A Comparison of Marxist and Hegelian Dialectical Form

fan Hunt and Roy Swan

Introduction world and recogn1s1ng the objective world as nothing but itself. This process is circular, but also pro­ Our aim in this paper is to exhibit the formal differ­ gressive, for in traversing its circular path the at ences that distinguish the Harxist dialectic from its first merely abstract Idea creates itself as an ob­ Hegelian predecessor. In sum, whereas in Hegel's jective being; indeed, an objective being that is at system identity has primacy over contradiction and, once fully subjective and conscious - a concrete sub­ what comes to the same thing, self-identity has ject. Having established the progression we must re­ primacy over mutability, Marxism reverses this bias emphasise the circularity. In creating itself as an and insists on the primacy of contradiction and muta­ objective being the Idea progresses within an all­ bility. This transition in form is to be seen as encompassing but self-enclosed circle, merely becom­ necessitated by the transition from an idealistically ing explicitly what it already is implicitly. More­ conceived to a materialistically conceived content. over, the true subject of this progression is hown to The point here, which we shall assume rather than be not the implicit but the explicit Idea, which as argue, is that a true materialism, certainly a dialec­ concrete subject creates itself by first positing tical materialm, must take plurality, difference and itself in and then unfolding itself from its own change to be ultimately real, and must reject the abstract form. So in becoming an objective being the idealist reduction to an ideal or essential unity Idea becomes determinate, but it is determined not underlying the appearances. Dialectical idealism from without - which would render it finite and un­ " marks itself as dialectical by modelling opposition free - but from within, through the process of its and process as essential, but nevertheless it reduces own self-becoming or self-unfolding. The Idea is them to the self-differentiation and self-development thus true infinitude and freedom, and reality is of a single ideal subject. Now, as a dialectical nothing but the self-determination of the Idea. materialist might expect, the development of a new This is first spelled out in abstract terms in the form ha~ not been so quickly, and not everywhere so first part of the Encyclopaedia~ the Logic, which con· thoroughly carried through as the transition in con­ sists in an extended deduction of categories or pure tent. It is for this reason that we believe this concepts. The Philosophy of Nature and the Philo­ paper will prove useful. For the same reason it will sophy of Spirit, the later parts of the Encyclopaedia, not be surprising that the position we shall counter­ continue to use the method developed and made use of pose to that of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the philo­ in the Logic, but are concerned not with deducing sophical Sciences will be based on a comparatively further pure concepts, but with disclosing how the late Marxist text, Mao's essay On Contradiction. logical categories are expressed in the realm of actual concrete existence, in Nature and Spirit. The , I Hegel step from the abstract logic to the concrete exist­ ences of Nature and Spirit is seen as a deduction, Our plan is to bring out the characteristic form of as are the developments within Nature and Spirit. the Hegelian dialectic as it appears in a single The beginning of the whole progression, the first movement or pulse-beat of the method, and in the idea of the Logic - which is 'being' - is therefore system as a whole. linked through a series of steps, all regarded as The two most basic features of Hegel's philosophy deductions, with the final actual existence - an idea of dialectical idealism are idealism and self­ which as a concrete existence is termed 'Absolute determination - self-determination being nothing but Spirit'. To accept this progression as a series of the essential feature and fully realised form of the deductions is to accept that the whole system is dialectical process. It is a philosophy of the self­ grounded in the first idea. Further, Hegel's determination of the Idea, which process is thought specific deductive method is intended to make what to encompass and inform the whole of reality. Real­ is initially implicit at last explicit in such a way ity appears as the process of the Idea externalising that the final idea contains and grounds the whole and estranging itself as the objective world only to series of ideas from which it is itself deduced. return to itself by realising itself in the objective Only in this way can the system be truly self-

33 grounding. At the most abstract level of the concepts of Hegel's deductive method differs from the more Being, the most characteristic aspect is the 'transi­ familiar 'mathematical' method in two basic respects. tion' or passing over of each concept into a differ­ First, it is not axiomatic in the sense of beginning ent concept. This characteristic form is bound up from concepts, propositions, laws, etc., which are with the content of Being, in which the major triad themselves undeducible and thus prior to and outside is Quality, Quantity, Measure. These categories the deductive system itself. Second, his method signify the immediate reality accessible even to does not proceed purely in accordance with the law 'sense', which is seen as the most primitive form of non-contradiction as the basic principle of formal of thought. In both Quality and Quantity any given logic, but develops the rhythm of contradiction and determination is shown to pass over with logical in­ resolution as the engine of its own dialectical logic. evitability into a further determination, so that we Dialectical logic starts with a posited idea, the must expect unlimited qualitative and quantitative thesis, which leads to another idea precisely because, wealth in reality. The two orders of Quantity and as it stands on its own so as to present a stable Quality are also shown to involve each other, in that significance, it necessarily reveals that its meaning a change in quantity beyond a certain point manifests can only be grasped if another concept is brought itself as a change in quality which in turn gives way into play. But this concept turns out to be its to a new quantitative development. For Hegel the contradictory, and reason, unable to rest in such a endless progression inherent in these categories is contradiction, must entertain a third concept, a the 'wrong' or spurious infinity, for it consists in 'synthesis', in which the two opposite ideas are con­ the capacity of the mind to pass from any given tained in a unity. This unity depends for its cont­ finite determination to a further finite determination ent on the continued opposition of the ideas it without ever coming to rest in an actual infinity. contains, and when it too is taken as a thesis The characteristic movement of 'transition' which reveals its own abstraction ('one-sidedness') of Engels (in Dialectics of Nature, article headed content. So the new thesis passes over to its own 'Dialectics') sums up as the law of Quantity into opposite in order to overcome its abstraction, and Quality and vice versa, concerns the succession of the whole process repeats itself until a synthetic states in time, and is seen as a relatively poor category is reached which is fully concrete and con­ expression of the dialectic. tains all significance in itself. The succession of In the Doctrine of Essence categories that are thetic and synthetic categories thrown up in this apparent to 'Understanding', the next highest form way is considered by Hegel to be a series of increas­ of thought, are dealt with. These categories involve ingly adequate definitions of what is, the Absolute a fundamental duality of the 'mediate' and the or truly infinite, while the corresponding series of 'immediate', or of the essential and the apparent. opposing or antithetic categories is taken to define The understanding insists on the rigid distinction reality as only finite. between the opposed categories, but they are shown However, the dialectical movement along the series during the section to be totally inter-dependent, to of increasingly adequate determinations of what is, have meaning only in terms of each other. They do is conceived by Hegel to fall short in itself of not merely 'pass over' into each other, as do the infinitude and freedom. Each deduction is necessit­ categories of Being, they 'reflect' each other. The ated and in this way unfree, and while each deduction resulting dialectical identity of Essence and Appear­ leaves behind some finite determination through a ance in Actuality may be conceived as a more fully transition into and reflection with its opposite, it realised identity than that of Quality and Quantity merely arrives at a new finite determination, which in Measure. And the richer dialectical process of reveals itself as a more adequate but less than this section gives rise to a law which is richer and absolute definition of what is. 'Dialectical more adequate to describe it - that of Interpenetra­ Thought', the ceaseless appearance and resolution tion of Opposites. of contradiction, must, for Hegel, be superseded by In this second section understanding gives way 'Speculative Thought'. before 'Dialectical Reason'. In the final section, In 'Speculative Thought', the Absolute Idea is no the Doctrine of the Notion, Dialectical Reason longer conceived simply as one more finite determina­ develops into the highest form of thought, 'Speculat­ tion albeit comparatively concrete, but as the unity ive Reason', which is the realised 'truth' of all the of the whole system, and as a thought with itself as lower forms. Hegel characterises the dialectical its o~ content. Of course, 'being', as Hegel con­ process of this section as follows: ceives it, is just such a thought, but is devoid of The onward movement of the notion is no longer concrete content. What Hegel intends is to show that either a transition into, or a reflection on everything that is in all its concreteness unfolds something else, but Development. For in the out of the emptiness of 'being' while remaining a notion, the elements distinguished are with­ thought, or a system of thought, which has only itself out more ado at the same time declared to be as its content. The Absolute Idea is thus supposed identical with one another and with the to encapsulate the whole system, freely taking up whole, and the specific character of each into itself all contradictions as its own development is a free being of the whole notion. as a determinate being, while it in turn cannot con­ [Logic, p. 224] ceivably be encapsulated or limited by something out­ The Idea does not merely pass over into or reflect on side it. The Absolute Idea has the circularity of its opposite, thus seeming to be alienated in and total self-consciousness, and as a totality whose determined by the other; it is clear from the begin­ only premise is that thought is - a premise which ning that in becoming its opposite the Idea as the Cartesian tradition accepts as self-validating - Subject is becoming only its own objective self so is absolutely and freely self-determining. that through its opposite it is freely developing Hegel's dialectic thus has a creative, self­ and determining itself. The Idea thus reveals itself grounding character, which is exemplified in each as what is, the essence that appears. The resultant single triad, and which, in a sense, contains the dialectical identity of the Idea, which in its fullest whole of Hegel's philosophy of the self-determining form is the Absolute Idea, is perfect self-identity, Idea. However, while each triadic movement of deduc­ the 'true infinitude' of 'self-mediation'. The law tion more or less clearly exhibits the universal form to which this section gives rise, and which alone can of the dialectic, the immediate or directly given bring out the fully realised character of the dialect­ aspect of the deductions becomes richer as we progress ical process, is Negation of the Negation. from the abstract to the concrete. Negation of the negation has a two-way teleological 34

1,,'- : I .. movement which brings out how the Absolute Idea is not the progression of the system in its entirety as the simply another idea, but encapsulates the whole overarching triad of Logic, Nature and Spirit, and system. To begin with, Being as the implicit Notion how the moments of Hegel's dialectic determine, and differentiates and negates itself as Essence only to are determined by the whole progression. negate this negation in realising and returning to As we have seen, the Logic presents the Idea as itself as the explicit Notion or Absolute Idea. It a universal, or pure category. Nature further is through this process that the Notion reveals and realises the Idea as a particular, and Spirit is the creates itself as a concrete or self-objectified synthesis of the universal and particular in the subject, or as the truth that knows itself as the Idea. Alternatively, the Logic presents the essence truth - 'for truth can only be where it makes itself of the Idea, the Nature the outward appearance, and its own result' [Logic, p.274]. By the same token, Spirit its actual existence as a concrete self­ the concrete subject has deduced itself only through determining subject. Or again, the Logic presents ~ts own activity. It deduces itself in the form of the Idea as an immediately given subject, Nature is the essence of thought, a deduction which reflects the estrangement of the Idea from itself, or its self­ back on all previous deductions, determining them as objectification, and Spirit is the return of the Idea the work of the very concrete subject that is being to itself from estrangement, negating Nature as such, deduced. Every transitional and imperfect category but affirming Nature as itself. In all these res­ is shown to be a mere aspect of the whole which the pects the transition from the Idea to Nature is whole abstracts from itself and grants a provisional dialectically necessary, although Hegel presents the immediacy or independence, an immediacy which must transition to Nature and ultimately to Spirit as a display its inadequacy or finitude by setting itself free development of the Idea. Hegel, however, aside and rendering explicit the infinite Notion that considers the Logic to have shown that the free is implicit within it. The negation of the negation development of the subject is the essence o~ object­ that moves from the preceding to the succeeding cate­ ive logical transition. So he says: gories is itself taken up into a negation of the ... the Idea does not merely pass over into negation moving from the ultimate category to its pre­ Life, or as finite cognition allow life to decessors. The earlier categories as apparent pre­ show in it: in its own absolute truth it SU2positions and thus external limitations or nega­ resolves to let the moment of its particular­ tions of the Absolute Idea are in turn negated in the ity, or of the first characterization and revelation that in reality they presuppose the other-being, the immediate idea, as its Absolute Idea and are nothing but the moments of its reflected image, go forth freely as Nature. self-unfolding. In sum, what is apparently a result And Hegel adds, declares itself to be the 'absolute prius' - it is We have now returned to the notion of the the resultant truth that 'makes itself its own Idea with which we began. This return to resul t' . the beginning is also an advance. "le began We are now in a position to sum up the dialectical with Being, abstract Being: where we now are method as it appears in a single movement or pulse­ we also have the Idea as Being: but this beat of the system, thus showing how, while the Idea which has Being is Nature. method is enriched and made explicit as the current [Logic, p.296] unfolds, the whole method is implicit nevertheless The Idea in going forth freely into its otherness even in the first triad of Being. as Nature, goes forth into mediation, externality, According to lIegel we have the transition of alienation. It is the essence of Nature, but as 'being' into 'nothing', and of both into 'becoming', Nature it ceases to exist' as subj ect and as obj ect of the quantitative development of each term determining its own contemplation. The notions of Nature - and its supersession by a qualitatively new term. This the same is true of the notions of Spirit - are onward movement also appears as the oscillation of developed in a sequence that parallels that of the reflection, the opposites 'being' and 'nothing' Logic. The major triad of Nature is 'Mechanics', depending on each other and actually interpenetrating 'Physics', and 'Organics'. The first term of to sustain each other in the dialectical identity of 'Mechanics' is totally abstract 'space'. The last 'becoming'. In sum, each concept by itself is shown term of 'Organics' is Man as free ego. This marks to be inadequate and unstable in meaning - whether we the return of Ideality, subjectivity, freedom, into think of it as a pure conception or as a definition the external necessity of Nature. It thus constit­ or description of reality as a whole or in any part - utes the transition from Nature, the Idea in its and to require other concepts to be brought into play mediation or otherness, to Spirit, the Idea in its if we are to grasp its full significance. From the self-mediation or 'for-itself'. higher perspective of development or negation of the The realm of the Spirit is the realm of human negation we see that the concept in thus setting it­ history, understood as the self-creation of the Idea self aside and reflecting into another effects the in Nature. This is a gradual process of self-crea­ uncovering of its own significance or 'truth'. Or, tion, a gradual process of return to self out of better still, the ultimate concept is exhibiting the otherness. The major triad of Spirit is 'Subjective structure and necessity of its own meaning and truth Spirit', 'Objective Spirit', and 'Absolute Spirit'. in the form of its abstracted elements with their Subjective Spirit deals with the subjective side of logical connections. Thus the concept of 'becoming' human development. Here the more ideal expressions differentiates itself into and reconstructs itself of human thought are deduced from the more sensuous, from the concepts of 'being' and 'nothing'. But this the several phases of thought and will accomplishing is really true and comprehensible only if seen as a a progressive internalisation of the object, which moment in the self-development of the Absolute Idea, presents itself as external and particular. The which as the real subject of the whole process is object is thus idealised, as the theoretical Idea here starting to unfold its truth, beginning with the confronts the given external world and attempts to concept of 'being' as the pure form and barest conform itself to it, so as to arrive at 'the True'. characterization of its thought-activity. In Objective Spirit, the Idea in its free univers­ We have seen how the deduction from abstract ality attempts to realise itself objectively in moral 'being' of the concrete existence of thought with and social life, embodying itself in institutions itself as its content is identical with the self­ such as the family and the state. Hence the determination of the Idea, and how Negation of the 'Practical Idea' is progressively actualised as Negation most adequately shows the infinitude and Spirit actively confronts the external world, and freedom of the Absolute Idea. We may now consider moulds it into conformity with itself so as to 35 achieve 'the Good'. We must therefore pass on to the second and superior lfuile Subjective Spirit expresses the universal movement of Negation of the Negation. The Idea of implicit in the sensuous world of particular things philosophy as the highest expression of Spirit real­ in Nature, and Objective Mind realises the universal izes itself as the final cause and absolute prius of in the particular, forming rational human institu­ the whole development. It contemplates its abstract­ tions, the objective world is still not fully ed essence in the Logic, which defines the Idea as identified with the subject, and remains somewhat dialectical process, or thought thinking itself. It external to it. traces its actual unfolding in Nature and Spirit, To overcome this contradiction the transition is which reveal themselves as dialectical process, the made to Absolute Spirit wherein art, religion and self-creation of the Idea. On the one hand it sees philosophy are treated. In philosophy the Idea as itself to be the outcome and truth of an objective Free Mind finally confronts an obj ect which is ade. and necessary process, all preceding stages, in quate to it and does not limit it - itself. Free actuality as in Logic, having inevitably put them­ Mind realises that in both Theoretical and Practical selves aside. On the other hand it knows this whole Mind the: subject, Spirit, conforms itself only to development as its free subjective activity, for as itself. The history of philosophy is presented as concrete subject it performs the extended deduction following a development that corresponds to that of that reveals actual existence as the self-creation the Logic; so, the first philosophy, that of the of its own philosophical Idea. It is itself just Eleatics, regards the Absolute as pure 'being', the this process of self-exhibiting truth, and thus the first category of the Logic. It is only with the earlier stages that are its presuppositions are taken Hegelian system itself that the final philosophy up into itself as 'vanishing elements'. It negates comes into being. This is a philosophy which is in itself by putting itself forth as these presupposi­ itself the Absolute Idea - as shown in the Logic - tions only to negate that negation by revealing and contemplates the whole of objective reality as these presuppositions to be nothing but its free un­ essentially nothing but the Absolute Idea - as the folding of its own truth. This revelation at once completed Encyclopaedia has now revealed. determines that the original negation is immediately Absolute Spirit, like the Logical Absolute Idea the Negation of the Nepation. And, by the same token, which it objectively realises, has the circularity this second movement of Negation of the Negation of total self-consciousness. Thus Hegel says: 'The absorbs the first movement of Negation of the Nega­ Eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, tion, which proceeds from the Logical Idea as the eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys appearance of itself in time. itself as absolute' [Philosophy of Spirit, p.315]. So, Hegel's whole philosophy can be summed up and If we look again at the triad of Logic, Nature, expressed in terms of Negation of the Negation, or, Spirit, considering which aspects constitute a pro­ equally well, of self-mediation, true infinitude, and gression in time, a phenomenon, and which are so on. Hegel also conveys the movement of his essentially atemporal, we can remodel the whole dialectic in an apt metaphor: philosophy, and there­ system as the triad Logical Idea, (pre) History, fore reality, is a 'circle of circles' [Logic, p.20], Philosophical Idea, in which the first, the Logical a 'circle which closes with itself' [ibid., p.23]. Idea, sets out the logical necessity of the progres­ It is also true that, not only each component circle, sion in History, and the last, the Philosophical but the all-encompassing circle, precisely in its Idea, reveals its purpose in the absolute self­ completion, 'bursts' out beyond itself. But in becom­ determination of Spirit. From this standpoint, ing other it is becoming only itself - contradiction History appears enclosed like a kernel in two shells or mutability is secondary to, is no other than, - the Logical Idea and the Philosophical Idea. identity or self-identity - so that the perpetual In any case, the major triad of the whole system, bursting out of the circle is at once, and more Logic, Nature, Spirit, conforms to the laws or properly, its perpetual closing with itself. general characteristics of the method generated and displayed in the Logic, where the whole presents 11 Marx and Mao itself in its abstract or implicit form. We will here set out the movements of Negation of the l'le want here to bring out the characteristics of the Negation from the standpoints of the Logical Idea and mature Marxist dialectic, at first in abstract terms, the Philosophical Idea respectively. The Logic as and then in a concrete example. lITe then look at how the implicit Idea, or the Idea in itself, puts the 'unity of opposites' comes to displace the itself forth as Nature, and thereby apparently loses Hegelian 'Ne~ation of the Negation' as thequint­ sight of itself as concrete subjectivity. But essential moment of the dialectic. Nature as the negation of the Idea is at once In the transition +rom the Hegelian to the mature implicitly the Idea, and so develops by its own Marxist dialectic, the initial step is from an ideal dialectic into the explicit Idea, which is Spirit. to a material content, from the Idea to (material) In Spirit as the unity of Nature and the Idea, the labour, from Spirit to ~ociety, which in early Marx Idea rediscovers itself as concrete sub,iectivity, is conceived in its fruition as the union of human­ but now in actual existence, or in and for itself. kind with nature in free, conscious self-determina­ It thus becomes evident - or rather, what had tion. already become evident in the Logic and in its trans­ As Marxism develops, it effects no radical altera­ ition to Nature is actually unfolded - that the tion of the materialist content, although it does Logical Idea, which is essentially self-mediation or render it radically more concrete. However, the self-manifestation, puts itself forth in its other­ developinp; Marxism effects a radical change in dia­ ness and negation as Nature only to negate that nega­ lectical form, and later in its formulation of the tion by actualising itself in and for itself as dialectical process. In terms of Hegel's metaphor of Spirit. However, this movement of Negation of the the circle, there is a change from an emphasis on the Negation represents the movement of Ideas as a pro­ circle 'closing on itself', to an emphasis in mature cess in time, from preceding to succeeding terms, Marxism on 'bursting-out' if the circle, which while which is ultimately only an 'appearance' or moment. completing, more fundamentally brings to dissolution And in the same way, this first movement of Nega­ one process and begins another. Whereas Hegel sees tion of the Negation represents the Idea and Nature a 'circle 0+ circles', that is, every 'bursting out' as essence and appearance, with Spirit reflecting as in turn a circle enclosed in the all-embracing into the Logic on the one hand and Nature on the circle of the Absolute, mature Marxism sees an end­ other as its apparently independent presuppositions. less pro~ression, a spiral movement (i.e. a 'bursting- 36 out' of a circle) which does not close on itsel~, but places from principal to subordinate, and thus is open-ended. precipitate the dissolution of the old contradiction By an emphasis on self-enclosure we mean, to begin and the emergence of a new. with, the encompassing of all otherness within the We will now outline a single movement of the subject that is supposed to ensure the true infinit­ mature Marxist dialectic as presented by Mao Zedong, ude and ~reedom of the subject. Thus, in early Marx­ whose formulation is, as far as we know, the most ism, the conclusion of social 'prehistory', itself a correct and simple. After considering its applica­ pdrt of nature and natural history, is Society brought tion to the process of knowledge, we will then to fruition, and this is after the Hegelian manner elaborate the contrast of the Marxist and Hegelian conceived as in turn encompassing (practically and conceptions of the kernel of dialectics, and sum up theoretically) nature and natural history. In mature the distinctive character of the Marxist conception. Harxism society is conceived as a part of natural For Hegel there is one all-encompassing dialecti­ history which does not in turn enclose natural cal process whose content and form may, indeed must, history. Rather, it is stressed that, both historic­ be expounded simultaneously. For Mao there is a ally and laterally, and in depth as well as in mUltiplicity of processes, and the unique content of breadth, an endless proeression of processes exists each determines its form. Nevertheless, we may ab­ beyond human history - and for that matter any other stract and generalise a certain universal form, particular process - and that therefore there must al though ""e must study individual processes if we are always be an infinity of processes beyond those that to flesh out this schema into particular models. Our we have come to know in practice. exposition, then, begins with the universal form and If, then, Hegelian idealism is ultimately a goes on to the particular form of the epistemological dialectical monism, in that all processes are ulti­ process, as the unity of objective and subjective mately taken up and grounded in the single process of processes. Spirit, as a diversity within a unity, mature Marxism Mao sets forth the universal form of dialectical is ultimately a dialectical pluralism, where reality processes in On Contradiction. He defines dialectic is seen as an interlocking whole of separate aspects as the 'law of the unity of opposites' (p.71), or as or processes, as a unity within a diversity. the law of dialectical contradiction. For Mao, all terms are opposed, although only in an abstract way. In certain cases, or 'in given conditions' (p.67), however, the opposition between two terms is also concrete, and this opposition contains a concrete identity or unity. It is this concrete unity of opposites that constitutes dialectical contradiction. (We are to understand that all terms exist in dialectical contradiction - no term could exist in and by itself, in mere identity - but any particular term is not necessarily in dialectical contradiction with any other particular term.) The existence of a dialectical contradiction con­ ;J stitutes a 'thing', and its developmerrt constitutes a process. A process may (perhaps must) contain second­ ( \. ary contradictions alongside its 'principal contradic­ tion', but this is only to say that it contains other The Hegelian process is characterised by a distinc­ processes. In the principal contradiction one of the tive kind of triad. The first term is mere or immedi­ two terms will constitute the 'principal aspect' of ate identity, the subject-in-itself. The second term the contradiction. This principal aspect is the is mediation, the subject-for-itself, or confronted dominant term, and plays the major role in determin­ by otherness. The third term is mediated identity, ing the character of the process. the subject-in-and-~or-itself, being and completing The principal contradiction develops through the itsel~ in and through otherness. mutual interaction or 'struggle' of its terms. The In mature Marxism the dialectical process may still terms are mutually exclusive opposites, but they only be conceived as triadic, but the triad takes a form exist as such insofar as they mutually interact. different from the Hegelian. Each process begins with Thus the struggle of mutually exclusive terms con­ a mutual transformation of opposites, develops stitutes the unity of opposites, or dialectical through dialectical contradiction, and ends with a contradiction. In that it consists of disequilibrium "further mutual transformation of opposites. Alter­ and struggle, the dialectical contradiction necessar­ natively, and more fundamentally, we can focus on the ily develops. This development culminates in the aspect of mutability by conceiving another triad resolution of this struggle of the terms, and thus of spanning the transition from one process to another, the contradiction or process. But the resolution is a progression from dialectical contradiction, essentially transitory, for a new contradiction or through a transformation of opposites, to a new process necessarily arises to replace the old - 'the dialectical contradiction. But whichever way we old unity with its constituent opposites yields to a look at it, we have here neither an initial mere new unity with its constituent opposites' (p.34). identity, nor a final self-mediated identity. The transition from the old contradiction or The point of transition from one process to process to the new is basicallY characterizable as a another, the mutual transformation of opposites, mutual transformation of opposites. More properly, might be thought to represent a transitory synthesis, the moment of mutual transformation, the essence of or fusion of two into one, but this is not the case. which is that the secondary term of the initial This transitional moment constitutes a transitory contradiction gains primacy and reduces the principal dialectical contradiction - a dialectical contradic­ term to secondary status, signals the point or phase tion of a special kind, characterised by a balance of resolution and dissolution of the initial contra­ of opposin~ terms. So, the whole progression con­ diction, and at once conditions, sometimes more or sists of nothing but dialectical contradiction, the less directly constituting, the emergence of a new qualitative transition from one particular dialect­ contradiction. In their concrete particularity the ical contradiction to another taking effect through terms of the old contradiction will necessarily die a special moment of dialectical contradiction, when out and those of the new will necessarily be novel. opposing terms momentarily balance as they change If the old and new contradictions constitute stages 37 of the development of an over-arching or ongoing possihle, and necessary, multiplicity of ways of process, however, then taken in their more universal, modelling complex processes, which undergo internal ongoing aspect, there will be a more or less direct development and articulation, and exist, not only in continuity between the old and new terms, especially themselves, but in relation to other processes. between the old secondary and the new principal term Thus, ~rom what is initially an apparently wider and between the old principal and the new secondary perspective on the dialectic of subject and object term. Whatever continuity there may be between the (reality-for-us), we arrive at a modelling close to stages of its development, an ongoing process will the dialectic of theory and practice, knowing and itself also reach a point of dissolution, thus hist­ doing, which is the object of Mao's discussion in orically conditioning radically novel contradictions. On Practice and in a narrow sense, constitutes only To illustrate this movement of the Marxist dialec­ one side, theory-practice, of the relation between tic, in an example as close as possible to the central the subjective and objective as a whole. Our model­ dialectic of Hegel's system, we may sketch the ling which focusses on theoretical practice and the dialectic of a subject knowing an object, the identity labour process has both sides (i.e. theory-practice, of subject and object, or the epistemological-practic­ practice-object) of the relation between subject and al process, following more or less the position obj ect expl ici t. outlined by Hao in On Practice. Now from our new perspective, practice appears in First we need to conceptualise exactly the subject­ its two-sidedness, as having subjective and objective ive and objective processes whose interconnection is moments reflecting the determination of the ob~ective to be sketched. From the standpoint of materialism, by the subjective, and vice-versa. It is with the the subj ective process is i tsel f (immediately) ob,; ect­ latter determination that the dialectic between an ive. Provisionally, the objectivity of the subjective inadequate theoretical practice and a developing may be viewed as consisting in the intersubjectivity labour process commences. It is the labour process of all the ~rocesses involved in knowledge, as well which sets the problem for theory to solve by moving as in the fact that the knowledge process itself can (extensively or intensively) heyond its former limits, be known in a natural epistemology. and by providing the means whereby theoretical pract­ The objective process in principle can be any ice may solve the problem of providing effective natura~ process anywhere, any time, but a process control over the labour process. Initially, the becomes properly objective, a reality-for-us, only subject cannot fully develop and control the labour when it is that to which some subiective activity is process, but in struggling to do so acquires directed. The objective process is thus immediately perceptual experience. subjective. As perceptual knowledge accumulates and is ana­ At the furthest limit of opposition or separation lysed a more-or-Iess adequate concept is formed in of the objective and subjective, the subjective theoretical practice through which the labour pro­ process appears as the grasping of an abstract con­ cess may be consciously directed. If the concept is cept, which can even seem a product simply of imagina­ initially less adequate, the process of accumulating tion (Hume) , or as a priori (Kant), and the objective perceptual experience continues until it culminates process can appear as the matter of nature, which is with an adequate concept of the object. Here the seen in different ways as a 'beyond' in Magic or stage of quantitative change of theoretical practice Religion. Considered from its extremities, the and the labour process is succeeded by a ~rocess of relation of obiective and subjective processes a~pears qualitative change as the labour process comes under as the dialectic of concept and object. However, conscious control with respect to a given object. object and concept are mediated by practice, so that The determination of the subject by the object in their connection divides into two moments, one the perception gives way to the determination of the relation of concept (theory) to practice, the other object by the subject in the application of concept­ the relation of practice to the ob;ect. ual knowledge. Object and subject change places, If we are to comprehend the objective and subject­ the object is adequately idealised, and the subject ive processes, not as they are 'in themselves', but adequately realises its concept, and thereby in their interconnection, we may regard the subject­ establishes the at least provisional adequacy of its ive process as reaching out, as it were, to include concept as a basis for further knowledge. The criter­ the side of practice which relates it to the object, ion of knowledge is not fulfilled, and the theoretic­ and vice versa with the objective process. The sub­ al practice itself is not fully com~leted, until the jective process then appears as including the practice concept is realised in the obiective process, which of learning and applyin~ theory, and we may term it is the very opposite of regarding, as do the 'theoretical practice'. The objective process is empiricists and a priori rationalists, the adequate seen as including the practice which transforms it, idealisation of the object as the criterion of that is, it merges with, in essence, the labour knowledge. process. (The labour process, or human industry, is At this stage, our model of a single movement of the activity transforming nature, the objective the epistemological-practical process exhibits, at world, into products necessary to life, and so is least implicitly, the triadic pattern of dialectical the focal point of the objective process insofar as contradiction, transformation of opposites, dialect­ it is subject to human activity.) The labour process ical contradiction. The movement from object to includes perception considered as an activity compel­ concept necessarily includes as its secondary aspect ling reality to affect the subject: 'If you want to the opposite movement from concept to object, and know the taste of a pear you must change the pear by together these constitute the development of the eating it yourself' (~1ao, Four Essays, p.81). But contradiction between concept and object. The trans­ perception as an ob;ect-transforming practice extends formation of opposites occurs when theory guides beyond the labour process proper, and must be separ­ the labour process on the basis of an adequate, ately conceived as an element of the objective established concept, and actualises the movement from process. Nevertheless, the centrality of the labour concept to ob;ect as the principal aspect, with the process to the transformation of the objective opposite movement still present but now secondary. justifies our speaking of the labour process in most The resulting transformation of both the labour contexts as though it were coextensive with the process and theoretical practice leads to a new objective process. contradiction, which we have suggested is usually a It is worth emphasising before we continue, that new epistemolop,ical problem set on the basis of the the shift we have gone through in modelling the resolution of the old. dialectic of object and subject is an example of the Our modellinp, both in abstract and particular

38 terms, brings out clearly the unity of opposites, different, aspects. It is true that a particular conceived as having two moments, mutual dependence process such as the epistemological-practical process and mutual transformation. Thus, without theoretical has a somewhat subjective and teleological character, practice nothing could be an object of conscious though even here it is seen as a succession of events activity, and without the objective process (in in time (Hegel's 'wrong infinity') and the knowing essence, without the labour process) there could be and acting subject does not freely put itself forth no theoretical practice. Moreover, theoretical as objective reality, but confronts it as primarily practice and the labour process each in realising given and other. itself passes over into, becomes the other. The Nevertheless, there is a limited exemplification labour process thus emerges as the essence of the of Negation of the Negation in the mature Marxist epistemological-practical process with theoretical dialectic, which we can explain with our example. practice as its reflection in the sUbjective. The In the case of an ongoing process, such as the unity of subject and object is thus asserted, in epistemological-practical process, we have seen how materialism, to be essentially objective. one dialectical movement initiates another essentially If the Hegelian categories of Being, the law of similar movement. The problem of ignorance in pract­ transition of quantity into quality and vice-versa, ice is resolved only to return to a (new) problem of and the Negation of the Negation are not immediately ignorance in practice; each cycle of knowledge, evident in our modelling of the Marxist dialectic, mutual transformation of object and subject, gives they are, nevertheless, present, although, as we way to a new cycle of knowledge, a new mutual trans­ shall see, with a different significance, and in the formation of object and subject, and so, from this case of Negation of the Negation, with less than standpoint constitutes a repetition. The ongoing complete universality. epistemological-practical process exhibits an alter­ In Hegel, transition of quantity into quality and nating opposition between theoretical practice and vice-versa establishes the cumulative evolution of the labour process, with now one term dominant and the Idea, considered as having temporal existence. the other secondary. Such repetition appears In mature Marxism, while the significance of the law explicitly in an (apparently) exact reproduction of must be different, it is somewhat similar neverthe­ alternating contradictions, e.g. day-night; night­ less ~ day; etc. This repetition is modelled in the Daoist Quantity into quality is clearly already implicit form of the dialectic, which has a characteristic­ in the unity of opposites in its two moments. The emphasis on mutual transformation of opposites: quantitative development of a contradiction, the 'Misery, alas! is what happiness rests upon. Happi­ existence and working out of the struggle between ness, alas! is what misery is hidden in .... What is dependent terms, culminates in a qualitative leap to upright becomes again treacherous and what is good a new principal contradiction which then undergoes becomes again unpropitious' (Lao Zi). Through this its own development. The terms of a contradiction emphasis it sets up a pattern of alternation, implying reflect the same transition: each undergoes a a cosmology of eternal recurrence. This kind Df con­ quantitative development which leads to a qualitative ception, dialectical but cyclical, is traditional in transformation of its position, and a further China, and seems to have influenced On Contradiction. quantitative change in that new position. Thus in our example, the quantitative development of theoret­ ical practice as the subordinate aspect of the process leads to its becoming principal, and passing into a new (different) phase of quantitative change. The movement thus encompasses the gradual formation of a concept, the qualitative leap to a potentially adequate content, and then the gradual application and extension of the concept as it is used to master However, it must be emphasised that a series of objective reality. However, the transition is not processes, e.g. of cycles of knowledge, appears merely necessarily from less rich to more rich processes, repetitious only because it is viewed as a series of and it exhibits regress as well as progress. In our stages constituting a more universal contradiction. example, the process does exhibit an overall cumulat­ Terms thus undergo a see-saw repetition only insofar _ ive evolution, in that ignorance becomes knowledge, as they are regarded more universally, as terms of an and knowledge in turn opens the door to a new ongoing contradiction, which, however, must itself specific ignorance, revealing unknown and unappro­ develop in stages with each, considered as a particu­ priated nature as such in ever new instances. But, lar stage, in its own right constituting a novel while the epistemoloRical-practical process is not process. the sole instance of cumulative evolution, not all It is in affirming the evolutionary character of processes exhibit the same features. such ongoing processes that Negation of the Negation If 0uantity into Ouality establishes the cumula­ transcends 0uantity into Ouality, and secures a resi­ tively evolutionary character of the Hegelian dual si?TIi~icance in the Marxist dialectical form. dialectic, Negation of the Negation, as the most The ongoing terms of an ongoing process such as the definitive moment of Spirit, further establishes the epistemolo~ical-practical process are themselves transition as closing on itself so that it proves to necessarily developing, since they constitute a more be subjective and teleological. universal contradiction that is itself inevitably It is important to emphasise that Negation of the characterised by disequilibrium and struggle, and in Negation cannot have the same meaning in Marxism. In which one ongoinp term, whether it appears in its material processes the end is the beginning, not of particularity as the primary or secondary term of any itself and as its own purpose, but of a new and stage, must constitute the initial primary ongoing different process. We do not have an ultimate syn­ determinant. This onp,oing determinant may then be thesis which Unites subject and object in a concrete regarded as the 'subject' of Nep,ation of the actualised subject. Opposed terms necessarily appear Negation. in a pair, as a dialectical contradiction, and neces­ In our example, the labour process initially sarily give way to a further pair, a new contradic­ appears as the principal ongoing aspect. Thus the tion. Thus the unity of subject and object is a labour process, as a p,iven reality which sets process of metabolism between human beings and nature objective problems, may be viewed as a thesis, the in which theoretical practice and the labour process subsequent attainment of mastery and control by the are interconnected, interpenetrating but irreducibly subject over the labour process as the negation of an

39 objective problem and the re-emergence of the labour self-identity would be in equilibrium with its muta­ process as a given reality as the Negation of the bility, the perpetual transition to new contradictions Negation. There is another aspect to the ongoing being just as much the perpetual reproduction of old process, knowing and acting humanity in theoretical contradictions. Conversely, in the dialectical form practice, which equally, but secondarily from the established by Mao, there is disequilibrium standpoint of ~aterialism, may be taken as the 'sub­ throughout. ject' of Nepation of the Nepation. Here ignorance is Hegel goes beyond the Daoist dialectic in recog­ the nepation of knowing and actin~ humanity, and the nising endless nonrepetitious becoming-other, but-he subsequent acquisition and use of knowledge the subordinates the objective necessity of becominp­ Negation of the Negation. Consequently, from the other, which he sees as the wrong infinite, to the standnoint of materialism, the P.egelian subject subjective teleology of self-identity, seen as the appears as a mysti~ied inversion of the real subject true infinite. He recognises disequilibrium, but o~ the epistemological-practical process, the labour pives weight to the subjective and conservative process. aspect. It is only with mature Marxism that object­ The 'reaffirmation' of the labour process as ive evolution becomes truly primary, truly absolute. objective in the Negation of the Negation is identi­ If the Hegelian form can be summed up in a single cal with the mode o~ production and reproduction of term, 'sel ~-determination', ~1ao can still express the the labour process through its opposite. This self­ essence of the dialectical materialist outlook in the production or reproduction is at the same time devel­ same or a similar term, e.g. 'self-movement'. For opment and self-mutability. Ultimately, if it is not 'internal and necessary self-movement' (Mao, Four deflected from its path by external causes, the on­ Essays, p.26) distinguishes the dialectical outlook going process will go through a transformation of as such from the metaphysical outlook, defined as a opposites in which the objective labour process 'vulgar evolutionism' which recognizes development becomes secondary and the secondary aspect, knowing as quantitative increase and decrease only. Only the and acting humanity in theoretical practice, becomes dialectical outlook, which grasps internal contradic­ principal. This Hao conceives as the character of tion as the essence of each thing, can explain not achieved communism in which 'all mankind voluntarily only quantitative development but also qualitative and consciously changes itself and the world' (Mao, transition, and thus account for otherness and Four Essays, p.20). becoming-other, or the existence of many different However, this process, while evolutionary, is things and the changing of one thing into another. neither primarily subjective nor teleological. Human Now, the self-movement of the mature Harxist dialec­ knowledge and capability are perpetually appearing as tic must of course be distinguished from the self­ ignorance and impotence with respect to particular determination of the Hegelian dialectic - and this objective processes, and the knowledge growing distinction will contain all the distinctions made in successively ereater with each successful solution of this part. But -:he fact that the mature Marxist problems is the product and reflection of the object­ dialectic is a self-movement at all does make it ive labour process, not its prior condition and possible to assert that there is a kind of free sub­ reason for existence. jectivity - that of dialectical contradiction itself In documenting the evolutionary path of ongoing, - in all its pro:esses, whether human or merely more universal processes, Negation of the Negation natural. In all cases, however, this sub'jecti ve appears as a mere moment of the unity of opposites, freedom is more properly understood as objective s~ecifically, as a direct consequence of the unity necessity. and struggle of ongoing terms in relation to particular stages of the ongoing process. Author's postscript The Marxist unity of opposites thus inverts the truth of the Hegelian dialectical form. As subsumed At the time of publication, Part 11 appears to us as under the Negation of the Negation, identity rather provisional in that there are certain implications of than opposition must be viewed as ultimately primary. the Marxist-Maoist dialectic which are not explored ll.1i th the Negation of the Negation i tsel f subsumed, here and which point to further formulations that the Unity of Opposites reveals contradiction as modify Mao's model in certain significant respects, ultimately primary. Hao concludes, on the basis of but also as relatively final in that it elaborates the position of On Contradiction in such a way as to the primacy o~ contradiction, that self-identity is conditional, relative, secondary, whereas mutability be compatible with all its important statements and is unconditional, absolute, primary. at once correct, if in certain cases only by omission There are, in fact, three aspects of disequilib­ or ambiguity, from a further developed standpoint. rium in the Marxist dialectical movement. \'le have We feel that if nothing else this exposition repres­ the primacy of one term over another in any contra­ ents a properly formed and placed stepping-stone from diction, the primacy of contradiction over identity, which we, and hopefully others, can now begin to and the primacy of mutability over self-identity. reach forward. If we may imagine, for the sake of argument, an References for Part I alternatinp. repetitive process that is non-evolution­ ary - a process exhibiting the 'Daoist' form - it Hegel, G. W. F., Logic, trans. W. Wallace, Clarendon will be seen that such a process would exhibit equi­ Press, Oxford, 1975. librium throughout. Its two aspects would be equal Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.V. as ongoing determinants, so that the ongoing process Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970. would exhibit no developmental bias. The ongoing pro­ Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Mind, trans. A.V. ~~iller, cess would therefore be inherently sempiternal, cap­ Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971 able of repeating itself endlessly. This means that the unity and opposition of the terms would be in References for Part 11 equilibrium, as their continued unity in the form of the enduring process would be as unconditional as Mao Zedong, Four Essays on Philosophy, Peking their continued struggle. And this is to say that Forei~n Languages Press.

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