Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality Nuclear Weapons and International Security Since 1945
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Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945 Series Editor: Professor John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, UK During the second half of the last century, the practical aspects of national nuclear weapon policies remained shrouded in state secrecy laws. This was an area where political and technical issues were intertwined, and understanding required knowledge and expertise of both. Archival material was sparse and most writings on the subject were based on information provided to well-placed journalists and confidential interviews with some of those involved. The result was that for the academic analyst, separating truth from fiction was a very difficult task, especially in the case of the United Kingdom. With the end of the Cold War, archival material became available from all of the five declared nuclear-weapon states on their activities and scholars were able to discuss the previous century’s nuclear reality. A small community of scholars and former practitioners in the UK therefore started to rethink this history by producing a new series of volumes on the evolution of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapon policies from 1952 onwards, the date of the explosion of its first nuclear device. Thanks to a grant from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Board to the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton, Professor John Simpson and his colleagues were able to start a systematic study of the post-1952 period, and to engage with those directly involved in its many aspects. What soon became clear was that in the period 1958–64 the course was set for UK nuclear policy in the next half-century. It is thus appropriate that Richard Moore’s volume Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64 should be the first of the planned chronological volumes arising from this systematic process. This is reinforced by the current salience of debates over the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent force, and the role of the volume as the lead publication in Palgrave’s wider series of studies on nuclear history. Titles include: Richard Moore NUCLEAR ILLUSION, NUCLEAR REALITY Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64 Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945 Series Standing Order ISBN: 978–0230–21775–1 hardback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64 Richard Moore Visiting Research Fellow, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton © Richard Moore 2010 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2010 978-0-230-23067-5 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-31163-7 ISBN 978-0-230-25140-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230251403 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10987654321 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Contents List of Illustrations viii Acknowledgements ix List of Abbreviations xi Introduction 1 Historiography 5 Macmillan and his ministers 8 Decision-making structures 12 Part I Nuclear Illusion 23 Chapter 1 Policy-making 1958–61 25 Government policy 26 Macmillan, Eisenhower and bilateral defence collaboration 32 Arms control 36 Bombers and ballistic missiles 40 Politics and force levels 46 Political opposition to nuclear weapons 50 NATO strategy 53 Nuclear sufficiency 57 Global war studies 59 NATO and ballistic missiles 62 Holy Loch, Skybolt and Polaris 64 The multi-lateral force and the Kennedy administration 69 Circumstances short of global war 71 Worries about Skybolt 73 Chapter 2 Policy Execution 1958–61 78 Military requirements 79 Fissile material 83 Aldermaston and warheads 85 Using American warhead information 87 Australia 91 Nuclear forces 95 Controlling nuclear operations 101 Megaton bombs 104 v vi Contents Blue Steel 105 Blue Streak 108 Kiloton bombs 112 Skybolt 116 Skybolt warhead 118 Red Beard replacement 122 Defensive weapons 125 Battlefield nuclear weapons 129 The future 133 Part II Nuclear Reality 143 Chapter 3 Policy-making 1961–64 145 Change at the top 147 Nuclear testing 150 NATO and the central front 155 France, West Germany and Europe 157 Defence policy east of Suez 160 Deterrent systems 164 Skybolt 166 Explaining the Skybolt crisis 170 Cuba 173 The Nassau meeting 175 The multi-lateral force 182 Buying Polaris 186 Party politics 189 Chapter 4 Policy Execution 1961–64 194 Military requirements and fissile material 195 Warheads 199 V-bombers 203 Megaton weapons 210 Other nuclear forces 214 WE177 217 Other tactical nuclear weapons 220 Alternative weapons 224 Choice of Polaris missile 227 Polaris system and facilities 231 Polaris warheads and Aldermaston 236 Conclusions 240 Britain and the United States 243 Other nuclear motivations 247 Contents vii Technology, strategy and politics 250 Wartime experience and nuclear culture 253 Appendices 256 Appendix 1 Estimated deliverable nuclear weapons stockpile 256 Appendix 2 Estimated fissile materials stockpile 257 Notes 258 Bibliography 301 Index 315 List of Illustrations Red Beard bomb undergoing vibration trials. Blue Water missile awaiting test firing. Blue Streak missile with re-entry vehicle. Blue Steel missile and Vulcan bomber. Harold Watkinson. Peter Thorneycroft. Sir Dermot Boyle. Sir Thomas Pike. Lord Mountbatten at Seacat missile launch. Early sketch of a Skybolt missile. Missile compartment of a Polaris submarine. Mountbatten and Sir Solly Zuckerman. Weapons development timeline. Map 1 Nuclear weapons production. Map 2 British nuclear forces, end 1962. viii Acknowledgements I should like to thank staff at Cambridge University Library, the Mount- batten Archive at the Hartley Library in Southampton, the RAF Museum at Hendon, the Archives Department at the UEA Library in Norwich, the Library of Congress in Washington and in particular the Public Record Office in Kew. Whoever has masterminded the changes made at the PRO in recent years – new opening hours, the online catalogue and the enlightened policy on digital photography – deserves special thanks for making it possible for me to work much more happily and effectively. The late John Slater collected a wealth of documentary material on British nuclear history, focusing in particular on the period 1958–64, and I have had the benefit of access to his extensive papers, now at the Mountbatten Centre in Southampton. This book would have been much harder to write without Slater’s painstaking and scholarly work. Ian Clark and Eric Grove taught me to love nuclear history. Lorna Arnold is an inspiration to everybody in the field, and I feel privileged to have heard her speak, for example on the Windscale accident of 1957. Kate Pyne and the incomparable Roy Dommett have given freely and patiently of their time and expertise, and my mistakes are many times fewer as a result. Nick Hill and Dave and Lesley Wright have brought the British rocketry community together every year at Charterhouse, and their vision and hard work has allowed a most enjoyable and stimulating exchange of views there and in the pages of Prospero. Some of the material here on Skybolt and Polaris has previously been presented at Charterhouse, and I have learned a great deal from the resultant discussion. I am grateful to everyone at the Mountbatten Centre, and especially John Simpson and Angela Murphy, for their extensive support. As an (occasional) visiting research fellow, I have been made to feel very welcome indeed by John and his team; John has also offered much useful comment and encour- agement for this book in particular. Iain Goode, Steve Roper and Ray Nolan in MoD helped with the declassification of documents, especially on WE177. In the course of my research, I have spoken with or emailed Brian Burnell, Tony Buttler, Steve Clifton, John Coker, Mike Fazackerley, Dave Forster, Jock Gardner, Chris Gibson, Brian Jamison, David Mackenzie, Chris Maddock, Richard Maguire, Frank Panton, Michael Price, Mark Smith, Kristan Stoddart, Jerry Stocker, Richard Vernon, John Walker and Robin Woolven, and I am very grateful for their kindness, insights and ix x Acknowledgements information.