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Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Author(S): John C Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Author(s): John C. Harsanyi Source: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Aug., 1955), pp. 309-321 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1827128 Accessed: 18-07-2015 00:34 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Political Economy. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Sat, 18 Jul 2015 00:34:52 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CARDINAL W ELFARE, INDIVIDUALISTIC ETHICS, AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF UTILITY' JOHN C. HARSANY1 Universityof Queensland I uals prefersY to X, thenX should be re- T HE naive conceptof social welfare garded as sociallypreferable to Y. But no as a sum of intuitivelymeasurable other restrictionis to be imposed on the and comparable individual cardi- mathematical form of a social welfare nal utilities has been found unable to function. withstand the methodological criticism Recently,however, Professor Fleming3 of the Pareto school. ProfessorBergson2 has shownthat if one accepts one further has thereforerecommended its replace- fairlyweak and plausible ethical postu- ment by the more general concept of a late, one findsone's social welfarefunc- social welfarefunction, defined as an ar- tion to be at once restrictedto a rather bitrary mathematical function of eco- narrow class of mathematical functions nomic (and other social) variables, of a so as to be expressible(after appropriate formfreely chosen according to one's per- monotone transformationof the social sonal ethical (or political) value judg- welfareand individual utilityindexes if ments. Of course, in this terminology necessary)as the weightedsum of the in- everybody will have a social welfare dividuals' utilities.This does not mean, functionof his own, differentfrom that of course, a returnto the doctrine that of everybodyelse, except to the extentto the existenceof an additive cardinalutili- which differentindividuals' value judg- ty function is intuitivelyself-evident. ments happen to coincide with one an- The existence of such a function be- other. Actually, owing to the prevalence comes, rather, the consequence of the of individualisticvalue judgmentsin our ethical postulates adopted and is wholly society,it has been generallyagreed that dependent on these postulates. Still, a social welfarefunction should be an in- Fleming's resultsdo in a sense involve an creasingfunction of the utilitiesof indi- unexpected revival of some views of the viduals: if a certain situation,X, is pre- pre-Paretoperiod. ferredby an individual to anothersitua- In this paper I propose, firstof all, to tion, Y, and if none of the otherindivid- examine the precise ethical meaning of Fleming's crucial postulate and to show I I am in(lebtedto rmycolleagues at the Univer- that it expressesan individualisticvalue sity of Queensland, Messrs. R. W. Lane and G. judgment going definitelybeyond the Price, forhelpful comments. Of course,the responsi- b)ilityfor shortcomingsof this paper and for the generallyadopted individualisticpostu- opinions expressedin it is entirelymine. I M. Fleming,"A Cardinal Concept of Welfare," 2 A. B3ergson (Burk), "A Reformulation of QuarterlyJournal of Economics, LXVI (August, Certain Aspects of WelfareEconomics," Quarterly 1952), 366-84. For a differentapproach to the same Journalof Economics, LII (Fehruary,1938), 310-34, problemsee L. Goodman and H. Markovitz,"Social and "Socialist Economics," in A Survey of Con- WelfareFunctions Based on Individual Rankings," temporaryEconomics, ed. H. S. Ellis (Philadelphia, AmericanJournal of Sociology, Vol. LVIII (Novenm- 1949), esp. lplp412-20. ber, 1952). 309 This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Sat, 18 Jul 2015 00:34:52 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 310 JOHN C. HARSANYI late mentionedearlier, though it repre- PostulateC transitivityyof social indif- sents,as I shall argue, a value judgment ference).- -If from a social standpoint perfectlyacceptable according to com- neither of X and 1 is preferredto the mon ethical standards (Sec. II). I shall other, and again neitherof Y and Z is also attempt to show that, if both social preferredto the other,then likewisenei- and individual preferencesare assumed therof X and Z is preferredto the other. to satisfy the von Neumann-Morgen- These three postulates are meant to stern-Marschakaxioms about choicesbe- insure that "social preference" estab- tween uncertainprospects, even a much lishes a completeordering among the pos- weaker ethical postulate than Fleming's sible social situations, from which the sufficesto establish an additive cardinal existenceof a social welfarefunction (at social welfarefunction (Sec. III). In ef- least of an ordinal type) at once follows. fect, it will be submitted that a mere (Actually, two postulates would have logical analysis of what we mean by sufficedif, in the postulates, "weak" value judgments concerningsocial wel- preference,which does not exclude the fare and by social welfare functions possibilityof indifference,had been used leads, without any additional ethical instead of "strong" preference.) postulates,to a social welfarefunction of Postulate D (positiverelation of social this mathematicalform (Sec. IV). Final- preferencesto individualpreferences).-If ly, I shall turn to the problem of inter- a givenindividual i preferssituation X to personal comparisons of utility, which situation Y, and none of the other indi- gains new interestby the revival of an viduals prefersY to X, then X is pre- additive cardinal welfare concept, and ferredto Y froma social standpoint. shall examine what logical basis, if any, As already mentionedPostulate 1) ex- thereis forsuch comparisons(Sec. V). pressesa generallyaccepted individualis- tic value judgment. II Finally, Fleming's Postulate E states Fleming expresses his ethical postu- essentially that on issues on which two lates in termsof two alternativeconcep- individuals' interests (preferences)con- tual frameworks:one in terms of an flict,all otherindividuals' interestsbeing "ideal utilitarianism"of G. E. Moore's unaffected,social preferencesshould de- type, the other in terms of a preference pend exclusivelyon comparingthe rela- terminologymore familiar to economists. tive social importanceof the interestsat Though he evidentlysets greaterstore by stake of each of the two individuals con- the firstapproach, I shall adopt the sec- cerned. In other words, it requires that ond, which seems to be freerof unneces- 4 Of course, when I speak of preferences"from sary metaphysicalcommitments. I have a social standpoint,"often abbreviated to "social" also taken the libertyof rephrasinghis preferencesand the like, I always mean preferences postulates to some extent. based on a given individual's value judgmentscon- cerning "social welfare." The foregoingpostulates PostulateA (asymmetryof social pref- are meant to impose restrictionson any in(lividual's erence).-If "from a social standpoint"4 value judgemnentsof this kind, and thus represent, situation X is preferredto situation Y, as it were, value judgments of the second order, X. that is, value judgments concerningvalue juldg- then Y is not preferredto ments.Later I shall discuss the concept of "l)refer- PostulateB (transitivityof social pref- ences from a social standpoint" at some length erence). If froma social standpointX is and introducethe distinctiveterm "ethical prefer- Y then X is ences" to describe them (in Sec. IV). But at this preferredto Y, and to Z, stage I do not want to prejudge the issue by using preferredto Z. this terminology. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Sat, 18 Jul 2015 00:34:52 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WELFARE, ETHICS, AND UTILITY 311 the distributionof utilitiesbetween each only, without affectingthe interestsof pair ofindividuals should be judged sepa- anybody else, social choice must depend rately on its own merits,independently exclusivelyon i's and j's interests pro- of how utilities(or income) are distribut- vided that i's and j's interestsagree in ed among the other members of the this matter. Postulate E now adds that community. in the assumed case social choice must PostulateE (independentevaluation of depend exclusivelyon i's andj's interests the utilitydistribution5 between each pair (and on weighingthese two interestsone of individuals). (1) There are at least against the otherin termsof a consistent threeindividuals. (2) Suppose that indi- ethical standard), even if i's and j's in- vidual i is indifferentbetween situations terests are in conflict.Thus both postu- X and X' and also between situations Y lates make social choice dependentsolely and Y', but preferssituations X and X' on the individual interests directly af- to situationsY and Y'. Suppose, further, fected.7They leave no room forthe sepa- that individual j is also indifferentbe- rate interestsof a superindividualstate tween X
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