Inefficient Coercion in Operation Allied Force
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2015-12 Luck is not a strategy: inefficient coercion in operation Allied Force Beaty, James E. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47901 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS LUCK IS NOT A STRATEGY: INEFFICIENT COERCION IN OPERATION ALLIED FORCE by James E. Beaty December 2015 Thesis Advisor: James A. Russell Second Reader: Daniel J. Moran Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2015 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS LUCK IS NOT A STRATEGY: INEFFICIENT COERCION IN OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 6. AUTHOR(S) James E. Beaty 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943–5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Operation Allied Force, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 over ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, has been used as evidence for many arguments including the value of independent airpower and the use of limited force to achieve coercion. This thesis examines the bases of airpower doctrine and coercion theory, and examines Allied Force as a case of coercion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), dominated by the United States, entered Allied Force without a coherent or complete strategy. Over the course of the air campaign, strategy eventually evolved to achieve the alliance’s goals, but this was only possible because of the incredible mismatch between the superlatively capable NATO air forces and the largely obsolete Yugoslav defenses. Allied Force conclusively proved that airpower alone can be used to coerce a target state to concede to diplomatic demands, but it also showed that the United States’ military and political leadership had little idea how to execute coercion. To improve the outcomes of future military interventions, it is essential that the United States’ military and political leadership devotes far more resources to strategic planning and analysis instead of hoping that operationally proficient military personnel will unknowingly arrive at an effective strategy. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Operation Allied Force, coercion, strategy, airpower, strategic bombing, NATO, U.S. Air PAGES Force, Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic 79 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited LUCK IS NOT A STRATEGY: INEFFICIENT COERCION IN OPERATION ALLIED FORCE James E. Beaty Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2009 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (STRATEGIC STUDIES) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2015 Approved by: James A. Russell Thesis Advisor Daniel J. Moran Second Reader Mohammad M. Hafez Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Operation Allied Force, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 over ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, has been used as evidence for many arguments including the value of independent airpower and the use of limited force to achieve coercion. This thesis examines the bases of airpower doctrine and coercion theory, and examines Allied Force as a case of coercion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), dominated by the United States, entered Allied Force without a coherent or complete strategy. Over the course of the air campaign, strategy eventually evolved to achieve the alliance’s goals, but this was only possible because of the incredible mismatch between the superlatively capable NATO air forces and the largely obsolete Yugoslav defenses. Allied Force conclusively proved that airpower alone can be used to coerce a target state to concede to diplomatic demands, but it also showed that the United States’ military and political leadership had little idea how to execute coercion. To improve the outcomes of future military interventions, it is essential that the United States’ military and political leadership devotes far more resources to strategic planning and analysis instead of hoping that operationally proficient military personnel will unknowingly arrive at an effective strategy. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. IMPORTANCE ..........................................................................................1 B. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................2 C. SOURCES ...................................................................................................2 D. THESIS ORGANIZATION ......................................................................4 II. RELEVANT THEORY .........................................................................................5 A. AIRPOWER ...............................................................................................5 1. Independent from Land or Sea Power .........................................5 2. Promises and Limitations of Technology .....................................8 3. Doctrine and Theories of Victory ...............................................10 4. Adjusting Action but Not Doctrine .............................................11 5. Independent Strike Doctrine Today ...........................................12 B. COERCION..............................................................................................13 1. Roots in Clausewitz ......................................................................13 2. Coercion Defined ..........................................................................14 3. Operational Mechanisms of Coercion ........................................15 4. Vocabulary of Coercion ...............................................................15 5. Characterizing Allied Force ........................................................16 III. RELEVANT HISTORY ......................................................................................17 A. SERBIA’S PLACE IN YUGOSLAVIA .................................................18 B. KOSOVO’S PLACE IN SERBIA...........................................................20 C. THE HOLBROOKE AGREEMENT TO ALLIED FORCE ..............20 IV. OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY ........................................................................23 A. DENIAL ....................................................................................................23 1. Preventing Yugoslav Goals .........................................................23 2. Inflicting Costs .............................................................................25 3. Coercive Effectiveness .................................................................27 4. Strengths and Weaknesses ..........................................................28 B. WEAKENING ..........................................................................................30 1. Weakening the Yugoslav Economy ............................................30 2. Coercive Effectiveness .................................................................32 3. Strengths and Weaknesses ..........................................................32 C. UNREST ...................................................................................................33 1. Fomenting Unrest.........................................................................33 vii 2. Coercive Value of Unrest .............................................................34 3. Strengths and Weaknesses ..........................................................35 D. POWER BASE EROSION .....................................................................36 1. Crony Attack ................................................................................37 2. Strengths and Weaknesses