The Phantom Menace: the F-4 in Air Combat in Vietnam
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THE PHANTOM MENACE: THE F-4 IN AIR COMBAT IN VIETNAM Michael W. Hankins Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS August 2013 APPROVED: Robert Citino, Major Professor Michael Leggiere, Committee Member Christopher Fuhrmann, Committee Member Richard McCaslin, Chair of the Department of History Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Hankins, Michael W. The Phantom Menace: The F-4 in Air Combat in Vietnam. Master of Science (History), August 2013, 161 pp., 2 illustrations, bibliography, 84 titles. The F-4 Phantom II was the United States' primary air superiority fighter aircraft during the Vietnam War. This airplane epitomized American airpower doctrine during the early Cold War, which diminished the role of air-to-air combat and the air superiority mission. As a result, the F-4 struggled against the Soviet MiG fighters used by the North Vietnamese Air Force. By the end of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign in 1968, the Phantom traded kills with MiGs at a nearly one-to-one ratio, the worst air combat performance in American history. The aircraft also regularly failed to protect American bombing formations from MiG attacks. A bombing halt from 1968 to 1972 provided a chance for American planners to evaluate their performance and make changes. The Navy began training pilots specifically for air combat, creating the Navy Fighter Weapons School known as "Top Gun" for this purpose. The Air Force instead focused on technological innovation and upgrades to their equipment. The resumption of bombing and air combat in the 1972 Linebacker campaigns proved that the Navy's training practices were effective, while the Air Force's technology changes were not, with kill ratios becoming worse. However, the last three months of the campaign introduced an American ground radar system that proved more effective than Top Gun in improving air-to-air combat performance. By the end of the Vietnam War, the Air Force and Navy overcame the inherent problems with the Phantom, which were mostly of their own making. Copyright 2013 by Michael W. Hankins ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe a large debt of gratitude to many people for helping to make this thesis possible. First and foremost, my major professor, Dr. Robert Citino, provided not only valuable insight and advice during the entire writing process, but an infectious enthusiasm for the work of a historian. I have leaned heavily on his guidance during our many conversations about military history, research methods, and rock and roll. The other members of my committee, Dr. Michael Leggiere and Dr. Christopher Fuhrmann, have also been extremely encouraging and helpful throughout my graduate studies, continually making themselves available for answering my many questions about writing, research, and career building. My other professors at The University of North Texas, Dr. Guy Chet, Dr. Richard Lowe, and Dr. Richard McCaslin, have all proven incredibly supportive and valuable to my development. Dr. Peter Lane, not only a great professor but a decorated fighter pilot in Vietnam, also provided very helpful guidance in my research. The staff at the Air Force Historical Research Agency was absolutely invaluable. I cannot overstate my gratitude for their generous help and welcoming attitude. I would like to sincerely thank the administrative staff of the University of North Texas History Department. Their diligence, combined with their tolerance of my many questions has been much appreciated. Likewise, I am extremely grateful to all my fellow graduate students at the University of North Texas for their advice, friendship, and the occasional adult beverage. Specifically, I received exceptional help in editing and proofreading as well as general guidance and inspiration from Luke Truxal, Molly Bundschuh, Megan Winkler, and Ryan English. Finally, I would like to thank my father, David Hankins, for instilling in me a fascination for history, technology, and aviation. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE DEATH AND RETURN OF AIR SUPERIORITY ........ 1 CHAPTER 2 ORCHESTRATED CONFUSION: DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE F-4 PHANTOM ............................................................................................................................ 13 Sacrificing Superiority: The Post World War II Air Force....................................................... 15 When is a Fighter Not a Fighter? Navy Doctrine in the Cold War........................................... 22 A Gleam in the Customer's Eye ................................................................................................ 26 A Maelstrom of Design Changes .............................................................................................. 29 Winners and Losers................................................................................................................... 34 Flexible Planes for Flexible Response ...................................................................................... 39 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 42 CHAPTER 3 A RIFLE IN A PHONE BOOTH: AIR COMBAT DURING ROLLING THUNDER ................................................................................................................................... 45 Waiting To Be Hit: The Opening of Air-To-Air Combat ......................................................... 49 A Real Menace: Growing MiG Aggression .............................................................................. 54 The Electric Trojan Horse: Operation Bolo .............................................................................. 59 The Wheel in the Sky: Changing MiG Tactics ......................................................................... 65 Revenge of The MiGs ............................................................................................................... 72 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 78 CHAPTER 4 HALFTIME: REEVALUATING TRAINING AND TECHNOLOGY ................ 82 Not a Fighter Pilot Among Them: Training in the Air Force ................................................... 83 iv Airline Captains, Not Fighter Pilots: Training in the Navy ...................................................... 88 Mirror Images and the “Fly Safe” Culture ................................................................................ 91 Know Your Enemy ................................................................................................................... 95 A Time of Reflection ................................................................................................................ 99 Rebuilding the Air Force: We Have the Technology ............................................................. 104 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 111 CHAPTER 5 TAKE WARNING: AIR COMBAT DURING THE LINEBACKER CAMPAIGNS ............................................................................................................................. 114 Nothing to Compare: New Gear, New Men, and New Strategies .......................................... 118 A New Bag of Tricks: Renewed Combat ............................................................................... 129 An Old-Fashioned Butt Kicking ............................................................................................. 133 The Most Effective Show We've Had: Project Teaball .......................................................... 135 Caught in the Apocalypse: Linebacker II ............................................................................... 142 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 146 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION: THE FAILED EXPERIMENT ................................................. 149 APPENDIX: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................... 154 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 156 v CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE DEATH AND RETURN OF AIR SUPERIORITY Many consider the F-4 Phantom II to be one of the greatest fighter planes ever built.1 Yet by a strict definition, it was hardly a fighter plane at all. With its large size and poor maneuverability, it carries few of the traditional hallmarks of successful air superiority fighters. 1 “It is impossible to gather enough superlatives into one book to adequately describe the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II,” states Lou Drendel in the introduction to Lou Drendel, USAF Phantoms in Combat (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1987). This publisher produced a line of books that highlight the Phantom in similar terms. Other books in the same vein consist of encyclopedic works focusing on the technical aspects of the Phantom and other aircraft. The best of these include Lou Drendel, F-4 Phantom II in Action (Warren, MI: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1972); Lou Drendel, The Air War in Vietnam (New York: Arco Publishing, 1968); Lou Drendel, Air War Over Southeast Asia: A Pictorial Record (Carrollton,