Explaining Voter Moderation In Post-Communist Ethnic Party Systems: A Cross-National Investigation in the Balkans1

Paula M. Pickering College of William and Mary [email protected]

Abstract: In this paper, I explore conditions that contribute to a rare outcome in ethnic party systems: the election of parties with moderate positions on interethnic relations. More specifically, I investigate why voters of the small, impoverished, and ethnically fragmented states of Bosnia and Macedonia, which share the same electoral system, chose parties with divergent positions on interethnic relations in 2002. Statistical analysis of survey data, content analysis of local media, and analysis of institutional arrangements help understand this puzzle. I find that political institutions, the parties supplied by elites, and external intervention interact to offer voters in Macedonia stronger options for moderation than in Bosnia. These rules and actors magnify small differences in preferences among citizens in the two states. One of the institutional arguments suggests that voting for moderate parties in Macedonia is partly an artifact, rather than an intentional expression of interest in interethnic cooperation. This sobering finding emphasizes the fragility of moderation in Macedonia’s ethnic party system.

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Across the globe, states that are deeply divided have embarked on the already arduous process of democratization. In such contexts, voter moderation is particularly crucial for the success of democratization, the prevention of communal violence, and regional stability. Unfortunately, it is rare. In this paper, I explore conditions that contribute to voter support for parties with moderate positions on interethnic relations in deeply divided states with ethnic party systems. Here, I conceive of “moderation” as concern for issues that are not necessarily ethnically defined and willingness to engage in cross-ethnic cooperation. More specifically, I investigate voters of the two strikingly similar countries of Bosnia and Macedonia, which are small, impoverished, ethnically fragmented, and threatened states that arose out of Yugoslavia.2 Despite these similarities and their shared electoral system, voters chose parties with divergent positions on interethnic relations in 2002. This puzzle of voter moderation in post-war ethnic party systems, like those in Bosnia and Macedonia, addresses several issues of concern in comparative politics. The first is identifying the forces in ethnic party systems that work to overcome tremendous centrifugal and exclusivist pressures that such party systems generate. Macedonia bucked a regional trend, illustrated by Bosnia,3 in which interethnic violence radicalizes voters and encourages the election of ethnically chauvinistic parties, which then generates a cycle of instability. More broadly, understanding factors that explain how an impoverished, deeply divided, and contested state with an ethnic party system manages to encourage moderate voting and mitigate violent conflict has significant implications for similarly fragile states such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, Moldova, and Tajikistan. Second, I examine voting in two important deeply divided societies in South Eastern Europe that have produced, and have the potential to produce additional, violence that could not only devastate their citizens, but also destabilize the region. Third, I use literature on elections to examine comparatively and systematically electoral outcomes in the former Yugoslav region, while scholars of elections in Eastern Europe have generally confined their focus to countries in East Central Europe. I first sketch the political context for ethnic politics in the region. Then I investigate several prominent alternative arguments for explaining the relative moderation of voters in Macedonia. Richard Rose and Neil Munro argue that election outcomes are a function of laws, the parties supplied by elites, and how voters respond to the choices offered.4 I look first at literature on how institutions and external actors structure political behavior in democratizing 2

countries and ethnic party systems. Given these constraints, how might citizens’ values and beliefs factor into their voting? Drawing on analysis of institutional arrangements and external intervention, content analysis of party campaigning, and quantitative analysis of public opinion data, I examine the hypotheses I derived from the literature described above. I argue that institutional and external factors interact with grass-roots attitudes to explain the victory of moderates in Macedonia's elections. I close by discussing the implications of this work and suggesting further research. DEEPLY DIVIDED POLITICAL CONTEXT In a culturally diverse Eastern Europe, pressures exerted by ethnic entrepreneurs for collective rights have sometimes threatened national integration, challenged state control, and deterred democracy.5 Until 1991, Bosnia and Macedonia were the most ethnically heterogeneous republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Three ethnic groups -- Bosnian Muslims (now called Bosniaks), Serbs, and Croats – dominate Bosnia; two ethnic groups – Macedonians and Albanians – dominate Macedonia.6 These republics were at the center of the Yugoslav communists’ efforts to overcome extremism of WWII and promote interethnic cooperation.7 In socialist Yugoslavia, people constructed a sense of who they were and what it meat to be, for example, a Croat, based on their experiences and their interactions with neighboring groups and official categories.8 Despite this complex social reality, many elites in Yugoslavia propagated a “crisis” frame of hostile interethnic relations that had been dormant since WWII to replace the “normal” frame of positive interethnic relations, in order to take advantage of crumbling socialist legitimacy, regional devolution, elite competition, economic decline, and mass frustration in the late 1980s.9 Cognizant of the fragility of their republics, however, leaders of the titular nations in Bosnia and Macedonia were not eager to secede from Yugoslavia and instead offered political compromises. These proposals were rejected by the strongest elites, who were bent on dismantling Yugoslavia. Serbia and Croatia’s leaders egged on and armed their co-ethnic parties in Bosnia to violently ethnically partition a republic they claimed was dangerously dominated by Bosniaks. After NATO’s intervention into Bosnia ended four years of war, the international community in 1995 imposed a political system intended to promote compromise. The Dayton constitution encourages mass-level mixing, such as promoting refugee return to prewar homes. It also, 3

however, reinforces ethnic divisions and separation through complex ethnic power-sharing arrangements among the three constituent nations, including territorial divisions. In comparison with Bosnia’s neighbors, Macedonia’s neighbors, while threatening, were less interested in, and less able, to violently intervene. Despite the disgruntlement of Macedonia’s Albanian citizens,10 it was not until 2001 that Albanian extremists in Kosovo helped spark an insurrection among segments of Macedonia's Albanian population ostensibly for “political and financial control over municipalities with Albanian majorities.”11 NATO and EU officials intervened within months to encourage the formation of a temporary government of national unity and to mediate the Ohrid Framework Agreement.12 The peace agreement compelled Macedonia to adopt constitutional changes that encouraged ethnic power-sharing.13 Electoral systems also shape political behavior by counting votes and assigning parliamentary seats.14 Bosnia and Macedonia share a proportional representation (PR) electoral system with multiple multi-member districts. This system interacts with ethnic diversity to foster a multiparty system in which it is difficult, but not impossible in Macedonia’s case, to form a government without entering into a multiethnic coalition. The number of seats allocated to each district affects party competition; the fewer the seats in a multi-member district, the larger the proportion of the vote that a party must win in order to gain a seat there.15 Bosnia’s electorates in its entities – the Bosniak-Croat Federation & the Republika Srpska – are divided into five and three multi-member electoral districts, respectively.16 The district magnitude varies from three to six. Macedonia’s electorate is divided into six multi-member electoral districts, where the district magnitude is 20.17 These rules encourage the proliferation of parties. Both countries possess ethnic party systems, which are dominated by ethnic parties, or parties that derive their support overwhelmingly from one ethnic group and appeal to only one ethnic group.18 Ethnic parties developed during the transition from one-party rule partly because of the prominence of ethnicity in the modern Balkans and socialist Yugoslavia's reinforcement of ethnicity.19 The tendency for the electorate to divide along ethnic lines was reinforced by the power-sharing arrangements contained in the 1990 constitutions, electoral sequences in 1991,20 and the post-violence agreements. Ethnic party systems compel all parties to take up ethnic causes in order to remain competitive.21 Ethnic party systems also often create incentives for radical appeals to the electorate, because parties can rarely win the votes of other ethnic groups. 4

Table 1: Similarity of Cases Bosnia Macedonia Political history Ethnically heterogeneous republic Ethnically heterogeneous republic of of Socialist Yugoslavia Socialist Yugoslavia

Electoral System Proportional Representation with Proportional Representation with multi-member districts multi-member districts

Party Systems Ethnic Party System Ethnic Party System

Recent interethnic violence 1992-1995 2001

Internationally imposed Ethnic power-sharing arrangements Ethnic power-sharing arrangements post-war agreement Size Population of 3.5 million Population of 2 million

Economy GNP/capita: $6,100 (PPP) GNP/capita: $6,700 (PPP) Unemployment: 40% 22 Unemployment: 31.9%23

Neighborhood Extremists in neighboring countries Extremists in neighboring countries express irredentist claims; Serbia & express irredentist claims; only those Croatia have pursued them in Albanian-dominated Kosovo have pursued them

Where ethnic power-sharing is necessary, there are several ways to promote political cooperation.24 The first is through political parties that have a cross-ethnic base, parties that Macedonia and Bosnia lack. The second and more realistic option in deeply divided communities, is through parties rooted in particular ethnic communities that are willing to engage in interethnic accommodation.25 The strongest parties for moderation in Macedonia and Bosnia in 2002 were the social democratic parties, which are affiliated with the majority ethnic groups.26 Nationalist parties create grave problems for governing a deeply divided state. For this paper, I define nationalist parties as parties that go beyond representing their putative ethnic- based nation to work toward privileging their ethnic-based nation in a territory and expressing hostility toward interethnic cooperation.27 Bosnia’s nationalist parties led the country into war and now virtually paralyze governance at the national level, while Macedonia’s advocate ethnic partition of the country, which would foment violence. Despite the similarity of their institutions and experiences, citizens in Bosnia and Macedonia, particularly those belonging to the majority group, elected parties to their national assemblies – the House of Representatives (Zastupnicki Dom Parlamentarne skupstine) in 5

Bosnia and the National Assembly (Sobranie) in Macedonia – with different positions on interethnic relations in 2002. Voters in 2002 supported Macedonia's Social Democratic Party (SDSM), which downplayed ethnicity, while voters punished Bosnia's Social Democratic Party, which offered a similar theme (parties in bold in Table 2). In Bosnia, the incumbent Social Democrats (SDP) garnered only 9.1 percent of the seats in Bosnia's House of Representatives, trailing the Bosniak nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the slightly less nationalist Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalist parties — the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) — also captured the Serb and Croat vote, respectively, of the House. Table 2: 2002 Election Results for National Assemblies in Macedonia and Bosnia Party competing in Bosnia’s % of vote Party competing in Macedonia’s 2002 % of vote 2002 House of Representatives won in National Assembly won in Bosnia Macedonia Party of Democratic Action (SDA) 21.9 Social Democratic Alliance of 40.7 Macedonia (SDSM)-led coalition Serb Democratic Party (SDS) 14.0 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 24.5 Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO- DPMNE)-led coalition Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) 11.1 Democratic Union for Integration 11.7 (DUI) Party of Independent Social Democrats 9.3 Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) 5.1 (SNSD) Croatian Democratic Union BiH (HDZ) 9.3 Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) 1.4 Social Democratic Party (SDP) 9.1 National Democratic Party 1.0 Party of Democratic Progress 4.3 Socialist Party .7 Serb Radical Party 2.0 Small parties that didn’t gain seats 14.9 Socialist Party of Republika Srpska 1.8 Bosnian Party 1.5 Pensioners Party of the Federation 1.4 Democratic Peoples Union 1.3 Economic Block-HDU 1.3 New Croatian Initiative 1.1 Small parties that didn’t gain seats 10.6 Source: Elections in Bosnia: Izborna Komicija Bosne i Hercegovine, [Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina] http://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati%20izbora%202002.htm, accessed April 1, 2004; Elections in Macedonia: http://www.izbori.gov.mk/

The moderate Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) led “Together for Macedonia,” a coalition with parties representing ethnic Macedonians and small minorities, which captured more than 40 percent of the vote in Macedonia’s parliament.28 The incumbent Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National 6

Unity (VMRO-DPMNU) led a monoethnic Macedonia coalition whose campaign rhetoric was largely nationalistic; it came in second.29 The Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), whose rhetoric sought merely greater rights for Albanians despite being led by the leader of the Albanian insurgency, captured the bulk of the Albanian vote.30 How did Macedonia’s voters overcome powerful pressure to vote for parties focused on privileging narrow cultural interests and instead support parties most willing to cooperate across ethnic lines? INSTITUTIONAL LITERATURE By creating incentives, political institutions influence what elites are willing to offer voters and how voters respond.31 The first multiparty elections or “founding elections” help determine the parties supplied by elites. It is during these initial elections that social cleavages are transformed into political parties, which then work to entrench themselves, thus “freezing” the major party alternatives.32 In her study of political and economic variation in the post- socialist region, Valerie Bunce maintains that the outcome of the first multiparty elections sets the course for future development.33 The results of the founding elections reflect the balance of power in society between the primary alternatives: those connected to the former authoritarian regime – here the communists -- and the oppositionists. The winners then set the political and economic agenda, charting a path-dependent course. In post-socialist states that are deeply ethnically divided, the first elections reflect ethnic cleavages as well as ideological ones.34 Voters who support parties willing to engage in interethnic cooperation during their founding election indicate preferences for coexistence, setting a positive precedent for cross-ethnic political cooperation and encouraging moderate voters in the future.

Given that Bosnia and Macedonia are merely 15 years away from their founding elections, it is not surprising that their political parties do not function the way they do in consolidated democracies, by effectively aggregating interests, defining choices for voters, and holding politicians accountable.35 Parties in the post-socialist states are organized top-down, have few roots in society, rarely reflect social cleavages, and often depend on the state for resources.36 Weak party systems encourage corruption and as a result, engender general frustration among voters with political institutions in general and the behavior of parties once in power. Weak party systems contribute to corruption and poor governance, which encourage voters to kick out incompetent incumbents in protest. 7

Party systems work within post-violence constitutional rules that enshrine power-sharing arrangements. These rules assume the preeminence of ethnic identity and seek to cultivate elite cooperation that promises all prominent groups a role in political power.37 Bosnia’ postwar constitution embraces consociational power-sharing arrangements, which institutionalize ethnic cleavages—Bosniak, Serb, and Croat—in a grand coalition (tri-ethnic collective presidency), ethnic-based federalism,38 a vital interest veto, and ethnic keys in the bureaucracy and state- owned companies. While the Ohrid Agreement mandates power-sharing arrangements in Macedonia, such as a vital interest veto, raising Albanian to the status of an official language, an increase in Albanian representation in state institutions, and devolving power to local governments, it stopped short of guaranteeing a grand coalition or ethnic-based federalism.39 Advocates of consociationalism point out the importance of rules that protect minorities without giving them the ability to perpetually block policy making.40 Critics of consociationalism level more fundamental disapproval, asserting that power-sharing arrangements fail to recognize the variability of ethnic identifications, strengthen ethnic party systems that deepen ethnic divisions, and falsely assume elite commitment to accommodation.41 In comparison with rigid power-sharing rules and radical political devolution, more informal power-sharing rules and a more powerful central government create incentives for political elites to engage in interethnic cooperation and supply voters with moderate options.

Because ethnic parties compete almost solely for constituents who belong to their own ethnic groups, party competition in ethnic party systems occurs almost solely within ethnic groups, rather than across ethnic groups.42 Normally, the greater the number of parties competing for the vote of one ethnic group, the greater the incentive for parties to resort to ethnic outbidding. This dynamic compels parties to distinguish themselves by arguing that they are “more purely,” for example, Albanian, than other parties competing for the ethnic Albanian vote.43 They try to outdo each other in convincing voters that only they can safely and effectively represent the “homogeneous” interests of their ethnic group. On the eve of elections in Macedonia, election observers expected that if any violence occurred, it would be mainly within each ethnic group, as ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian parties battled for votes in their own communities.44 Only in rare circumstances, in which parties of the ethnic majority rely on minority support, are high levels of party competition in ethnic party systems likely to 8

promote inter-group accommodation.45 If party fractionalization both overall and within the majority group is severe, issue cleavages other than ethnic ones are significant, and minorities make limited demands that the majority group feels do not threaten its security or domination, then Wilkinson predicts parties would need to consider forming a multiethnic coalition to govern.46 Under these conditions, pressures for ethnic outbidding would at least slightly decrease. In most cases, the greater the political competition within ethnic groups the greater the incentives for ethnic parties to engage in ethnic outbidding and present voters with few moderate options. However, extremely high political competition together with multiple issue cleavages and modest minority demands can encourage parties to moderate.

EXTERNAL ACTORS47 Because Bosnia and Macedonia are tiny, new, and contested by neighbors, the regional and international environment exerts a powerful influence on political outcomes in both states. Understanding interethnic relations in Eastern Europe requires considering the triangular relationship that exists among the minority communities themselves, the states in which they live, and their external national “homelands.”48 Neighbors who make irredentist claims and are willing to use force to realize those claims in multiethnic states elevate ethnic concerns in the political realm of that multiethnic state and discourage political moderation. Early and constructive multilateral intervention into a beleaguered multiethnic state can counterbalance regional tensions raised by irredentist neighbors and promote cross-ethnic political cooperation. Multiethnic states that posses less covetous neighbors and attract careful multilateral intervention allow more space for cross-ethnic cooperation among political elites than multiethnic states that possess strong irredentist neighbors and fail to encourage effective multilateral intervention.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL LITERATURE Individual voters must react to the choices that institutions, elites, and external actors provide. Popular values and beliefs will help determine voters’ reactions to parties and to democratization more generally.49 Individuals who express strong attachments to their ethnic identifications are more likely to express distance from other ethnic groups, and vote for parties that vow to protect the interests of their ethnic group. V.P. Gagnon argues that elites promoted violence in Bosnia in order to create “hard” ethnic boundaries easier for them to manipulate to maintain power.50 Intimate experience with violence often further increases ethnic distance,51 9

compels voters to interpret political issues through ethnic lenses, and sours views on coexistence. Ethnically defined interests are considered zero-sum “hot issues” over which it is difficult to compromise, in comparison with utilitarian issues, such as the economy.52 Macedonia’s relatively brief experience with interethnic violence in comparison with Bosnia’s should provide more space for voters to consider political issues that are not necessarily ethnically defined.53 The less interethnic violence that citizens suffer, the lower their levels of ethnic distance and the less likely their preferences are to be monopolized by ethnic concerns, these create opportunities for moderate political preferences.

Even after violence, certain types of social capital, or the “connections among individuals — social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them,” could support moderation.54 The West has embraced the idea of cultivating horizontally organized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that produce social capital as a grass-roots strategy for increasing accountability and building democracy in the post-socialist region.55 In deeply divided societies, culturally inclusive ‘bridging” social capital can assist interethnic peace and democratization, while homogeneous or “bonding” social capital can adversely affect democracy. 56 A problem is that bonding social capital is easier to generate than bridging social capital, because individuals seek out those similar to them (culturally, socio-economically, and ideologically) for close relationships.57 The more individuals participate in horizontal social organizations that bridge ethnic divides, the more likely they are to express moderate political preferences.

METHOD A most similar comparative-case study design of Macedonia and Bosnia facilitates investigation of these hypotheses for explaining the extent of voter moderation in ethnic party systems that experienced violence. Analysis of constitutions and electoral laws helps gauge the institutional incentives for party and voter behavior. I examine results of the founding elections and then draw on subsequent party behavior and public opinion to judge if they set the tone for future cross-ethnic political cooperation and moderate voting. Analysis of links between parties and constituents; data on corruption; and public opinion about parties, other democratic institutions, and corruption suggest potential for protest voting. Content analysis of the 2002 campaign messages in local press provides an unprecedented window into the messages that parties provide to the voters. Because the ethnic 10

majority party will largely set the tone for interethnic relations in the country, I focused analysis on the race for the ethnic majority’s vote. To analyze systematically campaign rhetoric, I randomly selected 350 articles on the elections from two independent newspapers considered “moderate”--Oslobodjenje (Liberation) in Bosnia and Dnevnik (Daily) in Macedonia.58 That these newspapers target readers from the majority group, possess similar ideologies, and provide at least some coverage of the campaigns of the minorities facilitate cross-national comparison.59 The qualitative data-analysis program NUD*IST guided analysis by uncovering patterns in the campaign rhetoric.60 Comparing the parties’ campaign messages to the concerns expressed by voters in public opinion polls measures the relationship between parties and voters. Secondary sources detail external intervention by neighbors and the international community. Survey data on ethnic distance and on civic participation provides evidence for individual attitudes on tolerance and social capital. Statistical analysis of the 2001 World Values Survey tests the individual impact of the factors specified in the alternative hypotheses. FINDINGS Analysis points to the prominence of several institutional and external factors in explaining the variation in voter support for moderate parties. These rules and actors magnify small differences in preferences among citizens in the two states. Institutional arguments In the founding elections in 1990, nationalists won more convincingly in Bosnia than in Macedonia. The outcome of these initial multiparty elections diverged partly because the communist party in Bosnia in the 1980s sought neither to reform nor to allow for free elections. This hampered the development of a reformed communist or other moderate party.61 As Gagnon demonstrates, the victors of SDA, HDZ and SDS in 1990 largely refrained from ethnic outbidding and instead portrayed themselves as representing the interests of their respective ethnic groups but willing to cooperate.62 The parties briefly agreed to govern cooperatively, though HDZ and SDS succumbed to pressure from Zagreb and Belgrade, respectively to elevate extremist leaders and divide Bosnia for the benefit of their ethnic and ideological supporters. Many of these exclusivist local networks of power, which were solidified during the war, preserve today. Since the war, instances of political cooperation across ethnic lines have been rare and occur often only under heavy international pressure. 11

In contrast, Macedonia's communists were able to adapt and remain popular in the founding elections. While the nationalist VMRO-DPMNU won the most parliamentary seats in 1990, its government fell in a vote of no-confidence in 1991. SDSM then formed a four-party coalition government that included the Albanian party. As an indication of the coalition’ program of building interethnic cooperation, the government included four Albanian cabinet ministers.63 Despite not needing to be, all subsequent coalition governments – including that led by VMRO- DMPME -- have been multiethnic. Members of these various multiethnic coalitions have largely managed to work together to formulate policy. Founding elections also give the winners the advantage of patronage. This too would encourage predominance by those parties able to shape policy in the wake of the first multiparty elections. Parties in Macedonia and Bosnia are dominated by candidates who seek to gain public office to promote their personal wealth and power.64 As a result, the parties often lack clear party platforms. While SDSM in the early 1990s preached toleration toward ethnic minorities, the party's candidate for the 1999 presidential election spewed anti-Albanian rhetoric.65 At that time, the previously nationalist VMRO-DMPNE advocated ethnic tolerance. By the 2002 parliamentary race, parties flip flopped again, with SDSM espousing moderation and VMRO- DMPNE embracing nationalism.66 Macedonian voters have consistently rewarded parties with the most accommodative message. Parties often lack not just ideological consistency, but also grass-roots organizations that help them connect to voters. One study showed that Sobranie representatives over a two year period had no contact with their constituencies on some issues in major policy areas.67 Given this lack of responsiveness and the fluidity of messages, it is no surprise that ordinary citizens continue to distrust political parties, distrust that spreads to other political institutions (Table 3) TABLE 3: Lack of confidence in political institutions % distrusting political % distrusting % distrusting parties parliament government BOSNIA: Bosniaks 84.8 75.8 64.0 Croats 80.7 84.1 79.6 Serbs 88.6 86.4 76.0

MACEDONIA: Macedonians 92.8 91.8 86.9 Albanians 85.0 96.6 80.2 Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004. N=694 for Bosnia; n=1055 for Macedonia 12

In Bosnia, the SDP-led coalition implemented only minor economic reforms but failed to meet voters' expectations of thorough-going reforms.68 The VMRO-DPMNE-led government also achieved little reform. Though the economies in Bosnia and Macedonia did not deteriorate between parliamentary elections, they remained in dismal shape.69 The poor records of governments reinforce incentives for challengers to blame society’s ills on the incumbents.70 Dire economic conditions and rampant corruption in both countries were easy targets for parties in the opposition. In a common charge, SDSM accused VMRO-DPMNE of engaging in racketeering, failing to open new businesses, increasing unemployment, and lying by promising to create 200,000 new jobs.71 Corruption appeared to increase in Macedonia during the VMRO- DPMNE-led government. Criminal networks among Macedonia's Albanians contributed to the war in 2001 and together with corrupt Macedonian officials helped undermine democratization.72 During the election, an NGO released a damaging report outlining endemic corruption in the VMRO-DPMNE-led government.73 In Bosnia, the SDP-led Alliance occupied itself with establishing its members' parties' control over remaining public companies.74 Shortly after a junior member of the SDP-alliance was accused of corruption, the Alliance fell apart in 2002. These events reinforce “the public's conviction that all politicians are vain, incompetent, corrupt, and unworthy.”75 Although the vast majority of ordinary citizens in Macedonia and Bosnia agree that “the country is run by a few big interests,” a higher percentage agrees in Macedonia (92 percent of Macedonians and 96 percent of Albanians) than agrees in Bosnia (77 percent of Bosniaks, 82 percent of Serbs, and 84 percent of Croats).76 General frustration with corrupt and ineffectual political parties, more than any kind of conscious choice in favor of party positions on interethnic relations, help explain the outcome of the election results. UN High Representative in Bosnia, Patty Ashdown, claimed that “protest voting” against ruling parties that did not do enough to reform, rather than “nationalist voting,” explained the SDP's loss in 2002.77 Between 2002 and 2003, voters across South Eastern Europe lashed out against incumbents, booting them out not only in Bosnia and Macedonia, but also in Croatia (November 2003), Serbia (December 2003), and Bulgaria (October 2003). Analysis of constitutional provisions suggests that Bosnia’s rules more negatively influence governance and ethnic power-sharing than Macedonia’s. These rules affect what elites are willing to offer voters. First, Bosnia’s constitution establishes power-sharing arrangements for balanced representation of the ethnic groups and/or ethnic-based regions in virtually all of the 13

multiple layers of bodies for political representation. This is clearest at the top, where Bosnia’s collective Presidency must consist of a Bosniak, Serb, and Croat. This encourages reactive nationalist voting as illustrated by informant Jadranka: “I voted for SDA not because I wanted to, but because I knew they [Serbs] were voting for SDS.” In the 42-seat House of Representatives, 28 members must come from the [Bosniak-Croat] Federation and 14 from the Republika Srpska. Macedonia’s National Assembly contains no provisions for regional or ethnic representation. Moreover, political power and resources in Macedonia are focused at the center, in its unicameral parliament. Though the National Assembly contains a “vital interest” veto, it clearly defines “vital interest.”78 Lacking alternatives, parties in Macedonia must formulate policy at the national level. Bosnia’s central institutions, including its House of Representatives, have such weak minimal competence and easy access to mechanisms for blocking decision making, that they contribute to paralysis.79 An undefined “vital interest” veto that is broadly interpreted at the state level confounds governance. The veto interacts with the significant powers allocated to federal, regional, and local assemblies, where one ethnic group usually predominates and is better situated to control institutions, than at the national level, to create further incentives for nationalist parties in Bosnia to withhold cross-ethnic cooperation at the center. Finally, the ability and the willingness of the UN High Representative to enact legislation also depresses the incentives for interethnic accommodation in the National Assembly. Public trust in national- level political institutions in Bosnia is significantly lower than trust in local political institutions.80 While power-sharing arrangements in Bosnia go so far that they hamstring cooperation, power sharing rules in Macedonia risk not going far enough, since the government is just now implementing contentious legislation on local self-government required by Ohrid.81 Party fragmentation also affects cross-ethnic cooperation. Bosnia’s party system is more highly fragmented, both overall and within ethnic groups, than Macedonia’s. In Macedonia, the effective number of parties, based on seat share, was 2.9 in 1998 and 2.88 in 2002.82 In Bosnia, the effective number of parties was 6.90 in 2000 and 4.09 in 2002.83 According to Wilkinson, the level of party fragmentation in Bosnia should have been high enough to depress the normal intra-ethnic competitive incentives for ethnic outbidding in the 2002 campaign.84 This is because the top Bosniak parties would expect to need minority coalition partners. Content analysis quashes this expectation. Bosnia’s campaign was dominated to a greater extent than Macedonia’s campaign by ethnically framed messages about protecting ethnic group interests, 14

ethnic identity, and the threat posed by other ethnic groups and disloyal co-ethnics inside and outside the state (Table 4). These are all divisive “hot issues.” Table 4: Messages In 2002 Election Campaigns Campaign messages Bosnia (as % of total Macedonia (as % of total campaign messages) campaign messages) Ethnically framed issues 57% 39% Anti-corruption 12% 8% Solve economic problems 11% 25% Stability and the rule of law 11% 18% Movement toward the West 5% 5% Change of leadership 4% 2% Supra-ethnic solidarity 0% 3% N= 244 campaign messages for Bosnia; N=1316 campaign messages for Macedonia85

Fifty-seven percent of the campaign messages in Bosnia compared with 39 percent of the campaign messages in Macedonia featured ethnic outbidding or propagated fear of other ethnic groups. In a good example of branding SDP a traitor for cracking down on Bosniak criminals, SDA backer Prof. Halilovic, hatib of Sarajevo’s King Fahd Mosque, warned in a sermon that “Bosniaks are not aware of how they are encircled by enemies; while Bosniaks look for culprits for all their misfortunes within their own ranks, their neighbors are sharpening their daggers…” Evoking the threat posed by Serbs, the Oslobodjenje newspaper contributed to raising tension by charging that, “leading politicians and the ruling party form the RS gave support to [Serbia’s President] Vojislav Kostunica regarding his position that the RS should be annexed to Serbia.” While SDP leaders downplayed ethnic issues and advocated a “social-democratic system that is understood as an open civil society, [and a] multiethnic and pluralistic democracy,” they sometimes got caught in responding to SDA claims that they failed to protect Bosniaks. SDA needed not only to demobilize the supporters of their opponents but also to mobilize their own supporter to re-take power. Eerily similar to SDA’s accusations, VMRO-DPMNE charged SDSM for “’stab(bing) a knife in the back of the country,” by accusing the VMRO-DPMNE-led government and not the “terrorists” for threatening Macedonia.”86 In the same breath that it accused SDSM of “snitching on Macedonian defenders” during the war, VMRO-DPMNE condemned SDSM for “refus[ing] to make a coalition with Macedonian parties, but admit[ting] that it would do that with terrorist 15

and criminal Ali Ahmeti [leader of the Albanian DUI].” VMRO-DPMNE’s ethnically framed rhetoric and attempt first to isolate the most popular Albanian leader and then to arrest him makes sense given Macedonians’ lukewarm support for Ohrid and the proximity of the war that began under their watch. Though SDSM largely refrained from anti-Albanian rhetoric and from labeling the VMRO-DPMNE as traitors, they occasionally resorted to charging the ruling party with betrayal. SDSM claimed that “they [VMRO-DPMNE] are already in coalition with the terrorists [in the Albanian DPA] who have done ethnic cleansing and killed members of the Macedonian security forces.” For its part, DUI could rest comfortably on the political concessions its leaders had achieved through their earlier violent uprising, while pledging merely to implement Ohrid and work for integration. Above harping on ethnicity, parties in the Macedonian campaign centered on concerns that were not explicitly ethnic, with 58 percent of campaign messages focused on economic problems; the rule of law and related stability, and corruption. The parties framed these issues as problems created by their co-ethnic competitors. In a typical appeal, VMRO-DPMNE claimed to have “returned the 8 percent that SDSM took from the pensioners and increased the pensions by 6 percent.” VMRO-DPMNE also asserted that it created 110,000 new jobs during its rule and promised to create 160,000 more. The campaign messages that emerge from the content analysis suggest why high party fragmentation in Bosnia failed to create pressures for moderation there. Conditions in Bosnia fail to meet two criteria other than fragmentation that Wilkinson specifies as necessary to produce moderating pressure. First, issue cleavages other than ethnic ones appear to be relegated by political elites. Furthermore, minorities seem to make—or at least endorse—radical demands, such as Serbia’s annexation of the RS. Such extreme demands make it difficult for Bosniaks to compromise with minorities without threatening their own security. At first glance, the lower level of party fragmentation in Macedonia, which means a multiethnic coalition is not necessary, seems a liability. But other aspects of the Macedonian political scene, including elite emphasis on economic issues, rather than just ethnicity, implies a multi-dimensional political space that Bosnia lacks. The minority DUI’s modest—though not wholly convincing — appeal to integration leaves open slightly more room for cross-ethnic compromise than in Bosnia. External factors 16

Serbia and Croatia’s governments acted upon their irredentist designs on Bosnia by fomenting political extremism and arming extremists among their co-ethnics in Bosnia in order to ethnically partition it.87 While Greece initially imposed sanctions, the putative homelands of Macedonia’s Albanians - Kosovo and Albania – were less willing and able to support irredentists and co-ethnic irregulars in Macedonia. Nonetheless, Kosovar Albanians armed and stoked co- ethnic extremists in Macedonia in 2001.88 Multilateral intervention was more effective in Macedonia than in Bosnia in holding off and stemming extremism and interethnic violence. While the UN refused to deploy preventive peacekeepers in Bosnia, it deployed the first preventative peacekeeping mission in its history along Macedonia’s border.89 Responses by the international community to violence in Bosnia were too little, too late, while its post-conflict reconstruction efforts there were delayed and then heavy handed.90 This allowed nationalists to entrench themselves, hamstring government, then compel intervention by the UN Office of the High Representative, who inadvertently undermined the accountability of local officials. International reaction to the violence in Macedonia was swift and largely effective in the immediate term, while its post-conflict reconstruction efforts appear more nuanced than in Bosnia. Not only did Macedonia benefit from mistakes the international community made in Bosnia, but it also itself learned from mistakes that Bosnia made. Individual-level explanations External intervention, political institutions, and the parties supplied by elites interact to offer voters in Macedonia stronger options for moderation than in Bosnia. The priorities that shape voters’ responses to these political options appear to reinforce the stronger viability of moderates in Macedonia’s political system. This is not evident through ethnic distance. Voters who express high levels of distance from those ethnically different are likely to influence and/or respond to ethnically defined rhetoric of parties. In surveys conducted just before the war, citizens of Macedonia expressed higher levels of ethnic distance than citizens of Bosnia.91 In the post-socialist period, comparable data are more difficult to find. On one indicator of the ethnic distance among the communities — willingness of individuals to live next to someone of a different religion — citizens of Macedonia and Bosnia express similarly low to moderate levels of distance (Table 5).92 Of all groups, ethnic Macedonians express the highest distance. 17

Table 5: Levels of Ethnic Distance in 2001, by citizenship and ethnicity BOSNIA MACEDONIA Bosniaks Croats Serbs Macedonians Albanians % who mentioned that they 8.0 6.0 22.7 30.8 14.8 would not live next to a neighbor of another religion Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004. N=694 for Bosnia N=1055 for Macedonia

These data suggest that levels of ethnocentrism cannot explain why voter moderation is more prevalent in Macedonia than in Bosnia. Despite maintaining distance from other ethnic groups, citizens of Macedonia expressed a significant commitment to coexistence. Approximately 62 percent of Macedonians and 38 percent of Albanians in 2003 answered that the ideal situation would be that ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians live together in Macedonia without any problems.93 After this option, Albanians supported full independence of a substantial part of the “former crisis areas” (24 percent), special minority rights (16 percent), and autonomy (11 percent). That one quarter of Albanians supports secession suggests a shaky foundation for the Macedonian state. Bosnia's constituent nations, however, are even more deeply divided over whether or how to live together. In 2002, about 76 percent of Bosniaks, 25 percent of Bosnian Croats, and only 17 percent of Bosnian Serbs believe that their paramount interest is Bosnia configured as a state of equal citizens and peoples or as it was before the war.94 More Bosnian Croats viewed greater autonomy (31 percent) as their paramount interest while 19 percent preferred independence. For their part, more Bosnian Serbs viewed independence (29 percent) or integration with Serbia (13 percent) as their paramount interest. The war’s violence, neighbors’ intervention, and external options for Bosnian minorities create strong centrifugal pressures in Bosnia. Given the substantial differences over the political configuration of their states and the campaigns’ emphasis on ethnic concerns, it would make sense if voters focused on fundamental problems with nation-building, while relegating concerns about economic issues.95 Testing this expectation is difficult due to the lack of directly comparable data. However, surveys suggest that ordinary people of all groups but Albanians agreed in 2002 that economic issues should be the government’s first priority (Table 6).96 18

Table 6: Identifying the new government’s first priority, by citizenship & by ethnicity BOSNIA MACEDONIA Bosniaks Croats Serbs Macedonians Albanians Utilitarian issues: Develop the economy & 74.0 47.0 52.0 47.2 21.4 promote new jobs Fight corruption 9.0 7.0 9.0 3.0 3.7 Reduce Poverty 13.5 3.7 Improve Education .7 4.0 Establish democracy 8.0 15 13.0 N.A. N.A. Pursue closer relations with 2.0 1.0 1.0 N.A. N.A. the West TOTAL UTILITARIAN 93.0 56.5 75.0 64.4 32.8 Ambiguous: Establish peace & stability N.A. N.A. N.A. 40.4 39.0 Ethnically framed issues: Implement the Framework N.A. N.A. N.A. .5 20.5 Agreement Defend the rights of people 2.0 28.0 22.8 N.A. N.A. of our own (ethno)national group Improve inter-ethnic N.A. N.A. N.A. 1.0 2.9 relations Promote safe refugee returns 5.0 1.0 1.0 TOTAL ETHNIC: 7.0 29.0 23.8 1.5 23.4 Other/D.K. 1.8 1.4 Sources: For Bosnia: National Democratic Institute 2002, (N=3700) For Macedonia: International Republic Institute 2002. (N=9321) Respondents were allowed multiple answers ; N.A. = not asked.

To facilitate analysis, I grouped priorities into “hot” (ethnically defined issues) and “cold,” utilitarian issues (not explicitly ethnic). Comparing Table 6 to Table 4 reveals a striking divergence in emphasis between elites and ordinary people – while elites emphasize ethnicity, ordinary people emphasize utilitarian issues. Albanians are preoccupied with peace and security while Macedonians rank these concepts just below the economy. How ethnically inclusive respondents interpret stability is not clear, so I placed stability in an ambiguous category between utilitarian and ethnically framed issues. Interpreting views on economic issues is also difficult. But other surveys suggest that voters do not always interpret economic concerns through ethnic lenses. Ordinary people in Bosnia and Macedonia generally express the greatest tolerance for interethnic mixing and cooperation in economic settings.97 Based on ethnic Macedonians’ tendency to view Ohrid as “giving in to Albanian demands,” I placed the framework agreement in the ethnically framed category. Overall, in neither country do ordinary peoples’ concerns 19

compel political elites to focus on ethnicity. Citizens recognize the negative impact of politicians on interethnic relations,98 but many do not believe they can influence political policy. Social Capital Building social capital could improve efficacy. Citizens of Macedonia are more likely than citizens of Bosnia to participate in the types of voluntary organizations theorized to produce social capital supportive of civility and democracy (horizontally-organized, non-religious organizations). Forty-four percent of Macedonian respondents and 34 percent of Bosnian respondents participate in such supposedly serendipitous organizations. But the NGOs in which Bosnian and Macedonian citizens are most likely to engage are monoethnic ones99 and not focused on advocacy. Of the numerous types of organizations that the World Values Survey asked about,100 sports organizations were the most popular group in Macedonia (13 percent of respondents reported membership) and in Bosnia (10 percent). Sports teams and fans in post- war Bosnia generally divided along ethnic lines. Soccer hooligans have caused problems during matches between ethnic foes in Bosnia and at opposition rallies in Macedonia. Nearly the same percentage of Bosnians (10 percent) and Macedonians (11 percent) reported membership in religious organizations, which in the Balkans contribute to the “dark” side of social capital. These data suggest that Macedonia produces no more bridging social capital than Bosnia. ASSESSING THE INDIVIDUAL IMPACT OF EACH FACTOR World Values survey data – though far form ideal – help test as many of the hypotheses as possible.101 How do the hypotheses hold up in multivariate regression? I created two logistic regression models to predict the likelihood that respondents of the majority group in Bosnia's Federation (Table 7, Model 1) and in Macedonia (Table 7, model 2) would vote for a political party that expressed a willingness to cooperate with political parties representing other ethnic groups in their states. Logistic regression allows me to assess the individual effect of each possible factor on political preferences.102 To test the social capital hypothesis, the models include common individual-level indicators for social capital: interpersonal trust, interest in politics, and involvement in non-hierarchical NGOs.103 Are those most involved in a web of horizontal non- governmental organizations more likely to support parties that advocate interethnic cooperation? Attendance at religious serves explores the potential nefarious influence of bonding social capital. In addition, do issue cleavages other than ethnicity matter? Models test whether voters’ 20 concern about “cold issues” of the economy (emphasis on government priority of economic growth) and corruption (belief that the country is run by a few big interests) increases the probability they will vote for parties whose campaigns address these issues, rather than for nationalists. The models also consider ideological views important in divided post-socialist states, such as opinions about the role of the state in politics, society, and the economy (left-right self-placement, views of the past communist system, and the extent to which the care of citizens is foremost a responsibility of the state),104 as well as ethnic distance (views about neighbors of a different religion). Finally, the models control for demographic factors.105

Table 7: Dependent Variables = Probability (Vote For Moderate Parties*) Among Majority Groups In Bosnia And Macedonia Independent Variables Model 1: Model 2: b (Bosnia's Federation) (Macedonia) SOCIAL CAPITAL: b s.e. B s.e. Interpersonal trust -.826 .459 -.406 .385 Interest in politics .069 .174 .242 .160 Member NGO (not religious) .305 .290 .280 .277 “Dark” Social Capital: attend religious services -.201** .068 -.078 .099 ETHNIC DISTANCE -.836 .510 .266 .277 DISSATISFACTION: Lack of confidence in political institutions -.081 .187 .550** .174 Dissatisfaction with national office holders -.002 .267 .288 .180 View gov’t as run by a few big interests -.469 .365 .755 .476 IDEOLOGY: Left-Right self placement -.221** .071 -.083 .052 Positive view of communist system .046 .053 .097* .045 Government should provide for all .221 .071 .097* .050 Economic growth as gov’ts most important task -.048 .352 .164 .328 DEMOGRAPHICS: Education .167* .080 .172* .081 Income -.077 .103 -.081 .147 Age cohort .002 .096 -.009 .089 Gender .009 .276 .044 .279 Rural-urban .048 .058 .005 .053 Constant -.089 1.733 -1.30 1.509 Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004. * In Macedonia, moderates competing for the ethnic Macedonian vote = Social Democratic Union of Macedonia and the Liberal Democratic Party; In Bosnia's Federation, moderates competing for the Bosniak vote = Social Democratic Party *=significant at the .05 level, **=significant at the .01 level N=302 for Bosnia's Federation, and N=324 for Macedonia Log Likelihood (Bosnia's Federation) -177.749; Log Likelihood (Macedonia) -190.520 Probability > χ2 .001 (Bosnia's Federation); Probability > χ2 .000 (Macedonia) Percent of votes correctly predicted: 71% (Bosnia’s Federation); Percent of votes correctly predicted: 72% (Macedonia)

21

Model 1 indicates that if we hold all other variables constant at their means:106 • The probability an individual who rarely attends religious services votes for a moderate Bosniak party is about .28. • The probability an individual who places herself in the middle of the left-right scale votes for a moderate Bosniak party is about .38 • The probability an individual who has some secondary education votes for a moderate Bosniak party is about .30.

Model 2 indicates that if we hold all other variables constant at their means • The probability an individual who rates the former communist political system as very bad votes for a moderate Macedonian party is .44 • The probability an individual who believes strongly that the government should ensure everyone is provided for votes for a moderate Macedonian party is about .63. • The probability an individual who has a little confidence in political institutions votes for a moderate Macedonian party is about .46 • The probability an individual who has some secondary education votes for a moderate Macedonian party is about .51

Different dynamics appear to be at work among voters in the two countries, with the exception that higher levels of education are positively correlated with voting for moderate parties. Postwar polls show that nationalist parties are rooted in segments of the population with lower levels of education. Model 2 suggests that moderate Macedonian parties benefited from voters who lashed out against political institutions that failed to garner their confidence. The freshness of the violence and the fact it broke out under an incumbent government that failed to use the existing democratic institutions to prevent or at least more quickly halt it helped mobilize those ready to give SDSM another try. Table 3 demonstrates the stunningly low levels of confidence that Macedonians express toward their political institutions. The admittedly weak indicators available from the World Values Survey data suggest that grass-roots concern over the utilitarian issues of economic growth and corruption exerted no independent influence on voting. Different aspects of ideology influence voting. Left-right self-placement helps predict voting among Bosniaks. Not surprisingly, voters who placed themselves on the left end of the scale supported the leftist social democrats. Ideological views more clearly tied to the economy and society present a more significant cleavage in Macedonia. A closer look at the data reveals why views on government providing for all do not distinguish supporters of moderate Bosniak parties. There is no statistically significant difference between the supporters of the nationalist SDA and moderate SDP about the need for government to provide for its citizens. In 22

Macedonia, however, SDSM supporters are more supportive of a significant government role. Those who believe the communist system had some positive traits are more likely to support SDSM, a successor party that orchestrated a gradual move away from socialist Yugoslavia. Individual-level indicators of social capital perform poorly across the models. Membership in horizontal voluntary organizations has no statistically significant relationship to support for accommodative parties. While the coefficient estimates indicate a weak positive relationship between involvement in horizontal organizations and support for moderates, the results suggest that there is not an important positive spill over from engagement in NGOs into the political realm. In post-conflict societies ripe with corruption, it is not surprising that interpersonal trust is in short supply and has an ambiguous relationship to support for politically moderate parties. The “dark side” of social capital rears its ugly head among Bosniaks. Individuals who more frequently attend religious services are less likely to support moderate parties, a relationship that reflects the monoethnic nature of religious institutions in the Balkans, their hierarchical structure, and their leaders’ role in supporting nationalist parties and contributing to interethnic conflict.107 Data indicate that Bosniaks are more observant than Macedonians, which means that they can be more thoroughly socialized by religious leaders. IN CLOSING This cross-national investigation in the Balkans sought to understand factors that help voters in post-conflict ethnic party systems overcome pressures to focus on narrow ethnic interests and instead support parties most willing to engage in interethnic cooperation. What distinguishes the Macedonian case is that voters reward parties whom they believe will do better on utilitarian issues, while Bosnian voters, who are equally concerned about corruption and the economy, do not use those concerns as a factor in determining their vote. Low levels of ethnic distance and high participation in advocacy or culturally inclusive organizations cannot explain why Macedonian voters are more likely to support accommodative parties. However, the greater willingness of disparate groups to coexist in the same state, in comparison with Bosnia’s groups, contributes both to grass-roots interest in political parties that offer more than protection of ethnic interests and to political parties believing they can benefit from supplying voters with practical programs. Though it is difficult to test, the results of Macedonia's founding election, which led to a functional multi-ethnic coalition, appears to have bolstered the willingness of Macedonians to 23

work across ethnic lines and for voters to support such accommodative behavior. In addition, institutional design in Macedonia creates more incentives for political moderation than in Bosnia. Macedonia’s constitutional framework refrains from reifying ethnicity at virtually every opportunity and from devolving the bulk of power to ethnically dominant bodies to the extent that Bosnia's does. These institutional factors work to decrease the incentives for parties in Macedonia to define problems ethnically, presenting more opportunities for moderate voters. The international community’s more constructive engagement in Macedonia and neighbors’ less destructive engagement in Macedonia seem to reinforce more moderate preferences among Macedonians than among Bosnians. Macedonia may represent what would have been “normal” politics in the most diverse areas of post-socialist Yugoslavia had powerful neighbors not violently intervened.108 Ethnicity is clearly politically relevant, but so are other issues of development that are not always interpreted through exclusive ethnic lenses. The success of political parties that engage in cross-ethnic political cooperation in Macedonia, however, appears in part to be an artifact of voting that protests weak political institutions rather than voting inspired directly by commitment to interethnic cooperation. This, ethnic distance, poverty, and unstable neighbors indicate that interethnic cooperation in Macedonia remains fragile. This paper raises several issues that deserve further research. More rigorous testing of the hypotheses I explored here requires individual-level data better suited than the World Values Survey data to identifying determinants of voting. A clearer understanding of how Macedonia reduces incentives for ethnic outbidding calls for locating additional information on electoral rules and demographic patterns within electoral districts. Interviews with voters about their decision-making processes and with political elites about campaigning would illuminate the dynamics that bolster support for parties with moderate positions on interethnic relations. Interviews could also shed light on how corruption influences voting. Extension across space and time would help sort out the complex interaction of factors influencing voters. This paper intentionally focused on domestic factors. But a more complete picture of the forces for voter moderation in the Balkans requires a thorough investigation of the role of external actors. 24

Appendix A Coding of Variables Used in the Models to Predict Support for moderate political parties (Table 5) SOCIAL CAPITAL: Interpersonal trust Agreement that most people can be trusted =1, Instead, one needs to be very careful= 0 Interest in politics 0=if respondent said (s)he was not at all interested in politics, 2=if respondent was not very interested in politics; 3=if respondent was somewhat interested, and 4=if respondent was very interested in politics Member NGO (not 1= if respondent reported membership in 1 or more of the following religious) voluntary organizations: political parties, sports, arts, labor unions, environmental, heath, professional, youth, service for elderly, charity, local, human rights, peace, other; 0=if respondent did not belong to a voluntary organization “Dark” social capital: attend Attend religious services: 1=never; 2 less often than 1/year; 3=once a religious services year; 4=special holy days; 5=once a month; 6=once a week; 7= > 1/week ETHNIC DISTANCE 1=respondent who mentioned unwillingness to live next to a neighbor of a different religion; 0=if respondent did not mention unwillingness to live next to a neighbor of a different religion DISSATISFACTION: Lack of confidence in An index consisting of three items measuring: confidence in government, political institutions Index confidence in political parties, and confidence in parliament* Dissatisfaction with national Extent to which respondent is satisfied that those holding national offices office holders are handling the country’s affairs: 1=very satisfied, 2=fairly satisfied, 3=fairly dissatisfied, 4=very dissatisfied. R View gov’t as run by a few Extent to which respondent agrees that the country is run by a few big big interests interests: 1=believe instead that government is run for all the people; 2 believe that country run by a few big interests IDEOLOGY: Left-Right self placement Self placement of political views along a scale of 1=left to 10= right Positive view of communist A scale of views of the former communist political system: Ranges from system very bad =1 to very good=10. Government should provide A scale of views ranging from 1: people are responsible for providing for for all themselves; to 10: gov’t should ensure that everyone is provided for Economic growth as gov’t 1= if believe that the most important task of government is to achieve most important task economic growth; 0-if believe that the most important task of government is either providing order, making sure people have a say in their jobs, making cities more beautiful DEMOGRAPHICS: Education 1=no education; 2=incomplete primary; 3=complete primary; 4=incomplete secondary technical; 5=complete secondary technical; 6=incomplete secondary university-prep; 7=complete secondary university prep; 8=some university education; 9=completed university Income Increasing scale of monthly income before taxes Age cohort 1=if between 18-24; 2=if 25-34; 3=35-44; 4=45-54; 5=55-64; 7=if > 65 yr Gender 0=if female; 1=if male Rural-urban 1=if resident in a town under 2,000, 2=if resident of a town between 2,000-5,000; 3=if between 5-10,000; 4 if 10-20,000; 5=20-50,000; 6=50- 100,000; 7=100-500,000; 8= > 500,000 Source: World Values Survey 2001 25

*Index of trust in political institutions: Factor loadings Confidence in government .740 Confidence in political parties .545 Confidence in parliament .764 N 734.000 Eigenvalue 1.427 Chronbach’s alpha .850

1 This paper was prepared for presentation at Cornell University on 31 March 2005. Thanks to T.J. Cheng, Ron Rapoport, and Valerie Bunce for suggestions about literature, to Larry Evans, Paul Manna, and Robert Hisploe for comments on earlier drafts, and to Allie Rosner, Melissa Shoemaker, Lawren Olenchak, Michael Zose, Sladjana Dankovic, Lidija Sokolova for research assistance. I remain entirely responsible for the contents of this paper. This paper presents preliminary research supported by the College of William and Mary. It is intended to inform the development of a larger research project comparing political outcomes in Bosnia and Macedonia. I am indebted to Hans Klingemann for providing me with early access to data collected for the 2001 World Values Survey in Bosnia and Macedonia. I welcome feedback. Please do not cite this paper without my permission. 2 The country names recognized by the US are Bosnia and Herzegovina and The Republic of Macedonia. For convenience, I will use Bosnia and Macedonia in this paper. 3 Steven L. Burg, and Paul S, Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 4 Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2004, p. xiii. 5 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jansz Bugajski, “The Fate of Minorities in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Democracy, 4 (October 1993), 85-99; Philip G. Roeder, “Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions,” Slavic Review, 58 (Winter 1999), 854-82. 6 Population estimates (there exists no post-war census) for Bosnia indicate that 48.3 percent of the population is Bosniak, 34 percent is Serb, 15.4 percent is Croat and 2.3 percent is other. UNDP, National Human Development Report 2002: Bosnia-Herzegovina, http://www.undp.ba/index.aspx?PID=14, accessed March 22, 2004. According to the 2002 Census, Macedonia is 64.18 percent is Macedonian, 25.17 percent is Albanian, and the remaining 10.65 percent includes Turks, Roma, Serbs, Bosniaks, and Vlachs. Republika Makedonija Drzavni zavod za statistika, Popis 2002 (Skopje: 12.1.2003) http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/10-2003/2.1.3.30.pdf 7 For analysis of socialist Yugoslavia’s policies for managing ethnicity, see Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav Nationalist Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Gary K. Bertsch, Values and Community in Multi-national Yugoslavia (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1976); Dennison I. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1977). 8 Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), ch. 1. 9 Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, Second Ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, Balkan Tragedy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds, Second Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). Anthony Oberschall, “The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia,” Ethnic and Racial Politics, 23 (November 2000), 982-1001. 10 Duncan Perry, The Republic of Macedonia and the Odds for Survival, FRE/RL Research Report, November 20, 1992. 11 ICG 2001, p. 9. 12 Jasmina Mironski, “War Declaration Less Likely as FYROM Works on National Unity Coalition,” Agence France Press, North European Service in English 0934 GMT May 8, 2001. 13 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 14 Tun-jen Cheng, “Political Institutions and the Malaise of East Asian New Democracies,” Journal of East Asian Studies (3, 2003) p. 5 15 Rose and Munro, p. 15. 16 “Election Law of Bosnia and Hercegovina,” Sarajevo: BiH Official Gazette nos. 23/02, 07/02, 09/92, and 20/02, August 2002) translated by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Election/Implementation Department. 26

www.oscebih.com, Articles 9.3, 9.4. Three-quarters of the deputies of Bosnia's national assembly are elected via multimember constituencies, while one-quarter are filled through allocation of “compensatory seats to various parties based on entity-wide vote,” to correct any disproportionalities between the outcome in one constituencies and the entity. Also, both have quotas for women. 17 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Parliamentary Elections 15 September 2002, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Final Report” (Warsaw, Poland: OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Election, 20 November 20, 2002), p. 4. I plan later to look at the possible role of the ethnic composition of electoral constituencies on electoral outcomes. 18 Horowitz, Donald, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) p. 299. 19 Ibid.; Stephen Tull, “Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation During Radical Political Transformation: A Theory of Ethnic Mobilization,” Paper Presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center/ACLS East European Studies’ Junior Scholars Training Seminar, Aspen Institute/Wye Woods, August 25-28, 1994. 20 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia,” Daedalus, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1992, pp. 123-139. Linz and Stepan argue that holding republic (sub- national) level elections before holding state-wide elections encourages the formation of parties focused on anti-state and ethnic issues. 21 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Paul Mitchell, “Party competition in an Ethnic Dual Party System,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18 (October 1995). 22 CIA factbook, 2003 Estimate, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html#Econ, accessed February 10, 2005. 23 CIA factbook, 2003 Estimate, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html#Econ, accessed February 10, 2005. 24 Bose, 208-11. 25 Mitchell, p. 788. Mitchell argues that ethnic parties are more or less inevitable in deeply divided societies and it is unless to try to promote a moderate multi-ethnic leftist party. 26 The 2001 World Values Survey show that a handful of Serbs and Croats express support for Bosnia's Social Democratic Party, while no Albanian respondent expressed a willingness to vote for Macedonia's Social Democratic Party. 27 I label parties “nationalist” based on their campaign rhetoric uncovered in content analysis of local press and on the analyses of international NGOs and International Organizations involved in the elections. 28 Other than the SDSM, the coalition includes the Liberal Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Labor- Agricultural Party, the Socialist-Christian Party, and parties from the Roma, Bosniak, Vlach, Turk, and Serb communities. “'For Macedonia Together' Election Campaign 'PILLARS' Viewed at Rally” Skopje MIA, 1421 GMT 03 Sept 2002. 29 The other member of the VMRO-DPMNU coalition is the Liberal Party. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, “Macedonian Parliamentary Elections 2002,” (Washington, DC: Election Watch Report, 1, August 15, 2002,) p. 3. 30 DUI leader Ali Ahmeti remained on the US terrorist (officially the U.S. Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals list) list until very recently, when he was removed for his apparent cooperative role in the political process. 31 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical institutionalism in comparative politics,” in Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Structuring Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) ch. 1; Philip G. Roeder, Red Sunset (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 32 Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 30 and 50; O’Donnell and Schmitter do not fully agree with Lipset and Rokkan and instead argue that more recent democratic transitions in Southern Europe have showed that the supposed freeze in partisan alignments quickly thawed; they believe this is partly because voters hold incumbents responsible for economic affairs. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Convoking Elections,” in O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 57-64; 33 Valerie Bunce, “The Political Economy of Postsocialism,” Slavic Review, 58 (Winter 1999), 756-793. See also, Vernon Bogdanov, “Founding Elections and Regime Change,” Electoral Studies, 1 (vol. 19, 1990), 288-94. 34 Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience, World Politics, 55 (January 2003) 176-78. 35 Lipset and Rokkan; Thomas F. Remington, Politics in Russia, Second Ed. (New York: Longman, 2002,) p. 174. 27

36 See for example, Gabor Toka, “Political Parties in East Central Europe,” in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, et al. eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 93-122; Schimmelfennig, Frank, “Introduction,” in Linden, Ronald, ed., Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States, Lahnam, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, pp. 1-29; Rose and Munro. 37 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), ch. 2. 38 Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided into two entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. 39 This is due to the ethnic cleansing of the war and the political polarization in Bosnia, as well as to the greater role that the international community played in crafting the constitution in Bosnia, in comparison to Macedonia. Republic of Macedonia, Framework Agreement, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co- operation/Police_and_internal_security/Police_cooperation/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp, accessed January 3, 2005. 40 Burg. 41 Paul Brass, “Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia,” in David Taylor and Malcom Yapp, eds., Political Identity in South Asia (London: Curzon Press, 1979); Bringa. 42 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 295. 43 Ibid, p. 346. For empirical work on ethnic outbidding in Europe, see: Mitchell and Carter Johnson, “Remarkable Peace: Democratic Transition in the Balkans,” manuscript, 2001, pp. 2-25 44 NDI 8/15/02, p. 6. 45 Donald Horowitz argues that the best case scenario is one in which majority parties actually rely on votes from minorities. Horowitz, Donald, A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) ch. 5. 46 Steven Wilkinson, Votes and Violence (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004), p. 140. 47 This paper only briefly examines the role of external actors. In summer 2003, I will conduct archival research and interviews with American and U.S.-based international officials. 48 Brubaker, Rogers, “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe,” Daedlaus, 124 (Spring 1995) 107-132; Stephen M. Saideman The Ties that Divide (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 49 Russell Dalton, “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior,” Comparative Political Studies, 33 (6-7, 2000), 912- 940. 50 V.P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 8 and 28. 51 Citizens of Croatia who directly experienced violence expressed higher levels of ethnic distance, than those who did not suffer violence. Robert M. Kunovich and Randy Hodson, “Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia,” Social Forces, 78 (December 1999), 643-74. 52 According to Cheng, O'Donnell describes “hot issues” as those on which it is difficult to comprise because they are considered zero-sum. The opposite are “cold issues.” 53 Ray Wilkinson, “The Balkans: What Next?” Refugees Magazine 124 (Vol. 3, 2001). 54 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), p. 19; Coletta 55 Thomas Carothers, Aiding democracy abroad (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999). 56 Putnam, Bowling Alone, ch. 22; Ashutosh Varshney Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). Kathleen M. Dowley and Brian D. Silver, “Social capital, ethnicity and support for democracy in the post-socialist states,” Europe-Asia Studies, 54 (June 2002,) 505-528; Rodney E. Hero, “Social Capital and Racial Inequality in America,” Perspectives, 1 (March 2003), 113-22; Katherine Cramer Walsh, Talking about Politics: informal groups and social identity in American Life (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004). 57 R. Robert Huckfeldt, “Social Contexts, Social Networks, and Urban Neighborhoods: Environmental Constraints on Friendship Choice,” American Journal of Sociology, 39 (November 1983), 651-83. Socio-economic similarity enables the even exchange of goods and services. Edward O. Laumann, Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973); Ada W. Finifter, “The Friendship Group as a Protective Environment for Political Deviants,” American Political Science Review, 68 (June 1974), 612. 58 In collecting a random sample of campaign messages, I expanded the campaign period one month before the official one-month frame because analysts noted that campaigning effectively began before the official start date. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, p. 6. 28

59 OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Parliamentary Elections,” pp. 11-2. Because reliance on these two newspapers likely underplays extremist messages covered in more popular press, I added randomly selected local articles translated by the U.S. Government's World News Service. While the World News Service does not share its criteria for selecting articles for translation, it likely focuses in on articles whose content appears potentially threatening. 60 Scolari, QSR NUD*IST 4 (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Software, 1997). 61 Burg and Shoup, p 44. 62 Gagnon, pp. 49-51. 63 Duncan Perry, “the Republic of Macedonia: finding its way,” 1997, p. 235 64 Robert Hislope, “Organized Crime in a Disorganized State: How Corruption Contributed to Macedonia's Mini- War,” Problems of Post-Communism, 49, May/June 2002, p. 35; “Bosnia's Alliance for (Smallish) Change”, Report No 132, International Crisis Group: Sarajevo, August 2002, p. 2. 65 US Institute of Peace, “Macedonia: Prevention Can Work,” p. 3; “Macedonia's Presidential Election 1999,” A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington: DC 1999, p. 6. 66 “Macedonia's Presidential Election 1999,” p. 6. 67 UNDP, p. 99l. 68 ICG, “Bosnia's Alliance for (Smallish) Change.” 69 UNDP, Human Development Report for FYR Macedonia, 2004, chapter 3. 70 Kim Fridkin Kahn & Patrick J. Kenney, The Spectacle of U.S. Senate Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999,) p. 54. 71 “For Negotino and Kavadarci,” Dnevnik, September 2, 2002. 72 Hislope. 73 ICG, “Macedonia's Public Secret: How Corruption Drags the Country Down,” Balkans Report No. 133, 14 August, 2002, http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1693&l=1. 74 ibid, p. ii. 75 ICG 2002, p. 22. 76 World Values Survey data, 2001. 77 Ashdown cites that fact that the vote for the nationalist parties did not vary much between 2000 and 2002, as evidence for his “protest vote” hypothesis. Despite the fairly steady percentage of votes for nationalist parties, SDP's vote significantly declined between 2000 and 2002. “Twenty-third Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” October 23, 2002, p. 7, http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=28227, accessed April 1, 2004. 78 http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co- operation/Police_and_internal_security/Police_cooperation/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp, see 5.2. 79 Hayden; Bose; European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative, http://www.venice.coe.int/SITE/DYNAMICS/N_RECENT_EF.ASP?L=E&TITLE1=62ND%20PLENARY%20SES SION&TITLE2=62E%20SESSION%20PLÉNIÈRE, March 2005. 80 The views vary by ethnicity. Bosniaks, who are more supportive of the Bosnian state than Serbs and Croats, trust the central government more than Serbs and Croats. While Bosniaks trust local political institutions five percentage points more than central political institutions, Serbs trust local political institutions 13 percentage points more and Croats trust local political institutions 24 percentage points more. Bell 2001a, 2001b, 2001c. 81 In Macedonia, nationalists led by VMRO-DPME compelled the government last year to hold a referendum on local self-government, which failed to scuttle devolution, but succeeded in raising tensions. See ICG, “Macedonia: Not out of the Woods Yet,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3295&l=1, accessed February 28, 2005. 82 2 I calculated the effective number of parties using the formula, 1/∑ si , where si is the share of parliamentary seats of the ith party. I use seat share rather than vote share because I lack data on the votes won by small parties that did not gain seats in Bosnia’s national assembly. I used official election data provided by the government of Macedonia: “Rezultati” [Results] http://www.izbori.gov.mk/, Drzavna Izbona Komisija na Republika Makedonija, accessed August 1, 2003. 83“Bosnia and Herzegovina: Last Elections,” Inter-Parliamentary Union parline database, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2039_E.htm, accessed June 1, 2003. 84 Wilkinson, p. 7 85 The divergent news coverage devoted to the election campaigns in the two countries reveals the greater interest in 29

the campaign in Macedonia, in comparison with Bosnia. 86“VMRO-DPMNE and LP in Probistip,” Dnevnik, September 2002. 87 Gagnon; Magas 88 On the role of Kosovar Albanians in stoking violence in Macedonia, see: Hislope; The few Serbs in Macedonia meant that Serbia had little interest in intervening. 89 UNSYG S/23900 1992 discusses the UN rejection of Bosnia’s request. For arguments about the effectiveness of multilateral interventions in Macedonia’s case, see: Henryk Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003); “Macedonia: Prevention Can Work,” Special Report 58 (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, March 27, 2000). I will further investigate the role of external actors this summer through interviews with policy makers. 90 Elizabeth Cousins, “Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia,” in Stephen Stedman, et al., eds., Ending Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) pp. 531-61 91 For example, 70 percent of Albanians from Macedonia expressed high or the highest levels of ethnic distance, compared to only 35 percent of Serbs from Bosnia, who expressed high or the highest levels of ethnic distance. Pantic in Bacevic, pp. 178-9. See also, Hodson, et. al. p. 1548. 92 Data for more robust measures of ethnic distance in post-socialist Macedonia and Bosnia are not comparable, due to surveys with different question wording and possibly different interpretations of these questions. Ideally, these problems require new surveys with consistent response categories and/or in-depth interviews. 93 UNDP 2001 p. 41. 94 UNDP 2002, p. 51. 95 Krause, Kevin Deegan, “Public Opinion and Party Choice in Slovakia and the Czech Republic,” Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, p. 41. 96 This table draws on surveys with different question wording that were distributed by different organizations. Unfortunately there is a lack comparable data on ordinary views about the government’s first priority. 97 Ibid, pp. 32-3. In Bosnia, about 63 percent of Serbs, 74 percent of Croats, and 85 percent of Bosniaks are willing to work together with some of another ethnicity. This is higher that their willingness to be a neighbor with, have children attend the same school with, be close friends with, or marry, someone of a different ethnicity. UNDP 2003, p. 49. 98 In Macedonia, 95 percent of citizens believe that politicians contribute to interethnic tensions, UNDP 2004, p. 30. 99 Though the World Values Surveys do not provide data on the ethnic makeup of NGOs in Macedonia and Bosnia, most scholars and practitioners agree that NGOs in the region are dominated by mono-ethnic organizations (Stuart). 100 See Appendix A for the types of organizations that the World Values Survey mentions. 101 The World Values Survey data are the only individual-level data on Bosnia and Macedonia that I have located. Unfortunately, they are not designed to predict voting and thus lack several variables commonly used to predict voting, including past voting record and evaluations of personal or national economic situations today as compared those under the previously elected government. According to Klingemann, the Federation and RS should be analyzed separately, since the investigators used independent samples and they are not weighted by size to give a proper picture of the whole country. 102 I use logistic regression because my dependent variable (the phenomenon to be explained) is dichotomous: intent to vote for a non-nationalist party or intent to vote for a nationalist party. I dropped the sizeable number of respondents who were undecided or did not intend to vote. 103 The non-hierarchical criteria for NGOs means that I have eliminated religious organizations from this category. In doing so, I follow Dowley and Silver. I test separately the impact of membership in religious organizations. 104 Krause identifies these as major cleavages in party systems in Eastern Europe, p. 30. On the importance of views of the economy, see Lynch, G. Patrick, “Midterm Elections and Economic Fluctuations: The Response of the Rational Voter Over Time,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 27:2 (2002), pp. 265-294; Fidrmuc, Jan, “Economics of voting in post-communist countries,” Electoral Studies, 19 (2000) pp. 199-217. 105 Lewis, Paul G., “Individual-level determinants of voting,” in Lewis, ed., Part Development and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe, (London: Frank Cass 2001), pp. 175-208. 106 In logistic regression, the effect of a variable depends on where in the logistic curve we are evaluating the effect. In determining the effect of each statistically significant independent variable (as indicated by asterisks) I have calculated the effect of each independent variable at the value specified while also choosing to fix the values of all other independent variables at their means. The command in Stata 8 is “prvalue.” 107 Lenard Cohen, “Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation,” Nationalities Papers, 25 (September 1997) 481-499; Srdjan Dizdarevic, “Elections are the opportunity for the 30

country to go out of crisis,” Helsinki committee for Human Rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, http://www.bh-hchr.org/, accessed September 2002; 108 Gagnon 2004 suggests as much through his study of electoral politics in Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s.