THE NAVY AND THE ARCTIC: THE THAW AFTER THE FREEZE

by Lieutenant-Commander J.F. Newton

INTRODUCTION ened. For the next 40 years, the sovereignty and security challenges of the North would be The most enduring tale of Canada’s coined in Cold War themes including Russian north is the quest for the , bombers and nuclear . Today the sea route to the orient that claimed hun- however, a new theme is being expressed as a dreds of lives in a hostile labyrinth of islands potential threat. The for-midable polar ice and ice. Surprisingly, not much progress has cap appears to be shrinking and the impene- been made since the tragic loss of Franklin’s trable obstacle to shipping may soon disap- expedition in 1845 or Roald Amundsen’s pear. successful navigation of the passage in 1906. Despite the march of time and technology, the Polar shipping routes are considerably ice remains a formidable barrier to shipping, shorter than southern ones that connect the no matter how seductive the route looks to Far East with Europe via the Suez and Pa- the navigator searching for a shorter sea-lanes nama Canals. For example, a passage and economical transit. Canada's interest in through the Canadian Arctic shortens the the passage has always been as a custodian, transit between Yokohama and Rotterdam reflecting a national identity that embraces from 23,000 km to 15,000 km. Even more the Arctic for its beauty, purity, vastness and dramatic econo-mies of up to 22,000 km wealth. Thus when HMCS Labrador became could be realised by giant ships that must the first deep-draught ship to navigate the currently round Cape Horn on account of Northwest Passage in 1954, she was respond- their size. It seems logical then that polar ing to the challenge of asserting governmen- routes would be explored by shipping inter- tal authority and presence in the vastness of ests as soon as the ice regime loosened its the north as the freeze of the Cold War deep- grip on the navigation channels. Speculative reporting on climate change is focussing an steaming a ship through Canada’s north is far inordinate degree attention on this very sub- from a simple matter and can only be accom- ject. An ice-free Arctic will no doubt mean plished during a navigation season that lasts considerable change for the ecosystem and roughly from July through October. From indigenous peoples. Increased shipping will southern Baffin Bay to Bering Strait, a ship specifically increase the potential for oil must endure 5500 km of varying ice and cli- spills, illegal activities and shipping acci- matic conditions, a voyage that takes eight dents, and as several recent reports by the days at 15 knots, a speed that is hardly main- Canadian Forces suggest, will potentially tainable in anything but open waters and ex- threaten Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.1 cellent weather. However, naval planners cannot base The most frequently travelled passage their policies and plans on sensationalised as a consequence of relatively favourable ice media reports, observational anecdotes or conditions is the southern route. This route single scientific conclusions. This essay will skirts the northern shore of the continental contend that while the ice regime is changing landmass, taking advantage of the early melt- slowly, commercial shipping will likely not ing of first year, land-fast ice along the coast. respond to exploit the Northwest Passage, and However, in several locations the route nar- a naval role in sovereignty protection is un- rows and shoals. While the ice is least im- warranted. In order to assess more accurately posing on this route, severe conditions are the impact of a changing ice regime on naval often encountered in M’Clintock Channel and operations, three factors require analysis. Larsen Sound where a persistent multi-year First, the specific nature of the Northwest pack moves about the confines of the sound Passage and the challenges faced by Arctic under the influence of prevailing winds, ne- shipping must be understood. Second, the cessitating icebreaker escort or limiting navi- science of climate change and the ice regime gation to shallow coastal leads. In a reduced must be assessed. Finally, the exact nature of ice scenario, the utility of this passage would Arctic sovereignty must be clarified, before remain restricted to ships with draughts under concluding why and how the navy should be 11 metres, forcing larger oil, bulk and con- involved in Arctic operations. tainer ships to use to the north. It was along this southern route that the St THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE Roch II reported encountering only limited The Northwest Passage describes two ice in July 2000, a rare occurrence that was main routes through the Canadian archipelago widely reported by the news media.2 A total (figure 1). Even during the mildest ice years, of six ships transited the Northwest Passage by this route in 2000, although none sought to exploit it as an economic passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.3

The second route of significance is north accounts for only three mining opera- Parry Channel. This 50-mile wide, 800-mile tions that employ shipping.9 On account of long channel cuts straight across the archipel- limited shipping in the Canadian Arctic, sup- ago from Baffin Bay to the . porting infrastructure such as berths, fuel, Deep, wide and navigationally simple, Parry repair facilities are totally non-existent. Channel is the shortest distance and only truly Moreover, the supporting government ice- deep-draught route through the archipelago.4 breaker fleets of the U.S. and Canada are very Furthermore, ample depths along the entire small and would be hard pressed to provide route support operations, first ex- escort services beyond that offered today. ploited by USS Seadragon in 1960.5 Ice con- While the exploitation of the Northwest Pas- ditions break-up early along the eastern end sage remains a rare event, in a future scenario of the channel in Lancaster Sound. However, of consistently favourable ice conditions, further west in Barrow Strait the summer ice would the passage become a viable naviga- pack becomes thicker and more of a chal- tion route? To answer this question, the latest lenge to shipping. Thick, dense multi-year science on changes in the Arctic ice regime ice and pressure ridges invariably obstruct or must first be assessed, before more specific completely block the channel from Viscount concerns of the shipping industry can be put Melville Sound west through to M’Clure in context. Strait. Multi-year pack ice that survives the CHANGES TO THE ARCTIC ICE summer's melt is regenerated by the slow REGIME ingress of thick ice from the Beaufort Sea and Sverdrup Basin.6 It was in M’Clure Strait in There is little scientific dispute that 1969 that the icebreaking tanker Manhattan, climate change is occurring and that its ef- in an epic voyage to evaluate the feasibility of fects are most readily observed in the Arctic. Arctic shipping, was forced to divert into the Climate change is highlighted by recent re- narrower Prince of Wales Strait on account of ports of starving polar bears in Hudson Bay, heavy ice conditions. It was also the same melting permafrost in the western Arctic, location where the 75,000 horsepower, U.S. open leads at the North Pole and an ice-free icebreaker Polar Sea was forced to divert Northwest Passage.10 It is the subject of the from her planned route in 1985.7 In all re- ice regime in particular that elicits the most spects, Parry Channel would be the centre- intense media interest, tending to focus on piece of an international, commercially vi- dire predictions while paying little heed to able, polar shortcut. However, it is also the scientific accuracy, reservations of the scien- region where the most significant change to tists or the decade-scale variability in the ice the ice regime must occur. pack. For the navy to embed climate change into policy development, a better understand- Despite relatively light ice conditions ing of the ice regime and its future is re- since 1997, shipping in Canada’s north re- quired. To this end, a broad spectrum of the mains limited to the northern sealift, some available science must be reviewed. resource extraction, icebreaker operations and a few fishing, research and eco-tourism ves- Using microwave satellite data col- sels. Robert Wolfe’s snapshot of Arctic ship- lected since 1978, Johannesson et al con- ping for 1997 and 1998 quantifies annual cluded that there has been a 3% reduction per shipping at approximately 110 and 140 ship decade in the total area covered by multi-year voyages respectively.8 Even the much- ice.11 Most ice observers now agree with this acclaimed resource wealth of the Canadian finding. However, Parkinson was able to show that change is a regional phenomenon, trend, a task complicated even more by con- and that significant reductions in the ice cover siderable regional variations across the Arc- in the Canadian north were either not observ- tic. Observational records of the Canadian able or were “statistically insignificant”, and Ice Service highlight this variability. For tended to be overwhelmed by the magnitude example, during bad ice years in 1972, 1978, of inter-annual variability in the ice.12 The 1983, 1992 and 1996, there was twice as overall decrease in ice coverage was mainly a much ice as during light ice years recorded in phenomenon of the Barents and adjacent Kara 1975, 1981, 1985 or 1997.16 To depict re- Sea of northern Russia. Within the Northern gional variability, when light ice conditions Hemisphere as a whole, Parkinson concluded were being recorded in the Canadian North in that those regions that experienced decreased 1998, Russian ice observers were reporting ice coverage (7.5 x 106 km2) exceeded those the severest ice conditions in 40 years in the regions experiencing increased ice extent (2.9 Kara Sea.17 x 106 km2).13 While the overall multi-year ice It is from the study of atmospheric coverage has decreased over a relatively short events that the existence of a trend is con- period, the author was reluctant to conclude firmed. Recent study of the ice, ocean and that this measure confirmed a trend, since the atmosphere system suggests that recorded reduced ice extents observed still fell within events in the ice regime are linked to an at- the extremes of inter-annual variability. mospheric phenomenon called the North At- Ice thickness measurements are an- lantic Oscillation (NAO).18 The NAO de- other means to assess change in the ice re- scribes regional variations in atmospheric gime. Rothrock et al compared ice thickness pressure whereby northern latitude low- data from early transits pressure cells periodically change in their with measurements made later during the intensity and location, causing prevailing 1993–1997 USN Scientific Ice Expeditions. wind conditions to vary, in turn affecting ice While data stations were not exactly coinci- transport and heat balances in the north. The dent between voyages and some difficulty current positive phase of the NAO seems to occurred in resolving the data to a common be directly linked to the recent, 1997–2000 baseline, the mean draft of ice in the central light ice years in the Canadian Arctic. How- Arctic was determined to have decreased ever, Zhang and other scientists studying this from three to two metres, a 40 percent vol- relationship caution that if the NAO and ice ume reduction.14 In another study, the Cana- trends are linked, then a reversal of the NAO dian icebreaker, Des Groseilliers measured phase could cause the recent reduced ice con- changes in ice thickness while frozen in the ditions to vanish.19 Such a reversal was wit- permanent ice pack during the yearlong Sur- nessed before in Canada’s north between face Heat Budget of the Arctic (SHEBA) Pro- 1972 and 1975, when four years of reduced ject of 1997. Scientists observed that after a ice conditions were followed by a sharp in- year of drifting across the Beaufort Sea, flows crease in ice conditions.20 These ice events that had measured 1.5 to 2.0 metres had de- correlate to a transition from a positive to creased approximately 0.33 metres.15 negative NAO phase over the same period.21 Morison indicated that while the deduction of This limited evidence on its own does a melting trend is tentative, he believes that not confirm the existence of a trend toward an an increasingly positive NAO value since ice-free Arctic in the near future. The signifi- 1900 suggests that reduced ice conditions will cant inter-annual variability in ice conditions likely continue and future NAO reversals will makes it extremely difficult to perceive a not cause regression to extremely bad ice ring, albeit far slower than in Russia’s north. conditions.22 In the near term though, the That said, strong inter-annual variability indications are that the NAO phase is transi- would most likely continue to be superim- tioning and the next few years will see a posed over any trend toward reduced ice. worsening of ice conditions.23 Should the NAO phase reverse as it does pe- riodically, particularly severe ice conditions With ice extent, ice thickness and cli- could return in the course of a year, with dra- mate observation all supporting the conclu- matic consequences for shipping ventures sion that a trend toward reduced ice coverage organized to take advantage of an apparently is occurring, it is the science of General Cir- navigable Northwest Passage. It is pure spe- culation Models (GCM) which offer some culation to conclude that Parry Channel will assessment of where this trend may be become ice-free in ten years, twenty years or headed. The National Oceanic and Atmos- even fifty years hence. During the most re- pheric Administration GCM is summarised as cent meeting of climatologists in Japan in a case in point. It predicts that by 2050, ice March 2001, none of the participants would extent in the Arctic will decrease to 85% of commit to concluding that there would be what it is today, while total ice volume will major change in the Arctic Ocean in this cen- reduce by 50% over the same period.24 Again tury.27 Nonetheless, change in the Arctic ice though, it is in Russia’s north that reduced ice regime in the short term is a fact. It remains conditions are most evident in the predictions. to be concluded, though, whether change in In the northern islands of Canada’s archipel- the ice regime will generate interest in com- ago, and in a small area of the Arctic Ocean mercial shipping lines as the numerous media immediately to the north of Ellesmere Island, reports suggest.28 the model predicts the persistence of a rela- tively thick, multi-year ice pack.25 This ves- IMPACT ON SHIPPING tige of the polar ice cap in the near vicinity Since 1997, relatively light ice condi- and amongst the high Arctic islands makes it tions have prevailed in the Canadian north, difficult to predict if ice conditions will re- yet Arctic shipping remains regionally re- duce to such an extent that more reliable stricted to traditional re-supply routes on ac- navigation conditions can be expected in count of persistent ice features. With the Parry Channel. However, pronounced change exception of eco-tourism cruises that have is depicted for the Beaufort Sea with retreat flourished since the early 1990s, there has of the ice pack away from the Alaskan coast, been essentially no commercial exploitation suggesting that this difficult leg of the North- of the Northwest Passage. In 1999, however, west Passage may become more open to ship- a startling development may have been the ping. A word of caution is warranted in at- harbinger of change. At the height of the taching too much credibility to GCM assess- navigation season, the powerful Russian ice- ments. Considerable disagreement exist be- breaker Makarov and an accompanying tug tween different GCMs concerning air tem- towed two floating dry-docks from Vladi- peratures, seasonal variability, and ice thick- vostok to the Bahamas via the Northwest Pas- ness, while all of the models fail to assess sage. Ice conditions were lighter than usual many important or poorly understood vari- in the southern channel and the transit was ables of Arctic climate.26 relatively uneventful.29 Remarkably, it was In conclusion, the scientific evidence the threat of high winds on the open ocean, suggests that a trend towards reduced ice and not an economy of distance, that decided conditions in the Northwest Passage is occur- the route for the project's insurers. A gradu- ally increasing navigation season in a more cles to commercial exploitation and the ways southern ice regime is stimulating some re- and means to overcome these. Yet basic sponse from the shipping industry. In the business rules were cited time and again as course of four years, OMNITRAX Limited major detractors to commercialisation. These doubled grain shipments from their Churchill, included ship construction costs that ex- Manitoba facility from 15 to 30 deep-sea ceeded that of conventional ships by 15 to ships per navigation season.30 It is noteworthy 20%, higher crewing costs, higher insurance also that during the last voyage through Parry rates, escort costs and strident anti-pollution Channel by the heavy icebreaker Louis St. regulations. Moreover, with draught limita- Laurent in 1998, the most favourable ice con- tions (11.5 metres) imposed by shoals, ships ditions in decades were reported.31 Beyond employing the NSR are restricted to 20- these shipping highlights, however, there is 25,000 DWT making them un-competitive little indication of an increased shipping in- relative to ships three to four times that size terest in the Canadian North, and less still that ply the southern canal routes.33 In an less still in the Northwest Passage. industry driven by regularity, punctuality and reliability, frequent ice-related delays and An indication of how shipping might disruptions make the currently employed respond to more substantive changes in ice “just in time” delivery system untenable. conditions can be gained from examining Even the presentation of data on a changing events on Russia’s Northeast Passage, or the ice regime did not elicit an optimistic opinion Northern Sea Route (NSR) as it is called. from the Director General of the Norwegian From ice regime discussions above, change in Shipowners’ Association that the NSR would the ice conditions of Russia’s north was become a commercial sea-lane in the foresee- shown to be more pronounced than in Can- able future.34 Additional detractions cited ada. Moreover, the predictions for the future included the lack of reliable navigation aids, are even more radical. One would expect then insufficient icebreaker escorts, distant search that a route roughly 1100 km shorter than its and rescue resources, a lack of repair facili- Canadian counterpart would be generating ties, insufficient ice forecasting and pollution some commercial interest. The attractiveness response capabilities to name but a few. of this route is even more apparent consider- ing the magnitude of shipping infrastructure Writ large, these are the same chal- and icebreaker resources established for the lenges facing shipping in Canada’s north, es- exploitation of Russia’s resource rich north.32 pecially for the more economically feasible, Russia already has a significant Arctic ship- deep draught ships that would be forced to ping history including frequent NSR transits use Parry Channel.35 In light of the currently by state owned, ice-class ships. Facing eco- severe ice conditions in Parry Channel and nomic collapse, it has been Russia’s desire the degree of change that would be required since the end of the Cold War to open the to make shipping there predictable, reliable NSR to commercial shipping, assisting with and punctual, deep-draught commercial ship- state-owned infrastructure on a cost recovery ping will not likely move to initiate scheduled basis to defray the high costs associated with liner service through the Canadian Arctic its northern responsibilities. In order to evalu- anytime soon. It is more likely that commer- ate the feasibility of a commercially viable cialisation will be limited to occasional and NSR, the NSR User Conference was con- opportunistic ventures, which are neither vened in Oslo in November 1999. Significant time-sensitive nor capable of transiting the research was presented regarding the obsta- Panama Canal due to dimensional restric- tions. There is also growing speculation on a change prediction of an ice-free Arctic in 10 renewed energy rush in the Arctic, which will to 20 years.40 These high-level military as- involve shipping during the exploration, de- sessments contend that opening the “North- velopment and exploitation phases.36 Finally, west Passage to regular use could result in draught limitations aside, the NSR represents legal challenge to Canada’s interpretation of a significantly more attractive polar route the status of the waterway as an internal than the Northwest Passage, providing a rout- one.”41 Moreover, they indicate that regular ing option to be assessed against ice condi- use of the passage would possibly result in it tions and available supporting services.37 being classified as an International Strait in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Three conclusions are drawn from the Convention on the Law of the Sea, thus un- foregoing discussion. First, the scientific evi- dermining Canada’s sovereignty over its in- dence indicates that change in the Arctic ice ternal waters.42 Clearly, the implied point is regime is occurring, albeit more slowly and to that there is a potential military role to be a lesser extent in Canada’s north than in other executed in the protection of the Arctic sov- Arctic seas. Second, significant and long-term ereignty. While acknowledging that change in change in the ice regime would be necessary the Arctic is occurring, this essay concludes to make a deep-draught sea-lane through the that it is happening very slowly and alarmist Northwest Passage, and specifically Parry postulating of an ice-free Northwest Passage Channel, commercially viable. Third, even if in 10 to 20 years is unwarranted. Nonetheless, the ice conditions reduce sufficiently to per- sovereignty arguments must be discussed to mit shipping, more substantial infrastructure clarify the linkage between sovereignty, secu- and escort support will be required before rity, ice and shipping. liner companies would entertain as a routine risk, 3000 miles of difficult Arctic navigation. To commence a discussion on Arctic The final section of the paper will respond to sovereignty, several points require clarifica- the question of how a change in Arctic ship- tion. First, there are no sovereignty issues ping or a reduced ice regime might impact on regarding the islands of the archipelago, Can- naval operations. ada has supreme jurisdiction over all activi- ties, including mineral and oil resources.43 AN EMERGING NAVAL ROLE IN THE Any intrusions on land, or breaches of Cana- ARCTIC dian law are within the enforcement mandate The most frequently invoked concern of Customs and Immigration, the RCMP or regarding increased Arctic shipping is the other agents of the crown. Moreover, as all supposed challenge to Canadian sovereignty of the waters of the archipelago fall within that it will pose. Moreover, any challenge to Canada’s 200 mile EEZ no matter how terri- Canadian sovereignty invokes cries for mili- torial waters, baselines or any other delineat- tary intervention for its protection. In the ing reference lines are drawn; Canadian sov- past, concepts of sovereignty and security in ereignty over renewable and non-renewable the north were nearly synonymous. Sover- resources in and under the sea are not in dis- eignty was clearly threatened by superpower pute.44 Finally, Canada has no intention of confrontation. Yet today, Russian sea power preventing shipping from using the Northwest and the Arctic theatre are marginal defence Passage, it simply asserts that it retains the considerations.39 Paradoxically, while the authority to regulate shipping in regards to Russian threat has diminished, recent Cana- routing, construction codes, pollution stan- dian Forces studies make an alarming climate dards, insurance coverage, escort and pilot requirements and so on.45 once sovereignty is established, it cannot be lost in that way.49 A second sovereignty vul- As for the assertion that shipping will nerability often cited involves the legality of challenge Canada’s claim of sovereignty over drawing long baselines across the entrances the waters of the north, this point is flatly to key straits and then proclaiming all waters disagreed. The position of the Department of so enclosed as internal waters. While the Foreign Affairs and International Trade drawing of straight baselines enclosing heav- (DFAIT) is that there is no challenge to Can- ily indented coasts has been established as a ada’s sovereignty in the Arctic whether the legal precedent in international law, it is the archipelagic waters are covered with ice or long length of the Canadian baselines that is not.46 Moreover, since the 1880 deed transfer unusual. Again, the foremost legal experts on of the Arctic Islands from Great Britain to Arctic sovereignty have concluded that these Canada, the waters of the Arctic Archipelago baselines are justified in law.50 As a final have been Canada’s internal waters by virtue point, DFAIT’s position is built on “historic of historic title. Quoting Mark Gaillard, title”, which predates Law of the Sea con- DFAIT’s legal expert on these matters, the cepts such as “international straits”, “straight relationship between ice cover, shipping and baselines” and “internal waters”. By all ac- sovereignty is clarified: counts, legal arguments could be made to Is our sovereignty in peril because the challenge Canada’s sovereignty in the north, permanent ice cover is receding? Is it but the fact remains that no nation, except the in danger due to the likelihood of in- U.S., has ever stated a position. Moreover, creased commercial shipping in and the very points on which the U.S. could make through the Arctic waters? Speaking their case are considered too weak; risking a from the legal perspective, the answer legal defeat and the establishment of an inter- to both is no. Canada’s sovereignty national precedent for other contested waters over the lands and waters of the Arctic world-wide. stands on secure foundations of law. This brief digression into the legal as- Any foreigners who travel there are vis- pects of sovereignty over the waters of the iting Canada and must obey Canada’s Arctic was necessary to point out that any laws.47 challenge to Canadian sovereignty claims While this may be DFAIT’s position, the over the internal waters of the archipelago points raised by the military studies discussed will not be caused by shipping or a changing above are frequently cited as arguments un- ice regime. Any challenge is purely a legal dermining Canada’s sovereignty claims. matter; DFAIT does not perceive a security Principally, the United States’ contend that threat to which a military response would be the Northwest Passage is an international necessarily required. However, the exercis- strait, through which shipping has the right of ing of Canada’s legitimate authority over its “transit passage”, thus denying Canada the sovereign territory may involve a military authority to control shipping to the degree response. In the event of increased shipping that it wishes. The weakness of this point is tempo in the north, there will be challenges to that the waters have not been used in the legal be faced regarding detecting, tracking and requirement as an international strait on ac- monitoring shipping activities. There is no count of the ice.48 Moreover, the fact that the doubt that the risk of pollution will increase waters may someday become navigable does and as will demand for search and rescue not jeopardise their status as internal waters, services. While Canada has articulated a care- fully structured hierarchy of statutes, regula- lance by Air Command capabilities and the tions and shipping control measures in order Rangers will likely continue to be a cost- to prevent pollution, and disruption of habi- effective military contribution. Warship in- tats and native peoples, the means to enforce volvement may be indirectly stimulated the laws of the land must exist? To this end, should the marine fleets of other government it will require government direction as to how departments be drawn north to execute an to provide the most cost-effective means to increasing Arctic task load, necessitating war- ensure an Arctic presence, to conduct the ships to back-fill through additional fishery monitoring and enforcement action necessary patrols or search and rescue duties. 52 using available national resources, all the In the matter of Search and Rescue while measured against the likelihood of a (SAR), the navy plays a significant role along potential incident. At this point, and given the major sea-lanes and in response to civil the concluded likelihood of very slow change disasters. For the most part, naval participa- in the ice regime and no direct security- tion in a SAR boils down to being at the right related threat, the first line response in exer- place at the right time. The rapid response cising rightful authority rests with the respon- and increased response range of an embarked sible government departments including helicopter enhances this utility, however, a Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, ship’s area of influence remains limited. The Cus-toms and Immigration and the Solicitor chance of a naval unit finding itself in the General. Arctic and within responding distance of an The 1994 White Paper on Defence event that could occur anywhere along 4000 states that the Canadian Forces will be capa- km of Canadian jurisdiction is remote to say ble of “mounting effective responses to the least.53 While the nation’s overall Arctic emerging situations in our maritime areas of SAR capability is under review in light of the jurisdiction… including the north.”51 “Effec- opening of polar air routes, marine SAR will tive responses” include the capability to undoubtedly remain a Coast Guard mandate monitor and control activities within the and best executed by icebreakers, embarked maritime areas of jurisdiction, the provision helicopters and Air Command support. On a of assistance to Other Government Depart- related note, the ability to move the naval ments (OGD) including fisheries protection, diving capability into the north will likely drug interdiction, and environmental protec- continue to be provided on the back of Coast tion, humanitarian assistance, and search and Guard ships as was the case during a helicop- rescue. To meet these expectations in south- ter salvage operation in 1996. ern latitudes, the navy relies on the intrinsic As a basic precaution, there are two capabilities of multi-purpose, combat capable simple initiatives that could be undertaken by units. Given the lack of a clear security or the navy. The first is to conduct a feasibility sovereignty threat and the unlikely possibility study for the ice strengthening of an entire for a surge in shipping, any initiative at this class of warships to establish the cost and time to build or modify an existing class of effort that would be required in the event that warships for Arctic patrols is considered as a security or sovereignty issue develops. The unwarranted. The threat of nuclear subma- second initiative would involve the dispatch rines operating in the Arctic during the Cold of warship patrols to ice-free northern waters War provided a far more compelling reason during the navigation season. Prior to 1987, than does contemporary domestic policing summer deployments in the north were con- issues. The provision of wide-area surveil- ducted routinely and without significant inci- dent. Frigates and replenishment ships safely shipping will remain significant until consid- visited numerous settlements while gaining erable change in the ice occurs, an analysis of navigation, sensor operation, flying and ice Russia's Northern Sea Route highlighted the avoidance experience.54 This does not imply reluctance of commercial shipping to exploit that warships should attempt to penetrate the the Arctic despite considerable infrastructure summer ice pack; however, considerable and state support. Continuing the analysis, an reaches of the Arctic are accessible during the assessment of the science of climate change summer. The experience gained would per- concluded that change in the ice regime is mit warships to react with confidence to inci- occurring, albeit slowly. Considerable inter- dents that occur in or around the accessible annual and regional variability in ice extent reaches of the summertime Arctic. tends to mask a long-term trend. Assertions of an ice-free Arctic in the next 10 to 20 years Finally, the intention to provide the could not be supported. Despite failing to Afloat Logistics Support Capability with ice assess significant commercial interest in Arc- strengthening is applauded. While an ice- tic shipping or a dramatically reduced ice strengthened vessel could be safely navigated regime to stimulate it, the involvement of the into a wide range of summer ice conditions, navy in a sovereignty protection role was its employment elsewhere due to high priority assessed. This paper briefly highlighted the training and operational commitments would latest legal opinions on Arctic sovereignty, suggest that the vessel may not be that avail- arguing that neither shipping nor ice will able to respond to Arctic contingencies. threaten Canadian sovereignty or necessitate CONCLUSION a distinct naval role. Clearly, any increase in shipping will increase the occurrence of pol- In the recent past there has been an lution, SAR and illegal activities. However, increasing chorus of media reports, joined by the responsibility for the enforcement of Ca- military studies, that highlight a threat to Ca- nadian statutes is best left to cost-effective nadian sovereignty in the north as a result of ships of the federal fleet, not warships. In profound changes to the Arctic ice regime conclusion, it will be the government's deci- and increased shipping. To date, thick, multi- sion to rationalise the investment in Arctic year ice fields have limited the utility of the surveillance and response capabilities balanc- Northwest Passage to all but a handful of ing the need for new capability against slow- heavy icebreakers and even occasional com- change predictions for the ice, and occasional mercial ventures. The speculation expressed shipping ventures. As a precautionary meas- is that a reduced ice regime will open the ure, the navy should re-commence Arctic Northwest Passage to ice-free navigation in deployments, exploring ice-free waters during the next 10 to 20 years. It was the intent of the navigation season to build confidence and this essay to assess the likelihood of such a expertise to provide a seasonal response ca- scenario and the consequent impact on future pability around the periphery of the North- naval operations, capital acquisition and poli- west Passage. cies. NOTES This was a three-part undertaking. 1 First, the physical nature of the Northwest Canada: Department of National Defence, “Arc- Passage was discussed to demonstrate the tic Capabilities Study”, Canadian Forces Northern limitations of Arctic navigation routes not- Area Headquarters, 1 December 2000. Chapter 10, pp withstanding changes to the ice regime. To 4–5. reinforce the conclusion that the challenges to 2The RCMP cutter, Nadon undertook the west to east passage of the Northwest Passage in July 2000 in tating considerable sealift and eventually the transport commemoration of the voyage of the St Roch, a voy- of oil to market from the Bent Horn well on Melville age that took 27 months in 1943 and marked the first Island (1985–1996). transit of the passage by a Canadian vessel. See James 10 Brooke, “Through the Northwest Passage in a Month, See James Brooke, “Even in Frigid North, Hints Ice Free”, The New York Times, 5 September 2000, p of Warmer Temperatures”, The New York Times, 10 A3. October 2000, p F1; David Crary, “Warming No Friend to Canada”, The Associated Press, 14 Decem- 3Brian McDonald, Operations Officer, Canadian ber 1998; Ian Stirling, “Running Out of Ice”, Natural Coast Guard, Regional Operations Center Sarnia, History, March 2000, p 92; and Brian McAndrew, Central and Arctic Region, Summary of Northern “Arctic Feels Chill of Global Warming”, The Toronto Operations 1997–2000, e-mail 6 January 2001. The Star, 15 November 2000, p A17.

Canadian icebreaker Simon Fraser provided escort to 11 the St Roch II, while USCG Healy was conducting ice Ola Johannessen et al, “Satellite Evidence for trials while enroute Seattle. The two cruise ships in- an Arctic Ice Cover in Transformation”, Science, De- cluded the powerful Russian icebreaker Kapitan Dra- cember 1999, p 1937. nitsyn and the Bahamas registered ice-strengthened 12Claire Parkinson et al, “Arctic Sea Ice Extents, cruise ship Hanseatic. The final vessel was the small Areas, and Trends 1978–1996”, Geophysical Research schooner eco-charter Evohe. Letters, 1999, pp 20, 853. 4 This statement is not entirely correct, for the 13Claire Parkinson, “Variability of Arctic Sea Ice: shortest distance from Baffin Bay to the Bering Strait The View from Space, An 18 Year Record”, Arctic, is actually over the pole, but this route would require December 2000, p 351. the most significant, that is total diminution of the ice 14 regime to become feasible to surface ships. Drew Rothrock et al, “Thinning of the Arctic Sea-Ice Cover”, Geophysical Research Letters, 1999, 5 William M. Leary, Under Ice: Waldo Lyon and p 3469. the Development of the Arctic (Texas: Texas A&M 15 University Press, 1999) 187. It should be noted, how- Richard Monastersky, “Sea Change in the Arc- ever, that the shortest route for a nuclear submarine to tic”, Science News, February, 1999, p 104. follow is through either Nares Channel or Jones Sound 16John Falkingham, “Sea Ice in the Canadian and thence across the Arctic Ocean. However, Parry Arctic in the 21st Century”, Canada: Canadian Ice Channel may be particularly attractive on account of Service Report, September 2000, p 2. its width. 17While Russian ice records were not consulted, 6William D. Smith, Northwest Passage (New the report of ice conditions during the spring 1998 York: American Heritage Press, 1970), p 132. voyage of the icebreaking oil tanker MV Uikku, as part 7For the sake of comparison, Canada’s most of the Arctic Demonstration and Exploratory Voyage powerful icebreaker, the Louis S. St. Laurent, has main into the Kara Sea, was the source of the ice informa- engines rates at only 27,000 hp. tion. The voyage was undertaken to prove the feasibil- ity of tanker shipments from new oil fields on the 8 Robert L. Wolfe, Canada’s Contribution of Yamal Penninsula and was very similar to the feasibil- Arctic Shipping Data for 1997 and 1998 (Canada: ity study of the Manhattan in 1969–1970. See website Transport Canada, 2000), p 25. at http:/arcdev.neste.com 9 Approximately five bulk carriers take advantage 18Jinlun Zhang et al, “Recent Changes in Arctic of the navigation season to ship mineral concentrates Sea Ice: The Interplay Between Ice Dynamics and from two eastern Arctic mines, including the Polaris Thermodynamics”, Journal of Climate, September Mine on Little Cornwallis Island and Nanisivik on 2000, p 4006. northern Baffin Island. These mines are forecast to 19 close in 2005 and 2002 respectively. A third, the Rag- Ibid, p 3112. lan Mine on Hudson Strait also employs ice strength- 20Parkinson, p 2. ened shipping. Of these ships, only the Canadian built MV Arctic is icebreaker rated and capable of opera- 21James Morison et al, “Recent Environmental tions outside of the summer navigation season. Be- Change in the Arctic: A Review”, Arctic, December tween 1969 and 1985, Panarctic Oils Ltd made 19 oil 2000, p 366. and gas discoveries in the high-Arctic islands, necessi- 22Ibid, p 369. energy reserves of the north in the face of rising natu-

23 ral gas costs and dwindling southern reserves required John Falkingham, personal correspondence of for electrical generation. This is generating intense lecture summaries from the Second Wadati Conference public debate regarding the exploitation of known on Global Change and the Polar Climate, Japan 7–9 reserves under the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve in March 2001. Alaska. At the same time, Nunavut has opened the 24Konstantin Vinnikov et al, “Global Warming Sverdrup Basin for renewed exploration, an area con- and Northern Hemisphere Sea Ice Extent”, Science, taining 10 percent of Canada’s conventional oil re- December 1999, p 1936. source (discovered plus potential) and 23 percent of the gas. See “Let’s Drill for Oil”, Wall Street Journal, 25 Keith Dixon, “Changes Simulated in Arctic Sea 18 January 2001, p A26; and “Canada’s High Arctic Ice in Some GFDL CGCMs”, website www.gfdl.gov/ Draws New Interest”, Oil and Gas Journal, January ~kd/KDwebpages/NHice.html 2001, p 29. 26 John Falkingham, personal correspondence of 37Brigham, Lawson W. Personal correspondence, lecture summaries from the Second Wadati Conference 9 April 2001. Captain Brigham, USCG (Ret.) is an on Global Change and the Polar Climate, Japan 7–9 expert on Arctic shipping, particularly with respect to March 2000. Russia. He is an Arctic Senior Associate, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge. 27Ibid. 38A number of prominent newspapers have re- 28See “Arctic Shortcut for Shipping Raises New cently published stories expressing sovereignty and Fears in Canada”, The New York Times, 29 July, 2000, security concerns in Canada’s north while quoting p A1; “Shipping’s New Ice Age”, Traffic World, 1 Canadian military officers regarding the nature of the February 1999, p 23; “Northern Thaw Raises Defense threats. See David Pugliese, “Arctic Defence Costs Concerns — A Canadian Waterway Free of Ice May Could Cripple Military”, Ottawa Citizen, 8 December Bring Commerce-and Foes”, The Wall Street Journal, 2000; Joel Baglolw, “Northern Thaw Raises Defence 20 December 2000. Concerns — A Canadian Waterway Free of Ice May 29Peter Timonin, “UFOs — Unaccustomed Float- Bring Commerce — an Foes”, Wall Street Journal, 20 ing Objects!” TC Express, March 2000, p 2. December 2000, p A14; James Brooke, “Arctic Short-

30 cut for Shipping Raises Fears in Canada”, The New Bernie Boucher, OMNITRAX Vice President York Times, 29 July 2000, p A1. Marketing, personal correspondence, February 2001. 39 31 Canada: Report of the Standing Committee on Brian McDonald, Operations Officer, Canadian Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and Coast Guard, Regional Operations Center Sarnia, the Circumpolar World”, April 1997, Chapter 4, p 1. Central and Arctic Region, Summary of Northern Operations 1997–2000, e-mail 26 January 2001. 40Canada: Department of National Defence,

32 “Arctic Capabilities Study”, Canadian Forces Northern The Noril'sk nickel and copper industrial com- Area Headquarters, 1December 2000, Chapter 10, pp plex and oil fields on the Yenisei River require year 4–5. The study contends that the shipping will in- round shipping support as does oil and gas production crease exponentially, pollution and accident rates will and exploration on the Yamal Peninsula. climb, and unauthorized exploitation of oil, water and 33Clases Lykke Ragner ed., The 21st Century — fish stocks may occur. Consequently, as a matter of Turning Point for the Northern Sea Route? (Dordrecht: preserving Canada's sovereignty claims over vast un- Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p 36. inhabited areas, a significant presence with military sensors and platforms is now required. 34 st Rolf Soether, in The 21 Century — Turning 41 Point for the Northern Sea Route? (Dordrecht: Kluwer Canada, Department of National Defence, Academic Publishers, 2000), p 37. “Arctic Capabilities Study”, Director General Strategic Planning, June 2000, p 6. 35 The M/V Manhattan had a draught of 16 me- 42 tres, while modern supertankers can draw up to 25 Ibid, p 7. metres. Modern S-Class container ships carrying 6000 43Mark Gaillard, “Sovereignty in Changing Arc- containers draw 14.5 metres. tic Waters”, DFAIT: Oceans Environmental and Eco- 36There is considerable American interest in the nomic Law Division, Legal Affairs Bureau — paper awaiting publication, 19 March 2001, p 2. 44Canada: Evidence, Standing Committee On hulled fleet oiler, HMCS Preserver on an Arctic sover- Foreign Affairs And International Trade, 9 May 1996, eignty patrol in 1991 was cancelled during the period p 21. of growing environmental awareness in the navy; the

45 Commanding Officer contended that he could not Ibid, p16. ensure due diligence taking a fully laden tanker into 46Gaillard, p 3. poorly charted waters for no apparent operational reason other than to show the flag. 47Ibid, p 4. 48Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, “Still Unresolved after 50 Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian- American Relations, 1946-1998”, The American Re- view of Canadian Studies, Autumn 1999, p 421. While the U.S. may someday use the argument that their submarines have used the strait and thus substan- tiating their assertion that it is an International Strait, this is considered a remote possibility and would not be in their best interest. 49Professor Donald McRae, University of Ottawa, correspondence with author, 12 April 2001. 50Donat Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law, 1988, cited by Donald McRae in “Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction”, CARC — Northern Perspectives, Winter 1994–95, p 5. 51Canada: Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence, 1994. 52Currently the Arctic fishery remains very limited, involving a handful of vessels working in the relatively southern waters of Davis Strait. There is no shortage of speculation, however, that major changes in the marine eco-system resulting from changes in ocean circulation would impact traditional fishing areas and could open Arctic waters to international competition. However, in a personal discussion with Ms. Liseanne Forand, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Sector, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, during presenta- tion at CF Staff College, on 31 January 2001, an im- minent fisheries concern does not exist. 53Discussion, Major Clarence Rainey, Operations Officer, Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) Trenton, 8 February 2001. Review of RCC Trenton’s SAR re- cords indicates that air and maritime SARs in the Ca- nadian area of the Arctic average approximately 30 incidents per year, with between 10 and 15 of these being related to shipping. 54The author participated in two NORPLOYs in HMCS Protecteur (1974) and Assiniboine (1975) visit- ing the high Arctic and numerous settlements. More- over, in 1987, the author sailed in CFAV Quest, with HMCS Cormorant in company during the last of the Arctic towed array trials into the western reaches of Lancaster Sound. A planned deployment of the single-