The Role of Moral Utility in Decision Making: an Interdisciplinary Framework
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Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 2008, 8 (4), 390-401 doi:10.3758/CABN.8.4.390 INTERSECTIONS AMONGG PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND NEUROSCIENCE The role of moral utility in decision making: An interdisciplinary framework PHILIPPE N.TOBLER University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England ANNEMARIE KALIS Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands AND TOBIAS KALENSCHER University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands What decisions should we make? Moral values, rules, and virtues provide standards for morally acceptable decisions, without prescribing how we should reach them. However, moral theories do assume that we are, at least in principle, capable of making the right decisions. Consequently, an empirical investigation of the methods and resources we use for making moral decisions becomes relevant. We consider theoretical parallels of economic decision theory and moral utilitarianism and suggest that moral decision making may tap into mechanisms and pro- cesses that have originally evolved for nonmoral decision making. For example, the computation of reward value occurs through the combination of probability and magnitude; similar computation might also be used for deter- mining utilitarian moral value. Both nonmoral and moral decisions may resort to intuitions and heuristics. Learning mechanisms implicated in the assignment of reward value to stimuli, actions, and outcomes may also enable us to determine moral value and assign it to stimuli, actions, and outcomes. In conclusion, we suggest that moral capa- bilities cancan employemploy andand benefitbenefit fromfrom a varietyvariety of nonmoralnonmoral decision-makingdecision-making andand learninglearning mechanisms.mechanisms. Imagine that you are the democratically elected presi- save y people on the ground ( y x)? Or do not only hi- dent of a country and have just been informed that a pas- jackers, but also presidents, have an unconditional duty senger airplane has been hijacked. The hijackers appear not to kill innocent people? to be headed for a city with well-populated skyscrapers. The questions above concern moral decision making, Your air force is in place and ready to shoot the passenger particularly what normative claims should guide us when plane down at your command. You can take many differ- we make moral decisions and how we actually make such ent courses of action: shoot or not, negotiate or not. How moral decisions. In the present review, we attempt to pro- should you decide? Would it make a difference whether vide a road map for the empirical investigation of moral 10 or 500 passengers are on board the airplane, or whether decision making. Our starting point will be the important the passengers have voted for you? Would it make a dif- philosophical distinction between is and ought. This dis- ference if the air force is not in place and the only way to tinction and the need for normative claims sometimes gets stop the hijackers in time is to ask the pilot of a nearby sec- forgotten by politicians and members of the public when ond passenger airplane to crash into the first? Would you they make statements about what should be done, given try to calculate how likely it is that the hijackers actually the facts. Then we will briefly introduce utilitarian and will crash the airplane into a skyscraper and how many deontological moral theories and will review psychologi- innocent people would die if the hijackers were to do so? cal and neuroscientific findings regarding moral decision Assuming that the probability of the hijackers’ heading making. This research will suggest that people may use for a skyscraper appears high, should you have the plane more than one moral theory, as well as moral heuristics, crashed by the other plane with its x additional passengers and that the prefrontal cortex may be particularly impor- beingbeing killedkilled withwith certainty,certainty, inin orderorder to probabilisticallyprobabilistically tant for moral decision making. Finally, we will propose P. N. Tobler, [email protected] Copyright 2008 Psychonomic Society, Inc. 390 MORAL DECISIONS 391 that moral decisions may rely on mental processes and ment (Brandt, 1979), and any other valuable consequences neuronal circuitry that originally evolved to serve non- of actions and rules. For utilitarian theories, something is moral functions, such as reward and punishment process- morally valuable because it promotes nonmoral values ing. We will do so by discussing parallels between moral such as happiness, pleasure, or other kinds of utility. and microeconomic utility theories and by suggesting that Deontological theories argue that certain things are classical learning theory, with its principle of error-driven morally valuable in themselves. Such moral value does not adjustment of reward predictions, can give clues as to derive from the fact that it promotes happiness, pleasure, how people acquire moral behavior. Neuronally, we will or any other utility (Rawls, 1971). The moral quality of propose that reward regions, such as the striatum and the actions arises from the fact that the action is done to pro- prefrontal cortex, may contribute to the acquisition and tect such moral values. The consequences and outcomes expression of moral behavior. Our proposal implies that of actions are secondary. Impermissible actions remain so the reward system may have beneficial functions not only irrespective of how good their consequences are. Some for individual survival by computing reward value, but deontological theories claim that all moral values can be also for society and culture by contributing to the compu- traced to one ultimate moral principle. One example of tation of the moral value of decisions and actions. such an ultimate principle is autonomy, conceived as the ability of a person to generate self-binding laws (Kant, The Is–Ought Gap 1797). Another example is the ability to act (Gewirth, When we ponder the morally right course of action, we 1998). Other positions claim that there are several moral always face a problem. Philosophers since Hume (1739) values, which have equal standing. Ross (1930), for ex- have argued that the factual characteristics of the situation ample, proposes seven basic values, which correspond to will themselves never tell us how we ought to act. Knowing seven moral duties: fidelity, reparation, justice, benefi- who the hijackers are, what they are going to do, and what cence, gratitude, self-improvement, and noninjury. Kant’s the consequences of their actions will be is not enough to de- (1797) work on morals is the paradigmatic example of a duce what the president ought to do. To use Hume’s words, deontological theory. The core rule in Kant’s system is the “you cannot derive an ought from an is” (Hume, 1739; for categorical imperative, which requires that we act accord- a related argument, see Moore, 1903; for a comparison, see ing to maxims that could become universal laws. Rules Bruening, 1971; for a dissenting view, see Searle, 1964). In often arise from the rights of those affected by the agent’s order to find out what the president ought to do, we need actions (Kamm, 2007). In Kantian terminology, this is ex- not only information about the facts of the current situation, pressed by the claim that one ought to treat others as ends but also some normative claims about what is valuable. We in themselves, and never only as means to an end. would commit a logical fallacy if we were to deduce moral Virtue ethics focuses on the motives and character conclusions just from descriptive facts. traits of actors. The bearers of moral quality are not ac- In the airplane example, one possible normative claim tions but life, people, and their capabilities (Nussbaum, might be that we are morally obliged to provide happiness 2000; Sen, 1985). Virtues are goods in themselves, and for the largest possible number of people. This would be their continued practice contributes to the good life. Ex- a utilitarian normative claim (e.g., Mill, 1861). Another amples of virtuous dispositions are wisdom, courage, possibility would be to presuppose the moral rule that moderation, justice, kindness, generosity, self-respect, one ought not to kill. This would be a deontological nor- compassion, altruism, forgiveness, and sincerity. Virtues mative claim (e.g., Kant, 1797). Descriptive information may fall in between more extreme character dispositions. about the situation must be combined with such norma- Having too little or too much of the disposition results in tive claims in order to reach a conclusion about what one vices (e.g., cowardice or rashness for courage; Aristotle, ought to do. For example, if one embraces the normative Nicomachean Ethics, 2002 ed.). Virtues should be care- claim that we are morally obliged to save as many people fully cultivated through moral education by role models. as possible, we could determine what to do by combining The development of habits helps to make the expression this claim with factual information about how different of virtuous dispositions more stable and reliable, but vir- possible actions would affect the number of people saved. tuous behavior should nevertheless remain goal directed Thus, normative claims and descriptive information taken and purposeful. Applying and reconciling virtues requires together allow us to make moral decisions. practical wisdom, which helps to discern what is important for a good life. Virtues are associated with an appropriate Moral Theories feeling of the right emotions. Aristotle and, more recently, We derive normative claims from moral theories. The Anscombe (1958), MacIntyre (1985), and Foot (2001) are main classes of moral theories are the utilitarian (conse- some of the prime proponents of virtue ethics. quentialist), deontological, and virtue theories. Utilitarian- ism states that the moral quality of actions is determined Moral Decisions in Theory and Practice by their consequences (utilitas Latin for [public] good, An implication of the is–ought gap is that whereas moral usefulness). This means that we have the duty to maximize theories provide standards for how we should act, they do not the sum or mean utility of all individuals in the society.