The Concept of Neo-Liberalism Has Become an Obstacle to the Anthropological Understanding of the Twenty-First Century
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Whatever Happened to Economic Anthropology?1
The Australian Journal of Anthropology (2009) 20, 285–300 doi:10.1111/j.1757-6547.2009.00037.x Whatever happened to economic anthropology?1 Chris Gregory Archaeology and Anthropology, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University In the 1970s, economic anthropology, along with kinship and ecological anthropology, was regarded as a core discipline in the teaching of anthropology. The centrality of all these subjects was reflected in the debates of the time. For economic anthropology, understanding the articulation of modes of production was the problem; the holy trinity—tribe, peasant, capitalist—provided the key terms of the debate. These terms, and this problem, are history. The discipline of anthropology has been de-cored over the past 30 years: economic anthro- pology, kinship and ecological anthropology are not even on the agenda in many universities today (ANU included). This presents us with a paradox because these academic trends are in inverse proportion to the importance of contemporary developments in the economy, the family and ecology as global problems facing humanity. This paradox must be addressed not by arguing for a rehabilitation of the core subjects of the 1970s—those days are long gone— but by taking a critical look at the implicit theories of value that inform anthropological thinking about the economy, the family and ecology today. I shall argue that, along with neoliberalism, ‘agency’ has been the key term of the new paradigm that emerged in the 1970s, that this paradigm is about to become history and that new ways of thinking about the economy will have to emerge as we all become victims of the ‘financialisation’ of Europe, the industrialisation of Asia and the desiccation of Australia. -
Product Differentiation
Product differentiation Industrial Organization Bernard Caillaud Master APE - Paris School of Economics September 22, 2016 Bernard Caillaud Product differentiation Motivation The Bertrand paradox relies on the fact buyers choose the cheap- est firm, even for very small price differences. In practice, some buyers may continue to buy from the most expensive firms because they have an intrinsic preference for the product sold by that firm: Notion of differentiation. Indeed, assuming an homogeneous product is not realistic: rarely exist two identical goods in this sense For objective reasons: products differ in their physical char- acteristics, in their design, ... For subjective reasons: even when physical differences are hard to see for consumers, branding may well make two prod- ucts appear differently in the consumers' eyes Bernard Caillaud Product differentiation Motivation Differentiation among products is above all a property of con- sumers' preferences: Taste for diversity Heterogeneity of consumers' taste But it has major consequences in terms of imperfectly competi- tive behavior: so, the analysis of differentiation allows for a richer discussion and comparison of price competition models vs quan- tity competition models. Also related to the practical question (for competition authori- ties) of market definition: set of goods highly substitutable among themselves and poorly substitutable with goods outside this set Bernard Caillaud Product differentiation Motivation Firms have in general an incentive to affect the degree of differ- entiation of their products compared to rivals'. Hence, differen- tiation is related to other aspects of firms’ strategies. Choice of products: firms choose how to differentiate from rivals, this impacts the type of products that they choose to offer and the diversity of products that consumers face. -
A General Theory of Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationship
W&M ScholarWorks Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 1992 A General Theory of Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationship Donn Robert Grenda College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons Recommended Citation Grenda, Donn Robert, "A General Theory of Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationship" (1992). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625722. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-kwnn-9j14 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A General Theory of Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationships A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Anthropology The College of William and Mary in Virginia In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Donn R. Grenda 1992 This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Author Approved, April 1992 f Norman Barka Theodore Reinhart ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i v LIST OF TABLES..................... .................... v LIST OF FIGURES......................................... vi ABSTRACT............... vii INTRODUCTION............................................ 2 CHAPTER I. AN EXAMINATION OF THE FIELD AND ITS FOUNDERS............................................ 7 CHAPTER II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GENERALTHEORY.... 52 CHAPTER III. A GENERAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC FLOW, SOCIAL EXCHANGE, AND HEGEMONIC RELATIONSHIPS...... -
I. Externalities
Economics 1410 Fall 2017 Harvard University SECTION 8 I. Externalities 1. Consider a factory that emits pollution. The inverse demand for the good is Pd = 24 − Q and the inverse supply curve is Ps = 4 + Q. The marginal cost of the pollution is given by MC = 0:5Q. (a) What are the equilibrium price and quantity when there is no government intervention? (b) How much should the factory produce at the social optimum? (c) How large is the deadweight loss from the externality? (d) How large of a per-unit tax should the government impose to achieve the social optimum? 2. In Karro, Kansas, population 1,001, the only source of entertainment available is driving around in your car. The 1,001 Karraokers are all identical. They all like to drive, but hate congestion and pollution, resulting in the following utility function: Ui(f; d; t) = f + 16d − d2 − 6t=1000, where f is consumption of all goods but driving, d is the number of hours of driving Karraoker i does per day, and t is the total number of hours of driving all other Karraokers do per day. Assume that driving is free, that the unit price of food is $1, and that daily income is $40. (a) If an individual believes that the amount of driving he does wont affect the amount that others drive, how many hours per day will he choose to drive? (b) If everybody chooses this number of hours, then what is the total amount t of driving by other persons? (c) What will the utility of each resident be? (d) If everybody drives 6 hours a day, what will the utility level of each Karraoker be? (e) Suppose that the residents decided to pass a law restricting the total number of hours that anyone is allowed to drive. -
An Economic Sociological Look at Economic Anthropology
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Aspers, Patrik; Darr, Asaf; Kohl, Sebastian Article An economic sociological look at economic anthropology economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter Provided in Cooperation with: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne Suggested Citation: Aspers, Patrik; Darr, Asaf; Kohl, Sebastian (2007) : An economic sociological look at economic anthropology, economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter, ISSN 1871-3351, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, pp. 3-10 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155897 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available -
Utility with Decreasing Risk Aversion
144 UTILITY WITH DECREASING RISK AVERSION GARY G. VENTER Abstract Utility theory is discussed as a basis for premium calculation. Desirable features of utility functions are enumerated, including decreasing absolute risk aversion. Examples are given of functions meeting this requirement. Calculating premiums for simplified risk situations is advanced as a step towards selecting a specific utility function. An example of a more typical portfolio pricing problem is included. “The large rattling dice exhilarate me as torrents borne on a precipice flowing in a desert. To the winning player they are tipped with honey, slaying hirri in return by taking away the gambler’s all. Giving serious attention to my advice, play not with dice: pursue agriculture: delight in wealth so acquired.” KAVASHA Rig Veda X.3:5 Avoidance of risk situations has been regarded as prudent throughout history, but individuals with a preference for risk are also known. For many decision makers, the value of different potential levels of wealth is apparently not strictly proportional to the wealth level itself. A mathematical device to treat this is the utility function, which assigns a value to each wealth level. Thus, a 50-50 chance at double or nothing on your wealth level may or may not be felt equivalent to maintaining your present level; however, a 50-50 chance at nothing or the value of wealth that would double your utility (if such a value existed) would be equivalent to maintaining the present level, assuming that the utility of zero wealth is zero. This is more or less by definition, as the utility function is set up to make such comparisons possible. -
Economic Evaluation Glossary of Terms
Economic Evaluation Glossary of Terms A Attributable fraction: indirect health expenditures associated with a given diagnosis through other diseases or conditions (Prevented fraction: indicates the proportion of an outcome averted by the presence of an exposure that decreases the likelihood of the outcome; indicates the number or proportion of an outcome prevented by the “exposure”) Average cost: total resource cost, including all support and overhead costs, divided by the total units of output B Benefit-cost analysis (BCA): (or cost-benefit analysis) a type of economic analysis in which all costs and benefits are converted into monetary (dollar) values and results are expressed as either the net present value or the dollars of benefits per dollars expended Benefit-cost ratio: a mathematical comparison of the benefits divided by the costs of a project or intervention. When the benefit-cost ratio is greater than 1, benefits exceed costs C Comorbidity: presence of one or more serious conditions in addition to the primary disease or disorder Cost analysis: the process of estimating the cost of prevention activities; also called cost identification, programmatic cost analysis, cost outcome analysis, cost minimization analysis, or cost consequence analysis Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA): an economic analysis in which all costs are related to a single, common effect. Results are usually stated as additional cost expended per additional health outcome achieved. Results can be categorized as average cost-effectiveness, marginal cost-effectiveness, -
Chapter 4 4 Utility
Chapter 4 Utility Preferences - A Reminder x y: x is preferred strictly to y. x y: x and y are equally preferred. x ~ y: x is preferred at least as much as is y. Preferences - A Reminder Completeness: For any two bundles x and y it is always possible to state either that xyx ~ y or that y ~ x. Preferences - A Reminder Reflexivity: Any bundle x is always at least as preferred as itself; iei.e. xxx ~ x. Preferences - A Reminder Transitivity: If x is at least as preferred as y, and y is at least as preferred as z, then x is at least as preferred as z; iei.e. x ~ y and y ~ z x ~ z. Utility Functions A preference relation that is complete, reflexive, transitive and continuous can be represented by a continuous utility function . Continuityyg means that small changes to a consumption bundle cause only small changes to the preference level. Utility Functions A utility function U(x) represents a preference relation ~ if and only if: x’ x” U(x’)>U(x) > U(x”) x’ x” U(x’) < U(x”) x’ x” U(x’) = U(x”). Utility Functions Utility is an ordinal (i.e. ordering) concept. E.g. if U(x) = 6 and U(y) = 2 then bdlibundle x is stri ilctly pref erred to bundle y. But x is not preferred three times as much as is y. Utility Functions & Indiff. Curves Consider the bundles (4,1), (2,3) and (2,2). Suppose (23)(2,3) (41)(4,1) (2, 2). Assiggyn to these bundles any numbers that preserve the preference ordering; e.g. -
ARCH 1570. Cold Hard Cash: the Materiality of Money in Ancient and Modern Finance
ARCH 1570. Cold Hard Cash: The Materiality of Money in Ancient and Modern Finance Spring 2012, MWF 1:00-1:50 pm Rhode Island Hall, Room 108 Professor Christoph Bachhuber [email protected] / tel. 401-863-7533 Joukowsky Institute for Archaeology and the Ancient World Office: Rhode Island Hall, Room 207 Office Hours: Monday and Wednesday, 2:00 pm - 3:00 pm, and by arrangement CultureLab point of contact: Geralyn Ducady [email protected] INTRODUCTION Now more than ever we are in need of new perspectives on the value and meaning of money. The course prioritizes anthropological and historical approaches as ways to offer time depth, cross cultural comparison and insight into our own troubled financial systems. The anthropological perspective in the course includes handling and studying a wide range of financial objects and devices that are housed in the Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology at Brown University, including but not confined to objects from New Guinea, Sub-Saharan Africa, and indigenous North America. The historical perspective will be informed by handing and studying the world’s earliest coins held in the Joukowsky Institute of Archaeology and the Ancient World. Through numerous ancient, historical, ethnographic and modern case studies the course explores how specific kinds of objects, materials, and non-materials can be invested with financial value. The course draws upon a diverse literature in order to understand how financial devices (to include currencies) are embedded in and mediate social relations. Financial devices mediate social relations because they contain within them core ideologies of the communities that use them. In this way we will explore the rich paradoxes of money at the interface between the material and ideological worlds. -
The Role of Moral Utility in Decision Making: an Interdisciplinary Framework
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 2008, 8 (4), 390-401 doi:10.3758/CABN.8.4.390 INTERSECTIONS AMONGG PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND NEUROSCIENCE The role of moral utility in decision making: An interdisciplinary framework PHILIPPE N.TOBLER University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England ANNEMARIE KALIS Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands AND TOBIAS KALENSCHER University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands What decisions should we make? Moral values, rules, and virtues provide standards for morally acceptable decisions, without prescribing how we should reach them. However, moral theories do assume that we are, at least in principle, capable of making the right decisions. Consequently, an empirical investigation of the methods and resources we use for making moral decisions becomes relevant. We consider theoretical parallels of economic decision theory and moral utilitarianism and suggest that moral decision making may tap into mechanisms and pro- cesses that have originally evolved for nonmoral decision making. For example, the computation of reward value occurs through the combination of probability and magnitude; similar computation might also be used for deter- mining utilitarian moral value. Both nonmoral and moral decisions may resort to intuitions and heuristics. Learning mechanisms implicated in the assignment of reward value to stimuli, actions, and outcomes may also enable us to determine moral value and assign it to stimuli, actions, and outcomes. In conclusion, we suggest that moral capa- bilities cancan employemploy andand benefitbenefit fromfrom a varietyvariety of nonmoralnonmoral decision-makingdecision-making andand learninglearning mechanisms.mechanisms. Imagine that you are the democratically elected presi- save y people on the ground ( y x)? Or do not only hi- dent of a country and have just been informed that a pas- jackers, but also presidents, have an unconditional duty senger airplane has been hijacked. -
Negative Externality: Reduces Utility Or Profit Externalities Defined
Chapter 7 Externalities Reading • Essential reading – Hindriks, J and G.D. Myles Intermediate Public Economics. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006) Chapter 7. • Further reading – Bator, F.M. (1958) ‘The anatomy of market failure’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72, 351—378. – Buchanan, J.M. and C. Stubblebine (1962) ‘Externality’, Economica, 29, 371—384. – Coase, R.H. (1960) ‘The problem of social cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1—44. – Lin, S. (ed.) Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities. (New York: Academic Press, 1976) [ISBN 0124504507 hbk]. – Meade, J.E. (1952) ‘External economies and diseconomies in a competitive situation’, Economic Journal, 62, 54—76. Reading – Pigou, A.C. The Economics of Welfare. (London: Macmillan, 1918). • Challenging reading – Muthoo, A. Bargaining Theory with Applications. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) [ISBN 0521576474 pbk]. – Starrett, D. (1972) ‘Fundamental non-convexities in the theory of externalities’, Journal of Economic Theory, 4, 180—199. – Weitzman, M.L. (1974) ‘Prices vs. quantities’, Review of Economic Studies, 41, 477—491. Introduction • An externality is a link between economic agents that lies outside the price system – Pollution from a factory – Envy of a neighbor • Externalities are not under the control of the affected agent – Efficiency theorems do not apply – Competitive equilibrium unlikely to be efficient • Externalities are of practical importance – Global warming – Damage to ozone layer Externalities Defined •An externality is present whenever some economic -
ECON 3458 Economic Anthropology Spring 2020 William C. Schaniel
ECON 3458 Economic Anthropology Spring 2020 William C. Schaniel Phone: Cell: (404) 328-7729 Economics (678) 839-6477 Office Hours: 1:10 - 4:30, Monday/Wednesday; after class; or by appointment. Email: [email protected] Texts & Materials: Readings (Handouts numbered 1 to 18). Composition Book (Empty) Course Objectives: The primary objective is to present the cultural context of economic activity. By the end of the course, a student will be able to explain: the methodology of economics and anthropology; the tools of economic anthropology; and how to apply the tools of economic anthropology. Attendance: Students are expected to attend every scheduled class including Saturday Flea market visits. Material supplemental and additional to the text will be discussed in the class. Preparation: Students are expected to read, write and turn in material assigned before the scheduled sessions. Grades: A. There will be 5 points per class based on class participation, and turning in of a work when due. Outline of readings will be due prior to the assign class discussion. The readings outlines will be placed in the folder with your name at the beginning of the class. Half credit will be given for assignments one class late (and the work is acceptable). B. There will be one major project worth 150 points. The project will be done at the West Georgia Flea Market. 1) Your project is to do an ethnography of the flea market. There will be five visits. All visits will be part of graded class work. 2) You will do a familiarization visit to the West Georgia Flea Market on Saturday, March 14th.