The Navy and the Arctic: the Thaw After the Freeze
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE NAVY AND THE ARCTIC: THE THAW AFTER THE FREEZE by Lieutenant-Commander J.F. Newton INTRODUCTION ened. For the next 40 years, the sovereignty and security challenges of the North would be The most enduring tale of Canada’s coined in Cold War themes including Russian north is the quest for the Northwest Passage, bombers and nuclear submarines. Today the sea route to the orient that claimed hun- however, a new theme is being expressed as a dreds of lives in a hostile labyrinth of islands potential threat. The for-midable polar ice and ice. Surprisingly, not much progress has cap appears to be shrinking and the impene- been made since the tragic loss of Franklin’s trable obstacle to shipping may soon disap- expedition in 1845 or Roald Amundsen’s pear. successful navigation of the passage in 1906. Despite the march of time and technology, the Polar shipping routes are considerably ice remains a formidable barrier to shipping, shorter than southern ones that connect the no matter how seductive the route looks to Far East with Europe via the Suez and Pa- the navigator searching for a shorter sea-lanes nama Canals. For example, a passage and economical transit. Canada's interest in through the Canadian Arctic shortens the the passage has always been as a custodian, transit between Yokohama and Rotterdam reflecting a national identity that embraces from 23,000 km to 15,000 km. Even more the Arctic for its beauty, purity, vastness and dramatic econo-mies of up to 22,000 km wealth. Thus when HMCS Labrador became could be realised by giant ships that must the first deep-draught ship to navigate the currently round Cape Horn on account of Northwest Passage in 1954, she was respond- their size. It seems logical then that polar ing to the challenge of asserting governmen- routes would be explored by shipping inter- tal authority and presence in the vastness of ests as soon as the ice regime loosened its the north as the freeze of the Cold War deep- grip on the navigation channels. Speculative reporting on climate change is focussing an steaming a ship through Canada’s north is far inordinate degree attention on this very sub- from a simple matter and can only be accom- ject. An ice-free Arctic will no doubt mean plished during a navigation season that lasts considerable change for the ecosystem and roughly from July through October. From indigenous peoples. Increased shipping will southern Baffin Bay to Bering Strait, a ship specifically increase the potential for oil must endure 5500 km of varying ice and cli- spills, illegal activities and shipping acci- matic conditions, a voyage that takes eight dents, and as several recent reports by the days at 15 knots, a speed that is hardly main- Canadian Forces suggest, will potentially tainable in anything but open waters and ex- threaten Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.1 cellent weather. However, naval planners cannot base The most frequently travelled passage their policies and plans on sensationalised as a consequence of relatively favourable ice media reports, observational anecdotes or conditions is the southern route. This route single scientific conclusions. This essay will skirts the northern shore of the continental contend that while the ice regime is changing landmass, taking advantage of the early melt- slowly, commercial shipping will likely not ing of first year, land-fast ice along the coast. respond to exploit the Northwest Passage, and However, in several locations the route nar- a naval role in sovereignty protection is un- rows and shoals. While the ice is least im- warranted. In order to assess more accurately posing on this route, severe conditions are the impact of a changing ice regime on naval often encountered in M’Clintock Channel and operations, three factors require analysis. Larsen Sound where a persistent multi-year First, the specific nature of the Northwest pack moves about the confines of the sound Passage and the challenges faced by Arctic under the influence of prevailing winds, ne- shipping must be understood. Second, the cessitating icebreaker escort or limiting navi- science of climate change and the ice regime gation to shallow coastal leads. In a reduced must be assessed. Finally, the exact nature of ice scenario, the utility of this passage would Arctic sovereignty must be clarified, before remain restricted to ships with draughts under concluding why and how the navy should be 11 metres, forcing larger oil, bulk and con- involved in Arctic operations. tainer ships to use Parry Channel to the north. It was along this southern route that the St THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE Roch II reported encountering only limited The Northwest Passage describes two ice in July 2000, a rare occurrence that was main routes through the Canadian archipelago widely reported by the news media.2 A total (figure 1). Even during the mildest ice years, of six ships transited the Northwest Passage by this route in 2000, although none sought to exploit it as an economic passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.3 The second route of significance is north accounts for only three mining opera- Parry Channel. This 50-mile wide, 800-mile tions that employ shipping.9 On account of long channel cuts straight across the archipel- limited shipping in the Canadian Arctic, sup- ago from Baffin Bay to the Beaufort Sea. porting infrastructure such as berths, fuel, Deep, wide and navigationally simple, Parry repair facilities are totally non-existent. Channel is the shortest distance and only truly Moreover, the supporting government ice- deep-draught route through the archipelago.4 breaker fleets of the U.S. and Canada are very Furthermore, ample depths along the entire small and would be hard pressed to provide route support submarine operations, first ex- escort services beyond that offered today. ploited by USS Seadragon in 1960.5 Ice con- While the exploitation of the Northwest Pas- ditions break-up early along the eastern end sage remains a rare event, in a future scenario of the channel in Lancaster Sound. However, of consistently favourable ice conditions, further west in Barrow Strait the summer ice would the passage become a viable naviga- pack becomes thicker and more of a chal- tion route? To answer this question, the latest lenge to shipping. Thick, dense multi-year science on changes in the Arctic ice regime ice and pressure ridges invariably obstruct or must first be assessed, before more specific completely block the channel from Viscount concerns of the shipping industry can be put Melville Sound west through to M’Clure in context. Strait. Multi-year pack ice that survives the CHANGES TO THE ARCTIC ICE summer's melt is regenerated by the slow REGIME ingress of thick ice from the Beaufort Sea and Sverdrup Basin.6 It was in M’Clure Strait in There is little scientific dispute that 1969 that the icebreaking tanker Manhattan, climate change is occurring and that its ef- in an epic voyage to evaluate the feasibility of fects are most readily observed in the Arctic. Arctic shipping, was forced to divert into the Climate change is highlighted by recent re- narrower Prince of Wales Strait on account of ports of starving polar bears in Hudson Bay, heavy ice conditions. It was also the same melting permafrost in the western Arctic, location where the 75,000 horsepower, U.S. open leads at the North Pole and an ice-free icebreaker Polar Sea was forced to divert Northwest Passage.10 It is the subject of the from her planned route in 1985.7 In all re- ice regime in particular that elicits the most spects, Parry Channel would be the centre- intense media interest, tending to focus on piece of an international, commercially vi- dire predictions while paying little heed to able, polar shortcut. However, it is also the scientific accuracy, reservations of the scien- region where the most significant change to tists or the decade-scale variability in the ice the ice regime must occur. pack. For the navy to embed climate change into policy development, a better understand- Despite relatively light ice conditions ing of the ice regime and its future is re- since 1997, shipping in Canada’s north re- quired. To this end, a broad spectrum of the mains limited to the northern sealift, some available science must be reviewed. resource extraction, icebreaker operations and a few fishing, research and eco-tourism ves- Using microwave satellite data col- sels. Robert Wolfe’s snapshot of Arctic ship- lected since 1978, Johannesson et al con- ping for 1997 and 1998 quantifies annual cluded that there has been a 3% reduction per shipping at approximately 110 and 140 ship decade in the total area covered by multi-year voyages respectively.8 Even the much- ice.11 Most ice observers now agree with this acclaimed resource wealth of the Canadian finding. However, Parkinson was able to show that change is a regional phenomenon, trend, a task complicated even more by con- and that significant reductions in the ice cover siderable regional variations across the Arc- in the Canadian north were either not observ- tic. Observational records of the Canadian able or were “statistically insignificant”, and Ice Service highlight this variability. For tended to be overwhelmed by the magnitude example, during bad ice years in 1972, 1978, of inter-annual variability in the ice.12 The 1983, 1992 and 1996, there was twice as overall decrease in ice coverage was mainly a much ice as during light ice years recorded in phenomenon of the Barents and adjacent Kara 1975, 1981, 1985 or 1997.16 To depict re- Sea of northern Russia.