MONITORING MB #05/2013EN, October 23, 2013
BISS POLITICAL MEDIA BAROMETER (April-June 2013)
Introduction The Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) presents its fifth quarterly report BISS Political Media Barometer (April – June 2013). It analyzes the political communication of the Belarusian political forces and their media coverage, summarizing the findings of the first six months. Following our mission as a non-partisan, independent Belarusian think-tank, we designed this product with one major goal in mind: to scientifically analyze the quality of the political communication between the Belarusian democratic political forces and the society, and contribute to its improvement. To accomplish this goal, the BISS Political Media Barometer provides an objective quantitative analysis of the media appearances of the Belarusian political forces, plus 23 individual politicians, based on the systemic monitoring of the available open media sources. After six months of analyzing the political communication, we can now formulate a number of recommendations on how to improve the political forces’ communication strategies. The findings also show some pinch points in the relations between the media and the independent political figures. In general terms, there has been a certain progress of the political communication. It is the first time since we have launched our media monitoring project that the politicians have quite often discuss the economic issues. The percentage of the economy-related communication has doubled in compare with the previous quarter which does not only mean a diversification of the political forces’ agenda, but it also brings it closer to the general public and their priorities. The authors of the BISS Political Media Barometer are grateful to the International Board of the project for their insightful comments and recommendations. We are open to discussion on the research methodology, dimensions of analysis and data interpretation. All responsibility for any errors or shortcomings rests solely with the BISS.
Authors: Alexei Pikulik, Alena Artsiomenka
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Contents
Introduction ...... 1 Contents ...... 2 Summary and recommendations ...... 3 Methodology: units of analysis ...... 6 Detailed research findings ...... 8 Quantitative index ...... 8 Qualitative index ...... 15 Where and how the opposition speaks ...... 17 Appendix 1. Media usage in Belarus ...... 41 Appendix 2. Description of methodology ...... 43 Appendix 3. Detailed findings ...... 46
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Summary and recommendations
The present report covers the political communication field from April to June 2013. On one hand, this was the time when the political forces have not yet actively begun preparing for the forthcoming elections. On the other, the analyzed period was marked by active preparatory work towards forming a coalition of political forces called ‘The People’s Referendum’ campaign. Within its framework, the campaign ‘Tell the Truth!’, The Movement for Freedom, the BPF Party and the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada declared that they are going to join forces during the run-ups to the local and presidential elections. The second quarter of 2013 was quite eventful in terms of the international activity of the political forces. The opposition members participated in the conference on Belarus organized by the European People’s Party in Brussels on April 9 and they appealed to the EU to ease the visa regulations; also, they had a number of meetings in the Lithuanian Parliament on April 15 and addressed the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the conditions that would allow the EU to start bringing its relations with Belarus back to normal. The analyzed period also covered the traditional rally ‘Chernobyl Way’, which marked twenty seven years since the Chernobyl disaster. This event determined an increase in the media presence for the politicians who were actively involved in organizing it. The exact figures regarding the media presence of the politicians, as well as the contributing factors, are presented in detail in the Detailed research findings. If we speak about the changes in the political communication field, it is necessary to take a close look at the main trends revealed in the previous stages, i.e. from April 2012 till March 2013. Among them we can list:
The presence of the stable variables that most commonly refer to the representation of the independent political forces in the media, i.e. the level of events that receive coverage, the position of the politicians speaking for their political forces, the gender composition of representatives, etc.; these variables are difficult to influence;
The presence of the changeable variables that include the content of communications in the first place, i.e. their topics, correlation with practical activities, etc.; these variables depend on the political forces to a greater extent;
the instability and the volatility of the information field, when the focus of media attention shifts in time:
o from ‘personal stories’ to ‘the political agenda’ and vice versa; o from the forces inside the country to those outside Belarus and vice versa.
Thus, the basic patterns of the political field revealed two major dichotomies.
Until recently, the focus of media attention swung like a pendulum between the forces active in and outside the country1, which was an important factor in determining the leader of the rating. Now it is obvious that this pattern has become a thing of the past. Traditionally Andrey Sannikau and Anatol Liabedzka swapped places at the top of the rating. However, during the previously analyzed period, Sannikau moved to the third position and in April – June he only came sixth. Meanwhile, the political figures
1 By ‘forces active outside the country’ we mean those that are registered abroad or whose leaders live in exile.
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representing the forces active in Belarus strengthened their positions in the ‘top-12’. This might indicate changes in the political media field, with less coverage given to the politicians in exile and a growing attention to the forces active inside the country. However, the time span of one quarter of year is too short to reach a final conclusion, as the analyzed period was marked by such significant events as the ‘Chernobyl Way’ rally or the launch of the ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign and the responding criticism.
The second dichotomy describing the changes in the communication field comes from the shift of focus from the political agenda to the ‘personal story’ and vice versa. The analysis of the communication from April to June 2013 shows that these two opposite subjects remain in the focus of media attention. In April Paval Seviarynets held the leading position in the quantitative index. The major issue that attracted the media attention was the estimation of the chances of the politician (sentenced to custodial restraint) to spend Easter with his family. Another example of ‘personal story’-driven quantitative index was an upsurge in Liabedzka’s media presence late in April, when the regime increased its pressure on the politician. However, it was the political agenda that formed the basis of media coverage in the second quarter. This is demonstrated, for example, by a boost in the ratings of certain political forces such as ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign, the Movement for Freedom and the BPF Party, following their press conference on May 20 when they announced their strategic partnership plans for the three forthcoming elections. The content of the communication still remains highly variable. This gives the political forces an opportunity to shape such parameters as the topics covered, the correlation with the offline activities and the share of proactive political communications. It should be pointed out that, on one hand, the distribution of communications by the topic is becoming more balanced and diverse. All the topics, including the economy-related ones, are now better represented and the political actors and forces seem to have found a solution to the problem of domination of one key thematic group. On the other hand, the share of proactive communications, i.e. the media coverage of the politicians presenting the new programs, projects or tactics/strategies is considerably going down. This is also a factor considered in the qualitative index. The variables concerning the representation of the political forces remain more stable and are less affected by the political forces. They include mentioning the political figures’ affiliation in the media coverage, the ranking of the politicians who represent their political forces in the media, the gender distribution of the representatives and the level of the events covered. Generally speaking, these parameters have not changed considerably as compared to the previously analyzed periods. However, the representation tends to become less diverse, with fewer regional leaders and common members, as well as women, speaking on behalf of their political forces.
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Thus, there were both positive and negative changes under way in the field of political communications.
The positive trends were as follows:
The media were giving more coverage to the political actors and forces with a higher rate of offline activity and with a larger share of proactive communications. Thus, following Anatol Liabedzka, the traditional leader in the media presence rating,2 the second, third, fourth and fifth positions were held by Uladzimir Niakliayeu, Aliaksandr Milinkevich, Aliaksiey Yanukevich and Vital Rymasheuski, respectively.
The thematic distribution of the communication content was more balanced. The leading topics in the political communications were more diverse. The analyzed period was marked by a growth in the coverage of various themes such as the international relations, domestic politics and the social sphere. The share of references to economy-related issues also increased, up to 15%. The negative trends were as follows:
For both the individual politicians and the political forces, the growth in their own communications slowed down. This cannot be attributed to an increase in the number of media references, since the total sum of references to politicians fell from 3,900 in January – March to 3,084 in April – June 2013.
The number of initiatives dwindled. During the analyzed period it was only Andrey Dzmitriyeu and Dzmitry Vus who came up with new projects or initiatives. This factor contributed essentially to a drop in the other politicians’ qualitative index (for the methodology of calculating the qualitative index see the Qualitative index).
The ratio of proactive communications, i.e. those instances when political actors create coverage opportunities on their own initiative, shrunk. At the same time the share of reactive communications, i.e. those references in which political actors simply react to external events, grew to 85%.
The percentage of regional representatives and female voices also decreased, which could lead to a decline in the attention paid by the audience to the political forces, customarily represented by the same key figures.
2 It is a quantitative index, calculated based on the number of references made to the political actor and on the media outreach.
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Methodology: units of analysis
Throughout the year, the BISS Political Media Barometer’s slightly changed the sample from one issue to another, including the individual politicians, the political forces and coalitions that demonstrated the most active media presence. However, the unstable media presence figures on one hand, and the criteria of data comparability on the other, have prompted to a different approach to sampling. Guided by expert opinions and by the analysis of the developments in the political media field, we have opted for the following sampling principle. The first-level units of analysis include thirteen political forces. The second-level units of analysis are two representatives from each political force, ‘leader+1’. The sample of individuals may change, depending on how active the representatives of political forces are in the information field. Exceptions from this principle are made for the units of analysis that do not represent any political force but act as the voices of the political prisoners, like Maryna Adamovich, or which, more often than not, participate in the political communication field without any reference to their political affiliation, like Stanislau Shushkevich and Dzmitry Vus. A number of political forces are represented in the present report by their leaders only. These include the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada with Iryna Veshtard, ‘For Fair Elections’ campaign with Viktar Karniayenka, the BPF Conservative Christian Party with Zianon Pazniak, ‘Our Home’ campaign with Volha Karach, the Young Front with Nasta Dashkevich and the Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ with Siarhiey Kaliakin. The list can be extended if the political forces decide have other spokespersons, with comparable media presence figures. The data on the individual politicians from this list will be featured in the monitoring findings, even if their political forces are not mentioned in the media. Yet, other political figures mentioned in the media topics involving the political forces are going to be monitored. This enables us, on one hand, to offer a list of media representatives for each political force and on the other, to show how often the individual politicians from the list are mentioned in connection with their political forces. Our analysis of the media presence for the coalitions of political forces (April 2012 to March 2013) showed that the political forces are most commonly referred to without mentioning the coalitions they belong to. Even the launch of the ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign on May 20 resulted in only 1.5% references to the political parties as members of coalitions. Although coalitions tend to be less active between elections, the objective of evaluating their media performance is still on our agenda. As new coalition projects emerge, the list of coalitions to be monitored can be expanded. Thus, during the analyzed period we identified, codified and described 3,084 references to twenty three individual politicians and thirteen political forces. (Among them is ‘For Fair Elections’ campaign, which was established in order to monitor elections and does not function between elections. Yet, it is included in the analysis, considering the prospect of an upsurge in its activity, so that its dynamics can be monitored.) Our sample is limited to the independent political actors and forces3 only; the ruling elites were not considered within the framework of the project.
3 Please, note that we stick to a very broad notion of politicians/political actors. In Belarus these are not necessarily individuals publicly contesting for a state office. In a situation when the opposition has been deprived of any opportunity to influence the decision-making process on any of the state levels for over a
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The political forces are tentatively split into two groups: those active in Belarus and outside the country. The latter includes the political forces whose leaders are forced to live in exile or those that are registered abroad. They are singled out due to certain limitations imposed on their activities.
Each communication subject is described in terms of: political affiliation, gender, and position in their political organization. The qualitative and quantitative indices that we produce in the report (to be explained in detail further in the text), allow us to identify the trends and compare the actors, making a media profile of each political force/individual politician. The table below lists the individual political figures and forces that the report focuses on.
Table 1. The categories analyzed in the BISS Political Media Barometer
Political forces Representatives 1. Uladzimir Niakliayeu ‘Tell the Truth!’ civic campaign 2. Andrey Dzmitriyeu
3. Anatol Liabedzka The United Civil Party 4. Leu Marholin
5. Aliaksiey Yanukevich The BPF Party 6. Ryhor Kastusiou
7. Aliaksandr Milinkevich The Movement ‘For Freedom’ 8. Juras Hubarevich
9. Vital Rymasheuski The Belarusian Christian Democracy 10. Paval Seviarynets
11. Andrey Sannikau ‘European Belarus’ civil campaign 12. Iryna Khalip The Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada 13. Iryna Veshtard 14. Siarhiey Haidukevich The Liberal Democratic Party 15. Aleh Haidukevich The Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ 16. Siarhiey Kaliakin
17. Nasta Dashkevich The Young Front (Palazhanka)
The Conservative Christian Party BPF 18. Zianon Pazniak ‘Our Home’ civic campaign 19. Volha Karach ‘For Fair Elections’ campaign 20. Viktar Karniayenka During the analyzed period the coalition was just being set. For this reason the present report describes only the basic characteristics ‘People’s Referendum’ coalition of its media presence. Its comprehensive media profile is going to appear in the next issue. 21. Stanislau Shushkevich Political affiliation is not traced 22. Dzmitry Vus 23. Maryna Adamovich
decade, those who are considered as politicians may come from different backgrounds/have very varied jobs and occupations.
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Detailed research findings
Quantitative index
1. The total presence in the media for individual politicians and political forces, by the number of references The Quantitative Index is calculated as a numerical score for each political force and individual politician, based on the size of the resources’ audience, according to www.audience.by (see Appendix 1) and on the number of articles that mention a politician or a political force (each article is treated as one reference, no matter how many times the name of the political force or of the politician appears). The index consists of three components:
1) the media presence (online media and printed press),
2) political actors’ and forces’ own communication (political parties’ websites, affiliated informational portals, Facebook accounts), and
3) the total presence, which combines both the media coverage and the political actors’ and forces’ own communications.
The research findings for April – June 2013 show that Anatol Liabedzka, who also led in the previous quarter’s ratings, came first by the quantitative index. Even though the total number of political communications decreased, as comparing to the previous stage, the number of references to this public figure and his total presence index were much higher than in January – March. This time, the 368 references brought Liabedzka 1,704 points (cf.: 197 references and 1,241 points in January – March). The growth can be attributed to Liabedzka’s participation in the conference on Belarus held by the European People’s Party in Brussels on April 9 and to the meetings held in the Lithuanian Parliament on June 26, as well as to his role in organizing the ‘Chernolyl Way’ rally and the accompanying events. (The former two activities determined an increase in the amount of topics referring to foreign policy and international relations) Uladzimir Niakliayeu managed to keep the second position in the ratings, though his total presence score fell from 1,210 points gained by 244 references in January – March to 953 points and 192 references in April – June 2013. Aliaksandr Milinkevich, Aliaksiey Yanukevich and Vital Rymasheuski came third, fourth and fifth, respectively. In the early 2013, the media tended to focus their attention on those politicians who acted in Belarus rather than on those whose index depended on external factors and keen curiosity about their private circumstances. We can see that the trend continued into the second quarter. Thus, Yanukevich’s and Milinkevich’s total presence indices steadily went up again, in line with this trend. Yanukevich, who rose from the twelfth to the fifth position in the January – March ratings, this time ranked fourth. As for Milinkevich, he moved from the seventh to the sixth place in the first quarter and now came third in the quantitative index rating, with 920 points and 197 references. It was the first time that our research had included Volha Karach, who ranked twentieth, having scored 109 points and 19 references. While the previous quarter’s ‘top-12’ included four women, namely Iryna Khalip, Maryna Adamovich, Natallia Radzina and Nasta Dashkevich (Palazhanka), this time it was only Maryna Adamovich who made it into the ‘top-12’, with 407 rating points and 59 references.
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Table 2. The total presence in the information field for individual politicians
Politician Number of Total presence index Position in the rating references Anatol Liabedzka 368 1 704 1 Uladzimir Niakliayeu 192 953 2 Aliaksandr Milinkevich 197 920 3 Aliaksiey Yanukevich 167 858 4 Vital Rymasheuski 148 795 5 Andrey Sannikau 108 664 6 Andrey Dzmitriyeu 84 482 7 Maryna Adamovich 59 407 8 Paval Seviarynets 70 368 9 Leu Marholin 61 305 10 Ryhor Kastusiou 58 284 11 Zianon Pazniak 46 249 12 Juras Hubarevich 58 225 13 Aleh Haidukevich 30 203 14 Siarhiey Kaliakin 38 199 15 Iryna Khalip 31 189 16 Stanislau Shushkevich 22 145 17 Nasta Dashkevich (Palazhanka) 22 136 18 Siarhiey Haidukevich 17 130 19 Volha Karach 19 109 20 Iryna Veshtard 26 107 21 Dzmitry Vus 11 83 22 Viktar Karniayenka 7 15 23 2. The individual politicians: media presence vs. their own communications
The upward trend in the share of individual politicians’ own communications that we described during the previously analyzed period did not continue in the second quarter. The share of Anatol Liabedzka’s own communication raised from 22% to 47% of the total references and for Uladzimir Niakliayeu the percentage of his own communications also grew, even though less strong than Liabedzka’s, from 34% to 41%. At the same time, the shares of Aliaksandr Milinkevich’s and Aliaksiey Yanukevich’s own communications slightly fell, from 44% to 40% and from 43% to 38%, respectively. In the previous quarter the dynamics of politicians’ own communications and their positions in the ratings led us to the conclusion that a growth in the number of their own communications provided a certain increase in the media presence. In this research stage, we can conclude that a lower share of their own communications does not result in the politicians’ lower positions in the ratings. Thus, Milinkevich rose from the sixth to the third position and Yanukevich moved from the fifth to the fourth place. It can therefore be stated that the impact of one politicians’ own communications on the general rating is only limited.
In terms of their own communications, it was Viktar Karniayenka (71%), Iryna Veshtard (65%), Juras Hubarevich and Leu Marholin (59%) who led during the analyzed time span. In this stage, it was the first time that we deliberately traced Leu Marholin’s communications. He ranked tenth among the individual political actors. His major topic is economy; he comments on such issues as privatization, Russian business in Belarus and the chances of another devaluation of the Belarusian ruble. On one hand, the higher shares of these politicians’ own communications are a direct outcome of the media’s lower attention. On the other hand, the agenda of their own communications gives them a lot more opportunities to shape their own political image.
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Table 3. The individual politicians: media coverage vs. their own communications
Politicians Media coverage Their own The share of their communications own communications in the total presence
Number of Index Number of Index references references Anatol Liabedzka 194 1 530 174 174 47% Uladzimir Niakliayeu 114 875 78 78 41% Aliaksandr Milinkevich 118 841 79 79 40% Aliaksiey Yanukevich 103 794 64 64 38% Vital Rymasheuski 80 727 68 68 46% Andrey Sannikau 83 639 25 25 23% Andrey Dzmitriyeu 45 443 39 39 46% Maryna Adamovich 51 399 8 8 14% Paval Seviarynets 50 348 20 20 29% Leu Marholin * 26 270 35 35 57% Ryhor Kastusiou 36 262 22 22 38% Zianon Pazniak 35 238 11 11 24% Juras Hubarevich * 24 191 34 34 59% Aleh Haidukevich 22 195 8 8 27% Siarhiey Kaliakin 21 182 17 17 45% Iryna Khalip 25 183 6 6 19% Stanislau Shushkevich 18 141 4 4 18% Nasta Dashkevich 17 131 5 5 23% Siarhiey Haidukevich 12 125 5 5 29% Volha Karach 11 101 8 8 42% Iryna Veshtard * 9 90 17 17 65% Dzmitry Vus 8 80 3 3 27% Viktar Karniayenka * 2 10 5 5 71% * - Leaders by the share of their own communications
3. The political forces: the total presence in the information field, media coverage and their own communications ‘Tell the Truth!’ civic campaign is the traditional leader in terms of the total presence in the information field. Its index has hardly changed; it scored 2,180 points as compared to 2,063 points in the previous quarter. This is evidence of a solid foundation for the communication policies of ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign, which contrasts with the more dynamic ups and downs in its leader’s total presence. During the analyzed time span, the political forces’ ratings on the whole correlated with those of their leaders. ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign, the United Civil Party, the BPF Party, the Movement ‘For Freedom’, Belarusian Christian Democracy and ‘European Belarus’ campaign were the ‘top-6’. (The latter took the sixth position, just like its leader did in the individual rating.) The political forces’ indices were invariably higher than those of their representatives. When a political force ranks lower in the ratings than its leader, it can be concluded that its communications were by and large related to only one representative, i.e. its leader. Although Uladzimir Niakliayeu ranked second, the ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign maintained the leading position. In contrast, the UCP’s communications were more leader-centered, so it came second in the total presence ratings, even though Anatol Liabedzka remained number one by the individual total presence index. The same is true for the Movement ‘For Freedom’ and the BPF Party. Aliaksandr Milinkevich, the leader of the Movement ‘For Freedom’, ranked third, while his political force took the
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fourth position, falling behind the BPF Party. Thus, if one representative of a political force is leading, this does not automatically improve the performance of their political force. The political forces’ total presence scores largely depended on the diversity of their representation in the media.
During the analyzed interval the growth in the shares of political forces’ own communications slowed down in comparison with January – March. (The same is true for the political actors.) Not yet receiving sufficient media coverage, ‘For Fair Elections’ campaign and the ‘People’s Referendum’ campaign took over the leading positions by the share of their own communications, 68% and 61%, respectively. The share of their own communications for the ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign, which ranked first in the previous quarter, dropped from 56% to 52%. The UCP meanwhile repeated its closest competitor’s last quarter’s achievement, with 56% of their own communications.
Just like in the previous quarter, the Liberal Democratic Party held the mid position in the ratings, ranking seventh of the thirteen political forces. The party’s quantitative index of total presence in the information field changed only insignificantly, from 456 points in January - March to 398 points in April - June. The number of references remained virtually the same, 55 ones in the second quarter as compared to 58 at the previous stage. The party has a relatively low share of its own communications – 31%, which points to an underdeveloped potential for increasing its media presence by creating coverage opportunities on its own resources. ‘Our Home’ civic campaign, which was monitored for the first time, ranked twelfth among the thirteen political forces. Overall, this is correlated with its leader Volha Karach’s position in the individual total presence index. However, ‘Our Home’ campaign got eighteen references, which is even fewer than the nineteen references to its leader. This is evidence of the potential for increasing its media presence by diversifying its representation and by consistently declaring the leader’s political affiliation. The share of its own communications makes up to 33%, which also indicates the potential for growth.
Table 4. The total presence of the political forces in the information field
Political forces Number of Total presence Position in references index the rating
‘Tell the Truth!’ civic campaign 487 2 180 1 The United Civil Party 522 2 113 2 The BPF Party 362 1 747 3 The Movement ‘For Freedom’ 320 1 425 4 The Belarusian Christian Democracy 316 1 397 5 ‘European Belarus’ civic campaign 84 531 6 The Belarusian Social Democratic Party 114 456 7 Hramada The Liberal Democratic Party 58 398 8 The ‘People’s Referendum’ Coalition 77 322 9 The Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ 77 295 10 The Young Front 63 283 11 The BPF Conservative Christian Party 39 228 12 ‘Our Home’ civic campaign 18 112 13 ‘For Fair Elections’ campaign 22 60 14
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Table 5. Political forces: media coverage vs. their own communications
Political forces Media coverage Their own Share of their communications own communications in the total presence
Number of Index Number of Index references references ‘Tell the Truth!’ civic 235 1 928 252 252 52% Thecampaign United Civil Party * 230 1 821 292 292 56% The BPF Party 210 1 595 152 152 42% The Movement ‘For Freedom’ 167 1 272 153 153 48% The Belarusian Christian 150 1 231 166 166 53% Democracy
‘European Belarus’ civic 66 513 18 18 21% campaign The Belarusian Social 54 396 60 60 53% Democratic Party Hramada The Liberal Democratic Party 40 380 18 18 31% ‘People’s Referendum’ 30 275 47 47 61% Coalition* The Belarusian United Left 37 255 40 40 52% Part ‘A Just World’ The Young Front 31 251 32 32 51% The BPF Conservative 28 217 11 11 28% Christian Party ‘Our Home’ civic campaign 12 106 6 6 33% ‘For Fair Elections’ 7 45 15 15 68% campaign* * - Leaders by the share of their own communications
4. The dynamics of the total presence over time
The following charts depict the quantitative index dynamics for the political actors and forces. Chart 6 represents a timeline of quantitative index accumulation for the ‘top-12’ politicians. (They scored at least 240 points, since the ‘top-12’ threshold steadily keeps going down, this time from 360 points in January - March to 240 points during the analyzed time interval).
In the second quarter the political actors accumulated their indices quite gradually. However, Anatol , who came first by the number of references, had performed similarly to the others until late April, when his media presence boosted. This could be partially attributed to his role in organizing the ‘Chernobyl Way’ rally. Yet, the other factor was the increased pressure on the politician, who risked facing the seizure of property for failing to pay a fine and was exposed to the police’s attempt to enter his apartment, under the pretext of searching for unregistered weapons. The ‘Chernobyl Way’ also led to an increase in Vital Rymasheuski’s and Aliaksiey Yanukevich’s total presence in the information field. Yet, it was Paval Seviarynets who kept the lead throughout April, after the number of references to the political actor boosted early in the month in connection with the permission to celebrate Easter with his family. Uladzimir Niakliayeu, Aliaksandr Milinkevich and Aliaksiey Yanukevich dramatically
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increased their total presence scores following the press conference on May 20, when they announced that their political organizations had reached an agreement to work together in the three forthcoming elections. Chart 7 presents the dynamics of total presence index accumulation for the political forces. The comparison of the chart profiles for the political actors on the one hand and for the political forces on the other reveals when exactly the politicians’ total presence growth was induced by their ‘personal stories’ vs. by their political activities. In the latter case, a surge in their individual indices was accompanied by a growth in the indices of their political forces. For example, when Niakliayeu’s, Milinkevich’s and Yanukevich’s total presence indices went up following their press conference on May 20, so did those of their political forces. By contrast, Paval Seviarynets’s leading position in April and the upsurge in references to Anatol Liabedzka later that month had no impact on the dynamics of total presence index accumulation for the Belarusian Christian Democracy or the United Civil Party.
The index accumulation chart shows how the ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign, which fell behind the UCP in April, first boosted its presence in the information field and caught up with the latter thanks to the news of its application for registration with the Ministry of Justice on May 8, and then went on to take the lead following the press conference on May 20. Chart 6. Accumulation of the total presence index for individual politicians
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07.04.2013 10.04.2013 06.06.2013 09.06.2013 01.04.2013 04.04.2013 13.04.2013 16.04.2013 19.04.2013 22.04.2013 25.04.2013 28.04.2013 01.05.2013 04.05.2013 07.05.2013 10.05.2013 13.05.2013 16.05.2013 19.05.2013 22.05.2013 25.05.2013 28.05.2013 31.05.2013 03.06.2013 12.06.2013 15.06.2013 18.06.2013 21.06.2013 24.06.2013 27.06.2013 30.06.2013 The order of names in the legend corresponds to the politicians’ position in the quantitative index Liabedzka Niakliayeu Milinkevich Yanukevich Rymasheuski Sannikau Dzmitriyeu Adamovich Seviarynets Marholin Kastusiou Pazniak
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Chart 7. Accumulation of the total presence index for political forces
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19.05.2013 24.06.2013 01.04.2013 04.04.2013 07.04.2013 10.04.2013 13.04.2013 16.04.2013 19.04.2013 22.04.2013 25.04.2013 28.04.2013 01.05.2013 04.05.2013 07.05.2013 10.05.2013 13.05.2013 16.05.2013 22.05.2013 25.05.2013 28.05.2013 31.05.2013 03.06.2013 06.06.2013 09.06.2013 12.06.2013 15.06.2013 18.06.2013 21.06.2013 27.06.2013 30.06.2013 The order of names in the legend corresponds to the forces’ position in the quantitative index 'Tell the Truth!' civic campaign The United Civil Party The BPF Party The Movement 'For Freedom' The Belarusian Christian Democracy 'European Belarus' civil campaign The Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada The Liberal Democratic Party The Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ The Young Front The Conservative Christian Party BPF 'Our Home' civic campaign 'For Fair Elections' campaign
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Qualitative index
The qualitative index was introduced in order to compare in what capacity the politicians were referred to in the media. The qualitative index is composed of 3 sub- indices:
Expertise (includes a political actor’s appearances in the media as an expert, commentator or author of analytical materials); Initiative (includes the media coverage of politicians presenting new programs, projects or tactic/strategy of the activity); and Action (coverage of specific actions taken by a political actor or force during the analyzed period, for example, when a leader participates in a round table or a rally).
The total sum total of all the politicians’ indices in each of the three areas is 100 points. The individual indices for ‘Expertise’, ‘Initiative’ and ‘Action’ show the share of each political actor’s contribution to the media coverage in that capacity and in the given dimension4. Below are the plots for the ‘top-12’ politicians, by the total quantitative index. The key feature of the communications’ content during the analyzed period was a decrease of the amount of initiatives presented by the political actors. Except for Andrey Dzmitriyeu, who also led by the share of ‘initiative’ in January – March 2013, none of the ‘top-12’ political actors had any communications that could be regarded as ‘initiative’. The qualitative index reflects each politician’s contribution to the sub-indices individually, created by all the rated political actors. For this reason Dzmitriyeu scored 75 points for ‘initiative’, while the remaining 25 points were distributed among those figures that did not make the ‘top-12’. That is why Dzmitriyeu maintained his leading position by qualitative index, with 84 points out of 300.
In the other two dimensions, i.e. ‘expertise’ and ‘action’, the chart of the qualitative index is similar to the chart of the quantitative index. In other words, as the number of references goes down, so does the qualitative index. In all the aspects except zero initiative for the ‘top-12’ politicians, the distribution of the qualitative index is more balanced than is was in the previous quarter, which was marked by discrepancies between the quantitative and qualitative indices in the ‘top-12’. For all the political actors except Dzmitriyeu, who leads in the qualitative index, the share of ‘expertise’ is equal to or slightly exceeds the ‘political action’.
4 The maximal index for each dimension is 100 points, so the maximal qualitative index can be 300 points.
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Chart 8. Distribution of the qualitative index parameters
Liabedzka Niakliayeu Milinkevich 9,2 16,5 10,1
8,0 8,0 27,0 Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Action Action Action
Ment.=368 Quant.=1704 Qual.=43,5 Ment.=192 Quant.=953 Qual.=17,1 Ment.=197 Quant.=920 Qual.=18,1
Yanukevich Rymasheuski Sannikau 7,3 8,6 6,3
6,1 8,3 12,4
Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Action Action Action
Ment.=167 Quant.=858 Qual.=15,5 Ment.=148 Quant.=795 Qual.=21 Ment.=108 Quant.=664 Qual.=12,5
Dzmitriyeu Adamovich Seviarynets 5,4 6,2 7,3 3,7 2,8 3,4
75,0 Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Action Action Action
Ment.=84 Quant.=482 Qual.=84,1 Ment.=59 Quant.=407 Qual.=8,9 Ment.=70 Quant.=368 Qual.=10,7
Marholin Kastusiou Pazniak 4,8 3,3 3,3 1,2 2,0 2,3
Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Expertise Initiative Action Action Action
Ment.=61 Quant.=305 Qual.=6,8 Ment.=58 Quant.=284 Qual.=5,7 Ment.=46 Quant.=249 Qual.=4,5
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Where and how the opposition speaks
1. The distribution of total presence by source
In the four previous monitoring stages the distribution of the sources containing/publishing political communication basically remained unchanged. In April – June 2013 these changes appeared insignificant, too. We can still state that the pattern is quite stable, so political actors and forces should make an effort and alter the model of their relations with the media if they want to increase or reduce the share of certain information sources. After an initial decrease in the share of the independent press (down to 4% in January – March 2013), in the second quarter it went back to 12%. The upward trend in the use of partisan resources persists. Their share increased from 30% to 38%. The growth, however, can be attributed to the methodological changes in sampling and to a larger proportion of political actors who actively represent their political forces. This is supported by the fact that the percentage of individual politicians’ own communications diminished rather than grew during the analysis interval Chart 9. Distribution of appearances in the information field by source
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
Partisan Facebook Facebook LiveJournal Facebook Facebook informati- accounts of accounts of accounts Partisan accounts accounts political politicians of onal portals informati- of political of LiveJournal forces 1% politicians onal 22% forces politicians accounts 3% 1% portals National 2% 1% of National 22% govern- politicians govern- ment press 0% ment press 0% 1% Independe Indepen- nt Indepen- dent Indepen- Belarusian dent Belarusian dent online Belarusian online Belarusian media press media press 63% 15% 60% 9% January-March 2013 April-June 2013 Facebook Partisan accounts of Facebook Facebook LiveJournal informati- political Facebook Partisan accounts of accounts of accounts onal forces accounts of informati- political politicians of portals 6% politicians onal portals forces 1% politicians 38% 30% 3% 0% 1%
National National govern- govern- Indepen- ment press Indepen- ment press dent 0% dent 0% Indepen- Belarusian Independe Belarusian dent online nt online Belarusian media Belarusian media press 62% press 43% 4% 12%
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2. How do the independent Belarusian political forces use the available information field
Just like the previously monitored periods, April – June 2013 showed positive dynamics in the themes of communications, though this time the area of change was different. In the previous quarters the social sphere was receiving increased attention, while the economy-related issues still received little consideration. However, during the second quarter the imbalance in the themes was redressed. The social sphere remained among the top priorities, though it gave way a little bit to international relations and domestic politics. International relations received a lot of coverage mainly thanks to to the conference on Belarus held by the European People’s Party in Brussels on April 9, to the opposition leaders’ meetings in the Lithuanian Parliament on April 15, and to the joint address of the opposition leaders to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 19. Domestic politics was featured by and large, covering mostly the regional initiatives, the training session of the Constitution for ‘Tell the Truth!’ and the BPF Party activists, and the discussion around the legal status of the members of the Parliament by ‘Our Home’ campaign. It was the first time since our monitoring was launched that the economy-related topics received wide coverage. Until the second quarter, their proportion never exceeded 6 or 7%, but this time it surged to 17.6%, which can mean a few things. First, this higher share diversified the political parties’ agendas, which could have a positive impact on their image. Second, the economic issues are more relevant to the general public than the political subjects, so bringing the economy to the foreground could help the political parties make their agendas more appealing to the voters.
In April – June 2013 the gap between the most and the least covered topics narrowed down, which also made the themes of communications look more balanced. In the previous quarter 75% of all communications referred to the social sphere and only 3% dealt with rights and freedoms. This time, by contrast, the international relations (the topic that received the biggest coverage) were subject of 41% of communications, while the least popular theme of internal partisan issues was referred to in 13% of communications.
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Chart 10. Topics of communications
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
elections 44,2 social sphere 53,1
domestic politics 14,4 parties 52,4
repressions 14,0 repressions 40,1
parties 12,6 foriegn policy 35,0
social sphere 8,1 domestic politics 30,8
foriegn policy 5,1 elections 21,4
economy 1,5 economy 6,8
rights and freedoms 0,1 rights and freedoms 2,4
January-March 2013 April-June 2013
foriegn policy 40,8 social sphere 75,4 domestic politics 40,1 domestic politics 46,9 social sphere 39,7 repressions 35,5 rights and freedoms 20,4 parties 33,3 economy 17,3 foriegn policy 18,6 repressions 16,7 elections 13,8 elections 14,8 economy 5,8 parties 12,9 rights and freedoms 2,7
Overall, the political forces were able to reach a balance in the distribution of topics of their communication acts. All the major subjects of the political communication field paid more attention to the economy-related issues. As for ‘European Belarus’ campaign and the Belarusian Christian Democracy Party, their distribution of topics in a way differed from the others’, as they gave much less attention to the elections. In the BCD’s case, the reason is that they are still undecided about the elections and the two coalitions that are now being formed. By contrast, ‘Our Home’ campaign discussed the elections more actively than the others. The international relations were in the focus for all the political forces except for ‘For Fair Elections’ campaign.
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Just like the previous quarter, the current one did not show any essential differences in the distribution of the topics covered by the political forces inside and outside the country. The proportions of most topics tended to converge. However, some traditional differences were still maintained. For example, compared to the forces inside Belarus, their ‘foreign’ counterparts showed more interest in such topics as repressions and social sphere and less interest in domestic politics.
Chart 11. Distribution of topics of communications for political forces
The United Civil Party 33 7 16 15 49 16 37 25
‘Tell the Truth!’ civic campaign 48 18 1115 32 22 48 17
The The BPF Party Party 53 20 1212 40 19 35 8
The Movement ‘For Freedom’ 53 19 18 13 45 15 26 9
The Belarusian Christian Democracy 44 4 19 6 30 16 50 19
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada 68 114 14 25 17 36 11
The Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ 44 14 18 17 53 17 29 8
The The Liberal Democratic Party 16 14 10 64 19 34 7
‘For Fair Elections’ campaign 50 18 55 41 32
Our Home' civic campaign 44 56 17 44 17
‘European Belarus’ civil campaign 43 6 29 4 56 20 27 18
The Young Front 24 21 1413 24 10 60 44
The The Conservative Christian Party BPF 31 18 21 31 13 51 21
domestic politics elections repressions parties
foriegn policy economy social sphere rights and freedoms
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Chart 11.1 Distribution of topics for groups of political forces
domestic politics 45,3% 33,9%
elections 13,5% 13,4%
repressions 13,9% 18,3%
parties 12,5% 10,2%
foriegn policy 39,7% 39,8%
economy 18,0% 15,1%
social sphere 38,9% 43,5%
rights and freedoms 15,9% 27,4% In country Out of country
3. The correlation between the offline activities and the political communications
The correlation between the politicians’ offline activities and their media presence is calculated as the proportion of references related to the politicians’ real-life actions in their total media coverage. Here we analyse media coverage only, i.e. we count the media references to offline activities. These include the political forces’ media activities, such as statements, press-conferences and interviews, and their own communications like postings and publications on parties’ websites, blogs, Facebook accounts etc. The offline activities include the internal partisan events and the activities aimed at the electorate and international audience, such as foreign trips and meetings with foreign politicians (see Appendix 2). The monitoring deals with only those offline activities that were mentioned by the media or promoted in the media by the political forces. That is why the regional activities, to give just one example, that were not promoted or reported in the media do not feature in the research findings. This time, there was a certain growth in the offline activities (or their media coverage) as compared to the previous quarter. Interestingly enough, we once again noticed considerable differences in the percentage of offline activities depending on the month. In other words, the previous quarter’s pattern was repeated. The smallest proportion of offline activities in the media coverage was observed in April – only 28% after a relative boost in March 2013, when it reached 51%. Then, there was a certain growth in May – up to 34% – and in June the percentage of offline activities reached a maximum share of 58%. Thus, in June over half of the media references to the political actors and forces mentioned their real-life actions. The dynamics of the offline activities in the media coverage during the two quarters of 2013 may lead to the conclusion that this variable follows a cyclical pattern. There were clear spikes in March and June. It may have something to do with the specific features of political forces’ work. Since the offline activities require a certain amount of preparation,
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there are times when they dwindle. Another factor could be significant dates (holidays) associated with traditional activities, such as Freedom Day or the Chernobyl Way. The next research stage will give us a chance to see if our assumption is correct, as it does not include any traditional history-related events.
In the previous quarter the main type of media covered offline activities were the press conferences. By contrast, in April – June there were the round tables discussions and debates with other politicians that came to the fore and these were mentioned in 67% of media references to offline activities. (This development is in line with a relative growth in the topics associated with domestic politics.) Chart 12. The correlation between the offline activities and the political communications
28,1%
33,5%
57,5%
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Chart 13. Types of offline activities5
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
Meeting with electorate 6,9 Meeting with electorate 3,7
Round table, discussion with other opposition 5,7 Round table, discussion with representative other opposition 32,9 representative Partisan meeting 5,9 Partisan meeting 26,9
Press conference 5,9 Press conference 8,0 Foreign trip 12,6 Meeting with foreign 28,2 Meeting with foreign politicians politicians 1,5
Statement, application 59,3 Statement, application 37,0
Appeal 0,0 Appeal 0,0
January-March 2013 April-June 2013
Meeting with electorate 45,0 Meeting with electorate 38,7 Round table, discussion with Round table, discussion with other opposition 67,1 other opposition 40,5 representative representative Partisan meeting 7,0 Partisan meeting 7,2
Press conference Press conference 74,9 21,0
Meeting with foreign Meeting with foreign 4,1 politicians 18,2 politicians
Statement, application 21,7 Statement, application 26,8
Appeal 4,1 Appeal 1,4
During the previous reporting period the proportion of the offline activities in the media coverage was roughly equal for the forces inside and outside the country – 37% and 35%, respectively. In April – June, by contrast, the share of the offline activities of the forces inside the country markedly exceeds that of their ‘foreign’ counterparts – 44% vs. 29%.
5 The sum total exceeds 100%, as one article can mention several events.
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Chart 14. The media coverage of political forces’ activities
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The United Civil Party 42% 58%
‘Tell the Truth!’ civic campaign 47% 53%
The The BPF Party Party 38% 62%
The Movement ‘For Freedom’ 45% 55%
The Belarusian Christian Democracy 45% 55%
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada 58% 42%
The Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ 61% 39%
The The Liberal Democratic Party 34% 66%
‘For Fair Elections’ campaign 55% 45%
Our Home' civic campaign 17% 83%
‘European Belarus’ civil campaign 38% 62%
The Young Front 24% 76%
The The Conservative Christian Party BPF 18% 82%
Connected with offline activity Not connected with offline activity
Chart 14.1. The media coverage of activities, for groups of political forces
In country 44% 56%
Out of country 29% 71%
Connected with offline activity Not connected with offline activity
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4. The levels of political actors’ and forces’ activity level in the media In analysing the levels of political subjects’ activity, we distinguish between proactive, reactive and passive communications. Here, ‘proactive’ refers to cases when politicians come up with a new initiative, acting as newsmakers for the media. ‘Reactive’ is about those instances when politicians react to external circumstances. ‘Passive’ refers to the cases when the politicians or the political forces receive coverage on the initiative of the media, without any proactive or reactive steps made by the political subjects themselves. The analysed period was marked by a steady rise in the reactive communications and by a downward trend in the proactive one. Reactive communications made up to 85% of the total, while the proportion of proactive communications fell from 15% in January – March to 6% in April – June and the passive ones dropped from 24% to 9%. The trend may have a negative impact on the political actors’ and forces’ images, depicting them as subjects that only react to external circumstances, like the latest developments in international relations, instead of taking an active stance in the political field.
Besides, the reactive communications do influence the growth of passive ones, which reflect the media’s own interest to the political field. It can therefore be argued that the levels of activeness in communications need improving.
Chart 15. Levels of activeness in communications
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
Proac- Proac- tive Passive tive 5% 18% 24%
Passive 45%
Reactive Reactive 50% 58%
January-March 2013 April-June 2013
Proac- Proactive tive Passive 6% 9% Passive 15% 24%
Reactive Reactive 61% 85%
In the second quarter the differences in activeness between the forces inside and outside the country evened out. The forces inside the country can be tentatively divided into two groups: 1) those whose communications had a certain share of proactive
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communications, albeit a small one (the UCP, ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign, the BPF Party, the BCD and the Hramada Party) and 2) those whose communications were only reactive and passive. The latter held lower positions in the ratings. We would recommend the political forces to increase their shares of proactive communications, in order to improve their total media presence. Chart 16. Distribution of levels of activeness in communications
0% 50% 100%
The United Civil Party 6% 86% 8%
‘Tell the Truth!’ civic campaign 9% 89% 2%
The The BPF Party Party 6% 89% 5%
The Movement ‘For Freedom’ 8% 88% 5%
The Belarusian Christian Democracy 11% 75% 14%
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada 15% 81% 4%
The Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ 91% 9%
The The Liberal Democratic Party 98% 2%
‘For Fair Elections’ campaign 100%
Our Home' civic campaign 11% 89%
‘European Belarus’ civil campaign 8% 86% 6%
The Young Front 2% 57% 41%
The The Conservative Christian Party BPF 97% 3%
Proactive Reactive Passive
Chart 16.1. Distribution of levels of activeness for groups of political forces
In country 8% 86% 6%
Out of country 4% 78% 17%
Proactive Reactive Passive
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5. Types of representation of the political forces in the media
The four previous research stages revealed that the overall media profile of the political forces’ representatives in the media was a rather stable feature of political communications. It became clear that the media profile was more difficult to be influenced by political forces than the topics of communications, the share of offline activities in the media coverage or the activeness in communications. This conclusion is supported by the research findings for the analysed interval.
This is particularly true about the positioning of individual politicians as representatives of political forces. Although we reviewed the methodology to shift the focus of the monitoring towards political forces, in April – June 2013 the proportion of references to politicians with and without mentioning their affiliation remained the same as in the previous quarter – 73% vs. 27%, respectively.
In order to trace the roots of stable individual representation without mentioning the political affiliation, let us consider this variable for each actor. If we take the leading group of politicians acting inside the country, there is a marked difference between Uladzimir Niakliayeu and Aliaksandr Milinkevich, on the one hand, and Anatol Liabedzka, Aliaksiey Yanukevich and Vital Rymasheuski, on the other. The former had a relatively big proportion of media appearances without reference to their political forces, while the latter seldom spoke in other instances than on behalf of their parties. If we consider the politicians who represent the most active forces alongside their leaders, Andrey Dzmitriyeu, Juras Hubarevich and Ryhor Kastusiou had a rather low share of media appearances without reference to their political affiliation. By contrast, Leu Marholin represented his political force in only 41% of references. He was most commonly positioned as an independent expert, not affiliated with the UCP.
Besides, Volha Karach was mentioned more often than ‘Our Home’ campaign, and quite often – namely in 26% of references – he appeared in the media not as a representative of ‘Our Home’ campaign.
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Chart 17. The positioning of messengers
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
No No affilia- affilia- tion tion 11% 15%
Affiliated Affiliated with the with the force force 85% 89%
January-March 2013 April-June 2013
No No affilia- affilia- tion tion 27% 28%
Affiliated Affiliated with the with the force force 72% 73%
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Chart 17.1. The positioning of the individual politicians in the media
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Liabedzka 93% 7% Niakliayeu 70% 30% Milinkevich 76% 24% Yanukevich 87% 13% Rymasheuski 90% 10% Sannikau 29% 71% Dzmitriyeu 95% 5% Adamovich 100% Seviarynets 40% 60% Marholin 41% 59% Kastusiou 95% 5% Pazniak 61% 39% Hubarevich 95% 5% Aleh Haidukevich 100% Kaliakin 66% 34% Khalip 100% Shushkevich 18% 82% Dashkevich (Palazhanka) 27% 73% Siarhei Haidukevich 100% Karach 74% 26% Veshtard 92% 8% Vus 100% Karniayenka 100%
Affiliated with the force No affiliation
As for the position of the political forces’ representatives, their pattern was similar to the model established in the previous research stages. As the methodology changed, the already miniscule proportions of rank-and-file activists and regional members decreased. This supports the assumption that the political forces maintained a certain share of representation by rank-and-file activists just because some of these individuals were traced deliberately.
Of all the political forces active inside the country, only the ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign had a share, albeit a minor one, of alternative spokespersons. 100% of references to the UCP, the BPF Party, the BCD and the Movement ‘For Freedom’ featured only their top leaders or one of the leaders. Only the Young Front had a sufficient share of references to a regional leader and the BPF Conservative Christian Party was represented by a common regional member.
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Chart 18. The positions of the political forces’ representatives
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
Common Common Common Not a member regional member represen from member from tative center 2% center 6% Regional 6% Regional 2% leader leader 4% 1% Leader Leader 50% One of 48% One of the the leaders/ leaders/ board board 43% 37%
January-March 2013 April-June 2013 Common Common member Common member from Not a Common Not a regional from center represen regional represen Regional member center 2% tative member tative leader 0% 2% 5% 2% 4% 0% Regional One of leader the 2% leaders/ One of board the Leader 36% leaders/ 48% Leader board 59% 42%
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Chart 19. The positions of the political forces’ representatives, for each force
0% 50% 100%
The United Civil Party 93% 7%
‘Tell the Truth!’ civic campaign 49% 50%
The The BPF Party Party 72% 27%
The Movement ‘For Freedom’ 73% 27%
The Belarusian Christian Democracy 100%
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada 100%
The Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ 64% 36%
The The Liberal Democratic Party 36% 64%
‘For Fair Elections’ campaign 100%
Our Home' civic campaign 100%
‘European Belarus’ civil campaign 52% 48%
The Young Front 15% 77% 8%
The The Conservative Christian Party BPF 82% 9%
Leader One of the leaders/ board Regional leader Common member from center Common regional member
Chart 19.1. The positions of representatives for groups of political forces
In country 62% 37%
Out of country 57% 40% 3%
Leader One of the leaders/ board Regional leader Common member from center Common regional member
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Chart 20. The positions of the political forces’ representatives by resource
56,4 Independent Belarusian online media 36,1 6,8 60,1 Independent Belarusian press 28,3 11,1 National government press 100,0 60,4 Partisan informational portals 37,4 1,7 65,5 Facebook accounts of political forces 32,2 1,1 38,9 Facebook accounts of politicians 61,1 Leader One of the leaders/ board Regional leader
Common member from center Common regional member Not a representative
Chart 21. Representation by gender
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
Female Female 14% 19%
Male Male 86% 81%
January-March 2013 April-June 2013
Female Female 7% 16%
Male Male 84% 93%
The proportion of female voices dropped from over 15% (in January – March 2013 the figure was 16%) to 7% only, the absolute minimum throughout the monitoring. It was the forces outside the country that accounted for the fall, as the ‘insiders’ customarily had a low percentage of female representation. In January – March 2013, the share of female voices who represented the forces outside the country made up 37%. By contrast, this time the figure plummeted to 6%, even though the two key personalities, Nasta Dashkevich (Palazhanka) and Iryna Khalip, were still included in the analysis.
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The shares of parties, movements and coalitions remained as stable as previously. The coalition activity was still low, but it has the potential for growth as the elections approach. This is substantiated by the creation of the ‘People’s Referendum’ coalition and by the plans to work together during the three forthcoming elections, announced by the BPF Party, the ‘Tell the Truth!’ campaign and the Movement ‘For Freedom’. (The parties that belong to the ‘People’s Referendum’ coalition even accounted for the modest 2.3% of the total references to political forces.) Chart 21.1 Representation by gender for groups of political forces
In country 98% 2%
Out of country 94% 6%
male femle
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Chart 22. Representation by the type of political forces
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
Political party 57,5 Political party 52,6
Movement 40,8 Movement 45,2
Coalition 1,3 Coalition 0,7
Party/movement as a Party/movement as a 0,4 1,5 part of coalition part of coalition
January-March 2013 April-June 2013
Political party 53,5 Political party 60,0
Movement 46,3 Movement 40,0
Coalition 0,2 Coalition 0,5
6. The levels of events figuring in the information field
Just like in the previous research stages, the distribution of the levels of events in the information field in April – June followed a stable pattern. There was a slight difference, in that the proportion of international events grew from 14% to 24%, while the share of national events reduced from 59% to 52%. Although the proportion of regional representatives dropped notably in the second quarter, the coverage of the regional events in the information field still made up 12%, just as it did in January – March.
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Chart 23. Levels of events
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
Interna- Interna- tional Personal tional Personal 7% 13% 11% 17% Regional 12% Regional 10%
National 70% National 60%
January-March 2013 April-June 2013
Interna- tional Interna- Personal 14% Personal 15% 12% tional 24% Regional Regional 12% 12%
National National 59% 52%
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Chart 23.1. Levels of events by source
27% 55% Independent Belarusian online media 7% 11% 26% 51% Independent Belarusian press 8% 15%
National government press 100%
21% 49% Partisan informational portals 19% 11% 22% 50% Facebook accounts of political forces 21% 8% 11% 70% Facebook accounts of politicians 5% 14%
International National Regional Personal
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7. In what capacity are the politicians referred to in the information field The large number of round table discussions and meetings between the opposition members, as well as the traditional ‘Chernobyl Way’ rally, allowed the political actors to increase their share of references as participants in events. However, the proportion of references to politicians as experts also grew from 10% to 18%, as compared to the previous time span. A certain growth in ‘active’ media appearances correlates with the higher figures of offline activities covered by the media. Chart 24. Types of references
July-September 2012 October-December 2012
Participant of the events 17,3 Participant of the events 20,6
Comment on the events 7,0 Comment on the events 2,5
Expert opinion 13,1 Expert opinion 9,4
General reasoning 54,9 General reasoning 60,5
New project, initiative 2,5 New project, initiative 3,0
New strategy 0,1 New strategy
Just mentioned 4,0 Just mentioned 5,1
January-March 2013 April-June 2013
Participant of the Participant of the events 52,2 44,2 events Comment on the events 0,3 Comment on the events 5,9
Expert opinion 18,0 Expert opinion 10,7
General reasoning 31,8 General reasoning 26,8
New project, initiative 2,7 New project, initiative 0,7
Just mentioned 4,8 Just mentioned 1,9
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Chart 25. The distribution of types of references for individual politicians
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Liabedzka 53% 33% 14% 1% Niakliayeu 37% 5% 58% Milinkevich 51% 40% 8%1% Yanukevich 55% 1% 18% 24% 2% Rymasheuski 58% 24% 17% 1% Sannikau 55% 18% 26% 2% Dzmitriyeu 76% 19% 3%2% Adamovich 60% 26% 11% 4% Seviarynets 53% 29% 17% Marholin 38% 13% 38% 11% Kastusiou 58% 3% 6% 26% 6% Pazniak 5% 45% 41% 9% Hubarevich 10% 20% 69% 1% Aleh Haidukevich 29% 2% 53% 17% Kaliakin 36% 9% 55% Khalip 59% 14% 23% 5% Shushkevich 24% 26% 43% 7% Dashkevich (Palazhanka) 81% 19% Siarhei Haidukevich 29% 71% Karach 35% 18% 47% Veshtard 37% 30% 33% Vus 15% 77% 8% Karniayenka 5% 5% 42% 47%
Participant of the events Comment on the events Expert opinion General reasoning New project, initiative Just mentioned
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8. The evaluation of the political actors and forces in the information field In April – June 2013 there were no essential changes in the evaluation of the monitored forces. However, we could see a certain growth in the references that contained an evaluation of the political actors or forces. Thus, the instances of positive evaluation of the political forces grew from 3% to 6%, as compared to the previous quarter, while the negative evaluation increased from 2% to 5%.
Of all the monitored channels of communication, positive assessment was most often found on parties’ Facebook accounts (8%), while the largest proportion of negative assessment – 5% – was present in the independent online media. Chart 26. The evaluation of the politicians
Positive Negative 6% 5%
No evaluation 89%
Chart 27. The evaluation of the political forces
Negative 3% Positive 4%
No evaluation 93%
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Chart 28. The evaluation of the political sources, by source
Facebook accounts of 100% politicians
Facebook accounts of political 8% 3% 90% forces
Partisan informational portals 6% 1% 93%
National government press 100%
Independent Belarusian press 2% 1% 97%
Independent Belarusian 2%5% 93% online media
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Positive Negative No evaluation
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Appendix 1. Media usage in Belarus
1.1. The penetration of Internet (urban population aged 18 to 64)
How often do you use the Internet? Number of % respondents
I do not use the Internet and do not have a connection 251 25,10% I do not use the Internet but I have a connection 117 11,70% Every day 446 44,60% 3 to 5 times a week 69 6,90% 1 to 2 times a week 82 8,20% 1 to 3 times a month 25 2,50% Less than 1 time a month 10 1,00% Total 1000 100,00% 1.2. The audience coverage
Audience Coefficient
Independent Belarusian online media (percentage of audience coverage; source: gemiusAudience 04-06/2013) belaruspartisan.org - 5 charter97.org 6,5% 10 ej.by 1,9% 5 naviny.by 5,6% 10 news.tut.by 20,6% 25 udf.by 1,6% 5 svaboda.org - 5 nn.by 2,5% 5 Independent Belarusian press (print-run) Naša Niva 7000 1 Belgazeta 20500 1 Narodnaja Volia 27700 1 Belorusy i Rynok 14000 1 Nationwide government press (print-run) SB. Belarus segodnya 400100 1
Respublika 40000 1 Zviazda 34200 1 Narodnaya gazeta 30000 1 Partisan informational portals ucpb.org - 1 camarade.biz - 1 narodny.org - 1
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bchd.info - 1 zapraudu.info - 1 europeanbelarus.org - 1 statkevich.org - 1 mfront.net - 1 sieviarynets.net - 1 bsdp.org - 1 narodnaja-partyja.org - 1 pyx.by - 1 ldpb.net - 1 Political forces’ Facebook accounts (number of subscribers)
UCP: https://www.facebook.com/unitedcivilparty 694 1 A Just World: facebook.com/groups/ck.smir/ 393 1 Tell the Truth!: http://www.facebook.com/Pravdaby 1 032 1 Young Front: facebook.com/mfront.net 285 1 Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada: 14 1 facebook.com/groups/152445731538229/?ref=ts Movement ‘For Freedom’: - 1 http://www.facebook.com/groups/ruch.za.svabodu/ Politicians’ Facebook accounts (number of subscribers) Dzmitriyeu: http://www.facebook.com/Belarusian 3 969 1 Niakliayeu: https://www.facebook.com/Uladzimir.niakliaeu - Rymasheuski: http://www.facebook.com/rymasheuski - 1 Liabedzka: - 1 https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100001776806548&fref=ts Kaliakin: https://www.facebook.com/kaseiv.smir?fref=ts - 1 Yanukevich: https://www.facebook.com/alaksej.janukevich 772 1 Kastusiou: https://www.facebook.com/rkastusiou?fref=ts - 1 Hubarevich: http://www.facebook.com/yury.hubarevich - 1 Sannikau: https://www.facebook.com/andrei.sannikov.1 - 1 Adamovich: https://www.facebook.com/marina.adamovich.3 - 1 Dashkevich (Palazhanka): https://www.facebook.com/Nasta - 1 .palazhanka
Pazniak: https://www.facebook.com/ZyanonPaznyak 342 1
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Appendix 2. Description of methodology
2.1. Sampling
We used the following resources to evaluate the representation of the political actors and forces in the information field (see Appendix 1):
1. The independent Belarusian online media 2. The independent Belarusian press 3. The national government press 4. The partisan informational portals 5. The Facebooks accounts of the political forces 6. Politicians’ Facebooks accounts (only those which are used for communication on relevant topics). All the news items, even repeated by different sources, are evaluated because they are contact-points with the audience and are aggregated in the Total Rating Points. This principle is not applied to simple links, to other resources or to videos.
2.2. The methodology of index composition
The Quantitative index for each political force and individual politician is calculated based on the size of the audience of each resource (see Appendix 1) and on the number of references in the articles from that resource. (One article is considered as one reference, no matter how many times the name is repeated.) The index includes three sub-indices: 1) The media coverage (online media and press); 2) The political actors’ and forces’ own communications (partisan informational portals, Facebook accounts); 3) The total presence.
The audience coverage for each resource is measured as the proportion of the total audience coverage (according to www.audience.by).
The possible intersections of the audience of each politician are not taken in consideration. The index is calculated as the total sum of accumulated media rating points. It correlates with the number of contacts with the audience. These contacts can refer to different people (if the audiences do not intersect) and reflect the scope of influence, or to the same people (if the audiences do intersect) and reflect the strength of influence (repeated contacts provide better retention and increase the effect of presence).
The audience coverage which is used to calculate the index is digressively proportional, where the minimal coverage is taken for 1% and maximal coverage is taken for 40%. The principle of digressive proportion is used because of the low penetration of independent online media. The usage of straight proportion could lead to insignificant results and there is a risk of getting a result which would be about zero. The principle of smoothing the differences between the audience coverage allows us to have comparable indices. The audience coverage of the individual politicians’ resources is assumed to be 1% as well. The total presence index is divided into media coverage (online media and the press,) and political actors’ and forces’ own communications (parties’ websites, affiliated portals and Facebook accounts that are used for communications on relevant topics).
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Moreover, the quantitative index is enriched with the content analysis of the media that give coverage to each politician and/or political force. This enables us to analyze the topics, genres and types of representation. A comparative qualitative index is used in order to compare politicians by type of representation and by the range of topics. The qualitative index is composed of 3 sub- indices: expertise (it includes the appearances in the media as an expert, commentator or author of analytical materials), initiative (it includes the appearances in the media where politicians present new programs, projects or tactic/strategy of the activity), and political action (based on the activity presented in the media during the evaluated period).
The qualitative index shows the share of each politician’s appearances in all the news items, in each of the three dimensions (expertise, initiative, and political action) and to what extent the topics of communications are balanced. The requirement to have balanced topics of news is highly important for Belarus because the absence of initiatives and projects in the areas relevant to electorate is a weak point of political forces. Each topic has the same weight for the value of sub-indices.
8. 3. Table of content analysis
Category Value 1 Date 2 Type of source 1. The independent Belarusian online media 2. The independent Belarusian press 3. The national government press 4. The partisan informational portals 5. The Facebook accounts of political forces 6. Politicians’ Facebook accounts 3 Name of source 4 Audience coverage 5 Link 6 Politician 7 Gender 1. male 2. female 8 Type of representation of political force 1. Top leader 2. One of the leaders/member of the Board 3. Regional leader 4. Rank-and-file member from the metropolis 5. Regional rank-and-file member 6. Not a representative 7. Other 7 The political force represented 8 Type of political force 1. Political party 2. Movement 3. Coalition 4. Party as part of a coalition 5. Other 9 Genre 10 Language6 11 The role of the politician 1. Main character 2. One of the main characters
6 The language of the articles on bilingual resources is defined as the one used by default.
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3. A character among others 4. Leading expert/commentator 5. One of experts/commentators 6. Other 12 The evaluation of the politician 1. Positive 2. Negative 3. Neutral 4. No evaluation (when the article is contributed by the politician himself) 13 The evaluation of the political force 1. Positive 2. Negative 3. Neutral 4. No evaluation (when the politician does not represent the political force 14 Type of reference 1. Participant in the events 2. Comment on the events 3. Expert opinion 4. General reasoning 5. New project/initiative 6. New strategy 7. Mentioned in passing 8. Other 15 Activeness7 1. Proactive 2. Reactive 3. Passive 16 Level of events 1. International 2. National 3. Regional 4. Personal 17 Topic 18 Correlation with offline activities 19 Concrete event 20 Type of offline activity8 1. Rally, meeting with the electorate 2. Round table discussion, debate with other opposition members 3. Party meeting 4. Press conference 5. Foreign trip 6. Meeting with foreign politicians 7. Statement 8. Appeal 9. Other 21 Direction of activity 1. Electoral 2. Internal 3. External 4. Media 5. Political actors’ and forces’ own communications 6. No activity reflected
7 ‘Proactive’ refers to the cases when politicians come up with a new initiative, acting as newsmakers for the media. ‘Reactive’ is about those instances when the politicians react to external circumstances. ‘Passive’ refers to the cases when the politicians or political forces receive coverage on the initiative of the media, without any proactive or reactive steps by the political subjects themselves. 8 Type of offline activity includes activities which are initiated by the politicians and it does not include activities initiated by the media, like interviews, comments, participation in TV/radio programs as experts, etc.)
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Appendix 3. Detailed findings Chart 29. The topics of communication
Relations with EU 31,3 General power critics 25,8 Public opinion 20,3 Rights and freedoms 18,9 Economy critics 13,9 Relations with Russia 11,4 Society 10,4 Prisoners of conscience 9,3 Solidarity 7,8 Presidential election 7,2 Work with people 7,2 Conflicts between opposition forces 5,6 Actions 4,8 Release of prisoners 4,7 Sanctions 4,4 Parties 4,3 Local elections 3,8 Eastern Partnership 3,6 Primaries 3,2 ChNPP 3,1 Referendum 2,5 Human rights 2,4 Emigration 2,3 War industry 2,3 Single candidate 2,3 Visa system with EU 2,1 Arrest 2,0 Building of NPP 2,0 Relations with friendly politicians 1,8 Culture and sports 1,5 Charnobyl way 1,4 Collection of signatures 1,4 National security 1,3 Civil contract 1,3 President 1,2 European dialogue on modernization 1,2 Rating of politicians 1,2
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Chart 30.1. The accumulation of the total presence index for individual politicians by date
200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
Liabedzka Niakliayeu Milinkevich Yanukevich Rymasheuski Sannikau
График 30.2. The accumulation of the total presence index for individual politicians by date
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01.06.2013 11.06.2013 26.06.2013 01.04.2013 03.04.2013 09.04.2013 11.04.2013 13.04.2013 15.04.2013 17.04.2013 19.04.2013 21.04.2013 23.04.2013 25.04.2013 27.04.2013 29.04.2013 02.05.2013 04.05.2013 06.05.2013 10.05.2013 14.05.2013 16.05.2013 18.05.2013 20.05.2013 22.05.2013 24.05.2013 26.05.2013 28.05.2013 30.05.2013 03.06.2013 05.06.2013 07.06.2013 09.06.2013 15.06.2013 18.06.2013 20.06.2013 24.06.2013 28.06.2013 30.06.2013
Dzmitriyeu Adamovich Seviarynets Marholin Kastusiou Pazniak
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Chart 31.1. The accumulation of the total presence index for political forces by date 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20
0
25.05.2013 01.04.2013 04.04.2013 07.04.2013 10.04.2013 13.04.2013 16.04.2013 19.04.2013 22.04.2013 25.04.2013 28.04.2013 01.05.2013 04.05.2013 07.05.2013 10.05.2013 13.05.2013 16.05.2013 19.05.2013 22.05.2013 28.05.2013 31.05.2013 03.06.2013 06.06.2013 09.06.2013 12.06.2013 15.06.2013 18.06.2013 21.06.2013 24.06.2013 27.06.2013 30.06.2013
'Tell the Truth!' civic campaign The United Civil Party The BPF Party The Movement 'For Freedom' The Belarusian Christian Democracy 'European Belarus' civil campaign Chart 31.2. The accumulation of the total presence index for political forces by date 100
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04.05.2013 26.06.2013 01.04.2013 03.04.2013 05.04.2013 08.04.2013 10.04.2013 16.04.2013 18.04.2013 20.04.2013 22.04.2013 24.04.2013 26.04.2013 28.04.2013 30.04.2013 02.05.2013 06.05.2013 09.05.2013 11.05.2013 13.05.2013 15.05.2013 17.05.2013 19.05.2013 21.05.2013 23.05.2013 25.05.2013 27.05.2013 29.05.2013 31.05.2013 02.06.2013 04.06.2013 06.06.2013 10.06.2013 12.06.2013 14.06.2013 18.06.2013 20.06.2013 22.06.2013 24.06.2013 28.06.2013 30.06.2013
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada The Liberal Democratic Party The Belarusian United Left Party ‘A Just World’ The Young Front The Conservative Christian Party BPF 'Our Home' civic campaign
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