5 Kosovo Diaspora

MASARYK UNIVERZITY Faculty of Social Studies Department of International Relations and European Studies

PhD Dissertation

Brno 2018 Michaela Strapáčová

MASARYK UNIVERZITY Faculty of Social Studies Department of International Relations and European Studies

Mgr. et Mgr. Michaela Strapáčová

The Influence of the Diaspora on the Statebuilding Process in a Post-conflict Enviroment in Kosovo

PhD Dissertation

prof. PhDr. Vít Hloušek, Ph.D.

Brno 2018

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Vít Hloušek for his patient support and helpful comments and suggestions that guided me throughout my PhD studies.

Author’s declaration

I hereby declare that this PhD dissertation is my own work, that it has been written on the basis of the sources listed here, and that these listed sources have been referred to and acknowledged in the text.

Den Haag, 20 April 2018 Michaela Strapáčová

CONTENT List of Abbreviations ...... 10 1 Introduction ...... 11 2 Theoretical points of departure ...... 20 2.1 Constructivism ...... 21 2.2 From ethnic identity to Diaspora ...... 23 2.3 Culture ...... 32 2.4 Statebuilding ...... 37 2.5 Postconflict reconstruction ...... 40 3 Methodological basis ...... 43 3.1 Significance of the research ...... 44 3.2 Aim and Objectives ...... 45 3.3 Research Questions ...... 46 3.4 Conceptual Framework and Design of the Research ...... 47 3.4.1 The case study ...... 48 3.5 Operationalisation ...... 50 3.6 Collecting data ...... 53 3.6.1 Semi-structured Interviews ...... 53 3.6.2 Observations ...... 56 3.6.3 Written documents and secondary literature analysis ...... 58 3.7 Data Processing ...... 59 3.8 Ethical considerations ...... 61 3.9 Limits of the research ...... 62 4 Reconstruction and building of a new Kosovo state ...... 63 4.1 Historical overview ...... 64 4.1.1 Early history ...... 65 4.1.2 Kosovo in the 20th century ...... 68 4.1.3 1990s ...... 72 4.1.4 Kosovo after the conflict ...... 74 4.2 The critical challenges of the process of Kosovo state-building ...... 79 4.2.1 Geopolitical bases of the state ...... 80 4.2.2 Institutional base of the state ...... 86 4.2.3 The idea of the state...... 91

4.3 Chapter Conclusions ...... 96 5 Kosovo Diaspora ...... 99 5.1 Historical overview ...... 101 5.2 Character of diaspora ...... 107 5.2.1 Character of the diaspora in different locations ...... 111 5.3 Relations toward Albania ...... 113 5.4 Role of Diaspora in the process of dissolution of the SFRY ...... 116 5.5 Diaspora during the Kosovo Conflict in Kosovo and afterwards ...... 117 5.6 Diaspora today ...... 121 5.6.1 Economic relations ...... 122 5.6.2 Political and institutional connection ...... 128 5.6.3 Societal and cultural connection ...... 133 5.5 Conclusion ...... 138 6 Analysis and Interview Reflections ...... 140 6.1 Kosovar Society and Masculinity ...... 141 6.2 Diaspora Identity ...... 150 6.3 Relations Vis-à-vis the Serbian Minority and Serbia ...... 162 6.4 The Social and Economic Environment ...... 167 6.5 The Political Consequences of Diaspora Perceptions ...... 170 7 Discussion and Conclusion ...... 176 7.1 Discussion of research findings ...... 176 7.2 Conclusion ...... 185 Bibliography ...... 192 Appendix 1 Interview Protocol ...... 209 Appendix 2 Codebook ...... 210

List of Abbreviations

AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës) IMF International Monetary Fond EU European Union KFOR Kosovo Force KLA Kosovo Liberation Army LDK Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe MoD Ministry of Diaspora Republic of Kosovo NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës) PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-government SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia UN United Nations USA United States of America UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo WB World Bank

1 Introduction

Due to their geographic location, the Western Balkans have been influenced by many different directions throughout the different periods of their tumultuous history. This mixture of the involvement provided a culturally rich environment, where different beliefs, cultures, ethnicities clash with opposing political goals and interests. Kosovo has gained a specific role in the history of Albanians as well as Serbs, and shortly after the disintegration of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), this area escalated into brutal civil conflict. The end of the 1990s made the location of Kosovo ingloriously infamous for the worst possible reasons. Media attention to tragic stories of war refugees leaving their homes to save their own lives made Kosovo widely known for almost everybody, without anyone exactly understanding what was actually happening there. The massive wave of emigrants who were forced to leave Kosovo accelerated the process of establishing a Kosovo Albanian diaspora, which has since emerged with many unique features that came to the fore in the media and as well as for researchers. The rising number of migrants should not overshadow the fact that the establishment of the Kosovo diaspora has been a long-term process. With the emergence of modern communication tools as well as the increasing mobility of people, new opportunities have opened up the ways in which the situation in the home country can be influenced.

In critical periods such as war and post-conflict reconstruction processes, the support of a diaspora community based on the same identity and on a similar understanding of the local environment becomes particularly vital. Another additional factor is the experience of the diaspora with life in a more developed, relatively functional country; this opens the space for more critical and constructive approaches regarding the effectiveness of reconstructed state structures.

The opportunities brought by the diaspora provide enormous potential to aid in overcoming the many painful challenges of the state reconstruction process. However, members of the diaspora cannot be considered as omnipotent because their influence and potential are strongly limited by the given society’s local environment and its openness to changes. In the literature, many different academic texts are linked to various aspects of the topic this dissertation focuses on. In addition to the classic works on diaspora literature (Safran 1991,

2004; Cohen 1997 and Sheffer 2003), there also exist progressive approaches, reformulating the original framing to consider the current character of diaspora groups (Brubaker, 2000, 2005). There is a massive body of research dedicated to the role of diasporas during a conflict (Collier 2000, Greed and Grievance in Civil War; Brinkerhoff 2011, Diasporas and Conflict Societies; Demmers 2002, Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long-distance Nationalism, and Delocalisation of Conflict Dynamics; and Demmers 2007, New Wars and Diasporas), which consequently opened up other topics, such as conflict resolution (Smith and Stares 2007, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?) and the role of diasporas as independent actors who actively influence foreign policy (Shain and Barth 2003, Diasporas and International Relations Theory) to be further studied.

Academic research also exists that is dedicated to the role of the Kosovo Albanian diaspora as an actor in the war in Kosovo (Koinova 2012, Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism For Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK; 2013, Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States: Varieties of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Kosovo; King, R. and Vullnetari, J. 2009, Remittances, Return, Diaspora: Framing The Debate in the Context of Albania and Kosova).

Later on, studies appeared that dealt with the role of diasporas in development (Odermatt, 2013, Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development; Ionescu, 2005, Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners, for Home and Destination Countries) and in the institutionalisation of their own respective role (Gamlen, Cummings, Vaaler, Rossouw, 2013. Explaining the Rise of Diaspora Institutions).

Only very recently has research appeared that is dedicated to the role of diasporas during the complicated process of long-term post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding (Koinova, 2017 Diaspora Mobilisation for Conflict and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Contextual and Comparative Dimensions). For this reason (among others), the topic deserves some more academic attention and research.

As the role of the Kosovo Albanian diaspora became less clear and cohesive after the end of the conflict, the heterogeneous character turned out to be more apparent. Nevertheless, the importance of the connection with the home country remained, and similarly diaspora

12 members continued to stress the importance of their identity links with the home country. Because these identity connections continue to be transferred to next generations, it suggests that their role in Kosovo development has not ended. On the other hand, from the perspective of the newly independent Kosovo, the role of the diaspora became even more essential and almost excessively mentioned. The previous war period has proved that the diaspora has served as a crucial actor that has clearly supported the interests of Kosovo and its population – their family members. Consequently, the expectation of support from the Kosovo diaspora became so high that disappointment both on the side of the population at home and in the diaspora itself was almost inevitable; moreover, the level of support may have even been considered unrealistic, almost transferring responsibilities from the side of Kosovo to the diaspora. Another critical mission of this thesis is to clarify the limits of the diaspora’s role in post-conflict reconstruction, and to emphasise a crucial part – what the local society itself has accepted to be the direction of development.

Another hope for this thesis is for it to provide a view of the local level that so far has not been covered. Interest in the post-conflict reconstruction and the statebuilding process has involved many international actors, and most of the research has been performed by “international” people. Unsurprisingly, international and state-level perspectives predominate in research as well. As David Chandler has mentioned, local level perspectives have not yet received enough attention in the statebuilding literature (Chandler, 2010, p. 10). Nevertheless, ignorance of the micro-level view has created frustration and impatience, and as a consequence, this has influenced what problems the state faces in the process. These often cannot easily overcome, especially due to a lack of support and legitimacy (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). Furthermore, Oliver Richmond has noted that outcome of statebuilding reflects neither local, sociohistorical frameworks for legitimacy, nor identity and as such, it commands little loyalty (Richmond 2014a, p. 16).

To include views from the most granular level of analysis, it made sense to use some more anthropological methods of research in this work, to capture essential aspects such as identity and culture. While one analyst has warned of cultural approaches when analysing statebuilding (Capussela, 2015), others have suggested that to better understand the drivers and the spoilers of any peace and statebuilding process, local sociocultural specificities and perceptions must be taken into consideration (Kostovicova, 2012).

With respect to methodological development, although not without critique, International Relations theories have increasingly supported the inclusion of the classic anthropological method of ethnography in order to gain a different understanding of the specific societal and institutional realities whose impact is often unnoticeable, but together with the unique cultural environment, these institutions are crucial factors influencing development and statebuilding projects (Armakolas, eds., 2017, p. 38).

The constructivist approach is most appropriate for such research because of its open-minded attitude to the identity of diaspora members. Moreover, it allows for the utilisation of a multilevel approach to the research; this is particularly helpful when looking from the bottom up, as well as when considering how different layers of societal interaction influence each other. Lastly, the constructivist understanding corresponds with an attitude that considers the role of identity features and ideological settings in the society necessary for the statebuilding process, which would otherwise often be overlooked.

Overall, this work employs the help of an ethno-symbolic approach to the identity shared by Kosovo Albanian diaspora with their home country to determine how they members of this diaspora are able to influence the processes of post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding in Kosovo, regardless of their permanent residency.

As previously mentioned, the dissertation covers a topic which in its overall context and complexity has not yet been covered. However, multiple areas of the topic have already been addressed with various perspectives depending on origin of the research, the area of the expertise of the author and/or the applied research approach.

The most complex previous research concerns the area of theoretical literature dealing with the topic of diaspora research and its anchoring in the identity, and more specifically for the purpose of this thesis, the conceptual links of ethnicity.

A superb introduction to the importance of ethnic boundaries for identity is provided by David Lake and Donald Rothchild in their journal article Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict (1996) and Pavel Barša in Konstruktivismus a politika identity

(Constructivism and the Politics of Identity) (2008), which opens the door to understanding the broader picture of identity, before getting to the identity of a diaspora specifically.

For the ethno-symbolic perspective of diaspora (self)-perception, the role of Anthony D. Smith has been crucial. Smith dedicated his academic work to studying ethnic nationalism for over forty years. Among his works, it is necessary to at least mention The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986) and National Identity (1991). In addition to Smith’s approach, various other approaches to the origin of ethnicity appear, including primordialism, as represented by Clifford Geertz, Old Societies and New States (1963), Harold Isaac, The Idols of the Tribe (1975) and Pierre van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (1981); constructivism as represented by Eric Hobsbawm, The Invention of Tradition (1983), and Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (1990) and Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983); and historicism as represented by Miroslav Hroch, Nationalism and National Movements: Comparing the Past and the Present of Central and Eastern Europe (1996).

Smith’s argument about the role of ethnic ties and identities for a nation can be further approached from the perspective of the long distance toward the original territory as introduced by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Community (2008). The diaspora’s involvement in the nation-building process of nation states configured by both race and ethnicity, which are deeply embedded in nation-building processes, is dealt with by Nina Glick Schiller and Linda Green Basch in Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialised Nation-States (1994).

The conceptualization of the diaspora is an intensively examined topic, which itself has experienced its own evolution starting with works such as William Safran’s Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return (1991) and Deconstructing and Comparing Diasporas (2004). These texts who argue that explanations of how nations emerged must start from that which has commonly formed their cultural basis. Gabriel Sheffer, in Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (2003), emphasised the role of the ethnonational dimension of the diaspora, while searching for a more suitable contemporary use of the definition of diaspora. Roger Brubaker then identified the core elements of a diaspora to underline the key aspects that allow wide understanding in Accidental Diaspora and External “’Homelands” in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present (2000), Ethnicity without Groups (2004), and The

“Diaspora” Diaspora (2005). This was a follow up of Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, who looked at the distinction of the meaning of “diaspora” in Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism (1999). One specific perception on the role of a diaspora adjusting in the modern era while gaining a different political weight was elaborated by Jolle Demmers in Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long-Distance Nationalism, and Delocalisation of Conflict Dynamics (2002) as well as more broadly in Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction (2012).

Among other theoretical aspects, the political connotation of culture as a common link of social organisation has been covered by many previous authors examining the connection between the diaspora and the prevailing connection with the home country. These are covered in Political Culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics: An Uneasy Alliance (2014) by Howard Wiarda. Further aspects of socialization of culture can be found with the help of Donna della Porta and Michael Keating in Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective (2008) which further elaborates on the ethnic-symbolical aspects of identity and its politicization, addressed by the previously mentioned Anthony Smith.

The description of the current statebuilding effort in Kosovo has been conceptualised with the use of Barry Buzan’s approach in People, States and Fear (1991). This work emphasised the sociopolitical aspects of state functions. The introductory part of the perspective on statebuilding was presented with the help of works of Timothy Sisk’s Statebuilding (2014), who also worked in cooperation with David Chandler to prepare the Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding (2013). The discussion about necessary state capacities were enriched by the research contributions of Francis Fukuyama in State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004), Stephen D. Krasner in the article Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States (2004), and Ronald Paris in At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (2004).

As the post-conflict reconstruction concept is only used as a supplementary construct to address different levels of progress at various points in the statebuilding process, conceptualisation required no further elaboration; nevertheless, for the purpose of this work, a concept prepared by Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the

United States Army called the CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction (2002) was very useful, as it closely corresponded with the applied policy processes. The time frame was also relevant for the period, when Kosovo needed to address the direst aspects of its many challenges.

The historical development of Kosovo is a topic which has been widely and deeply covered by multiple primary as well as secondary resources. For the purpose of the thesis, a combination of Czech as well as international secondary sources were useful. The oldest historical development in the region has been addressed in publications by Czech experts: Miroslav Šesták’s Dějiny jihoslovanských zemí (The History of South Slavic countries) (1998); Dějiny Jugoslávie 1918-1991 (The History of Yugoslavia 1918-1991) (1994) by Miroslav Tejchman and Jan Pelikán; and Národnostní otázka ve Svazové republiky Jugoslávii (The Question of Nationhood in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) (1997), also written by Pelikán. A brief overview of the crucial milestones were introduced with the help of works of Noel Malcolm in Kosovo: A Short History (1998) and Tim Judah, who has been devoted to the situation in Kosovo for long time as demonstrated by his books Kosovo: War and Revenge (2000) and Kosovo, What Everybody Needs to Know (2008). More precisely focused is a chapter in a book by Bulent Gokay and Michael Waller entitle Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion (2008), where Judah deals with questions arising from the legal consequences of the KLA’s activities. Other observations concerning the wa are covered by Kosovo: Perceptions of War and Its Aftermath (2001) by Mary Buckley and Sally N. Cummings. A different perspective of historical development in the region is covered in an article by Christopher J. Hewer and Vitija Spheres in Identity after Kosovo’s Independence: Narratives from within the Kosovar Albanian Diaspora (2013) and a book by Julie Mertus, How Myths and Truths Started a War (1999).The process of reconciliation including its strong influence on the post-war settlement is addressed by Lars Burema in his appropriately titled Reconciliation in Kosovo? A Few Steps Taken, a Long Road Ahead (2012).

One work that especially deals with the statebuilding process in Kosovo is a book by Andrea Capussela called State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans (2015) and is supported by the primary documents and reports such as European Union (EU) Progress and Election Reports, Amnesty International and UNHCR reports, and data from Kosovo Agency of Statistics (KAS). 17

Data and analysis regarding the Kosovo diaspora was less accessible and its validity needed to be critically evaluated as some of the estimations vary widely. One important resource were the reports prepared in Amir Haxhikadrija’s Diaspora as a Driving Force for Development in Kosovo: Myth or Reality? (2009). Moreover, together with Ardiana Gashi, Haxhikadrija prepared a report about the Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe (2012). Ardiana Gashi also took an important part in drafting another more economically focused report on the Kosovo diaspora entitled Facilitating Diaspora Investment in Kosovo: Assessment and Mapping of Innovative Strategies at Central and Local Level (2013). The European Stability Initiative provided an additional important source in Cutting the Lifeline: Migration, Families and the Future of Kosovo (2006) and the Summary of the Diaspora Engagement for Economic Development Project (2015). Recent and more complex data analysis in Kosovar Emigration: Causes, Losses and Benefits (2016) was covered by an article written by Besim Gollopeni. Specific activities of the Kosovo diaspora have been covered by the extensive research of the above-mentioned Maria Koinova. Additional information was obtained by the combined use of reports of statistics offices and UNDP reports. The critical project regarding the potential of the diaspora to build a positive image of Kosovo was started based on research work of Behar Xharra, and Martin Waehlisch called Beyond Remittances: Public Diplomacy and Kosovo’s Diaspora (2012), which follows up on previous research in Public Diplomacy of Kosovo Status Quo, Challenges and Options (2010).

Last but not least, important Insights into the situation in the society were provided by the work of Nita Luci in Seeking Independence: Making Nation, Memory and Manhood in Kosova (2014), which deals with national and gendered ideologies in state and nation-building projects; Dafina Paca in Neither Here Nor There: The Discursive Construction of Identity by Kosovo Albanians (2015), focusing on hometype stereotypization of Schatzies; and Arlinda Rrustemi in Localizing Local Theory: A comparison between local and International Perspectives on State and Peace Building in Kosovo through Life Stories (2016), which attempted to bring a more local perspective to the established literature.

The introductory chapter outlines the general grounds of the dissertation, including the justification and selection of the presented topic. Additional details are provided to explain the aim of this work and to give readers a more comfortable orientation within the text. The second chapter sets out basic methodological stances, including the philosophical underpinning of the chosen method, as well as the consequences and the justification of these choices to provide a definitive backbone for the theoretically and empirically focused sections of the thesis. The research question is introduced in greater detail, which is necessary if it is to be addressed adequately. Furthermore, the second chapter clarifies what data are used from primary and secondary resources and how they were collected and analysed, and what method and techniques were employed during the research process. Another important point that Chapter 2 addresses are the limitations that had to be dealt with during the research process. The third section introduces the theoretical positions used to create the conceptual research framework. This is based on the constructivist perspective of identity, as a starting point to address the role of the diaspora through its connection to ethnic identity. Ingroup socialisation allows the transfer of identity-based values and the preservation of a common cultural connection. The general framework of the research draws on Buzan’s perspectives on statebuilding, which are introduced together with a brief clarification about the concept of post-conflict reconstruction. The fourth chapter starts with a brief overview of the historical and international context of Kosovo. The second part of Chapter 4 is dedicated to covering post-conflict development of the state of Kosovo, including the process of statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, and the most significant challenges this embryonic state has faced and still faces. The fifth section is devoted to the role and activities of the Kosovo diaspora. After a basic overview of the historical trends and tradition of emigration of Kosovo Albanians, there is a short elaboration on the character the diaspora. Furthermore, this section addresses the specific identity link among Albanians from Albania and Albanians from Kosovo together with the ethnic framing of the diaspora connection as such, where no additional ethnic groups are taken in consideration during efforts to preserve the connection with the diaspora community. The role of the Kosovo diaspora is evaluated during the period of the dissolution of SFRY and the war in Kosovo, and compares how the role of the diaspora changed and developed after the end of the conflict. The final portion of Chapter 5 examines recent activity of the diaspora and its influence in the development of Kosovo, from the perspective of economic aspects, political and institutional connections, and the social and cultural links.

The sixth chapter draws on material collected during field research to demonstrate individual examples from everyday life. Results indicate that the attitude regarding the diaspora is antagonistic, because the culture and lack of openness of the society does not correspond with the expectations of the changes that are awaited. Therefore, this chapter further deals with the reciprocal relationship between the environment and the diaspora itself, and how they influence and are influenced by reconstruction and statebuilding in the development of Kosovo. The final chapter includes analysis discussing the findings of the research regarding the role of the diaspora in the rebuilding process when considering the societal and cultural environment currently in place. This last part therefore serves to answer the research questions, as defined earlier in the thesis.

2 Theoretical points of departure

This chapter aims to present outlined theories and concepts used to approach the role of the diaspora in the statebuilding process in Kosovo. The basic framework used in this thesis works with the concepts of Diaspora, culture and state building. All concepts mentioned above will be defined and introduced with regards to their further use in the framework and content of this work, because each of them could quickly become a single topic for the entire thesis.

Firstly, the concept of diaspora as a personal or group relation towards one’s own identity and origin must be discussed and introduced. Together with culturally bounded perspectives, which also implies political and international relations´ level, it is crucial to understand how in theory the automatic everyday process of evaluating different situations in social categorisation influences our decisions and actions, and how they are grounded in our cultural background and unique experience. These culturally entrenched patterns help to contextualise development described in the literature and are demonstrated in examples from individual members of diaspora I have interviewed. The concept of post-conflict reconstruction is then

20 connecting an effort for the immediate state reconstruction with the long-term process of statebuildingbuilding. As specific areas of the processes are at different level to considerate both concepts allows to cover in more realistic way the real situation in Kosovo.

2.1 Constructivism

First, the principal viewpoint of the main paradigm that determines how the aforementioned concepts are approached must be presented.In an attempt to make sense of the social world, constructionists view knowledge as constructed based on their understanding and knowledge of the world, through experiencing things and reflecting on those experiences.

Identity, ethnicity, culture or state are in this perspective of constructivism in international relations considered similarly as reality to be social constructs. These constructs are repeatedly created and recreated by the mutually constitutive relations among discourse, everyday practice of individual players and overall structure. In common with interpretivists, constructionists in general focus on the process by which meanings are created, negotiated, sustained and modified (Schwandt, 2000). Crucial objects of interest are in various ways used to individually and collectively interpret and construct language, social and psychological appearance of the world in its specific social and historical consequences. Regardless of the very limited cohesion of constructivist paradigms, for most of them it is typical that immaterial factors are deemed to be the central reason influencing human actions.1 Both arose as a challenge to scientism and have been influenced by the post-modernist movement. Proponents share the goal of understanding the world of lived experience from the perspective of those who live in it. On the other hand, no one can make assumptions concerning objective reality, but only about our constructed views on its character (Hynek, 2005, p. 136; Hendl, 2005, p. 91).

In particular, Berger and Luckmann (1967) view society as present both as objective and subjective reality. The previous is brought about through the interaction of people with the social world, with this social world, in turn, influencing people resulting in routinisation and habitualisation. That means, any frequently repeated action can develop into a pattern, which

1 For example, realists can be sure that concepts are created rather than discovered yet maintain that they correspond to something real in the world. This is in accordance with the idea of Berger and Luckmann (1967), which consider reality as socially defined but still referring to the subjective experience of every-day life, how the world is understood rather than to the objective reality of the natural world (Andrews, 2012). 21 can be further replicated without considerable effort. This brings individuals to engage in innovation rather than starting everything afresh. In time, the meaning of the habitualisation becomes embedded as routines, forming a general store of knowledge. This is institutionalised by society to the extent that future generations experience this type of knowledge as nothing less than objective fact about the reality. Additionally, this objectivity is continuously reaffirmed in the individual’s interaction with others. The experience of society as subjective reality is achieved through socialisation. The primary socialisation involves being given an identity and a place in society. Socialisation takes place through significant others who mediate the objective reality of society, render it meaningful, and in this way, it is internalized by individuals. (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) The crucial tool in this process is language. The conversation continues to be the most critical resource for keeping, adapting and recreating subjective reality. Subjective reality is encompassed by perceptions that can be shared indeed with others - there is kept common understanding to the extent that concepts do not need to be redefined each time they are used in everyday interaction and come to assume a reality which is mostly taken for granted (Andrews, 2012). Usage of the cognitive perspective to advance the constructivist approach allows to direct attention during the research further than is the general tendency to focus on conspicuously visible constructions, such as those of political entrepreneurs and state bureaucrats while the less visible activities and perspectives, which are framing everyday lives of ordinary people remained neglected. Furthermore, the cognitive perspective enables constructivism to capture the relations and dynamic nature of race and nation as a fluid and contingent product of retaining and cumulative process of framing, categorising and interpreting. As advised by Brubaker, I will search for responses to the question of when and why people interpret their social experience in ethnical terms rather than what is ethnicity or an ethnic group (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, Ethnicity as Cognition, 2004, pp. 52-53).

Between various layers of identity, ethnicity may be considered just one out of many existing social structures. It can be utterly obsolete if you live in the society, which your ethnicity does not have any significant impacts in your life. It means that you are not limited in your decisions and life patterns or directed to others because of some of your features. On the other hand, if the ethnicity gains this power, it becomes one of the most significant social structures. Regardless of its importance, which is in same order initially subjective and its irreversible

22 effect creates the idea of objectivity, it still exists only by virtue of being reproduced on daily bases in the way of thinking and behaving of countless anonymous individuals.

The constructivist perspective in research influences the way a research framework must be formulated. In contrast to the positivist approach, where there exists a need for a single methodology to generate knowledge, constructivism desires a diversity of used methods. While relying mostly on qualitative data collection, constructivism embraces e the belief that a human can identify the reality of the world not mediated by scientific approximations with different degrees of validity and accuracy because the aim is to provide understanding to the world of human experience. In this regard, there will be further details provided in the separate chapter dealing with methodology and methods.

2.2 From ethnic identity to Diaspora

Any enquiry into diaspora must start by operationalising the concepts and clarifying how it relates to everyday processes of identity building. Implicated in the sense of identity are two apparently counterpoised features. One is the person’s sense of being a unique self. The other is the sense of sameness – the essential sharing of common mental constructions that occurs when we are co-members of a social category. Social identity is constituted in the relations between the individual and the social environment that arises from different categories. Social identities possess a multifaceted, profoundly contextual character and are distinct by referring to those who lie outside the identity group: females vs males, Serbs vs Albanians. Typically, these categories overlap in the sense that the border between them does not have to be permanent or that membership if either of these categories does not limit the independent existence of their affiliates. However, in consequence of fear and specific construction of relations, social categories can be step by step perceived as more mutually exclusive. Antagonism or conflict does not need to arise between them, but the situation may escalate as is documented by the conflict in Kosovo (Strapacova, 2016, p. 3).

Identity is often treated as a natural entity outside of the range of personal influence. While it is still only a culturally based construction, consequences of these conclusions for human existence are tremendous. Constructivism, as the currently dominant paradigm in the study of ethnicity and nationalism, claims that ethnicity is socially imagined and reconstructed when changes occur in the subjective identification of individuals or in the admission rules for 23 belonging to a group. Thus, individuals can change as can their identities when ethnic boundaries are crossed or redefined (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p. 6). Primordialism, by contrast, advocates that ethnic identity is a natural, objective feature of human existence traceable to lasting bonds whose basis has a genetic origin. The mythical naturalisation of these products of social and cultural construction is often considered an objective and unalterable factor of human existence (Barša, 2008, p. 22).

In contrast to this belief, constructivists see the process of understanding differently. “Every object of our cognition and internal evaluation cannot be considered discovered by the mind because the reality is in it is various symbolic and language systems pluralistic and pliant toward different ways of interpretation to fit in intentions of human factor involved” (Schwandt, 1994, p. 136).

A great deal of variance in a population on ethnic attachments and identities is limited to only one prevailing dimension, which is becoming the only criterion determining mutual relations with other subjects. Especially political identity is not primordial and fixed but contingent and continuously changing.2 Thus, accepted perspective is amenable to be influenced and used by political mobilisation (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 336). A constructivist view of ethnicity allows in contrast to the perception of the primordial and instrumentalist views a unique opportunity to gain insight and examine how cognitive frames are using the concept evolving from the understanding of ethnicity.

This value neutral reconstruction of a case study of Kosovo-Albanian diaspora considers identity to be a structurally embedded intersubjective construct. It is in the exact same way as what we consider to be the reality formed by thoughts and discourses. Thus, everyone is giving sense to his perception of the world and own actions. Own culture, as well as the content of the social world in general, can be captured only in very fluid appearance, which is continuously updated by its bearers (Barša, 2008, p. 21) 21). Different aspects of social identity derive from multi-layered and changing self-concepts of the primary basis of human- being. Therefore, social identity is based on one’s awareness of own membership in the social

2 A primordialist attitude when actively promoted or supported will shape the underlying perception of ethnic issues. It will do so even if it is not supported but simply tolerated. Hence, one must decide in advance what might be achieved in the post-conflict reconstruction of interethnic relations when ethnic conflict is seen as rooted in ancient hatreds and never-ending violence among ethnic groups (Strapacova, 2016).

24 group. Quite the opposite to individual self-identification with the group identity is the attribution of specific communities’ membership to individuals by their close and further vicinity, which prescribes clear boundaries of choices available for those standing on each of the sides. The social identity of each person does not exist in a transcendent world not influenced by the everyday reality of politically-economical and culturally-social structures. Identification of who is a member and more importantly who is not a member is a part of broader processes of experience representation and categorisation, which are giving to ones´ perception of the world sense and importance. Consequences of defining boundaries between “us and them” also allows these concepts to be easily shared (Barša, 2008, p. 28).

Ethnicity is one component of the human identity profile. Ethnic identity may be understood in the previously mentioned context as a form of ascriptive identity based primarily upon assumed kinship, as expressed by a combination of different attributes, which are in repeated process institutionalised and ritualised to influence internal and external identification to group identity. The term ethnicity in the subjective understanding comes from beliefs, perception, understanding, identification and framing of experiences of their members. Its existence is reproduced in everyday thinking, speaking and behaviour of numerous anonymous individuals. Ethnicity is often articulated by a combination of various attributes of collective belonging, such as language and dialect, origin, customs, historical experience, collective memory and solidarity within the community. An important emphasis is put on the historical and symbolically-cultural connection of group identity with the specific territory. Based on the individual’s position within the community structure, his ability to make free decisions is differentiated (Brubaker, 2004, p. 31; Anderson, 2008; Smith, 1991, p. 94).

This two-in-one relation of self-ascribed and attributed identification is as Wodak describes it stating that: “The national identity of individuals who perceive themselves as belonging to a national collectivity is manifested, inter alia, in their social practices, one of which is discursive practice. The respective national identity is shaped by state, political, institutional, media and everyday social practices, and the material and social conditions which emerge as their results, to which the individual is subjected. The discursive practice as a special form of social practice plays a central part both in the formation and in the expression of national identity” (Wodak, R., et al, 1999, pp. 29-30).

The broad concept of ethnicity3 can be approached from different explanatory perspectives, which are often in contradiction to each other. Common grounds can be seen in an attempt to base ethnic identity on relationship to the social group, which contains more members than family, clan or any type of the face-to-face group. Thus, no individual can possibly know in person all members, but they individually remain connected by the idea of their similarity. As in the case of nations, members of these imagined communities are interconnected by ideas of their independence and sovereignty as their community fosters a sense of boundedness and difference. Members of the community gain a natural tendency to prefer what is seen as ingroup and perceive it in the more positive light. On the other hand, there is a tendency to discriminate towards what is perceived as out-group, even though in mutual relations there was neither a conflict of interest and other motives for hostile relations, nor is there possible benefit from a contrary understanding of mutual perception (Anderson, 2008; Tesař, 2007, p. 66).

It is important to mention one of the distinct debates about the character of ethnicity. Primordialism claims ethnic identity as a natural, objective feature of human identity traceable to lasting bonds whose basis is genetic. Hence, primordialists place ethnicity on an equal footing with race and gender, implying that conflict between different ethnic groups is just the outcome of essential differences between their ways of life. It is not possible to change it as it is inherited from generation to generation (Geertz, 1963; Van den Berghe, 1981). Constructivism, by contrast, suggests that ethnicity is socially imagined and continuously rebuilt as changes occur in the way, the personal identification of individuals or in the entry rules for belonging to a community develop.4 Thus, ethnicity is seen as “situational” and individuals can change their identities and cross or redefine ethnic boundaries. As the individual's situation changes, so will the group identification (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p. 6).

3 From a Greek expression ethnos, which means custom and reminds of a close relationship between the community and culture (Tesař, 2007, p. 16). 4 Instrumentalists take this approach one step further. They assert that ethnicity largely depends upon political power, wherein elites seize on the symbolism and emotion generated by ethnic bonds as a crucial tool for expanding their own gains (Barth, 1969). In his regard is mentioned example of original ethnic division between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. There was a longstanding but fluid distinction between Hutu and Tutsi based on a combination of ancestry and socioeconomic status, assessed in part on the bases of owning cattle. Communities were not tribes or ethnic groups before being seen as Hutu or Tutsi became during the colonial era officially dichotomizing population (Schwartz, Luckx, & Vignoles, 2011, p. 921). 26

Besides the primordialists, considering ethnicity to be ascribed status, that is by its nature static and common ancestry determines ethnicity in almost sociobiological way as argued by Clifford Geertz (Old Societies and New State, 1963;), Harold Isaac (The Idols of the Tribe, 1975) and Van den Berghe (The Ethnic Phenomenon, 1981) and constructivists, who on the other see ethnicity as socially constructed, flexible and dynamic as its changing to social environment, there still exist several different perspectives on ethnicity. This rich variety of approaches includes modernists such as Eric Hobsbawm (The Invention of Tradition, 1983; Nations and nationalism since 1780, 1990), Benedict Anderson (Imagined Communities, 1991) or Ernest Gellner (Nations and Nationalism, 1983). The last mentioned sees ethnicity as neither prerequisite nor requirement in the nation formation process. Emphasis is put on political and intellectual elites that impose the shared culture on the whole population through the national educational system, so the members receive minimum flexibility to fulfil a variety of roles. Somewhere in between primordialists and modernists on the imaginary scale can be found ethno-symbolism, represented by John Armstrong (Nations before Nationalism, 1982) and Anthony D. Smith (The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 1986; National Identity, 1991), who argue that explanations of how nations emerged must start from ethnic ties and identities, which have commonly formed their cultural basis. Similarly, it can be mentioned historicism introduced by Miroslav Hroch, who is describing possible structural patterns of nation formation by “non-dominant ethnic groups.” With the use of a comparative method, he argues that these groups became aware of their ethnic identity throughout the 19th century because the intellectuals used the signs of ethnicity taken from history, which were in a time accepted and grown into mass that became aware of their cultural and ethnic individuality (Hroch, 1996, pp. 78-97). More artificial is the origin of ethnicity in the perspective of instrumentalists such as Glazer (1975) or Hechter (1986, recalling specifically rational choice theory), who see ethnicity as a strategic tool to support own gain of resources. Functional advantage diverges from moral to economic repay, however, the usefulness is seen as the reason why ethnicity persists.

For the purpose of this work, only the political interpretation of ethnic identity will be more described, because underlines its symbolic and cultural attributes based on the modernist approach of Anthony D. Smith considering significant pre-modern roots of ethnicity. An ethnic group is a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences including

27 religion, customs, language or institutions. Such collectivities are doubly “historical” in the sense that not only are historical memories essential to their continuance but each ethnic group is the product of specific historical forces and is therefore a subject to historical change and dissolution (Smith, 1991, p. 20).

Behind the rival models of the character of ethnicity stand certain common beliefs about what ethnic identity is as a complement to any kind of collective cultural identity. They include the idea that ethnic communities possess and share a collective proper name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories; one or more differential element of a common culture; an association with a specific “homeland”; a sense of solidarity for a significant sector of the population (Smith, 1991, p. 94).

The above list of ethnic characteristics discloses not only their principally cultural and historical content but also their subjective components. For example, there is mentioned myths of common ancestry, not a fact of common ancestry, which the collective memory is based on. Even though it is usually impossible to differentiate, the living idea is more crucial than real historical grounds. It is the fictive origin and putative ancestry that matters for the sense of ethnic identification. Similarly, attachments to a specific territory, and to certain places there, have a mythical and subjective value, which is becoming a pure fact in eyes of its supporters. It is the attachments and associations, rather than residence in that matters for ethnic identification. This layer of identity has gained with the development of modern technologies of communication and travelling an entirely new dimension. “It is where we feel that we belong. It is also often a holy land, the land of our forefathers, our kings and sages, which makes this the homeland also for people, who were neither born nor raised at in this specific location” (Smith, 1991, p. 23).

Neither transnationalism nor a rising number of people living outside of their place of origin, however, eroded the capacity of the “homeland” and its myths and symbols to territorially anchor their identity discussions about diaspora5 communities and their fate gain more space (Conversi, 1997, p. 17).

5 From Greek expression diaspeirō, (speiro = to sow, dia = over), which means "scattering or dispersion." 28

With the rapid development of communication technologies and people´s mobility gained diaspora and its possibilities to influence the situation in the homeland an entirely different dimension.6 The real explosion of new opportunities that allows diaspora members to remain in touch with the country of origin mirrored rising interest in their role, character and activities in academia and public. In order to address the consequences further, the understanding of the phenomenon of diaspora and how specifically it will be approached in this thesis must first be clarified.

With the help of academics and journalists, who have applied the term with an established historical meaning that emerged in an ancient situation in entirely different settings to an extensive variety of social-political phenomena and institutions, the concept has proliferated its meaning and has been stretched to accommodate new challenging agendas. Such multiple usages of these terms have led to much misunderstanding about their meanings. This confusion is due in part to a traditional and prevalent misinterpretation and misuse (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997).

Until recently, the historical Jewish experience provided the archetype: forced expulsion and dispersal, persecution, a sense of loss, and a vision of return. Over the past decades, however, "diaspora" has become a term of self-identification among diverse groups who migrated voluntarily or not from one place to another or several other places. Therefore, we can talk about “a group of people living dispersedly outside of their original mythical or existing homeland, while preserving the collective idea of their common motherland. Common values facilitate the everyday presence of homeland orientation and help to keep in the multi-layered identity a special place for their own shared cultural uniqueness.” As mentioned by Vertovec, it is observable in a multitude of websites (a Google provide close to four million hits for "diaspora" in 2004 while 148 million hits in 2018), most self-described diasporas do not emphasise the melancholy aspects associated initially but for long with the classic Jewish, African, or Armenian diasporas. (Safran, 1991; Safran, 2004; Cohen 1997) Rather, they celebrate a culturally creative, socially dynamic, and often also quite romantic meaning (Vertovec, 20005).

6 Jolle Demmers describes main reasons to believe that the political weight of diaspora communities has increased importantly. Since the late twentieth century they also often play a crucial role in contemporary conflicts. These reasons are (1) the rise of a new pattern of conflict; (2) the rapid rise of war refugees; (3) the increased speed of communication and mobility; and (4) the increased production of cultural and political boundaries (Demmers, 2002, p. 86). 29

Due to moving in the meaning of the term has Safran suggested to extend the concept of diaspora to communities, whose members share the following characteristics: 1. Diaspora members, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from an original "home" to two or more “peripheral,” or foreign, regions; 2. Retention of collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its physical location, history, and achievements; 3. Partial or full exclusion or margination from host society, because they believe that they are not and perhaps cannot be fully accepted by their host society, therefore they feel partly alienated and insulated from it; 4. Desire to return to the homeland because they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would or should eventually return—when conditions are appropriate; 5. Maintenance of homeland, because they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; 6. Collective solidarity that lets members continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethno-communal consciousness is importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship7 (Safran, 1991, pp. 83-84). When Sheffer searches for an acceptable version of contemporary diasporas definition, he used features, which are like those that typify diaspora established in earlier periods. The most significant common characteristics are described as: distinct trans-state social and political entities, which result from voluntary or imposed migration; the members of these entities permanently reside in host countries. However, they mostly decide after they have settled in the host country;

they constitute minorities in their respective host country, where they evince an explicit ethnic identity, which is an essential base for promoting solidarity within diaspora and intricate support organisations;

7 In terms of that definition, Sheffer consider legitimate to speak only about the Armenian, Maghrebi, Turkish, Palestinian, Cuban, Greek, and perhaps Chinese diasporas at and of the Polish diaspora of the past. However, none of them fully conforms to the "ideal type" of the Jewish Diaspora (Safran, 1991, p. 84). 30

their involvement is not limited to economic activity, in contrast, they demonstrate solidarity with other members of the community, and consequently, cultural and social coherence;

they maintain discernible cultural, social political and economic exchanges with the homeland, whether this is a state or a community in a territory within what they regard as their homeland; for this as well as for other purposes (such as establishing and maintaining connections with communities in other host countries), they create trans-state networks that enable exchanges of significant resources;

they have the capacity for either conflict of cooperation with both the homeland and host country, possibilities that are in turn connected to highly complex patterns of divided and dual authority and loyalty within the diasporas (Scheffer, 2003, p. 83). Such a list of properties that are often offered provides some idea about what diaspora may be, but it does not present a clear conceptualisation. Therefore, Vertovec and Cohen differentiate three meanings of diaspora as a social form, diaspora as a type of consciousness and diaspora mode of cultural production (Vertovec, Cohen, & eds, 1999). The further dispersion in the semantic and conceptual usage of the term diaspora led Brubaker to identify three core elements that underline most definitions and remain widely understood to be constitutive of the diaspora (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). Dispersion in space as the almost universally accepted criterion, which is directly explaining the character of the diaspora. The dispersion can be interpreted as strictly forced or otherwise traumatic experience (as earlier suggested by Safran, 1991, p. 83) or more broadly when state border was crossed (such as supported by Cohen 1997). However, some substitute division for dispersion, when the creation of state borders cause that the part of the community lives outside the ethnonational homeland (also so-called Accidental diaspora as specified by Brubaker, 2000 or King & Melvin 1998). Homeland orientation toward real or imagined “fatherland” as a crucial source of value, identity and loyalty faced the most significant shift during the 1990s. Four out of six above mentioned main principles presented in 1991 by Safran mention homelands orientation and collective memory as crucial features (Safran, 1991, pp. 83-84). Later, this perspective was criticised for its continuous cultural connection to a homeland as a single source and teleology of return. (Clifford, 1994) Although this model does not qualify to some specific regions such as African or South Asian population, which today are a significant homeland for numerous diaspora groups settled around the world, in case of Kosovo Albanian diaspora is similarly as for others more traditional groups homeland orientation remaining a crucial element of

31 connectivity for diaspora members. Even if the return home does not have to mean a return permanently, there is no doubt that the homeland orientation and connection remain to be a constitutive element (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). Boundary maintenance includes the preservation of distinctive identity and cultural dispositions towards a majority host society. These boundaries can be kept intentionally as resistance to assimilation through self-enforced endogamy and other methods of self- segregation temporally extended over generations. It could be to different extents enforced by the community members towards their families and children, or it could also be present as a part of self-censorship regarding the own behaviour of life decisions including the selection of a future spouse (Brubaker, 2005, pp. 6-7). In accordance with Sheffer´s interpretation will be in the term diaspora emphasised the “ethnonational” dimension, which means that it is dealing with politics of dispersed groups whose members regard themselves as having common ethnic traits identities and affinities (Scheffer, 2003, p. 11). In the last decade of the 20th century, the question of boundaries, space and mobility gained a completely different dimension. Consequently, the concept of diaspora acquired new more “rooted” forms of identification such as nations seemed to imply a decline of a locality as a point of reference for collective identities. The general concept of “rootedness” was deconstructed to the point that connection of ethnic communities remained strong, but this type of group identities does not have to be spatially or territorially bounded. Although members of the community can live permanently in the land of their origin or they can live abroad they support territorially based identity even though they do not live in the territory (Kokot, Tölöyan, & Alfonso, 2004). Thanks to the speed of communication tools and rapid mobility of people, diaspora are gradually capable of nourishing social relations that connect their societies of origin with the places of their settlement. Hence, diaspora communities can easily live their politics long-distance (Anderson, 2008, p. 12). As Basch noted, by living across borders diaspora is confronted with and involved in the nation-building processes of two or more states. Their identities and practices are probably to be configured by hegemonic categories, such as race and ethnicity that are deeply embedded in the nation-building processes of these nation-states (Basch, Glick Schiller, & Szanton Blanc, 1994, p. 34).

2.3 Culture

Persistence of ethnic identity, especially when divorced from its original homeland location, is between diaspora members supported by homeland orientation, nostalgia and spiritual 32 attachments as some from the diverse elements of common shared culture that can differentiate one community from another also for upcoming generations. Despite changes in location or economic activities, social organisation and the sense of collective identity remains strong in a diaspora community as the transmitted culture strengthens a personal attachment to ethnical identity while separating them from their surroundings (Smith, National Identity, 1991, p. 26). As mentioned by Wiarda, it does not mean high culture such as painting, music and dance, although all or any of these may influence overall political culture. The focus remains much narrower on aspects of political values, beliefs and mindsets build up on almost any collection of habits and behaviours among a given group of people, which are undergirding a society8 (Wiarda, 2014, p. 1). Rich meanings of culture vary from simple to more complex elements, which influence through individual to international level political experience. As shared culture can be understood as the combined effect of humanly constructed social elements which help people hold together as can be illustrated in different elements introduce by Rees: Ordinary life practised in society is recalled by the need for cooperation forged to family ties, economic interest and economic concerns or by common values and beliefs emerging in everyday practice as may be seen in sport. The sports bond is the real power expressing culture of individuals from local to the international level as entire nations can be said to embody the activities of its national sporting hero. Symbols of group identity are serving to construct and interpret the unique experience of the community. Signs such as architecture, monuments, national flags and cultural symbols, identity banners, style of clothing, unique food are more than touristic attractions because of its specific role to inform group members about who they are and help them to live cohesively. Persecuted communities might see the national flag as a symbol of oppression and exclusion. On the contrary, the own flag symbolising the cultural identity and fight for freedom is so powerful that followers are prepared to die for its honour. Compelling stories about the critical moments of the entity cover the educational use of symbols in stories society need about individuals and events in the distant and recent history including stories of victories and defeats to reaffirm or even recreate ideas of common belonging of the society regarding the broader world. Culture change therefore also includes

8 On the other hand, it needs to be mentioned that popular culture including film and television help sustain prevailing political narratives. Not only stereotype and glorification of national values help to strength particular conception of identity and allows to react on last development to trigger feelings of togetherness as can be seen on example about popular culture in the USA (Duncombe & Bleiker, 2015). 33 that society can accept different stories about themselves to embrace a new social reality. In case multiple perspectives of own history do not comply, we can speak about a “culture war”. Agreement on what does it mean to live a good life in the society. From individuals to international societies people are influenced to reflect in their life what is believed to be healthy based on their cultural background which teaches what is good for them and society and can make it flourish. There is different opinion about characters needed for the society, which may vary enormously. We can see it on differences with which is treated for example individualism as a positive or negative feature. The prototype of the character wanted in the society can be seen in the characters of men and women that the society chooses as its heroes (Rees, 2017, pp. 103-106). Belonging to a diaspora entails a consciousness of, or emotional attachment to, commonly claimed origins and cultural attributes associated with them. Such origins and attributes may emphasise linguistic, regional, religious, national, or other features. Concerns for homeland developments and the plight of members in other parts of the world flow from this consciousness and emotional attachment. With such an understanding, we can understand how diasporic identification may be lost entirely, remain active or dormant. The degree of attachment — and mobilisation around it — often depends upon events affecting the purported homeland. In this regard, culture in this work serves as an important link to locate individuals in social context, in which their values, aspirations and associations are formed and in which their choices gain meaning (Keating, 2008, p. 103). Yet, there are still disputes over the importance of culture and its impact on politics; it is becoming more and more accepted as an significant variable in political, social and economic behaviour and therefore also analysis. Political culture refers to deep-rooted values, beliefs and behavioural orientations that members of the society have and carry around toward political functioning and policy outcomes. It also contains elements of so-called high and low culture, which are practices and behaviours so long as they pertain to politics and influence political behaviour (Wiarda, 2014, p. 166). As an example, from history can be recalled ancient Greeks philosophers such as Plato and Aristoteles, who pointed to the role of values and beliefs undergirding explanation of social and political institutions. Later Machiavelli completely divided religion and political culture from politics especially because he was conscious of the importance of religion and people´s beliefs for political purposes. Montesquieu highlights the effect of environmental and cultural aspects on politics. As mentioned, the system of the society must adapt to distinct conditions

– climate, soil, occupations, commerce, history, religion and customs, because they are all important in determining a country´s stability and development (Wiarda, 2014). Socialized culture allows the definition of a reference group and creates a framework for constructing visions of the world. In this regard, culture helps to make sense of highly complex human society, where individuals face a variety of stimuli and experience. Based on culture, it is possible to link ideas and interpret them based on societal consequences that are not possible to address differently. Identity in this sense is forged by socialization into a culture which consists of elaborate series of shared knowledge, religious, customs and rituals, societal hierarchy. These in fact codes and interpretations allow members of the group to reinforce their self-identity and to recognise each other. Some cultural differences may be large and denote different lifestyles and social values, but this does not have to work as group markers in the same time. The sense of group solidarity built on the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion of members (Keating, 2008, p. 109). Labelling members during the process of social identification with a specific collectively shared ethnic view makes it possible to provide them with different treatment than those who are not members, and different rules apply regarding some of their actions or even existence. Especially family traditions are very rigid in masculine society, where it may look like very modern but even small not very formal meetings with family and friends put lots of expectations to the various members (Brubaker, 2004, p. 34; Anderson, 1991). Common myths and beliefs have an effect regardless of their truth or falsehood. A rich ethnohistory is a significant source of cultural power and a focus of cultural politicization. The intellectuals from communities where that history is doubtful must not only recover a sufficiently large quantity of collective history to persuade their members that they have a great past, but they must validate it satisfactorily to persuade sceptical outsiders of its evidence. The truth-content of the exhumed memories is less important culturally and politically than their abundance, variety and drama or their example of loyalty, nobility and self-sacrifice that inspire emulation and bind present generations to the “glorious dead” (Smith, 1991, p. 164). The micro circle of the family system includes structure of family roles, children nurturing and institutions such as marriage, which are nested in the community and society with unique characteristics that may be perceived as a strengths or challenges when engaging in transactional relations in extended families and communities that are influencing further the macro-level perspective of societal organisation. Micro-level interactions occur between

35 individuals at the most local and personal level, when dealing with everyday situations. These relations explain the role an individual has within the community and thus shape his or her identity through socialisation process of facing expectations, culture and norms of the wider society. Macro-level interaction relates to large-scale institutions, the media, law and government at the national and international level, where personal relations are not immediately present. Nonetheless, the functioning of institutions and decisions of global importance mutually influence by the broader population as the social levels are interconnected. Mezzo-level social interactions occur between the individual and national or global level of vital importance and structure groups, communities and organisations within the state. This middle level features social groups and level of organisation with more structured models and rules, which are however interpreted and applied at the local level in accordance with hierarchically closer expectations and norms that are bridging for the local society organised by roles, location or ethnic identity. Macro-level is thus driven by historical events, social trends and issues that are together with economic factors influencing its complex development at national or even international level. Macro-level is not the only event-based regardless of how historical influences are presented in events such as war and right civil activities. The complete character is strongly influenced by social forces that are part of the culture of the time period and includes values and ideas whose influence is often not even consciously noticed and their social impact to certain extent prevails regardless of the personal or communal approval of their existence (Johnson, 2014). The hierarchically organised system of schemas is very much situationally and culturally specific. If a strong sense of ethnic competition schema is present in the society informed by a robust normative sense of community position, in which parties are ethnically defined, people may be there more prone to interpret their experience in ethnic rather than other terms. Social schemas are shared mental structures representing knowledge and recording and interpreting experience to guide perception and generate inferences and expectation. They work with scenarios and culture modes, which enable them to serve as mental recognition device. This kind of sophisticated interpretation use minimal input gained together with an overall organising structure of already familiar categories and schemas without conscious awareness (Brubaker, 2005, pp. 41-44). The concept of culture will allow for the understanding and interpretation of behaviour and changes at the micro-level and connect them to broader macro-level to provide a complex

36 picture while taking in consideration collective level in which decisions and interpretations are made. (Keating 2008: 100) In this sense, a political level of culture is used as an essential tool to anchor the political development in Kosovo in the specific circumstances of the regions and society. Furthermore, political culture – values, beliefs and ideology and orientation affect politics and influence political behaviour – helps to reintroduce importance of these aspects back to international relations. It is not possible to even imagine that the internal country situation, including the above-mentioned aspects, does not affect its stance and position in the international enviroment. Cultural factors impact individual, local, national and international experience and its recognition will also facilitate better understanding of more complex and dividing consequences (Wiarda, 2014, pp. 22, 147).

2.4 Statebuilding

Outside imputes are an essential incentive to support the feeling of group connection. Such a case was the violent conflict in Kosovo (Brubaker, 2004, p. 171) . Similarly, challenges of the statebuilding process also urge specific schemas to be activated and support or sabotage the aim to rebuild the state structures and society to create conditions to build sustainable peace (Hamre & Sullivan, 2010, p. 89). The classical definition what was initially understood as building a state speaks about “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within given territory“ (Weber, 1958, p. 78). Statebuilding has developed as an integral part or even a specific approach to the process of peacebuilding. In the 1992 UN Security Council document called Agenda for Peace drafted by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced this term, which became an initial approach to address challenges that post-conflict war societies face to prevent recurrence of conflict and its roots (Ghali, 1992). Statebuilding evolved as a specific peacebuilding approach that aims to improve government capacities to assure security and development goals in a more long-term perspective, which aim to consolidate peace and institutions and governance to provide conditions for society to develop and prosper on their own sustainably. From the security perspective, it is the final goal of the statebuilding process seen in stabilising war-torn countries to form a sole legitimate and internally and externally accountable authority. From the development point of view is to creation of this authority governing under the rule of law a precondition for economic grown and development. The underlying conviction about the current statebuilding concept is the presence of international assistance which is supporting the process, which still

37 must remain owned in the hands of locals, which may face in post-conflict society many problems (Sisk, 2014). This preferred strategy to overcome previous conflict era was used to rebuild state apparatus with its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in state territory. The process of the statebuilding after the previous violent conflict describe the situation, where are with crucial support and supervision of the international community rebuilding basic features of working state. The focus of statebuilding is to restore governance institutions and security from the national up to the local level to consolidate peace. In case of Kosovo is this statebuilding starting to create a wholly new state in the situation, where state institutions were previously ruled by another state (Chandler & Sisk, 2013, p. 70). Francis Fukuyama, have argued the importance of existing state capacity and infrastructural development as key determinants of statebuilding outcomes, such as demonstrated in rebuilding post-war Germany and Japan (Fukuyama, 2004, pp. 38-39). Others like Krasner have suggested that “de facto trusteeships” should be reintroduced for statebuilders in order to be able directly administered war-torn territories for an extended period so reform can be taken together with broader and more profound statebuilding campaigns (Krasner, 2004). Paris stressed that democratic institutions and free market principles are inherently divisive, and should not be instantly presented in post-conflict societies (Paris, 2004). Due to limited focus in the process of state building on missing legitimacy, the state consequently loses its strengths because of no existing capacity to command loyalty. In this regard, Buzan introduces the idea of the state from the state security perspective, which assumes integration between the territorial, societal and political aspects of the state as interlinking components.

This approach emphasises the socio-political rather than physical plane because the state exists more as an idea held in shared by a group of people, than existing physical organism. “The state must have a physical base of population and territory, institutions of some sort, which govern the physical base and there must be some idea of the state, which establishes its legitimacy in mind of its people” (Buzan, 1991, p. 71).

All three elements are crucial to understanding the strength of state:

Physical base of the state is the most concrete part consisting of state sovereignty and international consensus on territorial limits. There is included a defined territory, population, resources that might be in its disposal and even health as physical conditions, in which we can be found the state and which may limit its decisions and goals. As noted by Holsti, the boundaries of the defined territory have received lately almost sacred and unchangeable character (Holsti, 1997, p. 83).

The institutional base of the state is expressed by entire machinery of regime and government including executive, legislative, administrative and judicial powers and the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate including the incumbent holders of state offices. This concrete manifestation of the state, however, pays attention if the institutions really operates along the accepted norms and procedures. As their functionality matters their worth nothing in case they are only on the paper without the real effect (Buzan, 1991, pp. 82-83).

The idea of the state is the most abstract component of the mode, but also the most central. The idea of the state contains an implicit societal contract and ideological consensus about the given society such as are represented by history, traditions, nationality and ideology. All together, it binds people in a socio-political unity. The idea of the state has to be considered as a useful critical aspect such as the forces, sentiments and ideas distinguishing political communities from each other. As Buzan stated the physical base exists merely, the institutions govern and serve as a gatekeeper between intra-societal and extra-societal flows of action, but their functional logic falls a long way short of defining the totality of the state. Therefore, it is a category error to conflate the idea of the state with its apparatus only. (Buzan, 1991, p. 82).

Politically emphasised role of principles such as democracy and capitalism or a common ethnocultural identity can unify or divide the population. The first two elements are subsumed by the traditional institutional approach toward the statebuilding. However, the attention towards the “idea of the state” is the crucial element for the legitimacy of the whole process. In case the state does not exist without its physical base, it also can barely exist without a widespread and deeply rooted idea of the state among the population because the institutions themselves would have fatal difficulty functioning (Buzan, 1991, p. 82).

In regard to different phases of the statebuilding process, the distinction of three different phases could be used, as defined by Fukuyama. The first phase begins when the official state institutions completely collapsed and had to be rebuilt from scratch. The second phase includes the rebuilding of sustainable state institutions that shall be able to take over the governance of the state after the international mission leaves, however, whose presence is at this point crucial. The third phase is describing the necessary result of the situation when rebuilt state institutions can govern the state independently (Fukuyama, 2004, pp. 101-102).

2.5 Postconflict reconstruction

Elementary pillars of the process of constructive change of the environment to minimalise future use of violence as the effective mean of solving conflict include ensuring security; justice and reconciliation; social and economic well-being and governance and participation. These framework needs to be placed between stopping the violent conflict and normalisation of existing relations since without this step it will not be possible to close the previous phase completely (AUSA/ CSIS, 2002, pp. 2-3). The process between have to be approached as a continuous spectrum, where can individual aspect improve while their character is also implicitly influence all the other aspects regardless of the grouping. Post-conflict reconstruction usually contains strengthening of key fields with the different but still important assistance of international actors. Based on the phases are different requirements taking place gradually. Ensuring the security maintains control over former belligerents, national security and regional security, protection of population and protection of critical individuals, infrastructure and institutions, reform of local security institutions have to follow together with addressing the other aspects of public safety. Established the safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions is the elemental requirement to be able to move further. Security in this regards encompasses the provision of collective and individual security for members of all communities and these groups as such. It is a necessary precondition for achieving future successful outcomes in other pillars, whose progress would otherwise be destabilised continuously. In the most critical sense, which does not have to be always that immanently present, it concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and different-scale eruptions of violence coming in response to actions taken in the process. The restoration of territorial integrity can be seen differently based on the community perceptions. Therefore it is needed to find a livable solution to involve all them stabilise the 40 situation to be able to work on next pillars without undermining the underlying conditions for future development (AUSA/ CSIS, 2002, p. 4). Searching for justice and reconciliation must work on questions of transitional justice, the functionality of laws and judicial system including corrections and law enforcement. Moreover, there is an essential role of international courts and tribunal in solving previous human rights breaches and assisting in building the environment respecting basic human rights standards. In this pillar must be addressed the fundamental need for impartial and accountable legal system bouncing for everybody to build a picture of possible better future. Besides cannot be forgotten about dealing with past abuses. It needs to be created efficient law system, which is possible to enforce and an open judicial mechanism and human corrections system and other formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from the previous conflict period. Promulgation and enforcement of the rule of law for the population depend very much on the ability to encompass the provision of mechanisms to redress grievances, appropriate penalties for individual offenders. Often forgotten remain the concept of restorative justice, which shall mediate the space for reconciliation between former combatants, victims and perpetrators (AUSA/ CSIS, 2002, p. 8). Strengthening political governance and civic participation is related to processes to constitute a stable executive power, legislative framework including local administration at the municipality level. Special position includes transparency and fights against corruption, which might be based on cultural standards evaluated with different level of indulgence. Active civil society and free media supporting the governance of political parties governing based on the results of democratic elections. This pillar addresses the need for legitimate, active political and administrative institutions and participatory processes. Mainly need to be established representative and constitutional structure, strengthening public sector administration and management and supporting the active and open participation of critically responding civil society in the formulation of government and its policies. Participation involved the process of giving voice to the population and its problems and solutions through the development of society, which enables generation and exchange of ideas provided by advocacy groups, civic associations and the media. (AUSA/ CSIS, 2002, p. 3) Social and economic reconstruction needs to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons may securely come back, accessibility of food, shelter and healthcare. Rebuilding the education system and social security network need to address currently burning issues and also prepare for the future challenges. Fundamental economic and social needs have to be

41 addressed. After the restoration of essential emergency services for the population need to be laid down foundations for viable economy and initiation of a sustainable development program including all groups. Population need to be protected by securing basic needs to stabilise the situation and shift attention from the humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development. Preparation of economic strategy is very much connected with infrastructure building and policy of employment. All together need to prepare market and legal environment to connects country into the international trade environment and bring more investments and funding for the reconstruction (AUSA/ CSIS, 2002, p. 4). The concepts mentioned above will be used in different parts of the thesis to understand further the influence of diaspora on the post-conflict reconstruction and the process of statebuilding in Kosovo: Thus, the introduction of the concept of diaspora is essential to understand how the Kosovo Diaspora is approached in the thesis as an actor of international relations as well as a very heterogeneous group of individuals with diverse background and interests. As a diaspora group is kept together by their shared ethnic identity bonds, therefore it was needed to clarify how this approach is used in emphasising common cultural collectivities such as customs, values and historical collective memories on character of the ethnicity and what it means for the community of members living abroad such as diaspora as well as for every single person on its level in order to get a picture of how are their beliefs and norms transcended regardless of the location their members live and why are they important when trying to understand what is happening at the higher level of societal and political activities. In order to comprehend the importance of this individual micro-level, the concept of culture is used, the shared compilation of values and customs about social organisation of the life for individuals and their family members that helps to understand how relations in society is influenced by the context, where the development is happening and by what is considered to be correct approach and what occurred if objection about these traditional modes appears. The cultural symbols, ordinary life practices and shared memories at the individual and close societal level allows understanding how these rules influence the context of further societal development not only at the broader local level but also at the national or international level when it shapes major political decisions and practices. The concept of statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction is providing the framework for approaching the specific environment in which is the diaspora interacts with their family, acquaintances and state institutions and in which Kosovo as a subject of international politics

42 builds and consolidates its relationships with the diaspora. The concept of the statebuilding provides the framework including the future aspirations of the consolidating state, while the concept of post-conflict reconstruction allows taking into account consequences of the uneven development in different areas. In the following chapter, it will be further specified what system of methods were applied, including the broader phylosophical underpinning of chosen research methods and reasoning behind the choices made.

3 Methodological basis

“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.” (Albert Einstein)

As the title indicates, this chapter includes the research methodology of this dissertation thesis. It provides an overview of the epistemological and ontological stances for the chosen

43 analytical and methodological approaches but also an outline of the substantiated data collection method.

Therefore, firstly, the significance and aim of the study will be explained. In more detail, this part outlines the research strategy, including the research design, the research methodology and methods, the research approach, the research question and its operationalisation. It discusses the selection of the sample and the methods of data collection, the research process itself and the type of data analysis used. Finally, it presents ethical considerations and research limitations of this project.

3.1 Significance of the research

With a growing interest in the influence of non-state actors with the ability to shape crucial issues of international relations, the range of research is extended also to include activities of ethnic and religious communities, which, from the perspective of nation states, are considered to be living outside the country of their origin. In the contemporary view, the diaspora involves an understanding of the shifting relations between homelands and host nations from the perspective of those who have moved for various reasons from their country of origin and permanently live in the host country. Crucially, diaspora emphasises the inescapable life experience of many migrant communities that are often trans-local and exceed the boundaries of the nation-state.

As was previously demonstrated by the review of existing literature presented in the previous chapter, the significant role was studied mostly in regard of the diaspora influence during the period of conflict in the home state. In the post-conflict reconstruction phase, activities supporting the democratization in the home country were covered. Only a limited amount of current research (Paca, 2015; Rrustemi, 2016) deals with the connotation of how social bonds and habits transmitted between generations are influencing the mindset of people who never experienced the previous conflict themselves. However, this experience is very much present in their behaviour and, in fact, influences their role in the post-conflict reconstruction. What is meant by their role in the post-conflict reconstruction is not only their real influence but also the approach which is attributed to them and expected to be upheld. The analysis aims to understand how identities, actions and practices enable diaspora members to take their specific role and position in the Kosovo post-conflict reconstruction 44 and state building and how this way of thinking and understanding what is required and rejected influences the way the society is developing and its further progress.

3.2 Aim and Objectives

The aim of this dissertation is, with the support of a detailed analysis of the social context of post-war Kosovo state reconstruction, to provide understanding of the role of Kosovo Albanian diaspora in this dynamic process. The influence of the diaspora would be approaching the specific aspirations they have or those that are ascribed to them in the concept of the process of statebuilding introduced by Barry Buzan. This approach allows us to consider not only the significance of the diaspora for Kosovo but also the reciprocal relationship between the environment and the diaspora itself. Buzan deals with the process of statebuilding as something complex that includes the physical, institutional, as well as ideological basis of the state. The last one is often underestimated in other research works in comparison with the institutional and geopolitical layers because of its abstract character (Lemay-Hébert, 2009), nevertheless, the idea of the state is in fact the most central. In order to understand the societal and ideological consensus of the state not only concerning the relationship between the diaspora and the reconstruction of Kosovo, a bottom-up perspective allows us to take into account the identity features that are considered important in building common perceptions and expectations of the results of the whole process.

Through an analysis of the interview data, I collected specific examples from the everyday life of people living the process of post-conflict state building in Kosovo to demonstrate their view and understanding of the situation. I argue that the role of diaspora is misused for political purposes to globally present the Kosovo state image in accordance with its international aspirations, while the values which the diaspora members hold abroad are not very well accepted in the Kosovo society and political elites are not interested in changing that situation. Furthermore, political elites are rather supporting the traditional perspective of Kosovo identity based on conservative values as it is connected with a legacy which is very convenient for the domestic politics, of the KLA fight for Kosovo independence. This common memory interpretation of the recent history was politically emphasized to discredit the plurality of opinions and to shame political competitors in their struggle for power. Those not involved in the fight for independence in the field, as is the honoured traditional responsibility of the patriarchal society, have no right to disapprove. The credit of the political 45 elites was gained for bringing Kosovo to the dream independence and such an interpretation is regularly repeated because further steps in the process of establishing the working structures of the state are much less satisfying. Thus, the previous success in the fight cannot be forgotten and became ideologically owned by political elites, which also do not allow the society to move forward in terms of the idea of the state.

3.3 Research Questions

The main research questions mirror the two-fold objective of this thesis, namely, to understand the role of Kosovo-Albanian diaspora and to reflect on how the diaspora is culturally influenced in their actions and perceptions of their identity and role ascribed to them at the individual and social level and to understand this process and its international consequences. This is reflected in the following central research questions: How do the ascribed cultural roles of Kosovo-Albanian identity influence the process of post- conflict reconstruction and statebuilding in Kosovo? This reflects the aim of the thesis to provide more understanding of the role of the diaspora during these processes, while paying attention to societal and cultural aspects stemming from the micro and meso-level of the society, which, due to the tightly-knit relations and strong hierarchy of the society, also influence the macro-level of the international relations of Kosovo.

In order to base the understanding on real experience, the second central question asks: What roles did these societal expectations and identity attributes have in influencing the different sections of statebuilding before the end of the conflict in Kosovo and how the situation changed? Such a phrasing will allow us to focus also on the differences stemming from the historical changes of the political and economic environment in Kosovo and the whole region. The specific research questions support the more general phrasing of the central questions to focus on different mutually interlinked spheres of the statebuilding processes, where each feature can be experienced. This division is grounded in the theoretical considerations, on which this work further elaborates in a separate chapter.

The first specific question deals with the most pervading base of the research, which is also most central as it implicitly influences the character as well as the challenges noticeable in other spheres. The first question asks: What is the role of the individual identity attributes at the level of the “idea of the state” and how do they influence the current situation? 46

The second specific question inquiries about: What is the role of the individual identity attributes at the level of the institutional base of the state and how do they influence the current situation? Its focus is on the administration of the state, the level of the rule of law and legal environment and other attributes that have to be considered at a theoretical level of how the state should work and the real practice of how it actually works.

The third specific question wants to understand: What is the role of the individual identity attributes at the level of the “physical base” of the state and how do they influence the current situation? The theoretical emphasis of this framework is, in comparison to different approaches to statebuilding, on the ideological base of the state, which holds the community together mentally, ideologically and emotionally. Based on their shared identity grounds, even members of the community permanently living abroad are participating because they feel connected to a certain extent, and they are also considered by other members to be connected and involved in the development.

3.4 Conceptual Framework and Design of the Research

The methodological paradigm can be traced back to the philosophical perspective on which the methodologies are based. In contrast to a positivistic quantitative inquiry based on the objective reality of the world which exists independently of an individual or group perspective, interpretativism believes that a theory is always connected to a specific setting and circumstances under which it is developed. As demonstrated in the research, this approach does not strive for universal laws but recognises the subjective meaning of people´s experience, which shapes reality. Understanding is formed via reflection on personal experience and relating this knowledge to the information we already possess. Moreover, the research focus is placed on an interpretative understanding of participants’ meaning, and, with the use of other sources, an interpretative understanding of view and experience to identify and explain conceptually the ongoing behaviour. The philosophical bases and the character of data require developing a qualitative research design and choosing appropriate research methods to collect data - interview, observations, written documents and secondary literature analysis - and interpret them.

A qualitative research approach, in contrast to quantitative approach, enables a description and analysis of “the lifeworld and experiences” of participants from their point of view and a better understanding of social realities, while drawing attention to processes, meaning patterns and structural features present in the society and transmitted across generations.

This method was chosen because qualitative research, such as interview material and observations, cannot be reduced to numerical data and statistical form in the same way as a content analysis can. Furthermore, the thesis does not claim to provide truthful depictions of reality, but rather tries to understand and explore the implications of ethnic framing and reconstruction of shared and transmitted cultural concepts on political and social levels of the statebuilding process in Kosovo from the point of view of diaspora members. Emphasis is on understanding the phenomena from the inside rather than an outside perspective ( Timulak & Elliott, 2005, p. 147).

This research is in accordance with the idiographic perspective focusing its research goals on the role of the individual case. The idiographic method describes the characteristics as unique, approaching every case individually. Hence, it is designed to derive meanings particular to the research target and not to extrapolate to broader theoretical generalisations. Instead, it provides an exhaustive depiction of the unique and extensive circle of events and conditions to provide the complex situation at the micro-level, which needs to be understood and connected to the macro-level of the state politics to see the broader picture and consequences of the situation. Accordingly, idiographic research prefers qualitative methods like ethnographic and participant observation, or interviews, which will be used in this work (Berg-Schlosser & Stammen, 2000, pp. 111-117).

3.4.1 The case study The case study methodology enables us to carefully examine the data within their unique context when a single case example is explored in relation to a specific research problem. Yin defines the case study research methodology as an empirical inquiry that investigates a unique contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. When the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not evident, and multiple sources are used to explore, a detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events and conditions and their relationships is

48 used. A descriptive type of the case study presents a complete portrayal of the phenomena within its context (Yin, 1984, p. 23).

A case is often chosen not because it is extreme or unusual in some way, but because it will provide a suitable context for the specific research question to be answered. As such, the case allows the researcher to examine vital social processes (Bryman, 2004, p. 51). However, a good reason for deciding to select a case is also to consider whether this particular case will bring something which is not already known and permit inquiry of complex themes (Humphries, 2008, pp. 90-91). As Stake puts it, is the case study chosen because of interest in the individual case, not by the method of inquiry used? Hence, an intrinsic study examines the case for its sake. The case is selected not because it is representative of other cases, but because of its uniqueness, which is the genuine interest of the researcher (Stake, 2005, p. 443).

This interpretative framework and the constructivism paradigm, together with practice and method of data collecting, give shape to an ethnographic case study of behaviour and its political implications in the specific process of Kosovo statebuilding. A full, rich understanding of the culture and social context, gained by fieldwork interviewing and observations that generate rich authentic data allow the researcher to be in the setting that shall be studied. This kind of life experience is the best way to gain a holistic perspective on reality (Willis, 2006, pp. 239-243). Even though first-hand contact with the environment during the data collection process is crucial, even ethnographic research includes a variety of collection techniques such as interviewing, participant observations and document analysis. The most specific for ethnographic research is a socio-cultural interpretation that sets it apart from other forms of qualitative inquiry (Merriam, 2002). Harvey draws from critical ethnography to stress the need to link the collected data with structural relations: that is how participants, behaviours, beliefs and actions are influenced and sometimes moulded by wider social and cultural forces such as gender, ethnicity, language discourse and dominant ideology. The researcher shall examine and understand such processes rather than merely interpret and describe the events at face value (Harvey, 1990, p. 12). This research fully acknowledges that due to the nature of employing qualitative methodology, the ability to generalise the outcomes is very limited. Hence, this thesis does not aim to make general claims that shall be replicated. On the contrary, this research provides

49 a qualitative exploration which illuminates multiple and multi-layered meanings starting at the micro level and considering the international consequences. Other characteristics of the case study, such as presenting data of real-life situation and providing insight into the detailed behaviour of the subjects, made it possible to collect and analyse all the necessary data for this research. Furthermore, the thesis does claim to provide truthful depictions of reality, but rather to understand the implications of ethnic framing and reconstruction of shared and transmitted cultural concepts on political and social levels of the statebuilding process in Kosovo from the view of diaspora members.

In accordance with the ethnographic approach to research and the general concept of this work, the declared culture and its implications as well as the shared cultural patterns in case of Kosovo-Albanian diaspora provide a broad perspective of approaching the research environment. The content of ethnography is setting an environment that surrounds the cultural group. It is multi-layered and interrelated with many factors such as history, religion, politics economy and environment (Fetterman, 1998)

3.5 Operationalisation

After the explanation of the research design, the studied dimensions defined in the specific questions serve as an outline to concentrate on when analysing the data to understand and interpret the role of the diaspora in the post-conflict reconstruction process. The first central research question deals with identity features and cultural roles in the society that are in accordance with or clashing with the roles ascribed and expected by the community in different societal layers. This multi-layered concept allows us to understand how this localisation within the group influences individual behaviour, decisions, tasks and aspirations of each person in their personal and public life. Individual awareness of his or her role in the societal structure brings requirements, limits and other rules that are applied externally or via auto-censorship, which consequently influences personal behaviour in order to be considered to live a good life in the society. The strong identity of the community imposes internal rules, values and customs on its members that are required to be fulfilled with different levels of rigidity. For the purposes of this research, the requirements are illustrated by common life practices, evaluations of who the heroes of the society are, and other compelling stories demonstrating the most praised characteristics of its members. The societal roles require and award specific behaviour based 50 on previous experience that let the members of the community survive and sometimes even flourish. Therefore, the most effective rules were further maintained in the society. When the environment rapidly changes, the adaptability of the societal rules is questioned. Either they serve their purpose with the same effectiveness or they may be reshaped in order to serve the society better. Therefore, the second central question deals with the time perspective regarding the war experience of the Kosovo population which, in its tragic character, became a strong event strengthening different features of the cultural and identity (self)perception and also the environment of the country from an international, regional and internal perspective. These differences will be approached by a historical overview of the challenges the community faced in Kosovo. Looking how such situations were traditionally overcome, helps to clarify what behaviour was praised and remained actively used and, on the other hand, which features started to disappear as the new environment had different requirements. Furthermore, international aspirations of Kosovo foreign policy perspective are grounded in the European values corresponding to the same values the diaspora members have set for themselves. The harmony and friction between values that were based on Kosovo aspirations which are valued only at the declaratory level without having a real-life impact will be described based on the everyday situation from all three bases of the state. Furthermore, the contradictions on the political level between the different kinds of support of these values at the international and local level will be mentioned.

The societal roles used to have a specific purpose, which is reflected in the different positions of multi-layered identity in the personal, private and public life of individuals. Based on their gender, place of birth and living in a rural or urban location, education, working-position and frictions between the above-mentioned cultural and identity features in combination with values of different cultural perspectives of the home country and diverse host countries, the individual role in the society can be described, as well as the way in which each individual accepts it. An important part of the evaluation of these individual experiences supported by the literature and studies previously conducted is the linkage of what these specific experiences bring from the individual micro-level to the broader societal environment up to the level of state development.

The description of the perception of the Kosovo identity from the side of diaspora and its tightness in the cultural environment is then evaluated based on the expected and performed role of the Kosovo diaspora in the abstract component of the common idea of the state as defined in the first specific research question. The diaspora role is evaluated based on the approach of its members toward the politically preferred character of what Kosovo identity is based on, including the understanding of own history, collective memory, traditions, societal rules and praised human characteristics. Furthermore, it is considered what aspects are less accepted or possibly challenged from the side of members´ of the diaspora regarding the interpretation of the recent war experience and way to face the post-war relations between two most numerous ethnic communities in Kosovo.

For the purpose of the second specific research question, the role of Kosovo diaspora members in the institutional base of the statebuilding process is reflected by how they are involved in the process but also how reliable they consider the system to be. Such a situation can be evaluated based on their willingness to invest or set up a business or to plan their future back in Kosovo. A realistic idea of return, including temporal studies or permanent return to Kosovo, indicates a certain amount of trust toward the institutional system and social service. If they are visiting only temporarily, we can focus on how efficient they consider the development of the state services and education system, with regard to the satisfaction of basic needs, i.e., how much they trust the system in providing the elementary needs to them and their families in Kosovo. Moreover, being active in the civil society and political participation gives an indication of what potential and effect the diaspora members see in bringing their own perspectives on the future direction of the Kosovo development.

The role of diaspora members in the physical bases as defined in the third specific research question could be seen in their perspective of the security of Kosovo as an existing state but also of the individuals living within the state. It is important to consider how the chances of a reoccurrence of the war conflict are seen, as well as the possible security consequences of a cohabitation with the Serbian community. Thus, the perspective of relations toward the Serbian community in Kosovo as well as the mutual relations with Serbia will be evaluated. It is also necessary to consider the restrictions of the state existence arising from its limited international recognition and consequences of this situation for Kosovo international aspirations as well as directions of individual lives.

All the questions need to be considered as interlinked with each other and actively influenced by the specific cultural environment and identification with the Kosovo-Albanian community that in its abstract and pervading character legitimates (or not) the whole process and its continuation.

3.6 Collecting data

As previously mentioned, primary data collection approaches usually involve a direct interaction with individuals on a one-to-one basis or in a group setting. These data collection methods for case studies include a sophisticated strategy of multiple methods. Hence, the expensive, time-consuming and more difficult methods of interviews and observations are usually collected from a smaller sample. The benefit provided in the more vibrant character and deeper insight into the studied phenomenon is balanced by a combination with other resources. Furthermore, the primary data sources are supplementing the available secondary data together with the responses to research questions.

Triangulation of data was ensured by gathering data using multiple methods including observations, interviews, written documents and secondary literature analysis to provide a more precise and balanced picture of the phenomenon and to cross-validate the sources.

3.6.1 Semi-structured Interviews Qualitative interviews seek to describe the factual situation and the meaning of the central topics in the life world of the respondents. Covering both the factual and meaning level is necessary to make sure that we understand the specificity of the environment and how it influences what the respondent says (Kvale, 1996). Interviews are particularly useful for providing the background to the participants’ experiences and allow us to pursue in-depth information on the topic.

In accordance with the qualitative tradition strategy, the aim of this thesis was to select a sample broad and deep enough to capture all the critical aspects of the studied phenomenon. Generalisability is replaced by a thorough specification of the characteristics of the sample so that one can make judgments about the applicability of the findings. As the criterion of saturation was not satisfied, the data collected during interviews are used as illustrative 53 examples that can be linked back to the aspects mentioned in the theoretical part and provide more context for them.

The process of collecting data was continual and long-term with an attempt to set a focus group during the first longer visit of Kosovo in August 2013. I tried to find out what methods could be used by conducting a pilot sample of interviews to see what data could be collected. Based on the data received in interviews with members of the diaspora as well as experts, I prepared a set of questions for the interview protocol to collect during my visit from June to August 2015.

Both collections used snowball sampling because the participants were recruited based on the recommendation of the initial participants or experts and recruited further subjects from among their acquaintances. This strategy is a way to overcome the problems associated with sampling concealed members of the particular community, where some degree of trust is required to initiate contact and especially to cover topics of personal character (Rowland & John, 2001).

The format of the interviews was semi-structured as I developed a loose structure or a topic guide made up of a list of open-ended questions defining the area to focus on during the interview. However, the respondents’ perceptions and accounts were also welcome. This interview protocol (see Appendix 1) served as a guide during the interview process and allowed me to cover pre-determined topics and let the interviewees elaborate on topics themselves.

Interviews were conducted in informal and comfortable environments, which made it possible to face unanticipated aspects in individual conversations and provided enough space for clarification of ambiguous points and feedback (Wodak, R.; et al., 2009). The structure followed the recommended model of starting with general questions to direct the interview to the topic in an appropriate language, which allowed respondents to understand and not to feel intimidated. The setting of the interview has an impact on the answers. Therefore, enough privacy and a relaxed atmosphere were vital for each meeting to allow the respondent to provide their own authentic experience. Sensitive questions were placed towards the end.

The topics were usually addressed in the order listed unless the interviewee opened some of them on his or her own earlier. The prepared questions were amended to respect the natural flow of the conversation. I was encouraging narratives to emerge during the interviews by a conversational setting, which allowed everyone to bring up elements which the respondents found important. This aims to draw attention to the way in which prominent discursive frames influence individual stances and the extent to which the transmitted experience is similar or in conflict with the general positions publicly presented in media, research and other secondary literature. Deliberate giving of power to the respondents to take the lead and to point out salient features of the phenomenon as they see it, not only reveals aspects of their experience that were initially not expected but can also suggest improvements in the research procedure. An example of this can be the aspect of differentiating gender perspectives of the respondents, which was initially not included.

The interview collection periods for most of the interviews were July and August 2013 and June - August 2015, when I conducted most of the interviews during the visits in Kosovo. I also followed up on most of the interviews to gain more feedback on how the respondents’ opinions and views influenced their life decisions in what was discussed and expected. Regarding the sample, I conducted nine interviews with the diaspora members themselves during their stay in Kosovo. In addition to that, I conducted additional six interviews with current or previous political representatives and NGO activists from Kosovo and additional four interviews with the experts on Kosovo relations from international staff, who have been present in the country since the end of the conflict.

After the pilot sample of two diaspora members and one expert from an international organisation, I decided not to record or simultaneously transcribe the interview as it showed to be too distractive for both sides but also for the natural flow of questions and stories of the interviewee. When recorded, the interviewee was showing noticeable signs of self-censorship, as the respondents remained very much aware of the research purpose of the conversation and had more problems opening their topics. Thus, I preferred to take notes of critical formulations only and transcribe the interview right after it was conducted, which still offered the compromise of collecting fascinating and fruitful data in a sufficient form to be analysed. The collections of interviews were gathered in the research diary.

3.6.2 Observations Observation as a systematic description of events, behaviours, and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study enables the researcher to describe existing situations using their five senses, providing a so-called written photograph of the social context (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 79).

Participant observations as a typical ethnographic method in which the researcher joins in the flow of daily life, while also taking notes in order to gain more contextual data to help understand the complex interactions in a natural social setting. The observational data is helpful for designing appropriate interviews and suggesting who might be a suitable person to conduct the interview. The method of observation is most appropriate when the research problem concerns human meaning and interactions. It is helpful to gain more understanding about situations observable within everyday life, where a researcher can get access (Jorgensen, 1989, p. 13). The individual is not a consistent, static personality, but is always in a state of “becoming”, undergoing a change in interaction with the environment. Therefore, it is important to observe people in different contexts, since behaviour, opinions and beliefs change and may even contradict, depending on the context (Carey, 2012, p. 149). These data are useful in overcoming discrepancies between what people say and what they actually do even though respondents themselves may not be aware of it. In specific cases, direct observation was used rather than participant observation, because I was only observing certain sample situations as these interactions provided circumstances which directly involved topics included in this research. With the approval of the group, it was possible to observe how these topics are presented not only when the respondent is asked in the neutral environment set by the researcher, but also in the respondents’ natural everyday environment in Kosovo. A combination of both methods allows comparing more detailed field notes from direct observation sessions enriched by the advantage of a better interpretation of what happened and why, as participant observation provided more chances to be involved and understand the context (Kawulich, 2005). Observations were conducted in the same period as interviews (August 2013, June - August 2015) in Pristina, Gjilan and other smaller towns. I could observe students who were in group projects discussing and preparing solutions for real situations in Kosovo, which they chose themselves as cases to deal with. I could observe, with the approval of the group members who were familiar with my research, how the teams discussed and planned to solve the

56 situation of interethnic cohabitation in North Kosovo or accessibility of the bridge in Kosovo Mitrovica. Interactions between students from Kosovo, Kosovo diaspora and international students brought many discussions about Kosovo everyday reality and how it can be effectively solved. Furthermore, additional observations were made during lectures and seminar discussions and group preparations for various group tasks (Schwandt T. , 2015).

Although observation is a separate data collecting method, no matter which data collection method is followed, observation is always an important element. Some of the most important findings were accidental and captured from observations of the failure of other data collection methods. Thus, it is necessary to be alert and observe, note and document these observations. Field notes are created during acts of qualitative fieldwork to remember and record the behaviour, activities, events and other features of an observation. They shall enable the researcher to keep evidence to produce meaning and understating of the culture and social situation of the phenomenon being studied.

Thus, field notes were recorded during and after each observation and maintained in a research diary for the purpose of being read as evidence helping to understand and give meaning to the phenomenon. A research diary was used to store information from specific observation sessions as well as interview appointments (Adams, Khan, & Raeside, 2014, pp. 92-98).

The research diary has the form of descriptive information of factual data including the particular time, date, place and event. Furthermore, it mentions the social circumstances and language used, subjects present and their role during the session, details of the situation, behaviour, activities, conversations and significance of what was observed from the perspective of the participants (May, 2011, pp. 177-179). Lastly, other features of the observations have to be mentioned and the impression the observer may have had in each specific situation. Descriptive data are supplemented by reflective information about how observations were conducted and what ideas, concerns, impressions and thoughts were brought up and may need to be addressed further. Unanswered questions or points for clarification and insight about why the observed phenomena may have occurred are considered in view of future steps taken in next observations.

The preliminary analysis of field notes occurs as they are being written down and while the original observation is still being conducted in order to foster crucial self-reflection for the understanding and meaning-making process. Hence, themes emerge, which help to identify new directions which could be taken to foster a more in-depth inquiry (Labaree, 2017).

3.6.3 Written documents and secondary literature analysis For every qualitative study, data on the background and historical context need to be gathered. Knowledge of the context surrounding, and specific setting comes in part from reviewing and analysing documents. Previously collected data available in books, databases and online sources are irreplaceable for the research. Based on the criteria suggested by Scot, the used documents were evaluated based on their authenticity, credibility, representativeness and quality of data (May, 2011, p. 206).

The role of documents and their data and meaning is crucial, but it cannot be assumed that documents are neutral artefacts, which independently report social reality. Documents are, therefore, viewed rather as media through which social power is expressed and need to be approached within the cultural context in which they were written and should be viewed as attempts at persuasion (May, 2011, p. 200).

Primary sources and documents include various laws (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo 2008, Law on Local self-government 2008; Law on General Elections in the republic of Kosovo, 2008; Law on Diaspora of Kosovo 2008; Law on Gender Equality 2015, Law Gender Equality 2004), official statistical institutes (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Das Statistik-Portal, Federal Statistic Offcie FSO, Eurostat, Czech Statistical Agency CSU), reports from governmental offices (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Diaspora, Republic of Albania, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) and international organisations (European Union, European Comission Kosovo Progress Reports, EU Election Observation Mission, International Organisation for Migration, World Bank, United Nations,

The UN Development Programme, The UN Refugee Agency) and non-governmental organizations (Amnesty International, Human Right Watch, European Stability Initiative, Kosovo Gender Studies Center, Kosovo´s Women Network, Riinvest, Transparency International). The introductory part individually mentions all the resources based on the corresponding chapters. Furthermore, the literature review describes the initial situation 58 regarding the existing literature and academic research influencing the character of this work. An important source of information about the diaspora community introduced by authors coming from diaspora groups themselves writing about the political situation and their perception of Kosovo is Kosovo 2.0, which is an independent media organisation engaging society in insightful global discussions and providing new perspectives to contemporary local and international narratives (http://kosovotwopointzero.com). Another platform used for news and journalist analysis is The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, probing and analysing key transition issues and the process of European integration to produce in-depth analytical and investigative journalism on complex political, economic and social themes (www.balkaninsight.com). Individual articles are quoted accordingly in the text.

Additional knowledge was gained by comparing and reanalysing material across other studies within a specific area of Kosovo Diaspora and Kosovo group identity and cultural background. The knowledge and insight gained by various studies is not static and is processed through the lens of my personal insight. Secondary analysis then provides the opportunity to re-enter the original research and develop a new layer of analysis in this specific research context.

3.7 Data Processing

Data analysis is an iterative process, where a researcher makes sense of new information, data and knowledge acquired and collected and develops a theory, constantly referring back to the data to develop the analysis. The circle of data informing theory and theory informing data demonstrates how data analysis remains directly linked to and contextually supported by the social context. This context includes the current socio-cultural, theoretical and epistemological perspectives, which together allow to analyse what the data say, how they are related to each other and how we can respond to the research questions (Kirby, Greaves, & Reid, 2016, p. 240).

The Kosovo diaspora case is studied for its special and unique character and therefore the first level of the analysis accordingly requires truly respecting the individuality of the case and capturing all the details. As qualitative methodology is aware of its own influence and complete objectivity is impossible while pure subjectivity would undermine the credibility of any outcomes presented, the aim in data processing is to establish a balance between 59 understanding and depicting the world authentically in its complexity and of being self- analytical, politically aware and reflexive in consciousness (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). This critical flexibility in data analysis requires constant critical self-reflection and scepticism regarding the analysis method and the emerging results. Checking and auditing individual steps of the analysis is combined with systematic and organised work, which makes it possible to locate information to the data set and trace provisional results of the analysis back to the context of the data. The continuous process of reflexion starting already with the process of data collection allows researchers to witness actions and events in different settings and routinely ask themselves a variety of questions concerning motivations, beliefs and actions such as What do people usually do in this setting and why? What would happen if people did something else? What do they think about it? What are the usual rules of the social scene? How are the rules negotiated? What do they mean and how do they relate relationships and actions? What would happen if something different happened? (May, 2011, p. 176).

The general structure of the work includes data preparation, when the obtained data are transcribed. For the purpose of the data preparations, data from observations, interviews and other sources were reduced to structured notes. Their further classification and emerging order appearing from initial chaos allowed to summarize them by themes and frequency. A thematic framework of familiarised data has to be grounded in the original accounts. As the interviews are combined with my own notes from interviews and observations, I separated them in order to be able to clearly distinguish the different voices in the data set. During the initial reading, the whole picture was put together from the initial topics. This general analysis is conducted through hermeneutic analysis, which helps to address personal influence of the researcher and understand the pre-existing understanding to the data. The following micro-level analysis of elements of the language enabled me to relate the data to a broader socio-political and historical context. In the next steps, topics were connected in sets based on an overlap of obtained data and information about the context of each part of the topic.

After rereading the data, the formal steps of the analysis require coding of the text to the data bits, which has to allow to trace every bit of data back to its original source. The result is a denser description of information, new or enhanced concepts to explain data and possibly also some theoretical findings based on the data collected. Data bits are organized into descriptively defined codes based on their uniqueness. The code names are developed and

60 their character shifts dramatically as the material in the code collection expands. Bits expand, contract, amalgamate or split based on the need to organize the data. A codebook documents storing of refined code definitions and ensure their clear and consistent use. Saturation occurs when enough bits are presented and there is a relatively strong coherence and new bits are not revealing new understanding of the complex. Analysis then identifies and interprets the themes and trends appearing between the codes and their mutual relationships. Reorganized code book is attached in the appendix 2 (Kirby, Greaves, & Reid, 2016, pp. 248-256).

3.8 Ethical considerations

A careful consideration of the sensitive context in this research was always the centre of my attention during the data collection process. Questions in the interview process topics dealing with experience which is very personal but sometimes also frightening, traumatizing, or humiliating. Therefore, the possible uncomfortable or fearful consequences for the respondents were always taken into consideration of how and when the question may be asked.

Free and well-informed consent with the participation was a necessary precondition to use any data collected for the further analysis. All participants were informed about my research and the aim of my thesis. All the respondents were informed that the interview can be stopped at any time as well as to decline to answer any question that may feel uncomfortable with no further explanation necessary. Verbal consent was obtained prior to commencing the interview as well as the option to withdraw from the research at any time. Written consent was not requested as it would make the respondents apprehensive similarly to a situation in which the interviews would be recorded.

The sensitive personal character of the interviews led to the decision to protect the identity of my respondents and not mention any names and additional personal details, which might reveal the identity of the person as it might have a negative impact on their lives. Any negative effect to personal and professional life of interviewees must be avoided.

The respondents were also informed that the content would remain confidential and anonymous. Even though the respondents are anonymised, the researcher knows their identity. This information is not displayed in the research as such for security reasons. On the 61 other hand, anonymizing the identity and changing other details such as location and gender as suggested due to a more complex intention to keep the anonymity of the respondents (Saunders, Philip, & Thornhill, 2016, pp. 239-261) can cause loss or misinterpretation of valuable data. Especially in terms of gender, this was not possible as the collected data would not have made sense as the arguments were relevant in terms of a gendered discourse.

3.9 Limits of the research

The problem of access to data was twofold. Initially there was a question of physical contact with the members of diaspora and their number, which needs to be part of the sample. For example, without direct personal contact with members trusted in their group, it would be almost impossible to gain such trust of so many people within only a couple of weeks. Their number does not allow any generalization, but it rather links the individual dots under the influence of the local environment and culture that put together the different possible shapes of the picture. The second problem concerned choosing when it was appropriate to ask very personal questions about their family relations, experience and opinions during their visits or even temporary and long-term returns to the homeland where the general level of acceptance of talking about negative experience or criticizing the existing situation is much lower. For the people raised in a more liberal environment, this aspect is quite legible and if there is no trust from their side, they will not share the information, which can discredit them in the eyes of their community members.

It was also problematic to gain a sufficient number of respondents while taking into consideration additional expenses and time, which were not available anymore for various professional and personal reasons. Therefore, the original intention to cover a wider range of interviews in the dissertation was eventually not possible to satisfy and the structure of the work had to be adjusted accordingly. Interviews, thus, only help to illustrate the consequences reaching the macro-level of the statebuilding process. Thus, the methods used in the research had to be adapted from the original plans aiming for discourse analysis to combine information about the existing perspective as illustrative examples, which would be supported by additional sources of primary and secondary literature.

This chapter provided a comprehensive overview of the methodological approach used in this research and explained how the data was generated and analysed as well as the ethical 62 considerations that the research process involved. The following chapter will elaborate more on the context of historical-political experience of specific Kosovo development which influenced how the current situation is perceived and how it might be interpreted.

4 Reconstruction and building of a new Kosovo state

The recent case of Kosovo demonstrates, together with Afghanistan and Iraq, that it is not significantly problematic for an intervening party to reach its immediate military goal of intervention, since it usually has, at its disposal superior military and economic capabilities. However, successful intervention is only the first step in the struggle for sustainable consolidation of peace and reconciliation in a volatile state often involving opposing warring parties with weak or altogether missing institutions that fail to reconstruct and rebuild the state. Post-conflict reconstruction and the state-building process, in its modern version, involves multidimensional operations consisting of various components including military police, political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian affairs rule of law human rights (UN, 2003, pp. 1-2). In the words of former UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, there is a clear distinction between traditional peace operations and the modern, multidimensional approach to peacekeeping. While the traditional UN peacekeeping approach was mainly focused on monitoring ceasefires, today´s sophisticated peace operations have more complex objectives (UN, 2000, p. 48). A brief overview of the historical and international context, including the process of rebuilding post-war Kosovo needs to be presented to understand the appearance ethnically set frames and values grounded in the historical experience of the society. Such understanding is required to contextualise the research into consequences of the current situation in Kosovo. Therefore, first, a brief historical overview of Kosovo before the maintream media brought Kosovo to the centre of the world’s attention in the late 1990s, will be outlined. Second, the period of war in Kosovo will be discussed to illustrate the standing points for the new beginning of Kosovo under the supervision of the international community after the end of the open phase of the conflict. Finally, the state-building process in Kosovo will be addressed, taking into consideration the most significant challenges of the post-conflict reconstruction process. However, these sub-sections will be described only within the underlying context of this work, as the complexity of each of them does not allow one to describe them in significant detail.

4.1 Historical overview

At the end of the year 1998, Serbian police attacked the core forces of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and killed 80 people in the region of the Drenica valley. If it were an isolated incident, we could consider it as a human tragedy without further international impact. Even though Europe was just starting to gather its wits from the shock of the Yugoslavia dissolution, which resulted in civil conflict in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina, the burden of the Kosovo history proved that the opposite was the truth.

“Kosovo is a tiny place with a tiny population, yet it was the reason that NATO fought its first war. Recently it has been a major subject of international discord, especially between European and American leaders on the one side and a resurgent Russia on the other. If Kosovo were in central Asia, or Africa, or in the Caucasus, this would not have been the case. Kosovo counts because it is in the middle of Europe. On February 17, 2008, it declared independence, becoming the world’s newest and most controversial of states” (Judah, 2008, p. xii).

The position of Kosovo in the ethnically and religiously fragmented region of the Former Yugoslavia results from the expressions of national identity of two different ethnicities, which were perceived as fundamentally antagonistic yet a crucial element of the past and, as it appears at this point, also of the future. Moreover, the location of Kosovo has influenced how its history and culture have strategically intersected with different European and world powers, which were also impacting similar, and at the same time, profoundly opposing interests of Serbian and Albanian people of Kosovo (Bieber & Daskalovski, 2003; DiLellio & Schwandner-Sievers, 2006; Malcolm, 1998). The growing unrest in Kosovo remained hidden in the periphery of the larger European interest until the bloody escalation of the situation during the year 1999. The establishment of an independent Kosovo is a new bright and better

64 beginning for the Albanian side, while the Serbian population eagerly awaits the termination of this period of darkness9 (Albright, 2013, p. 375).

4.1.1 Early history

The following passages are not mentioned to describe the historical development of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, but is intended to mention key moments, which are thematically entrenched in the current Kosovo-Albanian collective memory and national mythology, not only as a reason justifying their right to rule over Kosovo but also their mutual relations. An antagonistic interpretation of history has long marred the relationships between the Serbian and Albanian inhabitants. Both sides employ history, memories and myths to justify their claim over to the territory and arguments regarding ownership of the land and the right to live there remain rooted in discourse that seeks to ascertain who is the truly native in the region (Hewer & Sphresa, 2013, p. 622).

The Serbs claim that before they arrived during the 6th and 7th century, Kosovo was largely uninhabited. The central Balkans were part of the Roman and Byzantine Empires before ethnic Serbs migrated to the territories of modern Kosovo. During the medieval period, Kosovo became the centre of a Serbian Empire and saw the establishment of Serbian Orthodox Church and construction of many important Serbian religious sites, including several prominent monasteries. The defeat of Serbian forces at the Battle of Kosovo on June 28, 1389, became a historic milestone, which led to five centuries of Ottoman rule during which large numbers of Turks and Albanians moved to Kosovo. The battle of Prince Lazar and Sultan Murad became a legend. The Serbian Prince should have chosen the offer of Angel of God to gain for Serbs the “Kingdom of heaven” instead of the “Kingdom on the earth.” This decision led to the devastating defeat and disruption of the Serbian Kingdom instead of a glorious victory. It is also interpreted as an eternal claim to Kosovo, which became the Serbian holy land. The legend about “the lost Kosovo” is thus the Serbian symbol of national consciousness, particularly important in their struggle for independence. This event put Serbs, in the position of “chosen nation” in their eyes, and June 28 became an iconic memorial of the national tragedy of mediaeval Serbia (Dannreuther, 2001). Serbian churches and monasteries

9 Moved ad absurdum the justification by Robert Kaplan as summarised in his book Balkan Ghosts described the historical relations between Serbs and Albanians in the region, where hatred has been passed down over two millennia. Or as he described by Sulzberg in the preface of his book, the Balkans are inhabited by people, who “loved and murdered easily and had splendid talent for starting wars (Kaplan, 1993). 65 in Kosovo document their historical and religious dominance in the region. Particular importance is attached to the Battle of Kosovo, which, according to Serbian folklore, imbued the region with deep spiritual and religious significance. Furthermore, it established Kosovo as a sacred territory and a central feature of Serbian history and identity. Based on their perspective of history, Islamized Albanians came to Kosovo at the end of 17th century and inhabited the territories, which remained empty due to the Austro-Turkish wars (Hewer & Sphresa, 2013, p. 622).

This is, however, only one side of the debate because Albanians seem themselves to be ancestors of ancient Illyrians from the period of the Roman Empire and Dardanians, whose territory extended beyond the modern state of Albania including Kosovo, western Macedonia and southern Montenegro (Mertus, 1999, p. 10). Kosovo Albanians, hence, consider themselves as natives to the region with a historical right to the rule over Kosovo, and regard Serbs coming from Russia as immigrants (Hewer & Sphresa, 2013, p. 622). This ancestral claim is materialized into a political strategy of the process of constructing the past, which could be seen since the end of the war in the title of the small businesses in the region called Dardania Import/Export, Illyria Tours (Judah, 2000, p. 2).

In the historical debate over this contentious issue, this claim is met with a counterclaim that others have colonised the region and the politics of memory is on both sides supported by the archaeologist seeking evidence to support their position and discredit the other side. Within the complex history of Balkans, both sides present cultural memory as a rational empirically based version of the history. The battle of Kosovo is a clear example of the modern-day battleground of political opinions based on such “historical facts”, wherein Albanians emphasise the role of Albanian forces and Serbs downplay it (Malcolm, 1998). Certainly, both groups remain to perceive themselves as victims of the oppression of the other side. (Buckley & Cummings, 2001).

For Kosovar Albanians, Skanderbeg, the heroic patriot who led Albanians in resisting the Ottoman forces in the 15th century has become a symbol of the long territorial struggle before the last war in Kosovo. Ottomans divided the two communities by the subsequent conversion of Kosovo Albanians to Islam, which shifted allegiance away from Christian Orthodox neighbours (who were seen as allies of Slavic Russia) towards the Ottoman Empire (Hewer &

Sphresa, 2013, p. 622). Later on, the League of Prizren was established in the city of the same name in 1878. This was the beginning the wave of the Albanian National struggle aimed at defending the rights of the Albanian Nation because previously the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin assigned territories inhabited by Albanians to different territorial units (Šesták, 1998, p. 11; Rusche, 2006, p. 7). The importance of the League of Prizren can also be seen as an argument that refutes the idea of “Great Albania connecting the territory of Kosovo. Kosovo would have to connect to its territory [in] Albania to create a Great Kosovo as Kosovo was supposed to be always the centre of Albanian National Self-awareness. The Ottomans dominated the region until 1912 when Albania declared itself to be an independent state – at this point Kosovo was divided into four regions, three of which were ruled by Serbia and one by Montenegro. The Albanian population was territorially disintegrated into western Macedonia, southern Montenegro and southern Serbia.

The mythical presentation of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the next Ottoman conquest lasting over 500 years just introduced the struggle and desire for freedom and self- determination in the complicated political environment, where various international interests met during that time. By the end of the 19th century, Albanians replaced Serbs as the dominant ethnic group in Kosovo and the western part of Macedonia. External colonialism evidenced by exclusion and subjugation of Kosovar population of Serbian and Albanian origin in different periods alters and brings into question the dispute of who initially settled in the area at the outset,and has, therefore, the more significant right to rule on the territory of Kosovo10, and created a burden for the inhabitants, which was not possible to resolve peacefully (Mertus, 1999, p. 10).

The Balkan wars at the beginning of the 20th century pointed out problems in the cohabitation of Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo. Serbia reacquired control over the region from the Ottoman Empire after 1912, which is seen as a defeat in the attempt to connect all Albanians to live together in one state. After this event, 2/3 of the ethnic Albanians population is living outside the newly established Albanian state (Šesták, 1998, p. 286).

10 Kosovo´s size correspond to approximately 15 % of Serbian territory. 67

4.1.2 Kosovo in the 20th century

Since then, there has been a crisis of identity for Albanians in Kosovo. Effectively they are still in the territory where they have always resided, however, since the forced annexation in 1913, the Kosovo Albanians considered Albania as the taken ‘motherland’. Thus some argue that shifting borders has left ethnic Albanians scattered across Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece and made them accidental or kin state diaspora members without changing their own place of living, however, even more influencing the relations between the country of origin and the country of residence (Brubaker, 2000). As Albania became a national state of ethnic Albanians in 1913, the ultimate dream of a nationalist of Albanian origin living outside that territory became to return the lost territory of Greater Albania and create a united territory for all Albanians living in one state. The concept of greater nations is not a unique and limited idea to the Balkans. A fundamental problem arises as created concepts of greater nations clash with one another territorially - especially in terms of where a border should be demarked so the nation would work and accommodate the interests of all members of same ethnicity living there (Sejdiu, 2017). The Greater Kosovo is seen as a unifying option to signify a national unit of all Albanians as it seen as a cradle of Albanian culture.11 Although the national conscience of Albanians in the Balkan exists and members of the community living in different states overwhelmingly identify as Albanians, a minimal number would support a conflict to create a Greater Albanian state. The political aim of Albanians in the Balkans is instead more focused on free movement across Balkans, providing education in the Albanian language, making their language official in other countries where Albanians communities live and obtaining civil and economic rights and supporting their cultural links (Vickers, 2004). Although the myth of “greater” state exists and has been brought in different incoherent and sporadic ways since the time of Ottoman Empire, it was never a serious political platform (Sejdiu, 2017).

The difference between Serbs and Albanians in religion is, in fact, a problem of secondary character. Besides ethnic, language and cultural differences, the real matter of the conflict is primarily about the claim over the territory of Kosovo. Both communities espouse a claim based on historical and nationalistic reasons of full right to control Kosovo. The following

11 The term Greater Kosovo was often mentioned in connection with the 2001 ethnic tensions in Macedonia (Judah, 2008, pp. 4,121). 68 period continues in the similar alternation of oppression of a Serbian minority in Kosovo and a minority of Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavian states claiming Kosovo.

After World War II, Kosovo's present-day boundaries were established when Kosovo became an autonomous province of Serbia in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). For Albanians in Kosovo, it became more difficult to identify themselves with the newly established state. For the state structures, they are considered less politically reliable. Therefore, they were not acknowledged as nation-building in the SFRY, regardless of their higher number of inhabitants if it is compared with for example Montenegrins. There has already existed one Albanian state. Furthermore, all other nations of the SFRY were connected by their Slavic origins, which excluded Albanians living in the poorest and least developed territory even further. Serbs never agreed to give Kosovo the status of the autonomous republic, as they would have lost their Autonomous Province. Serbian and Albanian communities were forced to live next to each other, but the existing barriers were not disappearing (Pelikán, 1997, p. 18).

The beginning of Albanian emancipation effort was allowed by change in the political climate after the dismissal of the Minister of the Interior A. Ranković during the 1960s. After handing over some of the powers in Kosovo to leaders of Albanian origin and a wave of criticism over expansive Serbian nationalism, student protests erupted in 1968. Protestors raised requests to establish the University, which would teach in Albanian language and to promote the Autonomous Province of Kosovo to become a Republic. A compromise was reached by the constitutional changes of 1974, which strengthened the powers entrusted in the hands of the Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Besides own administration and assembly, a substantial constitutional, legislative andis this judicial autonomy brought through the implementation of the 1974 Constitution also the power to outvote Serbia in the SFRY parliament. As a result the authority of the Province, more comparable with the competencies the Federal Republic and the Serbian Federal Republic, could be outvoted by the voices of Kosovo and Vojvodina in Federal bodies.

The situation was calmed down only temporarily, but in fact, protracted disputes were not solved and even escalated together with the growing social and economic crisis of the SFRY in the 1980s.

Following Tito´s death in 1980 and the 1981, Kosovo faced constant political demonstrations and social tensions and instability. As repressions stepped up, public discourse started to increasingly orient along ethnic lines, including the heightened debate among politicians, intellectuals, journalists and local activists (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011, p. 20). Increasing dissatisfaction brought Albanians back into the streets to request the transformation of the Province into the Federal Republic which meant definitive failure of weakening nationalistic tensions with help of modernisation and development (Teichman & Pelikán, 1994, p. 75).

The unemployment rate in Kosovo for this period stood at 33 percent, which is more than twice the national average in the SFRY viz Figure number 1 (Woodward, 1995, p. 208). Not only did people focus more and lament ever more the fate of their nation in this economically and politically challenging period, but the Serbian media also supported the rising hysteria of Albanian violence against the Serbian population.

Figure 1 Unemployment Percentage Rates by Republic 1952 - 1990

(Woodward, 1995, p. 204)

Reports of differing levels of credibility describe collective ethnic persecution and exclusion of Serbian population, which fuelled further the nationalist moods in Serbia. Later the presence of these sentiments was used to develop a whole ideology and skilfully used by Slobodan Milosević to gain personal power and political objectives.

The Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) issued by Serbian academics, manifested among other things, the crucial support to Serbs in Kosovo. The document published in 1986 claimed that Serbian international status is diminished by tolerating two autonomous provinces within its borders and further alleged that Kosovar Albanians were committing atrocities against Serbs, who became a minority in Kosovo (Hewer & Sphresa, 2013, p. 623). Memorandum SANU talked about the “physical, political, legal and cultural genocide perpetrated against the Serbian population of Kosovo and Metohija” and requested that the Serbian rights be restored in Kosovo12 and to stop prevailing Albanian influence and termination of the “genocide of Serbs in Kosovo. “There is blatant propaganda of the idea of Great Serbia and provides support to develop aggressive nationalism further (SANU, 1986).

The official support of Milošević, who opportunistically moved from communism to Serbian nationalism standing on the idea of Great Serbia during his visit to Kosovo in 1987, brought further radicalisation. The Serbian public accepted this approach and consequently its already very complicated mutual relations with the majority Albanian population was rendered much worse. In 1989, Milošević, acting on Serbian nationalist agenda, declared a state of emergency and abolished political autonomy of Kosovo. In March 1989, the Serbian parliament changed the Constitutional Amendments, which limited autonomous rights of Kosovo, followed by a series of laws which officially allowed the discrimination of Albanians based on their ethnicity.13 Provincial authorities were deprived of their authority as administrative, and executive control of the province was transferred to the National Assembly of Serbia (Hewer & Sphresa, 2013, p. 623). The police regime set up in Kosovo was strictly suppressing any expression of Albanian disagreement. The result was a unification of Albanian opposition in mass resistance, which erupted in Kosovo in 1991. The

12 Nationalists claimed also restoration of Serbian rights for their minorities in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina (Šesták, 1998, p. 562). 13 Based on Yugoslav census of 1991, live in Serbia cca 9.7 million citizens and estimated 1.7 million are ethnic Albanians. Almost all of whom live in Kosovo and represent more than 90 % of the population, whose numbers grew at a far higher rate than those of their Serb neighbours (Capussela, 2015, p. 3). 71 political triumph of Milošević was the speech at the Gazimestan, a memorial site and monument commemorating the Battle of Kosovo at its 600th anniversary in the enthusiastic presence of about 1 million Serbs14. The Kosovo Crisis began the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia when the political measures against Albanians triggered disputes with leaders of other Federal Republics. Belgrade and Podgorica supported strict action against the Albanian revolt. On the other hand, Ljubljana and Zagreb protested primarily from the pragmatic reasons to weaken Milošević´s position but no real support was provided to the Kosovo Albanian population (Pelikán, 1997, p. 39).

4.1.3 1990s

Already at the end of the 1980s, Albanians responded to repression by mass revolt including a boycott of the Serbian state´s institutions. Not only was the shadow republic including own institutions set up, but also a new constitution of the newly independent Federal Republic of Kosovo was set up on July 2nd, 1990, and proclaimed by the members of the officially dissolved Parliament. After the collapse of the communist political structure in Kosovo, new political clusters emerged. The prominent position gains the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK, Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) led by Ibrahim Rugova, who established the illegal government (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011, pp. 23-34). In 1991, articulate Albanians requested the need for the complete independence of Kosovo, which gained almost 100% support during the secret referendum in September 1991. The following secret elections saw Rugova as the only candidate for the position of the president of Kosovo, elected with the support of 78% of the constituents. The dominant group of his moderate supporters pursued the strategy of the peaceful resistance solving the situation in Kosovo but without much success, even with respect to engaging the world’s public to gain additional support at the international level (compare to Pelikán, 1997, pp.50-60).

After the Dayton agreement, the framework for the peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina was signed, the tensions in Kosovo started rising again. The failure of the policy of peaceful resistance to secure Kosovo´s claim to self-determination, caused tiredness of the population,

14 In his speech, Milošecić promised to the Serbs in Kosovo support with aggressive statements: "You have to stay here. It's your land, your houses. You cannot give up just because it's hard to live here… No one should dare beat you. It was never part of the Serbian or Montenegrin character, to give up when faced with obstacles. Put down arms when you need to fight ... "Throughout Serbia, there was a series of anti-white demonstrations called" meetings of truth ", culminating in the appeal of the most important representatives of the Kosovar Union of Communists, A. Vllassi and K. Jashari. Albanians respond to demonstrations and a general strike on the leaders' appeal (Dannreuther, 2001, pp. 16-17). 72 which was inclined to the more radical approach of the newly constituted Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK, Ushtria Çlimintare e Kosovo). In 1997, the KLA carried out attacks on Serbian civilian and paramilitary forces, and since the same year, the organisation became a central military power that influences the political situation in Kosovo and replaces the political strategy of passive resistance completely (Judah, The Growing Pains of the KLA,, 2001, pp. 20-25). In response to the KLA activities, the Serbian military launched an attack on Kosovo, which eventually led to the internal mass displacement of Kosovar Albanians and exodus across the border to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro (Hewer & Sphresa, 2013, p. 623). At the beginning of the year 1998, the situation started changing to a mass conflict, where two warring parties can be named – the UÇK and their supporters on the one side and the Yugoslavian Army and the Serbian police, supported by the paramilitary forces, on the other. The UN Security Council addressed the situation when it adopted Resolution 1199, which condemned the violence and imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo armed forces (Cross, 2006 pp. 119-120).

Thanks to the media, the image of Albanians witnessed a gradual change - they, who were earlier presented as terrorists, were now beginning to be recognised as victims. Similarly, the UÇK was becoming a national liberation movement, which was in deep contrast with the previous statements of the US Ambassador R. Gelbard, who earlier labelled them as terrorists, and appreciated the contribution of Milosević to the stabilising of the situation (Pavković, 2001, pp. 3-11). Finally, the media also played a crucial role in the decision on military intervention in Kosovo when it published how rising violence also caused the increasing numbers of refugees15 and civilian victims. Upon pressure from the USA Envoy R. Holbrook, Milosevic agreed to place in Kosovo the observation missions of the OSCE and oversight over its airspace to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Dauphinne, 2003, p. 103). This so-called Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement created conditions for the peace negotiations, withdrawal of Yugoslavian military forces and guaranteed broad autonomy for Kosovo. As the agreement did not include UÇK, there were no sanctions against them in case of disruption of the demilitarised zone, and they took a chance and gained control over the territory after the Serbians kept control of the cities and main roads. The situation escalated again at the end of 1998 when the agreement was violated, and the mission in Kosovo has no ceasefire to verify (Prtina, 2004, pp. 44-45). After the negotiations in Rambouillet resulted in

15 Until this moment is estimated about 400 000 refugees from Kosovo (Kříž, 2006, pp. 119-123). 73 deadlock as the conclusions were not acceptable for Serbian side and their new suppression of the Kosovo Albanian insurgency was posited as equivalent to “threat of genocide,” the NATO responded with air strikes on March 24th, 1999. At the end of 78 day-long bombing campaign led by the NATO, Kosovo became under an open-ended international protectorate (Batt, 2005, p. 33). These actions were afterwards legitimised by the UN SC Resolution 1244, which confirmed that the international community could take over the control over the territory of Kosovo. Even though Serbian titular sovereignty was protected, the future of the Kosovo status remained undecided. In next step, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), was launched in cooperation with NATO and the OSCE with the disposal of all powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial. The importance of Kosovo's democratisation seen by Western analysts as a key point for themselves and the stability in the whole region. Although reorganisation of the LDK began in autumn 1999, the UÇK representatives, who had strengthened their position during the war through gaining about 10 000 active fighters, were supplementing regular security forces. People with unclear personal history, such as Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj, later accused of war crimes and organised crime, became leaders of Kosovo in the established provisional Government in April 1999. Besides the LDK, which has a predominantly urban electorate base, after the NATO intervention were formed the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK), whose electorate base are from rural areas of central Kosovo and founders are former commanders of the KLA. In particular, they were connected with the Drenica area. The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës, AAK) is smaller party founded in 2000 by Ramush Haradinaj, a previous the KLA commander of Dukagjini area in western Kosovo, who tried to position himself between the polarised LDK and the PDK. (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011, pp. 35-46).

4.1.4 Kosovo after the conflict

The post-conflict reconstruction process in Kosovo was challenged by the far-reaching consequences of the previous conflict. Estimates speak of 10,000 dead; 3000 Albanians, and 800 Serbs and Roma forcibly abducted, over 850,000 Albanians expelled and thousands more internally displaced while 230,000 Serbs and Roma left Kosovo immediately after the NATO campaign (Amnesty International, 2009, pp. 3, 7; Burema, 2012, p. 7; UNHCR, 1999, p. 11).

In retaliation, reverse ethnic cleansing took place in the presence of 50,000 peacekeeping forces and about 700 Serbs were killed between June 1999 and June 2000. While almost 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced Kosovar Albanians returned to their homes with the arrival of UNMIK and KFOR, at the same time about 40,000 soldiers of the peacekeeping mission failed to prevent the expulsion of 200,000 Serbs and Roma from whom only a minimum returned. After the 2004 riots, under the UN administration, further incidents provoked violent protest. The attack on Serbian community caused the destruction of houses, public facilities and church buildings, which were followed by the wave of 4000 Serbian civilians (Batt, 2005). Until now, only less than 8 percent of refugees have returned, and UN data talks about 97,000 internally displaced people, (including also a territory of Serbia) who have been living since the end of the 1990s in ailing social and economic conditions without registration and direct state aid (United Nations, 2013; UNHCR, 2014). The failure of the international community documents their observation when post-war elites and extremists (former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army UCK) have systematically prevented the return of Serbs by creating an openly hostile environment. The malfunctioning system of lengthy property restitution, which was very difficult to enforce, complicated the situation well enough for those who had decided to return and were subsequently forced by political pressure from the Serbian and Albanian parties to move to northern Kosovo. This policy was used to homogenise the area to the south of the Ibar River and, on the contrary, allowed the creation of parallel structures in the north of the country (Jenne, 2010).

Besides the societal and economic destruction due to the conflict and missing political institutions to operate the reconstruction had Kosovo also abandoned socialist model inherited from the SFRY and adopted a model typical for the pluralist democratic system and free market economy. Regardless of enormous challenges Kosovo was, in a way an ideal place for such a state-building experiment because of public support to this transition process. Besides the interest of the international community and the West to succeed in this effort, Kosovo in the following years received the total monetary aid of USD 2 billion, which is more than USD 800 per capita.16

The United Nations (UN) presence in Kosovo including the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK; 1999-present) and the United Nations Transitional

1616 In comparison per capita was to post-war Germany send cca USD 300 per capita and to Japan less than USD 100. Bosnia and Hercegovina received cca USD 1400 per capita (Coyne, 2008, p. 22). 75

Administration (UNTAET, 1999-2002) was one of the first instances of an international mission that combined governance, peacebuilding and Security Sector Reform. It was unique in its complexity – including militaries, police, international governmental organisations and nongovernmental organisations – all of whom had to coordinate together to work on the democratisation, reconstruction and peacebuilding goals of the mission (Holohan, 2016, p. 331). In this regard, it is categorised as a typical example of the multidimensional mission of the fourth-generation. To lay down the foundations for open democracy was supported by the European Union (EU), the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and several UN agencies. Alongside with UNMIK was deployed Kosovo Force (KFOR), the military contingent protecting Kosovo from the external threats, maintaining regional stability and guarantee internal security. Even though both UNMIK and KFOR acted under the Resolution 1244, the coherence between political and military power was ensured by the involvement of same western powers. The NATO international presence, which was securing the physical base of the territory against the external threat of Serbian aggression, did not take any orders from the UN. Unclear constituent documents and open status of Kosovo lacked specified goals, which the accomplishment of should lead to withdrawing from the largest and longest lasting mission. In particular the position of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Kosovo was problematic, which was required to ensure the coherence of the entire mission. Thus his almost unlimited powers contradicted the principle of division and control in any democratic system (Hoxhaj, 2007, p. 131).

With the change of the situation in the region, it became a primary task and the biggest internal challenge to peacefully dissolve the UÇK, which was a substantially well-armed power substituting for a whole period the local security authority. Most of its members were in the end absorbed to civil protection corps and police, without substantially reconstructing or disarming the organisation of largely autonomous regional and personal groups. Existing commanders often covered up their position by entering politics, business or organised crime. Some experts talk about the substantial loss of credibility of the administration as at the peak of its power, popularity and authority in Kosovo did not insist on compliance with the disarmament orders and tolerated that it was openly floated. Their presence was significantly evident when formal guerrillas again proved how the stability of Kosovo and Macedonia was

76 deeply tangled by taking part in serious insurgency causing the state crisis in Macedonia during 2000 (Capussela, 2015, p. 3).

The UNMIK as per Resolution 1244 devoted a portion of its authorities to representative institutions named the Provisional Institutions of Self-government (PISG). PISG Involved a government with electorate mandate formed based on parliament majority and a president with only a representative role. In parallel to PISG, institutions also worked with UNMIK, overseeing the limited jurisdiction in economic and social affairs of the PISG with the power of a veto to the technically separate building of state institutions from statehood before the final status could be decided. As result of the unresolved situation about Kosovo statehood, UNMIK started to be seen as an obstacle on the way to reach independence (Capussela, 2015, p. 44). In 2003, the first negotiations began between the representatives of Serbs and Albanians from 1999. The space for dialogue was limited as Serbia insisted on their territorial sovereignty and Kosovo was not able to accept anything short of independence. This attempt was destined to failure due to widespread riots endangering the security in Kosovo in March 2004. Organized violence directed against Serbian population erupted in dozens of towns and involved more than 50,000 rioters and caused 19 deaths, 4000 displaced Serbs, 550 houses and 27 Orthodox monasteries and churches destroyed. The anger of frustration from waiting for development regarding Kosovo status destabilised security situation and spread across the Balkans also to Serbia and Bosnia. This situation was not possible to present medially in the West because the 1999 legally and politically controversial attack was only standing on the moral justification of the necessary need to save the suffering Albanian civilian population (victims) against army crimes committed by Serbian forces (perpetrator).17 This very simplistic black and white distinction did not allow to open the issue of ethnic violence against the Serbian minority in Kosovo after the end of the war as there theoretically did not exist real threats towards the security of their lives, property and religious heritage. The need to turn international action in Kosovo into the successful story of multi-ethnic democracy would strengthen the suspicions about the own interest of the Western claim to an entitlement to use force without authorisation of the Security Council and remodel the international law rules of not interfering with the sovereignty of another state violently (Capussela, 2015: 22).

17 The UK Prime Minister Tony Blair described the situation in Kosovo before the international intervention in 1999 “a battle between good and evil; between civilisation and barbarity; between democracy and dictatorship” so the intervention could help to move the situation so “Good has triumphed over evil” (Philip, 2000, p. 20). 77

In October 2000, the democratic opposition got to power and a few months later, the previous president Slobodan Milošević, accused of war crimes, was extradited to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. After the 2004 parliament elections in Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj became the new Prime Minister. The elections were boycotted by the Serbian population of Kosovo as advised from Belgrade. Between 2005 and 2007, the talks on the status of Kosovo continued with the mediation of Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy supported especially by the USA and the UK. Under his name remains publicly known the offered solution of Kosovo status introduced in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. In the recommendation provided to the UN Security Council, it was advised that the only viable solution for Kosovo was independence with international supervision.18 The reasoning was based on the need to move from double deadlock, which could destabilise the situation at Balkan Peninsula (UN, 2007, p. 3) In the following election campaign in Kosovo, independence was the only common topic. In the elections, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, led by Hashim Thaci, won. Notwithstanding the existing tensions inside the country and in the region with the protective arm of the West (and especially the USA), independence of Kosovo was unilaterally declared on February 17, 2008. The prime minister also recalled the Ahtisaari plan and appreciated the support of the USA19. The EULEX mission deployed police forces and administrative workers. Serbian protests remained quite limited. The new republic was almost immediately recognised by the USA and other European states, such as UK, France, Germany, and several other countries quickly, but the UN did not officially endorse it. Serbia opposed the move, and was backed by Russia and China but also several EU members involved in their internal disputes with would-be breakaway regions in Cyprus, Greece, Romania Spain and Slovakia. Regardless of this regional dispute, the West, in general, is a strong supporter of the Kosovo independence, and its backing was essential in the way the process evolved.20

18 The Ahtisaari Plan was rejected by Serbia and did not obtain the approval of the Security Council of the UN due to the threat of veto from Russia. 19 During the visit of Albania presaged the US president George Bush that Kosovo must became independent irrespective of the opposition of the Serbia (Traynor, 2007). 20 The USA were lobbing among the European Union member states to negotiate the support of the individual states as it was not possible to find agreement with the EU as a whole. The specific steps of the US Ministry of Foreign affairs went public due to leak of the Protocols about the negotiations on Kosovo status cooperation with Slovenia (Strapacova, 2006, p. 30). 78

The new Kosovo government carefully stated that it would protect the rights of its minorities, including Serbs and fulfilled the required legal obligations introduced in this regard by the Ahtisaari plan, which was recalled, when the independence was declared, and which is also mentioned again in the new Kosovo Constitution (UN, 2007, p. article 1.1; Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008, pp. art. 3, 6, 59, 108, 109, 110 and 129).21 The continual process of building the Kosovo state and assuring international recognition for its own independent existence remained a limitation for its active development. Furthermore, Kosovo is still building basic state structure coinciding with the process of post-conflict reconstruction after the inter-ethnic conflict, of which residues still remain apparent.

4.2 The critical challenges of the process of Kosovo state-building

Even though Kosovo declared the intention to preserve the multi-ethnic character of the state, due to challenging relations between ethnic Serbs and Albanian after the end of the conflict, the process is very complicated. Besides majority Albanian populations and the most often mentioned and the most numerous Serbian minority, numerous ethnic groups of Turks, Bosniaks, Gorans, Romas, Askhals and Egyptians also inhabit Kosovo22 (KAS, Kosovo Agency of Statistics,, 2011). Ethnically formulated relations of two collective identities of two largest groups bring not only practical governing and administration problems, but also the disagreement over the legitimacy of Kosovo independence status (Pellet, 1992, pp. 182- 185; BTI, 2014, p. 6).

21 According to wording of the Constitution and other specific laws expanding these rights are Serbs and their culture and social right together with other minorities living in Kosovo one among the best protected (Krasniqui, 2010). Political right of representation and self-government at the central level is assured by 10 seats in the Assembly (Art. 64/1) and the Permanent Committee on the Rights of Communities shall guarantee their vital interests within law making process (Art. 81). At the ministerial level have to be Serbs represented by one Minister and other balancing proceedings. On the local level is required that municipalities with minority population of 10 percent and more create the post of Deputy Chairperson of the Assembly for communities, as an advisor responsible for inter-community dialogue (Law on Local self-government, 2008, p. art. 54). Adopted laws are usually faultless on paper but most have yet to be implemented. Such as the Law on Antidiscrimination, and the Law on Use of Languages, which are two of the most advanced language law in the region, but ineffective or selective implementation makes their impact unreachable. Breaches, which negatively affects religious and cultural heritage have continued and legal protection remains weak. Often illegal construction is even within Special Protective Zones watched without administrative intervention (European Comission, 2016). 22Between different communities there exists a diversity of opinions and any of the mentioned ethnic minorities can be considered a uniform mass. On the other hand, certain simplification in approach to their existence and activities in regard the aims of this work are not able to influence the outcomes of this research as the numbers of minorities’ members are very small. 79

4.2.1 Geopolitical bases of the state

The de facto independent status of Kosovo, which is recognised about over half of the members of the international community,23 is thus challenged by the opposing opinion of Serbia, who is supported by the permanent members of the UN Security Council Russia and China. Furthermore, other European countries do not recognise Kosovo, which is also suspending its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Besides problems of legal character resulting from limited external sovereignty, practical and political implications for Kosovo are limits to its international activities. Regarding internal sovereignty, state power in the territory of northern Kosovo is a longstanding issue. The area of northern Mitrovica is in contrast to scattered enclaves in other parts of the country mostly inhabited by Serbs, who have officially refused to participate in Serbian-EU talks moderated by the EU, and have intensively demonstrated their support and loyalty to home Serbia (Hajrullahu, 2008, p. 344). In 2013, Serbia did not recognise Kosovo as a sovereign state, but Kosovo independence may be considered irreversible even more since the EU brokered Brussels’ agreement and opened the door to the normalisation of mutual relations. The political intention of the document was to agree on the integration of the Serb-majority municipalities in Northern Kosovo into the Kosovo legal system while providing specific guarantees to the Serbian citizens. The Serbian government officially renounced the support of parallel government structures in northern Kosovo and agreed to hand them over to the Kosovar administration in Pristina. On the other hand, the reactions of the Kosovar Serbs themselves were adverse. The litmus test for a chance to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia was following November's municipal elections, which took place for the first time in the territory of entire Kosovo. Despite several violent incidents that forced the recurrence of elections at three polling stations and a low percentage of voter turnout in the northern majority Serbian regions, interest was still much higher than have been ever before. In 2017 participation was at a similar level, while no significant incidents occurred, the lack of integration of data from Serbian civil registry did not allow some voters to participate (Election Observation Mission, 2017; Prelec M. , 2013). Implementation of the agreement continues slowly and in August 2016 started the work on the Mitrovica bridge opening, which remains a strongly symbolical issue repeatedly in the process. (European Comission, 2016)

23 As of February 17, 2018, Kosovo is recognized by 116 out of 193 UN member states, 23 out of 28 EU member states and 24 out of 28 NATO member states (Kosovo thank you , 2017). 80

3.2.1.1 State sovereignty Members of the Serbian community live in Kosovo long-term, but their numbers decrease not only as a result of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo but due to the perspective of having better life opportunities in Serbia. They remain reluctant to come back from hostile relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which still shapes the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo (Beha, 2014, p. 106).

As Serbs in North Kosovo are equally as (and also because of) Serbia still seen as a security threat to the Kosovo state, most Serbs consider independence to be a threat to their security and presence in Kosovo. Although their situation differs, they remain segregated from the rest of (Albanian) society. A homogenous Serbian area of North Kosovo is resisting Pristina´s authority since 1999. Its residents24 have little or no experience with Albanians or the Kosovo administration and perceive both with fear and distrust, reinforced by the belief that most of their leaders committed crimes against Serbs during the war, which were never punished or even acknowledged, and they would prefer purely Albanian Kosovo. Pristina governance is perceived as the illegitimate and corrupted reason why they do not receive all necessities such as clean water, electricity or waste management, which are unreliably distributed in the whole of Kosovo (Joseph & Hoogenboom, 2014, p. 21). The willingness of the Serbian majority in Northern Kosovo to cooperate with central institutions has only slowly moved forward, and they still see their future connected with Serbia, which they consider being a part of. Until recently, Serbian administration was the only governing authority in the area, while financing these self-policed areas without formal law enforcement to avoid emigration and maintain control (Prelec & Rashiti, 2015, pp. 5-6). Since 2013, Serbs have started to participate in Kosovo elections, which was a step further from Kosovo administration perspective trying to control their own territory. On the other hand, Pristina does not see a priority in its further integration. Satisfied with controlling its borders and general elections on the central and local level, they are afraid of additional costs and are less enticed to meet the needs of the restive minority (Prelec & Rashiti, 2015, p. 2).

The situation is different in the south, where Serbs live in fragmented and isolated communities (far from the Serbian border) surrounded by the Albanian majority and the

24 About 63,293 people; 43 percent of the total Kosovo Serb population. 81 strong existence of Kosovo state structures. Although the administration has succeeded in having noticeable control in these areas, the overall difficult inter-ethnic relations – influenced by the issue of missing people, war crimes, displacement, property issues and an absent reconciliation strategy – are worsened by lack of democratic features and no implementation of current procedures. (Burema, 2012, p. 12) Six Serbian-majority municipalities (37 percent of Kosovo Serbs) scattered throughout Kosovo follow its law but remain in Serbian payroll while demonstrating milder resistance such as refusing to carry Kosovo documents or licence plates. It has become increasingly clear that regardless of their strong disagreement, the reality of Kosovo independence can be neither avoided nor changed. Trapped in their communities, unsafe and mistrustful of political development, they cheer on the obstinacy against integration in the north, dejected that their integration process has led to so few improvements and observing that Albanian parties only take measures benefiting the Serb community after severe international pressure (Joseph & Hoogenboom, 2014, p. 21). The barriers between Albanians and Serbs are after all softer, imposed by differences in language and traditions, but easily crossed for commerce and other sources of legal or illegal mutually beneficial cooperation. Nonetheless, this bridge is not officially utilised enough. (Prelec & Rashiti, 2015, p. 7)

About 20 percent of Serbs live in enclaves in Albanian-majority areas. Lacking control of the municipal government and targeted services, they heavily depend on Serbian institutions though they also receive aid from Pristina. In these areas the Serbian will to integrate is most evident, since their financial situation is challenging as most public jobs are practically closed due to lack of personal or partial connections usually needed to secure them. They are vulnerable to petty crimes, including illegal logging and usurpation of fields that the Kosovo Police are disinclined, unable or unwilling to repress (Prelec, Rashiti 2015:8-12). Regular are also complaints about the bias of courts that assess crimes against Serbs. A private property right is difficult to practice. Serbian refugees can reacquire the right, but barely ever use it again (BTI 2014: 17).

Even though the ethnic division is no longer threatening Kosovo territorial integrity, the mutual relations with Serbia are moving with baby steps. Ethnic minorities remaining marginalised, regardless of institutional structures confirming their rights de jure, but the system of governance, is failing in all spheres of social, economic and political life.

3.2.1.2 International influence The situation in Kosovo is still complicated because the foreign influence has been an indispensable factor of national development in Kosovo since the 1999 intervention. The subsequent period takes place with a strong international presence and guidance. Given the globalised power of the contemporary world, not only the independence declaration of Kosovo but also the process of establishing state structures would not be possible without the support and activities of the international community, which also consequently predetermined the direction for development in purely internal affairs (Albertini, 2012, p. 4). In addition to physical and economic security, the international community later assisted during elections and supervised law enforcement. The presence of the UNMIK shall support the establishment of appropriate conditions for the state-building process and ensure not only humanitarian and technical support for the return of refugees and an overall stabilisation of the situation but also create and implement legislation, collect taxes, operate public services and restore civil society and strengthen respect for human rights (UN, 2000, p. 13). At the same time, the lack of understanding of the local realities negatively influenced the international administration. Limited cooperation with local structures and inadequate activities that are not required by needs of the local community and the context of the reconstruction further manifest the problem mentioned above. Hence, there has been a multiplication of the number of international staff and the neglect of local human resources, the involvement of which would accelerate the subsequent handover (Lemay-Hébert, 2009, p. 80). On the other hand, there were occasions where international community showed that much flexibility that their credibility also suffered.

After the 1999 international intervention into civil war led by the Milosevic regime against the Albanian population removed the Serbian military forces from Kosovo until the above- mentioned declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo was under undefined statehood led by UNMIK and NATO military forces (KFOR), which left it without a final solution to its status for over a decade.25 The international community ignored parts of the broad statebuilding mandate because the interest in Kosovo was not homogenous and changed during the period. The EU became together with the USA the most important actor as geographical

25 International involvement is currently reduced to the EU presence represented by EU rule of law mission (EULEX) that became fully operational in April 2009 (More information http://www.eulexkosovo.eu). 83 proximity clarifies the need for long-term stability. However, the need for immediate stability sometimes contradicted with the intention to build a modern democratic state. The result was, according to Capusella´s arguments that the newly established political elites were intentionally allowed to accumulate complex power without questioning their own goals and criminal character. Short term stability was handled in cooperation with the organised crime gangs (Capussela, 2015, p. 46).

After the national dream goal of independence for Kosovo became much closer along with its fight for international recognition, the aim for the further direction became less obvious and more problematic to achieve. Moreover, the previously overshadowing massive social grievances in Kosovo become more apparent. Although the end of supervised independence should indicate that an independence framework for managing state structures, securing minority rights and decentralising power has already been established, a large international presence continues to act as a vague variable affecting national developments (Gashi, 2012, p. 284).

3.2.1.3 Territory, population, resources Kosovo is quite densely populated. 1.77 million people (2016) live mostly in a rural area, and only Pristina has about 200,000 citizens followed by Prizren (cca 90,000) Gjilani, Pejë (around 50,000) with good potential for agriculture development and industry based on some of its mineral resources. In Kosovo, there is the second largest deposit of lignite in Europe and also lead, zinc, nickel and some other precious metals. Its deadlock position required developing infrastructure to be able to transport any potential products. The Milošević repressions and international sanctions devastated the Kosovo economy and created space for a grace economy. These are extremely challenging economic conditions needing elementary infrastructure reconstruction (in first three years it included 19 684 houses, one 449km of roads, 459 schools and 175 health care centres rebuild, and 32,7 m² of territory cleaned of landmines), which pushed the economic growth rapidly up to 20 percent. Growth continued to decline shortly after and mostly did not reached the border of 3,5 % per capita - a necessary minimum to reduce high unemployment rate around 48 % (2008) and extreme poverty around 17 % of the population. (World Bank, 2010, pp. 1-2).

Even though the current informal economy is giving a different perspective oF these numbers, a serious social problem for the future development of the country continues. About a 75 % unemployment rate persists among young people below 25 years and half of the total number of unemployed people are long-term unemployed, remaining in this situation for more than four years. An additional factor of existing poverty is a critical disproportion between average monthly wage in private sector (moved from EUR 250 in 2008 to 354 EUR in 2015 and the average cost of living, which leaves many working people living in poverty or dependent on the remittances sent by the migrant members of the family. (KAS, Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2015; World Bank, 2010, pp. 70-81)Declining foreign aid, not enough f foreign investments and the tendency of remittance senders to move the closest family with them mean that the existing gap is growing. without the national currency of access to the international capital market risks by words of Capussela that “Kosovo small economy will follow the same trajectory as a punctured hot-air balloon when little more air flows out than in.” (Capussela, 2015, p. 54).

Between 2003 and 2008 is Kosovo growth consistently lower than rest of the region, while natality rate is not adjusting to the poor economic performance. The structural weakness of the economic development is based on growth driven predominantly by private consumption and public expenditure and generous public wages in the period when Kosovo still receives rapid foreign support, which is however not used to prepare the environment for a rapid increase of production potential of shallow industrial production. (around 10% similar to the share of agriculture, which allows covering by exports not more than 5-10 % of imports) (World Bank, 2010, p. 2) Gradual improvement has been coming since 2014, when the economic growth got over 3 percent decreasing the unemployment to the post-war minimum of 27,5 percent by the end of 2016, when over 66 percent are long-term unemployed (World Bank Group, 2016, p. 6), while the rate between youth remained at 52.4%. Due to stronger growth boost by a fight with informal economy and tax reforms, the revenue performance started to influence the poverty and unemployment rate in Kosovo. However, the growth is still rather influenced by large public investment projects and consumption, which mean that growth is projected to slow down as project activities are finished. Internal reform can stimulate stronger outward-oriented growth in a global slowdown when the friendly business environment can bring more direct and private investments and limit growth based on domestic demand. Gradually continuing the decrease in remittance and large trade deficit (-32

% expected in 2017) also rise the wider public debt. The share of the GDP earned by goods export is also declining (around 5.3 percent in 2016). Prolonged political instability and lack of agreement on politically sensitive topics such as the border demarcation agreement with Montenegro, started to discourage foreign direct investments – the main source of external financing. Further structural reforms related to labour regulations, business climate, efficiency and public investment and services are needed to shift higher domestic productivity and enhance external competitiveness to support private sector (World Bank Group, 2016).

Initially UNMIK´s prudent fiscal policies and unilateral adoption of the EU currency guaranteed the macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, it was regardless of an existing development potential in for fast and sustainable growth its economic level quite backward and uncompetitive with prevailing problems in energy and transportation sectors with young and growing population, which, however, lack the skills needed from the labour force. (King & Mason, 2006, pp. 257-264)

4.2.2 Institutional base of the state

The essential characteristic of a state is, in addition to its population and territory, the exclusivity of power over both components mentioned above, which is exercised through institutions and within the given legal framework (Jellinek, 1906, pp. 144-153). The challenges of a not working market economy and other tasks of the state are not due to missing institutions and legal framework. On the contrary, under the UNMIK lead were adopted advanced laws including independent overseeing of independent regulators. The lacking part is implementation and enforcement of adopted laws, which means that model designed on paper is becoming far away from the real situation on the ground. The latest example can be demonstrated by the progress made in the 2015 justice package laws, which is on the other hand still missing up in the implementation phase. Therefore, administration of justice remains slow and inefficient as it suffers from lack of funding and human resources. More alarming is the insufficient accountability of judicial officials, which does not help the judiciary from vulnerability to political influence. The prevailing role of informal norms is making them ineffective in everyday functioning of not only economic institutions but almost any institutions suffering from the rule of law. (European Comission, 2016, p. 13) The strong foreign influence on the focus of legislative development in Kosovo is in a poor manner reflected in the understanding of the rule of law by its inhabitants. Although the constitution of Kosovo is considered to be the document, which guarantees the highest human 86 rights standards (especially in the issue of minority rights, which Kosovo politicians very much like to point out) as previously mentioned, its real social impact is insufficient. The way in which the law was adopted had allowed neither disagreement nor the discussion over the proposal and led to paradoxical situations. The law protects equality from all possible angles, without a base of these adjustments on the demands of the population. As a result, even 30% of the quota guarantee of the presence of women in the candidate lists in and in the same minimum representation in the local councils and the Kosovo Parliament, nevertheless does not guarantee their activities in regard of women's rights. Dual positive discrimination restricts the selection of candidates, which is a particular problem when women do not play an essential role in the themes that are most challenging for them. Similarly, there are contradictory quotas for the employment of women in specific positions, without considering the patriarchal setting of society. This result in comical situations such as the demand for female rangers which, despite the very high unemployment in Kosovo, remained unanswered. (Strapacova, 2006)

Constitutionally guaranteed rights for sexual minorities (article 24) also covered by the particular law against Discrimination and its implementation mechanism (2004) regardless of its political support, does not prevent from the massive presence of aggressive homophobia. Based on 2012 public opinion research is homosexuality for 61 % of respondents dangerous and 51% respondents think it shall be punishable (Libertas, 2012, p. 6). How to treat the situation, when law allowing the marriage for people of same sex in the state, where is general practice that as more than half of population thinks of it as an illness and homosexuals, hence, often have double life including societally acceptable marriage in order not to become suspicions for their family members. Gender-based violence and women´s limited access to the property ownership significantly limits their human rights. Strategies and legislation on rights of people belonging to minority groups and their protection are not sufficiently implemented as well as remains the problem of the access of the people with disabilities to the healthcare and other existing services. The protection of cultural heritage, including cooperation between Kosovo authorities and Serbian Orthodox Church, remains a challenge as even respect for several historical monuments and remembrances is the sight of difference which is not readily accepted. (European Comission, 2016, p. 23)

Only formal separation of powers exists, and the divisions of powers is in fact strongly dominated by executive power. The public administration is used an elite tool of patronage. Presence of corruption and nepotism is an everyday part of their function to the extent that it is considered impossible to find a job in public sector without having the proper connections. (Avenda, Interview 2015) Although the process of decentralisation is key to overcoming the historical and ethnic outrage between the Serbs and the Albanians, political complications did not allow the completion of budgetary autonomy in the majority of Serbian municipalities (BTI, 2014, p. 26).

The vast difference between the legal environment on paper and in society makes some norm practically impossible to enforce. The law is adopted only based on the instigation of international commitment and any social demand, which is the usually a decisive motive, to begin with legislative change is ignored. Thus, society is living in accordance with different regulation that these legally codified. (Paoletti & Klimesova, 2013).

Furthermore, there is the missing individual character of civil right in the Kosovo society. A character of the society is less individual and more communal comparing to western- European approach. However, political rights in Kosovo can be used solely on the basis of the membership of a single individual in the ethnically framed group as the social character of this rights is emphasised together with the commitment of the individuals towards society – meaning the ethnic community. The absolute and universal character of civil rights has faded away replaced by conditionality and reciprocity. (Mertus, 1999, p. 23) The framing of society based on membership in the ethnic community has also been maintained vigorously also by the international administration, and it remained evident in the process of establishing the vital governing institutions, which function is limited by the division of its members across ethnic lines. The most important indicator of the electoral system is instead of problematic candidate lists or election frauds usually to point out the guarantee of 10 seats for the representatives of Serbian minority and the same number for the representatives of another minority groups. The ongoing political polarisation between the government and the opposition strained the governance on Kosovo and did not allow to follow ambitions legislative agenda. Increased tensions challenge strategic planning and hindered delivery on mostly the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement related reforms.

As the UNMIK supervision of the PISG to demonstrate international state-building effort, which was producing a showcase of success results while inclined to underreport cases which would challenge an appearance of progress. This approach became evident in the judiciary, which has thanks to authority decided on prolonging six-months contracts to individual judges and prosecutors, who conducted investigations on as severe issues as organised crime, wire crimes or high profile corruption. From the decision of mission, senior officials were not desired prosecutions of many influential figures and former guerrillas, which are still active in highest political circles. (King & Mason, 2006, pp. 59-60) UNMIK prosecuted only three war crime cases, and 2 000 – 3 000 of reports of allegedly committed war crimes were not even investigated. So 1187 files were in 2008 transferred to the authority of the EULEX to search access to the justice almost ten years after it had happened.26Furthermore, transferred were also by UNMIK indefinitely suspended 21 000 compensation claims for damages suffered during the waves of violence focused against Serbs in 1999 and March 2004 brought by Kosovar Serbs. Access to the judiciary was used as a tool to strengthen negotiation potential with Kosovo elites, which strengthen the environment of corruption. (Capussela, 2015, p. 55) Regardless of UNMIK excuses that in post-conflict environment, where justice institutions need to be rebuilt from scratch, it is not possible to hold same standards required from the functioning state, only a few suspects of war crimes which took place in Kosovo were brought to justice in front of domestic and international court, and an atmosphere of systematic impunity continues because the judiciary and also law enforcement capacities lacked independence and accountability. (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 22) As a result, it is expected that there is a turnover of organised crime including money laundering, smuggling and human trafficking in the extent it is estimated between one quarter up to two-thirds of Kosovo GDP. (Capussela, 2015, p. 55) After the independence, only declaratory independence of the judiciary is repeatedly criticised not only by the EU. The result created considerable mistrust in the rule of law and its enforceability. In 2017 Kosovo finally met the remaining obligations to the establishment of the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecution Office to investigate allegations of international crimes committed during and after the 1999 conflict to open previously mentioned skeleton in the closet. However, the beginning of 2018 has opened political discussions about its dismissal due to possible personal consequences toward political leaders of the country.

26 Many reports including cases of abductions and forced disappearance contained only evidence brought by victims´ relatives and certain files shall be deliberately lost. (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 22) 89

Distrust to the political system is demonstrated by the continuously declining participation in the elections process. From 80 % turnout in 2000 drop to 41 % in general elections in 2017. (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011, p. 86) Disagreement between political parties did not allow to complete the electoral reform, which shall prevent the repetition of large-scale electoral fraud from 2010. The reform, which includes little improvements regarding the length of the electoral campaign is blocked since 2012. It should have been completed before the 2014 parliamentary elections; however, due to parliamentary disunity, it was an overly optimistic scenario as even 2017 elections faced same problems. (Brajshori & Tërnava, 2013, p. 1). Competitive and peaceful elections in 2017 brought with doubts about the creditability of the democratic process in the Kosovo Serb majority areas, where was the election process marred by intimidation and instances of violence within the community against candidates and voters. Other negative impacts brought long-lasting issues with inaccurate voter lists and a largely flawed system for voting out of Kosovo are vulnerable to frauds and abuses.

This situation only illustrates the fact that many Kosovars doubt the legitimacy of electoral outcomes as outdated votes bears a just little resemblance to reality and electors often cast in exchange for favours they receive from the parties. This can also be related to problems of the over-employment of the public sector and administration and the low level of public services. (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011, pp. 11, 86; Gashi, 2012, p. 286) Furthermore, ethnic affiliation remains the only and most crucial cleavage dividing the partial system in Kosovo. Passive approach influenced political preferences, which remained stable in regional support affiliation and clan ties because of the crucial importance of this social order for existence in Kosovo. (Election Observation Mission, 2017, pp. 1-10)

Although the function of institutions is strengthened, in reality, they have not so far genuinely gained trust among residents who, due to their lack of experience with a non-selective or discriminatory welfare state, tend to rely only on family relationships and solidarity (BTI 2014: 12). Similar complications of working institutions stem from the transition period of Kosovo, which is not even in ethnically undivided societies living in an entirely sovereign state without severe difficulties. Similarly, often criticised the electoral system, which is necessarily anticipating a reform, the previous failure was caused not only by an imperfect regulatory system but by a human factor that cannot be eliminated by any reform (Xharra, 2013).

With the official end of supervised independence, there is a visible decline in administration activities and the willingness to address sensitive topics such as decentralisation, which was previously recalled by the international community to be essential for the consolidation of the situation in Kosovo. As the institutions and their function are facing many challenges and the progressive legislation was adopted regardless the real situation in the country, many Kosovo Albanians do not feel that Kosovo is, in fact, representing them. In addition to ethnic tensions limiting the governance power, strong corruption creates low confidence in generally weak institutions and the rule of law which, despite some criminal law reforms, fails to strengthen (BTI, 2014, p. 8).

4.2.3 The idea of the state

Civil society is regardless the massive foreign support only slowly establishing. Its bases are in the system influenced mostly by informal norms and personal relations insufficient. Openly criticise or bring to the public attention topics necessary for the everyday life of ordinary people, which is putting Kosovo in the negative light is neither very welcomed as it seen as undermining the long-term struggle for independence nor in accordance with the need to remain in informal connection with influential people to be able to arrange everyday needs. The only minimum standard for public consultation was adopted, and now they still wait for its implementation across all levels of governance, which will be very much influenced by the lack of political will to unevolved civil society in policy-making. Remaining concern for civil society is also a lack of transparency in public funding, which is influenced by the abovementioned importance of informal connections in everyday life. (European Comission, 2016, p. 9)

Political interference constrains media freedom. Intimidation and harassment of investigative journalists exist, and in the system of the Kosovo state is not possible to rely on justice, and state security organs as such cases are barely ever investigated or adjudicated (European Comission, 2016, p. 24). Before the independence was proclaimed, the government deflect any public criticism towards UNMIK, which retained the last decision in every policy area. The international administration served as a shield for the political leaders to hide own responsibility and accountability for the situation of the country, from which the attention of the electorate was also distracted by the question of the status of Kosovo, so its capability of 91 holding its political institutions to account is insufficient (Capussela, 2015, p. 57). After the independence, however. There has been no progress in the area of freedom of expression. The problem of threats and attacks against journalists are combined with lack of commitment to finding a solution for sustainable funding of the public broadcast, which leaves it vulnerable to political pressure.

The creation of a collective Kosovo identity depends heavily on work with myths and narratives that allow a search for a "common truth" as a means of reconciliation to create a shared positive self-image across communities. There remains a prevalent ethnic differentiation in society, which is also characterised by the strong collective self- identification of Albanians as a victim of violations of the rights by Yugoslavia, Serbia and the whole Serbian community.

Currently, favoured narratives are based on an ethnically defined basis, which cannot help in any way to social cohesion. These acclaimed community roles, reinforced by informal stories, only consolidate the solidarity of the individual toward their ethnic community.

The group evaluations are fragmenting society and not allow to create any shared value. Moreover, the respect for universal human rights that belongs to members of other ethnic communities is devalued. (Mertus, 1999, p. 22) To build a shared historical memory is a longstanding challenge. In the case of two strictly separate groups, such as Serbs and Albanians, demonstrating their own identity by disputes and rejecting the other group, it is an impossible effort. Although the causes of mutual conflict have the purely modern character of the struggle for power and different historical experiences of each community are only used as a means of strengthening political influence. Both sides do not present until today a separate and non-discriminatory approach to state-building. Even in times of the best relations between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo (between 1974 and 1981), there was no real effort to create a multi-ethnic society. They have nothing to continue, and therefore it is challenging to find common ground for creating a shared civic identity (Marko-Stöckl, 2008, p. 49).

Serbs and Albanians must live non-voluntarily together in Kosovo, which is becoming with the status of multiethnic state more alien than common state. Civic status of a citizen of a multiethnic state is for any of the communities acceptable. Kosovo with its current legal

92 framework and national symbols for Albanian community, not enough reflecting their majority. On the contrary, for Serbs is Kosovo second nationally second Albania, which they cannot identify. New state symbols have no tradition and intention to provide something neutral makes them empty and without meaning. The national anthem without text does reflect the lack of willingness to search for common words. Strong international influence is proposing the future direction as was introduced in Bosnia and Hercegovina, but positions of ethnic communities are not in favour of cooperation unless there is present constant pressure. Missing willingness of Kosovo citizens regardless of their origin to create a shared content leads both communities in preference of own ethnonational symbols or in “ethnisation” or “Albanisation” of symbols, which should have helped to begin a new joint content. As an example can be seen the often use of Albanian flag to accompany the flag of Kosovo to emphasise the importance of ethnic characters in place. Previously it was possible to speak about their opposite order (Krasniqui, 2010, p. 21). Missing common narratives demonstrates how unsuccessful attempt to create an official non-ethnical identity (Albertini, 2012, p. 26).

The similar impact has a strong emphasis on epic dimension of symbols from the period of “independence war.” For both communities are symbols and situations interpreted in opposite meaning and, there does not exist common ground for establishing ecumenical interpretation, which could allow to reconcile war experience and overcome mutual stereotypization. The example of the opposite process can be seen in the massive project of building a monument, called Temple of Freedom to commemorate the attack on against of UÇK commander A. Jashari in the village of Prekaz. The fight with Serbian military forces, which resulted in massacre become legendary evidence of Albanian victimisation, which self-determination is based on the fight against Serbian hegemony and must be remembered as it is presented as a sacrifice to Kosovo Albanians. (Fylli, 2012) The name of the controversial figure titled as “the hero of Kosovo”, also bears the Pristina International Airport. Unfortunate symbolism can be seen in replacing the name after changing the previous name after Mother Teresa. Epic celebration of Jashari´s legacy is only snap of the problem with Kosovo society transformation after the war. The change of the name of the place, where most of the people enter the Kosovo first from being called after the saint of mercy and missionary to being called after the warrior, who was fighting against Kosovar most numerous minority (there is remaining the coincidence in perception of the Serbian state crimes and collective guilt of

93 community members) tells a lot about the status of the reconciliation process in Kosovo. (Mills, 2013)

Although both communities are emphasising different religion, language, origin and historical experience, there remain similar patterns and views on life in both communities. Common is the very traditional patriarchal approach in family and community matter, which is powerfully affecting the life of the single individual. According to the questionnaire survey conducted in Kosovo in 2012 as part of the dissertation research in the social psychology of Hana Klimešova, we can talk about essential similarities in the attitude of young Kosovo Serbs and Albanians in term of social and personal values. Similarities are found not only regarding values that derive from the social environment but also in personal goals and desires that are to the limited extent independently from current events in the society. Members of both groups value the most love, family, faith and independence along with securing material standards. On the other hand, among members of both groups is apparent strong tendency to evaluate a member of another community in very derogatory manner and reject even a hint of existing similarities. Instead of that, similarities should have served as a starting point for the reconciliation process as they are mentioning shared values and providing space to strengthen common narratives. (Klimešová, 2012, p. 53)

The prevailing societal situation in Kosovo eliminates the chance to even begin in building the common idea of single nation in its civic understanding. Due to international pressure on building institutional framework of the newly established state, there was not possible to secure basic assumptions to build grounds for societal agreement, such as finding transitive justice. Not settled accounts of the past and not overcoming group victimisation are essential tools, which are missing for societal transformation. Political negotiations and the subsequent implementation of collective agreements could at this moment only induce basic rules for reconciliation dialogue. Reciprocally respected values can help to induce non-violent coextended, which do not lead to social segregations among communities. On the other hand, today is intercommunal interaction still limited to a necessary minimum even when it comes to geographically close neighbourhoods. Strong distrust of Serbs in Kosovo institutions and elites is further enhanced by the narratives, in which the Kosovo state place Serbian community in the position of persona non-grata. From the side of Albanian majority is a tendency to point out declared right of minority communities in Kosovo. Their existence,

94 however, does not change anything regarding existing sense of hostility towards them. In Kosovo society is not possible to talk about mutual acceptance of groups as even accepting individuals of different origin is somewhat limited phenomena influenced by lack of empathy and compassion.

Education is a crucial instrument in dealing with the past and socialising of ethnic communities within the citizens. Expanding level of education enables the acquisition of knowledge and information to see reality more complexly and to mediate an adoption of new values and behavioural patterns. On the contrary, the current situation, when Serbian and Albanian children are attending to schools administrated from different centres, which do not communicate with each other and do not agree to work on a shared concept to interpret historical events. This reality mitigates the possibility to find common perceptions and conveys prejudices, mistrust and mutual rejection to the next generations. Future communication between members of different communities is also becoming impossible as unlike previous generations, youth does not longer speak the language of the other community - nor Albanian nor Serbian educational system allows it (Burema, 2012). Serbian curricula, when considering their level in the environment of growing hostility and persecutions are rather than a step toward the process of inclusive reconciliation a step toward vacuum, which can in currently economically challenging economic situation lead to further radicalisation (Woehrel, 2013, p. 8). The educational system did not even start to serve as a platform to build and empower civil society in Kosovo. Common Kosovo identity, which would overlap ethnic origin is something hardly conceivable under the current strengths of ethnic cleavages. There is no development, which can be considerate in a positive way. Therefore, the future evolution of interethnic relations is shifting to negative values. A missing communication tool between young Serbs and Albanians can be for the future limited only to the level of their English. Especially in rural areas is its knowledge very narrow and earlier mutual knowledge of both languages disappears together with interethnic personal contact. Everyday situations, when interethnic interactions were natural and which are so needed to restore an acceptable level of inter-ethnic relations are missing. About harsh relationships and the lack of understanding of the situation of unwelcomed minorities with emphasise on ethnic Serbs is visible in the situation of not returning refugees. No progress on a solution to the problem of missing people opens the door to other related

95 issues, such as the different perception of war and UCK's activities, combining war crimes, breaking the persistent image of Albanian victims and collectively guilty Serb offenders. Post-war integration attempting to reconstruct a strongly divided multi-ethnic society begins with the return and resettlement of refugees. Return is the first manifestation of the simple presence of ethnic tolerance. Kosovo has demonstrated to date the lack of support of local authorities for any return of Serbs. The international community has not superseded the absence of personal effort. Instead of return, there has been a gradual shift and the creation of mono-ethnic areas, which will make it even harder to find a way to cooperate. Due to the unresolved relationship with Serbia, Serbs in Kosovo are still uninvited guests - for some Albanians, mainly because of their lack of loyalty to the new country, for others merely because they are Serbs collectively responsible for war atrocities. The situation of refugees and missing persons, as well as the question of punishing war crimes perpetrated on civilians by their ethnicity, whose potential perpetrators are often heroes today, describes how contradictory and mutually incompatible is a presentation of the past that also divides their vision of the future for in Kosovo.

4.3 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter has provided the historical excursion with the milestones of Kosovo development, which need to be considerate at the extent of this thesis. In the second sections are mentioned critical aspects of the state-building process, which started after the end of the open phase of the conflict in Kosovo. Significant obstacles cover the level of geopolitical, economic and institutional and ideological spheres of the state.

The unstable interethnic relations, which escalated during the civil war continue to divide the inhabitants of Kosovo on ethnic bases, which influence the stability of the state internally in the further relations between communities and internationally as the actions and political aspirations of Kosovo as a self-declared independent country are restricted. Besides mentioned above sovereignty limitations apparent at the political level is this situation influencing the citizens of Kosovo also in their everyday activities including the freedom of movement. Such uncertainty is worsening the mutual distrust between communities. The most visible it is in the North Kosovo, where the Serbian population has a majority and is less forced to adapt to the new political consequences.

Although the ethnic division is not frightening territorial integrity of Kosovo, ethnic minorities remaining marginalised. Interethnic relations are moving similarly as the relations toward Kosovo almost invisibly.

Since the independence for Kosovo is becoming a reality, the further aims are less apparent and more problematic to achieve. The previously overshadowed social grievances and economic problems in society are more ostensible. With the end of supervised independence is apparent decline government inclination to address thoughtful themes such as decentralisation, previously considered as essential for the consolidation of the situation in Kosovo. As the institutions are facing many challenges and the progressive legislation was adopted regardless the real situation in the country. In addition to ethnic tensions limiting the exercise of state power, corruption generates little confidence in by and large weak institutions and the rule of law. Currently favoured narratives based on an ethnically defined basis, which cannot help in any way to social cohesion. The group evaluations are fragmenting society and not allow to create any shared value. No common content leads both communities in preference of own ethnonational symbols and ethnic conservation of the society. The interaction between communities is still limited to a necessary minimum even when it comes to geographically close neighbourhoods. Strong distrust of Serbs in Kosovo institutions and elites is further enhanced by the narratives, in which the Kosovo state place Serbian community in the position of persona non-grata. From the side of Albanian majority is a tendency to point out declared right of minority communities in Kosovo. In Kosovo society is not possible to talk about mutual acceptance of groups as even accepting individuals of different origin is somewhat limited phenomena influenced by lack of empathy and compassion. The intolerant approach is hidden in conservative and values recalled traditions, which were taken as a headstone for new Kosovo identity supported by the political elites grounded in their KLA experience. The European aspirations of the modern Kosovo state with a strong accent of multicultural approach grounded in the spirit of the legislation are devalued in their limited willingness to change the wording and orthodox interpretation of the traditional identity values of the Kosovo-Albanians, citizens of the new Kosovo state. The paradox of very progressive legislation and very reactionary and rigid environment, which is incompatible with implementation and further progress in the development across all dimensions.

The following chapter will address the tradition of emigration from Kosovo and the process of establishing an active diaspora community, which as able to act as a critical actor of international as well as the internal development of Kosovo. There will also be more elaborated the paradox of aiming for progressive development in the very rigid environment, where is insisted on its preservation as it works very conveniently for the political elites and diaspora have to adjust to such a situation.

5 Kosovo Diaspora

Chapter 5 provides the contextual and historical foundation of the empirical part of the thesis, and it introduces the Kosovo Diaspora and a brief history of the migration of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo. The chapter aims to introduce the character of the diaspora in its size, structure, length of stay and integration in the host country as these factors may affect their decisions and behaviour toward Kosovo, their homeland. Therefore, by contextualising the character and activities, it will be possible to better understand their current relations and actions regarding Kosovo. While a complete historical perspective of the Kosovo-Albanian migration is not the focus of this thesis, to provide a contextual understanding, the thesis presents an overview of the historical trends of emigration among Kosovo Albanian population and the different ways in which these trends contributed to the development of Kosovo. After the brief overview, where different waves of emigration are described, the chapter follows with the historical consequences, the current character of the diaspora including the typical features and most significant changes that occurred during the period. Relations toward Albania clarify the identity closeness as well as distinctiveness which becomes prominent both in Kosovo-Albanians and Albanians from Albania during their separate historical development. Before addressing the specific role of the diaspora in Kosovo after the conflict, its role in the process of dissolution of the SFRY is mentioned. Evaluations of the influence and current diaspora activities are introduced in subchapters covering economic relations, political and institutional relations and societal and cultural connections. First of all, it must be emphasised that beyond the fact that their members are connected by the same place of origin, Kosovo-Albanian diaspora is by no means a homogenous group. The opposite is the truth and cannot be emphasised enough as diaspora is a very heterogeneous population concerning education, gender, religion, legal and social status but also the length of their personal and family life abroad. Diaspora of Kosovo-Albanians is considered to have many historical layers as migration has been one of the structural features of the society. Therefore, in one of the most widely spread diaspora groups, there are impoverished undocumented migrants mixed with the so-called guest workers, political dissidents as well as initially homeless refugees (Haxhikadrija, 2009, p. 20). The relation to Albania needs to be included as a differentiation between different Albanian diasporas, as the idea of a Pan-Albanian unity might be misleading. The way these concepts 99 are approached needs to be understood regarding the historical consequences and the context of this thesis. The aim is not to seek cultural or societal differences between Kosovo Albanians and Albanians from Albania as the character of these differences is not crucial for this work. On the other hand, regarding political, social and economic cooperation between Kosovo diaspora and their home country, their location of origin is significant. Hence, in such a situation, only members of that group can be divided, as is described further. The diaspora´s involvement in the reconstruction of the homeland in the post-conflict environment is a crucial factor for the damaged economy, which has failed to create any income-generating opportunities and where the population affected by the conflict is dependent on financial assistance from abroad. Although the estimated size of the diaspora differs widely, Kosovo is ranked as one of the countries with the largest diaspora compared to the size of the total population living in Kosovo. One of the lower estimations is approximately 380,000 people, which would mean that 21.4 % live outside of Kosovo (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2014, p. 16)27. Higher net emigration estimations indicate about 579,000 Kosovo-Albanians. However, due to the probability of a positive birth rate, the diaspora may be greater than 700,000 people, including the children born abroad.28 Other sources mention a general estimation of around 800,000 (UNDP 2014: 12, IOM 2014). Others specifically talk about 381,000 Kosovo Albanians born in Kosovo and 300,000 more born abroad (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2014). So far, the Ministry of Diaspora managed to register 400 thousand individuals, a process that is still ongoing and is likely to continue in the following years, while not all diaspora members wish to be officially registered for various reasons (Demi, 2017). With about one emigrant for every two to five Kosovo residents, up to one-third of Kosovars (Kosovo population of 1.8 million according to the 2011 census), today lives abroad (UNDP 2014: 12, FID 2009: 5). The size of this population offers the potential for active and effective policy in promoting Kosovo development to involve its members abroad. An especially important factor is that the emigrating population is mostly working-age - over 56 percent are between 20 and 40 years old (UNDP 2009: 5).

27 A high number of diaspora members is expected to be left outside the registration process. If there was no family member living in Kosovo who would fill in the data for the persons and families living abroad, they are not included in the results (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2014). 28 Prognosis of the KAS for the population that left Kosovo between 1969 and 2011 has taken into consideration also the average value of the natural increase (Boletini, 2016, p. 298). 100

5.1 Historical overview

The determination to emigrate, hence, reflects the actual economic and political situation in Kosovo. Based on the previously mentioned factors, the migration can be divided into multiple waves happening during the 20th century. Even though there are insufficient written documents about migration from Kosovo before the end of World War II, the situation in Kosovo suggests that it was due to a similar mixture of many structural factors as in other known diaspora societies, which encouraged this behaviour. There is a saying which suggests how common the thoughts of migration are among some Kosovo Albanians: every family should have six sons – two to stay at home to take care of the family, two to go abroad and two to die for the country fighting for the freedom (Haxhikadrija, 2009, p. 20).

Before World War II up to nearly two decades later, many Kosovo Albanians migrated to large industrial centres of the Western Balkan region in Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina, to find a job to ensure better living conditions for their family.29 Young men, often living in barracks with foreign workers, were doing hard work such as black metallurgy, construction and mining (Gollopeni, 2016, p. 296). However, since then, there were five distinctive phases of migration from Kosovo, which are much better documented.

Even though after the end of the World War II, the SFRY was, similar to other socialistic states, not very open to migration, Kosovo Albanians were in a different situation. However, until the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, emigration from Kosovo was an individual phenomenon (Gollopeni, 2016, p. 295). Due to repressive policies, Kosovo Albanians were massively fleeing to Turkey. This phenomenon was even institutionalised in 1956 by the agreement arranged by the ministry of interior. This intention followed previously initiated talks with Turkey and Albania about the admission of some Yugoslavia´s Muslim population, mainly Turks and Albanians. The ministry of interior led by Ranković demonstrated a willingness to arrange such measurements and to cover the expenses and compensations for the host country. A plan for resettling 200, 000 Muslims from Kosovo and Macedonia to Turkey was drafted in Ankara in July 1938 to populate the sparsely-inhabited areas of Anatolia and tension areas bordering Kurdish-inhabited regions (Vickers, 1998, p.

29 What is meant by family is not the nuclear family but rather a wider family in the traditional communal sense in the Balkans as will be explained later on. 101

118). About 40,000 of not only Kosovo Albanian families which were subjected to this agreement were supposed to be resettled based on this programme between 1939 and 1944 (Gollopeni, 2016, p. 296). The group of migrants were destined to be permanently resettled as most of them sold their property in Kosovo before leaving for Turkey. Additional 195,000 people left after being encouraged by the government´s pressure for assimilation and de- nationalisation and stayed in Turkey during 1954-1957 (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012, p. 7). Besides the organised migration, the peak of individual migration mirrored other Ranković´s policies in Kosovo in the 1960s (Haxhikadrija, 2009, p. 4).

In the late 1960s the economic situation started worsening. It was the beginning of continuous underdevelopment in Kosovo and the consequent era of economic emigration of guest workers with limited education, who were often recruited on a temporary contract. Although they were encouraged to return through various programs, many of the guest workers were allowed to bring their families to the host country with them. Life in the host country nevertheless did not lead to losing touch with their families back home as their support was one of the main reasons for leaving the country (ESI, 2006, p. 3).

Since the 1960s, the tradition of labour migration among Kosovo Albanian population is documented (Haxhikadrija, 2009). According to the American anthropologist Reineck, who described the fate of the life of typical male from rural Kosovo by late 1980s: “a boy runs free until the day he finds himself on a train, a thirty-hour journey north, to Switzerland, Austria... [German speaking countries are host countries for a majority of Kosovo diaspora members] to find a job, any job to earn the money that will make the satin and gold for the bride that his parents have found for him” (Reineck, 1991, p. 10).

Emigration was supported by liberal economic reforms, which also influenced the border opening of the SFRY toward the West. Former Yugoslavia became, after Italy, Spain and Turkey, a central recruitment region for unskilled manual labour for Western Europe (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012, p. 8). Low level of industrial development and high unemployment reinforced labour migration from Kosovo to different more developed federal republics within Yugoslavia and also outside of Yugoslavia to Germany, Switzerland, Austria and other countries of Western Europe (Dahinded, 2013, p. 2). This period also caused the image of Kosovo immigrants as a not well qualified, skilled or educated which created a negative

102 approach to their integration in the host society as their primary objective was mostly to earn enough money to overcome the economic hardship in Kosovo and to return there after a few years (Haxhikadrija, 2009, p. 20). The exact number of the immigrants coming from Kosovo is unknown as these workers were registered abroad as Yugoslavs. However, the Kosovo statistical agency provides estimations of the total numbers (Figure 1). Figure 2 Emigration by years

(Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2014, p. 24)

After temporary guest workers with limited education, coming mostly from rural areas, in the 1980s and 1990s a third wave occurred, driven by the harassment following the political crackdown after the Albanian demonstrations of 1981 and political unrest following the abolition of autonomous status of Kosovo in 1989. During this period, political turbulence and emigration pressure increased. Members of the nationalist elite among Albanian students were increasingly persecuted and forced to leave. As a result, even better educated, skilled migrants from urban areas were leaving Kosovo and moving to traditional locations but also to the UK, France, Belgium, the USA and Scandinavia. Thus, economic and political hardship forced them to change their original plan for the return and many of the former guest workers were entitled to bring their families instead. Consequently, Kosovo experienced a steady increase of mainly women and children, who followed their spouses to the European countries. Such a trend lasted all through the 1990s (Dahinded, 2013, p. 2).

The situation was gradually worsening; police repression was increasing. University, schools and hospitals were closed. People of Albanian ethnicity in Kosovo became persona non-grata as far as jobs in the public sector were concerned and the social life of Kosovo society was paralysed (Gollopeni, 2016, p. 298). Furthermore, the persistent underdevelopment of Kosovo 103 was not providing many economic opportunities either. The political and economic situation in Yugoslavia in general and especially in Kosovo had been drastically deteriorating since the 1980s, which became an additional impulse for emigration. The deliberate social and economic marginalisation of ethnic Albanians forced the emigration of an estimated 350 thousand Albanians between 1991 and 1998 (Human Right Watch, 2001). Repressive measures, including the dismissal of ten thousand Albanians from their jobs, pushed even more dissenters and skilled professionals from urban areas to settle in Switzerland, which had been a country with already established Kosovar diaspora community. Another entirely new destination at that time was the UK, where during the early 1990s about 17,000 Kosovar Albanians arrived.30 Some of them arrived already as asylum seekers. Hence, politically motivated immigration rate increased and, subsequently, the European countries witnessed the first asylum seekers from Kosovo – better educated and skilled Kosovar Albanians from urban areas as well as young men seeking to avoid military service in the Yugoslav army during the war (Haxhikadrija, 2009).

Departures accelerated, and by mid-1990s, it was estimated that as many as half a million Kosovo Albanians – around 25 % of the total population – were living abroad (ESI, 2006, p. 3). The most massive wave of forced mass emigration occurred in reaction to the escalation of war violence including ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999. While the majority of over 850,000 refugees expelled between March and June 1999 remained in neighbouring countries, such as Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro, approximately 90,000 of them moved to over 25 countries as asylum seekers. About 200,000 Kosovo Albanians became internally displayed. Such a situation required more extensive international attention as the alarming number of civilians without shelter was threatening regional stability (UNDP, 2014, p. 23; Amnesty International, 2009, p. 3).

Usually, these refugee settlers were perceived as temporary by the receiving countries with a view of returning to Kosovo once the conditions allowed it.31 Even though initially driven by socio-political and security reasons, many migrants at a later stage decided not to return to Kosovo due to the significant income differences between Kosovo and developed countries as

31 In Germany, Kosovo Albanians were arriving with toleration permits called Duldung rather than asylum status, which left them subject to deportation at a short notice once the situation in Kosovo changed. (ESI, 2006, p. 3) 104 well as a lack of opportunities in the post-war country. According to the Living Standard Measurement Survey in Kosovo (2000), security was the main reason for the absence of a member of the household since March 1998 for 67.7 percent of respondents. For another 5.3 percent, it was because the house was inhabitable. In 2000, the situation changed and the responses to a survey carried out in Switzerland showed that the reasons for migration were mostly economic.

On the other hand, after the NATO intervention in 1999 and with the end of Serbian control over Kosovo, the temporary status of refugees in European countries lost its grounds. Hence, many decided to return or were repatriated. Thus, a rapid decrease of Kosovar population abroad was reported. According to the International Organization for Migration, Assisted Voluntary Program was used by a total number of 195,596 Kosovar voluntary returnees. Around 90,000 Kosovars (43 percent of returnees) came from Germany and about 30,000 returnees (17.5 percent) left Switzerland, followed by 3.7 percent from Norway, 3.6 percent from Austria, 2.6 percent from Belgium, 2.3 percent from the United Kingdom and 2.1 percent from the Netherlands as well as a smaller number from other countries (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012, p. 9). Additional 20,000 Kosovo Albanians were deported, and an unknown number returned on their own without any assistance from the authorities (Haxhikadrija, 2009, p. 21).

Furthermore, regular migration became strictly limited, typically to family reunification policies, which applied to the children and spouses of foreigners that had a residence permit, sufficient living space and stable income to support them in the host country. Another option was a temporary migration of highly skilled Kosovo-Albanians leaving to accomplish their university studies and often returning afterwards (Dahinded, 2013, p. 3). In the same period of the gradual return of refugees forced to leave during the war after the end of the open phase of the conflict in June 1999, there was a steady emigration in response to economic challenges such as high unemployment or lack of economic opportunities in Kosovo, albeit in smaller numbers. In 2001, the diaspora population in traditional host countries increased again (UNDP, 2014, pp. 26-27). After 2000, mostly economic reasons for emigration remained. However, the political stalemate had an important effect on emigration as demonstrated by the parliamentary elections of 2014, when after no government was established, around 100 thousand Albanians left.

105

At this point, the main reason for Kosovo Albanians to emigrate is family reunification. Between 2000 and 2004, family reunification accounted for 68 % of all new legal arrivals from Kosovo to Switzerland (ESI, 2006, p. 5). Due to stricter legal framework limiting the possibilities for seeking asylum and receiving work permits adopted in Western Europe, this often remains as the only legal opportunity available. Also, strengthened control on the borders of peripheries ultimately led to many deportations. Hence, most of the legal emigrants are women and children following their economically active and already settled spouse to the host country. The continuous trend of family reunion may influence further decreasing remittances since their arrival leaves fewer reasons for the head of the narrow family to send money back to Kosovo as they move to live with him (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012, p. 8).

Besides highly skilled workers, there is a new group formed by young students, who are often subject to a temporary legal migration from Kosovo due to study or work arrangements. The share of emigrants with higher education increased significantly from 18 % (1989 – 1997) to 38 % in post-1999 Kosovo. Furthermore, this statistic does not mirror the fact that many of the most progressive youths are leaving with the help of study programmes to gain their university education in Western Europe or the United States. Unskilled or semi-skilled migrants are leaving illegally, and their numbers are therefore not precisely known. The pace of migration has not been affected even by the economic crisis. Currently, migration remains more attractive to younger individuals who have more time to take advantage of the benefits. As Kosovo has, according to the results of 2011 Census, the youngest population in Europe - with the average age of 29.5 years comparing to the average age of EU citizens of 40.9 years - the recent numbers of emigrants around 12 – 13 thousand per year will not automatically decrease very soon. The survey among the Kosovo population suggests that they are likely to migrate within the following twelve months up to five years (UNDP, 2014, pp. 24-25).

Asylum seekers succeed with their request only in approximately 4 % of the applications from Kosovo and the majority of them go to search their fortune in France, Germany or Belgium. The rest of the applications are declined. Data from Kosovo Public Pulse shows that the intention to migrate does not vary much across different levels of education. Slightly higher intentions are displayed by those with tertiary education and the female population. Women indicate a higher intention to migrate than men of the same level of education. Also, divorced women reported a higher intention to migrate than all the other demographic groups. A higher

106 intention to migrate is visible among individuals who are unemployed or only occasionally employed. A twice higher intention to migrate (38 %) is mentioned by employees in the private sector, compared to the employees in the public sector (only 17 %), who are influenced by difficulties with salary differences between both spheres mentioned above ( Shehaj, Loxha, & Pula, 2016). Personal dissatisfaction with the political status of Kosovo and its development shows a correlation with the intention to migrate (UNDP, 2014, pp. 30, 28).

Figure 3 Main reasons for international emigration for the period 1969 – 2010 (%)

5.2 Character of diaspora

As a distinctive feature of Kosovo society throughout history, migration plays a part in the political, cultural and social life in Kosovo, as well as helping the economic situation of emigrants´ families. Emigrants´ characteristics have been continuously changing regarding their education, skills and reasons for leaving Kosovo. In all time periods, economic and social reasons caused the departure of a part of the population to other countries. About 73 % of migrants come from rural areas, with just minimal differences between various regions. Migration links with diaspora are pervasive as 40 % residents have family members abroad. Also, about 25 % of families claim to receive remittances with a slightly higher chance of receiving financial support from abroad among the rural households (UNDP, 2014, pp. 23- 25). Emigration influences the structure of the society and other political, social, economic and cultural processes in the society, such as the departure of specific groups, create an imbalance 107 regarding gender, age structure or education of the society. Until the 1990s, Kosovo emigration was predominantly young (20-35 years) male-led. The economic reasons for the past emigration resulted in the export of the manual labour force and also influenced the workforce and family character in Kosovo. The massive departure of the most economically productive population also influences the reproduction of the society and family relations. Economic and social reasons for emigration dominated the 20th century, except for the period of the war in Kosovo when the security reasons quickly overruled other possible motivations. From 1990 to 1999 over 55 % of the Kosovans emigrated (Demi, 2017). Leaving to join the family remained after the end of the conflict the primary reason for leaving Kosovo, while the disillusion of improving the prospect of the future remained an influential factor32 (see Figure 2).

Regarding the age, emigration was most attractive for young people, who could benefit the most from the opportunities abroad. Hence almost half of the group living Kosovo are between 25-44 years old with children under 14 years in 16.9 % (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2014, p. 23). As the study from the city Dahinde in Switzerland suggests, Kosovo Albanian families remained large, with an average of 4.07 members per family.33 Higher fertility expectations confirm that Kosovo diaspora will remain numerous if this trend follows – for example in Switzerland, it can become one of the most significant diaspora groups. For Kosovo, it brings prospects for cooperation with the active entity, which could positively support development in Kosovo in other spheres besides remittances being sent, if appropriate conditions are established.

In contrast to previous tendencies, emigration after 2011 is becoming more female dominated after being almost gender-equal between 2000 and 2004. This trend also corresponds with the expressed willingness to emigrate among Kosovars living currently in Kosovo and stricter immigration policies allowing mostly family reunions or marriages. Another significant factor is a more challenging working and social environment for women, who may have more reasons to search for a better place to live.

32 According to the World Bank, unemployment rate was around 45 %, youth unemployment rate around 76 %, 45 % of the population living in poverty and 15 % living in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2007, p. 7). 33 In comparison, the average size of the household in the Czech Republic is 2.34 members per household, corresponding to the average size of the household in the EU, which is 2.3 members per household (CSU, 2011). The biggest households are in Croatia with 2.8 members per household, while the smallest are in Sweden with 1.9 members per household (Eurostat, 2016). 108

Study on brain drain demonstrated evidence of a skilling process among Kosovo Diaspora, hence it could qualify as a limited evidence of possible brain gain. Individuals coming back after their time abroad demonstrate higher education and expertise compared to their peers in Kosovo. The current character of the migration cannot be considered brain drain because 92 % of migrants have not attained higher than a secondary level education. Primarily due to a high unemployment rate of youth, there is a concern that brain drain could become a problem in the future when the unemployed youth might be inclined to leave the country while the developing private sector would need more skilled experts. In 2008, it took an average of ten years to find a job after a completed university education (World Bank, 2009, p. 76). Also, the share of emigrants with higher education increased significantly from the 1970s, when the emigrants were mostly unskilled and uneducated.

Even though the education level of emigrants is rising, it still mostly does not qualify them to carry out other than hard manual work in the host country. Hence, the comfort of their life there, in comparison to the local standards, is influenced and even worsened by an additional combination of difficulties linked to the adaptation to the new environment including language, rules and culture. Moreover, diaspora members often need to save a significant proportion of their income to send back to Kosovo (Gollopeni, 2016, p. 305) . There are numerous individual achievements of successful members of the diaspora community, who managed to prosper in their field to become highly appreciated as an example of the fulfilled dream of emigration and the general progress in professional development (Xharra & Wählisch, 2012, pp. 34-45). Nevertheless, the construction sector is still employing most of the Kosovo-Albanian emigrants (38.8 %), followed by hospitality (13%). An additional share is working in manufacturing (12.7 %), agriculture, trade and transportation (around 5% each). Based on the data of the same study, only 7.5 % have a managerial position while 82 % are employees with lower qualification, which is, together with the lower level of education, a reasonable obstacle in further career progress (Riinvest, 2015). Skilled returnees tend to accumulate capital, knowledge and skills before coming back. The potential of enhancing the stock of human capital in Kosovo is diminished by the limited

109 options of the labour market with a high unemployment rate. Statistics about numbers of returnees also show that 70 % of people are not coming voluntarily (UNDP, 2014, p. 29).

Currently, over 70 % of the diaspora population live in the above-mentioned German- speaking countries and other states of Western Europe, where the socio-economic conditions can offer prosperous living and a stable political situation (Demi, 2017). Based on a study conducted among around 500 emigrants from Kosovo from the municipality Suhareka, emigrants take into account the following factors: living conditions in the chosen country (40.2 %), family reunion (39.6 %), reunion with friends and relatives (6.1 %), process of documentation providing residence or work permit (3.4 %), closeness to the place of birth (0.2 %), other unspecified reasons (10.5 %). Based on these results, there are countries where Kosovans from specific regions typically tend to emigrate (Gollopeni, 2016, p. 33).

After the first moves around the region of the Western Balkans after 1960, the most apparent direction was toward Western European countries (96 % of emigrants in 1971). Out of these numbers, 74.7 % were in the Federal Republic of Germany, 8.6 % in Austria, 4.2 % in France 5.9 % in Switzerland, where the share of Kosovo-Albanian emigrants increased to 32.1 % of all workers abroad within the ten following years (Islami, 2012). Even though both countries recorded an overall decrease of migrants, Germany and Switzerland remained among the host-countries with the most numerous Kosovo-Albanian diaspora. With slight differences between results of UNDP data and the Kosovo Agency of Statistics, they were followed by Italy, Austria, the USA, Sweden, France, and the UK.

The emigration of Kosovars has continued after 2000, and such a trend is anticipated to continue, even if Kosovo’s economy experiences a significant boost. Absurdly, as a country’s economy improves, it experiences an increase in emigration. As people’s earnings increase, their conditions become more promising to finance their travel costs abroad. The poorer strata of the population wish to leave but face expensive fees for illegal migration, whereas the rich do not have a crucial reason to leave. The middle class have the funds needed to migrate, yet still not enough to live a good life in their countries (Demi, 2017).

Figure 3 Distributions of emigrants by country

110

(Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2014; UNDP, 2012)

5.2.1 Character of the diaspora in different locations The character of diaspora communities in different countries varies in make-up, size and organisational level based on the way and the period, when this community was created. To reveal the richness of the character of different communities in host-countries, the background of the communities in Germany and Switzerland will be shortly outlined, as the host-countries with the most numerous Kosovo-Albanian diaspora. Furthermore, the diaspora community in the USA will be mentioned, because of is vibrant political activities and influence in lobbying

111 on behalf of Kosovo, and there will also be a mention of the diaspora in the UK, for its visibility and unique characteristics.

The most traditional destination for the Kosovo emigration is Germany and Switzerland, where Kosovo Albanians started coming as unqualified seasonal workers in the 1960s. They came to Germany mostly from the region of Pristina, Mitrovica and Vustri and built their communities in the region of Berlin, Stuttgart, Dusseldorf and Munich. Swiss areas around industrial centres such as Zurich, Bern, Geneva, Lausanne, Luzern and Basel were inhabited by Kosovo Albanians predominantly from the region of Gjakova, Gjilan and Suhareka, as the pre-war waves of migration were often like a chain consisting of its links, amalgamed later in the 1980s, when the families of these workers started joining them (Gollopeni, 2016, p. 303; Robelli, 2014). The Kosovo-Albanian diaspora members from German-speaking countries are othered by the label of “schatzies” meaning darling. Due their rural origin, inadequate integration is considered as lacking cultural advancement and social capital, which prevents them with their numerous families to climb the social ladder in the host country. Whereas the UK based diaspora members are frequently attributed with cultural sophistication and mentality that is linked with a framework of understanding that accepts their integration abroad and their role in the international labour market, the migrants in Germany and Switzerland are considered to be entrenched in pre-migration modes of thought (Paca, 2015, p. 15). Even though the KLA originated from the Kosovo-Albanian Diaspora in Germany and Switzerland in late 1980s, it remained politically irrelevant until 1996 (Koinova, 2013). In Germany 203,000 Kosovars are registered (Statistik-Portal, 2016) and in Switzerland 109,352 Kosovar citizens (Federal Statistic Offcie FSO, 2017, p. 9). However, based on estimation, the number in Germany can be around 350,000 and in Switzerland around 200,000 Kosovo Albanians, also including the population born there and people holding the host country citizenship – up to 58 % in Germany and 46 % in Switzerland. This proportion is tiny compared to, for example, the USA or the UK, where the proportion of citizenship holders is around 88 % and 65 % (Mustafa, M. et al., 2015, p. 31).

One of the more recent diaspora destinations is the UK. In 1991, there were only 338 Albanians registered in London, in 1993, due to the political persecution campaign in Kosovo, the number increased to 2500. The UK remained the destination of pre-was political emigrants. Although there are no exact numbers, it is estimated that 70,000 – 100,000 Kosovo

112

Albanians live in the UK, with 70-80 % of them settled in London. By the late 1990s, the central organisation affiliated with the Kosovo shadow government was the Kosovo Information Centre (KIC). KLA supporters established only a limited representation in the UK, which also suggests that education might be related to political perspectives.

The USA experienced, similarly to German-speaking countries, several waves of Kosovo- Albanian immigration. The first wave of peasants settled in the Northeast and Midwest at the beginning of the 20th century. After the end of the World War II, there followed an anti- Communist wave organised in New York. By late 1990, about 113 00 Albanians were registered (not differentiating Albanians from Kosovo and Albania), however, based on other sources, it is estimated that there could have been around 350,000 members of the Kosovo diaspora. During the 1990s and 2000s, the two most significant organisations emerged, which vigorously pursued Kosovo independence. They were the National Albanian American Council (NAAC) and the Albanian American Civic League (AACL), which created an instant pressure on the US Administration and were active in the political campaign including fundraising (Koinova, 2013).

5.3 Relations toward Albania

As Kosovo left the common state unit with the mainland Albania in 1913 at the Conference of London, when the Albanian border was created in its current state, the 2008 independence and the previous state-creation process generated considerable debate since the majority of inhabitants were Albanians and demanded not a multi-ethnic but a nation-state. The character of Kosovo-Albanian identity was questioned regarding the already existing Albanian national state and the possible intention to establish a Greater Albania on the grounds of the claimed ethnic territorial border. There also appeared suspicions about the potential hegemony intentions from the side of Kosovo or Albania. It would be a simplification to suggest that either of them possesses a single collective identity, but common perspectives together with specifics may be discerned despite the diversity within these groups (Chaitin, 2012, p. 152).

Not even the common cultural Albanian identity is rigid. Kosovo Albanians demonstrate a strong affinity to a kinship-based national state and were transfigured by the turbulence of the war in Kosovo. The specific unifying component of Kosovo Albanians is the protracted

113 resistance to oppression and the struggle for freedom, emphasising the recent war experience, translated into a need for an independence status of Kosovo, refusing to once again subject themselves to the risk of living as a minority in the parent unit.

Besides the struggle against Serbs over the primacy and right to rule the territory of Kosovo, during the 20th century, Albania and its history was presented to Kosovo-Albanians as their history and shared original homeland going as far as Skanderbeg heroism and common Illyrian ancestors. The conceptualisations of Albanian identity are wed inseparably to the territory of Kosovo, generating memories distinct from those of their ethnically affiliated neighbours. Thus, it corresponds in the diaspora to the traditional scholar narrative of the connected imagined homeland. On the other hand, Kosovo war experience changed the perspective on their modern culture and identity previously developed as it helped to crystalize the most critical features.

The current version of the common memory of the Albanian struggle for freedom emphasises independence as a long-term aim. Aside from its confusing nature, this version stresses the impossibility of Kosovo to remain a part of Serbia. It therefore selectively depicts the aims and character of the nonviolent civil resistance in the Albanian struggle. All the participants in parallel structures are quite marginalised in favour of the armed struggle for nationhood led by the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). Its commemorated legacy overlaps with the birth of the ‘new Kosovo’ and its members populate new Kosovo structures. No space has been left for alternative perspectives on the Albanian struggle that do not entirely comply with mainstream thinking. The personification of the authentic Albanian patriot, framed in the rural tradition of the heroic fighter, is the supreme sacrifice of the insurgent KLA leader, Adem Jashari (A. Di Lellio, 2006, p. 520).

The traditional patriarchal culture is used to create a homogenised discourse that glorifies the symbolic collective trauma of the Jashari family and pledges faithfulness and great sacrifice to the independence and freedom, which has been reformulated into a legend.34 This is intended

34 The powerful legend of Adem Jashari was politically established by the PDK as the official and exclusive symbolic interpretation of the emergence of the KLA. The possible consequences of the previous medial success cannot be ignored, when such a topic was used in political communication. After Haradinaj was publicly accused of war crimes together with the AAK, a strong public campaign was immediately prepared, built around the slogan ‘A leader who keeps his word’ notifying the importance of the Besa tradition and socio-cultural particularity as a powerful political characteristic of his leadership, which gained him enormous support and 114 to elicit a strong collective identification among the Albanian communities of Kosovo, unifying them in the mission of building a nation. Although not everyone may agree with ideals such as the masculinity celebrated in the rural Albanian tradition, any public criticism of the legendary commander is taken to amount to blasphemy. His sacrifice is seen as extraordinary, impossible to repay on equal terms, and therefore obliged to be met with quiet gratitude (Strapacova, 2016, p. 62).

Another difference between Kosovo Albanians and Albanians from Albania is dialect. Kosovans, famous for their tribal social organisation and fewer inter-marriages with non- Albanians, speak Ghek, while most Albanians in Albania speak the Tosk dialect (Minahan, 2000, p. 29). Regarding diaspora location, for Albanians from Albania the main destinations are Greece, Italy, Germany, Canada, Turkey, France and the UK, while the Kosovo Albanians tend to be more in German-speaking countries – Germany, Switzerland and Austria followed by Italy, Sweden or the USA (World Bank , 2008).

It still remains almost impossible to distinguish between the diaspora members, since there are Albanians from Kosovo, main Albania, Macedonia, Greece or Montenegro. These groups are not that strongly differentiated as there are still many ethnical and cultural connections. Nevertheless, a homogenous pan-Albanian identity is a rather idealised concept that has a negative impact on the interethnic relations. The diaspora connection with the home-country is currently channelled via direct family links to the territory of Kosovo. Therefore, before the escalation of the situation in Kosovo, which led to a radical mobilisation among diaspora members, it was not so important to make these distinctions. The registration in the host countries, therefore, did not previously differentiate the ethnicity of Albanians from Kosovo and from Albania. Albanians filled in Former Yugoslavia or Serbian Republic as the country of origin. Statistics about who is counted as Albanian may include ancestry, citizenship, self- declaration and external categorisation (Dahinded, 2013, p. 3). At the end of 2017, an agreement was signed between Kosovo and Albania of joint effort and financing to organise schooling in the Albanian language for the Albanian diaspora from both countries and to create new cultural centres. Even though the Albanian Prime Minister Rama stated that “regardless of the division between two countries, the Albanian diaspora is interchangeable for the two governments,” the real situation to exercise own political and social rights differs. solidarity among Kosovo-Albanians. This had the desired effect of side-lining the content of the indictment while the features of identity, which appeared to be under attack, were emphasized (Luci, 2014, p. 157). 115

The official registration and citizenship (as per legal requirements in Law on Diaspora) remain crucial. Cooperation, hence, needs to be seen especially from the cultural perspective, which would be arranged by shared costs but can strengthen the range of benefits (Mejdini, 2017).

From the perspective of international relations, Kosovo is an important factor in Albanian foreign policy. However, the country rather aligned increasingly with the EU policy toward the former Yugoslavia countries due to the pressure exercised by the Western countries and to receive support for its own necessary reforms in a politically and economically problematic period. There was support of Albania on peace restoration in 1999 in Kosovo peace talks and also later, during the reconstruction phase, there was support in cooperation with the vision of a future membership in the NATO and assistance with the refugee problem. Nevertheless, regarding the future status of Kosovo, Albania was not an important factor in the solution of the Kosovo conflict (Metz, 2014, str. 85). The bilateral relations are currently brotherly, and the common cooperation not only regarding the needs of the diaspora in host countries is seen as a fundamental booster to the EU integration process (Republic of Albania, 2018).

5.4 Role of Diaspora in the process of dissolution of the SFRY

The diaspora´s involvement in the reconstruction of the homeland in the post-conflict environment is crucial for the damaged economy, which has failed to create any income- generating opportunities and where the population affected by conflict is dependent on financial assistance from abroad. Although the estimated size of the diaspora differs widely, Kosovo is ranked as one of the countries with the largest diaspora. With about one emigrant for every two to five Kosovo residents, up to one-third of Kosovars (1.8 million according to the 2011 census) live abroad today (UNDP, 2014: 12, FID, 2009, p.5). Its size offers the potential for active and effective policy in promoting Kosovo development to involve its members abroad. Besides the often-mentioned economic support, the diaspora community has an important role in the political, cultural and social life of Kosovo. In the late 1980s, the Kosovo diaspora became politically crucial because the financial assistance that diaspora members provided

116 lent critical support to Kosovo during a challenging period,35 providing money to send home to the families to improve the housing and living conditions as a significant economic incentive (Clark, 2000). In the 1990s, taxes and contributions collected from the diaspora funded the so-called parallel system36 and later also the Kosovo Liberation Army. Cases of political lobbying to raise awareness of the situation of Albanians in Kosovo were not rare. Members of the diaspora also came back to be directly involved in the fighting and post-war politics (Bieber & Daskalovski, 2003).

Among Kosovars, it is widely believed that a massively mobilised and numerous diaspora has the potential to further fuel Kosovo development.37 The role of remittances to help reduce the enormous trade deficit has often been discussed. In the broader perspective, other sources, such as diaspora tourism and foreign direct investment undertaken or facilitated by diaspora members, followed. 38 Subsequently, the diaspora has come to be seen as a source of human development as well as active public diplomacy for Kosovo challenged independence.

5.5 Diaspora during the Kosovo Conflict in Kosovo and afterwards

The new dimension of diaspora possibilities to shape the events in their home country may be seen on the period of the Kosovo conflict during the 1990s. Kosovo diaspora actively supported home-land compatriots and family members financially by providing money for the shadow government and covering living expenses. At an early stage of the conflict escalation, the diaspora members mostly engaged in economic and political transactions including fundraising and lobbying. The Kosovo Albanians paid a 3 % tax on their incomes abroad. Hence the revenue was used to sponsor the activities of the shadow government. For example, the New York-based Albanian-American Civil League was less successful in its lobbying effort. Hence, it still facilitated contacts between US senators and political figures from Kosovo.

35 The IOM (International Organisation for Migration) estimates that between 1991- 2000, 70 percent of the population was “supported,” 14 percent had income from work and 4 percent received social security (Vathi & Black, 2007, p. 5). 36 Kosovo Albanians supported their homeland by more than $125 million in taxes to fund education and health institutions that took responsibility of the primary population needs (Hockenos 2003: 178). 37 On the other hand, remittances have only a limited influence on improving the situation of people living in “absolute” poverty, since they have a lower probability of receiving them (UNDP 2014: 45). 38 The investment-linked risk perceived by the diaspora is smaller than the risk of other potential investors. As overseas diaspora does not practically invest at all, diaspora based in Europe invest the equivalent of 15 percent of the GDP of Kosovo (10 percent of total investment) but it accounts for 70 percent of company acquisitions (Xharra, Wählisch 2012: 15). 117

Among the diaspora, circles became more radical when moderate homeland political actors lost their legitimacy and conviction that the goal of political independence may be obtained. From the 1995 Dayton Accords, governmental leaders weaken domestically as a resolution for Kosovo was not considered. Since 1996, radical elements in diaspora were recalling the option of guerrilla warfare. Even though Germany based Prime Minister Bukoshi suggested that the KLA activists in exile join effort with the shadow government, the proposal gained no positive response. The KLA built its network and converted moderates in the diaspora to support their activities, which Bukoshi supported himself. With the escalation of the situation on the ground in 1998, more radical methods were also supported. Diaspora increased support to the KLA, which advocated violence in their struggle for the right of self- determination. The Homeland Calling Fund was set up to gather donations from diaspora members in Switzerland in 1993. The fund was later moved to the USA, where the diaspora was more affluent, and the fund received more donations. Under the leadership of F. Krasniqi, an estimated 11 million dollars were raised to fund military equipment between 1997 – 1999. After the Drenica massacre of March 1998, a massive number of volunteers was drafted. Although the exact numbers are unknown, H. Thaci estimated that 20-30 % of the entire volunteer force that fought in Kosovo came from this diaspora (Koinova, 2013).

Moreover, especially in the USA, political negotiations were as important as military support in arming and human capacities. This period reopens the peculiar question of people´s willingness to kill and die to secure their own community (Anderson, 2008).

The role of the diaspora in the post-war period is less unitary as many divisive topics appear. During 1990, diaspora was organised according to the Kosovan political parties and humanitarian activities. Later on, the only shared vision which remained among members of the diaspora was the future Kosovo status. Military intervention and the establishment of the UN Administration rule in Kosovo did not mean achievement of the statehood, but radical activities from diaspora became more concerned with rebuilding their own lives.

The impact of the diaspora on Kosovo in the aftermath of the NATO 1999 intervention subsided. Priorities shifted for the new Kosovo leaders, who started building new Kosovo institutions. Many diaspora members turned their attention away from Kosovo and toward

118 improving their social situation (Koinova, Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States Variety of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo, 2013, p. 198).

Unlike the shadow government in the 1990s, the Kosovo government was overwhelmed with the local challenges of the institutional rebuilding of Kosovo as a path toward independence and became mostly inactive in diaspora circles after the establishment of the UNMIK rule. Ethnic majority Albanians did not experience significant insecurity from the side of Serbia in Kosovo anymore. The emotional impact of violence toward civil population during warfare lost its mobilisation potential in the diaspora. Their family members were safe, which encouraged them to focus on their situation in the host countries. Diaspora members could for the first time prioritise taking care of their cultural life in the host countries, to challenge their often quite negative image as media often portrayed them as linked with the criminal world and illegal activities (Xharra & Wählisch, 2012, p. 7).

Consequently, diaspora groups started losing their strategic centre for mobilisation. Diaspora also became fearful of embezzlement of some funds to support the strategy of the LDK or later the KLA, thus significantly reducing their financial contributions. As diaspora was forgotten in this particular period also from the side of the Kosovo state structures, there appeared feelings of disregarding their previous role and position, which brought disillusion with the whole process.

On the other hand, many activists supporting the KLA relocated to Kosovo and became politically active, further diaspora commitment to independence supported by lobby activities on a particular level prevailed. In the USA, lobby groups continued to remind the Congress and the Administration that the final status of Kosovo needed further consideration as violence could still occur. The diasporic lobbies were not as influential as in the pre-1999 period. Nonetheless, politically active groups helped to preserve a modest approach and keep the status of Kosovo in the centre of attention of international community as Kosovo’s independence at the national level disappeared from the Western countries’ policy agenda after 1999. Between 2004 and 2005, the diaspora circles of former KLA fighters settled in New York became impatient, but the moderate groups dominated politics (Koinova, Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism For Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK, 2013). The motives were very pragmatic as the overall goal was to

119 achieve Kosovo´s independence with the help of the international community. The diaspora circle knew that if democratisation were the way that could help them to achieve independence. Rather than genuine trust in democratisation, which drove the diaspora circle to keep a moderate approach to politics toward Kosovo, it was a strategic interest to pursue a goal that required a change in course (Koinova, 2009, p. 4).

In line with the strategy, the support from diaspora kept lobbying for these purposes and emphasising the critical message that Kosovo was capable of democratic governing and becoming a sovereign state.

The violence in Kosovo in 2004 brought the attention back to open the question of Kosovo status as the Western powers realised that concrete steps toward Kosovo were necessary. The diaspora did not officially endorse violence. However, individual members realised that this strategy helped to move the overall cause of independence.39 Based on the Koinova research, the diaspora in the UK disapproved of the political violence because of the negative image it created about them and the Kosovo independence struggle rather than because they considered it politically, culturally or morally unacceptable (Koinova, 2013).

Although the violence was officially disapproved, it was strategically useful in accelerating the political process when used carefully not to harm the image of the democratisation process in Kosovo (Koinova, 2009, pp. 3-5). Quite self-explanatory is the narrative tacitly agreeing with the development in Kosovo because nobody could stop people from taking matters into their own hands if they did not gain support for independence elsewhere (Koinova, 2013).

These actions managed to re-involve the USA under the Bush administration, which was facing new challenges but also accepted that the responsibilities of post-conflict reconstruction and state building of Kosovo could not be associated only with Europe. Until the independence was proclaimed in 2008 with the support of the major EU powers and the

39 The former KLA fundraiser Krasniqi mentioned for the Brooklyn Connection documentary, which maps out the support of diaspora during the conflict in Kosovo, that weapons are still being distributed to Kosovo on a small scale and the larger repercussion would come if the final status decision was not made soon (Klaartije, 2005). 120

USA, there was a substantial lobby support coming from the USA, which also destroyed the position of the EU with vigorous advocacy of diaspora members.40

5.6 Diaspora today

As one in every four Kosovans currently lives abroad, migration and linkages with the diaspora are an everyday reality for most people in Kosovo. Besides directly improving the welfare of Kosovo by supporting their family members and sending remittances, the diaspora also has in impact on the situation in Kosovo through their expenditure during regular visits in Kosovo, investments in Kosovo, support for resident’s mobility for education, healthcare and employment, transfer of skills and participation in social and political affairs. With the installation of international missions, the role of the diaspora began to fade, and a gap of us vs them emerged between Kosovars and the diaspora, which even resulted in a decrease in their organisations’ activities (Xharra, Wählisch 2012: 33). Gradually, mobilisation in favour of independence took a more modest path, adopting a focus on democratisation and institutional path to the independence promoted by the international community (Koinova 2009, p.5).

Kosovars abroad did not lose contact with their families back home in the first generation. Remittances were not always a purely altruistic demonstration on the part of diaspora members for their relatives’ well-being, but they were also an investment to ensure their future income and rights to inherit family assets (ESI 2006: 3; Havolli 2009: 3). These earlier, mutually beneficial reasons for the original family household cooperation are fading. Diaspora members are currently focusing more on their own lives, and further integration, while investment back home is considered to be riskier, also because of the environment in Kosovo.41 Lingering national sentiment can play a significant role in encouraging diaspora members to remain involved in Kosovo, but this motivation is not viable in the long-term perspective. Furthermore, the consequences of Kosovo diaspora involvement have changed. The total number of Kosovars living abroad after the war ended has decreased.42 While the end of the period of mass migration reflected the resolution of political repressions, the

40 B. Pacoli become well known for establishing a complete group of 60 lobbyists in this regard to pursue the independence. (Free Republic, 2007) 41 Such as in the case of diaspora living in Switzerland (FID 2009: 17) 42Many migrants had only temporary status while the number of new migrants was limited to reunifying families. Accordingly, entire diaspora families stayed abroad and the reasons to remit declined. (ESI 2006: 5) 121 economic situation remains unchanged. Notwithstanding the resilience of remittances to date, the amount may decrease even further over the long term due to the weakening of the ties with the second-generation migrants born and educated outside of Kosovo, well integrated into host countries and more often engaged in the socio-political life there. Not knowing the culture and language of their ancestors increases their detachment from Kosovo (UNDP, 2014, pp. 39, 78).

5.6.1 Economic relations

Migration is a household strategy aimed to improve not only the prospects of the leaving person but also the extended families left behind. Hence, in economic aspects, diaspora plays a vital role in funding the colossal deficit in merchandise trade and enables domestic consumption and investment to exceed domestic output not only through remittances but also through compensation (compensation of Kosovar residents, who worked temporarily abroad), diaspora tourism and direct investment undertaken or facilitated by the members of the diaspora.

The number of remittances and diaspora investments could further decrease if the ties of migrants to Kosovo became weaker over time and the flow of emigration was reduced. Even though between 2004 and 2010 their share of the GDP fell from 17.5 percent to below 13 percent, remittances serve as the most important external source of financing for Kosovo state. Since then, around 12-15 percent of GDP (based on estimations around 700 million EUR) is sent mostly from European countries 43 (World Bank, 2017, p. 23). According to the World Bank, over half of this sum arrives through unofficial channels, outside of banking systems, which means that the income from the diaspora is significantly higher than the official data. In the introduction to “The Preliminary Results of the Diaspora Registration,” published in June this year, the Minister of Diaspora, Valon Murati, stated that the yearly income from the diaspora is approximately 1.5 billion EUR (Demi, 2017). Remittance rates remain high by regional and global standards, while keeping Kosovo among the top 15 recipients worldwide (World Bank, 2011, p. 8) and second in Europe, following Moldova (World Bank, 2017, p. 23). On the other hand, from a development perspective, the practical use of remittances is not very strategical.

43 The highest share of remittances (35.67 %) was sent from Germany, 21.75 % from Switzerland, 6 % from Italy, 5 % from Austria and 4.8% from the USA. An additional 26.8 % came from other countries like Belgium, Sweden, UK, and Finland between 2008- 2016 (Riinvest, 2017). 122

With the end of mass migration, the pressure, especially in rural Kosovo, is now growing rapidly because without changing the structure of the economy, no sustained cycle of development can be generated. Kosovo villages, which have long since ceased to be economically self-sufficient, are also becoming more populated. Because of inheritance rules, the average plot has become inadequate even for subsistence agriculture. In economic terms, remittances have merely brought about more of what was already present in the local economy: construction services, shops, cafés, taxis, car mechanics and petrol stations. They have provided a supplement to household income, enabling some families to enjoy modern consumer goods, while just about saving the most impoverished families from a complete destitution (ESI, 2006, p. 27).

(UNDP, 2012, p. 21; Riinvest, 2017)

According to the UNDP, 60 % of the amount has been used mainly for consumption and luxury goods spending rather than productive investment (less than 4 percent). Another 20 percent is used for home construction and reconstruction, while only 4.6 percent for educational purposes and 6 percent for health care. Less than 4 % is used for savings and half of that amount for debt payment (UNDP 2012: 71). An adverse prognosis about the level of remittances also counts with a decrease in the total number of Kosovars living in diaspora compared to the late 1990s. Furthermore, the diaspora is no longer being replenished by the

123 new arrival of a single man supporting his family back home as their families are reunited in the host country or travelling with them from the beginning (ESI, 2006, p. 5).

Diaspora-related flow increases the demand for goods and services in fields such as construction industry, travel-related services or health care. Valuable sources of investment of diaspora members include, but are not limited to, sectors where they are often employed themselves such as construction or hospitality industry.

Diaspora travel expenditures are an essential additional source of income. More than 90 % of Kosovan emigrants interviewed by the UNDP study mentioned that they regularly visit Kosovo once a year or more often for a period of two weeks up to one month (UNDP, 2012, pp. 29-30).

Based on a 75 % increase of passengers at the former military airport in Pristina between 2001 and 2005 to nearly a million passengers at the end of that period, the airport is considered one of the most successful airports in South East Europe (ESI, 2006, p. 2). After the new terminal building was opened in 2016, there were about 1.75 million passengers a year, which represented an increase of 12.6 % in passenger numbers and an 8 % increase in flight numbers (Pristina International Airport, 2017). Hence, the international airport became an irreplaceable connection between Kosovo including its rural areas and the global economy for the diaspora members, who are the most frequent travellers (ESI, 2006, p. 3).

As there is an insufficient number of any other visitors to Kosovo so far, it will, from a medium-term perspective, depend a lot on how the ties with the diaspora and their link to Kosovo evolve. In this regard, certain governmental policies to strengthen links may be necessary (UNDP, 2014, p. 35).

Further income-generating activities and investments demand an encouraging environment, which is limited in Kosovo. Therefore, while it is challenging to attract diaspora investors, it is even more challenging to attract non-diaspora foreign investors. Although the official data are not able to distinguish between diaspora and other foreign investors, the involvement of diaspora members either as investors or as facilitators is estimated to be significant, accounting for 30 % FDI (UNDP, 2014, p. 35).

124

Besides direct monetary benefits, diaspora members provide their experience, which enriches the local environment with new business ideas, technology, managerial know-how and help to increase the skills of the labour force and competitiveness of Kosovan products. Even though all benefits mentioned above are problematic to measure, there are remarkable success stories of companies where diaspora members have contributed immensely with investment, management and technical know-how such as Rugova Cheese, Kosovatex, Trofta or 3CIS. Furthermore, a project initiated by diaspora members and international donors – Encouraging Young Entrepreneurs Venture – helps with gaining capital, training and mentoring for start- ups with a high growth potential (UNDP, 2014, p. 36). Essential diaspora personalities such as the KLA representative Dino Asanaj returned to become the chairman of the Privatization Agency and inaugurated the construction of the International Village housing complex, using cutting edge geothermal technology. The NAAC member and publisher of the Albanian American Ilirija newspapers, Harry Bajraktari, launched one of the biggest investment schemes in Kosovo after 1999. Florin Krasniqi, a KLA fundraiser, invested in the energy sector in Decani. Many other educated diaspora members owning experience in the technology sector returned to Kosovo with the vision of inspiring employment opportunities (IOM, 2008).

The most substantial immediate impact of diaspora support is apparent in the massive construction works that completely transformed the scenery of Kosovo, making it possible to rebuild many houses (Koinova, Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States Variety of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo, 2013, pp. 198-199).

At the macroeconomic level, the diaspora contributes to human development by helping to stabilise employment and sustaining salaries at a higher level than they would attain otherwise. Consequently, it helps to reduce poverty, when the lack of capital to cover primary consumption is compensated. Furthermore, a recent emigration directly reduces the domestic labour supply, and the unemployment rate, thus, decreases the pressure on a low salary level. High inaction and migration reduce the pressure of the high labour supply. Every year, ca. 36,000 individuals enter the job market, but only 10,000 retirees leave. The annual emigration of approximately 13,000 people compared to only a small number of returnees plays a significant role in preventing the unemployment rate from rising even higher (UNDP, 2014, p. 37). Furthermore, for ten years (2005-2014) only 63 thousand new jobs were created. On the

125 other hand, just within one year, from October 2014 until October 2015, around 90 thousand people emigrated from Kosovo (Demi, 2017).

Remittances and other migration related flow increase the demand for domestically produced goods and services in Kosovo, whose prices consequently increase. The relatively high price level in Kosovo in comparison with the region is based on the reasoning of Korovilas and Havolli due to remittances and related inflow, which prevent the re-industrialisation of Kosovo that should have occurred along with the post-conflict reconstruction process. In a small country, high remittances lead to higher private consumption, GDP growth and a higher salary level that would not be possible otherwise (Korovilas & Havolli, 2009). The average salary level almost doubled between 2003 and 2013, without a wide-spread rapid growth in labour productivity, which supports the above-mentioned argument.

All Kosovo households indirectly benefit from migration and remittance. In households directly supported, there is an 8 % higher consumption expenditure and a 10 % higher consumption expenditure per adult (UNDP, 2014, p. 43). On the other hand, the diaspora support that drove investments in real estate has resulted in an increase of real estate prices for those who live in Kosovo. While in Pristina alone, over 20 thousand flats are not permanently unoccupied (Demi, 2017).

The process of deepening economic relations should be, however, mutually beneficial rather than based on sentimental reasons which result purely in the support of individual family members rather than substantial development assistance (UNDP, 2014, pp. 36, 50, 60). More critical regarding the financial potential of the diaspora is the creation of a stable environment because a relatively small part of remittances and other income from abroad is spent on business investment.

Cases of emotional investment based on the desire to help the home country may lead to discouraging disappointment, which is even more difficult to remedy. Even though there are diaspora specific barriers, such as a lack of access to information on potentially profitable opportunities and an administration not very committed to integrating the diaspora, they are considered to be only the tip of the iceberg in comparison to everyday issues such as inefficient administration. Investments are instead hampered by limited access to finance,

126 unfair competition, a grey economy, a shortage of skilled labour and poor infrastructure, which in combination with the unresolved international status of Kosovo creates substantial obstacles (UNDP, 2014, p. 36). Widespread corruption embodies the above-mentioned structural problems, lack of the rule of law and a weak judicial system which is unable to enforce its decisions, hence, negatively influence the business environment in Kosovo (European Commision, 2016, p. 28).

Beyond the rise of arguments that the real problem of corruption is linked to the public perception44 which is not necessarily based on personal experience but rather on impressions, even the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency considers corruption, especially in the public sector, to be a critical problem and complains about how few of their actions are implemented (European Commision, 2016, pp. 17-18). The lack of political will to fight corruption and organised crime45 (not surprisingly linked to ties between politicians´ economic interests of big families such as Thaci or Haradinaj) has created a culture of impunity. Even if the perceived corruption is higher than the reality, continuous corruption and nepotism on the part of government officials have been blamed for complicating the business in Kosovo, for example in the case of obtaining construction permits. These difficulties discourage investment in Kosovo (Gashi, Shabani, & Rizvanili, 2013, p. 9). Law institutions are reluctant to fight high-level corruption (World Bank, 2014, p. 9). Even after the reforms of 2013, the independence of the judicial system was diminished. The decline in trust continues with the corruption scandal in the EU Rule of Law mission as well as the Kosovo Constitutional Court decision which deepened the political stalemate after the 2014 elections46(NIT Kosovo 2015). The judicial system does not allow the enforcement of contracts or the resolution of cases of insolvency efficiently enough to encourage further investment plans (World Bank, 2014, p. 9).

An additional obstacle perceived by diaspora members is the perception of not being appreciated by Kosovan institutions as well as the society. While governmental initiatives to

44 As seen in the Corruption Perception Index, where Kosovo stagnated with a score of 33 between 2012 – 2015 and finally increased the score to 34 in 2016, moving from rank 110 to rank 95 out of 176 (Transparency International, 2017). 45 Organised crime and corruption have a negative effect on Kosovo´s image abroad. Although it was argued that this was an effect of misusing the connection with the Muslim religion spread by Serbian propaganda, the perception connecting criminal activities with Kosovo is prevailing (Mustafa, M. et al., 2015, p. 64). 46 For more on political corruption, see (TI Kosovo: 2014). 127 strengthen ties with the diaspora and to facilitate their donor’s relations and potential investments are valuable, their full benefit can only be realized when the generic barriers to investment are addressed first. Furthermore, the successful economic cooperation needs to be mutually profitable in the long-term perspective.

Kosovan government and the Ministry of Diaspora in particular take actions to promote closer ties with the diaspora and their involvement in political activities to improve their willingness to invest in Kosovo.

5.6.2 Political and institutional connection

The decrease in diaspora mobilisation reflected the polarisation that came with the introduction of multiparty politics, in which members of diaspora rather side with a political party than with the community as a whole (Xharra & Wählisch, 2012, p. 32). During the 1990s, the diaspora had a strong motive, which mobilised their support to the liberation of Kosovo and humanitarian activities. After 1999, collective action was gradually substituted by individualism and focus on their own family life. Recently, diaspora is fractioned by opposing political groupings that arose in the aftermath of the conflict. Already in 2006, 50 % of diaspora visitors responded that they are not members of any Kosovo related association. Thus, the Kosovan diaspora is less involved in political issues at home, which, together with lowering the amount of remittances sent back home, gradually came to the attention of political institutions. The establishment of the central organisation has been seen as a way to bridge the negative shadow of political clientelism arising from cooperation based on party support and bringing diaspora members closer together (UNDP, 2014, p. 69).

Besides improvements for the business environment in Kosovo, establishing an appropriate emigration policy and an institutionalised framework are considered to be of key importance for stimulating economic growth. After the period of negligence toward diaspora needs, the last chance seemed to be to maintain the ties with diaspora members for the future. To address the previous failure of the administration in dealing with complaints about not addressing the diaspora needs, the Ministry of diaspora (MoD) was created in May 2011 with the aim to help preserve Kosovo diaspora identity, culture and language in the residing countries and cultivate their relations with Kosovo´s institutions to receive their assistance in return, which would

128 directly impact the country’s development (Ministry of Diaspora, 2013).47 It is committed to significantly improving relations with the diaspora by acknowledging their contribution to Kosovo and to offering incentives to remain their political and social members to maximise their potential contributions (Mustafa, M. et al., 2015, p. 7) (UNDP, 2014, p. 70). The Law on Diaspora of Kosovo (2012) was drafted as a specific document defining the relations of the diaspora, which focus not only on strengthening economic links (art. 15), but also on influencing the broader preservation of language, culture and educational identity of diaspora members (art. 1).48

In this regard, the Strategy on Diaspora and Migration 2013-2018 was prepared with four general objectives to promote and advance diaspora political and social rights, help protect their identity and strengthen the diaspora connection, integrate them into host countries and include them in the socio-economic development of Kosovo (Ministry of Diaspora, 2013).49 To convey their sense of appreciation for the contributions made by the diaspora, they implemented easier access to voting rights. These are, however, currently exercised only to a negligible degree because of the difficulty of the procedures.50 Voting on the local level is still being discussed (Law No. 03/L-073, 2008, p. art. 6.2). Furthermore, the diaspora may also be formally represented in the parliament through reserved seats, as it is in the case of ethnic minorities. Their representation shall become evident but symbolic since they are less affected by legislative decisions and do not pay taxes51 (UNDP, 2014, pp. 16, 78). Kosovo Cultural Centres for Diaspora and Migration (KCCDM) established by the MoD with the assistance of diplomatic missions in places where most of them live (Tukey, Switzerland, Sweden) shall maintain links with fully integrated members of the diaspora via

47 To institutionalize the diaspora position, the MoD replaced the Office or Agency for Diaspora and Migration under the auspices of the Prime Minister´s office and the department within the Ministry of Culture, Youth, Sports and Non-residential Issues, which did not significantly improve the situation. (UNDP 2014: 70) 48 A diaspora member is considered any person dwelling or located outside of Kosovo and who was born or has family in the Republic in Kosovo. (Law No.03/L-171, 2010, p. art. 3) On the other hand members of the diaspora entitled to participate in elections have to hold Kosovo Citizenship or fulfil alternative equivalent criteria. (Law No. 03/L-073, 2008, p. art. 5) 49 State strategy on Migration is rather dealing with irregular migration, legal migration management and also developing migration into a positive economic factor, which rather approached the perspective and needs of the Kosovo state only (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2013). 50 In the 2010 elections, only 1,405 voters from the diaspora out of around 300,000 eligible voters actually cast a vote through the post (Pantina, 2013, p. 12). In 2017, many voters failed to register due to technical problems ( National Democratic Institute, 2017). 51The range of seats in similar countries varies from 1 to 5 percent depending on the diaspora size (Pantina, 2013, p. 6). 129 attractive activities such as Albanian language courses, which are supplemented with networking events to establish more cooperative relations. These centres shall organise multiple activities every month. However, the Ministry, due to a limited budget, covers the expenses of at least one activity per month. Thus, centres rely on their member associations and volunteers. They are also active on social media as this is an interactive space where the state borders are irrelevant while costs are minimised. The prospect of the opening of additional culture centres is for the same budgetary reasons yet to be planned in Germany, USA, France and Austria in an unknown timeframe. In cooperation with Albania, common cultural centres shall be opened in the UK and Norway. The reasoning behind the location of existing and planned culture centres is unknown, as Germany, where the majority of Kosovo diaspora is, was supposed to be the location of a Centre already in 2015, nevertheless, it is currently not even mentioned (KWN, Kosovo´s Women Network, 2017, p. 17).

To ensure that the members of the second generation of the diaspora remain proficient in the Albanian language is crucial to keep the connection with the diaspora, as the transmission and circulation of cultural heritage within the social space is not possible otherwise (Gsir & Mescoli, 2015, p. 10). The Albanian language is often associated with the domestic sphere also for the second and third generation of migrants, for whom using the language of the country where their parents and grandparents were born and which they know mostly thanks to holidays there or which they even use for communication at home, becomes an important way to affirm their multiple belonging (Buitelaar, 2007). Maintaining national culture, language and history abroad is hence one of the ways of cultivating diasporic identity (Gamlen, 2006, p. 843).

During November, there are activities prepared for diaspora members in host countries (linked to National Albanian Day, November 28). During the summer, there are cultural activities prepared in Kosovo in July when many members are coming back to visit their families, which became the month of the diaspora. The central point is an enormous ceremony at the Prekaz memorial, where the annual prize for the most successful emigrant is awarded on Diaspora day - August 2 (Law No.03/L-171, 2010, p. art. 14). The celebration recalls the glory and national pride when a new era for Albanians began. With the legacy of Adem Jashari’s fight, Kosovo is reminded that it is a place of opportunity for every compatriot. This

130 encourages the sentimental reasons for the diaspora to retain their ties with Kosovo (Strapacova, 2016).

Also, language courses are organised and offered to youngsters from the diaspora during their summer visits, as an exchange with Kosovar academics from abroad, to help stimulate brain gain and to benefit from the rising qualifications of diaspora members.52 It is, however, not very effective in attracting the permanent return of highly skilled experts. Due to steady rates of youth unemployment, brain drain is becoming a concern of rising significance for the future (UNDP2014: 25, 70-71).

As a means to improve communication and enhance transparency, there has been a shift from the personal to the institutional in building a give-and-take relationship through the government introduction of concrete policies in cooperation with diaspora representatives. For this purpose, the National Council of Kosovo-Albanian Diaspora shall be founded as a formal means of representative diaspora involvement in the design of related policies and, as such, shall supplement existing informal activist sources of involvement53 (UNDP 2014: 78). Further institutionalisation requires the determination of a more accurate size, geographic and demographic profile of the diaspora to estimate their potential demand. Hence a project of voluntary registration has been developed since 2014 and preliminary results have been published in June 2017 (final results are estimated to be published in 2021 by the MoD and the Kosovo Agency of Statistics and Diaspora Engagement for Economic Development (DEED)). The voluntary census of Kosovo Diaspora was carried out online and manually via questionnaires between January 2014 and December 2016. Results of these questionnaires were published as preliminary results. The electronic platform, however, remains active until 2021, after which the final results shall be published. Given the nature of the diaspora community, where some people may not want the authorities to know where they are, since they may be staying or working there illegally or they do not have much access to others socially, the possibility to avoid such an initiative could hinder an accurate understanding of the composition of the diaspora (KWN, Kosovo´s Women Network, 2017, p. 17).

52 Between 2002 and 2011, more than 70 Kosovan academics from abroad have given more than 140 visitor lectures at the University of Pristina with the support of the WUS Austria project (UNDP, 2014, p. 71). 53 The Kosovo Diaspora public diplomacy study serves as a great example. It was the basis for establishing digital engagement and a diaspora platform connecting diaspora members throughout the world with Kosovo (Xharra & Wählisch, 2012). 131

Encouraging all potential descendants of Albanian origin to register might have its significance for cultural and language policy abroad and it may allow Kosovan institutions to better address their needs. As regards the ethnically mixed population of Kosovo, however, it does not match the perspective of a “post-nationalistic state,” and in a countrywide context, it may ignite the existing distrust of ethnic communities because the Kosovo Albanian diaspora is perceived from an ethnical perspective. Also, the preliminary registration results confirmed that 96.7 % of registered diaspora members are Kosovo Albanians (KWN, Kosovo´s Women Network, 2017, p. 5).

Furthermore, DEED is a project focused on enabling the Kosovo diaspora to play an active role as development agents in their origin communities with the aim of strengthening Kosovar capacities to implement the Diaspora strategy and facilitate mechanisms for investment and the development impact of remittances (DEED, 2015).

In general, the political connection of the second-generation diaspora members is rather weak. Since they often do not hold Kosovo citizenship,54 they, therefore, cannot take advantage of all political rights. On the other hand, it is not considered to be a crucial problem since their interest in the political situation is quite low. Subsequently, Kosovo does not limit the opportunity to work in the public service to those who hold Kosovar citizenship, as in fact many members of diaspora cannot even hold it together with their host country citizenship. This enables members of the diaspora who do not hold citizenship to be hired and work for the government even though they are Albanian speakers from Macedonia or other countries.55 Although an exciting work position is the only reason for many young members of the diaspora to remain in Kosovo, Kosovo is not perceived as their country of permanent residence. When they do have the opportunity to spend a more extended period in the country, they often look forward to going back to their host country, where they got used to the working system of a developed country. Many returnees, who usually are very sceptical about their return,56 also keep their foreign passports not only due to the ease of travel opportunities but also in case of a future crisis.

54 Their host country may not allow them to hold a second citizenship as is the case in Germany. Even if it does, mostly from the administrative perspective, they hold a Serbian citizenship, which they must first renounce. 55 There are no accessible statistics regarding the numbers of employees but, during the interviews, I have personally spoken with a person who is Kosovo Albanian from Macedonia working for the Ministry of Diaspora. 56 IOM estimates that 70 percent of Kosovo returnees between 2005 and 2012 were deported or forced (UNDP, 2014, p. 29). 132

However, experiencing the benefits of consolidated democratic systems, social justice, transparent public administration and quality public services on a daily basis, does not lead them to expect the same in Kosovo. On the other hand, they voice their critique, and they may engage in the political process to promote these values at home. Sometimes, it is even argued that diaspora remittance, can even keep the quality of public services down, as households are subsidised with diaspora support and do not have to push political representation to invest in an improvement of the public service system and increase the quality of governance (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2014, p. 67).

Nevertheless, the diaspora’s political influence remains present, although in a reduced capacity. In the June 2017 parliamentary elections, people from the diaspora voted in higher numbers compared to prior elections. Besides correspondence voting, a considerable number of people from the diaspora came to Kosovo to vote in person. More than 70 % voted for political parties that have not been in power over the past several years as they were willing to express a more critical approach. Besides direct active participation, international studies have shown that diaspora members influence how their families vote at home and relatives of emigrants are more likely to advocate for a political change. Furthermore, it shows that the diaspora serves as a driving force for civic engagement contributing new ideas and practical suggestions for the maintenance of public spaces, public lighting, construction of homes for families in need, extension of supply and sewage systems and organising sport and cultural activities (Demi, 2017).

5.6.3 Societal and cultural connection

Emigration substantially influenced the family as the core of the society. As a result of emigration, approximately 30% of residential houses in Kosovo are empty, and the average age of the population increased up to 7 %, while households remained to be inhabited by only the elderly accompanied by a family member responsible for taking care of them. Also, the average number of family members continuously decreased from 7.2 members per family household in 1991 to 5.9 members in 2011 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2014). During the 20th century, mainly the families living in the rural areas depend on the remittance support from the diaspora (ESI, 2006, p. 3). According to UNDP, around 25 percent, or 80 thousand, of Kosovo families receive income from remittances. Families that obtain remittances have a higher income compared to families whose only income is their salary or 133 some other activities in Kosovo (Demi, 2017). Poverty rate would increase by 2.2 % without remittance, and the overall impact would be more substantial in the remittance-receiving households (World Bank, 2009, p. 77). On the other hand, it needs to be mentioned that the distribution of the diaspora connection is not linear. The connection with foreign countries is often missing in the families, who are therefore living in the most demanding economic. Although remittances from abroad serve in some cases as a substitute for social benefits, many people in need, in fact, lack this kind of connection, and it should not therefore replace the role of the state.57 Furthermore in the post-war period, remittances were able to keep rural areas afloat without any credible development policy, which shows that the situation in these areas apparently maintained the status quo including the patriarchal Balkan family structure, which is protecting its members in the face of the weak institutional state system. Thus, Kosovo needs migration to stabilise economically while the emigration is preserving the family structure which is also limiting the development (ESI, 2006, p. 2). Multiple complex joint patriarchal family households reflect the practice of men remaining in their family after marriage creating large multi-family households. A fundamental principle of the so-called zadruga was that the sons and their descendants remained within. Only daughters left the family on marriage to become members of the zadrugas of their husbands. The zadruga was governed by a hierarchical system: every member had a particular rank within it. Ranks were determined by age and sex, the sex criterion being stronger than the age criterion: “all males were superior to any of the womenfolk.” As an economic unit, the zadruga was a true collective. All property was shared. In the zadruga, apart from clothing and small objects, there was no private property. All significant decisions were made by the head of the household, or else by another of the men to whom buying and selling had been assigned. Income was shared, and family members were entitled to equal provision for their basic needs. In case the households split, all possessions including the land were divided equally among the members. Since wives came from other villages, and daughters were expected to join another zadruga upon marriage, women did not inherit any share of the family property and occupied a subordinate status within the household (Erlich, 2016, pp. 32, 45, 46). This tradition has strongly influenced limitations in women´s rights to own property and become independent in Albanian society for a very long time until now.

57 Share of elderly people in average composition of households receiving remittance shows higher amount of elderly people above 65 years old and less children. These data correspond with the trend of migration of people in the working age, which are establishing their nuclear family abroad, as they support their parents and sibling in Kosovo. (UNDP, 2014, p. 41) 134

As the head of the household cannot check on their family regularly when abroad, it is believed that they will be secure as long as the strict traditional behaviour is upheld in their absence. Upon returning home, they will find the same lifestyle as when they left, months, years or decades ago. The only changes they hope to find are in material conditions (Reineck, 1991, p. 190). Thus, Kosovo remains organised in large family structures with a strong patriarchal hierarchy. This authority persists today, with the head of household deciding how remittances from family members abroad should be spent, and how much schooling the children should receive. Each grown man is considered to contribute an equal share to the family income, regardless of his actual labour (Erlich, 2016, p. 46). It could be argued that instead of spreading modern approaches, remittances allow the traditional way of life of the agricultural society to be conserved and maintained. If the system will not be adjusting slowly together with the Kosovo states filling the gap for social security role, a costly social crisis might occur. Historian Karl Kesser draws parallels of how the process of modernisation put the traditional value system in Albania under the enormous strain. If credible social and economic policies are not in place, escalation of the situation can bring similar chaos that swept through Albania in 1996 (ESI, 2006, p. 28).

Migration brings new opportunities and challenges to members of vulnerable groups leaving Kosovo as well as those who remain. Women-headed households face more pronounced poverty in Kosovo than others and may, therefore, be considered as marginalised. Women in Kosovo face a higher unemployment rate as they are not used to working outside the house and family. Moreover, there is the diametrical difference in their economic activities compared to men (17.8 % compared to 55.4 %) due to the tradition of caregiving to family, children and elderly and only a slowly progressing issue of gender inequality. A potential benefit brought by the migration of women is the signal it may send to women in Kosovo, who may see migration as a mechanism for improvement of their situation (UNDP, 2014, p. 47). Kosovo society traditionally lives together, and also due to their weak social system, it is unacceptable to leave elderly family members behind without the support provided. Furthermore, it is societally inappropriate and shameful in Kosovo for the elderly to be looked after by somebody outside the family circle. Thus, the family often negotiate about who will take care of the elderly relatives and how the other members will financially support them during that period.

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Women-headed households have a slightly higher chance of receiving remittance. While migration contributed to the economic well-being of the family, they stay behind burdened with familial responsibilities, which at the same time contribute to their emancipation and enhance their confidence and decision-making power, which would not be possible earlier. On the other hand, an even more conservative tendency limiting their freedom was reported in raising their daughters if the father is not permanently present. Women-headed households show similar spending patterns, except for business investments, on which women spend twice as much as men (UNDP, 2014, pp. 53-54).

Kosovan women may find in migration an attractive option of escaping their miserable prospects at the domestic labour market but also their predestined role in the society. Besides enhancing education and better opportunities for employment, the return of female diaspora members is often unlikely because of their appreciation of the freedom and autonomy, which goes hand in hand with earning their living. They settle well in the host society and establish a better life in the host countries than they could have had in Kosovo. Even though the most common reason to leave abroad is marriage or family-related reasons (46 up to 70 % based on different sources), more women migrants than men improved their education status and held a permanent status in the host country, thus, they are entitled to benefit from local educational, employment and social schemes (UNDP, 2014, pp. 47-49). In Kosovo, it is not very common that a woman would publicly formulate and present her stances, which may not correspond with the general expectations and traditions of the societal and gender setting, which is intensified by economic dependency on her husband (ESI, 2006, p. 10). Traditional gender roles and affiliations are a potential explanation for the much smaller role as remitters than men. In general, a smaller share of Kosovo women works, hence they are not bringing material support to their own families nor can they send it back home. On the other hand, women´s effort is often seen as a part of men’s support from abroad, as this is the perception in the patriarchal society still maintained by the society, where women’s contribution is conventionally underestimated. Furthermore, traditional practices also seem to affect the destination of remittance from women, which tend to send it to their in-laws. Social remittance including values, ideas, behaviours and practices, which are limiting women in Kosovo may be transferred by diaspora members from host countries may help to overcome local practices limiting women in private and public life and provide more opportunities for gender equality. (UNDP, 2014, p. 50).

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Further institutionalisation of cultural and political relations, especially with the host countries of diaspora members, is vital regarding the long-term perspective of building a sustainable system of bilateral ties for future cooperation. It also responds to diaspora member's reservations, such as the protection of their rights and the obstacles they face in their resident countries. The positive effect of social remittances on the values and attitudes regarding gender balance and liberal democratic principles is limited. The Kosovo context has not allowed them to make the desired impact on socio-political life. As a result, especially the female population of the second generation faces rapid differences in their opportunities and roles in Kosovo and the countries they live in. Strict cultural rules of a patriarchal society do not encourage them to use their education or business experience. Females are often discouraged from running businesses in Kosovo. These culture barriers are then additional reasons not to come back permanently. Also, from the perspective of single or divorced women living in Kosovo, emigration is a possible way to live their own independent life outside the strictly male- dominated hierarchy in their own family but also in the society. Apart from the shame on her family, societal stigmatisation, blame, disapproval and prejudice, a divorced woman has insufficient access to financial income as women traditionally take care of the household and family which is unpaid work and only 20 % of women have income. Moreover, in the more traditional rural environment, they may not even be allowed to come back by their own family if they have children58 (Halilii, 2016).

The diaspora’s influence goes beyond the financial support from more established host countries. Besides financing their families’ economic consumption in Kosovo, they can provide their life experience from a different country or expertise from their job area. In addition to the economic potential, the diaspora affects the politics and political participation, education level, the integration of Kosovo society with other countries, and the founding of civic initiatives. Their experience of traditional values in Kosovo and a more open standard in the host country may also lead to changes in their way of life, fitting each of these environments better (Demi, 2017).

5858 Sibel Halimi, a sociologist, says that in developed countries, divorce comes as a result of emancipation. Women do not want to endure domestic violence or discrimination, and since they are economically independent, they are self-aware and make the decision to end their marriage. On the contrary, in the Kosovo context, women are victims of both marriages and divorces, because the majority are married against their will (Hajrizaj, 2017). 137

5.5 Conclusion

Migration has been a defining feature of Kosovo society for decades and cannot be simply reduced to key moments. A historical overview reveals that migration has been a continual aspect of the Kosovo Albanians in the Balkans for a long time (Dahinded, 2013, p. 1). Migration plays a part in the political, cultural and social life in Kosovo, as well as helping the economic situation of emigrants’ families. During the 20th-century, rural households survived and occasionally also prospered only thanks to the support from their family members living abroad (ESI, 2006, p. 3). In the late 1980s, the Kosovo diaspora becomes politically important because the money that diaspora members provided lent critical support to Kosovo during a challenging period.59 In the 1990s, taxes and contributions collected from the diaspora funded the so-called parallel system60 and later also the Kosovo Liberation Army. Cases of political lobbying to raise awareness of the situation of Albanians in Kosovo were not rare. Members of the diaspora also came back to be directly involved in the fighting and post-war politics (Bieber & Daskalovski, 2003, p. 266; Dannreuther, 2001, p. 18).

Since the end of the conflict, the role of the diaspora lost its previously very clear aim, which allowed a more individual approach from the side of the diaspora and also visible differences in views started appearing between Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo and living in diaspora. Consequently, a gap of us vs them emerged between Kosovars and the diaspora, which even resulted in a decrease in their organisations’ activities (Xharra & Wählisch, 2012, p. 33). Gradually, mobilisation in favour of independence took a more modest path, internalising the focus on democratisation promoted by the international community (Koinova, 2009, p. 5). The decrease in diaspora mobilisation reflected the polarisation that came with the introduction of multiparty politics. Organizational capacities were influenced, and they continued to support different political parties. Since Kosovo declared independence, the diaspora and the issues its members face, gradually became a hot political topic. Among Kosovars, it is widely believed that a numerous diaspora community has the potential to further fuel Kosovo development and overcome the challenging economic, political and social situation. The role of remittances to help reduce the enormous trade deficit has often been

59 The IOM (International Organisation for Migration) estimates that between 1991- 2000, 70 percent of the population was “supported,” 14 percent had income from work and 4 percent received social security (Vathi & Black, 2007, p. 5). 60 Kosovo Albanians supported their homeland by more than $125 million in taxes to fund education and health institutions that took responsibility of the primary population needs (Hockenos 2003: 178). 138 discussed. In the broader perspective, however, other potential such as democratic and cultural values transfer may be helpful in the effort to build a working environment for the state-building process. Subsequently, the diaspora as a source of human development as well as a source of active public diplomacy for Kosovo challenged independence. Without a doubt, the Kosovo diaspora is hugely important for individual families as well as the Kosovo society at large. Its role almost became the most powerful collective myth in modern Kosovo, shared by foreigners and Kosovo Albanians alike. The moral economy is usually described only from its economic aspect. However, there is an evident link between migration and other political and societal aspects in Kosovo. The next chapter continues with an analysis including the reflection of the experience of individual diaspora members to provide their perspective of Kosovo state-building from the side of the diaspora.

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6 Analysis and Interview Reflections

The following chapter uses additional sources of data from interviews with diaspora members and experts in the field to document the perception of post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding in Kosovo and its character from a micro-level perspective of the individual diaspora members and their view of life in Kosovo and its current development. The chapter primarily focuses on the consequences of statebuilding processes and post-conflict reconstruction; however, this chapter starts from “the bottom up,” going from the lowest social level up to the international level. Complex statebuilding processes are more frequently analysed from higher levels – i.e. top-down. However, the everyday lives of ordinary people, even those who do not have their permanent residency in Kosovo itself, also have a significant impact on these developments. The influence is mutual, as the social levels are interconnected. Therefore, the way the political framework approaches the influence of Kosovar identity, which aspects of the development process are affecting, in reality, the most their life. These topics are consequently mentioned by the respondents, and are thus used as an example in the following section of the thesis. Reflections of the interview, therefore, do not cover all the topics of the statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction process, as the theoretical framing of the research problem in the real life does not have to appear in the same structure. The topics covered here are mentioned and organised based on how they were expressed by interviewees. Other sections of the chapter as well as the thesis that are not covered by the sources from the interviews are supplemented by other existing sources to provide a more complete picture.

Therefore, the areas discussed in this chapter are structured according to how they were mentioned in the interviews, and their interpretation provides additional understanding about how these micro-level perceptions and interactions in a society – as described by diaspora members – in fact, consequently influence the local, national and international level of Kosovo’s development processes.

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6.1 Kosovar Society and Masculinity

The crucial starting point to understand how the progress in the sociopolitical and economic development in Kosovo has been undermined can be found in the character of the political leadership that emerged from the war, which promoted the masculine ideals of patriotism and valour, insisting on conservative values. Gender stereotypes persisted after the end of the conflict in Kosovo and undermined a growing movement toward gender equality, which started forming in the 1990s as a part of a parallel Kosovo society (Haider, 2017, p. 5). The struggle, however, was seen as a communal effort to gain more of the nation as a whole, rather than something specifically gender-oriented. As it later became more apparent, even though gender-related issues received more attention after 1999, social changes regarding the rights of women as well as the acceptance of a diversity of opinions did not come automatically.61 The framing of “women’s activities” during the conflict, in their traditional role of serving and sacrificing in the name of the nation, thus encouraged them to show solidarity by remaining silent concerning the challenges they had to face as women in their society (Haug, 2015, p. 154).

These common patterns of behaviour have a deep tradition and are a part of the current culture division of gender roles. Women’s presence in the public sphere has traditionally been meagre; moreover, their privacy rights have also been limited.

Women previously did not possess any property rights, and they were also excluded from inheritance within the family household based on rules from the still-practised traditional customary law (Kanun), which continues to govern many crucial aspects of social life in rural areas of Kosovo. This codex only allows patrilineal succession of the family resources. Therefore, women do not need to seek property rights as their home and future is provided first by their father and later by their husband anyway. The man always attends to her financial and other needs as well as making decisions on her behalf. The role of the

61 Edita Tahiri, the Minister for Dialogue in the Kosovo government pointed out that the new situation did not automatically lead to increased gender equality. A combination of international ignorance and sometimes prejudices, combined with local patriarchal social norms, has made women’s inclusion a challenge (Haug, 2015, p. 154). 141 woman is to be a good and obedient daughter and mother (Haug, 2015, p. 151). If there is no son in the family, the property goes to the closest male cousins. Furthermore, property disputes were traditionally settled at all-male meetings of elders. Females had neither the right to own nor could they influence the decisions about property. Progress and education in this field managed to facilitate an increase in the share of property in Kosovo owned by women from 8% in 2012 to 15% in 2015. Even though that increase may be considered a step forward, cultural indoctrination often leads to women waiving their rights on her own, when the inheritance issue occurs in the family and comes before a court. Female inheritance is still not a very common practice, allowing people to ignore the existence of more progressive laws. These laws remain ineffective due to citizens ignoring the legislation and preference for the traditional codex (Joireman, 2015). If the potential shame of exclusion from her family, coercion or physical threats do not persuade the woman to give up her rights, and the claims are not ignored by the court, the long judicial delays and insufficient enforcement of her property rights destroy her last chance to succeed. The underlying male give a hint about the character of the situation in the public life including the levels of political and social structures. Over half of society is in that regard not allowed to actively participate in the development of Kosovo, as other minorities face even worse inequalities in public involvement with exception of Serbs (Kushi, 2015).

The renaissance of the traditional patriarchal culture creates a homogenised discourse within the Kosovo Albanian collective identity that glorifies the symbolic collective trauma and pledges faithfulness and great sacrifice to independence and freedom, which has been reformulated into legend. The personification of the authentic Albanian patriot, framed in the rural tradition of the heroic fighter, was the supreme sacrifice of the insurgent KLA leader Adem Jashari.62 Stories of enormous suffering leading consequently to common victory (as the proclamation of independence was) reaffirm and even recreate the ideas of Kosovo society, with its unique experience that bonds Kosovars together; these stories fit into broader international political aspirations as well as contrastingly, what is considered to be the political direction based on everyday reality. At the beginning of the 1990s, it was not very clear what legal status Kosovo would have, as the burning problem at that time was persecution of the Albanian population by the SFRY’s state structures. Furthermore, the

62 The so-called “Legendary Commander” died with his extended family in three days of fighting Serbian forces in March 1998. The Prekaz Memorial Complex commemorates the massacre and the fight, whose message must remain alive for future generations (Di Lellio & Schwandner-Sievers, 2006, p. 520). 142 conditions and the environment changed to the extent that anything less than independence was unacceptable. Later on, the independence of Kosovo was presented as though it had been the only ultimate goal since the beginning of the long and complicated journey. The struggle for national liberation was framed in a robust nationalist discourse, which re-traditionalised the division of roles in the society. Those who did not adhere to the officially promoted roles became labelled as traitors of the nation. Talking too loudly about domestic abuse, limited rights and feminist activities could be seen as an offense toward societal norms and national values, as well as the Albanian way of life, because bringing attention to harmful elements was a sign of a lack of loyalty toward Kosovo itself (Haug, 2015, pp. 151, 154).

Specific cultural uniqueness is mostly understood via the various narratives a society tells about itself. Cultural changes, therefore, often involve a change of understanding of one’s own identity. New views about one’s own history and its interpretation can embrace a different social reality, in which the society finds itself. Moreover, such a change in interpretation helps to embrace what is seen in the society as an ideal to the extent that a single individual cannot challenge it regardless of its factual character.

To maintain a robust collective identity among the Kosovo Albanians regardless of their geographical location, it is necessary to support the mission of building a nation. Although not everyone may agree with the ideals espoused, such as the masculinity celebrated in the rural Albanian tradition, any public criticism of the legendary commander and the values he embodied for the society would amount to blasphemy. His sacrifice is seen as extraordinary, impossible to repay on equal terms, and thus it is obligatory to appreciate it with discreet gratitude. Any kind of disapproval must be kept secret, since open critique, especially regarding sensitive identity topics such as questioning the KLA’s role in retaliation toward the Serbian civil population, cannot be made publicly without significant vocal (at the least) disapproval63 (Di Lellio & Schwandner-Sievers, 2006, pp. 520-523).

The current version of the collective memory of the Albanian struggle for freedom emphasises the fight for independence and stresses the impossibility of Kosovo to remain a

63 The limited right to discuss the topics of KLA activity from any perspective was demonstrated by an experience of the author at an international conference dedicated to gender and identity, when she was interrupted by a sitting Assemblywoman and former KLA member, who informed her that she had no right to talk about the KLA, as she was not in the KLA. Such a perception prevails not only regarding the KLA, but also regarding any evaluation of their actions (Luci, 2014). 143 part of Serbia. It selectively undermines the aims and character of nonviolent civil resistance in the Albanian struggle. All the participants in parallel structures, such as teachers, medical doctors, protesting students, females and LDK supporters are marginalised in favour of the armed struggle for nationhood led by the KLA. Its legacy as commemorated overlaps with the birth of the “new Kosovo”, and its members occupy the structures of this new Kosovo. No space has been left for alternative perspectives on the Albanian struggle that do not entirely comply with mainstream thinking (Strapacova, 2016, p. 62). As Harvey has argued, the meaning of the past is continuously rewritten according to the present circumstances to serve the political purpose, which is currently to support an idea of the state that will legitimise the position of current elites in power (Harvey, 2001, p. 326).

The heroes praised by current Kosovar society present obvious examples of what prototype characters are desired and approved by the society – persevering men and passive, silently accepting women. A clear message was sent by naming the Kosovo International Airport after Adem Jashari instead of Mother Theresa. Regardless of the different aspects of this change, the name of the woman who devoted her life to helping the poorest of the poor was changed for a name closely connected with the violent fight for Kosovo independence, which is emphasised as the most crucial part of the struggle. Such an interpretation sends a clear political message not only to Kosovo Albanians but also to all other minorities living in Kosovo, including Serbians, as well as people at the international level. Kosovo has thus followed the example of Croatia, which had also previously chosen to name an international airport after Franjo Tudjman, a recent figure who preferred to use hard power to achieve political goals and which emphasises the conflictual past instead of searching for cooperative opportunities.

The concept of “militant masculinity” has placed males in the role of decision-maker, violent warrior, the one capable of protecting his nation and country and the one respected for his valour. On the contrary, the woman is placed in the role of biological reproducer and nurturer of the nation. The engagement of women is seen within the context of helping and sacrificing submissively for the sake of the country. In accordance with this tradition of the region, women were presented by politicians and in the media as powerless victims and society still assigns this type of “accepting” status for them (Haider, 2017, p. 4).

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Regardless of legal gender equality on paper, in everyday life, women continue to live within the restrictions of a rigid, patriarchal society. Men have not only the final say in all main family matters, but also have primary access to all social and economic resources on behalf of the family. Such a situation reinforces women’s subordinate position and the cultural landscape of more traditional times are preserved. Consequently, women are kept in the privacy of family (per their traditional role), but even there the distinctive expression of her stances is unwanted. In public spheres the presence of women is strongly supported from external sources of the international community and the EU, but otherwise it remains marginalised regardless of the progressive legislation adopted to address gender inequality at the formal level.64 Even electoral quota mechanisms requiring 30% female candidates at the local and national level have not been able to guarantee change in an unreceptive society where opposite models are supported. The set number of women in the Assembly is not able to ensure any real impact on the level of governance (which is in Kosovo on average around 10%), though its existence has theoretically contributed to the increased participation of women in the decision-making process.

Although Kosovo has one of the most significant number of women deputies in the Assembly of Kosovo and its local assemblies among the countries of the Western Balkans, men still dominate the top level of Kosovo-Albanian political structures. Some have argued that international actors have fostered this form of discrimination by including only male representatives when dealing with significant political issues, justifying these actions by the traditional and patriarchal character of Kosovo (Haug, 2015, p. 156). Since Edita Tahiri has become the Minister for Dialogue, it may be possible to open the door to accelerating changes in cultural norms and stereotypes, which influence the society far more than quotas and other top-down approaches can in fact change. Alternatively, it could mean another manifestation of the effort to present Kosovo internationally as a modern, secular Europeanized state, while so far women are mostly engaged in activism on the level of the non-governmental sector, where they work to raise awareness about gender equality among domestic political leaders and civil society (Haider, 2017). However it is not possible to overlook animosity among the civil sector and both international actors and domestic institutions due to limited funding and

64 Besides the previously adopted Law on Gender Equality (2015), gender equality has been addressed in the Kosovo Constitution and the previous Law on Gender Equality (2004), other general laws such as Family Law and the Law on Inheritance, UNMIK Regulations and institutional mechanisms. 145 a lack of effort in implementing key legislation into the practice at the local level, including in rural areas.

Generally, Kosovo’s women’s rights advocates have lost the support of political leadership over time, as there was no longer any need for the narrative of “the suffering woman” to strengthen the national cause, and they became a threat, so they were undermined by a public opinion campaign (Di Lellio, 2016).

All main configurations of women’s structural oppression constructing complex webs of devastating dependency rooted in cultural norms that linking the social value of women to men. Women in Kosovo are equal on paper, 65 but the reality, in contrast, is often bleak (Kushi, 2015). The gender factor plays a vital role, as half of the diaspora population is to some extent discouraged to even consider a return to Kosovo, not only due to a lack of economic opportunities, but also due to the specific position they have – as females in the society and on the employment market. Their previous education and skills would have a limited chance to be used, as there are clear expectations, which would not allow women to focus on their career to the same extent. Not only are women automatically expected to provide care for the family, but also it is impossible to search for help in this task, which puts the female population under enormous pressure.

One example of such a situation occurs when young women are discouraged from setting up a business, not because of weak points in their business plan or possibly limited experience, but because of their gender – all possibly valid reasons are outweighed by this single consideration. This limitation is connected to the appropriate role of women in the society and historical tradition not allowing them to own property (as mentioned above, only 15% of property in Kosovo is owned by women) or run a business (only 6% of businesses in Kosovo are owned by women). Thus, the freedom to set up a business without depending on male decision-making and management becomes impossible as their current (limited) experience in the labour market and (in rare cases) of asset ownership limits their access to take out loans and even start to participate in most entrepreneurial activities (Kushi, 2015).

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“Since I have been in Kosovo for almost one more year, I am considering setting up a small business...There is demand, which at the moment without any supply; however, we are discouraged by the business environment on the one side and from another side by our community because we are two females [her and her business partner]. Family and friends discourage us, because as girls we have no chance to be taken seriously” (Iliriana Interview, 2015).

The abovementioned traditional cultural division of the roles in society brings many challenges for the diaspora, whether they are returning or only visiting Kosovo. The cultural pattern requires particular behaviour to follow the conservative societal setting and stereotypical gender roles not only in the public but also within the family circle.

Women are expected to keep their vital traditional role vis-à-vis the family and morals with a primordial certainty that this is the “right” way to live, and to take their responsibilities over at a relatively young age. The final change comes with the wedding, as the wife traditionally becomes a member of her husband’s family; while still following all the same rules of following and obeying her father, this role is merely transferred to her husband.

“There were various misunderstandings and smaller or bigger problems regarding my return. I moved into my boyfriend’s parents’ house. It is not acceptable in the society unless the couple is married or at least engaged. Even my parents have asked me about that. I do not want to get engaged, because everybody is so much expecting that it seems basically required. I cannot see myself making such a decision. Furthermore, after the wedding, the bride almost becomes the housekeeper of her husband’s family technically as well. [On the other hand, it was even less acceptable for an unmarried girl to live alone or with friends.] “I have a fundamental problem with all the expectations of my behaviour in the family circle which are based on the fact that I am a woman. Things that I should and should not do have been set for a long time by traditions – serving guests when they come, questions of morality and everyday customs, which do not ask for my opinion. It is very contradictory to the attitude I brought from Germany… I do not want to just take care of the family and provide them with service around the house. We have both the same two hands [her and her boyfriend], we are both able to take care of the same job at home or outside. I sometimes consider breaking up with him after all this time, because I question if I would be able to bear all these expectations. On

147 the other hand, I cannot imagine I would live with a German, who would not understand Albanian language and culture at all” (Hana Interview, 2015).

“I do not understand, why I should pay the price for not being born in the USA for my whole life, by listening to all the rules set for my life, even though I have lived there my whole life… I do not want to follow the Kosovo tradition of an official engagement and a wedding a year after just because it is supposed to be done that way. I especially do not like the way it is done here, without a proposal, as is normal in the USA. Furthermore, we have already lived together for almost four years without parents knowing, so what approval from their side is really necessary?” (Albana Interview, 2015).

Respondents similarly describe the consequences of the traditional patriarchal society that have been applied to them in the broader family environment. Resistance or making a change became almost impossible. Since I stayed in contact with respondents after the interview, I could verify words with what happened. Both young students got married within a year of their graduation, without any clear explanation of what changed their opinion to ultimately follow the required Kosovo tradition, other than that it would be easier for their life. Thus with minor adjustments at the level of the couple (the proposal actually took place), in contrast to Albanian tradition, the rest of the ceremonial events happened according to the traditions of the society within the year after the proposal, with a daughter coming soon after, and hope that in their own family they would be able to decide more about their own life direction.

The different role of daughters and sons is quite easily possible to demonstrate in the different understanding of the return on the side of male population, which is only influenced by the economic consequences between the host country and Kosovo.

“For me, it was straightforward to adjust to Kosovo when I returned. On the other hand, my sister and cousins (girls) see the situation much differently. Since they grew up in the USA, they cannot adjust to the society easily... As for men, for me, it is much easier to live in both societies. The expectations about me does not vary based on where I am. There are no local rules limiting if I can go out and with whom. I know that for girls these expectations are very

148 different. I do not know why, but maybe because this society is quite protective and male- oriented” (Besim Interview, 2015).

Further emotional and family issues arising from the conflict between the new culture in the host country and traditions that may be sometimes bit taken out of the context was mentioned by a young respondent whose family relations have been influenced by the traditional gender differentiation between the roles played by son and daughter, and also the order in which they were born. The insistence on the original differentiation is proven to work in previous experiences of generations and has allowed them to manage various challenges in the past successfully. As such, the family follows a verified model based on selected elements of shared cultural rules and values which remain alive in a different context for future generations as well.

“I feel the very different roles of daughters and sons in Albanian culture. It is very sick to judge a person and make her life predestined based on her gender. It is harrowing to experience. I once offered my mother that as she aged, she could certainly stay with me and I would take care of her. However, based on Albanian traditions, the youngest son is obliged to take care of parents. Then, my mother responded that my brother (a little baby at that time) would take care of her – as tradition dictates. It is harrowing to see in an everyday situation that it does not matter what relationships we have but what the traditions say about it” (Albana, Interview, 2015).

Regardless of the change of location and economic situation that initially required such a system, social organisation keeps personal attachment to ethnic identity. An almost childish clash about parents’ sympathies gains utterly different perspective when evaluated in conditions in which one are born with obligations that are almost predestined, regarding the musts and requirements as well as regarding prohibitions and borders that are not allowed to be crossed. In cases in which these expectations are not fulfilled, or if they become incompatible with the roles acquired in the new society of the host country, the clash may become tense. Respondents gave examples of the situations when unmanageable differences are treated in secret or by dividing these two completely different lifestyles, which causes a vast discrepancy between the internally ascribed and externally attributed characters of their own identity.

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6.2 Diaspora Identity

The perception of “who I am for myself” and “where I see myself as a part of the society” can start to clash with the perception of my identity, which is ascribed to me. This could be considered a split among various aspect of individual and collective identity. The sense of self can also widely differentiated based on the conditions in which a person lives. Such a situation can much quickly arise when a person lives to a certain extent in two different countries with different cultural backgrounds, because one’s sense of self, together with his or her own ideas about ethnical, national and/or gender identity can quickly contradict expectations attached to individual social roles (Scott & Marshall, 2009, pp. 231-233).

“[I]t was quite natural to build an identity for the two different states, where I have been living. My “normal” world in Germany, where I go to school, have friends, more freedom to not considering carefully every word said. I have a future with many open opportunities. My second “summer” world in Kosovo, where I regularly come back to and where I love to see my family… however, the emerging limitations were getting to be too much. You cannot freely move, not even think about speaking in an open way. I become extremely bored by being in Kosovo because you have to be so careful” (KB Interview, 2013),

After finishing her degree, this respondent did not return to Kosovo for several years to escape from a life bound strictly by the cultural rules applicable in the city her family is from. One very interesting aspect to note is that the rules regarding family members are to a certain extent only required based on the context in which the situations occur. So it seems that even people are culturally accepting of a different environment, even though they come themselves from the conservative environment of the smaller city.

“In Germany, I can behave freely in the society; I do not have to be careful about gossip about sharing a taxi with a male cousin, who may say whatever he wants about what happened between us, and potentially harm me and my family because he considers my independent approach inappropriate for women and want to punish me. It sounds ridiculous from the Western European perspective, but here it is an unbelievably big deal” (Kaltrina Interview, 2013).

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Thanks to the expert interviews, with professionals from Kosovo environment, I was also able to document examples of cases, where these differences in expectations within the family lead to the dissolution of romantic relationships or planned marriages because the wife-to-be did not demonstrate enough willingness to take care of the household. The most extreme was the cancellation of a wedding just a couple of months before the date it should have taken place, because of unacceptable obligations regarding the family for an educated, full-time working woman.

Similarly, in interviews with local Kosovo-Albanian men I have documented negative cases in which the in-laws share one house or live close by and are able to maintain the traditional division of roles and requirements. Because there were issues in perceptions for intergenerational perspectives on domestic arrangements in the case of young couples from Kosovo, it can be assumed that in cases where the husband’s family comes from Kosovo, while the wife has grown up in the diaspora, even more potential clashes in everyday roles as it is ascribed by the social circles can be found.

The challenge of combining the crucial role of the cultural identity and requirements for Kosovo Albanians into their everyday life and the importance which it is given in everyday life could be demonstrated by the family experience of one of the respondents:

“My grandparents were living in Germany at the time my parents migrated. My grandmother was from Slovenia, and my grandfather met her during the military service. They left to Germany together. My father was later sent to his uncle as a child to be raised in Kosovo to keep his attachment to its culture and traditions...” (Hana Interview, 2015).

Even though a parent may provide the knowledge and everyday experience of the culture to his or her child by one’s own example, there will always be other cultural aspects coming from the host country. In addition to possible economic reasons, which may be understandable but was never mentioned in the interviews in the case of raising a child in the foreign country without family support, the emphasis on the experiencing the culture in the country itself must be enormous. This is especially true when a connection with the culture and traditions to form the identity of the child is considered more important than the imminent

151 close connection with the child’s own parents and their presence in that child’s life. However, as previously mentioned, socialisation also involves constructing identity and a place in society through others who mediate an objective reality of the society, rendering its meaning so it may be internalised. Language is a critical tool in this process, and therefore it is interesting to evaluate what language was used at home in diaspora families and in which proportion (Berger and Luckman, 1967). Since multiple approaches to language in which families communicate at home exist, it seems that the critical role of language may suggest more about the potential clashes regarding the requirements of the cultural and ethnical identity traditions, and vice versa – the most natural interchanges between languages may imply more natural acceptance of both influences on the identity creation of the individual and easier understanding and sharing of the concepts with members of both groups.

“At home with my parents, we used to speak Albanian 55% of the time and German 45% of the time” (Hana, Interview 2015).

“I have only ever talked to my parents in English. Even if they have talked to me in Albanian, I always responded in English. Even today I do not speak fully Albanian. With my boyfriend, who is Albanian, we just speak English” (Albana Interview, 2015).

Many respondents mentioned that their parents saw the return of their children to Kosovo as an opportunity to get to better know their own country, culture and members of their extended family as the most significant advantage. Culture in the aforementioned narrower sense of political values, beliefs and mindset, builds on almost any collection habits among community. It helps to transmit social organisation and keep a sense of collective identity. In addition to visible symbols of group identity such as flags and monuments, oral traditions and the role of powerful tales provide testimony of the common identity’s roots.

In contrary, the disadvantage in returning to Kosovo to stay during the student age brings a lack of control over the behaviour of the child at the age of young adulthood, which is especially problematic in the case of daughters. As such, the choice between better understanding better one’s past and where one’s identity comes from, and the more options to gain additional future opportunities with a more prestigious university. According to theory, homeland orientation remains a crucial element of connectivity for the Kosovo Albanian

152 diaspora as well as a way to keep the cultural connection, which provides the roots for one’s own identity. Even if the returnee does not intend to permanently reside in the country, in the previously discussed expansion of Pristina airport and the incalculable numbers of people coming every summer by car, there is no doubt that the homeland orientation remains a constitutive element (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5).

“I returned to study in Kosovo, as my mom recommended me to go to improve my Albanian language skills and get to know better my broader family, culture and my country of origin… The return to Kosovo will be important international experience, which can help me later when I come back to the USA” (Besim Interview, 2015).

Another reason respondents often mentioned in regard to the temporary return of their classmates was to find a future partner for marriage in the Kosovo Albanian environment. None of the respondents mentioned that they themselves did this, but nobody denied this aspect. I did not find that the respondents considered a Kosovo-Albanian partner to be something they want to primarily avoid. Some of them had already mentioned that they came because of a romantic relationship with a Kosovo Albanian they had, and some of them even got married to that partner as soon as their studies were over. On the other hand, the respondent who refused to return regularly mentioned that the gender division in romantic relationships often practiced among Kosovo Albanians was unacceptable for her (Kaltrina Interview, 2013).

Even though they mentioned that some parents are more liberal in their approach and they would not mind that their child would have a partner who was not Kosovo Albanian, every parent would prefer if that was not the case. So-called “boundary maintenance” preserves the cultural character and distinctive identity to resist assimilation in the host country. This can be either deliberately enforced through endogamy and similar methods of self-segregation over generations by the community members toward children and family members, or become part of a form of reinforced self-censorship regarding the selection of a future spouse for various reasons (Brubaker, 2005, pp. 6-7).

Especially among girls, the tendency to remain in the family’s Kosovo Albanian tradition seems to be more visible. In cases where there is a mixed marriage in the family, they seem to

153 be more open to such a possibility. Furthermore, it is documented that the conservative approach to marrying members of other ethnic communities (not only Serbians) is traditional for Kosovo Albanians, even in comparison with Albanians from Albania.66

“For my parents, it would not be a problem if I would find a partner that would not be an Albanian. On the other hand, my parents are thrilled that my boyfriend, in fact, is Albanian” (Hana, Interview 2015).

Meanwhile, some men returning from the diaspora are themselves aware of the cultural and identity conflict that the return to Kosovo brings – requirements of the Kosovo traditions on their identity become far more tangible – others regard such a situation as a decisive factor for their own life. That reasoning offers space to consider this influence, which may be also impacted by the culture of the host country and how much gender equality comes as “natural” there.

“My parents are also from two different countries, so it does not matter even for them, where I decide to get married. The wife nevertheless to a certain extent follows her husband and adjusts to the situation. So for me, it doesn’t matter in which environment I will be exactly” (Naser, Interview 2015).

Not surprisingly, there are members of diaspora coming mostly from more conservative rural areas, where the customs are kept alive in a more rigid way:

“For my parents, it is more difficult to live in a mixture of more cultures, since they grew up in a different era, but they are still modern people from the city. They hope that I would marry an Albanian girl, but they let me choose myself. Once during the visit to Kosovo, we met a diaspora family of a friend I used to know from my time in Kosovo. They live in the USA, and her parents tried to arrange a marriage for us!! My mother disagreed with such a practice, but between families from villages, it is still quite common. If my wife were from a different community, I see that there might be problems in perspective of my culture and language” (Besim Interview, 2015).

66 Kosovo Albanians are a part of the Ghegs, one of the two major cultural and linguistic subgroups, which is less intermarried with non-Albanians than Tosks, were historically more subjected to foreign influence (Minahan, 2000, p. 29). 154

Furthermore, if family requirements do not meet expectations of the children, they often lead to disputes, which are mostly against the traditional hierarchy, or to hiding and searches for other ways to find a way around that set of rules.

“I was dating a German guy for over a year without my parents knowing. My dad would go nuts if he found out. They want me and my sister to get married to Albanians. I did not dare to tell them. I met him in secret, which became much easier when I went study to Luxembourg. I do not want to go to fight with my parents. It is complicated for me to live behind their back. Instead, I avoid needing a boyfriend, because I cannot stand the requirements Albanian boys have” (Kaltrina Interview, 2013).

It was also possible to document how the presence of the international mission with their members have influenced romantic relationships in Kosovo. However, with the strict societal and family rules, relationships with a non-Albanian girl are only for amusement, and such a relationship would not be acceptable for a girl in Albanian society, who is supposed to be married appropriately with respect to family honour. Such interethnic relationship may last long years without meeting the family, as they are a tolerated way of being entertained without too much attention. When the time for married life comes, the family is introduced to a Kosovo Albanian girl that respects traditional values and fulfils expectations (HK Interview, 2013). The places, where the internationals and locals meet, such as bars and clubs, are not the right place for any girl that wants to be considered “marriage material” for any of the local men present (Iliriana Interview, 2015). One of the most important attributes is to respect family honour, which has to be protected by the husband. The idea of creating an environment where such a quality is not needed as the society would be considered physically safe to the extent that mutual trust would be sufficient for standard interpersonal relations, and thereby allow women to flourish in other unique characteristics and skills they have, is still very utopian.

Women are socialised in the name of cultural tradition to respect family honour to the extent that they suffer in excruciating personal shame – even for criminal acts committed by men against them – to protect a male relative’s honour. A woman, in fact, damages her family if

155 she denounces her abuser publically. The cultural norm places the shame on her, who dared to speak about her own suffering, instead of on the perpetrator of the violence.

A powerful example of this is a few women who in fact dared to speak publically about their trauma of war rape, and subsequently brought immense humiliation not only to their families, but even to complete villages and possibly to ethnic Albanians as a whole. Regardless of the estimation that 20,000 women were raped during the Kosovo war, and many cases were documented, (HRW, 2001) the EULEX prosecution led only two court cases, as victims often do not dare to speak up. Because of it tarnishes the honour of the male in the family in particular, sexual violence is perceived as a fate worse than death for women in society.67 The issue ultimately disappeared from public discourse after the war and is only slowly starting to reappear after a phase of denial among the public about the violent experience itself and the way victims were traumatised by having to keep silent and regard it as a private matter (Di Lellio, 2016). The case of domestic violence follows the same pattern, often even considered to be a regular part of the marriage (Kushi, 2015). A recent UNICEF survey has indicated that Kosovo women have a high tolerance of male physical violence even in comparison to neighbouring countries. The primary cause of domestic violence is seen as the unemployment rate, which has led to the severe social and economic situation. One-third of women were willing to justify a man’s right to beat his own wife because she leaves home without telling her husband, neglects the children, has a verbal disagreement, burns the food or refuses to have intercourse. In the case of other missteps, such as inadequate care of the household, cleanliness and caring for husbands’ parents, or daring to decide for the family without consulting the husband, over 42% of respondents were willing to tolerate violence toward the wife (BIRN, 2015). Continuous silence regarding women from outsiders as well as from within the family circle went alongside reproduction of stereotypical gender roles, with men responsible for policing behaviour and women for upholding social mores (Di Lellio, 2016).

67 Even the husband and family often abandon a victim once they learn about her rape. One victim gave secret testimony that she has hidden her painful secret from her husband for 15 years because he told he told her that rape would dishonour the family and he threatened her with torture and abandonment multiple times if she were ever touched by a Serb (Zejnali, 2014). 156

“I will search for my future partner within the Albanian community. I think he will understand me better. On the other hand, a Kosovo Albanian from Kosovo would not marry me, as I am not submissive and do not easily obey without additional questions. I have a better education than most of the men in Kosovo, which does not make the situation easier, and I grew up in a society which is very egalitarian. So nobody from Kosovo would choose to marry me, as I would not accept orders” (Iliriana interview, 2015).

Huge expectations regarding the future spouse only demonstrate how the established cultural rules have influenced the way individual identity is shaped in everyday life. All female members of the diaspora who got married during the period of my research have a husband that has foreign experience or to certain extent at least education to bridge their values, openness and flexibility. Meanwhile the previously presented data indicates that it is quite common that men from the diaspora come back to find a wife of the same origin in the home country to maintain family values and the cultural connection.

Some respondents mentioned that to a certain extent, they have a mixture of both cultural experiences of home and the host country, and there is no conflict between their identities as they perceive it in the host or home country.

“Home is where I rest and relax, now it is in the USA because I study in Kosovo. However, Kosovo is closer to my heart, because I was born here. I feel fully accepted in the USA. I like the culture but it is not that easy for my parents, who grew up in Kosovo.” (Besim Interview, 2015)

On the other hand, most of the other respondents mentioned clashes of various extent within the character of their identity existing in the host country, as they did not like it or they did not feel welcome because of their ethnic identity/origin and cultural differences. The partial or even total exclusion or marginalisation of the diaspora members from the side of host society leads them to believe that they cannot be fully accepted and that makes them feel somewhat alienated and insulated from majority society. Such consequences affect the desire to return to the homeland as well. Regardless of their relationship to the common myth of the true ideal ancestral homeland, return is seen as a better solution for their own happiness and that of their descendants. This situation very much influences the overall experience of the country and,

157 for them, how a person has not accepted the local customs and values – these values and customs embodied many of the difficulties respondents faced during their stay.

“[H]ome was always implicitly in Kosovo. It leads to an identity crisis if you are seen as the different one. Based on your different language, name, prejudices of your differences, which make you stand aside the rest of the society” (Avenda Interview, 2015).

The advantage of being enriched by the presence and cohabitation of both cultures remained significant, while openness and acknowledgement of the complexity of the individual experience and character as still being a Kosovo Albanian sharing the same identity was expressed differently.

“As a daughter of Kosovo Albanians I faced a strong identity split if I am more “Albanian” or “German”. I felt more at home in Kosovo than in Germany, where I was to a certain extent not accepted as all the others because of being different – an Albanian from Kosovo. I feel more Albanian, but my customs and traditions are based on the positive influences and perceptions of both cultures.” (Hana Interview, 2015).

The clashes with the cultural requirements emerging from Albanian values can also complicate integration into the host society when the differences raise additional questions. Furthermore, limited participation in the customs, events and traditions of the majority society ostracise members of the diaspora from the majority society and only permit them to build closer relations inside the same ethnic community.

“From my time in kindergarten I have introduced myself with the English version of my name. Anne is my identity; it is a name I took as it allowed me to integrate quickly, without revealing where I came from. It was a way to escape from many questions about my origin, and I felt better…. My refusal of even part of Albanian identity hurt my parents. Inside I felt that American children have different parents, which support them differently and I miss that a lot” (Albana Interview, 2015).

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When the new environment is presents very different inputs, the culture bounds may face a clash of values, which could call into question belonging to that identity group solely because of the requirements each member of the respective society is supposed to live their lives.

“Germany is my home. I can be fully who I am and do what I do what I want. Since the rules in the society are equally set, I do not have to be afraid – and my parents are not worried about harming the family and my name when I go out or put myself at risk somehow. I also have the chance to become a bit more than a wife and mother if I want to. There is nothing bad about being married and have children, but at my age (24) my family in Kosovo is already asking when I am going to get married, as that is the only purpose of my existence – to take care of my husband and children. For my parents, it is automatic that I would want to graduate first. However, I want also to get working experience, travel the world and build my career. Such dreams are unacceptable for an obedient wife” (Kaltrina Interview, 2013).

Most of the respondents describe interest about the political situation in Kosovo as a national hobby for inhabitants of the youngest European state. The struggle to have its unilateral proclamation of independence recognised gained even more supporters because of the effort, which had cost many lives even among people not very focused on political development. This is an essential part of their collective memory, which has remained tied to the social, historical and political forces transmitted through state institutions, and tied to the cultural connection, which serves to build an identity. These processes start early, when children learn about historical figures, songs and stories, and ceremonies which blend mythical idealisation with the “real”. All these rituals produce narratives and structures that solidify the community’s roots, ideological cohesion and the sense of belonging. Memory always functions within a particular environment. Moreover, for members of the diaspora, an additional influence remains from the host country, which may have a different priority and extent (Chaitin, 2012, p. 151).

“I feel more at home in Kosovo than I have ever felt in Germany. In a football [soccer] match between Kosovo and Germany, I would root for Kosovo to win… because for Kosovo, far more effort has been given to be able to represent their own country” (Arben Interview, 2015).

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Sports bonds are one of the ordinary life practices in society, which are humanly constructed social elements that hold the community together. Starting from the individual level, of being aware of one’s own position in the society, through the local level of practising its community identity, up to the international level, where the power of these connections can be harnessed to demonstrate persistence against problematic situations. Such examples of impressive cooperation serve to offset the continually repeating stories of war, conflict and disputes in the media, and to demonstrate how successful ordinary life of the community could be together. In football or other sports, the star embodies the struggle of the entire nation to keep their identity in a historically very challenging region68. This bond, which members of the diaspora also participate in, supports a goal of proudly maintaining one’s own identity at the international level (Rees 2017, p. 103). Sports in this regard are useful tools for the political management of identity and its public presentation, which is successfully used to achieve critical strategic goals including legitimacy, territorial integrity, international recognition and citizens’ commitment. The instrumental potential of sports promotes a sense of national identity as political leaders use its unifying power to adapt the mythology and the symbolism of the ethnic community to help in achieving their objectives. In the case of an independent Kosovo, sports help to sharpen the sense of reestablishing national identity abroad, including among numerous diaspora members, with what is known as “wilful nostalgia” (Houlihan, 1997, p. 113).69 Football serves as an additional symbol of national identity, as this sport is very popular in the region, and to compete in football is to provide a global arena for the expression of Kosovo Albanian identity, which also strengthens the links between Kosovo and Kosovars abroad. The broadening of the base for Kosovo sports-based nationalism has been reflected in and encouraged by public policy, which has persistently strived to ensure the presence of a national Kosovo team in UEFA, FIFA and the Olympic Games (member in all above-mentioned since 2016).

Another, more specific way of participation – the right to actively vote in elections – is not something mentioned among the young Kosovo Albanians from the diaspora, who for various legal or personal reasons only have a passport from their host country. Political connection is instead evaluated in personal terms, as a limitation preventing them from qualifying for

68 Nowdays a clear example of this can be seen in the role of FC Barcelona in support of the Catalan movement for independence, while it had previously had important role in integrating immigrants coming to the region with common values and standards. 69 Geertz goes so far to argue that sports as a collectively sustained symbolic structure is a powerful metaphor which reveals the most deep seated values of culture (Geertz 1972). 160 development study programs that allow Kosovo students to participate in scholarship grants for Western universities. These programs only allow holders of Kosovo passports to participate, which, contrastingly, is not a requirement for job positions in the Kosovo governmental administration. On the other hand, foreign passports often allow those in the diaspora to travel more easily, including to lands other than their host country, in comparison with the holders of the Kosovo passport.

“I do not want to stay in Kosovo at the moment. I am here at home, as I am also in Germany. Moreover, I want to study abroad in the UK or Switzerland. The possibility of the USA would be amazing. However, I cannot use the program for Kosovo students as I do not hold Kosovo- Albanian citizenship” (Hana Interview, 2015).

“I have two citizenships and I keep both passports – Belgian and Kosovo – also for my children and husband. If the situation in Kosovo were to become critical, we can return as citizens of the EU and leave Kosovo to be safe. My kids can decide to study in one of the European countries. It was not a long time ago that Kosovo experience war, and the previous war showed us that to search for security abroad was necessary to keep all family members safe” (Avenda Interview, 2015).

This connotation also retains some security aspects. In addition to a security connection regarding Kosovo, the possible future of either remaining in the host country or returning there after a period spent in Kosovo corresponds with the transnational status of diaspora members as people living in two or more states (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc, 1994).

One reason that was often articulated for remaining permanently in the host country is a functioning system of government that provides the services of the state in good quality together with better financial possibilities for finding an appropriate job opportunity.

“I would like my children to have the same opportunity as I got growing up in Germany. I would like to give them something better. An education system that not only asks them to memorise irrelevant facts by heart, but teaches them analytical thinking. There are also not adequate employment opportunities in the job market, an insufficient level of education in

161 social sciences such as psychology or sociology, as well as in technical production. If I were to receive an interesting job offer, I would consider staying in Kosovo” (Hana Interview, 2015).

Alternatively, a return to the host country is perceived as a problematic situation, where adjusting to new conditions is not comfortable, and reasonable concerns exist about why some people would prefer not to do it again and would prefer to stay in Kosovo, because of various feelings of not being welcome or accepted due to their cultural differences.

“I do not want them (children) to experience problems in their life in a country, where they are a lonely minority and do not have their family with them… My future and the future of my children is in Kosovo, which was for a long period oppressed and only recently has started to work on its opportunity to build a fully functioning state” (Avenda Interview, 2015).

6.3 Relations Vis-à-vis the Serbian Minority and Serbia

Ethnicity as a component of the identity profile remains in Kosovo, which is still recovering from the ethnic conflict that the country experienced in the 1990s, and it continues to divide the society. Collective identity played a crucial role in the outbreak of the conflict because of a decisive function it had in the social learning process, actively redefining the reality shared by antagonistic identities and remaking the belief systems that had motivated past violence (Strapacova, 2016, p. 58). In many ways relations toward the Serbian minority are still a burden limiting a critical perspective toward the Kosovo state; the protracted struggle over a final decision over the country’s status still overshadows many real challenges of its functional existence. Furthermore, the negative impact of the Serbians’ disapproval of the independence proclamations are often an obstacle for free decisions at the international level.

“Independence is already a huge stop up front. If it were possible to execute it without limitations and obstacles from the side of Serbia, then Kosovo could fully start developing its potential” (Avenda Interview, 2015).

Indeed, the “execution” of interdependence is still limited, and responsibility is seen to be on the side of Serbia, while many internal issues continue to remain unchallenged. In the aftermath of ethnic conflict, collective memory tends to deal in self-justifying stereotypes that 162 exclude alternate perspectives. This has resulted in continued demands for the punishment of Serb wrongdoing, but no discussion of rehabilitating innocent people. Ethnically motivated violence is perceived one-sidedly. Its anonymity feeds the self-image of Albanians as collectively traumatised victims. Individuals and communities are seen as having limited culpability for their actions, as is visible in the tolerance Kosovo Albanians show to members of their community who violated the human rights of minorities, particularly of Serbs. The blind refusal to admit that ethnic Albanians have committed any crimes and the attempts made to justify revenge are complemented by demands that the other side acknowledges its wrongs and apologise first70 (Strapacova, 2016, p. 7).

“I have Serbian friends from my university, and I do not have anything personal against them. On the other hand, my Albanian friend lost his father, when Serbs killed him in front of his eyes. I understand that he hates Serbs because for what happened to him and his family” (Naser Interview, 2015).

Bringing about the depoliticisation of war crimes in an effort to cauterise the reaffirmation of ethnic divisions within Kosovo society is a goal that has not been achievable at the national or international level. Moreover, it is almost impossible to carry out when confronting the individual experiences of families who were direct victims of war atrocities. The individual loss of family members are the most sensitive situations, which are often used as a justification for a request of collective responsibility and it is a challenge to address it in an acceptable way that would not offended the survivors However, the accused should receive a fair trial, regardless of ethnicity, and their indictment should not be considered a collective insult that amounts to unjust treatment of the entire ethnic group. Taking personal responsibility does not amount to justifying the actions of the other side (Strapacova, 2016, p. 7).

The vast majority of Albanians think it is vital that justice is obtained for all victims and that all perpetrators are punished. However, 70% of respondents also disagree with the notion that all perpetrators of war crimes are criminals regardless of their nationality or the nationality of

70 Once comment by Xhaver Veliu, whose son was captured and killed by Serbian forces, for Balkan Insight demonstrates an example of the reason why he believes that Serbs have to make the first move toward reconciliation by admitting guilt and saying sorry. “I cannot forgive unless Serbia apologizes and all the perpetrators are brought to justice” (Peci, 2013). 163 their victims. The figure holds on both sides of the ethnic divide and is identical to the percentage obtained in an earlier survey in 2007. It is buttressed by the finding that only 30% of Serbs and 13.2% of Albanians admit that members of their ethnicity have committed war crimes. The Albanian majority’s repudiation of blame has likewise stifled any willingness on the part of the Serbs, still universally cast as the culprits, to acknowledge their own guilt (UNDP, 2012, pp. 7-8, 46-50).

“I cannot consider the critique of excessive positive discrimination of minorities as an exaggeration. In cases where the majority society faces such economic hardship, it is not fair to support them and leave the majority without any help, especially if they can still also use the additional source of support from Serbia” (Naser Interview, 2015).

“Serbs in Kosovo are getting much more support then Albanians, who suffered during their previous regime and the war. Serbs got much more support from the state and internationals too. They are building them houses, but they are still not coming back here. It is a ghost town. [Referring to a project of building a village for Serbs close to Pristina,] there was nothing similarly organised for Albanians. Serbs themselves sold their apartments, which they initially received after they were taken from Albanians…. What else do they want? They have so many rights guaranteed in the Constitution, like seats in the Assembly, bilingualism... which Albanians never previously had, regardless of being the majority in Kosovo! They only need to accept that they are a minority in Kosovo, as they also were before the war. They only had access to power which was overused against Albanians to harm them. Like they are doing nowadays in Macedonia: They are getting rent from Serbia as well, they are using all possible advantages” (Fatmir Interview, 2015).

Even among members of diaspora, it is challenging to accept the turn of Kosovo Albanians to the majority society with access to the power and control over the resources of Kosovo without mentioning the previous grievances, which have not been resolved. Furthermore, the critique of unimplemented and unenforced rule of law in everyday access to career opportunities, care and services is an obstacle for everyone, and therefore in the case of the Serbian minority, differences between the de jure and de facto situation are seen as secondary. The limited impact of legislation is not considered a valid argument, as such situations prevail

164 in many other areas as well. Therefore, the situation is not perceived to be any worse simply because they are from the minority community in Kosovo, as this still is compared with how Serbs treated the Albanians – even though they were majority population before the war.

“The security situation in Kosovo has greatly improved. There is no immense risk toward Serbs in Kosovo…. In strict contrast to the huge danger that it poses for an Albanian to go to northern Kosovo, where Serbs are in the majority. There is no hatred from the Albanian side toward Serbs” (Avenda Interview, 2015).

Most of these expressions are in line with mainstream Albanian opinion, as the intergroup reconciliation process has still a long way to go to even start addressing the unresolved issues of opposition and grievances that may fuel intensified activity, and painful memories; in the worst case, the scenario may foster a future resurgence of conflict (Strapacova, 2016, p. 60).

“I think that relations toward Serbs are quite open from Albanian side. I do not get their overreaction over certain situations. I do not think that they are really in danger in Kosovo about something serious possibly happening to them. It is not fair that a huge amount of money is paid to arrange private transportation of Serbian students from Serbian villages that are covered by a scholarship to study but not live in Pristina. It is not needed at all…. It is an exaggeration, when my classmate, who is Serbian, did not come to school for a week because he was afraid, after the football match of Serbia versus Albania, which got a bit out of hand [referring to match of 14 October 2014 in Belgrade). All these strong words from the mouth of individuals need to be taken as pub bluster rather than truly serious treats. Serbs are exaggerating quite a bit” (Iliriana Interview, 2015).

This statement claims that most of the harsh words addressed to the Serbian population should not be taken seriously, even while the respondent herself, during the group task focused on developing a solution for the situation in North Kosovo, contributed to the discussion with loud calls to “send Serbs back to Serbia, where they came from, as what is ours [Kosovo Albanians’] must remain in our hands because the territory is not theirs” (Iliriana observations, 2015). It is quite difficult to quantify just how such outbursts influence minority groups, whose members live surrounded by a majority society that is apparently against their presence and demands radical solutions, and how such experiences are still not wholly

165 forgotten as a consequence of previous war experiences. There is often also a lack of any sign of empathy toward the experiences of the other community, which may indeed mirror some of the experiences of the civil population living alongside similar political machinery on the Albanian side.

Even though the improvement of the security situation is visible, and few people can imagine a reignition of the conflict, society remains deeply divided. A more open approach acknowledging the more complex experience of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs is rare. Other members of diaspora presented a more considerate approach, though it is a somewhat minority opinion, which would not significantly influence prevailing opinions.

“I do not have any problem with Serbs. It is necessary to accept all the events that happened in the 1990s with the context in which they occurred. It is not possible to judge everyone only based on his or her ethnicity. I know that I can say it only because I am not personally involved in what happened in Kosovo, and I can look at the situation with the distance from of all the atrocities that happened in Kosovo. However, real history can be evaluated only with such a step back. I think that if there had been a different political leader in power than Milosević, the whole of the 90s could have happened in peaceful ways” (Albana Interview, 2015).

The official perspective presents a strictly black and white picture of the collective past, which allows no doubt about who was the good guy and who was the bad guy, and it was solely based on ethnicity. Since the KLA’s legacy has become synonymous with heroic sacrifice, it is difficult to abandon the image of a homogenous collection of Serbs as perpetrators and an equally homogenous Albanian collection of victims. Any accusation of war crimes against any former KLA members as well as challenging the public acceptance of the collective responsibility of Serbs, therefore, is seen as a common assault on those who embody every noble value (Balkan Insight, 2013).

Even though diaspora members may be able to approach the relations toward Serbians and see Serbia as a part of bigger and more complex picture, just like in many another aspects of the newly built vision of Kosovo, their attitude is barely able to change anything, especially as themselves are self-censoring and not critically oppose the generally accepted perspectives on

166 live alongside with Serbia; in general, voicing such a negative opinion would be disrespectful and taken personally with respect to survivors and victims on the Albanian side. Even though the formal dialogue with Serbia has not yet been finalised, many questions regarding the independence of Kosovo are not seen as directly endangered at the moment. On the other hand, the role of reconciliation within society is also not seen to be something that needs to be addressed for future political stability and development of Kosovo.

6.4 The Social and Economic Environment

Along with strengthening political governance, improving economic conditions are crucial for diaspora members when evaluating the circumstances in Kosovo as a potential place for temporary or permanent return, as the security situation of the Kosovo state is mostly considered satisfactory to the extent that it is not seen as risky for the future. Still, even though ongoing dialogue with Serbia is addressing significant issues, no one connected this process with the immediate security situation.

“I see great improvements in Kosovo, economic development and infrastructure are improving slowly, but steadily it can grow. I do not follow politics very closely though. I do not think Kosovo is in danger of reopening the conflict with Serbia. I think the situation is very different and calmer than it was before the conflict” (Arben Interview, 2015).

As previously mentioned, economic and social reconstruction must address the fundamental needs of the population, but must also ensure that the education system and the governmental safety net have to be prepared to support future development. The lack of work opportunities is seen as a vital material obstacle for people to come back or stay permanently in Kosovo. The high unemployment rate, especially among young and vulnerable groups as women and minorities, also strongly influence the diaspora’s perspective on a future in Kosovo. Return is almost in every case conditioned with an adequate job offer coming from mostly international vacancies or government institutions, as the private sector is not currently seen to be solvent enough to offer such an opportunity.

“I cannot imagine living in this economic situation. I am not willing to work for 100 EUR per week. If this changes, I would stay here. I recommended to my parents to buy apartment in Kosovo. Thanks to the development, I expect that prices in Kosovo will grow and it could be a good investment. My parents could return here for their pension. With their income around 167

1000 USD per person per month, their life in Kosovo would be very comfortable” (Besim Interview, 2015).

Unlike the diaspora members who grew up in Kosovo themselves, is the upcoming generation is not as emotionally bonded as those members of their parents’ generation. As such, they are more critical regarding their life expectations, and their perspective has tended to become more individual and economic. A possible return therefore has to be seen as a mutually beneficial project, not only an altruistic commitment; this can bring about huge disappointment due to limited chances to influence the process (Robelli, 2014).

Due to the existing connection, Kosovo is seen instead as a location for vacation, which also creates opportunities to meet members of the extended family. However, the lack transparency in such a system has an influence on many diaspora members, who do not want to become dependent on it; they are critically aware that the effectiveness of such a system is not always reliable.

“The situation when I returned to Kosovo was complicated. It is challenging for me to live along with the traditions and customs that are considered very normal here, and your relatives expecting them from you as well. I really want to maintain the customs and professional behaviour; I am used to being from Germany… unjustified lateness drives me crazy. On the other hand, I got very used to open demonstrations of respect toward older generations, such as letting them sit down in the bus instead of you… The first year I was doing everything as I was used to in Germany. I was taking the bus only at the bus station, even though here it is widespread that you wave to the bus driver regardless of where you stand. It is more comfortable. However, you become dependent on knowing the right people to arrange what you need – the system is not transparent and fair to everyone…. such as the visit of the doctor without an appointment… because you know the right person to skip the line and be seen on that day without previous arrangements. I was trying to resist in situations where I had my ethnical doubts about the circumstances… However, the life here is a bit with whom you stay, you will yourself become! (Hana Interview, 2015).”

The limited amount of opportunity is exacerbated by the local education system, which does not provide the same level of education relative to Western standards. In addition to this

168 crucial impediment for Kosovo’s future development, the lack of travel also influences the outlook of the youth when entering a job market. Consequently, their knowledge and skills do not have the same level of quality and they lack comparable practical experience as well as an “international” perspective.

“To grow up in Kosovo is to be in a kind of aquarium, which you cannot leave to travel. In addition the visa policy, you generally have insufficient financial resources to get to know what is outside, even much later” (Arben Interview, 2015).

The lack of human resources could be covered by bringing back highly skilled and educated experts with international experience from the diaspora, and by supporting valuable “brain gain” processes facilitated by diaspora members.

“I am lucky that I could grow up in Germany… in an education system that not only asks students to memorise irrelevant facts by heart, but teaches them analytical thinking… I could get better ideas and opportunities for my future life. The most significant thing is the better level of the public education, which opens up many options in the future” (Hana Interview, 2015).

However, they are discouraged by obstacles having the aforementioned economic and political character, which are not limited to those in the diaspora. Other problems for Kosovo’s future development are seen in the lack of transparency and the rule of law; this eliminates most chances to create trust toward the government and its administration, as well as other public and private services.

“A crucial problem is corruption and employment. As a prospective employee, the lack of structure makes it impossible to find transparency when searching for a job. Family links and contacts via friends are the crucial difference, which often decides who will be accepted. Experience, seniority, skills – these are ignored” (Avenda Interview, 2015).

It is the employment market that most clearly demonstrates immature level and limited functions of Kosovo state, which can barely ever prevent circumventing the rules and enforce them to secure the rights of citizens. In light of the previously mentioned reasons regarding

169 the lack of trust in the system, it is not very surprising that participation in elections process is not perceived as a way to change anything in the development process of Kosovo. Overall interest in elections is quite low, and enthusiastic interest has only registered among particular activists who have themselves remained politically active. Nevertheless, the number of registered diaspora voters rose last year’s (2017) elections by 2,000 voters compared to the 2014 turnout. The total of 15,118 applications, of which 5,236 were rejected for various reasons is still not a particularly impressive number considering the estimated numbers of Kosovo diaspora members. On the other hand, participation is limited to holders of a Kosovo passport, and the complicated application process they had to complete for this purpose (Halili, 2017).

“I do not follow the political situation in Kosovo. I’ve lived here [in Kosovo] for three years at the moment. However, I learn about main things only because other people talk about it” (Albana Interview, 2015).

Not following political developments and taking information mostly from others who talk about it is a very unreliable source, which prevents respondents from developing a more critical perspective of the situation and from possibly challenging some otherwise automatically accepted conclusions.

6.5 The Political Consequences of Diaspora Perceptions

Kosovo has proudly displayed the importance of the diaspora in the country’s struggle for independence as well as in the following processes of post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding. The extraordinary numbers of financial resources and other means of indirect assistance that diaspora members remit every year are often mentioned together with the potential developments of brain gain and public diplomacy as ways the image of Europe’s youngest country are improving. On the other hand, manual workers supporting their families in Kosovo are in mostly ignored in politicians’ statements, even though demographic data indicates that they make up an essential part of diaspora members. The potential gains from the diaspora, emphasising the direct investment that is supposed to help rebuild Kosovo has gained near-legendary status. But how, exactly, should this “potential” of diaspora members, with their direct personal experience growing up in politically stable, developed states with

170 economic opportunities as well as functional educational and welfare systems, be harnessed? And how should it be brought back to support the development and flourishing of Kosovo? How are their unique experiences potentially able to make a positive impact on situation in Kosovo, which has chosen a future as an independent, modern, secular state with aspirations for EU and NATO membership? The current situation is deeply affected by persisting tensions between the traditional conservative image of the Albanian identity connected to the reality of the urban areas, where more than 60% of population lives, and aspirations to present an image of Kosovo internationally as a modern, secular European state. This is analogical to political attempts to selectively reinterpret the “traditionalisation of gender models and roles” in efforts by the LDK, led by Ibrahim Rugova, to justify the non-violent strategy toward Serbia employed in the 1990s (UNDP, 2014, p. 25). The newly introduced image of “the honourable man” stood in sharp contrast with the ancient tradition of the representation of masculinity in the form of blood feuds and avenging family honour in blood. Instead, the “honourable man” was rationalised through a nationalist discourse that called for forgiveness for the sake of a great family – that of the Kosovo nation. This perspective of Kosovo identity opened the door to reframing the traditional model of strong, uncompromising male warrior and replacing it with one more in line with modern European values. Nevertheless, with the rise of the KLA, the traditional masculine vision regained its importance and remained to become a key feature in building the identity of the new Kosovo nation in an independent state (Haug, 2015, pp. 152- 153). The identity-building process of the newly independent nation has chosen a clear direction regarding the features that are recalled, emphasised, praised and must remain respected. Such an uncompromising attitude, not allowing social discussion and openness, limits the options of diaspora members on how to address differences regarding expectations in their social roles and what characterises appropriate behaviour. While the abovementioned benefits are expected from the diaspora, criticism of the approach Kosovo has taken to development is not welcomed. Diaspora members can either accept the usual patterns of the behaviour, or their life would become quite complicated. Strong expectations start at the lowest level – the role of the individual within the family – which should show the proper level of respect for societal gender divisions and hierarchical courtesies. To a certain extent and especially in case of women, this is essentially the same as obedience. Criticism regarding these expectations and social norms can be perceived as an unpatriotic attack on shared

171 culture and identity as well as the Albanian way of life. Respect for one’s own parents usually makes it very difficult to get away from the usual social patterns. In light of the very close decisions made on the family level, it is even more challenging to bring sweeping changes to middle and higher levels of society. The politically shaped identity and culture shapes the rigid character of the society from the micro-level of the family to the macro-level of national and international politics. In turn, a paternalistic nesting of familial links have developed from these institutions, which traditionally are the most trusted. These links then ensure the needs of their members in a political environment, but comes at the expense of the state as a whole. Relying on the state or another administrative structure is not usual in Kosovo for obvious historical reasons. The political consequences of culture can influence decisions from the micro-level, where choices by family members are made. In such an environment, this affects how policies and law are displayed at the national and even international levels. In spite of enormous pressure from the EU to facilitate the acceptance of progressive policies and law, in the end, the character of the environment, mirrored at the local, national and even international level, casts these developments in an entirely different shade. One of the most recent examples can be seen in the situation regarding the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, which were formed under enormous international pressure via a change of the Constitution; this institution created an unprecedented judicial mechanism to deliver justice to the victims of the KLA (both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians), and to fight the culture of impunity that has been allowed to grow, which has entrenched organised crime and government unaccountability. Approval of the Law on the Special Chambers demonstrated a recognition from the highest political levels that the political environment in Kosovo had to deal with its skeletons in the closet if it wanted to open the door to reconciliation and address many related weak points of the Kosovo justice system. As the tribunals are currently established, it seems that at the highest political level personal interests have been put ahead of those of the future of the country as a whole, with political attempts to discredit and undermine the changes, and avoid addressing the connections of central political figures. These include the President, Hashim Thaçi71; Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj72; his

71 Thaçi was the political leader of the KLA. In the 2010 Council of Europe report that paved the way for the court to be set up, he was accused of being the leader of an organised crime ring dealing in the trafficking of human organs (Hopkins, 2018). 72 Ramush Haradinaj was the KLA commander in western Kosovo. He was twice acquitted by the ICTY, partly because witnesses were intimidated, either failing to testify or meeting a premature death (Hazan, 2018). 172 brother, Daut Haradinaj, who is also a Member of the Assembly73; and finally Assembly Speaker Kadri Veseli.74 All men are previously senior members of the KLA, who may be brought before the court (Hopkins, 2018).The main international partners of Kosovo, including the USA, UK, and Switzerland expressed their support for the Tribunal and warned against isolation, turning out future of Kosovo away from their previous political aspirations and development progress (Kostreci, 2017). The struggle over the Chambers will show how much it is possible to bend the official rules by the tradition of influential family clans, which the Haradinaj family represents. The dominance of material, family, clan and regional interest instead of national consciousness thus has allowed the prioritisation of the values put on family stability, as this is still the institutional guarantee for morality as well as assurance of basic needs (Rrustemi, 2016, p. 159).

To question KLA members, who symbolise the effort of liberating Kosovo from oppression, for suspected crimes is considered harmful, as it seen as revoking Kosovo’s independence not only for the KLA’s political role in the struggle for Kosovo independence, but also due to direct political interest in keeping the mantra of the KLA alive for own safety as accountability of specific political leaders may be questioned (Surk, 2018). As a result, Kosovo still has not yet made a convincing attempt to initiate a comprehensive process of dealing with the past and ended its use of the scapegoat of an internal enemy responsible for everything (Armakolas, eds., 2017, p. 271).

The missing role of public service, which would differentiate between the private interests of an individual as well as the members of his extended family, his friends and his acquaintances reflect a quotation about Kosovo politics, in which “Men dominate politics almost everywhere, but in Kosovo men own politics and guard the turf with such vehemence that a seat in parliament looks like private property” (Krasniqui, 2017).

Besides other problems, the rigid traditional approach, rooted in social expectations and the persistence of patriarchal values, including discriminatory attitudes toward women, has undermined progress in establishing and (especially) implementing legislative frameworks

73 Daut Haradinaj is currently facing charges for inciting hatred against Serbs because of his comments constituting hate speech about expelling Serbs from Kosovo, which he made when the extradition was requested, after his brother was arrested in France in January 2017 (Sovrlic, 2017). 74 Veseli was the commander of the KLA force’s intelligence service (Hopkins, 2018). 173 and, thus, Kosovo’s development as well. The choices that leading politicians make regarding the aspects of tradition they follow shows the influence of personal interests, which are mostly preferred over a more beneficial solution overall. Even though the number of women in the Assembly of Kosovo proudly is repeated, the real impact is doubtful. The Law on Gender Inequality adopted in 2015 follows a trend of progressive legislation that allows Kosovo to internationally present its progress in the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law and competitiveness. However, the lack of implementation is also very common. Neither governmental nor local level institutions75 respect the law that requires equal representation for each gender. Regardless of the role of legal instruments, there are other different factors that obstruct women’s political participation as well.

Large effects stream from the cultural and historical traditions of the society, which continue to influence the general mentality of compliant women appropriate for such a role and party clientelism, which consolidates men’s dominance of the major political parties in Kosovo. Furthermore, a lack of financial resources and family support in opposition to the traditional family responsibilities and elites controlled by men limit the channels for women to enter politics. As previously mentioned, traditional values do not support women’s political participation. The environment in which local political discourse is ordinary, such as odas rooms in traditional Albanian households, have typically been the domain of men (National Democratic Institute, 2015, p. 15). In a 2014 study, most respondents mentioned external reasons, such as the traditions of Kosovo and a business sector dominated by men, family pressures, and a lack of support from the state rather than internal ones, like personal choice, as reasons for staying away from politics. In contrast, education, skills and dedication are not seen as missing attributes in the case of a career. Geographical differences as well as differences among ethnic origin of women are also cited among the most significant indicators; women from the Kosovo-Serbian community as well as Albanian women from Gjilan have a more favourable perception of women in leadership positions than women from Prizren and Gjakova (UNDP, 2014, pp. 17, 19).

75 While at the national governmental level women represent 40.6% of employees, at the municipal level it is only 28%. Only North Mitrovica Municipality and, since February 2018, Kamenica Municipality, have respected calls for gender equality, while there are other municipalities with less than 10% of women in the administration (Kastrati, 2018). In senior positions, women represent 5.2% and leadership positions consist of 26.1% women at the national level. At the local level, 10.1% of the leadership positions were occupied by women (Kosovo Gender Studies Center, 2017, p. 29). 174

The role of the diaspora has evolved together with the changing experiences of its members and the character of the community on its own. The environment in Kosovo itself has reflected these changes; these observations are addressed more deeply in the first section of the concluding chapter, which elaborates on the findings of my research. Finally, the second section answers the research questions,

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7 Discussion and Conclusion

To finally conclude the dissertation thesis, this last chapter is divided into the two parts. The first part further discusses the findings of the research that deserve to be recapitulated with respect to their key points. The second part serves to address the research questions formally presented in the methodological section.

7.1 Discussion of research findings

More than ten years since independence, Kosovo has continued to remain in deep crisis, confronted by a mixture of compelling economic, political and social challenges that influence the security institutional and ideological aspects of the statebuilding process. Regardless of the period of international supervision, Kosovo citizens have continued to be among the most pro-Western-oriented people in Europe. They still desire to entry into the EU and NATO to anchor themselves entirely to the West, though their trust has also been weakened after the protracted period when lack of a solution to the status of Kosovo was keeping their lives in uncertainty. Furthermore, corruption and clientelism, critical issues in Kosovo statebuilding currently, are linked with international prioritisation of immediate stability over long-term security. This allows high-profile corruption to proliferate in the society and together with organised crime enjoys systematic impunity (Capussela, 2015).

The attempt to start building their own state for the first time cost Kosovo-Albanians massive effort during the previous ten years, when the habit of emigration abroad to improve economic opportunities for their families exploded to enormous proportions, as Kosovars left in light of the critical security situation, which often required the civilian population to escape in fear for their own lives.

The desperate situation demanded quick and efficient solutions, and the previous role of diaspora took on an entirely new dimension. The diaspora attachment to family and its members’ association with Kosovo mattered more than the place of residence. Strong community identification (Smith A. D., 1991, p. 23) together with possibilities of modern communication technologies and people´s mobility allowed the diaspora community to be actively involved in the situation in Kosovo long before media coverage broadcast news about the most escalated phase of the conflict (Demmers, 2002, p. 86). Because the emigrants at that time were direct witnesses of the political persecution and economic hardship of Kosovo

176 population, diaspora members not only sent their usual financial support to family members, but also started to become more politically active. They created a shadow government and funded a parallel state system with contributions collected abroad, thus assuring essential public services for the local population. The KLA was also initially an organisation established in the diaspora, which consequently lobbied for international support at the highest political levels to support the arming of the locals and the return of diaspora members willing to sacrifice their lives when heroically defending the endangered fatherland. Critical war events were such an intense experience for most of the population that they became firm material recalled in a politically useful way to support the idea of the state not only in future statebuilding efforts, but also in the internal struggle for political power.

During the process of international Kosovo-Albanian mobilisation, the emotional bond to country, family and the identity group played a crucial role, as the origin of the community made Kosovo-Albanians a target of persecution in the political struggle for more power. In light of imminent danger, collective memories and traditions reemerged. The past materialised as proof that they would have to fight, as passive resistance failed as an achievable solution, and the past could be used as a resource for political and cultural congruence. The traditional perspective of a man – willingly sacrificing himself for his country, vigilant, brave, disciplined and ever prepared to lay down his own life – became the respectable mantra of the crisis period.76

While Kosovo had become depleted by periods of enduring conflict and weak formal governance, prior to independence, the area was described as the worst-governed society in the Balkans because of its totally insufficient experience with an efficient, citizen-oriented state system (Capussela, 2015, p. 12). Not surprisingly, more traditional values, including the customary code of conduct, honourable manhood, and the collective memory of a heroic past came to the fore, and led Kosovo-Albanian families to survive the most challenging periods. Hence, they intuitively came back to it in critical moments in their life, where they needed to stick together in mutual support to be able to survive as a family and as community. Similarly, when the head of the household left for abroad, there was a tendency to become even more conservative within families, as this was seen as a guarantee to stay safe and together as it had

76 For an example of this, compare the oath of the KLA and that of the Kosovo Security Forces (Luci, 2014, p. 155). 177 worked until that moment. Intense national unity was created against a backdrop of a traditional patriarchal culture, which in turn was used to create a homogenised discourse that glorified the symbolic collective trauma, differentiated based on culturally appropriate forms of the masculine resistance of man and the silent suffering of victimised women, and which continued employ men in the construction of the “national” project. The story of ordinary people taking part in the process was simply pushed aside, and general civic pride was replaced by a current patriotic standard that is used to dictate and moralise.

In the post-war situation, the country faced many existential challenges in its devastation. Together with massive international support to rebuild Kosovo, the diaspora has continued its previously established role as a crucial international actor with great potential to boost the crippled economy, which has failed to create any income-generating opportunities, and where the population affected by conflict has been dependent on financial assistance from abroad to rebuild the basic housing and business environment.

Because of the estimated proportion of the diaspora community of Kosovo, there were enormous expectations for active and effective policy in promoting development in Kosovo with the involvement of the members from its diaspora. Even after the return of war-displaced refugees, up to one-third of Kosovars remained abroad. This, of course, created substantial developmental potential for a country of the size of Kosovo. However, most of the effort to create the necessary environment and to keep political accountability for such a process would have to remain in Kosovo, rather than merely creating the idea that the diaspora would bring know-how and funding back, and thereby raise Kosovo’s standard of living ultimately to the level of the host countries of the diaspora.

The earlier tradition of financial support from family members living in the diaspora served as a crucial economic incentive. In the first year after the war, it became obvious how help from the diaspora was sent almost overnight to rebuild what was immediately needed to improve the living standards of those who had remained in the uncertain post-war environment. During the post-war period, the reasons for diaspora support became less evident, as responsibility started to return to domestic political representatives. After the years of support, it started become possible to notice a tendency among diaspora members of the upcoming young generation to more willingly discuss their own status and development in the host

178 country. There have even been voices of mentioning a lack of gratitude toward the diaspora, as its support was simply automatically expected after the war without addressing their role in any specific way. Moreover, their needs from the side of the Kosovo state were often ignored, and many issues regarding the problematic foreign-residency voting procedures still have not yet been addressed.

As development reports regarding the progress of Kosovo with respect to the rule of law and the condition of the legal environment demonstrate, post-war political elites have long been abusing their power, and at the same time gradually losing hints of democratic trustworthiness, as they have shown favour on various occasions for their own interests to those of the society and the state as a whole.77 Because more recent political achievements have been less compelling, the public image of the statesmen has no grounds on which to be built. Thus, their earlier credit for their roles in fighting the enemy to get this opportunity is reiterated and repeatedly used as the basic idea of the newly built state. After the conflict a homogenous normative discourse of the previous experience developed, which consolidated the hierarchical tradition of humble gratitude toward the symbolic (masculine) battle, whose members are the only ones with the right to interpret it. Questioning of the process coming from “outsiders” (meaning anyone who was not a former KLA member) is not allowed, as the KLA war become a sacralised part of the politically preferred interpretation. This narrative became accepted regardless of the fact that it has a hidden political undertone, based on a traditional authoritative approach, and not accepting other approaches, questioning and criticism.

In Kosovo internally, the memory of patriarchal manhood is made manifest and celebrate in the form of symbolic monuments of martyrdom and violence erected for visits by locals and diaspora members. These reinforce the shared collective memory of the events. Meanwhile, Kosovo has tried to present itself abroad (in part through public diplomacy strategies and private efforts by the Kosovo diaspora) as the youngest European country, with the youngest

77 In 2017, Nations in Transit gave the level of democracy a score of 4.96 out of 7, where 7 is the worst. Improvements in the judicial system, the fight against corruption and media freedom are not systematic. Political actors tend to demonstrate authoritarian tendencies (Nations in Transit, 2017). Regardless of the sophisticated legislation in place, a series of wiretaps leaked in 2016 confirmed that power structures in Kosovo remain informal and external to the state system (World Bank, 2017). 179 population in Europe (average age: 30.2 years (KAS, 2016, p. 21), branding itself in such a way to overcome its negative reputation as a post-war country, with organised criminal groups, poverty and corruption (Wäshlich & Xharra, 2010, p. 12). The spotlighting of achievements by diaspora members at the international level is often used to give the country of their origin a more positive appearance (Xharra & Wählisch, 2012, p. 68). However, professing a sense of European belonging as a part of the Kosovar identity has not changed domestic approaches to accepting deviation from expected societal norms. Only rarely does such acceptance occur, as can be seen in relations to minority groups or other disadvantaged groups. “Europeanism” continues to be very superficial, which can also be seen in the example of the diaspora. Their members are rather well Europeanised and adjusted to Western values and standards; nevertheless, traditional roles and social habits tend to return when they are back in Kosovo to. As one of the respondents said, “Those you are with, you will become.”

The culturally idealised and praised elements of culture, personified by war heroes, are only changing very slowly. Different opinions in this regard are not particularly welcomed, and members of the diaspora themselves do not have the same expectations of standards in the society and the system.

At the micro-level the family is set up in communal system with hierarchies by gender and age; in such a system, it is quite dishonourable to express criticism. Criticism regarding the situation in Kosovo could be to a certain extent seen as ingratitude toward the effort and sacrifices to even get to such a stage. Disapproval of expectations and social norms is perceived as unpatriotic, because the expressing the negative aspects defame the traditions that serve as the basis for a common culture – and can be seen as an assault on national identity and the Kosovo-Albanian way of life. During the interviews, it repeatedly became clear that regardless of any initial disagreement with the family tradition, compromises take place only within the internal family circle, where no external members are involved (such as a wedding proposal to the bride included in the usual way of marriage agreement between families. This can be added without any real relevance regarding final approval, but allows for a private tradition taken from the host country, where “consent” means the consent of the parties directly involved i.e. the bride and groom – and not their parents). On the other hand, disagreement about getting married as such simply meant that the wedding was postponed

180 until the bride’s graduation, which is becoming another relatively accepted pattern in society. The difference in situations where a person could raise his or her disapproval and have it taken into consideration was described with clear distinctions based on gender. Smaller differences regarding behaviour were expected in the host country, where probably in dependence on the overall family integration are more equal standards for both genders. The clearest distinction was drawn when a girl from the diaspora considered herself unable to get married to a local Kosovo Albanian man due to her education, independence and disobedience with respect to “taking orders” from the husband as would be expected. Such an evaluation demonstrates that in the diaspora, attitudes to local Kosovo-Albanians (even in the urban context, where the differences would likely be much less evident than in the case of rural area) there is a major discrepancy between cultural values and the legal environment that Kosovo would like to present abroad as reality, and how it truly is in reality. For international political aspirations, a different cultural framing of identity values is used then the one used domestically to stabilise the situation and maintain the legitimacy of political leaders in the current statebuilding process. In Kosovo, every day is women’s role in private life still tight with many cultural rules and expectations that do not allow them to make independent decisions on the same level as a man. As a consequence, the perspectives from female participation and their role in public life have been wholly excluded. The formal change of legislation has almost no effect on their rights, as their everyday use is not supported in any way that would make a real difference. In this regard, it can be considered the completion of a particular nationbuilding process that has returned to its de facto pre-modern roots, which were only partially papered over in the period of communist Yugoslavia. Currently, the continuous integration of conservative diaspora groups in host countries may open the door to less automatic acceptance and legitimisation of traditional rules. This arrangement cannot be changed overnight, but with such process occurring, it can be gradually challenged and adapted to serve the development environment more effectively.

For members of the diaspora, another reason that it is challenging to deviate from expectations at the closest micro-level of their existence is because of their own traditional respect toward their own family. Diaspora members usually displayed an understanding of the specific Kosovo-Albanian cultural and societal tradition and environment. It may be even appreciated, depending on the own personal experience from the host country; diaspora members recall different personal stories. At this stage, however, their own acceptance of

181 traditional cultural rules may in fact limit their own integration process in the host countries, which is supposedly one of the recently stated priorities of the Ministry of Diaspora and their strategy. The possible negative impacts of the specific aspects of Kosovars’ own cultural environment rooted in Kosovo is clearly recognised by members of the diaspora, but there is no power to change rules of that game. Individuals instead search for an acceptable way to sail through their family duties, the inescapable bond to Kosovo and their own life in the host country without any additional unnecessary attention. It seems that the secret dream is to strike a kind of mysterious balance between loving their Kosovo identity and homeland without being delusional, and all the while remaining a good Albanian with respect to family duties and community belonging, and on top of all this pursuing one’s own life (Marku, 2014). As such, the only reasonable expectation would be for a very slow and challenging process of influencing the cultural environment and traditions at the micro-level, and an even more limited expectation when going up the ladder to the meso-level and macro-level. It is important to mention that for some members of the diaspora who had emigrated or been born abroad, Kosovo also became an idealised fatherland, where a sense of belonging is encouraged more than toward the host society, despite the growing realisation among diaspora members that they would never (want to) go back (Rama, 2018). Such a trap may raise further concerns if not addressed from the side of the host as well as the home country.

Even though members of the diaspora continue to financially support their family members in Kosovo, the funding is for the most significant part used for consumption and luxury goods, and not for investments that would change the default situation. Even direct investment targets non-productive capacities like housing, which from a long-term economic perspective is not a sustainable solution (World Bank, 2017, p. 44). With the declaration of Kosovo’s independence (and regardless of the unresolved issues with its status and relations toward Serbia), territorial sovereignty is not currently views as being directly threatened and most of the locals are thus preoccupied with the everyday problems of the functioning of the Kosovo state as such.

It was during this time that political attention was brought back to the diaspora situation, as fears emerged about the gradual loss of connection with the diaspora community. These fears had a legitimate basis insofar as the Kosovo diaspora currently has demonstrated a very high tendency to send remittances. Younger generations, however, have shown a much more

182 rationalizing approach, preferring mutually beneficial relations to the relationship their parents had to Kosovo, where they had been born and raised previously. These younger generations have great potential to help facilitate Kosovo development, as many of them are well-educated, better integrated in their host countries and less preoccupied with the past. This may be an advantage if an open attitude for feedback and an interest in their experience is present from side of Kosovo, or as a disadvantage, if the national sentiment, with its emphasis on a connection of common identity connection is no longer so appealing (Xharra & Wählisch, 2012). Members of the new second and third generations demonstrate support for Kosovo. However, their position is changing and their interpretation of “home” spans a messy spectrum, influencing the urge of personal responsibility for the involvement in the reconstruction while at the same time they pay attention to forging their own lives, which may also help Kosovo or may remain entirely tangential. This is especially the case if the rigid environment remains deaf to questions and suggestions at the lowest levels (Marku, 2014). “We here, they there (“të ketu, ara atje”) is a saying that has developed among Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo as well as abroad to describe the split in perspective regarding identity, sometimes resulting in an almost passive-aggressive approach against each other due to the conviction that the other side is not bearing their respective burden of change and does not understand reality in Kosovo or in the world as such (Rama, 2018).

National sentiment was a very powerful bond during the period of imminent danger, which is no longer the case, because locals and diaspora Kosovars face different identity changes. Lingering national sentiment can play a significant role in encouraging diaspora members to remain involved in Kosovo, but this motivation is not viable from a long-term perspective. Furthermore, the consequences of Kosovo diaspora involvement have changed. In addition to the diaspora, specific obstacles include the need for income-generating activities and investment in an encouraging economic environment, with the rule of law supported by the existing legal environment; this is simply not the case in Kosovo.

In the postwar memory, national visions of manhood became the space for social realignments that used the potential of memory creation to further convey traditional roles. However, as the mobilisation of the blood-feud reconciliation movement at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated, a successful redefinition of national culture and tradition is possible, and it even happens naturally as a part of development. When such progress is no longer

183 possible, society begins to decline because of its lack of adaptability to the external environment. This recent example shows that renegotiation is possible and can be sustained by social and cultural policies (Luci, 2014, p. 96).

The utilisation of the shared heroism of the past to activate society at a critical moment of the Kosovo struggle recalled customs, the moral principle of manhood, and the collective memory of a courageous past. Especially in the rural areas, this consequently led to a repatriarchalisation and retraditionalisation process not only when mobilising efforts to face their historical enemy (Triantafyllou, 2017, p. 340). After the end of the conflict, this approach sometimes even justified a return to “natural” sexual roles as an attempt to return to morality from the previously “immoral” socialist Yugoslavian regime and to interpret it in a nationalist way, which even increased the distance from the official legislative situation in Kosovo (Luci, 2014, p. 233). The postwar political landscape became dominated by narratives of sacrifice, martyrdom and victory, leaving no space for any painful stories and experiences of war that would not prepare society for the rebuilding of the new Kosovo state. The former enemy is still painted as collectively responsible for many atrocities, while Kosovo Albanians are seen as collectively victimised, instead of taking an active part in reconciliation process to open the door for their involvement. Currently, the chance to include other communities – and especially Serbians – in the process of statebuilding is almost impossible, as the idea of the state is clearly directed against their positive participation, and thus disregards their situation in light of the harsh clash with the state’s international aspirations. Not surprisingly, progress in interethnic cooperation is quite limited. While members of the diaspora have demonstrated a more detached view of interethnic relations, in real situations, diaspora members have only sporadically been able to bring a perspective of empathy, which is, moreover, another thing entirely missing in this society. The largely unresponsive environment rejects rare challenges to the traditional approach, which is perceived as entirely legitimate.

In post-war Kosovo, the power structures based on a traditional cultural model without adaptation to current conditions have created an obstacle to the statebuilding process, as citizenship cannot be limited to a male citizenry when civic participation is found in the spaces and practices of public political issues, but females can only be found in a private sphere in the context of nationalist reproduction (Luci, 2014, p. 173).

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Because of an essentialized attitude to the body, the purity of the blood and conception of family honour, and shame, the horrific weapon of war rape became extremely effective in breaking up family cohesion. This weapon attacked the masculine honour of Albanian men directly once women’s chastity is debased. Thus women either hide their own trauma to protect family honour, or it led to the collapse of family relations (Luci, 2014, p. 231). Maintaining this situation, where is only very difficult to break cultural norms, means that women only value themselves and are in turn valued in the context of their unequal relationships with men. Ultimately, in fact, this situation undermines whatever progress has been made (Kushi, 2015).

7.2 Conclusion

This dissertation has aimed to provide an understanding of the role of the Kosovo-Albanian diaspora on the post-conflict reconstruction and state-building process of Kosovo while taking in the account social context and for the idea of the state essential common identity considerations. The first main research question reflects on how members of the diaspora are culturally influenced in their actions and perceptions by the identity and role ascribed to them at the individual and social level. To understand this process and the extent of its international consequences, the first question asked: How do the ascribed cultural roles of Kosovo- Albanian identity influence the process of post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding in Kosovo? The second research question is focused on the dynamic of the process, when looking into what roles did these societal expectations and this identity have in influencing the different areas of statebuilding up to the end of the conflict in Kosovo, and how did the situation change? These specific questions focus on individual bases of the statebuilding process. What is the role of the individual identity attributes at the level of the “idea of the state” and how do they influence the current situation? The first specific question is dedicated to the central idea behind the state, which is ideologically connected to the other bases in an effort to legitimise them. What is the role of individual attributes of identity at the level of the institutional basis of the state, and how do these attributes influence the current situation? The second specific question

185 deals with government, governance and administration and its legal environment in theory and practice.

What is the role of the individual attributes of identity at the level of the “physical basis” of the state and how do these attributes influence the current situation? This question defines the focus of the third specific research question, looking at the consequences of Kosovo state sovereignty, including the internal interethnic character of the state as well as international dimensions.

In the statebuilding process in post-war Kosovo, massive expectations were placed on the role of the diaspora, and its ability to have a positive influence on the rebuilding of the country. And indeed, there were reasons – including the massive number of Kosovo-Albanians living abroad compared to the proportionally tiny country back home – so their social capital, economic strength, and experience from abroad (together with international support) was supposed to make the complicated rebuilding process much more manageable. Furthermore, the Kosovo-Albanian diaspora had previously been shown to be a crucial actor when supporting their families prior to the war during a period of great economic hardship. During the war, they also mobilised at the international level to provide Kosovo with political support; this was crucial, because they themselves were unable to provide support other than the funding of underground state structures and/or returning to the country to become directly involved in the battle.

What role do different attributes of identity have at the level of the idea of the state and how these attributes influence the current situation? The idea of the state is the heart of a state’s political identity; it brings people together in sociopolitical unity, justifying the steps that must be taken during the long and difficult project of reconstruction and statebuilding in a post-war state. The interpretation of a shared history, tradition, collective memory and role models enable citizens of the new country to involve the entire population and keep them actively involved along the way. If the interpretation only allows and encourages the participation of a particular part of the population, while the rest is kept passive, oppressed or even targeted as a possible threat, it is hardly possible to build a democratic, multiethnic society, even if these aspirations are internationally presented in part with reference to the role of the diaspora. The articulation and

186 actual practice of such interpretations should not cause confusion, either among Kosovo Albanians living in Kosovo or for the diaspora, which in fact has experienced to varying different extents working versions of the finalised system of the state in their host countries. When such aspirations do not correspond to those aspects encouraged by society, problems in the functioning of the state begin to appear, as the necessary steps are impossible to legitimise. This is equally true for members of the diaspora, and the direction the state takes becomes unreadable. Due to their detachment from everyday situations, however, it is much more natural for them to recognise these discrepancies; at the same time, while due to own involvement in the expectations of identity and their societal roles, they do not necessarily broadcast their observations, and for various personal and societal reasons may tend to (re)adjust to traditional norms.

What role do different attributes of identity have at the institutional level, and how do these attributes influence the current situation? The institutional basis of the state consists of state machinery and bureaucracy that is supposed to exclusively serve the idea of Kosovo statebuilding. Unfortunately, this not the case, and this is publically well known and almost practically accepted. The specific problems of the rule of law, and a weak, non-independent judiciary system have still not been effectively addressed. Unfortunately, the common idea of the state behaving in a particular way justifies the current situation, as it continues to style itself as the political “owner” of this interpretation, which at the same moment also somewhat insulates the leaders of Kosovo independence struggle from legal consequences for actions during and after the war; indeed, the legitimacy of the state of Kosovo is tightly intertwined with the legitimacy of their actions. That situation negatively affects civil society and political participation more generally, and also hinders necessary reforms in many spheres that would influence the function of public and private services. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the legal system in theory and practice serves as a living example of the consequences of contradictions between the premised functional aspirations, without considering any reflection on ideas that define sociopolitical unity – why the state exists, and what its aims are. Without ideological support for advanced laws in the form of everyday “rule of law” behaviour, legislation will never be effectively applied. Kosovo-Albanians never saw statebuilding as a way to eradicate traditions that were in contradiction with legislation, and so respect for such laws is not demanded among society. Furthermore, society has not gotten used to relying on the system

187 as such, and the new Kosovo state has not changed this practice. The Kosovo diaspora does not trust the system regarding services for their family members, including medical care and education. For their own lives, they can only with difficulty imagine facing the fact they can depend on a system with such a high level of functioning. Even though members of the diaspora adjust their behaviour to that of the local level, they avoid being in a position of fully depending on the state administrative decisions, assistance or consideration. The standard the diaspora members are used to from their host country is incomparable. They require it for their own life on one side, while on the other side they do not even begin to expect the same service to be provided in Kosovo; with the current arrangements in Kosovo society, they consider such a level to be impossible to achieve.

What role do different identity attributes have at the level of the physical basis of the state and how do they influence the current situation? Due to the recently experienced war conflict, the territorial basis is also a very sensitive and to some extent an overestimated characteristic of the Kosovo statebuilding process. In fact, this strong territorial orientation has politically severe consequences, such as prolonging the negotiation of demarcation agreements with not only Serbia but also Montenegro. This causes tensions at the international as well as at the domestic level. It stops progress in other international aspirations, because of ideological dispute connected to the self-perception of identity. The real value is doubtful, but the political presentation is priceless and wholly in accordance with the previously set traditional approach. The focus on territory in this aspect overshadows the inclusion of a human aspect, such as in the case of the Serbian community and other minority groups living in Kosovo and their lack of involvement in the statebuilding effort. This is the case both ideologically as well as practically, and the focus on territory neglects the necessity of the population’s cooperation with state structures, if only to make the territory governable. Currently, the lack of trust and will complicate further steps in the dialogue with Serbia and Serbian community. Confrontational approaches and missed chances to reinterpret the division of society does not allow the parties to agree even on honouring the memory of civilian victims regardless of their ethnic origin as a first step in the effort to reconcile and include Serbians closer in the statebuilding effort. The Kosovo diaspora shows signs of a more open attitude when approaching interethnic relations; on the other hand, the sensitive character of the topics is almost impossible to address in discussion without quickly escalating debate.

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How do ascribed cultural roles of Kosovo-Albanian identity influence the process of post- conflict reconstruction and statebuilding in Kosovo? The politically preferred character of identity, including traditional features drawing on and reflecting a strictly masculine, hierarchical society are largely contradictory with respect to the stated domestic vis-à-vis the international aspirations of the Kosovo state. At the domestic level, the “traditional” identity undermines the superficial intention of building a multiethnic state (and reinforces the preferred political conception of Kosovo national state), while at the international level it limits the collective will to search for solutions in discussions with Serbia. Overall, the configuration of the society justifies the crisis mode political elites use to politically mitigate their lack of efforts in pursuing state interests, and contrastingly sabotaging progress of the rule of law – which ultimately further erodes the cultural and societal foundation the society needs for the future. In such an unconsolidated situation, the diaspora serves as a direct connection with external actors and the aspirations that Kosovo has declared to part of and claimed to follow. However, without any preparation of an appropriate environment based on a corresponding idea of the state that would support these aspirations and legitimise necessary changes, the diaspora must explain its essential role and insist on changes regardless of their challenging and complex character in order to have hope for a better future of the Kosovo state and its citizens.

What roles did these societal expectations and identity attributes have when influencing the different areas of statebuilding before the end of the conflict in Kosovo and how did the situation change? There was a critical period of Kosovo’s modern history during the war that reshaped the identity ascribed to it as well as how it was perceived by the community itself. This identity drew on a traditional patriarchal culture to strengthen a homogenised discourse of the Kosovo Albanian collective identity; moreover, it was this identity that helped Kosovars to get past a critical moment of existential danger. The role of the values and traditions of Kosovo Albanian identity recalled during the conflict helped to keep society together and overcome the most critical moments. The idea of a Kosovo state was supported by emphasising attributes of identity such as heroic courage and bravery, highlighting the idea that Kosovo Albanians could fight back and it helped to find unity and cooperation among Kosovo Albanians at a decisive moment.

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These traditions were maintained insofar as they had previously served the society to get over the problematic period by holding numerous extended families together. The hierarchal system allowed an adequate level function and provided for the needs of its members, regardless of weak state systems that they could not rely on. As such, the customary code of conduct addressing family and economic relations truly had a once-vital role in everyday life of the society. Honourable manhood, defending household and country, was an experience their ancestors had had, and had passed it on to the next generations with the best intention to assure their common interests.

With the end of the war, however, the situation changed rapidly. Kosovo announced its aspiration to join Euro-Atlantic structures and presented itself as a modern secular country with European values that wanted to advance and develop its potential among like-minded countries. So far, however, the international aspiration has been sabotaged by the discrepancy between the Kosovo identity presented domestically and abroad. Currently, the politically propagated idea of the state, including the features of the Kosovo Albanian identity that are more highly praised, does not correspond with these aspirations. The ideological basis needs to take on a corresponding character that fits the society and implements a self-perception of Kosovo that would like to be seen as a young modern state with a secular character, growing in European values, respecting human rights and dignity, regardless of particular individual differences, with a flexible and progressive approach that can help to bring the country closer on the way to reach its aspirations. This idea must become as accepted and deeply-rooted in the society as the hierarchical tradition of humble gratitude toward the symbolic masculine fight has been. The battlefield to decide about the success of statebuilding requires clear-eyed reflection about the weak points of the process; this can only come from an active, critical civic society that demands accountable political steps to strengthen the rule of law. Decisions about power cannot be built in a society that does not support such a self-perception if that perception is not in accordance with the features of identity and the social roles of the vast population. Otherwise, diaspora connections bringing useful inspiration from abroad loses any potential effect. There needs to be a receptive environment supporting the use and development of such inspiration. If there are no changes in the politically set directions of the idea of the Kosovo state, the diaspora will become more detached from the domestically formulated features of identity, while the progress of the

190 statebuilding process will limp even further behind the aspiration, and failing to correspond to the way the society is arranged.

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Appendix 1 Interview Protocol

Past in Kosovo Where were you born? Where did you live?

Migration When did you leave Kosovo? Why did you leave? How was the situation in Kosovo when you left? How did your family leave? Where did you go? Did you have any friends or relatives in that area? Did you intend to stay there? Did you intend to return?

Life in the new country and own identity Where do you have more friends? Are your friends also Kosovo Albanians? Does it matter to you? Does it matter to your family? Are you in contact with other members of the Kosovo diaspora? Which customs do you observe? Where do you follow news?

Where is home for you? Where do you feel more accepted? What language do you mostly use at home?

How do you introduce yourself? Who would you support in a football match between the country you live in and Kosovo?

What is expected from you by your family based on your origin? Do your parents expect you to have a partner of Kosovo Albanian origin? Can you imagine that your partner was not Kosovo Albanian?

Relationship to Kosovo How often do you visit Kosovo? What language do you use when you go back to Kosovo?

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What has been the longest period you stayed in Kosovo? How is it to be back in Kosovo? /differences, challenges/ What do you think about life in Kosovo? Do you follow news in Kosovo? Are you interested in the situation /political, economical.../? Do you want to come back to Kosovo? Where do you see your future? What would you like to do? Can you imagine coming back to Kosovo? What are the challenges? What would be an advantage? Do you have a Kosovo Albanian passport/ Do you participate in elections?

Serbian community What is your opinion about the conflict in Kosovo? Do you have any friends of Serbian origin? What do you know about life of Serbs in Kosovo?

Appendix 2 Codebook

Code Descriptive definition

Reason for moving What was the reason for your family leaving Kosovo and how and when did abroad you leave the country? What was an additional important connotation of the departure? Minority vulnerability Differences, which distinguish the members of the diaspora community from the majority society and how they influence their everyday life.

Language use What language the member, the family used in communication between them, at home. What is the proportion?

Culture difference / The assumption of loneliness is not based only on the physical situation when being a minority a person is alone without extended family members, but the behaviour, traditions and culture make them alone among people who behave differently. There is a lack of mutual understanding Not accepted in the Acceptance of own existence in the host country. Membership in the society host country in the host country and treatment there Keeping a foreign Keeping a foreign passport to be able to travel from Kosovo for leisure but passport also in case it may be needed for security reasons. the feeling of being Where is it to be at home, what does it mean? home/ 210

Identity

Family expectations of What does the family expect regarding their future partner, origin, ethnicity, the future partner social role, family role? Family Expectation of What was/would be the reaction of the family if the respondent decided to the return to Kosovo return to Kosovo? What requirements for their personal, social, family life have the Family Expectation expectations/traditions/rules based on the family and societal position of the behaviour, traditions person? Kosovo state How does the respondent perceive Kosovo independence, and the situation in Kosovo? Own civil activity How does the respondent want to support Kosovo development, what active role does the responded see in building new Kosovo state for himself/herself/ Kosovo diaspora? Following the political How familiar is the respondent with the immigration policy and other situation in the host political actions, main changes and development in the host country? Where country does he/she follow news? Future in Kosovo/ Where is the respondent´s future and which location does it relate to? Where permanent return do they want to retire? Return to Kosovo What did their first return to Kosovo look like and what is it like to regularly come back. What triggered the return and what were the expectations of Kosovo. How did the return fulfil what was expected? Situation in Kosovo To what extent has the respondent followed the situation in Kosovo and how informed is he or she about the current development in Kosovo? relations to Serbs and What is the situation of Serbs in Kosovo and what is it like to be a Serb in Serbia Kosovo? Security situation in How safe is Kosovo, what may be dangerous? What does the respondent Kosovo think about the chance of a conflict in Kosovo?

Appendix III Respondents

Hana is in her late twenties. As her son is still a baby, the young mother is currently on maternity leave. She was born in Germany, where she together with her brothers grow up in a small city close to Frankfurt. As an excellent student, she was considering studying abroad, but because of her Albanian boyfriend, Hana returned to Kosovo to study. Hana stayed in Kosovo for over four years, while previously she had visited Kosovo with her parents. Her family had already lived abroad from previous generations. Her grandparents settled in Germany, and her parents left Pristina because they need specific medical care which was not available in Kosovo when she was born. She mentioned ambitions to continue her studies further; however, after graduation, she got married and shortly after that, her child was born. During maternity leave, she put her career ambitions aside and dedicated her time to her family. 211

Avenda is in her forties. She works in education. She is married and has two sons and two daughters. She left Pristina as a seven-year-old child with her family long before the war, because her uncle worked in several countries in Western Europe. Avenda has spent 15 years of her life abroad in Belgium and the Netherlands. She obtained her degree in the UK. However, she decided to return to Kosovo after the war because of her romantic relationship with her current husband. After a period of their common life in Germany, they decided to return to Kosovo permanently. Her mother and brother with his family, her family, lives Belgium, and she regularly visits them.

Lana/Albana is in her twenties. She has recently graduated and continues to work as a teacher. As a little child, she left a small village on the border with Montenegro with her parents. Thanks to a letter of support from her uncle, it was easier for them to go to the USA, where the family settled in the New York. Albana returned to Kosovo after high school to study in Kosovo. She does not speak fluent Albanian because she refused to learn the language. From kindergarten, she called herself Lana. After graduation, she got married to her Albanian boyfriend, whom she met before she decided to return to study in Kosovo. After the wedding, Albana remained with her husband to live in Kosovo. Her parents and three siblings live in the USA. It was not possible to clarify if the return to Kosovo is temporary in order for her husband to arrange the necessary immigration papers.

Naser in his early thirties and works for the family business. He was born in Istanbul in a mixed family to a Turkish mother and Kosovo Albanian father from Podujevo, whose family left Kosovo during one of the phases of population exchange with Turkey. He came back to Kosovo with his family as a teenager, and continued his education in a school for students from the Turkish minority. When he first came to Kosovo, he did not learn Albanian, and it stayed that way until he started to study at the university, because he thought about returning to Turkey. His mother still does not speak Albanian as she stays in the Turkish community and does not work. Later, Naser volunteered in the Turkish community by teaching the

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Albanian language to help the Turkish minority integrate into the majority society. He previously worked for a Turkish company, but he did not like that he was requested to practice his religion more.

Kaltrina is in her early thirties. She lives in Frankfurt and is building a career in finance. She left from a small village close to Gjilan with her parents and two brothers before she went to school. It was shortly before the war, because the economic situation of her parents became more complicated and her uncle stopped sending money to support the family. Kaltrina grow up close to Bonn; later on, she studied at universities in the USA and France. Kaltrina has a partner who is not Albanian and he still does not know her family even after more than three years. Since her graduation, she has not visited Kosovo for longer than a week at a time.

Iliriana is in her twenties, currently studying her master’s degree in Sweden. She has lived in Falkenberg, Sweden since she was a toddler. Her parents left a village close to Pristina because of the medical treatment her sister needed after she was born. Unfortunately, after a couple of years in Sweden, her sister died, but the family decided to stay in Sweden as there was war in Kosovo. Because Iliriana wanted to study abroad, she returned for an exchange year to Kosovo. After that, she returned to Sweden, where her parents with two sisters remained even after the end of the war.

Besim is in his early twenties; he still studies business and lives in the USA. His parents are lawyers. His mother originally come from Pristina and his father from Mitrovica. After their wedding, they moved to northern Kosovo. Besim was born in Bujanovac, in the Presevo Valley. During 1998, his family initially decided to hide when the Serbian forces started to search houses for people cooperating with the KLA. Because of the profession of his father, they decided to leave. His mother, with Besim and his brother, left to Macedonia with a refugee column to a refugee camp; his father went on his own outside the roads. From Macedonia, they went to the Houston, Texas, where they stayed. Besim returned to Kosovo after 14 years in the USA to gain international experience and improve his Albanian language. He has lived in Kosovo for three years.

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Arben is in his early thirties; he works in IT in Kosovo, but he often travels around Europe for his work. He was born in Pristina. He left with his parents and grandparents at the end of the 1980s to Düsseldorf, where his uncle was working. The family remained in Germany until the end of the war, as their limited legal status did not permit a longer stay. Arben could return shortly after to Germany, to study at the University in Cologne. He then returned to Kosovo to support his family financially as he gains work in the region for the foreign company. His wife is a Kosovo Albanian woman who grow up in the diaspora in Switzerland.

Fatmir is in his late forties, together with his brother, he owns a business in the construction industry in Pristina. He was born in Gjakova. In 1989, he left with his parents to Switzerland, where he finished a college in Zurich and start to work in the construction industry. Because of his family, he returned after the end of the war to Kosovo. He helped to his parents to take care of his grandparents and set up the business with his brother. He is married and has three children. His wife works in their family business.

Jaram worked in the Eulex monitoring project, focusing on customs. He provided background information about the unmonitored return of diaspora visitors and the standards regarding the rule of law among police and customs in Kosovo during his five years of employment with the agency.

Maria Maria is an independent researcher and a former employee of Eulex mission, and she dealt with medical and psychological assistance to international and local employees of the mission. She was willing to share experiences at the ground level about the cultural bonds and everyday customs of the society that have influenced the everyday lives of local as well as visiting or returning diaspora members, who also often worked for international organisations present in Kosovo.

Mike

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Mike is currently a consultant and a former Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Adrian Prenkaj A former Kosovo diplomat and Adviser to the former President of the Republic of Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga is currently a public policy consultant active in the European integration process.

Ibrahim Makolli Makolli is a former Minister of the Diaspora (2011-2014).

Lorik Pustina Pustina served as Director of Communications of the Ministry of the Diaspora under Minister Valon Murati (2014-2017).

Bernard Nikaj Nikaj is currently the Ambassador of Kosovo to Belgium and Luxembourg and a Head of the Kosovo Mission to the EU and NATO. He is a former Minister of Trade and Industry (2013-2014).

Shpend Ahmeti Since 2014, Ahmeti has been the Mayor of Pristina.

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