скошшш The Aggressor Squadrons

An inside look at the downfall of the Air Farces elite enemy simulation units.

fay Reina Pennington

t seemed like a good idea They were accused of ma­ of enemy air combat tactics had never at the time. Take a group nipulating intelligence data before been attempted; by the standards I of crack fighter pilots, to support outrageous tac­ of the Air Force of those days, the con­ weapons school graduates, tics; at the same time, some cept was radical. "We got thrown out and guys who flew in combat senior officers pressured of almost everybody's office because in Vietnam. Give them free them to ignore develop­ [they thought ] the Aggressor idea was access to intelligence sources ments in Soviet tactics that too dangerous," says Randy O'Neill, a so they know exactly what were seen as too danger­ former instructor at the Air Force's the enemy's doing. Give than ous to duplicate. Fighter Weapons School who, along some airplanes that look and act In the late 1980s, the per­ with fellow instructor Roger Wells, was like enemy airplanes. Then let them ceived end of the Soviet threat led instrumental in Ihe founding of the go out and fly against other Air Force to severe cutbacks in the military, and program. pilots—show what Ihe enemy might the Aggressors seemed to have out­ Wells, the outstanding graduate in look like in a real war. Thai was the idea lived their usefulness. In 1990, the Ag­ his class at the Fighter Weapons School, behind the creation of the U.S. Air gressor program—arguably one of the had been interested in the idea since Force's Aggressor squadrons in 1972. most innovative air training programs 1966, when he had flown F-4s in Viet­ For combat pilots, the first 10 mis­ in history—was disbanded. Today, many nam. He still remembers the critique sions are the riskiest; the Aggressors, former Aggressors believe that deci­ he wrote of the training he'd received: together with the Air Force's "Red Hag" sion may have been a costly mistake. "You taught me everything there is to war simulations, were designed to give know about how to fight against an­ pilots those 10 missions in peacetime. 3rom the beginning, it was a tough other American airplane, but you taught The program rapidly expanded: during 1 sell. The creation of a squadron me absolutely nothing about how to their 18-year existence, the Aggressors specifically devoted to the simulation fight against the enemy." His experi­ flew more than 200,000 sorties and made ences clearly jiointed him to the need more than a thousand training deploy­ for, in Air Force lingo, "dissimilar air ments lo U.S. and Allied unils around Until they were disbanded combat training"—training against air­ the world. in 1990, the Air Force's craft different from those the pilots were But within a few years of their cre­ Aggressor squadrons flying. To Wells, these would ideally be ation, some people—very high ranking emulated the Soviets in actual enemy aircraft flying enemy tac­ officers and line pilots among them— their squadron patches tics. In the early 1970s, O'Neill and Wells began to see the Aggressors as a plague (above), their paint began lo preach their radical gospel. rather than a cure. Some said the Ag­ schemes (opposite), and— On October 15, 1972, their persis­ gressors had ego problems; they pushed most importan tly—their tence paid off: the 64th Aggressor young pilots too hard; people got killed. air combat tactics. Squadron was activated at Nellis Air

26 Air&Space February/March 1994

Force Base in Nevada. It would provide as the first host. adversary forces for Air Force exer­ The problem was cises, train new Aggressors, and send the pilots there were Aggressor teams on deployments to just learning to fly operational wings to give academic brief­ F-4s. "I was really ings and fly against the local pilots. nervous about that," To simulate the primary' threat air­ O'Neill admits. craft of the time, the MiG-21, the Ag­ However, the gressors would fly 20 Northrop T-38s weapons officers at on loan from the Air Training Com­ Homestead devised mand. Wells' dream of actual MiG-21s a special program would have been far too expensive. The of workup flights two-seat supersonic trainer resembled for the crews se­ the MiG in one particularly important lected to fly against way: its engines did not smoke. In train­ die Aggressors, and ing against other F-4s in preparation in July 1973 the first for Vietnam, American pilots had be­ Aggressor deploy­ come dependent upon spotting the F- ment "went off beautifully," O'Neill re­ both dissimilar air combat training and 4 engines' trail of smoke, visible up to calls. That broke the ice. Soon Ihe Ag­ academic training. In popular parlance, five miles away. gressors were fulfilling a heavy schedule the Aggressors became known as So now the Aggressors had a prod­ of "road shows" to operational wings, "gomers," a slang word for "enemy" in uct—but still no market. "Probably the and a second Aggressor squadron, the Vietnam. hardest thing we ever did was lo find (55th, was created at Nellis. The U.S. The early Aggressor road shows are somebody who wanted to host us for Air Force in Europe (USAFE) created widely remembered for the quality of that first deployment," notes Lloyd the 527th Aggressor Squadron at Al- training they provided. Jerry "Sparky" "Boots" Boothby, the squadron's first conbury Air Base in England, and the Coy, former assistant operations offi­ commander. "It was like pulling teeth Pacific Air Force opened the 26th Ag­ cer of the 65th, says that during a typ­ to gel anybody to do it." At the lime, ac­ gressor Squadron at Clark Air Force ical road show, six aircraft and seven cident rates in the tactical air forces Base in the Philippines. or eight pilots, plus support personnel, were high. "Wing commanders were By the mid-1970s, the Aggressor pro­ deployed to the host base. About 20 pi­ scared to have us come," says Ron Iver- gram seemed to be on the fast track to lots from the host squadron were des­ son, one of the original Aggressors and success. In 1975 the Aggressors got a ignated to fly against the Aggressors; later a two-star general. "All they'd heard new fighter: the F-5E. Built for export, generally the host pilots flew once a was there was a bunch of guys out at the F-5 was small and sleek, with sim­ day, while the Aggressors themselves Nellis Hying T-38s, they're going to ple avionics. It could achieve supersonic flew two or three sorties a day. The come and whip up on your guys, and speeds only in short bursts, and it had host pilots were usually so wrung out your accident rate will probably go even tiny fuel tanks. The only weapon sys­ after one, that was all they could han­ higher." tem it had was its guns. But in terms of dle," Coy says. Wing commanders were also reluc­ performance, the F-5 was a better sim­ The type and size of the missions- tant to be first because they knew it ulator of the MiG-21 than the old T-38. were always tailored to the host unit. would put their wing under a micro­ Once they were accepted, the Ag­ Typically for the first few days of a road scope. As O'Neill points out, "We knew gressors visited every operational wing show Ihe training consisted of a series thai when we made our first deploy­ two or three limes a year, providing of single Aggressors flying against sin- ment, everybody and their brother For Lloyd Boothby would come down (above; now a sales from the Pentagon. manager at a IMS Vegas Everyone waiting hotel) and Randy O'Neill for us to go kill (left), the Air Force's ourselves, the performance in Vietnam naysayers—we pointed to the need for knew they'd be combat training with out in force." dissimilar aircraft. For Finally, an F-4 most of their 18 years, replacement train­ the Aggressors ing unit at Flori­ accomplished this with da's Homestead the Northrop F-5 (right), Air Force Base bedecked in large, Soviet- agreed to serve style nose numbers.

28 Air&Space February/March 1994 glc F-4 crews. Single-ship training flights before onboard videotape, they relied mander, Ron Iverson, in the bar at the focused on basic fighter maneuvers on memory, brief clips of gun camera officers' club and tried to convince him rather than specific enemy tactics. film, and tape recorders. Every pilot that my background uniquely qualified After a few days, the training sce­ had his own memorization techniques. me to be the next Aggressor intelli­ narios might be upgraded to two F-4s Most commonly, Aggressor pilots taped gence officer. Within a few months, I'd against a single Aggressor. Later in the a running monologue during the flight. received special permission to curtail deployment, or if the host pilots were The maneuvers used, their effective­ my tour at Hill and transfer to Nellis. more experienced, two Aggressors ness, and the "learning outcomes" were The Aggressors always worked at would square off against two host pi­ all discussed in the debriefing. the junction of operations and intelli­ lots. At the leader's call of "Fight's on!" gence^—sadly, a relationship that in the ihe Aggressors would simulate Soviet first encountered the Aggressors as Air Force has usually been weak. The air combat tactics, based on classified Ia second lieutenant intelligence offi­ intelligence community was definitely intelligence information. 'I"his would in­ cer at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, when a world apart from the flying commu­ clude flying typical Soviet en route for­ they came to fly against one of our F-4 nity. First there was the problem of se­ mations and diversionary tactics, and squadrons in 1979. I sat in on eveiy curity clearances: most pilots were not simulating the ranges and aspects at briefing and was enthralled. I had not cleared for highly classified informa­ which enemy missiles could be fired. known that the Air Force had a unit that tion. Second, there was the physical After each flight,th e Aggressors con­ simulated the Soviets—certainly no one separation of intelligence and opera­ ducted debriefings, drawing every turn in the intelligence division had men­ tions. Intelligence personnel worked in and maneuver used during the en­ tioned it Having majored in Soviet stud­ vaults, usually at wing headquarters, gagements on a blackboard. Aggres­ ies in college, I couldn't imagine a bel­ behind a series of doors secured by sor pilots were specially trained to re­ ter job than Aggressor intelligence locks and entry codes. Pilots couldn't create a sonic in its entirely. In the days officer. I cornered the detachment com­ just walk in and ask questions.

Air&Space February/March 1994 Tactically relevant intelligence was almost completely lacking during and immediately after the Vietnam war and the Aggressors were among the first to try to remedy that situation. Boots Boothby remembers telling the com­ mander of the Tactical Air Command that there was "a huge, huge wall be­ tween operations and intelligence. And the reason it's there is because no fight­ er pilot was ever going to admit there was something he doesn't know. And intelligence doesn't have the aptitude to know what the pilots need. They're a library, and until someone asks for a book, they don't care what's on the shelf." It was clear to the Aggressors that pilots had to gel into the intelli­ gence world. That meant many Ag­ gressors had to get special intelligence clearances. But it cost them; they be­ 11ЧЧ • came ineligible for combat duly until a year after the clearance had expired. Il could compromise loo many sources if These classified academic briefings be­ benefits of the Aggressors. At the same someone with a special intelligence came one of the hallmarks of the Ag­ time, problems had begun creeping into clearance were captured. gressor program. the program. Each Aggressor was required to be­ The Soviets were making steady, if come an expert in some facet of ene­ 'throughout the 1970s and '80s, the incremental, improvements in tactics my capabilities. Pilots produced brief­ T Aggressors were a cornerstone of and technology, lite United States'ca­ ings on their specialties—the training Air Force air-to-air training. Any time pabilities were improving almost ex­ of Soviet pilots, their tactics, what fu­ you talked about realism, you were talk­ ponentially. But no provision had been ture threats would likely entail—and ing about the Aggressors. Even articles made for automatically upgrading the presented them during deployments. in Soviet military journals noted the Aggressors to match the threat. By the late 1970s the Soviets had introduced the MiG-23 Flogger as their frontline fighter; the U.S. Air Force began field­ ing the F-15 and F-16. Yet the Aggres­ sors continued to fly the outmoded F- 5, an increasingly poor simulator against tin increasingly capable opponent. It was almost impossible for them to keep pace with the changes. The F-15's arrival changed the na­ ture of the road shows. In the early days, when the Air Force primarily flew the F-4, most training with the Aggressors involved small engagements—rarely more than two aircraft on each side.

The Aggressors' ubiquitous red star was an homage to the Soviets; some Aggressors today believe their strong identification with the former superpower ultimately limited the value • *i> -j. '.r. : f-. ..*'„ . У \ ,(, of the training the squadrons provided.

30 Air&Space Fcbniary/March 1994 There was a lot of emphasis on close- both visually and on radar, as the F-5, McKenzie. A tall man out of the "strong in, within-visual-range fighting. This and its performance in air combat was and silent" mold, McKenzie flew as an was because the F-4 had been built as far superior. "The F-16 could turn up Aggressor in Europe, the Pacific, and a dual-role fighter and was largely used its own fanny. It's tough to 'be humble' the states. "Some guys would just sit in that capacity in the Air Force, with against that little guy, you know?" Hen­ back and play it and you'd lose control Ihe bulk of the training focusing on air- derson adds, in reference to one of the of the debrief—guys would be arguing to-ground rather than air-to-air combat. Aggressors' mottoes. about shots. The debrief could just fall But the F-15 was built specifically for Technological improvements also be­ apart." air-to-air combat, and the new F-15 host gan to supplant another facet of Ag­ Another problem was that ACMI de­ pilots were already conversant in basic gressor training. Traditionally, the Ag­ briefs brought in more observers. Tra­ lighter maneuvers and more advanced gressors were known as masters of ditionally, Aggressor debriefings oc­ air combat training. In some people's debriefing—"chalk talks" that recon­ curred in squadron briefing rooms that minds, the need for pure instruction structed the mission and discussed could accommodate only the pilots in­ from the Aggressors had diminished. lessons learned. In the 1980s, automated volved in the flight ACMI facilities could The superior capabilities of the F-15 .Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumen­ seat a lot more observers. "You'd lose also meant "the basic mission changed," tation (ACMD ranges began to replace the honesty of the debriefing, some­ Randy O'Neill stresses, "because air- the blackboard. Pods mounted on fight­ how," McKenzie says. "It's more diffi­ cult to have an honest, frank environ­ Although Roger Wells (left) ment when you've got a cast of Uiousands was instrumental in the in there watching what's going on." founding of the Aggressors, Personnel issues—the source of the he was not asked to serve ego and attitude problems sometimes with them. "Needless to say, attributed to the Aggressors—were al­ that broke my heart," he ways a thorny question. From the Start; says today. Both he and there was a dispute over how the Ag­ charter Aggressor Earl gressors should be manned. Roger Henderson (right) believe Wells had dreamed of assembling the staffing problems led to the Aggressors of "the best fighter pilots Aggressors' demise. in the United States Air Force, the great­ est weapons school instructors that walked the face of the earth." Today, to-air now doesn't involve he believes staffing problems were what getting into a phone booth led to the Aggressors' demise. In his with a pocket knife, like it Alabama drawl, he says, "before they did back then. A properly were ever operational, I knew Ihey were flown F-15 will never close; doomed." he'll just shoot you down While most people never expected from 30 miles away—no fur­ the Aggressors to be manned only with ther questions." Flying the weapons school graduates, they did be­ F4, only really outstanding lieve that at a minimum, only experi­ pilots had been able to beat enced fighter pilots should become Ag­ the Aggressors early in their training, ers relayed information through ground gressors. "We could not sustain the but with die F-15, most pilots could win. receivers, allowing a master computer quality we needed," says Earl Hender­ "When we started going to the F-15 to track a fight as it occurred. During son. Abig man with the sort of face you units, some squadrons became so pro­ the debriefing, the air battle was re­ immediately trust, Henderson is uni­ ficient that we had to do everything we played on a large screen in a 20- to 30- versally admired in the Aggressor com­ could just to keep our heads above wa­ seat theater, in a format a lot like a video munity. He remembers that "the per­ ter," Hal Smith remembers. Smith is a game. The ACMI displays could show sonnel system said: you guys can't just soft-spoken, highly intelligent former the relative positions and ranges of each keep taking the top talent—that's rap­ Aggressor who had been a pilot in a aircraft, how fast they were going, how ing the operational community." high-risk covert program in Laos dur­ hard they were turning, and who fired O'Neill says he bitterly resisted wa­ ing the Vietnam war. when. It permitted greatly increased tering down the entrance requirements, The F-K5 was yet another challenge. accuracy in debriefing. but the Aggressors couldn't do much "With the F-16s, now you don't have The problem, according to some Ag­ about it. He recalls the case of one pi­ even the size advantage" of the small gressors, was that the quality of the de- lot "His courage was undoubtedly very F-5, says Earl Henderson, a former op­ briefings declined. There was no for­ high, but his skill at flying fighters was erations officer of the 64th and a char­ mal program for using the ACMI in substandard. So consequently he washed ter member of the Aggressors. The F- debriefings. "It's a great machine, but out. Well what do you know, about six 16 was just as small and hard to see, it can be too distracting," says Mark months went by, and the new [director

Air&Space February/March 1994 31 of operations] who came in reinstated him in the program and ordered us to graduate the guy. So the standards were getting all terribly twisted." By Ihe late 1970s, as Henderson re­ members things, the Aggressors were being sent a large percentage of pilots with only one fighter assignment un­ der their belts. "You gel a kid who was King Kong in his F-15 outfit, and now he's got to fly this fighter that's ten years older than what he was flying, with two- thirds the maneuvering capability, and he's going to go out and get his ass kicked by these average guys he's been flying against" Henderson says. "I think il was disastrous for a number of rea­ sons. These kids didn't have the emo­ tional maturity to do the mission, lo be a training aid, to lose, and to like it when they lost." Yel that was the purpose of the Ag­ gressors. As Ed Clements, another char­ ter Aggressor, explains, 'The best pos­ sible feeling for an Aggressor was lo come back from a flight out of breath, tired, and sweaty, knowing he used ev­ ery tactic, employed every advantage he knows, and still did not come away with a 'kill.'" Learning to be that sort of instructor was extremely difficult for some of the younger pilots. In operational units, fighter pilots do everything they can to fight and win. But in the Aggressors, they were asked to pull their punches, to keep the fight to a level where the opponent could leant Ihe most. "Some of them weren't able to do that without making il very obvious they didn't like it," Henderson says. "They were young buck warriors. They wanted to go out and kick some ass, take some names." Being a good Aggressor demanded more than just experience, maturity, and flying skill; it also required a cer­ tain type of personality. "You think of an Aggressor as a macho fighter pilot, but it's more than just stick-and-rudder skills," Mark McKenzie says. The key is being able to steer a debrief or con­ the ground academics course with one troubles in the Aggressors. versation toward valid learning. You class of Aggressors. Someone designed Concerns about flight safety also con­ have lo have that core, innate ability to a patch for our class that prominently tinually hounded the program. "Flying listen, interpret, and articulate things displayed the words "be humble" in the safety and combat capability are dia­ in an unpoliticized way." center. Across the top of the patch, how­ metrically opposed," says Boots Booth­ It's hard to say where or why some ever, was written "Oh Lord, it's hard by. "I just wish to hell somebody would of the Aggressors began to lose their to..." At the time I thought il was just explain lo people: Who cares about an "be humble" attitude. When I first ar­ a play on the popular country song, but accident rate? You kill them in wartime rived at Nellis in 1980,1 went through later I wondered if it indicated deeper or you kill them in peacetime; the ones

32 Air&Space February/March 1994 ш

*щ.

• N.V

v

'^ks:"• У г &

vt Ч,

who get killed are the ones who aren't combat training is inevitably a weeding The F-16s the Aggressors going to make it. And they don't pay process. The more realistic your train­ finally received were a youflying pa y because you're going lo ing, the higher the risk involved—but mixed blessing; they live as long as the other guys." the result, it is believed, is a much more performed better than the Boothby's attitude is commonly held capable operational force. old F-5s, but they couldn 't but rarely expressed officially (and "Some commanders were afraid to provide the dissimilarity Boothby himself is quick to note that have the Aggressors around," Jerry Coy necessatyfor training. no accidents occurred under his com­ recalls. "We were blamed for so much mand). Many fighter pilots believe that stuff that we had absolutely nothing to

Air&Space February/March 1994 33 do with." The problem, in Coy's opin­ Like many of his former ion, was that the Air Force got carried colleagues, Hal Smith away with air-to-air training. Sometimes (right; now an airline the Aggressors flew against units that captain) thinks the end of had little or no preparation in air-to-air the Soviet Union shouldn't training. In the excitement of the light, have meant the end of the some host pilots who were unaccus­ Aggressors. tomed to the demands of combat found themselves in over their heads. In ma­ The new Adveisary Tactics neuvering to avoid being "killed," some group, under the leadership stalled or spun their aircraft; a few end­ of Mark Dulancy ed up dvud. One notorious pair of ac­ (opposite), carries on some cidents occurred in the early 1980s, of the Aggressors' work in a when the Aggressors were training pi­ limited fashion. lots in a reconnaissance squadron lo defend themselves against an enemy attack. On two consecutive days, RF-4s Third World country and went out of control during training mis­ screw it up ten ways from sions. One crew ejected successfully, Sunday, and we're still go­ but the other did not and both the pi­ ing to win. But if we go against lot and navigator were killed. "We were the Soviets, we'll have only doing [basic fighter maneuvers] with one chance. We'd better be these reconnaissance pilots who did doing it right, based on ex­ nothing more than fly fast, straight and actly what the Soviets are level," Coy says. "We did not recruit doing.'" those people to come out there and fly. believe me. They didn't know how to One Aggressor remem­ handle situations if they let their air­ bers, "One argument I heard craft get out of control. And the Ag­ a lot at the time was: We've gressors were blamed for this." He not­ shown them all this real So­ ed that it was higher headquarters and viet stuff. But say we're in not the Aggressors who decided which day five of Ihe war—aren't the Soviets of the Aggressors to fill in the gap and units needed the training. going to say, 'Hey boys, this is stupid! behave realistically in an all-aspect en­ All our comrades are dying!' And they'll vironment may have hurt the training Another problem was the question make some natural evolution in their value in the long run, and I believe the of how strictly the Aggressors' training tactics. It's never been observed, but [U.S.] air community sensed that." should simulate Soviet tactics. Many that doesn't mean it ain't ever gonna When I was the Aggressor intelli­ Aggressors believed such simulations happen in the war." gence officer in the early 1980s, I knew should have been just the starting point "I don't for a minute believe the So­ there were gaps in our intelligence in­ for Aggressor training, not the be-all viets would have suddenly become pro­ formation. Our collection techniques and end-all. But the Aggressors were ficient in a real conflict," says Lieutenant were often compared to looking through told to justify everything they did in Colonel Tom Smith, a USAFE Aggres­ a soda straw. It seemed obvious to me terms of simulating the Soviets. sor and Desert Storm veteran current­ that the Aggressors should give the So­ Several Aggressors told me about ly working in the Pentagon. But he also viets the benefit of a doubt and err on the time General Wilbur Creech, the questions the value of limiting the Ag­ the side of better training. commander of the Tactical Air Com­ gressors to observed enemy tactics; he "It could be the whole Soviet concept mand, sent his director of operations, believes the squadrons should have ended up being the death knell," Hen­ Larry Welch, to Nellis in 1978 to in­ had more flexibility to react to situa­ derson says. "Wc got ourselves locked vestigate the alleged problems with the tions in a natural way. For example, the into this death spiral about being Sovi­ Aggressors. ("A witch hunt, I guess, Aggressors operated under rules of en­ et" When the Soviet Union disappeared, would be the best name for it," Hen­ gagement that prevented them from people began to question the value of derson says.) Aggressor tactics were dodging long-range radar-guided mis­ enemy simulation—and of die Aggressor closely scrutinized. One young pilot ad­ sile shots simulated by the F-15s and program. mitted to Welch that a tactic he pre­ F-16s. "In combat, even Iraqis flying Yet the biggest problem was proba­ sented in a briefing had been obsei-ved MiG-25 Foxbats proved smarter than bly money. It was tough to keep up with in Soviet training only once: he tried to that," Smith says. "They weren't clever enemy tactics while flying an aircraft justify its use as a tactic thai a Third enough lo improvise new tactics dur­ that was two generations behind in per­ World nation could use. According to ing a war, but I think the Iraqis were formance—sort of like getting into a Henderson, "General Welch said some­ human enough to dodge missiles on Ford Pinto and trying to drive it like thing like 'We can go to war against any shots they were aware of. The failure you were in a Corvette. For a long time

34 Air&Space February/March 1994 the Aggressors tried lo continue Sovi­ this might have been the final nail in F-16C, painted in "threat" paint schemes, et tactics by simulating MiG-23s dur­ the coffin. Giving the Aggressors F-1 (is and provides a core of air-to-air adver­ ing the beyond-visual-range portion of violated one of the basic tenets of the sary forces at major Air Force exercis­ an engagement; they replicated MiG- Aggressor charter: providing dissimi­ es. Adversaiy pilots still provide aca­ 23 formations and tactics to try to show lar air combat training. The F-16 "was demic briefings, and the division is what they would look like to an F-15's not dissimilar to the most plentiful air­ housed behind a door with the tradi­ radar. But there was no way the F-5 craft in our inventory," Smith says. tional red star of the Aggressors. The could pretend to be a MiG-23 in a vi­ A few months later, the Air Force de­ main difference is in scope. Adversaiy sual fight; the Flogger was significant­ cided to disband the Aggressors alto­ Tactics consists of six aircraft and 10 ly faster in straight flight, more slug­ gether. The Aggressors staged their full-time pilots. The pilots fly only dur­ gish in turns, and completely different last road show in August 1990, when ing exercises; there are no more road in other performance characteristics. the 64th went to Eg]in Air Force Base shows except for occasional academic Year by year, the decision to spend in Florida to train F-15 pilots who were presentations. money for new Aggressor aircraft was preparing to deploy to Desert Shield. When I interviewed the Adversary's delayed. In the Air Force, "bang for the In October 1990, the 64th—the first commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark buck" was measured in terms of com­ and, finally, the lastAggressor squadron— "Dula" Dulaney, last October, I asked bat-capable aircraft; the Aggressors just closed its doors. him, "Who is the enemy these days?" didn't fall into diat category. There were He replied, "I don't know, you tell me. too many badly needed improvements •loday, one unofficial remnant of the We replicate mostly Russian-type sys­ in the operational force; training was T Aggressors survives: the Adversary tems because those systems and train­ way down the priority list. Tactics Division of Red Flag. The name ing are in place in most hot spots in the In early 1989 the Air Forcefinally de ­ was changed to dissociate ihe unit from world that we might face in a future cided to upgrade the Aggressors to the the Aggressors, but there are many sim­ conflict." But they've also added what F-16. Ironically, according to 'lorn Smith, ilarities. The Adversaiy group flies the they call "gray world systems." The

H

L •'•' -•'•V^NV&'Y^ -\"ч';-:':' ''.'^'^C^v.''''•'^-'^' 'v^^:^4>^^'^y :,V^

й:ч\

'pvVbj^-'^j

>v^:o:Y>^rx^,,:-',;'iv^;Vv'V.x-i'/:,v.'.''

Air&Space February/March 1994 35 gray world, he explained, is not "red" fighl the way you train. The Air Force (enemy) or "blue" (the United States), that flew in Desert Storm trained against but all that odier stuff out there—French, the Aggressors. How will today's Air Swedish, whatever weapons systems Force, with no dedicated adversary might be sold to and employed by po­ training, perform in a future war? tential adversaries. "I think that we're going to live to re­ In a sense, the lack of a central threat gret having done away with the Ag­ makes the Adversaries' job more diffi­ gressor program," Jerry Coy says. One cult than that of the old Aggressors. way the Air Force is compensating for Based on parameters for various threat closing down the Aggressor squadrons aircraft. Adversary pilots restrict their is by having operational wings train power and maneuvering and use dif­ against each other. "With the Aggres­ ferent avionics settings to attempt to sors, Ihe only agenda was to make the replicate an enemy's search and lock- guys that we were flying against bet­ on ranges and so forth. "You're always ter," says Coy. ".And you just don't see looking down at your card, saying, 'What that whenever you're doing dissimilar are my ranges loday?' " Dulaney says. air combat training with another oper­ "Yeah. There's a lot of number crunch­ ational unit. That's definitely a short­ ing that goes on." coming in the way things are being Speaking in 1992 at the 20th an­ done now." niversary of the Aggressor's founding, Many former Aggressors told me Ron Iverson claimed that because of that they believe the Air Force is flying the Adversaries, "the quality of train­ more conservatively loday than it was ing that the original Aggressors tried a few years ago. 'The gomers are al­ to bring to our Air Force has not changed. ready sorely missed, even I can tell," The discipline's there, the attitude's says Rich Cline, recently retired from there, the 'be humble' is there, and active duly. "Every wing commander they're doing exactly what we want that has a clue could tell the proficien­ them to do." But with F-16s, ottiers point cy of every air-to-air unit has fallen off out, the dissimilarity has been lost, Ihe considerably since the Aggressor pro­ road shows have been lost, and, to a gram closed up shop." Even Adversaiy large extent, the unique Aggressor aca­ Tactics commander Dulaney notes, demics program has been lost "People in the active Air Force contin­ An old military maxim is that you will ually tell me, 'We really miss the train-

The Northrop F-5E Tiger 11

Originally buill for the South Vietnamese air force, the F-5Es the Aggressors used became available to the squadrons in the mid-1970s after U.S. withdrawal from the war. The small and relatively inexpensive export fighters were powered by two General Electric J85 afterburning lurbojets that ing like we used to have.' I get that ev­ produced 5,000 pounds of thrust. Hie craft lincl a maximum speed of Much ery time I go some place." 1.63 at 36,000 feet "The idea of disbanding the Aggressors because Ihe Soviets go away is ridicu­ lous," says Hal Smith. "It should have been Ihe kind of thing where you had adversaries, and you fighl adversary tactics as you saw fit, based on what­ ever you could dream up." Rich Cline also notes, "There's still a need for a professional air-to-air adversarial unit that puts training first—instead of putting winning first, like every other unit." "The mental process of learning your

36 Air&Space February/March 1994 1 *

^

^^^•НВННМ enemy inside and out and training to a "It doesn't matter if the Air Force has A team ofF-5s displays a razor's edge lo defeat thai threat is ap­ got 13 wings or 39, the Aggressor part range of Warsaw Pact plicable anywhere against any adver­ of the program is vitally important to camouflage schemes in use saiy," says Desert Storm veteran Tom the combat effectiveness of the mili­ in the Aggressors' heyday. Smith. He compares this process lo cre­ tary," Roger Wells says. "I'll tell you Today, the lack of a central ating a "learning template" that can be what I would do if I was God for a day, enemy to train against has applied to any enemy. 'Those of us who if I ran all the military in America. Ten made the Adversaries' job fought in Iraq prepared ourselves in percent of my forces would be Ag­ more difficult. just that manner, and the process of ap­ gressors. Because I would want to be plying that learning template worked able, every day that I train, to go against wonderfully. I'm not sure il would have a realistic enemy. I'd have Aggressors had we not refined the template against in the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, a long-time opponent like the former space force, whatever. That would al­ Soviet Union." ways be a pail of it." —*e*

Air&Space February/March 1994 37