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Making International Intelligence Cooperation Accountable

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Making International Intelligence Cooperation Accountable Making International Intelligence Cooperation Accountable Hans Born, Ian Leigh, Aidan Wills DCAF DCAF a centre for security, development and the rule of law Making International Intelligence Cooperation Accountable Hans Born, Ian Leigh, Aidan Wills DCAF DCAF a centre for security, development and the rule of law Authors: Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills Editorial assistants: Youngchan Kim and William McDermott Designer: Alice Lake-Hammond Cover photograph: Tobias Schwarz/AFP/Getty Images Cover photograph description: German intelligence service (BND) chief Gerhard Schindler arrives at the enquiry commission of the German Bundestag on the US intelligence agency NSA in Berlin, on 21 May 2015 Background cover image: polygraphus/Shutterstock.com This publication has been made possible by the generous support of the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee. Published by: Printing Office of the Parliament of Norway Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either DCAF or the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee. Neither DCAF nor the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee are responsible for either the views expressed or the accuracy of facts and other forms of information contained in this publication. Reproduction and translation, except for commercial purposes, are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and provided DCAF is given prior notice and supplied with a copy. ©2015 DCAF ISBN: 978-92-9222-375-5 Contents List of Boxes ...........................................................................................................iii List of Acronyms ...................................................................................................... v Foreword ................................................................................................................ ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. xi 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................1 1.1 Relevance of the guide ................................................................................... 2 1.2 Aims of the guide ......................................................................................... 4 1.3 How little we know ....................................................................................... 5 1.4 What this guide will cover .............................................................................. 6 1.5 Target audience ........................................................................................... 9 1.6 Structure of the guide .................................................................................... 9 1.7 Methodology ................................................................................................ 9 Part I: International Intelligence Cooperation ............................................... 13 2. Nature and Scope of International Intelligence Cooperation ..............................15 2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 15 2.2 Conceptualising international intelligence cooperation ................................... 16 2.3 Taxonomy of international intelligence cooperation ......................................... 18 2.4 Institutions involved in international intelligence cooperation .......................... 25 3. Benefits and Risks of International Intelligence Cooperation ............................ 33 3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 33 3.2 Benefits of international intelligence cooperation ........................................... 33 3.3 Risks of international intelligence cooperation ................................................ 38 3.4 Risks to human rights and the rule of law ....................................................... 40 Part II: Legal Frameworks of International Intelligence Cooperation ............ 59 4. International Legal Standards and International Intelligence Cooperation .........61 4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 61 4.2 International legal basis for international intelligence cooperation ................... 62 4.3 Types of international intelligence cooperation and international law ............... 66 4.4. Cooperating with legal proceedings and international investigations ................. 75 ii Making International Intelligence Cooperation Accountable 5. Domestic Legal Framework for International Intelligence Cooperation ...............83 5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 83 5.2 Relevance of regulating international intelligence cooperation in domestic law .. 84 5.3 Treatment of international cooperation in security and intelligence legislation ... 86 5.4 Protection of information relating to international intelligence cooperation ....... 89 5.5 Procedural safeguards and international cooperation ....................................... 92 5.6: Human rights safeguards .............................................................................. 94 Part III: Accountability of International Intelligence Cooperation ...............105 6. Internal and Executive Controls of International Intelligence Cooperation ....... 107 6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 107 6.2 Internal controls ....................................................................................... 108 6.3 Role of the executive ................................................................................ 120 7. External Oversight of International Intelligence Cooperation ........................... 131 7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 131 7.2 Aspects of international intelligence cooperation requiring external oversight .. 133 7.3 Approaches and methods for external oversight of international intelligence cooperation ............................................................................................. 143 7.4 Access to information by overseers ............................................................. 150 7.5 Role of overseers in improving transparency of international intelligence cooperation ............................................................................................ 155 7.6 International cooperation between external oversight bodies ......................... 156 8. Role of Courts in International Intelligence Cooperation .................................. 163 8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 163 8.2 Intelligence and the courts ......................................................................... 164 8.3 Domestic courts and international intelligence cooperation ........................... 169 8.4 Judicial inquiries ....................................................................................... 172 8.5 Difficulties of challenging international intelligence cooperation in the courts . 172 8.6 Judicial examination of intelligence cooperation ........................................... 175 8.7 International courts and tribunals and international intelligence cooperation ... 180 Recommendations ................................................................................................ 189 Author Biographies .............................................................................................. 195 iii List of Boxes Box 1.1: Overview of selected possible oversight responsibilities related to international intelligence cooperation ............................................................................... 8 Box 2.1: Operation Samnite .................................................................................... 22 Box 2.2: US-German signals intelligence cooperation at bad aibling .............................. 23 Box 2.3: UKUSA Agreement (Five Eyes) ..................................................................... 27 Box 2.4: Operation Condor ...................................................................................... 29 Box 3.1: Curveball .................................................................................................. 39 Box 3.2: The bombing of Air India 182 and the failure to exploit international intelligence cooperation ............................................................................. 41 Box 3.3: The case of Maher Arar ............................................................................... 44 Box 3.4: The case of Ahmed Zaoui ............................................................................ 46 Box 4.1: US-Israel SIGINT memorandum .................................................................... 63 Box 4.2: UN Security Council Resolution 1373 ........................................................... 65 Box 4.3: State responsibility and complicity in torture: The UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights ...................................................................... 68 Box 4.4: Liability for extraterritorial intelligence activities under the ECHR ................... 72 Box 4.5: Examples
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