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Great Quarterly Studies, Center for

1992

The Role of 's In Constitutional and Parliamentary Reform

Howard Cody University of Maine

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Cody, Howard, "The Role of Canada's Prairie Provinces In Constitutional and Parliamentary Reform" (1992). Great Plains Quarterly. 672. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/672

This Article is brought to you for and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. THE ROLE OF CANADA'S PRAIRIE PROVINCES IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY REFORM

HOWARD CODY

Canada's federation always has been tentative. I make a necessarily tentative effort to consider This motley collection of French and English the interests and involvement of one of Can­ speakers, multiculturals and Native peoples, ex­ ada's , the Prairie Provinces of , tended across a narrow ribbon of land just above , and , at the present the border with the , seems eter­ stage of the ongoing constitutional reform pro­ nally fated to endure tension and uncertainty cess. concerning its national identity and political The search for a new constitutional formula institutions. This uncertainty may now have has assumed a sense of urgency, with a specified reached its highest point in Canada's history. deadline. The Meech accord would have The 1990 failure of the Meech Lake constitu­ entrenched in the constitution the designation tional accord, which was intended to bring of French-speaking as a "distinct soci­ Quebec voluntarily into Canada's 1982 consti­ ety." Many English , exemplified by tution, has inspired an unprecedented quest for Premier Clyde Wells, believed new constitutional provisions acceptable to Ca­ that this provision would have assigned to Que­ nadians throughout the country. 1 In this paper bec potentially extensive powers denied to the other provinces. Accordingly the Meech Lake accord was widely unpopular in and remains so. As the June 1990 deadline for unanimous provincial legislative ratification ap­ proached, the Newfoundland and Manitoba legislatures refused their assent. In reaction Quebec's government has proposed to stage a An associate professor of political science at the referendum on political sovereignty by late Oc­ University of Maine, Howard Cody has published tober 1992 unless English Canada offers by that articles on Canadian federalism and policymaking time an acceptable formula for a redesigned fed­ in journals in Canada, the United States, Great eration. Quebec expects considerably strength­ Britain, and . ened powers in any new federation; its [GPQ 12 (Summer 1992): 147-1551 government already has identified twenty-two

147 148 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1992 desired new exclusive jurisdictions as its nego­ growth or actual economic shrinkage even be­ tiating position. Prime Minister Brian Mulro­ fore the recession" in the two provinces. It warns ney's government presented its own twenty-eight that "without major economic retooling, Man­ point bargaining position in September 1991. itoba and Saskatchewan ... may soon become Among other provisions it would enhance fed­ little more than hapless adjuncts to the (also eral control over Canada's economic union but distressed) U.S. regions of the plains."4 allow provinces to negotiate with Ottawa greater In this paper I have utilized interviews with autonomy over culture and other fields. Inev­ members of Canada's House of Commons (MPs) itably a redesigned federation would greatly af­ to address these issues. I interviewed eighteen fect all of Canada, not simply Quebec or the Prairie MPs in their Ottawa offices in May 1991 Quebec-Ottawa relationship. All segments of to ascertain their perspectives on their own pro­ Canadian society and all regions of the country vincial and regional interests in the looming must recognize and advance their interests in constitutional talks. I also asked respondents for the constitutional reform process. 2 their suggestions and preferences for constitu­ At this juncture the stakes for the tional change and parliamentary reform. Eight are especially high. The occupies the vast of the respondents come from Alberta, six are and often unforgiving territory between pros­ Manitobans, and four represent Saskatchewan perous Pacific Rim-oriented constituencies. By party the respondents in­ and industrialized "fat-cat" . Most prai­ clude eight Progressive Conservatives (Prime rie Canadians desire a well-financed and inter­ Minister Brian Mulroney's party), five New nationally credible federal government in Democrats (social democratic party), three Lib­ Ottawa. Only a respected Canada can market erals, one Reform (right-wing party) prairie grain, potash, and oil and supply "de­ and one Independent. ficiency" payments and other supports that may be necessitated by poor world grain markets or THE PRAIRIES IN CANADA TODAY low prices. At the same time, the thinly pop­ ulated Prairies remain alienated from the distant Canada is a highly regionalized country. and majoritarian-oriented federal government Canada's existing Senate, party caucuses in the and feel themselves powerless to affect national House of Commons, some proposed formulas policymaking allegedly dominated for more than for constitutional amendments and Senate re­ a century by the huge central provinces of On­ form, and statistical information, are all orga­ tario and Quebec. 3 Thus, prairie Canadians wish nized on the basis of four or five regions. Atlantic to keep a united Canada with a strong federal Canada, Quebec, Ontario, and the West (or, government while they simultaneously enhance sometimes, the Prairie Provinces and British prairie influence in national politics. This is a Columbia separately) all enjoy regional status. formidable dual assignment. This preoccupation with regional categories Complicating the Prairies' approach to the works against the Prairies. Western Canada is constitutional crisis is western Canada's grow­ not nearly as homogenous as the four uniformly ing economic bifurcation. Alberta and British poor Atlantic provinces, much less the region­ Columbia become steadily wealthier while provinces of Quebec and Ontario. Moreover, Manitoba and Saskatchewan stagnate. Statis­ there remains the disputed British Columbia tics Canada reports that between 1970 and 1989 perception that the Pacific should be Alberta's share of Canada's gross domestic prod­ classified as a fifth region of its own. British uct rose faster than any other province's, while Columbia's semi-apartness enhances the West's Manitoba's and Saskatchewan's shares declined diversity and further impairs the coherence of faster than any other province's. A recent study western contributions to national political life. of Manitoba and Saskatchewan urban centers Complicating this matter still further is the blames federal government policies for "no growing belief in Alberta that the province CANADA'S REFORM 149 should forsake its prairie neighbors to forge an inces cannot afford, thereby luring meat pack­ alliance with British Columbia in its dealings ing plants elsewhere in the West to move to with federal authorities. 5 Alberta. The same respondent admitted that Even when we consider British Columbia a the Conservative Party's western regional cau­ separate region, the three Prairie Provinces di­ cus in Parliament finds it "hard to function" verge sharply in their economic and political under these circumstances. interests and especially in their fiscal relation­ Despite, or perhaps because of, the percep­ ships with Ottawa. Alberta is Canada's wealth­ tion that the Prairies are "simply growing apart," iest province in respect to its independent fiscal Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy recently capacity. It enjoys a much greater ability to raise appealed for the Prairie Provinces to coordinate revenues from its own sources (mostly oil and their policies respecting grain pools, telecom­ natural gas) than does any other province. Man­ munications systems, energy planning, the en­ itoba, most of whose residents live in econom­ vironment, and higher education. Such ically stagnant Winnipeg, falls well into the cooperation could enhance efficiency, increase "have-not" category of provinces that receive bargaining power in constitutional and other substantial "equalization" benefits from Ottawa national policymaking, and improve competi­ to help them to provide services near national tiveness in international trade. Presumably the average levels. Grain and potash exporting Sas­ region could benefit from enhanced interna­ katchewan requires protection from the vagaries tional credibility, especially in the struggle of weather and markets as well as equalization against the European Community's agricultural benefits. Until recently the "boom or bust" cen­ subsidies. (On the other hand, a rural Saskatch­ tral Prairies occasionally enjoyed high incomes ewan respondent observed that the greatest ­ from grain sales, but the near collapse of over­ stacle to Canadian grain sales is the fact that markets has forced Saskatchewan to rely has become a exporter of food.) In heavily on federal grain "deficiency" payments, any case the early political and media responses which approximated $2 billion in 1991 alone, to the Axworthy appeal were favorable but pre­ and grain prices reminiscent of the 1920s mean dictably pessimistic about the chances for in­ that prairie farmers "are going to need substan­ creased interprovincial cooperation on the tial help from Canadian taxpayers" for some Prairies. 7 time to come. Inevitably Manitoba and Sas­ katchewan, but not Alberta, have become RESTRUCTURING THE CANADIAN steadily more dependent on federal assistance FEDERATION: DIVISION OF POWERS since the 1970s. 6 Fiscal disparities alone can make Alberta appear to be "another country," With the present constitution apparently as a Winnipeg Liberal MP described the prov­ discredited, Canadians face six broad options ince. A rural Saskatchewan New Democrat went for their federal system. The options are offered further, claiming that oil wealth has helped to here in two groups, three of which maintain "Americanize" Alberta in respect to its values the principle of provincial equality and three of and political culture. which repudiate it. Each group is presented from The sharp intraregional divergences cause the the most to the least centralized. The options Prairie Provinces to advance quite different in­ are rebalanced federalism, asymmetric (or terests or similar interests in unequal ways. When checkerboard) federalism, general decentrali­ prairie provincial governments pursue "beggar­ zation, special status federalism, sovereignty-as­ thy-neighbor" policies, Alberta enjoys distinct sociation federalism (or institutionalized advantages. To cite one instance among many, bipolarity), and full Quebec sovereignty. a rural Manitoba Conservative complained that Three options would perpetuate provincial Alberta subsidizes its meat packing industry equality in principle if not in practice. Rebal­ through tax concessions that other Prairie Prov- anced federalism would reallocate several fed- 150 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1992

era I and provincial jurisdictions that supposedly Quebec sovereignty, supported by the relatively could be exercised more efficiently at the other few extreme Quebec sovereigntists, Canada and level. Federal authority over free movement of Quebec would maintain no greater institutional people, goods, and services could be strength­ integration than Canada and the United States. ened in return for, say, full provincial freedom Many functional links would remain possible, over health and other social services. In the including free trade. second option, asymmetric or checkerboard fed­ Put briefly, prairie MPs suggested that their eralism, all ten provinces would be offered wholly region wishes Canada to remain united, with new powers, such as unemployment insurance, all provinces on an equal constitutional footing, and the complete freedom Quebec demands in and much, although not necessarily all, existing at least some of the fields now shared with Ot­ federal authority retained. They would accept tawa, such as health, energy, environment, in­ either rebalanced federalism or asymmetric fed­ dustry, income tax, social and family services, eralism, particularly if federal supervision of the communications, , manpower, re­ national economy and valued national insti­ gional economic development, and language. tutions, such as the Canadian Broadcasting Because provinces could pick and choose from Corporation, were preserved. The options that the available offerings, some provinces would explicitly recognize Quebec's distinctiveness potentially retain much more extensive respon­ with special powers for Quebec alone encounter sibilities and a very different relationship with vigorous resistance in the West. They are widely Ottawa than others, but officially all provinces interpreted as yet another outrage in which only would remain constitutionally equal. Canada Quebec gets what it wants while the legitimate already possesses various asymmetric arrange­ concerns of other provinces are ignored. On the ments. 8 Under general decentralization, most other hand, most prairie MPs believe that the or all of the above jurisdictions would be fully confederal general decentralization option of­ entrusted to all ten provinces whether they fers a formula for national disintegration. Even wanted them or not. Canada would then ap­ Alberta Conservatives in Parliament-al­ proximate a confederation whose member states though not necessarily their provincial govern­ have equal powers. ment-believe that a radically attenuated federal The other three options would place Que­ government would damage Canadians' national bec, and only Quebec, in a distinct power po­ identity and allegiance. Saskatchewan and sition. Special status federalism, which appears Manitoba respondents fear that a weak federal to be the preference of the Quebec government, government would prove unable or unwilling would extend full control over many jurisdic­ to subsidize their provinces or to market their tions to Quebec alone, leaving Ottawa still par­ products abroad. This last concern is most acute tially or wholly concerned with these activities in Saskatchewan, which already suffers from the in the other provinces. Quebec would remain same farm and small-town depopulation as the as a province, enjoying continued federal assis­ plains states south of the border. According to tance and parliamentary representation. Sov­ Robert Sheppard, ereignty-association or institutionalized bipolarity, the objective of Quebec's opposition nearly 85,000 people, mostly young and ed­ Parti Quebecois, would have Quebec assume ucated, have left the province in the past legal sovereignty and, its proponents hope, en­ five years. According to some accounts, joy the trappings of an independent state such nearly 1,000 farms have vanished each year as membership in the United Nations. A formal since 1982, and with them have gone the economic association with Canada would con­ jobs at the repair shops and machinery out­ tinue to exist, however, to administer a com­ lets, and the vibrancy of many small towns. 9 mon currency and some sort of economic union through joint institutions. Finally, under full CANADA'S REFORM 151

Mindful of these perceptions, the Mulroney provincial paramountcy than the other prov­ government has presented a proposal that com­ inces. Through this device, each province could bines features of rebalanced and asymmetric fed­ secure an informal special status in accordance eralism. The program includes essentially four with its self-defined interests while all ten prov­ provisions in this respect: Parliament would gain inces theoretically remained equal. The Mul­ sweeping new authority to make laws that it roney government acknowledges the influence declares necessary for the efficient functioning of David Milne's recent essay on its consider­ of the economic union, subject to the assent of ation of concurrency with provincial para­ seven provinces with fifty percent of Canada's mountcy.11 "Rebalancing" provisions to population; a new mostly provincially ap­ strengthen federal enforcement of free move­ pointed Council of the Federation would ratify ment from province to province could be in­ certain federal economic policies on the same corporated into a delegation or CPP formula. "7/50" basis; the provinces would receive the Concurrency with provincial paramountcy is "non-national" residual powers now assigned to tempting as a resolution to Canada's constitu­ Parliament plus labor market training; and the tional predicament. For Quebec to accept this current asym!lletry between provinces' powers arrangement, the menu of available new pro­ would increase as Ottawa "delegates" various vincial responsibilities would have to be lengthy federal responsibilities, such as culture and im­ and inclusive. Quebec would probably assume migration, through separate arrangements with all possible jurisdictions, but power-hungry each province, while provinces also "opt out" provinces elsewhere, also exasperated with per­ from federal spending programs (with compen­ ceived federal "interference" in their affairs, sation) and from federal initiatives designed to probably would seek delegation or paramountcy advance the efficient functioning of the eco­ only in so much as they could afford it. Ac­ nomic union. The first two of these provisions cordingly, two broad classes of provinces could are given little chance of surviving the coming result: Quebec and the three wealthiest prov­ negotiations. inces, Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, A different version of asymmetry, unmen­ likely would take over many more jurisdictions tioned in the federal proposals but popular with than the other provinces, including Saskatch­ many senior Canadian political leaders, is ewan and Manitoba. The Atlantic provinces, "CPP," or concurrency (shared federal and pro­ Canada's poorest, would undertake the fewest vincial jurisdiction) with provincial para­ responsibilities. A similar scenario also could mountcy (supremacy). 10 This system could prove unfold under the federal proposals, especially if more far-reaching than the federal proposals. "culture" is defined very broadly. Under this arrangement, each province would Questions inevitably arise from such an ar­ be offered the same extensive "menu" of new rangement: If wealthy provinces assume the tax­ powers that Quebec is now demanding, and raising capability to fund their new responsi­ some new tax jurisdiction to fund them, with bilities, where will Ottawa find the money to final provincial authority wherever each prov­ finance these services in the "have-not" prov­ ince chooses. For example, if, as is likely, com­ inces, which are now funded primarily by the munications were to appear on this list, a richer provinces? Albertans contend that their province could accept existing federal policy or province "lost" at least $50 billion in the 1970s implement its own communications policy and early 1980s when Ottawa forced them to whatever Ottawa or other provinces wished. A sell their oil to the rest of Canada at prices well senior Alberta Conservative respondent called below world levels. Yet what would have hap­ asymmetric arrangements available to all prov­ pened to the national fabric if Alberta had gained inces an essential element of a "face-saving" this additional revenue at the expense of other deal for the West, as Quebec would presumably provinces' residents? John Dafoe uses 1988 fig­ make much more frequent use of delegation or ures to show how fiscal federalism differentially 152 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1992

affects the provinces. In that year Alberta paid ulist Reform Party puts it, "the West wants in," $1688 per capita more in federal taxes than it namely access to power over federal policymak­ received in federal services. By contrast, Sas­ ing. This access can only be assured through katchewan and Manitoba respectively received parliamentary reform, especially reform of the $1845 and $1521 more than they paid. 11 presently appointive and ineffectual Senate, to Might Ottawa not become as crippled fiscally offset Ontario and Quebec's majoritarian dom­ by CPP formula as in general decentralization? inance of the House of Commons. II Recall that If each province exercised different powers, how a senior Alberta Conservative observed that the would their MPs and cabinet ministers operate West may be persuaded to accept delegation or in Ottawa? Would they participate in federal concurrency with provincial paramountcy as part policymaking involving jurisdictions that their of a face-saving arrangement. The other, pos­ own provinces had assumed completely? What sibly indispensable, component of this deal about federal tax policies that would affect each would be Senate reform. Since 1985 Alberta's province differently, some more so than others? provincial government has led the movement Milne addresses the foregoing questions, but not for an all-new "Triple E" Senate. This chamber those that follow. In any event his assurance would be elected, effective, and have equal rep­ that each province will be satisfied with its con­ resentation per province, much like the upper tinued participation in federal policymaking on houses in Australia and the United States. Pub­ the current representational basis, because con­ lic opinion polls routinely report that more than currency with provincial paramountcy leaves the seventy percent of westerners desire a Triple E provinces theoretically equal, is not entirely Senate. 14 convincing. Indeed, might not CPP or the fed­ Senate reform presents a daunting array of eral proposals allow the great majority of MPs difficulties, both in implementation and op­ and cabinet ministers who are from larger prov­ eration. There are problems attending all inces to dominate federal policymaking in mat­ components of Triple E, especially equal rep­ ters disproportionately or exclusively affecting resentation per province. Despite the Austra­ the smaller provinces? How would the smaller lian and United States provisions for small state provinces react to this situation? power through a Triple E Senate, or more likely There is another question: Is there a suc­ because of the observed results of these prac­ cessful asymmetric federation in operation to­ tices, the governments of Ontario and espe­ day? The answer is . Malaysia gives Sarawak cially Quebec lack enthusiasm for an and Sabah, on Borneo, some powers not ex­ arrangement in which their provinces, with 60 ercised by the states in peninsular Malaysia. The percent of Canada's population, would supply Bornean states enjoy full representation in the only 20 percent of the senators. Largely for this Kuala Lumpur parliament, but they have rela­ reason, the new federal proposals call only for tively few people and small parliamentary rep­ a "more equitable" distribution of Senate seats, resentation. There is no existing or historical without providing any definition of "equitable. " example of the concurrency with provincial par­ A new Senate's potential effectiveness is also amountcy variation of asymmetric federalism. controversial. Even Alberta proposes a mere suspensive (temporary) veto over most legisla­ tion and no veto at all over money bills. Under RESTRUCTURING THE CANADIAN the federal proposal, the Senate would have no FEDERATION : PARLIAMENT legislative role in raising or spending money but While a reallocation of jurisdictional powers a six-month suspensive veto over matters of na­ constitutes Quebec's overriding objective in tional importance such as national defense and Canada's constitutional crisis, residents of the international issues and a full veto on other Prairie Provinces consider parliamentary reform legislation. Some Senate reformers maintain that a more urgent priority. As the right-wing pop- there is little point in pursuing Senate reform CANADA'S REFORM 153

unless the new chamber's powers and credibility a population-sensitive apportionment by prov­ approach those of the House of Commons. 1\ ince. This might mollify Ontario and Quebec, Moreover, there are disagreements over pro­ but under regional near-equality the divergent cedures for electing senators. Alberta wants all interests of the Prairie Provinces would neu­ senators elected provincewide under the famil­ tralize much of the region's influence. British iar plurality (first-past-the-post) system. Some Columbia's claim to represent a region of its other reformers prefer senatorial districts inside own also would have to be addressed in a re­ provinces or proportional representation. The gionally oriented Senate, as would the divisive federal proposals specify only that senators be issues relating to powers and electoral arrange­ elected at the same time as MPs. Before Senate ments. Yet the specter of a Reform break­ reform can be implemented, these and other through in the next election, due by the end details will require reconciliation of widely vary­ of 1993, displacing dozens of sitting MPs of all ing conceptions of the role and character of a other parties, especially Conservatives, appar­ new upper house. ently has concentrated the minds and overcome Prairie MPs betray markedly less enthusiasm the misgivings of the Mulroney government and for Senate reform than their constituents. Many many MPs of all parties on the Senate reform MPs, both New Democrats and Conservatives, issue. 16 Surely Reform's right-wing program, would like the upper house abolished alto­ which combines drastic reductions in federal gether. Understandably they perceive a strong taxes and social programs with an American­ Senate as an unwelcome limitation on their style electoral system, contributes to the con­ own chamber's powers. They also suspect that sensus that the Reform threat must be count­ Ontario and Quebec will never accept Triple ered. E. Moreover, one Alberta Conservative openly Public support for Senate reform closely ac­ predicted that the seven "have-not" provinces companies public exasperation with the nega­ would dominate a Triple E Senate. He believed tive and polarized environment, the narrow that they would exploit any such chamber to partisanship, and the publicly unaccountable induce Ottawa to transfer additional revenues voting behavior characteristic of the House of from wealthy provinces like his own to poorer Commons. A highly placed Alberta Conser­ provinces such as Saskatchewan and Manitoba. vative confessed that Canadians-perhaps Thus, a Triple E Senate would undermine Al­ Westerners above all-are "fed up" and want berta's interests but not those of the other Prai­ MPs to "clean up the place." The Reform plat­ rie Provinces. Additionally some MPs of all form calls for MPs to operate without party dis­ parties believe that a Triple E upper house blurs cipline on all votes in committees and on the the cabinet's clear responsibility to the lower House floor, in line with constituency opin­ house, which is a long-cherished hallmark of ion. 17 This runs utterly contrary to the familiar the British-derived Westminster parliamentary party-dominant parliamentary norms in Canada system. Many Canadians believe that crises and other Westminster parliaments. The Con­ generated by Australia's Senate, especially the servative government and the major opposition 1975 affair that culminated in the dismissal of parties are gradually, and grudgingly, preparing the government, suggests the inadvisability of to offer backbenchers a much wider range of a strong upper house in a Westminster parlia­ "free votes" in order to weaken Reform's appeal ment. and to avert those still greater American-style Despite these reservations, many MPs con­ evils that Reform also proposes, namely fre­ cede that public pressure and growing support quent referenda and the recall of elected offi­ for the Reform Party may force creation of a cials. Accordingly the federal proposals vaguely "Double E" (elected and effective) Senate that endorse more free votes for individual MPs. would replace equal representation per province The Commons reform process, which re­ with roughly equal representation per region or quires no constitutional amendments, has been 154 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1992 under way for some time. Since the late 1960s, E model retains its allure throughout the region. but especially since 1986, MPs have acquired Thanks to Quebec's sovereigntist potential and increasingly independent standing committees Reform's electoral threat, the likeliest outcomes and better personal and committee staff sup­ include increasingly asymmetric federalism port. 18 While Commons reform is universally through delegation or concurrency with pro­ acclaimed as an enhancement of MPs' general vincial paramountcy, a strengthening of the usefulness if not their policymaking power, there wealthiest provinces at Ottawa's expense, Sen­ remains strong opposition in all parties-except ate reform on a Double E model (but with no Reform-to such an extension of freedom that absolute veto over all legislation), and limited Canadian MPs come to resemble members of enhancement of backbench MPs' independence the United States Congress. The features of from party leaders' control. Prairie public opin­ Congress that the MPs I interviewed liked least ion and all of the MPs interviewed for this paper are what they perceive as party weakness and probably could accept this package, but on the interest group domination. Parliamentary re­ whole only Alberta in the region would benefit formers of both Canadian chambers will en­ from it. deavor to prevent these evils from extending to Indeed, the long-term outlook for Saskatch­ Canada. Consistent with the Saskatchewan ewan and Manitoba (and the Atlantic prov­ MP's description of Alberta as the most Amer­ inces) is not encouraging. All of the "have-not" icanized province, Conservative Alberta MPs provinces may soon be left largely to their own admitted some admiration for the congressional devices as early victims of a more decentralized practices of nonpartisan logrolling and the rel­ federalism. Ottawa policymakers may ask: "Why atively open committee investigations and bar­ should-and how can-we keep paying Prairie gaining over legislation. Most respondents of farmers billions to produce (or not produce) all three major parties, however, still treasure grain that we cannot sell?" Delegation or con­ party caucus solidarity. They insisted that par­ currency with provincial paramountcy would ties must be seen clearly to "stand for some­ raise these and other questions relating to new thing" and that MPs should unconditionally federal jurisdictional and fiscal limitations and declare themselves "in" or "out" on every issue. the perceived inefficiency and futility of equal­ Those who even occasionally take the "out" ization and other support programs. Surely a position, opposing party policy, earned such ep­ Triple E or even a Double E Senate could en­ ithets as "unreliables" and "flakes." MPs cannot hance prairie participation in federal policy­ be expected to assert much independence from making, but it would prove cruelly ironic if less party policy when confronted with a choice be­ advantaged provinces finally secure influence tween collegial acceptance and social ostracism, over federal policymaking through Senate re­ even if more "free votes" are theoretically per­ form just as Ottawa surrenders the political will, mitted in the future. the fiscal capacity, and the international cred­ ibility that these provinces need.

CONCLUSION NOTES What lies ahead for the Prairies? We cannot 1. For accounts by an English Canadian and a expect a coordinated regional strategy in con­ French Canadian of the Meech Lake process and its stitutional negotiations. Saskatchewan and ultimate failure, see Andrew Cohen, A Deal Undone: Manitoba will seek to protect federal fiscal The Making and Unmaking of the Meech Lake Accord power, while Alberta, possibly joining British (: Douglas and Mclntyre Ltd., 1990); and Columbia, will favor substantial tax and juris­ Pierre Fournier, A Meech Lake Post-Mortem: Is Que­ bec Sovereignty Inevitable? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's dictional decentralization. Alberta seeks Senate University Press, 1991). reform plus autonomy over energy (including 2. Joan Bryden, "English Canada Says 'No Way' royalties) and taxes. Senate reform on a Triple to Distinct Society for Quebec," Montreal Gazette, 5 CANADA'S REFORM 155

June 1991, A12; Patricia Poirier, "Sovereigntists 10. It will be difficult for Canadians to accept the Winning Battle, Top Pollsters in Quebec Say," Globe initials "CPP" in this context because for a quarter and Mail (Toronto), 9 March 1991, AS; Rheal Se­ century they have stood for "Canada Pension Plan." guin, "Canada First Choice of Liberals, Bourassa A detailed description of concurrency with provincial Says," Globe and Mail,S February 1991, AI; Gov­ paramountcy and other options presently available ernment of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Eco­ to Canadians may be found in Ronald L. Watts, nomic Union: Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa: "Canada's Constitutional Options: An Outline," in Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991). Watts and Brown, Options (note 8 above), pp. 15- 3. For expressions of , see Re­ 30. gional Representation: The Canadian Partnership (Cal­ 11. Milne, "Equality or Asymmetry" (note 8 gary: Canada West Foundation, 1981); David Kilgour, above). Inside Outer Canada (: Lone Pine Publish­ 12. On Alberta's argument see John Grimond, ing, 1990); and David E. Smith, "Perennial Alien­ "Nice Country, Nice Mess," Economist, 29 June 1991, ation: The Prairie West in the Canadian Federation," pp. 12-13; John Dafoe, "Canadians Alone Reduce in Michael Burgess, ed., Canadian Federalism: Past, Nationhood to Fiscal Fiddling," Globe and Mail, 23 Present and Future (Leicester: Leicester University February 1991, D2. Press, 1990). 13. For a discussion of how Reform proposes to 4. , cited in Miro Cernetig, "How secure western access to federal policymaking, see the West Won," Globe and Mail, 25 January 1992, Murray Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party Dl; David Roberts, " Facts Show Prairies Hurt­ (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1991), pp. ing," Globe and Mail, 24 February 1992, AI, A6 191-206. For the best discussion of Canada's existing (quoted). Senate, see Colin Campbell, The Canadian Senate: 5. Robert Sheppard, "Holding Hands Across the A Lobby from Within (Toronto: Macmillan of Can­ Rockies," Globe and Mail, 20 February 1991, A19. ada, 1978). 6. John Dafoe, "Record Low Prices on Biggest 14. Alberta Select Special Committee on Upper Crop Ever is a Bitter Irony for Grain Farmers," Globe House Reform, Strengthening Canada: Reform of Can­ and Mail, 3 August 1991, D2 (quoted); David Rob­ ada's Senate (Edmonton: Province of Alberta, 1985); erts, "Western Premiers Expected to Focus on Econ­ Cernetig, "How the West Won" (note 4 above). omy," Globe and Mail, 13 May 1991, A3. 15. David Elton and Peter McCormick, Measuring 7. Roberts, "Western Premiers" (note 6 above); Senate Effectiveness (: Canada West Founda­ Lloyd Axworthy, "Prairie Integration 1992," Speech tion, 1991). before Manitoba Federal Liberal Policy Conference, 16. On the Reform Party's popularity and its im­ Winnipeg, 11 May 1991 (mimeographed copy in au­ pact on Mulroney government policies, see Miro thor's possession), pp. 4-5; Jeffrey Simpson, "One Cernetig, "Reaction to Reform Delights Calgary," Man's Welcome Departure from the Usual Liberal Globe and Mail, 21 May 1991, A4. Rant," Globe and Mail, 17 May 1991, A16. 17. Miro Cernetig, "Could Preston Manning Pull 8. David Milne, "Equality or Asymmetry: Why It Off?" Globe and Mail, 30 March 1991, D4. Choose?" Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, 18. For the best treatment of the parliamentary eds., Options for a New Canada (Toronto: University reform process to date, see C.E.S. Franks, The Par­ of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 285-307. liament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 9. Robert Sheppard, "Empty Homes on a Full Press, 1987), especially pp. 161-85 and 219-26. Map," Globe and Mail, 8 October 1991, A19.