISH?

he original function of the Visegrád struggling nations, but because we know was about convincing our partners all too well the amount of time and effort it Tfrom Western Europe that since we takes to forge the foundations of modern, were able to cooperate with each other, we European-centred societies. would also make constructive members of We spent eight years turning Po- the European Union. However, the V4 also land into a democratic Mecca and to make created a buffer for the more developed Warsaw a home for numerous pro-demo- economies of the West from the social and cratic institutions; efforts which coalesced political aspects of the former communist with a congress, established by Bronisław states once held under the sway of the So- Geremek, on the 10th anniversary of the viet Union; the V4 acted, in essence, as an Community of Democracies. We managed Eastern porch to the EU. to organise a new seat to ODiHR (Office From the very beginning, the issue of for Democratic Institutions and Human democracy has been of the upmost impor- Rights)—the most significant institution tance for the Visegrád Group, and when of OSCE—which supervises elections in this fundamental component was chal- countries around the world. Furthermore, lenged, we did not hesitate to act. This was I have had the good fortune to be the initi- exemplified by the suspension of Slovakia’s ator of the European Endowment for De- active membership in the V4 when it was mocracy (EED). ruled by Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. Poland has also become the place for Since our progress and determina- dialogues and discussions on democratisa- tion during the years that preceded our tion, housed in a centre in Natolin (a dis- accession was so focused, the V4 was pre- trict of Warsaw). Moreover, the Polish In- sented as the paragon of successful trans- stitute of Diplomacy organised trainings formation for the Eastern Partnership and workshops for diplomats especial- (EP). More generally, the EP was inspired ly from the EP countries. Long standing by the Visegrád Group, and—to protract support for Bielsat TV for Belarus and as- the metaphor—it has taken on a simi- sistance to Ukraine during EuroMaidan lar functionality and purpose of anoth- come in accord also with V4 priorities. er porch, to the now extended European The brand we worked hard to cre- house, showing Europe that multilateral ate was priceless; it was one of the pillars cooperation is possible. of our co-operation with the USA, and the The reason for this hesitation is not weakening of this brand is deteriorating our unwillingness to help burgeoning or our capability to shape the world. V4 – 25 YEARS 158

What does have the potential to greatly diminish or harm the V4 brand in emerging democracies is a lack of foreign policy strategy and an ambivalence in bilateral relations

VLAĎKA VOTAVOVÁ

(b. 1988) is a Czech international relations expert, Director of AMO: Association for International Affairs, foreign policy think tank and NGO founded in 1997. 159 HOW CAN V4 HELP DEMOCRACIES FLOURISH?

ne could rightfully hesitate the perspective of our eastern or south- when deciding whether the V4 ern partners, countries that are in a more Ois a stakeholder that is entitled painful transition period at the moment. to help other world democracies pros- Specifically, the practice of the last twen- per. Looking back at the last few years, we ty-five years indicates that the countries have seen what some have called an un- that are able to profit the most from the precedented “democratic backlash” in all lessons the V4 learned are those in the re- four Visegrád countries. This pattern went gions of the Western Balkans and the East- hand-in-hand with the ever-rising position ern Partnership. By no chance, the prac- of populism, and not to mention the per- titioners refer to “lessons learned” instead sistent structural problems such as barri- of “best practices”, a wording that is linked ers in the rule of law, a lack of democratic to the V4’s ability to admit their mistakes accountability, corruption and clientelism and provide others with recommendations in the state and self-governing institutions. on how to avoid them. Together with their That being said, we should not pre- combined histories and non-imperial past, vent V4 foreign policies from focusing on the Visegrád Group is strengthening its empowering civil societies, offering human trustworthiness. rights assistance or promoting democracy. On the other hand, what does have As the history of deeply-rooted democrat- the potential to greatly diminish or harm ic societies shows us, a perfect democracy the V4 brand in emerging democracies is is simply non-existent; the path towards it a lack of foreign policy strategy and an am- never ends, and this challenging process bivalence in bilateral relations. An example of building a democracy requires constant of this inability to rethink old patterns was cultivation and care. Even now, we are wit- shown when the Czechs sold arms sup- nessing an increasing support of illiberal plies to the Egyptian state apparatus while tendencies in the stable democracies with simultaneously supporting the transition far more developed political culture such to democracy. Yet, the V4’s active partic- as the U.S. or France. Nevertheless, it does ipation in democratic assistance in North not automatically mean they are leaving or Africa at the outset of the Arab Spring il- abandoning the democratic narrative with lustrates a growing awareness of the influ- which they have followed. In numerous ence the V4 can have, even outside the tra- occasions in modern history, democracy ditional, European borders. has proven its capacity to absorb these, at Unfortunately, the V4 are missing times, destabilising elements. the opportunity to utilise the observations What matters in the case of the Viseg- it gained during the Arab Spring in the rad Group is its proven track record with MENA region, and transform this knowl- political, economic and—the only part- edge into rational answers to the refugee ly finished—societal transition to de- crisis. Only time will tell how the Visegrád mocracy. The experience far from being response, lacking in humanitarian and lib- smooth and often criticized for a number eral dimensions, will damage the V4 repu- of shortcomings remains credible from tation inside of Europe and abroad. WHAT ARE THE MAIN ARISING NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND HOW SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES ADDRESS THEM? MILITARY BALANCE SWEDEN RUSSIA IN THE V4 NEIGHBORHOOD 30 798 ACTIVE ARMED FORCES (in thousands) SOURCE: 0 ESTIMATED RESERVISTS (in thousands) The Military Balance 2016 2000

BELARUS

AUSTRIA UKRAINE 48 23 204 290 156 900

LITHUANIA

16 7 ROMANIA

71 SLOVENIA 50 8

CROATIA 2

17

0 GERMANY CZECH REP. HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SERBIA 179 28 22 27 99 16 50 32 0 44 0 0 V4 – 25 YEARS 164

Energy companies could merge to compete on a global level, and a Visegrád bank should be created to support small and medium-size businesses, especially in the technological sector

TOMASZ CHŁOŃ

(b. 1961) is a Polish diplomat and hungarianist, Ambassador of Poland in Estonia (2005-2010) and in Slovakia (2013-2015). 165 WHAT ARE THE MAIN ARISING NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND HOW SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES ADDRESS THEM?

here is no meaningful debate about Combining the capabilities of the Visegrád’s future and security chal- Central European countries creates nu- Tlenges without considering the merous opportunities that one member European Union and NATO at its core. would not be able to accomplish which The causes and consequences of the cri- is why the V4 defence industries should ses surrounding the European Union and merge as well. In my opinion, the Czech the transatlantic area are interconnected. Republic may play a pivotal role, given its Sometimes one cannot help but make par- considerable influence on Slovakia. As for allels even with the Cold War and consider Poland, it should be the main advocate for the area on the verge of a geopolitical con- this process since they spend more on de- flict. While these are the external factors fence than all other nations that joined which should be deliberated, the internal NATO after 1989 combined. factors relate primarily to the European Moreover, V4 security policies need project’s weakness in upholding the ambi- more consistency and trust. In the context tions of new generation and, in particular, of the EU, the V4 Battlegroup cannot be- the Visegrád Group’s (V4) economic mod- come a mere episode, and the active use of el based on a cheaper work force which is battlegroups could be promoted to protect now dwindling away. borders, for instance. As a result, the V4’s answer to politi- The geopolitical map is changing and cal, social, economic and military security NATO is in dire need of new defence plan- threats and risks should be comprehensive ning and procedures of the highest quality, and imbedded in the institutional frame- and Visegrád must become more of a com- work of the EU and NATO. To highlight mon operational space. AWACS should the regional dimension, it is also crucial to not require parliamentary decisions or expand its strategic infrastructure espe- “visas” for tanks. As for capabilities, they cially when it comes to developing the con- must take into consideration the compat- nection between the countries (e.g. the Via ibility of defence systems and the synergy Carpathia) and the energy and research of industries. sectors (a more assertive use of EU funds). In twenty-five years, Visegrád has Furthermore, energy and banking compa- probably achieved more than its found- nies could merge to be able to compete on ers could have hoped for. However, its a global level and a Visegrád bank should governments could convene a panel of be created to support small and medi- wise individuals which, together with um-size businesses, especially in the tech- expert help, would propose a strategy nology sector. Such infrastructural under- for the development of the group for the takings would be indispensable also for next quarter century and which could creating stronger links between Visegrád also be the answer to the existing secu- and Northern and Southern Europe. rity challenges. V4 – 25 YEARS 166

The integrity of Central Europe is in peril

MATTHEW KAMINSKI

(b. 1971) is an American journalist, executive editor of POLITICO’s European edition, former member of the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board.

ho would have thought that Eu- Driven apart by history, culture and rope’s margins – places that al- mutual distrust, these four countries came Wways, as Czeslaw Milosz wrote, together as never before and forced the “knew far more about the West than the West to take their insistent demands to be- West ever knew or cared about the East” come part of the “European family” seri- – could change the world by remaking the ously. It is too easy to forget now that the continent, bring down an empire of tyranny motivation to get these seemingly quixot- and rekindle the dream of a free, liberal and ic entreaties into the EU and NATO came whole Europe. Those who were lucky to from their own internal drive. Kohl in Ber- see their creation come to life were Wałe- lin as well as Bush and Clinton in Washing- sa, Michnik, Havel and, believe it or not, ton were all lukewarm in receiving, patron- Orbán. izing and worried about offending Russia. 167 WHAT ARE THE MAIN ARISING NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND HOW SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES ADDRESS THEM?

Despite this international hesitancy, the inside Prague Castle (Havel, presumably, Visegrád group forced their way in through has turned a few times by now in his grave) – the front door. Or that once in, these up- are the trendsetters. starts could play a role far beyond their fi- The integrity of Central Europe is in nancial sway or military capabilities. Within peril and yet the reasons do not stem from weeks of joining NATO, Hungary was on the Putin’s aggressions, even in the midst of his frontlines of the alliance’s first war and most revanchist kick right next door in Ukraine, direct dealings with Yugoslavia. The Poles nor America’s waning interest in Europe, harnessed their long track record of demo- though both hold tangible consequences. cratic stability and economic growth to be- No, today the source of the most evident come a power in the EU – both the leaders danger to what the Visegrád club struggled of the East and Berlin’s junior coalition part- so hard against in the nineties has trans- ner in Brussels. As a Brussels mandarin re- formed from the ominous shadows of exter- cently told me, fifteen years ago, who would nal threats to their own reflections in a for- have thought Poland, that fractious, rural gotten or purposely avoided black mirror. country, would one day wield more power in In no particular order, consider the the EU than Spain. greatest achievements of the past twen- And who would have thought that hav- ty-five years from a Visegrád point of view: ing led the liberal charge into Europe, the security, provided by NATO; open bor- East would now be leading the illiberal bri- ders, thanks to Schengen; and being part gades. Orbán the former Budapest student of a prosperous bloc that trades freely and leader who headed the Liberal Internation- searches for common solutions as no other al has turned into a champion for nation- group of nations anywhere in the world do. al sovereignty, Hungarian nationalism and Of course, if you ask them, the last the outright rejection of liberalism. Criti- thing the Visegrád leaders want is to under- cism of his shift in political leaning is not cut any of those achievements. Last Novem- of import for this discussion; however, the ber, when I posed a similar question to Or- more significant point is that Orbán has ban he said “Hungary’s national interest was shaped and driven this new mood through to reinforce Schengen, NATO and the EU”. his country and the broader region. Wheth- The new Polish government desperately er the issues concentrate on migrants, trade, wants NATO, preferably American, boots the trans-Atlantic alliance, open borders or on its soil., and for all Easterners of a certain fuzzier notions like “solidarity,” “democra- age, a world without visas and border checks cy,” “free speech” and the “ever deeper uni- is rather utopian. on,” scepticism is the new norm in the East Yet, this world – a world with a reuni- and the West. It is the force behind the Bri- fied Berlin and the stronger, expanding alli- tish campaign to “Leave” the EU and the rise ances of NATO, the EU and Schengen zone of Jeremy Corbyn atop Labour. It is propel- – still lies in jeopardy. Forces will be un- ling the far-right in France and the far-left in leashed on Europe in this decade that, in no Spain to unprecedented electoral gains. And small way, were either born or reinforced in the Visegrád Four – with Kaczynski reigning the Visegrád countries, and these forces will supreme in Warsaw, Fico in Bratislava and pose a very real, existential threat to Europe. the revolving cast of pro-Putin, Eurosceptics Who would have thought. V4 – 25 YEARS 168

The reaction of the Visegrád countries has to have two levels: regional and broader, European and Trans-Atlantic

ROBERT ONDREJCSÁK

is a Slovak political scientist and international relations expert, Director of Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, a think tank based in Bratislava. Co-founder of the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) and director of Strategic Policy Institute (STRATPOL), a think tank based in Bratislava. 169 WHAT ARE THE MAIN ARISING NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND HOW SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES ADDRESS THEM?

erhaps it is a paradox, but the most Ukraine), and they occupy significant important arising “new” security territories belonging to their neighbours Pthreat which determines V4 securi- (e.g. South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, ty is a very traditional one. While accept- Donbas and Transnistria). ing threats posed by international terror- The reaction of the Visegrád coun- ism, the proliferation of weapons of mass tries has to have two levels: regional and destruction, failed states and other so- broader, European and Trans-Atlantic. called “new threats”, for Central Europe On a more global scale, we have to attach the revanchist Russian approach towards ourselves to strengthening the most im- our broader region and in post-Soviet portant alliance which guarantees our se- space is the most important threat. Rus- curity, NATO. We need to argue in favour sia destroyed all of those principles which of strengthening the presence of our allies in post-Cold War and pre-2014 period in the region as well as the overall transfor- constituted the main pillars of our securi- mation of the alliance in order to be able ty: the pre-eminence of territorial integri- to address its members’ security needs, ty and the refusal of using military tactics with a focus on Moscow´s aggressive ac- as tools for reaching political goals. Both tions. At the regional level there should of these violations can be exemplified by be a strengthening of V4 cooperation in the destabilizing and invasion of Ukraine. the field of security and defence as well as Moreover, the Russian military forces in an increasing level of support for integra- their offensive posture outnumber the tion and transition ambitions in our direct capabilities of their regional neighbours neighbourhood, with a focus on Ukraine, several times over, and they regularly en- naturally. The Central European securi- gage in conventional as well as unconven- ty cooperation is a long-term priority, but tional exercises, including, unfortunate- so-far very few real results were produced, ly, nuclear attacks against those in close having the V4 Battle Group as a most proximity (e.g. Poland and Sweden). Rus- prominent example. We need to fulfil the sian authorities also try to deny the free- goals with real, measurable steps and to fi- dom of states to choose their strategic nally utilise the huge potential which cer- and foreign policy objectives (e.g. again tainly exists. V4 – 25 YEARS 170

To understand our situation, we must embrace the fact that our perceptions of common threats are not wholly unified

TOMÁŠ POJAR

(b. 1973) is a Czech diplomat and security analyst, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005-2010) and Czech Ambassador to Israel (2010-2014), currently works as at the CERVO Institute, a private college based in Prague. 171 WHAT ARE THE MAIN ARISING NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND HOW SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES ADDRESS THEM?

haos in the Middle East will con- point, it is unfortunate that only Poland tinue to make the region a breeding meets the 2% criteria in defence spending Cground for Islamic extremism and - the other three should meet their obliga- terrorism. Adding to the throngs of refu- tions as well. If they do not, joint action of gees, more people will flee the instability the V4 should be based on the principle of stemming from the war zones and overall “the coalition of willing”. The rest can al- non-functioning states of the Middle East. ways join once they are prepared to com- Russia will test American and European mit the necessary resources. resolve, attempting to regain its control To understand our situation, we must over as many “lost” territories as possi- embrace the fact that our perceptions of ble or at least prevent their full and irre- common threats are not wholly unified due versible integration into other alliances. As to our varied historical experience as well a result of fostered tensions related to the as our different geographical locations. migration and economic crises, Europe- We do share worries regarding the Middle an domestic security challenges will arise East, terrorism and migration. Regarding from the fragmentation and radicalisa- Russia, however, we differ on the degree tion of the population. A growing distrust and urgency of the situation. An addition- in leading European elites and the elites of al reason for this disunity stems from our individual member states will test the ex- competing views on the ruling governmen- isting political systems. To say the least, tal constellations. the outlook for our geo-political situation The V4 defence cooperation can be is not optimistic. strengthened, but it is unlikely to happen The Visegrád Group has a limited simultaneously. Any effective and mean- ability to address these challenges as a uni- ingful collaboration and integration of fied front. However, every Visegrád mem- forces will always be based on bilateral, ber state can strengthen the resilience of rather than trilateral or multilateral, coop- its own population as well as contribute to eration. The same, sadly, can be said about the defence of Schengen borders and aid the cooperation of the intelligence agen- in reinforcing NATO capabilities. On this cies and police forces. V4 – 25 YEARS 172

The Visegrád countries should become a driving force in establishing a realistic and effective European security policy

PÉTER SIKLÓSI

(b. 1966) is a Hungarian defence policy expert , Deputy State Secretary for Defence Policy and Planning of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence since 2010, former Defence Counsellor at the Hungarian Permanent Representation to NATO (2007-2010) and Head of the Defence Policy Department of the Ministry of Defence (2000-2007). 173 WHAT ARE THE MAIN ARISING NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND HOW SHOULD THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES ADDRESS THEM?

ur deeply globalised world is tensions stemming from “causes” outside characterised by enormous po- the country is a common practice to drive Olitical, economic, military, de- attention away from domestic problems. mographic, technical and environmental These elements could coalesce in the ever changes. These changes are taking place more fragile security environment. with increasingly higher velocities and are The diverging demographic trends generating tensions especially in fragile of Europe and of its southern neighbours societies. are also concerning developments. While Currently the most acute security Europe is struggling with the challenges challenges are coming from Europe’s pe- of an ageing populace, overpopulation is riphery and its wider neighbourhood. We an acute problem in the Middle-East and have to simultaneously cope with chal- especially in Africa. All of these develop- lenges from both various directions and ments might be multiplied by the nega- of diverse natures. On the one hand, Rus- tive effects of global warming. As a result, sia seeks to restore its super power status the migratory pressure on Europe will in- with means that had been hoped to be out- crease significantly. dated in 21st century Europe. On the oth- In such a deteriorating security situa- er hand, extreme Islamic militants–some tion, a deliberate and robust European pol- with European citizenship–were able to icy is needed to meet these serious, in some take advantage of the division and frag- cases existential, challenges. The Visegrád mentation of states in the Middle East, and countries should become a driving force conquered territories of significant size in establishing a realistic and effective Eu- to establish their own “state”. As a result, ropean security policy. As the unified re- the number of migrants to Europe has in- sponse of the Visegrád countries to the creased drastically and terrorist attacks migrant crisis has shown recently, Central have been carried out in Western Europe. European states fully understand the crit- These challenges appear to be staying ical nature of current developments. This with us for at least the coming years if not provides us with a solid basis on which we decades. The security situation might eas- can formulate a strong V4 voice. I am fully ily deteriorate further if the current trends convinced that Europe badly needs a new will not change and the revenues of oil pro- impetus. And this time the new impetus ducers will decrease significantly. Increas- might come from our region. ing nationalistic sentiments by fabricating V4 / 25 174

Introduction What are the values that bind us

FROM RES PUBLICA 5 together?

OLGA GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ 54

JACEK PURCHLA 56

Are the ideas on which the Visegrád LIBOR ROUČEK 58

Group was founded still relevant in BALÁZS TRENCSÉNYI 60 today’s European politics?

RUDOLF CHMEL 10

MIROSŁAW FILIPOWICZ 12 Does V4 need euro zone? GÉZA JESZENSZKY 14 PÉTER ÁKOS BOD 66 PETR PITHART 16 MAREK CICHOCKI 68 JACQUES RUPNIK 18 MARTIN FILKO 70 DANIELA SCHWARZER 20 DANUTA HÜBNER 72

ZDENĚK TŮMA 74

What does the rising importance of geopolitics in Europe mean for V4? Could innovation be the

JANUSZ BUGAJSKI 26 future of economic growth in the V4 region? MARTIN BUTORA 28 PÉTER ÁRVAI 80 PAWEŁ KOWAL 30 RUT BÍZKOVÁ 82 JÁNOS MARTONYI 32 JADWIGA EMILEWICZ 84 ALEXANDR VONDRA 34 IVAN MIKLOŠ 86

STEFFEN ROTH 88

What should the Visegrád Group contribute to the common European project beyond blocking What should the climate policies in power? the V4 region look like?

PÉTER BALÁZS 40 DAVID BUCHAN 94

ERHARD BUSEK 42 MACIEJ BUKOWSKI 96

KAREL SCHWARZENBERG 44 VOJTĚCH KOTECKÝ 98

KRZYSZTOF SZCZERSKI 46 JURAJ MESIK 100

MAGDALÉNA VÁŠÁRYOVÁ 48 JÁNOS ZLINSZKY 102 175 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Energy security – what has been How can V4 help democracies accomplished and what remains flourish? to be done? ÉVA BÖRDŐS 150

VÁCLAV BARTUŠKA 108 PAVOL DEMEŠ 152

JERZY BUZEK 110 IVAN KRASTEV 154

MATTHEW BRYZA 112 RADOSŁAW SIKORSKI 156

JÁN KLEPÁČ 114 VLAĎKA VOTAVOVÁ 158

ANITA ORBÁN 116

What are the main arising new How could the improvement security challanges and how should of infrastructural connectivity the Visegrád countries address contribute to the regional them? development and cohesion in the TOMASZ CHŁOŃ 164

Visegrád Group? MATTHEW KAMINSKI 166 ĽUBOŠ ĎURIČ 122 ROBERT ONDREJCSÁK 168 MATEUSZ GNIAZDOWSKI 124 TOMÁŠ POJAR 170 MARTIN KVIZDA 126 PÉTER SIKLÓSI 172 PIOTR NAIMSKI 128

GYÖRGY WÁBERER 130

Where should the external priorities of the Visegrád lie?

JUDY DEMPSEY 136

ALEXANDER DULEBA 138

MICHAL KOŘAN 140

OLAF OSICA 142

ANDRÁS RÁCZ 144 V4 – 25 YEARS THE CONTINUING STORY OF THE VISEGRÁD GROUP 1991 – 2016 editors: Wojciech Przybylski and Vit Dostal, Pavlina Janebova, Tomaš Stráay, Zsuzsanna Végh assistant editor: Karolina Jesień language editor: Galan Dall graphic design:

published by: Fundacja Res Publica im. Henryka Krzeczkowskiego ul. Gałczyńskiego 5, 00-362 Warszawa www.res.publica.pl, [email protected] funded by:

photos TASR/Pavel Neubauer (p. 8-9), AFP/EASTNEWS (p. 10, 16, 18, 32, 38-39, 42, 72, 164), MTI/Photoshoot (p. 14), Andrzej Stawiński/REPORTER (p. 20), SIPA PRESS/EastNews (p. 28), Wojciech Stróżyk/REPORTER (p. 30), Bartosz Krupa/EASTNEWS (p. 34), Wygoda/EASTNEWS (p. 44), Maciej Luczniewski/REPORTER (p. 46), Pavol Frešo (p. 48), M. Lasyk/REPORTER (p. 56), PAP/Šimánek Vít (p. 58), CEU/Daniel Vegel (p. 66), Robert Laska (p. 68), TASR/Štefan Puškáš (p. 70, 114, 152), AP/Judita Thomova (p. 74), Krzysztof Kaniewski/REPORTER (p. 82), PAP/STF Bartłomiej Zborowski (p. 84), AP/EASTNEWS (p. 86), Mariusz Gaczyński/East News (p. 96), PAP/ Myšková Marta (p. 98), TASR/Michal Svítok (p. 100, 168), Kardos Gabor (p. 102), PAP/Photoshot (p. 110), AP/EASTNEWS (p. 112), PAP/STF Michael Reynolds (p. 116), Jerzy Undro/REPORTER (p. 120-121), MUNI/Photoshoot (p .126), PAP/STF Andrzej Hrechorowicz (p. 128), PAP/STF Maciej Kulczyński (p. 142), Evgeny Feldman (p. 148-149), Beata Zawrzel/REPORTER (p. 156), IWM / Dejan Petrovic (p. 154), Jakub Stadler (p. 170)

ISBN: 978-83-945261-0-8