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Home , Anil Kakodkar, Dhruva reactor, George Fernandes, Naresh Chandra, Ramakrishna Hegde, Satish Sareen

&MUN IX JCC NUCLEAR ARMS RACE: BACKGROUND GUIDE & Letters From The Directors

Dear Delegates, Welcome to &MUN IX and to the Nuclear Arms Race: India v. . My name is Reeves Yanez and I will be the coordinating crisis director. I am a Junior at William & Mary majoring in Kinesiology with a concentration in Public Health. I have done MUN since middle school and since I have become increasingly involved, competing as part of W&M’s travel team, staffing our conferences, and serving as the USG for specialized agencies and Director General for our middle school conference, WMIDMUN. Outside of MUN, I love to spend time outside, leading students on backpacking trips through the student rec center. I am beyond excited to see what you all bring to the table as we discuss such an exciting topic with so many possibilities. I would encourage you to use history as a guide as you change the future of the subcontinent, but don’t be constrained by it.. The historical outcome was not perfect and I look forward to the alternate solutions you put forward. I especially value creativity and novel solutions, and plans that account for contingencies will be the most successful. With that being said there may be some sensitive subjects covered in this committee and we have high expectations of delegate conduct. We will not tolerate any racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, or any other form of discrimination. I look forward to your exciting plans as you strive to lead your nation to victory. This committee will also be a joint crisis committee, and so you will be actively working against another committee. JCC’s are fast paced and require quick thinking. Your plans will be opposed by an actual committee bound by the same constraints as you which makes JCC’s much more exciting. The entire director team and your USG’s have worked really hard to design this committee, and so we hope you are as excited for it as we are. Please do not hesitate to reach out if you have any questions at all about &MUN or this committee! Your crisis czar, Reeves Yanez

& Background

From their infancy, Pakistan and India have been at each other’s throats. In 1947, British India was partitioned into two independent states, Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. The partition saw the mass migration of Hindus and Muslims across the new borders and hundreds of thousands of deaths from violence. Territorial disputes between the two newly independent states – particularly over Muslim-majority – soon broke out. Pakistan’s refusal to allow Kashmir to join India led to war in 1948. India won control over much of Kashmir, but neither state has ever accepted the other’s rule. The partition left Pakistan considerably weaker than India. It lacked the military organization and arms production infrastructure that India possessed, and population disparities amplified Pakistan’s relative weakness.

The Beginning of the Nuclear Program Since its independence in 1947, India has worked towards the development of nuclear weapons. There are several factors that have pushed India in this direction, chief among them the partition and Pakistan, however, their disputes with China and their desire to be a world power should not be forgotten. The key players in India’s early development of nuclear weapons were Homi Bhabha and Prime Minister . Homi Bhabha was an Indian Physicist and founder of the Indian nuclear program. Often referred to as the “Indian Oppenheimer,” he began working on nuclear weapons for India in 1944, even before their independence. He helped found and directed Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) in 1945 and started work on enriching uranium for power generation. True nuclear research would start after he convinced the new government to pass the Atomic Energy Act, on 15 April 1948, leading to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) not quite one year after independence. Prime Minister Nehru was a proponent of disarmament and pushed research towards non military applications, but left open the possibility for military use. In 1949, when asked about nuclear weapons, Nehru said, “We must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war - indeed I think we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes. Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way." Although Nehru insinuated military use, the early years of the program were focused on civilian use, pushing towards .

& The first major push towards weapons came in 1954 when the Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay (AEET) was set up. This was followed up by the creation of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), headed by Bhabha. The DAE fell under the direct control of the prime minister who gave it a huge amount of independence. This autonomy was a major fear for other nuclear powers and the UN. They suspected it would be easy to manipulate but did not initially take any major action. The DAE quickly grew to take up a third of India’s research budget. Also during this time, Canada formed a partnership to set up an experimental nuclear reactor in India and the United States and provided for the reactor under the Atoms for Peace program. These programs were initially peaceful and worked on civilian technology but they gave India the infrastructure to develop weapons grade . Although the infrastructure existed and there had been some talk of nuclear weapons, up to this point the Indian nuclear research was almost all peaceful and civilian. They continued to receive assistance from the US and Canada through the early 1960’s and were pursuing a three step plan to replace much of their coal generation with nuclear power. Nehru was a powerful force directing the country away from pursuing nuclear weapons and even Bhabha was primarily interested in civilian uses. They even directed research into Thorium reactors because India had about 25% of the world’s reserves of Thorium compared with only 2% of the world's reserves of Uranium. Although this turned out to be more expensive and impractical, it should still be noted that the Indian civilian nuclear program was very strong and on the forefront of research.

The Sino-Indian War India’s nuclear focus changed with the Sino-Indian war in 1962. India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had initially been allies following the Chinese Civil War. While the United States and the United Nations recognized the Republic of China (ROC) as China’s sole representative, depriving the PRC of diplomatic relations, India supported the PRC. To maintain cordial relations with the People’s Republic of China, who from hereafter will be referred to as China, India did not push back very hard when they occupied Tibet, a contested area. However, India did welcome the Dali Lama, which greatly upset China, who sought more control over the region. This sparked China to grow increasingly weary of India as a threat to their dominance of Tibet. Tibet is the start of all of China's major rivers that maintain food independence for its large population and serve as an impenetrable barrier to invasion. An independent Tibet was essentially an Indian controlled Tibet as the Tibetan people were less antagonized by India and closer religiously to India.

& China declared war on India in 1962 to further assert their dominance over the occupied Tibet. India did not expect an attack from China and so had a very weak military of about 20,000 troops, heavily outnumbered by China’s military of 100,000. India also expected the Soviet Union would protect them and ward off an invasion. However, China's attack came at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, so the Soviet Union was dealing with much larger problems. All these imbalances led to an unprepared and surprised India, which, coupled with some clever and decisive moves by the Chinese led to a crushing defeat. One of China's first moves was to cut the Indian telephone lines, which stopped communication between Indian units, and command. China was also able to encircle and get behind Indian forces, quickly gaining the advantage. The only advantage India had was their mortars, who were able to accurately target Chinese division. However, these mortars ultimately only slowed Chinese advance. In the aftermath of the war China secured their border and control over Tibet.India was forced to pull back and end their policy of pushing the Himalayan border. It was a humiliating defeat for the Indians and provided the first major push towards nuclear weapons. Then in 1964 China tested their first essentially guaranteeing their supremacy over India. India now had to contend with a Nuclear neighbor, which essentially ended any hopes of India regaining control of parts of Tibet, or winning any significant victory over China.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions The next phase of India’s nuclear program was designed to create a nuclear bomb, however, it was not a military program. Instead, nuclear development was viewed as an engineering and state building program. Following the Sino-Indian War, Bhabha argued strongly for the development of nuclear weapons, ostensibly to ward off China. China's power spike due to their successful nuclear test needed to be matched and the only way to do this was for India to develop a nuclear weapon of their own. Despite this, prime minister still opposed military research, and so compromised by allowing the development for civilian purposes only. Shastri acknowledged that the technology could later lead to a weaponized version but was steadfast on the point that it should only be used for civilian purposes. Bhabha continued to lead the nuclear program and through this period sought the United States support through the Project Plowshare Program. This was a US Department of Energy program to test atomic explosions for excavation and quarrying. Bhabha claimed that India could develop a nuclear bomb in 18 month on its own during this period, during a meeting with US State Department officials. He wanted the US to assist India’s nuclear program in exchange for the promise of purely non military use. It is worth noting that this claim is disputed, however, it gives an idea of the Indian nuclear capability of the time, which was far beyond other countries' assessments of India. The US ultimately decided not to support India but this was the start of major change. & Smiling Buddha 1966 saw the death of Shastri and the ascension of as prime minister. She was the daughter of Nehru and not related to Mahatma Gandhi. Ghandi was a strong proponent of a nuclear India. Just two weeks after she became prime minister, however, Bhabha died in a plane crash and his protégée Raja Ramanan took over as head of Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC). Concurrently, India also drew closer to the Soviet Union, signing the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Co-operation with the Soviet Union. This treaty further pushed India towards the Soviet Union and reduced their reliance on the West. This process was accelerated when a war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1971 over the separatist movement in , which is now Bangladesh. The Soviets sided with India, while China and the United States sided with Pakistan. The US even moved a carrier strike group into the Sea of Bengal, and in response a Soviet nuclear sub was dispatched to tail the American fleet. This showed India firsthand the power of a nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, Pakistan’s effort and Western support could not overcome the strength of the Indian army;Pakistan was defeated decisively. This pushed India further away from the West and closer to the Soviets, giving them some immunity to pressure to curb their nuclear weapons programs. The official start of India’s nuclear weapons program was 1972 when Prime Minister Gandhi toured the BARC. As Ramana put it “There was never a discussion among us over whether we shouldn’t make the bomb, How to do it was more important. For us it was a matter of prestige that would justify our ancient past. The question of deterrence came much later. As Indian scientists we were keen to show our Western counterparts, who thought little of us those days, that we too could do it.” Ramana led a team of 75 scientists to develop a Plutonium implosion device. The Indian Army was charged with preparing a site for the device to be detonated and began digging a test shaft in the Desert. Ultimately in 1974 a nuclear device was successfully detonated marking the beginning of a fully nuclear India. The message to the prime minister from Rahman said “the Buddha is smiling” after the test had been completed. The success of the Smiling Buddha project was due in large part to its secrecy. There were several ways the government made sure that the information on the project was not leaked. The first and most significant was limiting the number of people who knew about the project. Recall from earlier that the Department of Atomic Energy and therefore the BARC were under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Because of this, during the two years of development only the 75 members of BARC, Gandhi, and one General knew about the project. Later as the military prepared the test site a few more were added to this group, but even the Minister of Defense was not notified about the project until after the successful test. The Minister of

& Foreign Affairs was only notified 48 hours before the test. India kept the knowledge of this project to a tiny circle which is one of the major reasons they were able to surprise the world with the test. Once the world learned of India’s Nuclear capability they responded quickly. Pakistan proposed a nuclear-free zone in South Asia to the U.N. General Assembly. The measure was approved by a vote of 96 to 2, with 36 abstentions and only India and Bhutan voting in opposition. India rejected the resolution because it felt that treating South Asia in a vacuum was inappropriate when China played such an important role in the region’s nuclear balance.. But while the world did not approve of India’s test, general condemnations were lacking. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited India in October 1974 and affirmed that the United States would continue to provide for India’s Tarapur reactors, even though Pokhran-I had used fuel produced by American-provided heavy water plants. The international community instead focused on improving the nonproliferation regime. Pakistan had enjoyed significant Western support for its nuclear program up until this point. Canada provided it with a heavy water nuclear reactor that began to produce weapons-grade plutonium. In response to Pokhran-I, Canada, which had provided India with the reactor that the plutonium for the bomb came from, cancelled nuclear cooperation with both India and Pakistan, despite Pakistan’s acceptance of IAEA safeguards.

Weaponization Post Smiling Buddha Following the Smiling Buddha test and resulting international backlash, India’s weapon development slowed dramatically. It became much harder for India to acquire nuclear material due to international backlash and sanctions. This meant that despite India’s initial quick development, they could not create a weaponized version of Smiling Buddha for nearly 20 years until the 1990’s. India also faced a setback with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the US pushed. It sought to ban nuclear device tests. While neither India nor the United States ended up signing the treaty, it did lead to significantly less nuclear testing and the world keeping a watchful eye on India. Despite these challenges, there were two important developments that took place to bring India up to their current arsenal. The first was the at Trombay in 1977. The Dhruva reactor was India’s largest nuclear plant and now produces most of their weapons grade Plutonium. Although work was started on this facility in 1977 it was not operational until 1988. This is India’s main method for circumventing embargos on the Nuclear materials needed. The second major development were the long and short range ballistic missile programs 1983. The Defense Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) built the short-range Prithvi missile and the long-range Agni missile. These were both later equipped with nuclear warheads. These programs allowed India access to usable nuclear weapons sometime in the early 1990’s.

& Recent Developments At the May 1997 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit, I.K. Gujral and Prime Minister Sharif agreed upon a Pakistani-India dialogue. Gujral and Sharif both have their reasons to improve relations; Sharif believed that it was time for Pakistan and India to move on beyond their past. In mid-1997, their foreign ministers held talks on many issues, such as the territorial dispute in Kashmir. Progress was being made and hopes for a more peaceful future in South Asia were alive. However, the past months (March and April 1998, respectively), have doused those dreams due to internal developments in India. The Bharatiya (BJP) won elections across India. BJP, widely viewed as an Islamophobic and Hindu nationalist party, loathes compromising on Kashmir and is open for a overt nuclear weapons policy. Relations between India and Pakistan have plunged, and dangerous months are ahead. India is faced with a decision on whether to seek a cooperative agreement or flex its nuclear muscle.

& Topics to Consider

The State of the Indian Nuclear Program A resurgence in Indian nuclear activity appears imminent. On March 18, 1998, the Indian government, under control of the BJP, reiterated what the BJP had campaigned on: India would declare itself as a nuclear state. Soon afterward, Prime Minister of India, , announced that India intended to undergo new nuclear tests. This set off alarm bells across the world, but most acutely in Pakistan. On March 26, Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan, speaking to the international community, asked that the world impose sanctions on India to prevent further proliferation. On April 2, Prime Minister of Pakistan wrote letters to world leaders, including U.S. President Bill Clinton. Sharif pointed to India’s dangerous rhetoric on nuclear weapons as a sign that India planned to fully operationalize its nuclear capability. Ominously, Sharif told them that Pakistan would take measures it finds necessary to guarantee its security. According to Western intelligence (and as reported by the newspaper The New York Times in March), India has stockpiled around 100 nuclear warheads that can be quickly assembled. India also has plenty of fissionable material, such as tritium from the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in , for further weapons. While these are estimates, there is little reason to seriously doubt the veracity of these claims. No matter – if India decides to test a nuclear weapon, Pakistan will know immediately.

Delivery Systems While India has the materials for weapons, the delivery systems for those weapons is a different story. Since the 1960s, India has developed missile technology that can serve its nuclear program. India’s conventional missiles, while they are not intercontinental, can threat Pakistan and China. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation has worked on the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme since 1983, which was born several missiles. Foreign pressure, particularly from the United States, has stymied development; for example, the U.S. pressured Russia into withdrawing from an agreement to providing India with rocket technology and a cryogenic engine. Foreign pressure, however, has not been fatal to Indian missile development. The Prithvi tactical missile, which has a range of 150 kilometers and a payload capacity of 1000 kilograms, was first tested in 1988. The Agni missile had its first test flight in 1989. The short-range Prithvi missiles went into production in 1997, although it is not nuclear-capable yet. As a result, India lacks operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, although its scientists are hard at work on making that possible; depending on the actions of the Indian government, that may change in the near future. If Pakistan tests a nuclear weapon, for example, the Indian government may rush development of its missile programs to bolster its nuclear deterrent. & The only delivery system currently available to India for its nuclear weapons are fighter- bombers, specifically the Mirage 2000H. These fighters became available for nuclear deterrence duties when they completed testing in 1994. India is estimated to have a few dozen operational nuclear bombs, ready to be deployed on these jets. Whether India will put them into action remains to be seen.

Pakistan's Economic Weakness Pakistan has a population of nearly 135 million people. India, on the other hand, has a population of over one billion; India outnumbers Pakistan by a factor of 7.5 to 1. Such a large population disparity has contributed to the major power disparity between the two neighbors, but it is not the only source of Pakistani weakness. In recent years, Pakistan has faced political instability and budget deficits. Since 1988, seven different administrations have governed Pakistan, each bringing their own style of leadership and policy views. Religious disputes and political violence plague the country. This environment is not attractive to foreign and domestic investors; foreign direct investment has plunged in recent years, from a respectable $2 billion in the 1994/1995 fiscal year to an estimated $436 million in the 1997/1998 fiscal year. In addition to declines in foreign financial flows, the recent years have seen an increase in the emigration of educated Pakistanis. The loss of the movers and shakers of the economy – both human and financial – is a serious blow to Pakistan’s long-term fortunes.

Fiscal Problems In addition to instability and a poor economy, the government’s terrible fiscal situation amplifies Pakistan’s weakness. Government revenue has hovered around $5.4 billion; this does not even come close to covering the government’s expenses. Of the drips of revenue that do come in, it is roughly split between defense spending and debt repayments and servicing. Administrative and development spending is wholly financed by borrowing from domestic and international institutions. The result of this arrangement is a high fiscal deficit; estimates for the 1997/98 fiscal year put the budget deficit at about 5.4% of GDP. One of the reasons why the government collects such a pitiful amount of revenue is due to tax evasion, a serious problem in Pakistan. fewer than 1.4 million Pakistanis – around one percent – pay their taxes. Pakistani citizens also have accumulated a large amount of defaulted loans to Pakistani banks – from 10 billion Pakistani rupees in 1985 to 121 billion rupees in August 1996; most of these non-performing loans are held by influential business oligarchs. The January 1998 creation of the Pakistan Revenue Service was intended to improve tax collection, but the agency is still in its infancy.

& International Sanctions Should Pakistan or India test a nuclear weapon, international sanctions are assured. India’s nuclear weapons program was not particularly active after the 1974 test. While the nuclear test was a popular decision among the public and the (the lower house of India's parliament), the international reaction was negative – although haphazardly so. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did not put much pressure on India – although American aid to Pakistan restarted. On a more harmful side. India lost almost all foreign support for its nuclear program; Canada, which had been providing assistance for two nuclear power projects, ended cooperation, halting those projects entirely. The loss of foreign aid crippled the civilian nuclear power program, which had been reliant on foreign technology and assistance. The program failed to meet its objectives into the 1980s; the easiest avenue to improving it, importing nuclear reactors from suppliers like the Soviet Union, required that India operate those reactors under IAEA safeguards. India’s nuclear weapons establishment was wholly opposed to this measure. The threat of additional sanctions has been partially credited for preventing additional Indian nuclear tests since 1974. The nuclear nonproliferation regime – which was effectively born out of India’s 1974 – was effective. Yet Pakistan was also ensnared by the regime; the new restrictions on nuclear technology transfers impacted its program. If India were to test another weapon, there is a high chance that the international community will place some sanctions or restrictions on nuclear technology that applies to India and Pakistan. If Pakistan decides to test a weapon, it should expect much the same, but the impact of sanctions on Pakistan will be considerably worse. India has some advantages over its archrival that make less susceptible to the effects of sanctions. The leader of the international community is the United States; India has never relied on the U.S. for its defense or development, unlike Pakistan, which has been a close American ally for some time. Only after the Soviet Union collapse did India begin to develop serious security and commercial relations with the United States. India, unlike Pakistan, is also not reliant upon international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which Western states like Japan and the U.S. dominate, for its development.

The Fallout of a Test A test by India or Pakistan of a nuclear weapon would bring widespread international condemnation. In addition to facing sanctions, the tester would find itself isolated on the international stage and viewed as a pariah state. There are, however, benefits to testing. For India, the BJP would fill an electoral promise after securing 26% of the popular vote in the February-March elections. The BJP prides itself on and ensuring that India is viewed as a nuclear power to gain respect on the international stage. It would also be a response to Pakistan’s April 6 test of the Ghauri missile; that test shocked India, which had thought its missile technology was significantly more advanced than Pakistan’s. & There are also benefits for Pakistan to test a nuclear bomb. A test would serve as a powerful demonstration of Pakistani technical prowess and reinstate a sort of perceived balance of power between India and Pakistan. Many factions in Pakistan would be interested in a nuclear test: the conservatives in the Sharif administration, the military, the religious right, and even some liberals. While it may prove to be a popular choice domestically, the diplomatic costs are high. Pakistan has nuclear capability; a test is not necessary to develop the program. But a test would make Pakistan seem like a “bad guy” in the eyes of the world, a provocateur like its neighbor. It would anger the United States, an important economic and military partner of Pakistan. Pakistan would lose leverage; if India were to test a bomb first, Pakistan could use the threat of testing to gain benefits from the international community for itself. Moreover, not testing in the face of Indian aggression would be a boon to Pakistan’s public image, with Pakistan as a responsible, gentle country in face of a provocative, unhinged neighbor. And, of course, there is a real chance Pakistan is biting off more than it can chew – India’s nuclear and conventional capabilities are better than Pakistan’s. Testing could bring the two countries to the brink of war; a war Pakistan would likely not win.

The State of the Pakistani Nuclear Program Amidst Pakistani’s poor demographic and economic situation, nuclear weapons would almost seem like the cost-efficient solution to guarantee its security. And yet, Pakistan has not tested a nuclear weapon. Still, it is quite capable of conducting a nuclear test on short-term notice. After it discovered that India had planned – but cancelled – a nuclear test in 1995, the government made the arrangements to test a bomb in the Chagai district in Balochistan. These arrangements still exist, so if the government decided to test a bomb, it could be done quickly – but not secretly; nuclear tests are extraordinarily difficult – if not impossible – to hide. Pakistan will finally join the nuclear club, but at a cost: the whole world will know what it did, and the government will have to come to terms with that.

Pakistani Missile Development Unfortunately, simply testing a nuclear device is not a clear indication of a state’s nuclear capability; the ability to deliver such a weapon is the next most necessary component. Pakistani scientists have labored for decades to solve such a problem. In the 1960s, the Space Sciences Research Wing of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) collaborated with the United States’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration, providing training to scientists and engineers, which turned into a Pakistani rocket program. This rocket program gave birth to its missile program. The missile program intensified in the 1980s with the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles, constructed by the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) with substantial Chinese technical aid. Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 had limited capabilities and were not mass produced; they were used more as training tools – a way for Pakistan to gain experience with missiles – than as weapons. & The imposition of the 1990 Pressler Amendment sanctions did not deter the Pakistani missile program. It redoubled its efforts by pitting two competing programs against each other: a solid-fuel program led by PAEC and aided by China and a liquid-fueled program led by Khan Research Lab (KRL), aided by North Korea and directed by A.Q. Khan. China sold M-11 missiles and launchers to Pakistan in 1988. In response, the Bush Administration placed sanctions on SUPARCO and two Chinese companies for the M-11 technology transfers in 1991; the Clinton Administration imposed additional sanctions in 1993. The sanctions were effective in weakening – although not eliminating – Chinese assistance. To make up for the drawdown in Chinese aid, Pakistan turned to North Korea for missile development. In 1993, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited North Korea and acquired the transfer of Nodong missile technology for A.Q. Khan and his solid fuels missile development program. In 1996, Taiwan and Hong Kong intercepted a North Korean shipment of several tons of ammonium perchlorate destined for SUPARCO. Despite sanctions and interdictions, the programs continued to great success. In July 1997, SUPARCO successfully tested the Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi) missile.

Pakistani Delivery Systems More consequentially – and relevant to the imminent proceedings – was the Hatf-5 (Ghauri) test. Developed by KRL, the Ghauri missile is a derivative of North Korea’s Nodong. It is claimed to have a range of 1,500 kilometers (9367 miles) and a payload capacity of 700 kg. On April 6, 1998, during the rise of tensions with India, Pakistan tested the Ghauri missile. The test was successful, although the missile only traveled 700 kilometers, far less than the stated range. Still, 700 kilometers is more than enough to put much of western India – including New – in range. The test was an unsubtle message to India; a warning that Pakistan was not defenseless and could respond to provocations. Nonetheless, the missiles are still in the design and testing phase; it will take considerable time and resources for them to become operational on the battlefront. For now, Pakistan’s delivery options remain airborne. American-made F-16s are the most likely nuclear delivery option. Pakistan also has the A-5 Fantan and Mirage III/5 as delivery options, although their range, speed, and quantities are lacking compared to the F-16. The jets would air-drop the bombs, as the missile technology is not sound enough at this moment. For the time being, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent lies entirely on the survivability of its aircraft.

& Conclusion

India is in an advantageous position over Pakistan. India is larger, more economically developed, and has the larger military. Despite all this, India has the weaker nuclear program, and has been historically hesitant to threaten its use. Furthermore, India must contend with a strengthening China. It also stands to reason that a first strike by Pakistan could quickly knock out India’s entire nuclear arsenal, leaving us without a meaningful deterrent. This is a huge concern and India should look into ways to remedy the situation with missile and submarine development. India is also at a crossroad where they will have an opportunity to open up more to the west, however, continued nuclear development will certainly slow this progress. It is of the utmost importance that India presses its advantages, while working to minimize its weaknesses.

& Questions to Consider

1.Should India continue to strengthen its nuclear capabilities, even if it risks sanctions and

retaliation by the international community?

2.How can India improve its nuclear capabilities to survive a first strike by Pakistan?

3.What kinds of diplomatic solutions would be acceptable given the views of the current

government? 4.How should India address their northern border with China?

& Dossier

George Fernandes - Minister of Defense Fernandes is a longtime , and has held several cabinet level positions. Although Minister of Defense, his background is with organized labor. His position on nuclear weapons has evolved, He is now a strong proponent and he is actively pushing India towards conducting more tests. He is one of the furthest left members of the cabinet, coming from the . As Minister of Defense he has sway over a lot of the logistics, and day to day management of our nuclear systems.

Lal Krishna Advani - Minister of Home Affairs Advani is a longtime member of parliament, and has held several other cabinet level positions. He grew up in a wealthy business family, but was forced to move during the partition, which left a huge impact on his political beliefs. He is a founding member of the BJP. As the Minister of Home Affairs he is one of the highest ranking cabinet officials and has the ear of the Prime Minister.

Jaswant Singh - Minister of External Affairs Singh’s career began in the Indian Army. Upon entering into the government, he was almost immediately given a cabinet position as the Minister of External Affairs. In this position he oversees the country's relations with the rest of the world, however, he is noted for his skilled approach in handling the west. Although he is responsible for overseeing foreign relations, he is a strong supporter of the nuclear program.

Air Chief Marshal - Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Sareen's early childhood was heavily influenced by the partition when his family had to move from Pakistan to India. As the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff he is the highest ranking commissioned military personnel, and has broad oversight through the entire military. He also has strong connections to the Iraqi regime where he spent much of his time stationed as a flight instructor.

General - Chief of the Army Staff Prakash was born in Pakistan and had to move at a young age due to the partition. He joined the Indian Army and held several commands. These commands include the mountain command and the Punjab command where he mostly oversaw anti-militancy operations. As the general in charge of the Indian Army he would oversee much of the conflict if India and Pakistan were to go to war.

& Admiral Sushil Kumar - Chief of the Naval Staff Although Kumar leads arguably the weakest branch of the Indian armed forces, there is a lot of room for improvement. The idea of nuclear capable submarines has been thrown around since the 1960’s, but may take on more importance now. He is a strong supporter of India’s nuclear program, and tends to support more aggressive recommendations of its use.

Air Chief Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis - Chief of the Air Staff Tipnis oversees India’s only current nuclear option, its strategic bombers. As Air Chief Marshal, it is essential that he keep India’s nuclear weapons ready at all times to ward off a Pakistani attack. He also has a high degree of control over access to India’s nuclear weapons as Air Chief Marshal.

Arvind Dave - Director Research and Analysis Wing The Research and Analysis Wing is India’s external intelligence agency. As such Dave has broad power over India’s foreign operations but also must keep the prime minister informed of outside nations. He is also the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which advises and briefs the prime minister. Should India decide to conduct more nuclear tests, Dave will be crucial to ensure they are successful and undetected. Dave was trained by the KGB in the Soviet Union and, despite its collapse, he may still have some contacts in the Russian government.

Arun Bhagat - Director of the Intelligence Bureau The Intelligence Bureau is India’s chief internal intelligence agency. Bhagat is the highest ranking law enforcement officer in the nation and can exercise broad power to conduct counter terrorism and counter espionage operations. These operations will be essential to combat Pakistani incursion or foreign spies attempting to infiltrate the government. The Intelligence Bureau also largely oversees intelligence in disputed border regions (e.g. Kashmir and Tibet). Bhagat was trained by the KGB in the Soviet Union and, despite its collapse, he may still have some contacts in the Russian government.

Dr. - Director BARC Kakodkar earned a degree in mechanical engineering, and later earned a Masters in England. He started in the reactor engineering division of BARC. He is a strong proponent of India becoming self-reliant on power and the further development of nuclear power technology. The BARC is India’s largest nuclear research facility and is the known source of the material for the Pokhran test.

& Dr. Placid Rodriguez - Director IGCAR Dr. Rodriguez was educated in both India and the United States, and is an expert in metallurgy and nuclear materials. As head of the IGCAR, he is responsible for India’s second largest nuclear research facility. Although mostly a civilian research facility, IGCAR has the staff and facilities to develop weapons grade materials and design improved warheads.

Admiral Aarav Gandhi - Commander Submarine Force Gandhi grew up in the Punjab region of India and was commissioned into the elite submarine corps. Although India currently possesses no nuclear capable submarines, it has long been discussed as a further deterrent. In addition, the IGCAR has started work on a prototype nuclear reactor designed for a submarine. It will be up to Gandhi to push the submarine force forward and ensure it receives the resources it needs to be successful and develop from a small attack force to a strong nuclear deterrent.

Krishnaswamy Kasturirangan - Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation Kasturirangan is a world class astronomer and oversees all of India’s space activities, especially satellites. The ISRO has worked with the Soviet Union to launch several satellites including some of the world’s most advanced surveillance satellites. Kasturirangan works closely with the air force to coordinate how satellites are used in addition to other military projects. The ISRO has also worked on missile design in the past and has the experts to overcome some of India’s past difficulties in that area.

Kamalesh Sharma - Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Sharma has been a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service and is the current representative of India at the United Nations. He is a strong advocate of peace and while he does not support increasing India’s nuclear capability, he understands both sides and is willing to defend his country at the UN. He will be essential to controlling the backlash from any further nuclear action and should be consulted on how to proceed without causing international outrage. He also maintains close ties to the UK where he went to college. Satinder K Lambah - Ambassador to Russia Lambah was born in Pakistan, however moved to India early in his life. Prior to his appointment as ambassador to Russia, he led India’s mission to Pakistan, where he surely retains several connections. In his capacity to Russia, he is key to gaining their support on any of our operations. He could also be key to establishing operation in Pakistan, although he is a strong proponent of peace. & - Ambassador to the United States Chandra is a longtime civil servant having served in several cabinet level positions. He was appointed as ambassador to the United States following his retirement from the Civil Service, however, he has long worked to connect the nations more closely, even leading the first official delegation from India to the US. Chandra will be essential as talks continue between the two countries and India seeks to align more closely with the west.

Yashwant Sinha - Minister of Finance Sinha is a career civil service officer. He spent much of his early career in Germany and specialized in India’s relations with the European Economic Community. As the Minister of Finance he oversees the Indian economy and has responsibilities to regulate taxes and interest rates. He is also an Indian nationalist, breaking the tradition of presenting the budget at a time convenient for the British Parliament and instead presenting it during working hours in India

Sikander Bakht - Minister of Industry Bakht is a career politician, and has been involved in several different parties including the BJP. As Minister of Industry his main focus is on encouraging Indian development. Although he opposes further nuclear testing because it is bad for business, his industry connections could be useful.

Satyanarayan Jatiya - Minister of Labor Jatiya is a longtime politician of the BJP. As Minister of Labor he is broadly responsible for bridging the gap between workers and employers. He has an important role protecting the poor and underprivileged from abuse and predatory employment practices. He opposes further nuclear testing because it would hurt the economy and put more Indians in a venerable position.

Ramakrishna Hegde - Minister of Commerce Hegde is a lawyer by profession and a politician. He has been involved in many political movements including the Quit India Movement. He is responsible for promoting India’s trade and as such currently opposes further nuclear testing, however, if he could be convinced, his support could help guide and cover the import of materials and equipment needed.

& Rangarajan Kumaramangalam - Minister of Power Kumaramangalam comes from a very well connected family and got into politics right after university. As Minister of Power he oversees electricity generation, and works as a liaison between state governments, the federal government, and private companies. India has a serious power generation problem, often struggling to provide enough to its people. This is one of his primary concerns. One avenue for bridging the gap between supply and demand could be nuclear power, especially as he already has a research team working in collaboration with BARC and IGCAR.

Sushma Swaraj - Minister of Information and Broadcasting Swaraj is a lawyer and politician. She began her career as an advocate to the Supreme Court and worked closely with and his legal defense team. After her election to Parliament she was appointed to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting where she oversees the dissemination of information. She is primarily responsible for controlling public TV and radio, while also regulating private media sources. Her work will be crucial to win the hearts and minds of the people.

Madan Lal Khurana - Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Khurana has long been involved in politics and is a member of the BJP, although he is not afraid to publicly disagree with his own party. As Minister for Parliamentary Affairs he works as a liaison between the two houses of parliament and has great power over the legislative agenda. This role gives him a huge amount of access to the Prime Minister and other members of parliament.

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& andmun.org &2021