Security Sector Reform MODERN DEFENSE FORCE philippines Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippineS

Published by:

Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU) Department of Political Science Working Group on Security Sector Reform (WGSSR) 3/F Leong Hall, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City 1108 Ph Tel No: +632 426.6001 Email: [email protected] in partnership with

Armed Forces of the Philippines Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City 1110 Ph Tel. No.: +632 913.0952 Military Tel. No.: +632 911.6001 Military Line: +632 774.5625 Website: www.afp.mil.ph with funding support from:

Australian Aid Level 23-Tower 2 RCBC Plaza 6819 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, 1200 Tel. No.: +632 757.8100 Fax: +632 757.8268

Philippine Copyright ©2014

ISBN 978-971-550-691-5

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, except brief quotations for review, without permission in writing from the Authors.

Editor Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.

Copy Editors Kathline Anne S. Tolosa Mereniza C. Gomez Reyna Mae L. Tabbada Maribel Daño-Luna Alexis Jerome M. Tolibas Disclaimer Admin Support Ramona Liza M. Paulino This publication is produced by (or is a product of) Working Group on Security Sector Reform, Department of Political Layout & Design Science, Ateneo de Manila University with support from the Tyrone John A. Reyes Australian Aid. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions Email: [email protected] expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views Bernadette N. Patañag of the Australian Government. Email: [email protected] ABOUT THE BOOK

The authors have attempted to break apart the ten-point agenda towards a Modern TDefense Force to problematize and translate the big words into smaller, bite-sized, chewable pieces. The essays attempt to elaborate on the intricacies of the concept ‘modern defense force,’ and engage the reader to think through the issues.

The authors have extensive knowledge as regards the issues they have dealt with in their essays – some of them are military officers in active duty, others are researchers who were involved in actual policy research while in the Department of National Defense (DND) and/or Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), while others are academics involved in security research. The writers are part of the technical working group (TWG) created for this research publication while some were invited contributors.

The papers, prior to publication, were all subjected to thorough discussion by the TWG. While the essay-writer has full responsibility to his/her work, each paper was vetted, challenged, and debated upon by the entire TWG. The series of TWG discussions happened during the period January to December 2012.

No confidential information is revealed in any of the papers.

ABOUT THE BOOK iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

about the book iii

foreword vii chapters: 1 Dreaming of a Modern Defense Force 1 2 Policy Environment for a Modern Defense Force 11 3 Mapping Out the Legal Terrain of the Philippine Security Sector 25 4 AFP Modernization 39 5 AFP Force Structure 49 6 AFP Doctrine and Training 57 7 AFP Clear Operational Plans 65 8 Philippine Intelligence Community: A Case for Transparency 75 9 Civilian Engagement of the Military 87 10 Gender Inclusiveness in the Military 99 11 Ethnic Representation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines 109 12 Self-Reliant Defense and People-Centered Security 115 13 AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation 131 14 The Evolving Role of the AFP: Skewing Towards Non-Traditional Roles 141 15 Regional Cooperation on Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response 155 – Crisis or Opportunity? JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP 175 about the authors 177

TABLE OF CONTENTS v

FOREWORD

This publication comes at an auspicious time in the history of the Armed Forces of the Philippines T(AFP). In 2011, the AFP formally began its institutional reform with the adoption of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) “Bayanihan”. The IPSP puts on paper the positive strides that AFP units operating on the ground have accomplished. For many years, our soldiers and officers have carefully and painstakingly tried to rebuild their relations with communities and stakeholders, with lessons the IPSP Bayanihan has harvested and put into a formal document that now guides the doctrines and rules of engagements in the military. Alongside such efforts, the Major Services of the AFP embarked on crafting their respective transformation roadmaps, which allowed the units to collectively realize the future of the armed forces that they wish to become.

True to the spirit of multi-sectoral engagement, civilian-led advisory boards were created to help guide the transformation roadmaps in achieving their agenda, with distinguished members of the business, academe, and public service as members. Likewise, the AFP has also formalized its commitment to the Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations (running now to almost 180 CSO-members nationwide), to allow the group to be the oversight in the implementation of the IPSP Bayanihan. Since November 2011, the AFP and Bantay Bayanihan network has institutionalized the quarterly dialogue with AFP Unified Commands, Divisions, and Brigades that allowed for candid and serious discussions between AFP officers and civilian groups regarding combat and non-combat operations of the AFP.

The IPSP Bayanihan and the Transformation Roadmaps, together, serve as the platform of the AFP reform agenda. Most significant in these undertakings is the fact that the drive to transform is coming from within the organization. The AFP is transforming to be a better armed forces that is more responsive in the fulfillment of its constitutional mandate as protector of the people and the State. It is recognizing the changing landscape of the Philippines as a democratic country, and the need for the military institution to adapt to this changing environment. It recognizes the increasing demand to address and manage territorial concerns due to competing claims to resources.

I am happy that military officers and civilian researchers have worked very closely in the true spirit of Bayanihan to put together the essays in this publication. Indeed, the discussion in this publication will greatly help the AFP in further realizing the needed transformation that the military requires to become a credible and modern defense force, worthy of Filipino pride.

Maraming Salamat at Mabuhay ang Sandatahang Lakas ng Pilipinas!

GENERAL EMMANUEL T BAUTISTA AFP Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

FOREWORD vii

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 1 Dreaming of a Modern Defense Force by Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

The paradox of transitional societies is that eye of security groups, while groups supportive Twhile it attempts to strengthen and deepen of the state enjoy its friendship. During periods the institutionalization of basic governance of democratization, security forces naturally infrastructures, it also requires a significant experience, too, a transition – from “waltzing democratic space for people to engage with a dictator” 1 and exclusive power circles, to in democratic governance. It is a paradox periods where inclusivity and people engagement since institutionalization requires regularity, become the new normal. standardization, and routinization of practices, which are easily disrupted, sometimes even In the Philippine context, the military and the compromised if people’s engagement is not police forces were heavily utilized by the Marcos’ managed well. During transition period, different government during the infamous martial law era groups may push for specific policies and (1972-1983), and even way after the official lifting measures on how to address issues confronting of martial law until its fall in 1986. In more than society. If avenues for people’s participation a decade of the cozy relationship between the are unclear, this can have detrimental effects dictator and the security forces, hundreds have on the standardization-routinization demand reported to have been victimized by the state’s of institution building. Policies that are within strong hand, while others remained disappeared, the ambit of “good governance,” if unpopular, mostly those who belong to the opposition and/or can even succumb to public pressure. Yet, militant groups. people’s engagement in governance is also the fundamental essence of democracy. A healthy Naturally, when the failed coup d’etat of then level of people participation ensures that the Defense Minister Enrile produced the severing political system is relevant and responsive to of ties between the defense department people’s needs, and transparent and accountable and Malacanang (with then AFP Chief of Staff to merit the trust of the voting public. Fidel V. Ramos joining the beleaguered Enrile), the attitude of the people was expectedly Security governance is among the most ambivalent – largely due to the perception that it controversial and contested terrain in transitional was simply a staged play of the dictator, which societies. Society always has ambivalent feelings had one-too-many. It was the intercession of the towards security forces, depending on which late (Catholic church’s) Jaime Cardinal Sin that side of the fence they are in. This is precisely swayed the favor of the people and eventually due to the fact that it is the security forces – in produced the now famously regarded “people this essay, the military and the police – that are power”. In this historical juncture, it was the usually utilized by the state to protect its survival. military’s swinging of loyalty, from Marcos to Oppressive leaders use the military and police to Corazon Aquino2 that catalyzed the political suit their agenda – to quell dissent and remove change. This greatly changed the perception of possible roadblocks to their rule. Expectedly, people – especially the fence sitters – favorably groups critical of the state receive the watchful towards the military.

1 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy. Vintage, 1987. 2 Historical accounts of the event, however, claim that Enrile was not too eager to support President Corazon Aquino’s ascension to Presidency.

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The succeeding years of democratic transition (Weber, 1919).4 After all it is the military that is under President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), the primary instrument of the state to protect however, were peppered with several attempts its survival. This is the fundamental argument at power grab by the military, the same group on why the institution should be out of politics. that won the favor of the people due to their Finer (1975) argues that the military has the participation in the 1986 “people power.” ability to usurp power anytime it wants to, and the fact that it does not is a clear testament to its The second wave of “people power” in 2001 again professionalism. placed the military in the center of controversy. The withdrawal of support of the military from the During the administration of President Marcos, presidency of Joseph Estrada was, in military the Philippine Constabulary (PC)5 was the primary parlance, a mutiny, but it produced the desired unit that managed and handled internal security, result – the stepping down of the President with the rest of the military acting as support from the seat of power.3 This showed again the units. Dealing with internal armed threat groups, capacity of the military institution as a decisive therefore, falls in the lap of the PC. The PC was, force during historical crossroads. to a large extent, similar to the gendarmerie of Western countries where it functions as a ‘hybrid’ As shown, in both 1986 and 2001, it was the police and military, and handles internal threats. military that served as the ‘swing vote’ that changed the direction of events. The key role that The administration of President Corazon the military played in crucial historical junctures Aquino (1986-1992) adopted peace negotiation is also the source of the mixed feelings of the with armed threat groups as a major pillar of people toward it. its security policy. There was an attitude of reconciliation, viewing the armed threat groups no longer as adversaries but as possible partners in The Crucible: development. With the internal threat seemingly Internal Security Operations (ISO) lessened due to the progress of the peace talks,6 the need for internal security operations was In a democratic and fully functioning state, the also lessened. This somehow justifies the move monopoly of use of legitimate force is lodged to collapse the PC with the Integrated National only with the state, through its military and police Police (INP), hence the new entity PC-INP was

3 This act was regarded by the Supreme Court as tantamount to resignation, hence, the swearing in to the Presidency of then Vice President Gloria Arroyo. 4 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” (speech, Munich University, 1919). 5 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People (Manila: New Day Publishers, 2000), 207. The Philippine Constabulary was the nucleus of the Philippine Army during the Martial law regime. 6 The peace talks with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front, however, eventually collapsed under the watch of President Corazon Aquino. It was only the peace negotiations with the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) that was signed under her leadership.

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born. This later on was further transformed to the Continuous involvement of the military in internal now Philippine National Police (PNP).7 The major security affairs would have great repercussion on change was the removal of the semi-military or the force structure of the AFP service units, the constabulary character of the unit, fully clothing military code of conduct; the rewards, sanctions, it with civilian identity and function, and placing and promotion mechanism, and the capacity of it under the Department of the Interior and the institution for external defense. Local Government. In short, the police was fully integrated in the government bureaucracy. With Given the renewed thrust of the Aquino the PC out of commission, dealing with armed administration (2010-2016) to peace talks and threat groups was left with the civilian police political negotiations with armed groups, there as it was regarded more as a law enforcement again is renewed discussion as regards the role of concern rather than an ISO (see RA 6975). Note the AFP in internal security operations, especially however, that while the police was civilianized, since the peace settlements are steadily moving the armed threat groups (e.g. the Moro National forward. The basic contention is, if armed Liberation Front, New People’s Army, private groups will forge political settlements with the armed groups) continued to function as guerilla government, they will no longer be considered units, with military-like chain of command and ‘threats’, and hence, any infraction will be a law- were still equipped with high-powered weapons. enforcement concern, an issue well within the Unfortunately, when the function of going after ambit of police function. With less of its force them was transferred to the police, the capability committed to ISO, more attention and resources upgrade of the police force, both in materiel and of the AFP can now be devoted to improving its training, remained wanting. A civilian-trained and basic and fundamental function in a democratic bureaucratized police dealing with armed guerilla state that is, protecting the territorial integrity and fronts is an obvious mismatch that would have sovereignty of the country. The crucible, however, great repercussions in effectively quelling armed is the lesson learned in transferring ISO to the dissidence. police in 1992, and back again to the military in 1998. As shown, the sudden shift in transferring The institutional limitation of the police prompted ISO from AFP to PNP was not a good move. President Ramos (1992-1998) to shift again the A clear plan and transition strategy is key to security policy, calling on the military to again take generate a win-win solution to peace and security the lead in internal security concerns (see RA concerns. 8551 [Sec. 3], 1998). The difference this time was that there was no longer a hybrid or semi-military This is the context by which the concept of a Constabulary to take on the internal security modern defense force is framed. operations (ISO). Hence, it was the entire military institution, instead of just a unit, that was drawn into the ISO arrangement.

7 see Republic Act 6975, as amended by RA 8551 and RA 9708.

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Modern Defense Forces of the entire process to professionalize is coming from within the ranks of the institution rather than Despite the positive developments in the peace externally driven. This is what makes it interesting. tables and the impending gradual disengagement of the AFP in select areas, the reality remains The ten-point agenda below attempts to that the military shall continue to engage in ISO capture this momentum for reform. A large part whenever it is necessary, until such time that of the ideas presented are actually culled from the police develops the necessary capability formal and informal conversations with military and institutional grounding in taking on the lead officials. The humble contribution of this essay role in ISO. The concept of defensive forces is the attempt to put the ideas in a cohesive and relative to internal security, therefore, requires organized fashion. the broadening of the imagination to include both the military and the police. It is a concept The 10-point agenda towards a Modern put forward as the long-term agenda of security Defense Force: reform initiatives. In order to provide for effective and efficient For this publication, however, the theme revolves provision of security (state security and people around the security reform agenda necessary security) that satisfies the demands of a for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to move democratic state, it is necessary that the armed closer to becoming a modern defense force. In forces: simple terms, a modern defense force is one that has the capacity and capability for effective and • are trained and equipped to suit the strategic efficient provision of security that satisfies the domestic and regional environment; demands of a democratic state, contributes to regional stability, and operates within a framework • maintain an appropriately-sized force of democratic governance, rule of law, respect for structure for its army, navy, marines, and human rights and international humanitarian law. air force, whose size is consistent with the internal-external security demands; The relevant question, hence, is how to create this professional and modern defense force? This • has sound organizational set-up that concern, to a large extent, reflects the dilemma of maximizes the strengths of the institution and security governance in transitional societies. The ably complements its weaknesses; push and pull of the need for order and control on the one hand, and the need for inclusivity and • has sufficient budget to support its operations; accountability on the other permeate the whole discussion on security. What makes the entire • can contribute to national and international process noticeable is the fact that we have an goals of peace and security. armed force that has been used to perpetuate power and privilege during the dictatorship period, The armed forces is expected to operate within but is now struggling to make itself professional a framework of democratic governance, rule of and democratically accountable – and the driver law, respect for human rights and international

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humanitarian law. A clear showing that these to ensure that the training and education values are respected are the following: of the military personnel are consistent with the demands of the strategic environment • The Armed Forces is under civilian authority; 2. The Armed Forces maintain an appropriately- • There is clear mechanism for feedback sized force: between the Armed Forces and civilians; • Clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities • The armed forces abide by the principles of of the military and the police in so far as accountability and good governance; internal security is concerned.

• The armed forces abide by the principles of • The force structure of the armed forces human rights and international humanitarian must be consistent with its internal-external law; security tasks.

• The armed forces have representative • There has to be a clear policy that composition in terms of gender, and ethnicity; defines situations needing military action, and situations needing law-enforcement/ Obviously, pursuing the ten-point agenda would police action. have operational and policy implications. Listed below are the key action points for each of the 3. The Armed Forces has sound organizational agenda: set-up that maximizes the strengths of the institution, and ably complements its 1. The Armed Forces are trained and equipped weaknesses. to suit their strategic domestic and regional environment. To do this, the following are the • The military institution must introduce necessary interventions: integrated approaches to policy development, military expenditure, human • There is a need to strengthen the process for resource planning, and management of reviewing security threats and developing the military assets. capacity of the state to respond to them; • It should improve the career development of • It is important to capacitate the armed forces military personnel. with modern equipment necessary to support its mission; • The institution must promote a transition and resettlement plan for those leaving the armed • It is necessary for the country to develop a forces. self-reliant defense program; • It must establish clear feedback channels • The training and education of military between force employers (users) and personnel must be improved; there is a need providers (deployment unit).

1 DREAMING OF A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE 7 Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

4. The Armed Forces have sufficient budget to 7. The Armed Forces have clear mechanism for support its operations. feedback from civilians:

• The state must have clarity in national policy • Encourage civil society debate, improve regarding the share of “security mission citizens’ awareness and engagement with areas”8 in the national budget. defense reform issues. • There must be clear mechanism for civilian • The expectation between the demand of oversight on security forces. transparency in government procurement process should be balanced with the need 8. The Armed Forces abide by the principles of to satisfy the military specs in equipment and accountability and good governance: materiel purchase. • It complies with the requirements imposed • There has to be a clear state policy regarding by the Central government as regards budget-sharing of local government units and transparency and accountability. AFP in disaster response and humanitarian mission. • Metrics on grievance, reward, and punishment regarding AFP personnel are 5. The Armed Forces can contribute to national clearly stipulated. and international goals of peace and security. 9. The Armed Forces abide by the principles of • Strengthening regional arrangements for human rights and international humanitarian military cooperation, confidence building, law. arms control and disarmament. • Establish clear Standard Operating 6. The Armed Forces is under civilian authority: Procedures (SOP) regarding complaints on HR/ IHL violations. • There must be clear constitutional and legal framework regarding the role of the military in • Communicate to public the HR-IHL SOPs of state building and national security. the AFP.

• Clarify and strengthen the accountability 10. The Armed Forces have representative lines in the chain of command. composition in terms of gender and ethnicity;

8 ‘security mission areas’ are the assigned tasks given to the military. Internal security operations (ISO) is one mission area, while humanitarian assistance and disaster response is other mission area. Regional peacekeeping work is another mission area, as well as the territorial defense function. Other mission areas include ‘support to national development.

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• There must be a clear policy that promotes equal opportunity in the defense sector.

• There must be a clear program to improve the gender sensitivity of the institution.

• An affirmative action to increase the number of ethnic representation in the AFP must be initiated.

As a final note – defense reform is not just about changes in management or organizational structure. Its main agenda is changing mindsets, perspectives, and most importantly, security policies. Pursuing the ten-point agenda of a modern defense force, this publication believes, would allow the AFP to move closer to its dream of becoming a world class military worthy of the pride and confidence of the Filipino people. SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 2 Policy Environment for a Modern Defense Force by Kathline Anne Sigua Tolosa Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE

Anchored on the basic tenet “the military is an instrument of policy,” this article pieces together a picture of a “modern defense force” based on existing national policies on defense and security.

A look at existing policies from the National Defense Act of 1935 during the Commonwealth era to the most recent National Security Policy 2011-2016 shows an ever-expanding role for the Philippine military. Over time, the military has been increasingly called upon to perform tasks beyond the core specialization of soldiery. True to its nature, the military does as the policies say. However, the military cannot perform its varied missions through sheer talent and fighting spirit alone. In this light, the article traces laws and policies that sought to develop the capabilities of the military for it to reach fully mission-capable readiness levels. Juxtaposing the two sets of policies, the article discovers that modernization policies are playing catch up to the expanding roles of the military.

Nonetheless, the article finds that one can form a coherent picture of a modern defense force: one that is fully mission capable. The article asserts in the end, however, that this picture is but a portion of the bigger puzzle of security sector reform. It asserts that modernizing the country’s defense force must extend beyond reforms and capability development in the military. Equally, if not more important, is the modernization of existing policies and other institutions in the security sector. The article ends by calling for these efforts to be framed within a coherent national security sector reform agenda.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Locating the military in national government agencies. This is embodied in security planning and policy making the national security planning process. Simply illustrated, the process flows as such. All policies The military is an instrument of policy. This is and programs of the state are anchored on the Tespecially true in a society such as the Philippines Constitution. From the Constitution, relevant where the military is assumed to be under the firm laws are passed by Congress. Based on democratic control of civilian authorities. In the the Constitution and other pertinent laws and words of Huntington (1957), “the superior political issuances, the National Security Council then wisdom of the statesman (over the military) must crafts the National Security Policy and the National be accepted as a fact.” In a democratic state, Security Strategy. From these, the Department the military receives its marching orders from of National Defense draws its National Defense the civilian government as the representatives Strategy. Based on the National Defense Strategy, of the Filipino people. The supremacy of civilian the Armed Forces of the Philippines then crafts authority over the military is enshrined as early its own policies on how it will perform its role as the 1935 Philippine constitution, which states, in the attainment of national security goals and “The President shall be commander-in-chief the safeguarding of national interests. Currently, of all armed forces of the Philippines.” 1 The these plans are the National Military Strategy, the Commonwealth Act No. 1 reiterated this principle Unilateral Defense Plan, and the Internal Peace in Article 1, Section 2 (d), to wit: and Security Plan Bayanihan.2

“The civil authority will always be supreme. Moreover, the military’s performance of its The President as the Commander-in-Chief role is subject to the oversight and control of of military forces, shall be responsible that civilian government institutions. The Department mobilization measures are prepared at all of National Defense is the lead line agency times.” in formulating national defense and security policies, plans and programs.3 The Defense This principle was further upheld in the 1987 Department likewise exercises supervision and Constitution and subsequent laws and policies control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines.4 thereafter. In addition, performing oversight roles on the military are the National Security Council, the In other words, the military implements national House of Representatives and the Senate, the security and defense policies crafted by civilian Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman,

1 1935 Philippine Constitution, Section 11. (2) 2 The National Security Planning Process is further discussed in Kathline S. Tolosa and Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Revisiting the Policy Environment on Peace and Security (Quezon City: ADMU, 2013). 3 Executive Order No. 112 of July 9, 1999, Re-Directing the Functions and Operations of the Department of National Defense, Section 2. 4 Executive Order No. 292 of July 25, 1987, Administrative Code of the Philippines, Book IV, Title VIII, Subtitle II, Chapter 1 – General Provisions, Section 18. Organizational Structure.

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and constitutional commissions, specifically the military is expected to perform. Consequently, the Commission on Human Rights and the a modern defense force’s form (structure, Commission on Audit. capability, technology, etc.) must be dictated by its function. Based on key defense and security It follows, therefore, that when one draws a policies, this section traces the evolution of the definition of a Modern Defense Force, it cannot roles and functions given to the Armed Forces of simply be from the point of view of the military. the Philippines from 1935 to present. It has to be firmly grounded on national laws and policies on defense and security. It is in this During the Commonwealth period, the prime light that this paper engages in a conversation duty of the Government was the protection of the with relevant policies in an attempt to surface a state and all citizens may be required to render definition of a Modern Defense Force. This paper military or civil service.5 The armed forces may be treats the picture of a Modern Defense Force as a called upon by the President, as Commander-in- puzzle, with its pieces drawn from existing policies Chief, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, on security and defense. It hopes to surface invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent these pieces, the specific aspects and angles danger thereof.”6 Under Commonwealth Act No. 1 of a Modern Defense Force; how it is imagined, or “The National Defense Act” of 1935, the military what roles the force is expected to play, and how is the Army composed of the Regular Force7 and this modernization is to be achieved. Lastly, this the Reserve. The Philippine Constabulary was paper then attempts to piece them together into a likewise transferred under the control of the Chief more coherent picture. of Staff. It is given the primary task of ensuring internal security (lawless violence, insurrection, or rebellion) and the performance of police duties The Roles of the Philippine Military: in peacetime and wartime but may also be called Protector of the People, Plus, Plus upon in case of invasion or national defense. Ergo, the military in 1935 was organized as a The standard architectural maxim “form follows ground force, a territorial organization, adapted function” is often applied in military decision as closely as possible to the territorial and making for identifying the force structure and administrative organization of the Philippines. military technology that must be evolved to meet military needs. In layman’s terms, this means As a side note, back then, there was no Navy or the military’s force structure, capability and Air Force yet.8 In fact, in the 1935 Constitution, technology must be based on the functions that Filipinos still owed allegiance to the United

5 1935 Philippine Constitution. Article II – Declaration of Principles, Sec 2. 6 1935 Philippine Constitution. Article VII – Executive Department, Sec. 11 (2). 7 The Regular Force is composed of the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Field Artillery, the Coast Artillery Corps, the Air Corps, the Corps of engineers, the Signal Corps, and the active elements of the Offshore Patrol; the General Staff Corps; the Services consisting of the Adjutant General’s Service, the Judge Advocate Service, the Quartermaster Service, the Medical Service, the Ordnance Service, and the Chaplain Service, the professors and officers and enlisted men as may be provided for, and of the Constabulary. 8 The U.S. Navy patrolled the Philippine’s waters until July 4, 1946.

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States.9 This is because the Commonwealth Republic of the Philippines against enemies, administration was a transitional arrangement foreign and domestic; with the end view of preparing the country for independence. It is assumed therefore that the 2. Promote and advance the national aims, territorial nature of the military and the dependence goals, interests and policies; on the United States for external defense were intended as transitional arrangements as well, 3. Plan, organize, maintain, develop and deploy with the country eventually developing its own its regular and citizen reserve forces for capabilities for external defense. national security; and,

By 1987, the Armed Forces of the Philippines 4. Perform such other functions as may be (AFP) was anointed the “protector of the people provided by law or assigned by higher and the State.”10 It was given the goals of authorities.14 securing the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.11 All members of Clearly, from the twin roles of ensuring internal the Armed Forces are bound by an oath to uphold security and territorial defense under the and defend the Constitution.12 Moreover, with the Commonwealth-era laws, additional functions country emerging from the shadows of the martial have been given to the military. This expansion of law era, the 1987 Constitution sought to clearly roles is a natural consequence of the broadened define the role of the military as an instrument role of its “mother unit”, the DND, which is to of policy and thus, decreeing that no member guard the State against external and internal should be involved in partisan politics, except in threats while providing support for social the exercise of their right to suffrage.13 and economic development. The military likewise moved away from its transitional force While the 1987 Constitution clipped the political structure under the Commonwealth regime to wings of the military, Executive Order No. 292 an Armed Forces of the Philippines comprised or the Administrative Code of the Philippines of the following major services: Philippine Army, provided for an expanded role of the AFP, under Philippine Air Force, Philippine Navy, Philippine the auspices of the Department of National Coast Guard, and the Philippine Constabulary. Defense (DND). Its roles are spelled out, to wit: Evidently, this signals an attempt to develop its own capabilities for external defense 1. Uphold the sovereignty, support the while performing police and coast guard Constitution, and defend the territory of the functions as well.

9 1935 Philippine Constitution. Ordinance Appended To The Constitution. Section 1 (1). 10 1987 Philippine Constitution. Article II – Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 3. 11 Ibid. 12 1987 Philippine Constitution. Article XVI – General Provisions, Section 5 (1). 13 1987 Philippine Constitution. Article XVI – General Provisions, Section 5 (3). 14 Executive Order 292, “Administrative Code of 1987”, Title VIII. National Defense, Subtitle II. Department of National Defense, Chapter 6. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Section 33. Functions.

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Three years later, the military’s police functions Philippines to assume the primary role and and internal security role were removed15 by the Philippine National Police (PNP) to play virtue of Republic Act 6975 or the “Department of the supportive role in the area concerned.” 16 the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990” with the creation of the Philippine National Police With the AFP relieved of its internal security and the transfer of the primary role of preserving function, it is assumed that it can now re-allocate internal security, with some considerations, to the its resources to the other functions given to it. Department of the Interior and Local Government Thus, in a bid to modernize the armed forces of (DILG), to wit: the Philippines, the Congress sought to develop the AFP’s capability to (a) uphold sovereignty and “Section 11. Relationship of the Department territorial integrity; (b) assist civilian agencies in with the Department of National Defense. – the preservation of the national patrimony; (c) During a period of twenty-four (24) months protect the Filipino people from armed threats from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed and natural and man-made disasters; (d) assist in Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue the enforcement of domestic and foreign policies its present role of preserving the internal and as well as international covenants; (e) support external security of the State: Provided, That the PNP in law enforcement and ISO; (f) fulfill said period may be extended by the President, the country’s international commitments; and, if he finds justifiable, for another period not (g) support national development.17 Plainly, the exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after transfer of internal security operations to the PNP which, the Department shall automatically was not simply to allow the AFP to focus on its take over from the AFP the primary role of primary role for external security. In fact, there is preserving internal security, leaving the AFP an expansion of its roles which, by 1995, include to its primary role of preserving external responding to natural and man-made disasters, security. However, even after the Department support to law enforcement and ISO, and support has assumed primary responsibility on to national development. There is also a reiteration matters affecting internal security, including of its role as an instrument of foreign policy. the suppression of insurgency, and there are serious threats to national security and It must likewise be emphasized that considerations public order, such as where insurgents for the eventual (i.e. after a minimum of 2 years have gained considerable foothold in the or a maximum of 4 years from the passage of the community thereby necessitating the law) and full transfer of the primary role in internal employment of bigger tactical forces and the security to the Philippine National Police (PNP) utilization of higher calibre armaments and stems from a recognition that the PNP, as a new better armored vehicles, the President, may, organization is not yet fully mission capable to upon recommendation of the peace and order address insurgency. Therefore, said transfer of council, call upon the Armed Forces of the function was not absolute. The law provided that

15 Later on, the Philippine Coast Guard was also established as a separate armed and uniformed service attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications by virtue of Republic Act 9993 of 2009. 16 Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the “Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990”, Section 11, December 13, 1990. 17 Republic Act 7898 otherwise known as the “AFP Modernization Act”, Sec. 3 – Objectives. February 23, 1995.

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military can be called upon, at any time, should These are: circumstances require, to take on the cudgels 1. internal security; of internal security. As history would tell us, this 2. territorial defense; is exactly what happened. In 1998, by virtue of 3. disaster response; Republic Act 8551, the primary responsibility of 4. support to national development; suppressing insurgency was given back to the 5. international defense and security AFP, to wit: engagements; 6. international humanitarian assistance and Section 3. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6975 peacekeeping operations; and, is hereby amended to read as follows: 7. force-level central command and control, support and training. “SEC. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense. In 2011, the National Security Plan (NSP) was – The Department of the Interior and Local issued, prescribing a comprehensive definition Government shall be relieved of the primary of national security. Accordingly, national security responsibility on matters involving the has seven (7) elements: socio-political stability, suppression of insurgency and other serious ecological balance, territorial integrity, external threats to national security. The Philippine peace and harmony, cultural cohesiveness, National Police shall, through information economic solidarity, and moral-spiritual gathering and performance of its ordinary consensus. Under the NSP, it is the policy of the police functions, support the Armed Forces state to “undertake the necessary steps to ensure of the Philippines on matters involving that the Filipino national community’s welfare, suppression of insurgency, except in cases well being, way of life, institutions and territory where the President shall call on the PNP to and sovereignty are enhanced and protected.” 18 support the AFP in combat operations.” This is divided into a two-fold goal: promote internal socio-political stability and capacitate the In 2004, within the ambit of the overall Philippine Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its Defense Reform Program of the DND, the territory and to provide protection to its maritime Secretary of National Defense (SND) issued the and other strategic maritime interests. Following first ever Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). the national security policy planning process, the The DPG intended to institutionalize a defense military has to anchor its plans on the NSP. planning system that is based on strategy and is responsive to capability needs. The To guide the performance of its internal security DPG followed the “tradition” of calling upon the role, the AFP came up with the Internal Peace military to perform such peacetime tasks beyond and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan in December the functional specialization of soldiery. It 2010. Under the Plan, the ISO function is divided identified seven mission areas that the Defense into four (4) strategic tasks: contribute to the Department, including the AFP should strategize, permanent and peaceful closure of all armed plan, implement, and develop capabilities for. conflict; conduct of focused military operations

18 Republic Act 8551 otherwise known as the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998,” Title II. The Role of the PNP in Counter-Insurgency Functions, Section 3, February 25, 1998.

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against armed threat groups; support community- 3. International Engagements, Humanitarian based peace and development efforts; and, carry Assistance and Peace Support Operations; out security sector reform initiatives in the AFP. and, These tasks are consistent with the thrusts and 4. Force-level C2 (command and control), objectives of the Philippine Development Plan support and training. 2011-2016 and the National Security Policy 2011-106. Starting with roles distinctly assigned to the coercive organs of the state (internal security What is remarkable in IPSP Bayanihan is the and territorial defense), the mandate of the paradigm shift that the entire military institution Philippine military has been gradually redefined takes in the conduct of its decades-long task and expanded. Based on existing policies, the of suppressing insurgency. Rather than the Philippine vision of a Modern Defense Force is traditional goal of defeating the enemy, the one that can address the armed component of military instead should focus on “winning the insurgency, defend the country’s sovereignty and peace” through a “whole of nation approach.” In territorial integrity, respond in times of natural or doing so, it seeks to conduct military operations man-made disasters, support in the delivery of the and support operations with the security and well- State’s international commitments, and perform being of the people as the foremost consideration a broad array of tasks in support to national and in concert with different stakeholders. This development. The title “protector of the people is termed as “people-centered security” within and the State” has been liberally interpreted to the ambit of human security. Flowing from this, include protection from non-military/non-armed IPSP Bayanihan emphasizes multi-stakeholder threats to the well-being of the people and the engagement and respect for human rights, State. international humanitarian law and rule of law as imperatives in the dispensation of its duties. In As an instrument of policy, the military does as addition to spelling out the principles that must the policies say. Whether it has the necessary underlie AFP internal security operations, IPSP capabilities to do so or not is another question. Bayanihan articulates a clear intention to move Military training, logically, remains to be focused away from internal security operations to give on honing the soldier’s professional specialization priority to territorial defense. of warfighting. It goes without saying, however, that a Modern Defense Force should be appropriately This intention was somewhat echoed in the 2013 organized, fully trained, sufficiently equipped, Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations adequately supported, and able to maximize its (IGRR) of the Revised AFP Modernization effectiveness for all of its functions,19 not just for Program. The seven (7) mission areas were internal security and territorial defense. To look at streamlined to four (4) mission areas: whether capabilities being developed are aligned with the vision for a Modern Defense Force, 1. Territorial Defense, Security and Stability; modernization and capability build up programs 2. Disaster Risk Reduction and Response; within and for the Armed Forces of the Philippines

19 Executive Order No. 112 of June 18, 1999, Re-Directing the Functions and Operations of the Department of National Defense, directs the entire Defense Department to maximize its effectiveness, i.e. maintain a mission capable status, for the performance of its functions.

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are discussed in the succeeding chapter. the Philippines.”21 The modernization process was to take place for a period of 15 years requiring a total budget of PhP 332 billion with Toward a Fully Mission Capable PhP 50 billion intended for the first five (5) years Defense Force of implementation. It was divided into five (5) components: The Commonwealth-era reliance on the United States for external defense, which was supposedly 1. force restructuring and organizational a transitional arrangement, remained even as the development; country gained its full independence. While the 2. capability, material and technology Armed Forces of the Philippines was reorganized development; into three Major Services (Army, Navy, Air Force), 3. bases/ support system development; the capability of the Navy and the Air Force were 4. human resource development; and, maintained at a dismal level and largely defined 5. doctrines and development. within the ambit of internal security. In fact, up until 1991 when the Philippine Senate rejected the Attention is drawn to the fact that while the renewal of the bases agreement, the Philippines projection primarily was a credible defense availed of a de facto security umbrella from US capability, the Modernization Act actually military presence in the country. The primary intended to develop a multi-mission capable responsibility for the defense of the country’s armed forces able to “engage in conventional airspace was given to the 3rd Tactical Fighter and/or unconventional warfare, disaster relief and Wing of the United States.20 rescue operations, and contribute to economic development and other non-traditional22 military The early 1990s sought to fill the gaps in the roles.”23 The goal, therefore, was not merely to country’s territorial defense capability. With the focus the military to territorial defense (though transfer of the internal security function to the PNP, this is the primary intention of the law) but also the AFP was geared towards external defense. to ensure that it can continue performing non- The Philippine Congress thought likewise. On warfighting tasks. February 23, 1995, the AFP Modernization Act was passed into law. It sought to “modernize The implementation of the Modernization the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to a Program would tell an altogether different level where it can effectively and fully perform its story.24 The dreams for a “modern” armed forces constitutional mandate to uphold the sovereignty were quickly dashed when an assessment of and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of defense capabilities in 2005 revealed that there

20 Kathline Anne S. Tolosa, “Owning Sovereignty,” OSS Digest, 4th Quarter (2008): 6. 21 Republic Act 7898, “AFP Modernization Act,” Sec. 2 – Declaration of Policy, 25 February 1995. 22 It can be argued that what is “non-traditional” to Western countries are actually the “traditional” roles that have been given to the Philippine military. 23 Republic Act 7898, “AFP Modernization Act,” Sec. 2 – Components of the AFP Modernization Program, para (a), 25 February 1995. 24 The fate of the 1995 AFP Modernization Act is further discussed in Tolosa, “Owning Sovereignty.”

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was virtually very little to modernize. What The Philippine Defense Transformation (PDT) capabilities the AFP had have been worn down Program intends to ensure that the Department by time and regular operations. There was a dire of National Defense is able to meet the strategic need to bring back the basic capabilities of the objectives laid down in the National Security AFP to acceptable levels of readiness. Thus, Policy of 2011-2016. These objectives are to instead of the Modernization Program, what promote internal socio-political stability and to were implemented instead were the Capability enable the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty Upgrade and Philippine Defense Reform over its territory and provide protection to its Programs. In addition, while the intention was for maritime interests.27 Thus, capability had to be the development of multi-mission capabilities, the developed to carry out five (5) strategic options: upgrade was focused on beefing up capabilities for internal security. The implementation was 1. securing the national territory and protecting likewise distinctly skewed towards materiel and strategic maritime interest; equipment upgrades, with very little attention 2. securing communities and supporting local given to ensuring that necessary skills and authorities; know how are transferred to the soldiers, 3. reducing the risks of natural and human- especially for the performance of non-warfighting induced disasters; tasks. Moreover, the release of funds for the 4. strengthening and expanding international Modernization Program is dismal to say the least, defense alliances and partnerships; and, with only PhP 33.9 billion released by the end of 5. strengthening the integrity of the defense the implementation period. establishment by subscribing to generally accepted principles of security sector reform. Nonetheless, gains have still been achieved under the AFP Modernization Plan though it The PDT attempts to balance modernization was not implemented according to plan. The of materiel and equipment on the one hand Philippine Defense Reform likewise resulted in with the modernization of knowledge and skills positive reforms inside the defense and military and transformation of mindsets on the other. institutions.25 The White Paper on Philippine This includes education and training so that Defense Transformation of 2012 takes stock of the military can work within the framework of these advancements and seeks to “sustain and the primacy of the peace process. Appropriate institutionalize the reform measures initiated skills for engaging other stakeholders in internal under the PDR Program” and to synchronize security are also sought to be developed, such the improvements in materiel and technology as the capacity for inter-agency and multi-sector capabilities under the AFP Modernization security cooperation and engagement activities, Program.26 enhanced knowledge of ethnic communities’

25 These are discussed in detail in Melanie Rodulfo-Veril, “AFP Modernization” in this book. 26 Department of National Defense, “Transforming the Department of National Defense to Effectively Meet the Defense and Security Challenges of the 21st Century: A White Paper on Philippine Defense Transformation,” July 2012. 27 National Security Policy 2011-1016.

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culture, customs, and traditions, key capabilities for strategic communications, and humane civil The AFP would be the first to say that disturbance control capabilities, among others. modernization and true reform does not happen simply through the acquisition of new equipment. The bid to rejuvenate modernization efforts of Particular attention has to be ensured to the AFP under the PDT was given a fresh breath improve the entire military institution in terms of of hope with the passage of Republic Act 10349 good governance and internal processes and also in December 2012, which established the systems. In addition to anchoring their plans and Revised AFP Modernization Program. This was programs on national policies on security, these supported with DND Department Circular No. 3, should likewise be moored to the institution’s series of 2013 or the Implementing Guidelines, shared mission, vision and core values. The Rules and Regulations (IGRR) of the Revised Philippine Navy took the initiative in 2006 and AFP Modernization Act. This effectively extends came up with the Philippine Navy Sail Plan 2020. the Legislative’s commitment to see through The Philippine Army followed suit and released the AFP’s modernization for another 15-year the Army Transformation Roadmap 2028. The period from 2013 with a promise of PhP 75 billion General Headquarters, AFP is currently in for the first five (5) years. While the Revised the process of coming up with an AFP-wide Modernization Program carries over the intention transformation and governance strategy. Looking of its precedent plan to beef up military capability at these transformation plans, the military for external defense and other mission areas, institution is telling us some things. First, the very the old and the new modernization plans differ nature of the institution requires that it is able to act into two points. First, instead of playing a support as one. This can be done by clearly linking each role to the PNP in internal security, the military’s individual’s tasks to the overall mission, vision new modernization program sought to “enhance and goals. This is done through the respective its capability in the conduct of Internal Security Governance Roadmaps. Second, equal attention Operations (ISO), particularly in the suppression must be paid to the non-tangible aspects of of insurgency and other serious threats to modernization – internal controls and systems, national security.”28 Second, from the intention training and education, morale and welfare, of developing and transforming the AFP into a ethics and values. Third, developing capabilities primarily external security-oriented force, the for a modern defense force takes time. Note that revised modernization program seeks to develop the Sail Plan charts the course for 16 years while and transform the AFP into a multi-mission the Army’s Roadmap spans 18 years. This means oriented force capable of effectively addressing that efforts must be sustained, holistic, consistent, internal and external security threats. and coherent.

28 Department of National Defense, Department Circular No. 3 of April 11, 2013, “Issuing the Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations of the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Act.” Article 1.1.2.

2 POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE 21 Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

Completing the puzzle: coherent that defines the parameters and limits of modern patches, missing pieces, sketchy defense force. framework When we look at the policies, we see consistency As we piece the different parts of the puzzle, we in the assignment of multiple roles to the military. can coherently form a picture of a modern defense But this does not mean that the multiple roles force. In a nutshell, this is an Armed Forces of assigned to the military cannot be looked at the Philippines that is fully multi-mission capable. and evaluated anew. At the very least, clear A look at the foregoing tells a story of a military parameters have to be set to define the roles with continually expanding roles with capability of the military. The limits, so to speak, to the development and modernization policies playing military’s involvement in internal security and catch up. Efforts under the current Aquino stability, support to law enforcement, and support administration are laudable. Finally, it appears to national development has to be clearly that the Philippines is committed to addressing the demarcated. yawning gaps in our military’s capability to protect the people and the State. As of January 2014, Therein lies the paradox of the military’s non- Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin involvement in partisanship politics. While said that a total of 36 modernization projects the military is required to separate itself from worth PhP 41.2 billion have been completed politics, national policies make this quite difficult and awarded under the current administration.29 to do so as the military is also required, in the In March 2014, the Philippines inked a contract same breath, to perform tasks that necessitate for the procurement of 12 Korea Aerospace its involvement in the broader service delivery Industries FA-50 fighter aircraft.30 Indeed, things and governance tasks. The military has to liaise are looking up as we see the beginnings of a with national government agencies and local modern defense force. politicians; at times it takes the role of “catalyst” for governance and service delivery in provinces and But a modern defense force is not reached municipalities that are strongly affected by violent through transformation, reforms and capability conflict. When the military prods underperforming development in the military alone. We realize local government officials, or even links local that the puzzle we are trying to piece together communities with their local government unit must not just show the necessary capabilities of and other relevant government institutions, it is the military to be mission-capable. This is but a inevitably exposed to politics. Ironically, it is the patch in the bigger picture of national security military that calls for its weaning out from internal planning. First we look at the border pieces of the security operations to a focus on territorial puzzle; those pieces that frame the entire picture, defense. No national-level policy calls for this

29 Frances Mangosing, “36 AFP Modernization projects completed under Aquino, says Gazmin,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 14, 2013, Accessed http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/563845/36-afp-modernization-projects-completed-under-aquino-says-gazmin. 30 Greg Waldron, “FA-50 buy puts Manila back in the jet business,” Flightglobal, March 28, 2014, Accessed http://www.flightglobal.com/news/ articles/fa-50-buy-puts-manila-back-in-the-jet-business-397548/.

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transition. Perhaps another look at the strategic Clear national interests, defined through broad assumptions made when policies were crafted consultations with a well-informed public, also can ascertain if these could have changed with cultivate a strong national will to modernize the positive developments in the peace process the military – a firm resolve to beef up the with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), military’s capabilities that is sustained even the Cordillera Bodong Administration - Cordillera after incursions in the country’s territory by other People’s Liberation Army (CBA-CPLA), and countries is highlighted in the news and social media. the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa The initial AFP Modernization Program faded – Pilipinas/ Revolutionary Proletarian Army/ into the background as the Chinese incursions Alex Boncayao Brigade Tabara Paduano in Mischief Reef also faded from the front Group (RPM-P/RPA/ABB TPG). The revised pages of national dailies. The administration of AFP Modernization Program, which ends in 2028, President Benigno S. Aquino has consistently includes the development of ISO capabilities. Do sought to safeguard the national territory we still see a role for the AFP in ISO post-2028? from day one. This is reflected in a sustained commitment to the revised AFP Modernization At the most ideal, the roles assigned to the Program. This national will must carry beyond the military must be anchored on a clearly articulated current administration and finally be seen to its national security frame based on national completion. security interests. While the National Security Policy identifies broad national objectives, If policies commit men and women in uniform it is silent on prioritization. It fails to identify to a certain task, then there must be firm which interest the Philippines, as a country, national resolve to commit full support to is willing to die for.31 This clear articulation of reach the objective. There must be a strong national priorities could then provide a firm national resolve to organize, train, and equip anchor and rationale for the painful decision them to ensure that they are fully mission capable to involve the military in functions beyond its to do so. For national commitment to happen, institutional specialization of warfighting. This there must be a clear understanding of why safeguards that the deployment of the military for such roles are given to the military. Moreover, “civilian tasks” is borne out of national interests commitment does not only mean the passage of rather than simply calling the military to fill in laws and allocation of resources. This involves gaps in service delivery that, for all intents the commitment to journey with the armed and purposes, should be done by the civilian forces in its modernization by seeing to it that the government. This also provides a clear basis other parts of the puzzle are completed as well. for the development of the military’s capabilities Now we look at the missing pieces of the bigger beyond its core tasks. picture.

31 The case for the need for a stronger and more coherent national security framing which will define core national security interests and priorities and from which will be drawn a National Security Policy and a National Security Strategy is discussed in more detail in Kathline S. Tolosa and Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Revisiting the Policy Environment on Peace and Security (Quezon City: ADMU, 2013).

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The hierarchical responsibility of the military, or general direction and milestones so that these its chain of command, directly places it under are done in harmony and synergy. civilian control. A big part of modernizing the armed forces is ensuring that it is under firm Civil society likewise plays an important role. democratic control under the supervision, A strong constituency for peace and security control and oversight of civilian government issues, with a clear understanding of democratic institutions. These institutions must be “fully institutions and values, the roles and functions of mission capable” as well. The legislative the military, can help frame a coherent strategy plays a significant role in the formulation of for reforms in the security sector. Civil society can national laws on security, in bringing the voice also further strengthen the modernization process of their constituents to national policymaking, by performing oversight and monitoring roles.32 in approving the budget for the military and ensuring transparency and accountability in Developing a modern defense force entails more spending. The Department of Defense is tasked than just modernizing the armed forces. It calls with the direction and supervision of the military. for the modernization of policies and the entire It is now undertaking its own transformation plan security sector as well. All of these efforts must be to ensure that it is fully capable of dispensing its done in unison, under a coherent framework of a tasks. Other institutions in the security sector clear national security sector reform agenda. The involved in preserving peace and security in the absence of one would mean that while reforms land should likewise be equally modernized. The may move forward, these would be done in Philippine National Police is undertaking its own patches, silos even. This poses the danger that, transformation roadmap. As the two institutions at the end of the day, we would be holding parts (the military and the police) pursue their own of different puzzles rather than coming together to tracks, national level policies must lay down the form a coherent whole.

32 One such effort is Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations that performs an oversight role in the AFP’s implementation of IPSP Bayanihan. Bantay Bayanihan likewise endeavors to create dialogue spaces to discuss defense and security issues as well as build a strong constituency for peace and security.

24 2 POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 3 Mapping Out the Legal Terrain of the Philippine Security Sector by Atty. Noel del Prado Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR

Upon the country’s reversion to democracy, the 1987 Philippine Constitution has mandated and established several oversight mechanisms to ensure that the Philippine security sector will never again return into a Martial law force characterized as highly-politicized, deeply- partisan and lacking in accountability.

The article examines the country’s legal foundations and the resultant institutional design and mechanisms which have the authority to control and the power of oversight over security forces such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). It provides an in-depth discussion of how the three (3) branches of government (i.e. executive, legislative, and judicial branches), autonomous constitutional bodies (i.e. CSC, COA, Office of the Ombudsman, and NAPOLCOM), and their agents carry-out their respective mandates and powers, and subsequently affect the administration and operations of the security forces.

The article asserts that the security forces were never insulated from the highly politicized culture and partisan environment despite the beauty and intent of the constitutional provisions and other legal instrumentalities to eradicate these socio-political illnesses. Instead of becoming more mature, these government entities relegated the security forces into becoming “gatekeepers of power” and “courts of last resort”. The article also characterizes the multi-layered security sector and oversight mechanisms as filled with the same institutional flaws attributed to the Marcosian regime: political misuse of security units, unaccountable bureaucracies, arbitrary policy-making, lack of transparency, risk- avoiding, amateurism, corruption, and nepotism.

In view of the institutional and legal gaps and shortfalls, the article offers several recommendations aimed at rationalizing, optimizing, and integrating the legal frameworks and policies which govern the security sector. It advocates for the reformation of institutions and the prevailing political culture that will veer the security forces and the rest of the government from the entrenched partisan politics. Furthermore, a comprehensive Security Plan and related policies should be enacted that will foster an integrated, whole-of-nation approach to national security.

26 3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

Introduction

In June 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino run and governed by representatives. The term assumedI office and declared that he is anchoring “democratic” refers to the manner, by which such his administration on a 16-point Agenda that is representatives are chosen, and the mode and built on a strong foundation of respect for human extent that such powers may be exercised by rights, which he appropriately denominated as the people’s agents. The people’s sovereignty is his Social Contract with the Filipino People. expressed, and its authority is exercised, through representatives. Thus, the President has embarked on a journey to attain a just, comprehensive, and lasting The Filipino people, coming from two (2) peace within the perspective of the rule of law, decades of martial rule that was characterized by eradicating the root causes of unrest, through by monopolies of power, wealth and influence, poverty reduction and empowerment of the poor and the inevitable abuses that are spawned by and vulnerable and transparent, accountable, a unitary system, have decided to delegate the and participatory governance. Likewise, the state authority to three (3) co-equal branches of President has vowed to translate the gains from government: the Executive, the Legislative, and good governance into direct, immediate and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within substantial benefits for the poor, by building the its own sphere, but their respective powers and capacities of, and the creation of opportunities for, authorities have inherent constitutional limits and the poor and marginalized; and increasing social may only operate within a well-defined system of protection and engaging the local government checks and balances.3 units in their own developmental processes.1 This research aims to map out the legal terrain of The Philippines is a democratic and republican the Philippine Security Sector. By demonstrating state.2 While government authority emanates how the legal frameworks and policy instruments from the people, the people do not directly have served to isolate and dis-integrate the exercise that authority. The Philippine Constitution principles of good security sector governance4, shuns a direct and unbridled rule by the people, we hope to build the philosophical, legal and and abhors the concentration of power on one policy “bridges” to rationalize, optimize and or a few. Thus, the Constitution has created a integrate the discordant and separate “islands” of government that is a “republican” state which is the Philippine security sector “archipelago”.

1 Executive Order No. 43 of May 13, 2010, Pursuing Our Social Contract with the Filipino People Through the ReOrganization of the Cabinet Clusters. 2 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 1, Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies. 3 Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003, the main decision and the separate opinion of Justice Vitug; Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998. 4 Carolina G. Hernandez, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND GOVERNANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES: “… looked at whether the principles of good security sector governance (transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, responsiveness) were present or absent in the security sector…,” Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, www.isdsphilippines.org

3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR 27 Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

Scoping the Legal Terrain: of good security sector governance, which are An “Archipelago” responsiveness, transparency, responsibility, accountability and wider participation, not just The policies relating to the Philippine Security among the formal security forces, but also among Sector may be likened to a landscape of the general citizenry. monolithic, self-contained and separate islands of legal frameworks, policies and rules. Their A study undertaken by the Institute for Strategic scope and application are defined within the and Development Studies found that martial law confines of their specialized mandates and and authoritarianism has not only destroyed the jurisdictions, but they are separated by “deep democratic processes and political institutions, but waters” of discontinuity, limited cooperation and also hindered the progress of the security sector non-integration. in several ways: (1) limitation of elite recruitment and elite circulation; (2) underdevelopment or Ironically, the Philippine Development Plan reversal of democratic institutions of governance; 2011-2016 recognizes that peace and security (3) the decline of the ethos of public service; (4) are indivisible, and adopts a “whole-of-nation politicization of appointments to the executive approach” that seeks to bring about a concerted departments including the foreign service, the effort towards national peace and security.5 courts, the constitutional bodies, the military and police officer corps, etc.; and, (5) failure to Even between and among the core security develop a responsible citizenry in a functioning forces, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) democracy, among other democratic political and the Philippine National Police (PNP), they development deficits.6 are separated by the following lines: These deficits in public order and security are 1. national government agency; not products of conscious decision-making, but surfaced only through the natural accretion of 2. geographical and political subdivisions; and historical events, social movements, and political upheavals. After the first EDSA Revolution, the 3. mechanisms for accountability. Filipino people sought to eradicate the evils of the unchecked abuses of the concentration of power, While these lines promote administrative and sought to disperse it by ushering in a regime efficiency, they do not promote the basic principles of “oversight” and an era of checks-and-balances.

5 Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016, Chapter 9: Peace and Security. 6 Carolina G. Hernandez, “Security Sector Reform and Governance in the Philippines,” Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, http:// www.isdsphilippines.org.

28 3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

Over-seeing the Security Sector: on the Armed Forces, when the President deems A Case of Over-Oversight? it as necessary, his judgment cannot be reviewed by the Court or the Legislature.9 The 1987 Philippine Constitution has decreed several oversight mechanisms to ensure that the security sector will never again regress into the Executive Oversight Marcosian armed force that is highly-politicized, deeply-partisan and lacking in accountability. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents The new Constitution declares that: “civilian the government as a whole and sees to it that all authority is, at all times, supreme over the laws are enforced by the officials and employees military”. 7 This principle finds practical expression of his department.10 The President is likewise in the constitutional designation of the President, vested with the broad authority to appoint the highest civilian official of the country, as the all executive officials, except for some high- “Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of level appointments that are subject only to the the Philippines”.8 The Constitution is quick to confirmation of the Commission on Appointments qualify and limit this supreme authority over the (CA), who are composed of representatives from military, and provides for a graduated manner of both Houses of Congress. exercising this executive power. Aside from the power of appointment, the In the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional President has the authority to directly assume Convention, it was clear from the clarifications of and exercise the functions of the executive Delegate Bernas that the President is authorized department, bureau and office or interfere with to exercise “graduated power” from being able to the discretion of its officials.11 He has control over call out the Armed Forces as may be necessary the executive department, bureaus and offices, to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion including all the Armed Forces of the Philippines or rebellion; to the power to suspend the writ of and the Philippine National Police (PNP). habeas corpus; until the exercise of the power to The President exercises the power of control declare martial law. The power to suspend the writ and supervision over the AFP and the PNP, of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial either directly or through the Secretaries of the law is subject to judicial review and conditioned Department of National Defense (DND) and the upon the concurrence of the National Assembly. Department of the Interior and Local Government However, in exercising the lesser power of calling (DILG), respectively.

7 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 3, Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies. 8 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 18, Article VII: Executive Department. 9 Joaquin G Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers. Rex Bookstore, 1995. 10 Sec. 17, Article VII: Executive Department, 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. [Emphasis supplied] 11 Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, 583 [1965].

3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR 29 Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

In recent years, the Office of the Presidential Administrative power is concerned with the work Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) has of applying policies and enforcing orders as likewise been constituted, through the broad determined by proper governmental organs.17 It administrative powers of the President under the enables the President to fix a uniform standard Revised Administrative Code, as an additional of administrative efficiency and check the official executive oversight of the security sector, with conduct of his agents.18 To this end, he can issue the end in view of pursuing peace negotiations, administrative orders, rules and regulations.19 while complementarily addressing the root causes of conflict, through the effective and Thus, any and all significant reforms in the sustained delivery of basic services, institution of security sector will necessarily entail an overhaul good governance, people empowerment, policy of the manner by which the President exercises reforms, and local economic development. his role as both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Executive of the institutions, organizations, Executive power generally refers to the power and operations of the core security forces. of the President of the Republic to execute and to implement the laws of the land.12 Executive power is vested in the President,13 and the cabinet Legislative Oversight secretaries who act as the President’s alter- egos, and whose actions and decisions, unless Congressional oversight is the broad power of the recalled or countermanded by the President, are Legislature to inquire into the implementation of for all legal intents and purposes, the acts and any and all official activities undertaken pursuant decisions of the President. It is generally defined to the laws that it has enacted. Both Houses of as the power to enforce and administer the laws.14 Congress likewise posses the inherent power to It is the power of carrying the laws into practical conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. operation and enforcing their due observance.15 Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution provides In the context of the security sector, the President that: “the Senate or the House of Representatives, is obliged to supervise the enforcement of the or any of its respective committees, may conduct laws for the maintenance of general peace and inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its public order. Thus, he is granted administrative duly published rules of procedure.” This power is power over bureaus and offices under his control founded upon the basic principle of necessity of to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.16 information in the crafting of legislative measures.

12 Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259, 305 [1927]. 13 Sec. 1, Article VII: Executive Department, 1987 Constitution. 14 Cruz, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW (1996): 173. 15 Tanada and Carreon, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 1 (1961): 275. 16 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, (1962): 234-235. 17 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 234. 18 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 235. 19 Blas F. Ople vs. Ruben D. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998.

30 3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

The enactment of laws should be informed by the may exercise the power of judicial review, in wealth of information and experience, culled from cases where the exercise of any official power or the operation of their offices; thus, the two Houses authority, by any branch or instrumentality of the of Congress have the inherent power to access government, to determine whether there has been that information and to compel the disclosure a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or thereof. This power of inquiry is exercised excess of jurisdiction, or not in accordance with, or through established congressional committees beyond, the limits imposed by the Constitution.21 such as, the Blue Ribbon Committee, National Defense Committee, Committee on Public Order and Safety, and such other ad hoc committees, Constitutional Oversight that the Congress in the exercise of their broad legislative power, may create and constitute. The 1987 Constitution created several oversight bodies that are intended to exercise specialized The power of legislative oversight covers all post- powers of review, inquiry and enforcement in the enactment measures undertaken by Congress: field of security and public order.

• to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; Constitutional Oversight: • to determine whether agencies are properly Civil Service Commission (CSC) administered; • to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; As the central personnel agency and human • to prevent executive usurpation of legislative resource organization of the national government authority; and, bureaucracy, the Civil Service Commission • to assess executive conformity with the (CSC) exercises concurrent jurisdiction over all congressional perception of public interest.20 personnel matters,22 including the disciplinary and administrative jurisdiction for violations of civil service rules and regulations. Judicial Oversight While the core security institutions have their The Supreme Court of the Philippines, as well own specialized human resources development as all lower courts of competent jurisdiction, programs for all levels and ranks, and their own

20 Primer on Separation of Powers, Inquiry in Aid of Legislation.”, http://jlp-law.com/blog/primer-separation-of-powers-inquiry-in-aid- legislation/. 21 Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphasis supplied] 22 Section 3, Article IX. B.: “The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.” [Emphasis supplied] 3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR 31 Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

mechanisms to promote accountability, the CSC accounts pertaining to the expenditure and use of sets the minimum standards for qualifications, public funds and property.23 All the core security advancement based on merit, accountability forces are subject to the broad audit powers of and due process requirements for administrative the COA. In fact, it is constitutionally prohibited investigations. While the military and police for Congress to pass laws that will have the effect have their own Judge Advocate General Office of exempting any government entity from the (JAGO) and Internal Affairs Service (IAS), jurisdiction of the COA.24 respectively, the Philippine Constitution provides for concurrent jurisdiction over all public officers and employees. Constitutional Oversight: Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) Republic Act No. 3019 tasks the CSC as the central repository of the records for all Statement The 1987 Philippine Constitution devoted a of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) of all whole article to “Accountability of Public Officers.” public employees and officials. In coordination And true to its general distrust of the military with the Office of the Ombudsman, the CSC establishment, the constitutional provision is authorized to conduct lifestyle checks on providing for the Office of the Ombudsman, all officials and employees of the security mandated that a separate Deputy for the military sector based on their baseline information and establishment may be appointed. The other subsequent submissions of the SALN. deputies of the Ombudsman correspond to the major island clusters of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Subsequent legislation implemented Constitutional Oversight: this constitutional prescription, and the Office of Commission on Audit (COA) the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs was created under Section 3 of R.A. 6770.25 Currently, The Commission on Audit (COA) is the supreme the Office of the Ombudsman has denominated audit institution of the Philippine bureaucracy. this Office as the Deputy Ombudsman for It is empowered under the 1987 Constitution to “Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers” or conduct examination, audit and settlement of all “MOLEO.”

23 Section 2. Article IX. D.: “(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government x x x (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. [Emphasis supplied] 24 Section 3, Article IX: Commission on Audit, 1987 Constitution. 25 Republic Act No. 6770, An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for Other Purposes, “The Ombudsman Act of 1989,” November 17, 1989.

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The Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO exercises of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). jurisdiction on all graft cases filed against the Thus, the authority over the police force would be following: shared between the NAPOLCOM and the local chief executives. The daily responsibilities and 1. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and functions of the police, including but not limited its service units; to: criminal investigation, crime prevention 2. Philippine National Police (PNP); and control, traffic control, peace and order 3. Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP); initiatives, are under the operational control of the 4. Bureau of Jail Management & Penology provincial governors, city and municipal mayors. (BJMP); The national police may, in certain exceptional 5. Bureau of Corrections; cases where the local police cannot cope with or 6. Philippine Coast Guard; and, handle the situation, come in and take control. 7. All civilian employees of the above agencies. The NAPOLCOM has been tasked with the larger administrative matters, among others, When these constitutional provisions were being the standardization of pay, professional training, debated upon during the 1986 Constitutional organization and operation of crime laboratories, Convention, there were extended debates on the and investigation of administrative and disciplinary need to insulate the security forces from politics. cases. The solutions explored were often based on clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, as well The PNP is now governed by Republic Act No. as the institutionalization of a system of inter- 6975. Under this law, the NAPOLCOM has been governmental checks and balances, that are re-organized as an instrumentality or agency of secured by a general constitutional prescription, the executive department, and thus, it is under and the use of the phrase “as may be provided the power of control of the President, and this for by law” to identify specific areas for further “control” is exercised through the line agency legislative determination. department head or the cabinet secretaries. The governors and mayors were given the power These constitutional and statutory focus on the to appoint, but this function has been declared security sector reveals a deliberate effort to by the Supreme Court as being exercised by subject the core security forces to closer scrutiny the local chief executives as deputies of the in terms of anti-graft monitoring and integrity NAPOLCOM, and as such, the decisions of the promotion. former, may be countermanded by the latter.26 RA 6975 likewise granted disciplinary powers to the People’s Law Enforcement Constitutional Oversight: Boards (PLEB), and made the decisions of National Police Commission the PLEBs appealable to the NAPOLCOM. (NAPOLCOM) The President exercises control and supervision over the national police force, The focus on the core security forces finds not pursuant to his power as commander- another constitutional foundation in the creation in-chief, but his powers as chief executive.

26 Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, 14 February 1992.

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While the objective of the constitutional provision oversight mechanisms, the Philippine security providing for a multi-level executive oversight of sector continues to reflect the highly-politicized the PNP, and the legislative enactment that was environment that has developed into its natural meant to enflesh this constitutional purpose, habitat. The inter-governmental oversight the same evils that has plagued the pre-1987 structures have not only ironically institutionalized Constitution security sector still hound our core political intervention into the security sector, but security forces to this day. have also informally installed the security sector as the “gatekeeper of power” and the “court of During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional last resort.” Convention, Commissioner Natividad, speaking about the dangers of giving full control over In its most palpable demonstration, the transition the police to the governors and mayors: “[b]y to power and installation of a replacement our experience, this has spawned warlordism, administration was made possible through the bossism and sanctuaries for vices and abuses.” pivotal withdrawal of support of the Defense Despite several layers, and in some cases, Secretaries, Chiefs-of-Staff of the Armed overlapping jurisdictions over the discipline Forces of the Philippines, and the Chiefs of the of the core security forces, we find the same Philippine National Police. This is the discernible structures, bumps and barriers in the security and indubitable formula for the two (2) EDSA sector landscape: Revolutions.

1. Political misuse of security units Even in the recently concluded impeachment 2. Unaccountable bureaucracies proceedings, no less than the Presiding Judge, 3. Arbitrary policy-making the Senate President of the Philippines, who 4. Lack of transparency himself served as the long-time Defense Secretary 5. Risk- avoiding of then President Marcos, when asked about 6. Amateurism the acceptability of the manner and outcome of 7. Corruption the highly political exercise, conceded that: “[t] 8. Nepotism he only one that can stop us is the might of the military.”27 All of these elements are present in the core institutions of the security sector in the Philippines The underlying principle of insulating the security today. They do not only prevent modernization, sector from partisan political activities and but they point to a fundamental irony, that political opportunism in the 1987 Constitution, despite the institutionalization of multi-layered has effectively become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

27 Christine Avendaño, “ENRILE: ONLY MILITARY CAN STOP CORONA IMPEACHMENT TRIAL,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 02, 2012, Accessed http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/121009/enrile-only-military-can-stop-corona-impeachment-trial.

34 3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

Gaps in the Big Picture: coherent standards where appropriate security Plain Oversight sector policy reforms can be drawn.

Section 21 of Article X of the Constitution provides Each major security establishment is governed for a clear delineation of the responsibilities. by a law or a charter that embodies its general On the one hand, the local police agencies are mandates and specific responsibilities and tasked with the preservation and maintenance of objectives. However, these laws and charters peace and order. On the other hand, the defense have institutionalized a fragmented approach to and security of the regions is clearly placed in the security policy. What was being practiced on the hands of the national government.28 ground has been captured in legislation, and thus cementing an inert and solitary existence, which The problem of ordinary criminal activities is the ultimately slows down any progress of thought, responsibility of the local police authorities. In the practice and vision. age of international terrorism and transnational organized crime, the local peace and order A quick review of the existing structures and concerns have been elevated to a level that is legal instruments reveal a terrain of unrelated, beyond the capabilities of the local governments. dis-integrated and self-contained “islands” The responsibility for the defense and security of of security policies and stakeholders. These the regions belongs to the national government. “islands” must, therefore, be re-connected by philosophical, structural and policy “bridges,” if Through the years, however, this unambiguous we are to successfully adopt a “whole-of-nation delineation of roles has been blurred into several approach.”29 gray areas of joint responsibility. In Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 7898, otherwise known as 1. There is a need to integrate the local Peace the “AFP Modernization Act,” provides that one of and Order Councils into formal security sector the objectives of modernizing the armed forces is structure and processes. “to enhance its capability to assist the Philippine National Police in law enforcement and internal • The PNP should be given the authority to security operations.” On its face, this provision prescribe the structures, procedures and appears to unduly stretch the boundaries of the training of barangay peace and order. constitutional assignment of duties for external • Barangay neighborhood watch systems defense and internal peacekeeping, and may are not integrated into the peace and be corrected by either legislative amendments, order initiatives of the police and military judicial relief, or by executive issuances. establishments However, upon further review of other similar • Provincial, City and Municipal peace and symptomatic indicators, we find that there are no order councils should have a minimum set

28 Section 21 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution: “The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the national government. [Emphasis supplied] 29Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016, Chapter 9: Peace and Security.

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of objectives that are prescribed by the PNP school system, except in formal security and the DILG sector recruitment and formation • There is a need to articulate the role of an 2. There is a need to correct the mis-integration “Informed Public” of cross-over institutions. • There is a need to identify the “pillars of the security sector” and to identify their specific • Role of the Local Chief Executives over police roles and responsibilities and military units must be further de-limited • Philippine Coast Guard as an adjunct of 5. There is a need to define the role of an DOTC 30 “informed Media establishment,” where their • The administration of the Philippine National “watchdog” (outsider) function must be clearly Police Academy (PNPA) must be returned delineated from their stakeholder (insider) the Philippine National Police (PNP) function.

3. The development of Military Bases must be • “Distrust” for public institutions is exacerbated based on a Comprehensive Security Plan. in the negative portrayal of state security agents in the media • It should NOT be Secondary to social and • Reports of abuses, unresolved cases, and economic development of communities. involvement of police and military officials • It should NOT be based on their historical, and ex-police and ex-military officials in graft but on their strategic value. cases or organized crime • Procurement and acquisition of materiel • The Freedom of Information Act (FOI) and/ should be based on established mechanisms or the Public Ownership of Government of identifying and prioritizing security needs, Information (POGI) must clearly define as opposed to stockpiling and upgrading of matters of “national security,” “national existing facilities, equipment and supplies. defense,” and “national interest”

4. There is a need to foster a culture of “Security 6. There is an urgent need to insulate the Consciousness.” security sector from politics, without removing the built-in checks-and-balance functions of • Security education is not integrated into the oversight agencies.

30 Republic Act No. 9993, otherwise known as the “Philippine Coast Guard Law,” and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

36 3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

Conclusion

While most of the above proposals will only to the barangay, and even welcomed into each require executive action through administrative family unit. It would seem that the concepts of issuances to be undertaken by the President health and safety are generally accepted as being and his cabinet secretaries, there are a few included in the concept of general welfare, but areas that will require legislative action. The security remains to be perceived to be restricted President, as the Commander-in-Chief and as to the national government, the core security the Chief Executive of the State, is strategically forces and the intelligence agencies. While health installed at the helm of the formal security sector and safety consciousness has been seamlessly organizations, with all the legal mandates and integrated into the collective consciousness of capabilities to rationalize, re-organize and steer the Filipino family, a shared responsibility for the security sector in the direction of integration, national security has yet to be internalized and rationalization and encourage a wider ownership institutionalized. and internalization of the “whole-of-nation” approach. Unless we initiate and usher in an era of integration, not just of functions and processes, but also of One may argue that the resulting “isolation” vision and perspective, the stakeholders will of security sector stakeholders is a product of remain standing on “separate islands,” unable to historical and cultural accidents. The Philippine communicate, incapable of drawing support from Constitution envisions an integrated national and other stakeholders, and cut-off from what would local government; security consciousness must otherwise be a synergistic environment. pervade all levels of Philippine society, down

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, AFP

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Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 4 AFP ModernIZATION by Melanie Rodulfo-Veril Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines AFP MODERNIZATION

Confronted by a number of challenges and threats to national security, there is an exigent need for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to develop and modernize its capabilities to fully support the effective implementation of national security and defense plans and programs. The article provides a quick historical review on the evolution of the AFP from being one of the superior militaries in the Asia-Pacific region after the Second World War into a one that lags behind its neighbors in terms of modern assets, materiel and equipment. It establishes the relationship between the capability and readiness of the AFP to the level of support and augmentation provided by the US, which peaked during the heydays of the US bases in the country.

The article characterizes the present state of the AFP as plagued with strategic, institutional, and operational deficiencies making the military only partially capable of performing all its critical mission areas. It offers several factors which have been crucial in the current weakened state of the Philippine military, including 1) end of Cold War and the subsequent expulsion of US bases in the Philippines; 2) reprioritization of AFP operations from traditional defense to internal security operations; 3) intricacies of the Republic Act (RA) 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act of 1995, and the resulting complications and shortfalls in the implementation of the law; and, 4) lacking and delayed release of funds to support the implementation of the law and related modernization programs.

Consistent with the new administration’s policies and strategic intent, the article deems it imperative to fast track AFP modernization to effectively address prevalent national and regional security issues and concerns. It further recommends the continuous streamlining of defense planning and procurement processes, and allocation of significant budget to support the modernization programs and projects under the new AFP Modernization Law.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Security Sector Reform (SSR) is linked with 1970s. At the height of its laurels, the AFP had Ssecurity and development since ineffective and a range of aircraft in its inventory to include inefficient governance becomes a challenge jet-fighter interceptors – the F-5A/B and F-8 in the development, democratization, conflict Crusaders. It also had 140 “Huey” helicopters, 35 prevention, and peacebuilding of a state.1 The attack helicopters, 30 trainer jets, and 12 C-130 development of the AFP’s capabilities is included “Hercules” planes. It also boasted of warships in the SSR component of the Internal Peace and and gunboats for the Philippine Navy (PN).3 The Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan. Furthermore, it AFP was equipped, although apart from minimal is deemed important to have a credible deterrent counter-dissident campaigns, its major role then posture in attaining peace and security in the was the occasional participation in the military country. exercises conducted by South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).4

The Hope of an Independent Defense The support from US was firm but like all military Force organizations, the AFP sought to professionalize its soldiers and develop its own capabilities. By the end of the World War II, and upon In the 1970s, during the outbreak of Muslim declaration of Independence from the US, separatism in Mindanao, the government made the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) was an effort to upgrade the capability of the AFP. established with the three service units (Army, Then President Ferdinand Marcos particularly Navy, and Air Force) in 1947. Both states aimed for an independent armed forces that will recognized the other’s strategic value to their be capable for an autonomous defense posture. respective national interests and thus entered This attempt was further encouraged following into several bilateral arrangements. These are the reluctance of the US to provide the AFP with the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, the counter-insurgency materiel. Considered as the Military Assistance Program (MAP) of 1947 and first major step in the AFP capability upgrade, the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. The the government allocated USD 25M to support Clark Air Base located in the Philippines was then research and development of the Philippine Army the biggest airbase outside US territory.2 (PA) capabilities.5

It was the golden era of the AFP when it enjoyed The government’s vision of having an autonomous military superiority from the 1950s until the early defense capability was furthered in the 1980s.

1 InciteGov & Stiftung, “A Primer on Security Sector Reform (SSR) focused on Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF),” Manila, 2010. 2 Renato De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?,” Pacific Affairs 78 No. 3 (2005): 403-422. 3 Ben Cal, “SPECIAL REPORT: AFP modernization still an elusive dream”. July 11, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.interaksyon.com/ article/8682/special-report-afp-modernization-still-an-elusive-dream. 4 De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy, “ 404. 5 De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy, “ 405.

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In 1989, with the brewing tensions in the West Forces became apparent. This prompted the AFP Philippine Sea, the Department of National to create an initial 10-year plan for modernization. Defense (DND) aimed to strengthen the maritime It initially focused on the acquisition of weapons security of the country and this time proposed the system, and was billed for a total of PhP 140 modernization of the PN. The acquisition of six billion or USD 560 million for the 10-year fast attack crafts (FAC) was projected to better program. This, however, was way below the USD control the maritime borders. The PN, lacking any 200 million provided by the US for military support missile or blue water capabilities, requested the annually before the withdrawal of the bases.9 The funds.6 This was encouraged by the Senate and 10-year plan also experienced criticisms from the Congress and directed the AFP to formulate a various sectors in the Philippine society, and was 15-year plan for arms acquisition and ultimately, therefore hampered. It took the Congress three a plan to lessen dependence on the US. The (3) years to approve the AFP Modernization conclusion of the Cold War welcomed the plan Program (AFPMP). in view of the possible withdrawal of US bases in the country.7 The road to a modernized AFP Post Cold War, the general view is that Manila and Washington no longer shared similar security The AFPMP was finally approved on February interests. By then, the Philippines requested 23, 1995 as a legal and policy framework. This payments from the US for hosting the latter’s program aims to “modernize the Armed Forces of military facilities. A new basement treaty was the Philippines (AFP) to a level where it can fully proposed but was not ratified in the Senate in and effectively perform its constitutional mandate 1991, which led to the withdrawal of US forces in of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the Philippines.8 the patrimony of the Republic”.10 This 15-year Program is mandated by Republic Act (RA) 7898, The turn of events created strife in the RP-US otherwise known as the AFP Modernization relationship, and there was an obvious impasse Act and is implemented through Department on the alliance. This was reflected in the reduced of National Defense Circular (DC) No. 1 dated US military and economic aid to the Philippines. 06 March 2000 (replacing DC 29 dated 19 May The need for the modernization of the Armed 1996).11

6 De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy, “ 410. 7 ______”The 20-Year Strategic Plan: Self-Reliant Defense Posture”. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2002. 8 Bayoneto M Victoria, “The Former U.S. Bases in the Philippines: An Argument for the Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to Overseas Military Bases.” Fordham Environmental Law Review 6 Issue 1 (2011). 9 De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy, “ 411. 10 Armed Forces Of the Philippines Modernization Program Management Office. AFP Modernization Program Primer. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1996. 11 Jaime Frumencio Montañez, “The Need For Qualified Contracting Officers In The Armed Forces Of The Philppines (AFP) Modernization Programme,” (Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2008).

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The modernization program focused on five The proposed acquisition was deemed timely components namely: following the incidents in the West Philippine Sea over the territorial disputes in the area. 1. Capability, Materiel and Technology The Philippines has been ill-equipped in Development; confronting China upon the discovery of Chinese 2. Bases and Support System Development; military structures in Mischief Reef in 1996. 3. Human Resource Development; The incident verified how the AFP scantily 4. Doctrines Development, and; operated in view of potential and sensitive 5. Force Restructuring & Organizational flash points. Development.12 RA 7898 stipulated parameters to limit the effect The program was given a PhP 331.62 billion of hefty military spending in the country. The first budget broken down into two sub-programs: set of parameters is that AFPMP allocation will not Sub-program 1 has a budget of PhP 164.55 billion hamper the basic economic and social services while Sub-program 2 has a budget of PhP 167 provided by the government. As such, the DND billion. This was also distributed down tranches, was required to make the program sustainable by PhP 50 billion to implement the first five years of creating its own trust fund.15 the AFPMP, PhP 74.2 billion for the second year, and PhP 37.6 billion on the third year, while the The AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund was to be remaining five years is PhP 2.8 billion.13 sourced out from:

Under the Program, the Air Force hoped to 1. Appropriations for the AFPMP; acquire two squadrons of multi-role fighter aircraft 2. Proceeds from the sale, lease, or joint and surface-to-air missile and gun systems. The development of military reservation, as may PN projected the procurement of three frigates, be authorized by Congress, include such six corvettes, 12 offshore patrol vessels and 12 immovable and other facilities as may be missile boats along with nine helicopters and six found therein, not covered by the Bases fixed-wing aircraft to develop its naval aviation Conversion Development Authority, as capability.14 provided for in Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 16;

12 Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program Management Office. AFP Modernization Program Primer. Quezon City:Armed Forces of the Philippines. 1996. 13 Montañez, “The Need.” 14 Armed Forces Of the Philippines Modernization Program Management Office. AFP Modernization Program Annual Report 2008. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines. 15 Montañez, “The Need.” 16 RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 declared the policy of the Government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay Station), to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps, and to apply said funds for the development and conversion to productive civilian use of the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.

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3. Share of the AFP from the proceeds of the AFP of principal technology involved for the sale of military camps provided for under RA operation and maintenance of the equipment. No. 7227; 4. Proceeds from the sale of the products of the Unfortunately, the Asian financial crisis Government Arsenal; caught up with the program in 1997. 5. Proceeds from the disposal of excess and/ When the modernization plan was crafted, or uneconomically repairable equipment and the exchange rate was only PhP 20 to 1 USD. other movable assets of the AFP and the The peso depreciated by almost 40 percent Government Arsenal; and financial investments in the country 6. Funds from budgetary surplus, if any, as may were greatly reduced. Funding for be authorized by Congress subject to the modernization was austerely challenged. provisions of Section 8 of RA 7227; and, In 1998, with the advent of increased Muslim 7. All interest income of the trust fund separatist activity in Mindanao, the AFP shifted Congressional funding however will only be priorities from external defense to internal made available if there is a surplus in the security, which also shifted the priorities of the appropriations.17 modernization program to enhance Internal Security Operations (ISO) capabilities.19 The second set of parameters guarantee the The Revised Reprioritized Project List (RRPL) economic and technological benefits of the was approved in 2004 based on the project lists country from AFP acquisitions. The program identified in the years 2001 and 2002. must be able to reduce foreign exchange outflow, contribute to local employment, and enhance On the side, for its contribution to the US-led technology transfer to the Philippines. With this, global war on terrorism as an offshoot of the 9/11 the DND must ensure the following:18 incident, the Philippines and the US prompted the Joint Defense Assessment which led to • Give preference to Filipino contractors and the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR), and the suppliers or foreign contractors and suppliers AFP Capability Upgrade Program (CUP). In the willing and able to locate a substantial portion assessment as early as 1999, the findings were of production in the Philippines; able to identify 65 key and 207 ancillary areas of • Incorporate as far as possible, in each concern. The key areas have been distilled into contract/ agreement provisions for ten (10) key recommendations, which the PDR countertrade, in-country manufacture, implements throughout a multi-year time frame: 20 co-production schemes or other innovative arrangements; and, 1. Implement a strategy-driven multi-year • Include in the contract the transfer to the defense planning system;

17 AFPMPMO, 2008. 18 Montañez, “The Need.” 19 AFPMPMO, 2008. 20 Department of National Defense. “The Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDR)” Retrieved from:http://www.dnd.gov.ph/ DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/pdrpage.htm.

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2. Improve AFP operational and training The development of military capabilities for capacity; 2012-2018 is anchored on seven mission areas 3. Improve operational readiness rates of key namely: ISO, Territorial Defense, Disaster Risk AFP systems; Reduction Management and Response, Support 4. Improve operational level expertise by to National Development, International Defense addressing organizational, management and and Security Engagements (IDSE), Peace operational systemic deficiencies; Support Operations (PSO), and Force-Level 5. Develop an effective AFP personnel Command and Control, Support and Training management system; (FLC2ST).22 6. Plan, program and execute a Multi-Year Capability Upgrade Plan for the AFP; 7. Optimize the defense budget and improve AFP Modernization 15 Years After management controls; 8. Create a professional acquisition workforce The implementation period of the RA 7898 and establish a centrally- managed defense expired on December 2011 without any acquisition system; significant progress in terms of modernizing 9. Increase capability of the AFP to conduct AFP capabilities. What was pursued instead civil-military operations; and was the upgrading of basic capabilities to bring 10. Develop accurate baseline data on critical these back to acceptable levels of readiness.23 AFP functional areas. However, of the total amount of PhP 331 billion approved for the total fund requirements of the Program 6 of the PDR, the Multi-Year Capability Program, only PhP 35 billion was used for the Upgrade Plan (CUP) was aligned in the AFP capability upgrade program of the AFP for internal Modernization Plan. The program is an 18-year operations. On the July 2011 report released by defense acquisition period that is divided into the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, three phases: J5, only three hundred seventeen (317) projects (59.36 percent) were completed from the five Phase 1: (2006–2011)—acquisition and upgrade hundred thirty four (534) planned projects. There of equipment for enhancing the ISO; are still two hundred nine (209) ongoing projects and eight (8) projects suspended for review. Phase 2: (2012–2018)—the transition phase from ISO to territorial defense; and, The Commission on Audit (COA) found that the AFP itself was slowed down by its complex Phase 3: (2019–2024)—acquisition geared for acquisition structure, which would commence from territorial defense and peacekeeping operations.21 the Circular Requirements (COR) formulation to

21 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. AFP Capability Upgrade Plan. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2007. 22 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. AFP Medium Term Development Plan (2012- 2018). Quezon City:Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2010. 23 Vincent Cabreza, “Gazmin admits AFP upgrade a dud,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 19, 2012. Accessed May 8, 2012, http:// newsinfo.inquirer.net/148403/gazmin-admits-afp-upgrade-plan-a-dud.

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contracting phases. Certain RA 7898 stipulations raised by Secretary of National Defense (SND) would also make complications inevitable to wit: Voltaire Gazmin for the poor implementation of “That no major equipment and weapons system the program. The Commission on Audit agreed shall be purchased if the same are not being used and added that the lack of funding was a major by the armed forces in the country of origin or used reason for the program’s poor implementation by the armed forces of at least two countries”. since only Php 35 billion or 10.02 percent of the total projected amount of Php 331 billion was This section made it difficult for Filipino contractors appropriated. who were willing to invest on defense industry, as they were required to sell to other countries before selling in the Philippines. Interventions to address the concern

In this pretext, RA 7898 contradicts itself as the President Benigno Aquino intends to fast track Section 10 of the law explicates, the delayed modernization plan under his term. In 2010, with the commitment from the SND, “The SRDP intends to induce the AFP to give the AFP Long Term Capability Development preference to Filipino contractors and suppliers or Program was crafted. It pushes for an immediate to foreign contractors or suppliers willing and able development of a modest deterrent capability to to locate a substantial portion of, if not the entire, protect the country’s vast maritime borders and production process of the terms involved, within to protect its territorial claims in the Spratlys.24 the Philippines.” This transition from internal security to territorial defense is timely and well reflected in the IPSP The modernization plan also shouldered Bayanihan. changing priorities from the government. The Reprioritized Capability Upgrade Program The DND also released Department Circular No. (RCUP) was primarily designed to speed up the 11 to effectively implement the Defense System procurement of equipment for ISO and realign of Management (DSOM) in the entire defense modernization with AFP missions. A 2010 AFP establishment. DSOM was created to support the Office of the Special and Strategic Studies report planning, resource and financial management however noted that RCUP directs the AFP to and decision-making responsibilities of the SND, consider foreign military sales or government- the Chief of Staff, AFP and other senior leaders of to-government transaction in the procurement the AFP and DND in determining the needs and of equipment, which contributed yet again to the priorities of the defense system. complex procurement process. The DND has lined up one hundred thirty eight The lack of and the delay in the release of (138) projects spread over a period of five (5) years. funds for the program were the main reasons The bulk of the budget has been earmarked for

24 Office of the Deputy-Chief-of-Staff for Plans (J-5). DND-AFP Thrust for Capability Upgrade: The AFP Long-Term Capability. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2010.

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the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and PN.25 Planned procurement process will be introduced and will acquisitions for the PAF include eight brand-new be cut down from 29 stages to two assessment combat utility helicopters along with multi-role levels in addition to the actual procurement and and lead-in fighter planes, surface-attack aircraft, contracting stages. There are also amendments and long-range reconnaissance planes. The PN on the AFP Modernization Trust Fund. on the other hand has projected the acquisition It is proposed that funds should be used to of multi-role attack vessels, off-shore patrol craft, “cover all necessary expenses to implement the and even surface-to-surface and surface-to-air procurement of equipment such as expenses for missiles. Materiel for “joint maritime surveillance, the pre-selection and post-qualification stages”. defense, and interdiction operations in the South In addition, the “approval of congress will China Sea” were also included in the plan.26 no longer be required in the lease or joint Among the notable acquisitions under the development of military reservations”.29 Additional Aquino administration is the Hamilton Class BRP funds will also be sourced from the earnings Gregorio del Pilar. The DND has approved 10 of the Malampaya gas wells from the new oil percent of the 138 modernization projects meant exploration service contracts in the Sulu Sea. to modernize the military in securing our borders and protecting our territory.27 The Php 70 billion initial budget has already been approved. Way Forward for the AFP Modernization The office of the expired AFP Modernization Program on the other hand was deactivated While recent acquisitions of defense materiel and and has transitioned into a Defense Acquisition equipment, and continuing efforts toward defense Office, under the direction of the Department of reform and transformation are recognized and National Defense. Sec. Gazmin stressed that the lauded, it is still apparent that there is a need for modernization of the AFP is finally moving and the the the continued allocation of funds for bigger program will support not only internal security but acquisitions of defense materiel and equipment, also external security, disaster risk management and the continuing defense reform efforts of the and support to national development.28 government.

The bill for the amendment of the AFPMP was There is also a need for more focused efforts, passed by Congress in 2012. In a statement by programs and policies within the defense Senator Panfilo Lacson, a new system for the establishment to facilitate more effective and

25 “AFP modernization awaits funding,” Manila Times, January 30, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/news/ nation/16081-afp-modernization-awaits-funding. 26 OJ5, 2010. p. 3. 27 Frances Mangosing & Katherine Evangelista, “DND approves 10% of military modernization projects,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 18, 2012, accessed May 8, 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/148187/dnd-approves-10-of-military-modernization-projects. 28 Elena Aben, “AFP Modernization Projects Partially OK’d,” The Manila Bulletin, February 18, 2012, accessed May 29, 2012, http://www. mb.com.ph/node/351788/afp-modernization-project. 29 Interaksyon, “Senate Passes Bill Amending AFP Modernization Program,” Interaksyon, June 5, 2012, retrieved from http://www.interaksyon. com/article/33822/senate-passes-bill-amending-afp-modernization-program.

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fast implementation of modernization projects. the 138 modernization projects will be achieved. At the same time, such policies promote a more responsive defense institution in a changing The AFP faces different security challenges security environment. in light of the changing security environment. This highlights the need to sustain capability At present, the modernization of the AFP is development efforts. Otherwise, the AFP might moving and looks positive. Budget allocations be left behind once again, and might not be able for the procurement of materiel and equipment to to address these challenges. The AFP must at all modernize the AFP have already been approved times be able to perform its mandate of upholding and released. According to Sec. Gazmin, before the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the term of the President Aquino III ends in 2016, the Republic.

Other references:

Cal, Ben. “SPECIAL REPORT: AFP modernization still Interaksyon. “Senate Passes Bill Amending AFP an elusive dream”. July 11, 2011. Retrieved from: http:// Modernization Program” June 5, 2012. Retrieved from: http:// www.interaksyon.com/article/8682/special-report-afp- www.interaksyon.com/article/33822/senate-passes-bill- modernization-still-an-elusive-dream amending-afp-modernization-program

Cabreza, Vincent. “Gazmin admits AFP upgrade a dud” 19 InciteGov&Stiftung. “A Primer on Security Sector Reform February 2012. Inquirer News Retrieved from http://newsinfo. (SSR) focused on Democratic Control of Armed Forces inquirer.net/148403/gazmin-admits-afp-upgrade-plan-a-dud 8 (DCAF)” January 2010. Manila, Philippines May 2012 Manila Times.net. “AFP modernization awaits funding” Department of Budget and Management. http://www.mb.com. January 30, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.manilatimes. ph/node/351788/afp-modernization-project nt. Retrieved from net/index.php/news/nation/16081-afp-modernization http://budgetngbayan.com/mybudget-2012/the-2012-budget- awaits-funding a-summary/ Mangosing, Frances & Evangelista, Katherine. “DND Elena L. Aben. “AFP Modernization Projects Partially OK’d”. approves 10% of military modernization projects”. 18 February The Manila Bulletin Newspaper Online. 18 February 2012. 2012 Inquirer News. Retrieved from http://newsinfo.inquirer. Retrieved from http://www.mb.com.ph/node/351788/afp- net/148187/dnd-approves-10-of-military-modernization- modernization-project 29 May 2012 projects 8 May 2012

48 4 AFP MODERNIZATION Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 5 AFP FORCE STRUCTURE by Capt Roy Vincent T Trinidad (GSC) PN Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines AFP FORCE STRUCTURE

The Armed Forces is classified as one of the core state security actors. It is utilized by the government to implement its policies. Currently, it is a primary tool of the government to suppress insurgency. Additionally, the AFP is heavily land-based, even though the Philippines is archipelagic in nature, thus requiring an armed force with strong air and naval capabilities.

The paper examines the different events and factors that led to the current AFP Structural Organization. These events include the post martial law culture, counter-insurgency operations, organizational expansion and modification, utilization of reservist, and strategic direction.

The author argues that a national policy framework is an imperative in coming up with the AFP’s strategic direction, which is the hinge in devising the organization’s force. Additionally, policies should be cleared on the handover of areas to civil authorities and declaration of insurgent-free areas. A Transition Plan that would govern the shift from ISO to Territorial Defense should also be formulated.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Introduction stresses the need to review the organizational structure of the AFP to befit the Philippine setting. The Armed Forces is classified as a core security Tactor and a state actor. It is one of the political tools of the government to implement policies. Source of Problems in The AFP is a security sector institution whose AFP Structural Organization core competency is war fighting, may it be real or for intimidation. It is the government actor The Post Martial Law Culture tasked to protect the territory of the state and its sovereignty. The effects of Martial Law are still apparent in the security sector even decades after its fall. With In the current Philippine setting, the AFP is the overthrow of dictatorship after the massive used by the government as a primary tool to display of people power in 1986, the reins of suppress insurgency. Yet the government should power were handed to civilian revolutionary be circumspect in the utilization of the armed leadership which paved the way for the gradual forces in resolving conflicts whether local or strengthening of democratic institutions. The end international. The use of military strategy to of Martial Law symbolized the triumph of military settle conflicts should be the last option of the force over dictatorship. This made an impression government since it is violent and expensive. The of a strong military force and even emphasized its resultant damage to people and properties and vital role in society. Martial Law created a culture the financial equivalent of such damage is widely of the use of inherent force since it is how the greater than when other options are used. During AFP was trained to perform its task. The military the rise of disputes and even response to crisis became the immediate option in every emergency situations, other approaches should be employed situation and conflict. first since the use of military forces beget greater collateral damage and leaves no viable option Even during the Marcos administration, the once committed initially. military was given non-traditional duties in economic development and infrastructures under In the aim of transforming the AFP, one of the the banner of ‘civic action’ to bridge gaps on things to be looked into is the suitability of its resources, manpower and logistical requirements. organizational structure to the dynamism of the Moreover, military members/officials were given current societal setting. It is devised to be land posts in the government which were traditionally based, army-based per se, though the Philippines appointed to civilians. This practice of utilizing is archipelagic in nature. Instead of being heavy the military in activities other than war continued with land forces, the organization should be even after the fall of the Martial Law. Indeed, the equipped with air force and naval personnel which end of martial law and the utilization of the military the geographical and strategic setting demands. during the Marcos regime led to the emergence of The assumption of a more active role in territorial a more participatory role of the AFP in the civilian defense and other non-traditional tasks such government, which in turn led to the modification as disaster relief and response operations also for the structure of the military to address this

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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role. The employment of the military in various Since the transfer of the ISO lead role from government endeavors also led to the change of PNP to AFP in 1998, the AFP performs focus of the AFP from its true mandate of territorial activities such as nation building defense to the performance of tasks beyond the efforts, community organizing, medical services jurisdiction of the Armed Forces. and other engineering projects. The military personnel who were once trained to Counter Insurgency Operations engage in combat became teachers, engineers, medical practitioners, law enforcers etc. Through Republic Act 8551, which holds that This elicited mixed responses from LGUs. the DILG (PNP) be relieved from the primary Some grew complacent and dependent on the responsibility on matters involving the military for the performance of their tasks suppression of insurgency and other serious while others felt disrespected or encroached threats to national security, the AFP is tasked upon by the AFP. On the other hand, there are to lead on matters involving internal security others that failed to fully grasp their roles and operations. Yet there had been difficulties in functions in internal security as the AFP has defining the scope of efforts where the AFP been performing these tasks since previous should lead, even in defining suppression per administrations. se. There are also no definite set of parameters which will accurately measure the success of Hence, the capability build-up for territorial suppression of insurgency. defense has been sacrificed to support ISO efforts. The war fighting capability of the Since there is no definitive boundary on where AFP which should be its core competency the task of the AFP in the suppression of had been neglected likewise and modified to insurgency starts and ends, there is also a suit its ISO mission. confusion in the internal security functions that should be assumed by government agencies, The roles played by the AFP in ISO led to especially the local government units (LGUs). In the structuring of the military organization as its fight against insurgency, the AFP was able to land-based with a heavy army force. The determine the factors and roots of insurgency. It structure is expected to remain as such while further asserted that these cannot be solved the lead role in ISO remains on the shoulders of solely through a militaristic approach but the military. Additionally, improvements on the through a holistic national effort. However, local AFP’s capabilities for its other mission areas will government units do not take an active role continue to be compromised. on matters concerning insurgency in spite of the problem being rooted in concerns Organizational Expansion/ Modification that necessitate the LGU’s participation and efforts. The AFP is forced to perform The demands of fulfilling the ISO mission various tasks even those which are beyond its forced the AFP to train and build up mandate and competency since those are held capabilities to satisfy needs which should to be part of its broad mission of suppressing have been catered by civilian sectors such as insurgency. engineers, health workers, educators,

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community organizers and others. This resulted Strategic Direction to the activation/ establishment of AFP branches, units and offices that will provide said services. The absence of a comprehensive policy framework such as the National Security The lack of an efficient human resource Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy system led to the abuse in the creation of (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) positions even exceeding in number to that for the defense and military establishments authorized by the law. As to recent cases, Grade made it more difficult to have a strategic 07/BGen positions are filled up with Grade 06 direction for the AFP. Policy baselines and Officers/Colonels since piled up promotions national frameworks are very important cannot be accommodated anymore in the in setting military objectives and coming Congress. up with the appropriate framework to support said plans. The absence of a forward Utilization of Reservist looking plan will make it hard for the organization to set its own specific and measurable objectives There are currently two (2) types of reservists and provide a suitable structure to accomplish in the component of the AFP Reserve them. The strategic direction of the AFP is hinged Force; the Ready Reserve and the Standby only on available references such as the National Reserve. Ready Reservists are personnel that are Security Policy, the Defense System of always on constant alert and on call whenever the Management, the National Military Intent, the mobilization order has been given, while Standby Internal Peace and Security Plan and Reservists are the personnel that support and the Unilateral Defense Plan. augment the Ready Reserve Force only when needed. At present, the AFP organization lacks proper accounting of the reservists as well as Interventions Needed to Improve AFP a clear concept or strategy on how to integrate Force Structure reservist into the regular force. The organiza- tion is devised from a ‘peace time perspective’ The publication of a national policy framework thus the reservists are not seen as integrated is very vital in coming up with the AFP’s in the force. There is no clear strategy for strategic direction which is the hinge in devising the integration; whether reservists would be tucked organization’s force structure. There is a need to into the regular force or there will be a separate expedite the formulation of the NSS to regular organization with regular soldiers as consequently publish NDS and NMS. cadre. Moreover, the capabilities that reservists may contribute to the force are unspecified. There should also be clear policies on the Thus it would be hard to mobilize them when transition of the law enforcement concept which the need for integration arises. The reserv- covers the handover of areas to civil authorities and ists are also not considered in most contin- declaration of insurgent free areas. A government gency plans and are likewise not included in policy should also be crafted rendering the array of forces of the Unified Commands. the military as the last option in addressing

5 AFP FORCE STRUCTURE 53 Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

emergency or conflict and even in the The concept of having a sole headquarters enforcement of government policies. for all the Major Services of the AFP should also be considered. This will aid in better Upon fulfillment of above mentioned coordination, supervision as well as command and interventions, a Transition Plan for the shift of control among the services. It will also avoid the military operations focus from ISO to Territorial advent of creating a separate domain per Major Defense should be formulated. This should Service. This may also provide a united includes the exit plan of AFP from internal atmosphere among the highest leaders of the AFP security operation and defined roles of AFP and translate to a strengthened armed forces. units in territorial defense. This transition plan should also provide a clear concept and Should the AFP be structured to address strategy on the utilization/ employment of maritime security and other non-traditional tasks, reservists. Contingency plans and Rules of there is the need to reprioritize programs to the Engagements should also be consistent support the modernization of the AFP, particularly with this transition plan. There should also the PN and PAF, and upgrading its capabilities be a review of the Unilateral Defense Plan build-up. This will also entail the procurement of and its implementation plans. Mobilization equipment, material and assets. plans should also be revisited to ensure its relevance and consistency with the transition plan. Consequences

There should also be an in-depth review of the There is a growing recognition of the need for force structure of the AFP organization based on defense and security sector transformation in our the strategy laid down by the agency. Reservists’ society. The reform in the Armed Forces is just organization should be rationalized and be a miniscule element that may contribute to the incorporated in the structure of the AFP. There reformation of the security sector yet the AFP should also be strict observance of the force gives great value in every minimal step that the employer/ provider concept. The AFP institution may do to effect change.These may organizational structure should also follow only be viewed as baby steps toward a reformed a simpler command and control mechanism security sector but these small steps when done to avoid confusion in assuming responsibilities in a consistent and determined pace will eventu- and chain of authority. The structure should ally lead to the bigger goal. also address different war time scenarios may it be internal or international conflicts and can Should there be no revision in the AFP easily adapt to different situations. The AFP structure, deterioration of the AFP capability may also needs a force structure that complies with follow. The core competency of the AFP in war national policies, can easily be adapted and is fighting may be compromised. The country might centered in the core competency of the gradually lose the AFP affixed to its ‘real’ organization. mandate and mission.

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Addressing the concerns and issues on force had been doing a big role not just in the provision structure of the AFP entails a deep political of security but also in the internal dynamics of will among the leaders and members of the the state. In this light, the support of various organization. This will also call for a wide government sectors to the gradual changes in the advocacy of this endeavor to policy makers and uniformed service in terms of strategy and roles other stakeholders. The rationalization of the AFP in society is one key factor toward developing a structure into a more fitting organization will affect reformed AFP. other government instrumentalities as the AFP

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, AFP

5 AFP FORCE STRUCTURE 55

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 6 AFP Doctrine and Training by Col Amador T Tabuga Jr (GSC) PA Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

In 1998, RA 8551 assigned the task of handling insurgency from the PNP to the AFP. However, a document crafted in 2010 redefined military operations, with the end goal of the military focusing on territorial defense and only as a support to the country’s domestic threats.

The paper examines the possible gaps in the AFP’s doctrines and training that may have been crucial in the battle against insurgency. It discusses how the absence of an ISO doctrine has greatly hampered the fulfillment of the AFP’s assigned task of suppressing insurgency. The absence of an ISO doctrine would also impact on the quality of military training, rendering military training weak and inadequate.

The author argues that there is a need for a National Security Strategy that will provide the basis in the formulation of the AFP’s ISO doctrine and other related military doctrines. Furthermore, there is a need to transform the US-patterned doctrines to suit domestic requirements and incorporate regional, cultural, and territorial differences.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

58 6 AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

Background insurgency or it is beyond their capacity, looking traditionally at the Armed Forces who were The Philippines has been fighting insurgency basically trained to defend territorial boundaries Tthroughout history, from the Huk rebellion, to the and not internal conflicts. communist and Muslim insurgencies. Insurgency is defined as an organized movement aimed to Several researches, studies, dialogues and fora overthrow a constituted government through were conducted to look closely on this particular the use of subversion and armed conflict. The issue and one common finding stood out, that communist insurgency is considered as the Philippine insurgency is multi-dimensional, longest running insurgency in the country that covering the political, cultural, sociological and lasted for more than 40 years and affected and economic dimensions, and requires a multi- killed thousands of combatants and innocent dimensional approach, a new frame in addressing civilians. insurgency.

The passage of Republic Act No. 8551 in February However, a document was crafted in 2010 that of 1998, entitled: ‘An Act Providing for the Reform would redefine the whole military operation, and Reorganization of the Philippine National with the end goal of leaving its primary role on Police’, formally transferred the task of handling domestic threats, assuming functions therein and insurgency from the Philippine National Police to refocusing on territorial defense. Internal Peace the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Section 3 and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, as a military clearly provides: document, provides the strategic guidance in the AFP performance of its mandated functions of “The Department of the Interior and Local protecting the state and the people. Government shall be relieved of the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national Issues security. The Philippine National Police shall, through information gathering and performance While the AFP considers a new direction come of its ordinary police functions, support the Armed 2016, it is still fundamental to re-examine Forces of the Philippines on matters involving past performances versus counter-insurgency suppression of insurgency, except in cases where operations. Experience is the best teacher after the President shall call on the PNP to support the all. It is agreed that the military invested their lives, AFP in combat operations.” their knowledge and learnings, and to an extent, their own families, in their attempts to suppress Since then, the AFP has been in-charge and insurgency. These investments are worth in the forefront of every operation against highlighting and should not be overshadowed by insurgency. But despite numerous attempts, failures. the AFP continuously failed in putting an end to insurgency. This resulted in a growing debate on The military’s learning talks about training, whether the Armed Forces is capable of handling education, experience and doctrine; logically

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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perceived to be present in every man-in-uniform on best practices and lessons learned rather in actual operations. All military at the forefront than ISO doctrine. of insurgency operation are assumed to be fully equipped and ready. Room for mistakes is hardly 5. Is it be doctrinal development? This pertains to considered. technical capacity, the available documents, the systematic approach and motivational The government on the other hand is in full support attributes towards doctrine development. and poured a substantial amount of resources and services, year by year and administration by administration to really put closure on the Sources of the Problem insurgency problem. The only issue here perhaps is political. On Doctrine

However, success is usually short-lived and The absence of an ISO doctrine has been largely pocket-based, because in the long run the considered as one of the major setbacks why problem on insurgency resurfaces. So, what the military was unable to suppress insurgency could be or where could it be wrong? despite substantial investment and resources provided in every operation. The AFP Manual 1. Is it the doctrine or the lack of it? The Internal “Doctrine Development” (AFPM 8-03) defines Security Operation (ISO) doctrine is supposed doctrine as a body of principles in any branch to serve as the guiding principle in all AFP’s of knowledge that is set forth as a speculative operations against all forms of insurgency. and or self-evident truth, or as speculative This way, heavy reliance on best practices working principles as taught or recommended and lessons will be minimized. Rather, these for acceptance by others. It is based on the will be utilized only as models or modes of accumulation of knowledge gained through reference in an operation. experience, study, analysis, test and validation.”

2. Is it the existing AFP doctrines that were Without doctrine or the so called “guiding patterned from foreign principles, from the principles,” all operations conducted against United States? The kind of doctrine that insurgency will rely on past operations, as the next does not address regional differences nor most logical approach to do so. Interpretation will contextualize regional conflict-based groups. not be cohesive and likely be based on individual belief and interpretations vis-à-vis best practices 3. Is it the absence of national security and lessoned learned. Point of consensus will strategy on insurgency? The strategy would only be achieved should exchange of opinion be clearly define strategic approaches among given enough space; however we also have to stakeholders or courses of action towards observe the concept of individuality. insurgency. Other existing military doctrines on the other 4. Is it systematic? The way the military training hand were patterned from the United States, the was developed and conducted rely heavily remnants of American occupation that shaped the

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Philippine Armed Forces from structure, system eventually become the AFPDDC today. Aside and academic institutions. The overarching from developing doctrines, its primary roles principles were foreign in nature. The doctrine include managing GHQ and AFPWSSUs’ does not constitute Filipino discipline nor put into doctrine research and development activities, context territorial, regional and cultural differences and to reinforce doctrine proponents in support in this archipelago. to the AFP mission. Since 1977, AFPDDC has published 80 doctrine manuals, 23 are current In addition, the doctrine centers or offices while 57 are for review and revision. observed that little attention has been given to doctrine development in the Armed Forces Philippine Army. Doctrine development for notwithstanding that it is one of priority areas in the Philippine Army (PA) is undertaken by the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program and Doctrine Center established in 1995 under the also one of the major pillars of the earlier AFP Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) of Modernization Program. Instead, priority is given the PA. The primary mission of DC, TRADOC is to pressing operational requirements for ISO. to develop, test, evaluate and validate doctrines; Consequently, emphasis was given to units that publish manuals and pamphlets for doctrinal/ were created for ISO and not units dedicated for historical information and instructional purposes. doctrine development. To date, TRADOC has developed 34 doctrine manuals and 145 reference materials. Less or inadequate doctrinal emphasis when correlated to degree of importance would Philippine Air Force. Doctrine development for eventually affect personnel assigned or being the Philippine Air Force (PAF) is handled by the assigned to doctrine development in terms of Air Power Institute (API) which was organized on attitudes, technical capacity and motivational January 16, 2002. API is mandated “to develop attributes (facilities, promotion and monetary doctrines and advance airpower for the Philippine support to programs). Air Force”. As of the end of 2012, API has already developed 39 manuals (34 organizational, 4 Doctrine Development at GHQ and functional and 1 operational manual). Major Services Philippine Navy. The task of developing naval AFP Doctrine Development Center. The doctrine has been given to Naval Doctrine Office AFPDDC was established on February 10, (NDO) of the Philippine Navy (PN). The office 2007 as an AFP-Wide Support and Separate was established on December 2, 2009 and was Unit (AFPWSSU). Historically, it is the Doctrine later organized as a separate office from the Development Office (DDO), a Special Staff Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Education of the Chief of Staff, AFP (1977). In 1984, its and Training, N8, PN on July 26, 2010. The PN functions and personnel were transferred to Basic Doctrine is still on test and evaluation the AFP Command and General Staff College at its Headquarters and would soon set for (AFPCGSC) and became the Research and promulgation by the Chief of Staff, AFP. Doctrines Development Group of the college. The center underwent several renaming and

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On Military Training During the AFP Education and Training Summit 2012 at GHQ, participants observed and identified Fundamental to military training is the presence of the following major gaps and challenges on doctrine that would provide guiding principles for training and education, among others: courses of action in the conduct of operations. In the absence of doctrine, military training would be 1. Apprehension of some unified commanders weak or inadequate to some extent. Assumptions to conduct joint training due to the absence are: (1) context and direction setting if not difficult of clear policy. ISO remains to have utmost will be mostly trial-based, (2) discourse might priority compared to training. be all over the place and interpretation is widely open, (3) cohesiveness or consensus building will 2. Some participants including ground officers be quite hard to achieve; and lastly, (4) targets or agree that the present AFP peace education mission might suffer. for soldiers is insufficient. Its creation should be designed to encompass building trust, The AFP defines training as the development of a communications, human relations, social particular skill or group of skills through a regimen marketing and stakeholders’ management. of teaching, drills, exercises, practices, and systems primarily designed to enhance precision 3. There has been no local doctrinal basis for and discipline response (AFP ETS, 1997). Syjuco training. Training is usually anchored on (1977) on the other hand defines military training US and allied doctrines. Akin to operations, as the instruction of personnel to enhance their training relies heavily on domestic best capacity to perform specific military functions and practices and lessons learned. tasks. 4. Lastly, the participants observed that If doctrinal development in the AFP has issues there is no institutionalized and functional on emphasis, absence or inadequacy, and development program in training institutions contextualization or localization, then the kind of or units primarily due to the following training given to the military would likely reflect circumstances: the same. And while both training and doctrine are still far from enjoying priority and support, the • funding challenges; nature of insurgency in the country continuously • lack of permanent faculty; evolves, becoming more and more complex • absence of standards for instructor’s or multi-dimensional. Quite a mismatch. Then qualification; comes the military’s transition to external defense • lack of training facilities and amenities; and, in 2016. Imagine adding this to the equation. • ambivalent attitude of officers and personnel As a paradigm shift, will it create opportunity towards training and assignment to training for doctrinal support or would it merit support units. insufficiency?

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Recommendations/Interventions “Armed Forces Joint Doctrine Development Strategy” (2006) into policy, to wit: On Doctrine “The rank or grade that will head this AFPWSSU 1. To hasten the process of formulating a will be O-7. This new AFPWSSU requires a National Security Strategy (NSS), thru the matured, seasoned, and experienced flag national leadership, to provide basis in officer to steer and lead it. Having a flag officer the formulation of AFP’s ISO doctrine and rank means that he has already gained much related military doctrines that would in turn knowledge and experience in the military service provide overarching principles and guidance and this could be utilized to motivate and inspire in training and actual operations. Subjective the personnel to attain the goal of producing joint interpretations in the conduct of operations doctrines. His rank and authority could be used will be avoided, if not minimized. to leverage needed resources for the center. Relatedly, having a star-rank as the head of this 2. To transform the current US patterned AFPWSSU will show that the AFP is now serious doctrines to suit domestic requirements and in pursuing the development of doctrines.” incorporate regional, cultural and territorial differences. On Training

3. To highlight the importance of doctrine 1. To formulate policies that would amplify development and encourage DND/AFP to emphasis and support on training in order to consider the following: further enhance AFP capacity and to generate more quality and skilled personnel. • include doctrine development in all AFP training courses; 2. To create a more comprehensive AFP • come up with policy that would encourage education and training system. The officers, enlisted personnel and civilian design of which will include policies and employees assignment in doctrine centers procedures in conducting individual, unit, and offices; joint and combined training exercises with • allocate additional resources on doctrine emphasis on pre-entry training, professional facility improvements and other logistical military education program, and instructor needs/amenities like transports and billeting development program. It should also include areas; the interface between the AFP and civilian • consider interface with learning institutions, learning institutions, both local and foreign, civilian agencies and Civil Society within the objective of enhancing the capacity Organizations (CSOs), local and foreign, in of AFP training institutions. In addition, support to doctrine formulation; and, it should also include modules on peace • transform the proposal of the then Lieutenant building, conflict transformation, human Colonel Alexander V. Ambal, PA on AFPDDC relations, communications, social marketing leadership described in his paper entitled and stakeholder’s management.

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3. To create a policy on the motivational also include modules on peace building, attributes of training. Examples are: conflict transformation, human relations, communications, social marketing and • credit on promotion among instructors both stakeholder’s management. for local and foreign trainings; • improvement on training facilities and “Article 18 which provides for the following; (1) amenities; and, establishment of National Defense University • allocation of additional fund support and (NDU) (Sec. 66), (b) DND shall maintain a resources to training institutions. defense and security education system (Sec. 62), (2) DND shall enter with learning institutions, 4. To support the proposed Senate Bill No. local or foreign, for the conduct of education, 675, the ”National Defense and Security training and research programs designed to Act” that would strengthen military training keep the defense establishment abreast with and education. In addition, it should current trends and developments (Sec. 64).”

SOURCE: PAO AFP

64 6 AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 7 AFP Clear Operational Plans by Col. Isidro L. Purisima (GSC) PA and Iren C. Gumpal Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines AFP CLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS

The AFP has employed various operational concepts and approaches in addressing insurgency and its root causes. The AFP implemented the Bantay Laya series from the early to the latter part of the 2000s that brought together tested operational concepts such as Win-Hold-Win, Sustained Operations, and the strategic precepts of Lambat Bitag (Rapid Conclusion, Gradual Constriction, One-on-One, and Keyhole Approach). With the termination of Bantay Laya 2 in 2010, AFP crafted the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) – Bayanihan, a seemingly fresh approach addressing insurgency and translating the government’s peace and security agenda at the local level.

The paper discusses the specific operational concepts employed in the various Operational Plans implemented by the AFP. It also talks about the innovations introduced by the IPSP Bayanihan, such as the People-Centered Approach, Human Security, and the Whole-of- Nation Approach.

The authors argue that there are interventions needed to be conducted to address the current gaps in the plan. There should be a national policy that will compel other line agencies to take part in internal security operations. Furthermore, the AFP’s campaign plan should be clearly understood by its personnel and staff.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Overview of the operational priority group develops into a more dangerous approaches/concepts employed by threat, the AFP will shift its priority focus and WIN the AFP over the years against the emergent threat while containing the other threat groups. Lambat Bitag/ Bantay Laya In the strategy of Sustained Operations, Over the years, the AFP has employed various the strategic precepts of Lambat Bitag were operationalO concepts and approaches in employed. The AFP used the Rapid Conclusion, addressing insurgency and the root causes which aimed at dismantling, in the shortest that propelled insurgency. While some of possible time, the major guerrilla fronts and these approaches were unique in concept and decisively defeats the main enemy forces through implementation, most were a metamorphosis of simultaneous and sustained campaign. This one or two operational concepts. likewise is aimed at drawing out the armed threat groups to do battle in a situation determined by Since the AFP’s assumption of the lead role in the military. The Gradual Constriction, on the internal security operations through RA 8551, its other hand, slowly constricts the targeted guerrilla main thrusts mostly orbited on the suppression fronts by progressively organizing the enemy from insurgency and other threats to peace and affected barangays “in reverse” starting from the security. RA 8551 prescribed the relief of the PNP outskirts of the guerrilla front and moving slowly of its primary responsibility on matters involving towards the central district of the given front. This the suppression of insurgency and other serious is coupled with seeking decisive engagements. internal threats to national security. Further, the One-on-One concept prescribes the deployment of forces to be on a one-on- The AFP implemented the Bantay Laya series in one basis: one task unit under one commander early up to the later part of 2000’s bringing together against one of the guerrilla fronts. It is about combinations of time tested operational concepts focusing or concentrating forces and resources of such Win-Hold-Win, Sustained Operations one unit to an enemy target. The guiding principle and the strategic precepts of the Lambat Bitag is “focus rather than spread.” This enhances unity (Rapid Conclusion, Gradual Constriction, One- of command in launching “gradual constriction” on-One, and Keyhole Approach). Preceding the against each of the enemy guerrilla front. original Bantay Laya was the AFP Lambat Bitag Furthermore, the Key Hole Approach applies to campaign plan. units with enough forces to form a mobile battalion that sit right in the central district of the armed On the tactical level, the Win-Hold-Win approach threat to serve as the unit strike force and disrupt focused on combat power to WIN against the threat group activities in the central districts and identified principal threat group while employing threaten his rear. economy of force to HOLD and contain lesser priority threats. Upon defeat of the targeted By and large, the AFP employed the operational priority threat, forces will be shifted on the next principle of Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop priority threat. Should the threat posed by the less (Support) to carry out the coordinated and

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integrated efforts of the entire government Apart from these operational approaches, machinery, with the support and participation concepts such as the Red Area/ White Area of civil society. In the operational plan, it is Operations demand for two distinct operations accomplished within a frame of four overlapping, conducted simultaneously to break the red supporting and interrelated stages that may area-white area symbiosis. Red Area Operations be conducted sequentially or simultaneously focus on the armed threat groups in the countryside depending on the specific situation in the area. The while the White Area Operations focus on CLEAR stage ensures decisive defeat of armed guerrilla front committees piloting general groups and neutralization of its politico-military uprising in the urban areas. structure. The HOLD stage preserves the initial gains by strengthening the local defense system To reinforce the HOLD stage, the AFP utilized/ to secure the cleared areas. The CONSOLIDATE developed the Community Security Mechanism/ stage involves the collaborative participation of Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS)/ the military, the PNP and the civilian government Integrated Area Community Public Safety agencies and instrumentalities in the delivery (IACPS) Plan by integrating the efforts of of basic services. The DEVELOP stage is the territorial forces (AFP, CAA and PNP), local implementation of government’s socio-economic, defense organization, local government, local psychosocial and political reforms. sectoral organization, and local populace into an effective defense and security system that The deployment of Special Operations Team will secure and insulate the locality from (SOT) operations integrate combat, intelligence threat group influence, incursion or re-entry. and civil-military operations. SOT activities are ITDS starts as soon as all affected components of the CLEAR phase which frees the barangays are cleared of armed groups barangays from insurgent influence. It dismantles and mass-based organization. the mass base political structure developed by insurgent groups at the barangay level. This Furthermore, under the Bantay Laya, the doctrine, having been proven to be effective, AFP also employed the TRIAD Concept, a has undergone several refinements leading to synergistic employment of combat operations, the development of COPD, PDOP, Peace and intelligence, and civil-military operations. As Development Team/ BayanihanTeam which the supplementary measure, the AFP, in close AFP has been using until today. coordination with the PNP and other law enforcement agencies exercised legal offensive operations In its basic sense, the CLEAR stage is also against armed threat groups to ensure the referred to as the Area Clearing wherein it aims successful prosecution of those responsible for the decisive defeat of the insurgent armed for committing atrocities by filing cases groups and the neutralization of the insurgent’s against leaders and members of the different politico-military infrastructures in target priority threat groups. The establishment of Inter-Agency fronts.The aforementioned tactical approaches Legal Assistance Group (IALAG) has were variedly used in this stage. strengthened the effort on legal cooperation.

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While the AFP employed various approaches insurgency efforts of the government, combines to address the armed threat groups, it has not the energies and capabilities of LGUs, the AFP ceased in providing opportunities to those who the PNP, concerned CGAs and some committed are sincere to return to the folds of law. The DND- citizenry at the national, regional, provincial and AFP Balik-Baril Program in coordination with city/municipal levels. This can be viewed that the LGUs, LGAs and NGOs continued to encourage AFP has always been clear on the role of the armed insurgents to lay down their arms and POCs and the importance of the support of other be productive members of the society. Rebel line agencies in the campaign against insurgency. returnees who availed of the program benefitted However, the AFP is just part of the whole gamut from firearms payment, emergency cash loan, of the counterinsurgency efforts. livelihood assistance and amnesty. The Amnesty Program of the government thru the Proclamation IPSP Bayanihan No. 405, s. 2000 grants amnesty to all rebels who have committed crimes in pursuit of their political With the termination of Bantay Laya 2 in 2010, the beliefs. Rebels who applied in this program AFP saw the crafting of the Internal Peace and benefited from integration into a peaceful, Security Plan (IPSP) – Bayanihan, a seemingly pluralistic and democratic society. Furthermore, fresh approach to address insurgency and the AFP has also supported the rehabilitation translate the government’s peace and security of conflict-affected areas through peacebuilding agenda at the local level. In this plan, the AFP is initiatives by constructing barangay roads and the catalyst. school buildings, and other community-based infrastructure projects. The crafting of the IPSP Bayanihan has introduced several concepts unfamiliar to the exclusive Civil Government Agencies Involvement military organization. It has put emphasis to People-Centered Approach which seeks to While the Lambat Bitag series prescribed enhance human rights and promote human intensified military operations against threat development efforts, the necessary conditions groups, it has likewise called for the active to create a peaceful and secure environment support of civil government agencies (CGAs) under the broader frame of Human Security. such as Peace and Order Council (POC), Human Security centers on the protection and National Reconciliation and Development respect for human rights, good governance, Program (DSWD, DND, DILG, DTI, DPWH), access to economic opportunities, education and Joint Legal Action Committee (DOJ, DILG, DND) health care. It addresses the seven components and other related bodies of instrumentalities of which are economic security, food security, the government to the overall counterinsurgency health security, environmental security, personal campaign. In the document, the POC was security, community security, and political security described as a coordinative body designed to requiring the entire government bureaucracy, the orchestrate a unified and strongly coordinated private sector, and the civil society to collectively mechanism in the conduct of overall counter- implement. This, however, does not eliminate the

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role of the ordinary citizen and the entire Filipino development teams that shall use the combination nation as active contributors to internal peace of military and non-military activities to counter and security. In the Whole-of-Nation Approach, coercive activities and diminish the influence security is shared not just among security forces wielded by armed threat groups in barangays. and government institutions but also with civil With the IPSP, the AFP has embraced a new society and the communities. approach to check and balance by integrating interagency assessment and stakeholder’s Moreover, it introduced the concept of analysis as part of its approach to enhance its “Winning the Peace” wherein it shifts from a operational cohesiveness in the implementation predominantly militaristic solution to a people- of IPSP. In the essence of the whole-of-nation centered security strategy that is founded on approach, the AFP in return, employed support broad-based consultations and engagements operations to establish and maintain a just and with key stakeholders. It strives to pursue lasting thorough support to civil law enforcement, collaborative efforts with other internal peace and civil-military cooperation such as conflict security actors and participants in sharing the resolution, peace advocacy, peace constituency responsibility of the peace and security agenda. and human security. It also strengthens interagency coordination which effectively and efficiently synchronizes Moreover, under this new campaign plan, it and integrates efforts and responses of the entire introduced the concept of Security Sector Reform government machinery and non-governmental which is operationalized by adhering to the entities to overcome insurgency and to identify principle of Democratic Control of Armed Forces areas of exclusivity, coordination, and integration (DCAF) with emphasis on democratic principles, to ensure unity of efforts. such as transparency, and accountability. It identifies three main thrusts, to develop AFP While it pursues collaborative efforts, the AFP capabilities; to enhance professionalism in the under the IPSP, conducts Focused Military armed forces; and, to institutionalize stakeholders’ Operations against all internal armed threat involvement. groups threatening the safety and well-being of the people. Under the IPSP, adherence to As new operational approaches were introduced the principles, concepts, provisions and spirit in the plan, several gaps were identified that need of Human Rights, International Humanitarian clarification. There is a need to review the old Law or Law on Armed Conflicts and Rule of operational concepts and approaches whether Law became a must in all its operations. It has they are still applicable or needs revisions. not ceased to support Community Based Peace There are concepts in the IPSP that need further and Development through the deployment of elucidations because they are not purely military specifically organized community peace and in nature.

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Interventions needed for The publication of the IPSP Bayanihan has improvement of the plan and relatively defined what it hopes to achieve under operational environment the peace and security agenda of the government. Compared with the all-military plan Bantay Laya, The need for a national policy that shall the IPSP necessitates sincere commitment necessitate other line agencies to take part in the from other relevant actors and stakeholders for internal security operations. it to achieve its maximum potential. The plan gives equal emphasis on the combat and non- The publication of the National Internal Security combat dimensions of military operations and Plan (NISP) in 2001 embodied the “Strategy of the increasing involvement of national and Local Holistic Approach” involving the entire instrument Government Agencies, NGOs, Civil Society and of power of the government. Past experience the entire citizenry. indicated that these were not achieved on the ground. In a review of the implementation While the government has published the National of Bantay Laya, it was identified the lack of Security Policy 2011-2016 which lays down the awareness and dissemination of the NISP to fundamental and comprehensive framework other government agencies and their lower units/ on inter-related issues and concerns that may offices resulted to the limited participation, if not impact on national security, it lacks the National the non-participation of line agencies in the peace Security Strategy (NSS) which embodies the and security agenda of the national government. method by which the instruments of national At the local level, subsequent to the area clearing power are developed, applied and coordinated operation of the AFP, the development phase of to attain the national security objectives. In the cleared barangays was either delayed or lacking absence of an updated NISP, the IPSP is in at all. As a result, the psychological impact of need of a comprehensive national plan that shall the government’s development projects and the necessitate the commitment and involvement of delivery of basic services remained marginalized. all government line agencies and other relevant stakeholders in addressing internal security The NISP has provided a mechanism to address concerns. This national policy shall also be insurgency however; this plan is more viewed expected to clarify the roles of government units, as a military defense/security plan rather than a especially the PNP, and the AFP. plan that requires the essential participatory and holistic approach to address insurgency. Thus, Empowering of the POCs and LCEs/LGUs efforts of all involved were not coordinated and focused. Even with the PNP, its support role to The Peace and Order Council with the LGU are ISO was taken nonchalantly that pre-emptive the focal point and central authority responsible measures against insurgent offensives were to deal with human security issues at their overlooked. As a result, local PNP stations and level. This is clearly stipulated in the Local detachments have become lucrative sources of Government Code of the Philippines wherein the firearms for the insurgents. local government units are empowered by law to

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exercise efficient and effective governance. They internal threats to national security. The RA 8551 shall have the lead role in creating a structure provides that the AFP is the lead agency involving that shall address human security issues at the in the suppression of insurgency. The urgency local level. Moreover, they are the lead actors of this concern is relevant because the Defense in promoting the general welfare of the people Planning Guidance 2013-2018 projected the AFP within their respective territorial jurisdiction such to focus its main efforts on its highest core security as maintaining peace and order. Furthermore, concern which is the challenges on the country’s under Section 4 of the E.O. 546 signed on 14 territorial integrity. It shall however, render support July 2006, the local chief executives (LCEs), to other actors and government agencies on in coordination with the POCs are tasked to matters pertaining to internal security. include their priority program of action/thrust in their respective Integrated Area/Community Continuity of the Modernization Program in Public Safety Plan on resolving insurgency and preparation of its transition to territorial defense serious threats to national security. As such, the (RA 7898) POCs and LCEs should be strengthened and empowered to pursue the peace initiatives in The issuance of RA 8551 in 1998 prompted their area of jurisdiction. the AFP to shift its priority from the then called External Defense to Internal Security In totality, the DND/AFP is just a part of the Operations. This event led to the refocusing of whole-of-nation approach toward the attainment the modernization program from building AFP’s of the national goal. Imperative to this is the future territorial defense capability to addressing mutual support of all government agencies and shortages in the ISO. The RA 7898 known as the stakeholders working toward good governance, AFP Modernization Act which was signed by the delivery of basic and services; economic President in February 1995 purposely declares, reconstruction and sustainable development; as a policy of the state, to modernize the AFP to a and security sector reform. While the AFP on the level where it can effectively and fully perform its ground is yet to polish its grasp of the approaches constitutional mandate to defend the sovereignty embodied in the plan, it lacks the central authority and protect and preserve the patrimony of the to compel key players and line agencies in the republic. This was extended in 2012 for another local arena to commit and get involved. period of 15 years under RA 10349.

The need to repeal Section 3 of RA 8551 The need for parallel understanding of the AFP and stakeholders of the plan. One of the main issues in the defense reform is delineating clear roles and responsibilities As the AFP has entirely shifted from purely with the PNP for internal security operations. military plan to co-authoring the internal security This is apparent in the need to repeal Section plan with stakeholders and civilian counterpart, 3 of the RA 8551 which prescribed the relief it caused diverse appreciation on how this will of the Philippine National Police/DILG of its be operationalized on the ground. The need for primary responsibility on matters involving the comprehensive advocacy and education of all suppression of insurgency and other serious actors involved in the implementation of IPSP is

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essential. This lack of parallel grasp of the plan its core mission of upholding the sovereignty and is evident in the study conducted by the Working defend the territory of the country as long as it Group on Security Sector Reform of Ateneo de performs primary role in ISO. Manila University, Political Science Department to various AFP units and offices across the country. Yet, the PNP must be prepared and equipped to Intervention on this is crucial. take the lead role so as not to compromise the gains the country has achieved so far against armed threats. The Joint Peace and Security Implications If No Interventions Are Coordinating Center (JPSCC), an AFP and PNP Done partnership, must be enhanced as one of the mechanisms in the gradual transition of the AFP’s In the absence of interventions on the gaps ISO to law enforcement functions of the PNP. in the plan, the potential of the AFP’s current operational plan will not be fully realized. With In addition, without the support of the government’s the lack of a national policy that will compel other modernization program, the AFP cannot be fully line agencies to take part in the internal security mission-capable in territorial defense. It is primary operations, the plan shall remain an entirely AFP that this be emphasized as the AFP is working plan – no different to previous plans crafted by towards its shift to territorial defense. the AFP. Non-functioning POCs/LCEs shall again put greater weight on the AFP to pursue the Lastly, that the personnel and staff of the AFP peace and security agenda of the government in have no clear and unified understanding of its the local level. own plan is a serious concern that should not be neglected. Disjointed appreciation of the plan Furthermore, with RA 8551 still in force, the AFP breeds indifference to commanders and field shall not be able to focus its energy and resources operators. to territorial defense. It cannot be fully effective in

References:

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Primer on AFP Campaign Plan (LOI 23/88) Lambat Bitag of December 16, 1988. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Campaign Plan (“Lambat Bitag II”) of November 18, 1991. Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO Plan 02-01 (“Bantay-Laya”) of February 24, 2002. Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO PLAN s-2007 (“Bantay Laya”) II of December 01, 2006. Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO Plan 02-01 (“Bantay Laya”) Review Report and Briefing of January 06, 2007. Armed Forces of the Philippines, IPSP Handbook of December 2010. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Rules of Engagement for AFP IPSP “Bayanihan” of March 31, 2011. Department of Interior and Local Government, Executive Order No. 546 of July 14, 2006. National Internal Security Plan (NISP) Version 3.0 National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011-2016 of April 2011. Armed Forces of the Philippines, GHQ and AFPWSSUs CY 2011 Yearend Accomplishment Report of December 2011.

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Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 8 Philippine Intelligence Community: A Case for Transparency by Francis Domingo Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY

The continuously evolving global security landscape has prompted states across the world to establish intelligence agencies to effectively protect national sovereignty and security from prevailing and emerging security challenges and threats. Anchored on Western ideas, a general notion of intelligence is that it is “stolen information” acquired through espionage or clandestine activities. This information normally pertains to matters critical to aspects of national security and threats from actual or potential adversaries. Thus, secrecy of intelligence information, processes, and organization is absolutely necessary to prevent any damage to the prestige and national security of a state.

Despite the need to ensure secrecy across all aspects of intelligence, the article argues that the prevailing tradition or practice of security restrictions should not impede public understanding or awareness of basic intelligence information in the Philippines. The article provides an in-depth examination of the Philippine Intelligence Community (IC) by focusing on the following critical junctures of analysis: 1) identification of the notions of the intelligence; 2) implications of secrecy of intelligence activities; 3) structure and organization of the Philippine IC; and, 4) mechanisms for intelligence oversight.

Furthermore, the article offers some recommendations in developing and ensuring intelligence transparency in the Philippines. These include 1) maintaining public transparency through the dissemination of basic information on intelligence agencies (i.e. use of media platforms and linkages with academic and civilian research entities), and 2) developing intelligence oversight mechanisms, either through executive or congressional oversight mechanisms, which will ensure that intelligence agencies operate in accordance with democratic principles and controls.

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Democratic states, both new and established, in democratic states,4 the general mindset areD confronted with fundamental and inevitable towards intelligence and intelligence agencies in dilemma in combining intelligence agencies that the Philippine is still dominated by secrecy and are effective and under democratic civilian control. resistance to transparency. This is manifested This is due to the tension between the necessity by the fact that government agencies that of intelligence agencies to work in secret and engage in intelligence work do not have official the requirement of democratic government for communication mediums like websites and do not accountability, obliging intelligence transparency.1 consistently publish information briefs and annual The ultimate challenge for policymakers and reports where basic details can be imparted to scholars is to understand this dilemma and to the public. It is also significant that scholars, local manage it in a consistent and productive manner.2 and foreign, have not produced any research that focuses primarily on the intelligence community. In the case of the Philippines, basic information While some commentators and journalists have regarding the mandate, functions, and objectives written about issues that challenge intelligence of intelligence agencies are not available to the agencies, their works did not consider the public due to the ‘culture of secrecy’ embedded emerging academic literature on intelligence in members of the intelligence community. And studies and the substantial information available without the benefit of a freedom of information from other states.5 law which provides access to ‘all information pertaining to official acts, transactions or With this background, this article argues that while decisions, as well as government research data numerous aspects of intelligence should remain used as basis for policy development…’3, it would secret, security restrictions should not impede the be impossible for ordinary Filipinos who help fund public from understanding the purpose, objectives intelligence agencies to develop awareness and and basic functions of intelligence agencies. gain basic knowledge about the activities of the The article examines the Philippine Intelligence Philippine Intelligence Community. Community (IC) in the context of the following questions: What are the notions of intelligence Considering that transparency and openness in the Philippines? Why is secrecy necessary in are instituted norms in intelligence communities intelligence activities? What is the structure and

1 Refers to the oversight function for different sectors including legislative and judicial branches of government, media, academia and non- government organizations to ensure the Philippine Intelligence Community is undertaking its mission legally, effectively, and efficiently. 2 Thomas Bruneau, “Introduction: Challenges to Effectiveness in Intelligence due to the Need for Transparency and Accountability in Democracy,” Strategic Insights Volume VI, Issue 3 (2007). 3 Freedom of Information Act of 2009, S.B. No. 3308, 14th Congress, Second Session (2009). 4 Adam N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent War Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd Edition (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), 102-103. 5 Kimberly Tan, “Drilon wants intelligence coordinating agency reorganized” GMA News Online, October 10, 2010, accessed, May 13, 2012, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/203297/news/nation/drilon-wants-intelligence-coordinating-agency-reorganized; Cathy Yamusan, “Open records of Marcos’ spy agency, Enrile urges,” Inquirer News Online, December 12, 2011, accessed, May 13, 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer. net/109377/open-records-of-marcos%E2%80%99-spy-agency-enrile-urges; Maila Ager, “Drilon, Enrile question intelligence agency’s 811 ‘unjustified’ positions,” Inquirer News Online, November 13, 2010, accessed, May 13, 2012, http://globalnation.

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organization of the IC? What are the different relevant to a government’s formulation and mechanisms for intelligence oversight? The last implementation of policy to further its national section presents recommendations for developing security interests and to deal with threats from intelligence transparency in the Philippines. actual or potentials adversaries.”9 In most cases, this “relevant information” is collected from different sources (secret and open) and Understanding intelligence pertains to matters regarding an adversary’s military capabilities and intentions, diplomatic The concept of “intelligence” in the Philippines affairs, and intelligence activities.10 The is predominantly influenced by Western notions information is then processed and analyzed of intelligence. In fact, the whole concept of to generate what is referred to as an “intelligence “coordinating intelligence” and establishing a product.” government agency that would coordinate national intelligence efforts and provide Another notion is that intelligence is also assessments can be attributed to American considered a systematic process. Mark influence.6 Therefore, currently Philippine civilian Lowenthal, a former American intelligence and military intelligence strategies and policies official offers another perspective on intelligence. are mostly based on the practices of the United He asserts that intelligence is a “process by which States Intelligence Community.7 specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, There are three dominant notions of intelligence and provided to policy makers.”11 This notion of which are generally accepted by intelligence intelligence is broader and considers the entire scholars and practitioners. These notions classify intelligence cycle, from planning and direction to intelligence into focus on three general catego- dissemination, as “intelligence.” ries: information, process, and organization.8 Lastly, intelligence is defined as anorganization . One notion is that intelligence is information. Prominent intelligence scholar and former In their seminal work Silent Warfare, British intelligence officer Michael Herman intelligence scholars Abram Shulsky and Gary asserts that while there are several perspectives Schmitt define intelligence as “information on intelligence, the key element in these

6 Executive Order No. 235 of 1949, “Creation of the National Intelligence and Security Authority.” 7 See for example: Executive Order No. 246 (1987). “Providing for the Creation of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, and for other Purposes.”Malacanang, Manila, med Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-2 Tactical Intelligence (Quezon City, General Headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo, 1978), Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-5 The Armed Forces Attaché (Quezon City, General Headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo, 1981), and Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-02 Joint Intelligence Collection Manual (Quezon City, General Headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo, 2008) 8 Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent War. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy 4th Edition (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009).

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perspectives is the organizational aspect. He Therefore, information from open sources - explains that “intelligence in government is based newspapers, television broadcast, or academic on the particular set of organizations with that publications may be valuable, but it is not name: the ‘intelligence services’ or (sometimes) necessarily intelligence. the ‘intelligence communities.’ 12 Consequently, aside from information or a systematic process, In terms of methodology, there are different ways intelligence also refers to government of stealing information. Information can be stolen organizations. These organizations or intelligence through technical means such as enciphered services have been a twenty-first century growth cables from foreign embassies can be intercepted industry and are now permanent institutional and decoded or satellites can surreptitiously structures in governments around the world.13 photograph a terrorist training camp hidden in a desert. Information can also be the work of a The definitions presented above are certainly human agent, perhaps by slipping classified useful in increasing our understanding of documents into a briefcase when leaving work intelligence but they are not considered as at the end of the day, the classic secret agent “official” or “accepted” definitions. In fact, for of the spy movies. However the information is the past years, a number of practitioners, stolen, its theft involves two extremely sensitive academics, and specialists (intelligence components that intelligence agencies have to scholars) have attempted to develop viable protect at all cost: the source of information and definitions of intelligence.14 While these studies the method used to steal the information.15 have contributed to the emerging academic literature of intelligence, a viable definition of The maintenance of secrecy has proven intelligence is still lacking until this time. essential to the successful development, implementation, and completion of plans and missions of the government.16 Secrecy is Secrecy and intelligence implemented through levels of classification, reflecting the sensitivity of the intelligence or Since a general notion of intelligence is that intelligence means. More specifically, the it is stolen information that pertains to critical confidential classification level prevents the aspects of state’s national security and threats from disclosure of information that is expected to cause actual or potentials adversary, secrecy is ‘damage’ to a state’s national security, the secret absolutely necessary to prevent any damage classification level prevents the disclosure of to the prestige and national security of a state. information that is expected to cause ’serious

12 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: University Press, 1996) 13 Ibid. 14 Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition for Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 46 Issue 2 (2002). 15 Thomas Patrick Carroll, “The Case Against Intelligence Openness,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 14 (2001): 559-574. 16 Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997): 6.

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damage’ to a state’s national security, while national security and foreign policy matters with the top secret classification level prevents the his senior national security advisors and cabinet disclosure of information that is expected to cause officials.18 The President chairs the NSC, which exceptionally grave damage’ to a state’s is composed of members of key government national security. These classifications are departments including foreign affairs, national driven by concerns that disclosure of sources defense, military, interior and local government, and methods will allow other actors to justice, labor and employment, science and implement measures to prevent collection, technology.19 effectively negating the collection system.17 To translate policy into action, the NSC relies on Therefore, intelligence and secrecy are directly the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency correlated. Since intelligence is information (NICA) which is the main intelligence agency of acquired through espionage or clandestine the Philippine government. The agency which activities, secrecy is required to protect the was originally established as the National sources of information and the methods utilized Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) by to steal the information. Having established the President Elpidio Quirino in 1949 was tasked connection between intelligence and secrecy, to “organize and coordinate the intelligence the next section examines the structure and collection activities of various government organization of the Philippine Intelligence instrumentalities concerned.” However since Community. 1987, NICA’s mandate has shifted to a broader scope of “directing, coordinating, and integrating all government activities involving The Intelligence Community national intelligence.” 20 In addition, the agency plays a central role in preparing intelligence The structure of the IC is generally patterned assessments for consideration of key after the US Intelligence Community prior to 2004. decision-makers in the Philippine government. Much like the United States, the President of the Philippines is the highest authority on matters Under NICA, there are two functional bodies, the involving national security. The National National Intelligence Committee (NIC) and the Security Advisor (NSA) is the chief advisor of the Regional Intelligence Committee (RIC). The NIC President on national security matters and is the principal arm of the National Intelligence belongs to the official cabinet of the President. Board for providing direction and control of The National Security Council (NSC) is the intelligence operations and activities of the President’s principal forum for deliberating on intelligence community. The NIC is also a

17 Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secrets to Policy 18 The White House, National Security Council, last modified 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc. 19 Shiela Coronel and Yvonne T. Chua (eds.), The PCIJ Guide to Government (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2003). 20 Department of Budget and Management, National Expenditures Program 2009 Executive Offices, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency. Quezon City: Department of Budget and Management, 2009.

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high-level forum where the IC can conduct the SMC, SMC-Alpha and SMC-Bravo. Alpha intelligence exchanges to generate inputs for closely monitors domestic threats specifically NICA’s national intelligence estimate (NIE).21 destabilization plots against the administration while Bravo serves as “the body principally RICs have the same mandate and structure as tasked to undertake threat assessment work” the NIC, however the scope of these units is including intelligence monitoring of terrorist narrower or more “localized”. RICs have direct plans and activities.” 25 operational function thus permitting them to act on intelligence reports requiring immediate action.22 Recommendations for intelligence transparency The National Intelligence Board (NIB) is the highest forum for intelligence exchange among The emergence of transnational security senior officials from selected government threats originating from state and non-state departments and units.23 The NIB provides the actors has proven that intelligence is an NICA Director-General with an independent essential tool for states in the twenty first century. source of advice on the effectiveness of the While developing an internal security service is a IC in meeting the country’s intelligence standard procedure for states to secure requirements and the coordination and integration their citizens, few states still take the view of local and global intelligence operations. Due to that they can dispense with a foreign the nature of its mandate the NIB has access to all intelligence service. Two basic patterns exist for information needed to perform its functions organizing security and intelligence. The first and includes senior officials of all government involves the establishment of a single agency department and units of the Philippines integrating domestic and foreign intelligence government.24 (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey). The second The Special Monitoring Committee (SMC) necessitates the creation of separate was established in 2002 for counterintelligence agencies for domestic security and external operations, particularly to monitor domestic intelligence, with either distinct or coinciding threats such as destabilization plots against territorial capabilities (France, Germany, Hungary, the administration, and terrorism against the Poland, the UK and the USA). Even with general public. Two groups were created within the variations in the organizational structure or

21 National Intelligence Board Directive No. 1 Series 2003 cited in Ariel Perlado, “Assessing the Effectiveness of the Intelligence Coordination System of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (unpublished master’s thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, 2011). 22 Ibid. 23 AFP-J2, AFP-ISAFP, PNP-IG, PNP-ITG, NBI, Presidential Security Group, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Local Government, Budget and Management, Finance, Energy, Transportation and Communication, Labour and Employment, Transportation, Environment and Natural Resources, Social Welfare, Public Works, Trade and Industry, Heath, Agriculture. 24 Executive Order No. 158 ______(1968). 25 National Intelligence Board No. 2 Series 2002 cited in Perlado, Assessing the Effectiveness.

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governmental set up, security and intelligence various threats to national security.27 On the other pose a common set of challenges for hand, setting up official websites that feature accountability across different states.26 basic information about intelligence agencies indicates a high level of transparency and respect The central issue in advocating for intelligence for democratic processes. Indonesia’s Badan transparency through oversight is the Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency), challenge of how to provide democratic control of Mexico’s El Centro de Investigación y Seguridad intelligence and intelligence agencies which Nacional (Center for Research and National are essential to the survival and prosperity Security) and India’s Central Intelligence of the state, but which must operate secretly. Bureau are examples of developing countries Consequently, this study submits the that have been successful in disseminating following recommendations which are based information to the public through the Internet.28 on the practices of democratic governments. Collaborating with academics and researchers Maintain public transparency is another basic strategy which intelligence agencies implement to maintain transparency. There are two basic strategies that intelligence Since intelligence is a process, intelligence agencies employ to maintain public agencies work with academics and researchers to transparency. One strategy is for intelligence ensure that their administrators, analysts, and agencies through their public affairs office, officers develop new and progressive publish basic information, whether printed or perspectives regarding the different aspects online, about their work. A second strategy is for of intelligence, particularly clandestine the intelligence agencies to collaborate collection, counter intelligence, analysis and with academics and researchers to allow covert action or in Philippine parlance ‘special them to understand and assess different operations’. While the literature on intelligence aspects of intelligence agencies. is well developed, it is strictly dominated by Western academics and practioners. Important Publishing basic information about intelligence examples of scholarly works on intelligence agencies such as US National Intelligence: A include: Michael Herman, Intelligence Power Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence released in in Peace and War and Allen Dulles, The Craft 2009 and the UK National Intelligence Machinery of Intelligence which discusses clandestine published in 2010 provides American and British collection from an historical perspective; citizens with a general understanding of how the Jennifer Sims, Buton Gerber, Vaults intelligence agencies will protect them against and Mirrors and Masks Rediscovering

26 Hans Born and Ian Leigh, “Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services” Geneva Centre for the Democratic control of Armed forces Policy Paper 19 (2007), 6-7. 27 Office of the Director for National Intelligence, National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide (Washington D.C.: U.S. Director for National Intelligence, 2009) and UK Cabinet Office, National Intelligence Machinery (London: The Stationary Office, 2010) 28 Center for Research and National Security, What is the CISEN?, last modified 2010, http://www.cisen.gob.mx/ cisen.htm; BadanIntelijen Negara, Profile,last modified 2012, http://www.bin.go.id/#; Ministry of Home Affairs, Organisational Setup, last modified May 16, 2011.

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US Counterintelligence and William John- powers, functions, duties, decision making son, Thwarting Enemies at Home and processes and other information that does not Aboard discusses prospective reforms in damage the national security of the State, it is US counterintelligence; Stephen Marrin, still uncertain whether this bill will be approved Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the by both legislative and executive branches of Gap Between Scholarship and Practice the government.30 and Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainly, Intelligence Analysis and National Security Develop intelligence oversight mechanisms provide key ideas on how to improve intelligence analysis; and, finally Gregory The central issue in ensuring intelligence Treverton, Covert Action The Limits of transparency is the challenge of how to provide Intervention in the Postwar World and democratic control or oversight on intelligence William Daugherty, Exec tive Secrets: Covert functions and institutions which are essential Action and the Presidency offer recommendation to the survival and development of a state, but to address controversial issues regarding which must operate in justifiable secrecy. covert actions in the United States. In contrast to other areas of governmental Aside from the two basic strategies, it is activity, it is accepted that official necessary for the Philippine Congress to pass communications and operations of intelligence legislation requiring intelligence agencies to agencies can only be transparent to a limited disclose basic information which should at extent. Prevailing mechanisms for oversight the least, include “descriptions of its central applied by a majority of governmental activities and field organization” and “statements of the need to be modified to match the requirements general course and method by which its functions of intelligence agencies. Therefore, the need for are channeled and determined.” 29 As mentioned rigorous oversight is much greater than in the previously, the Filipino people have yet to case of activities such as education or welfare.31 benefit from a law that mandates easy and efficient access to public information. While Intelligence oversight is still an emerging the latest version (2012) of the freedom of concept in the Philippines.32 The mission of information bill, An Act to Strengthen the Right of investigating “illegal, unjust, improper or Citizens to Information held by the Government inefficient” actions by public officials resides requires all government agencies to “regularly with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Senate publish, print and disseminate” updated key Committee on Accountability of Public Officers information regarding mandate, structure, and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and the House

29 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 as amended by Public Law No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524. 30 Proposed Freedom of Information Act of 2012, accessed on 16 July 2012, http://www.gov.ph/foi/. 31 Born and Leigh, Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services. 32 Senate Bill 765, The Intelligence Oversight Act of 2010, accessed on 17 July 2012, http://www.senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress=15&q=SBN-765

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Committee on Good Government and Public they authorized. In states where this system is Accountability.33 While these may be considered absent, the only democratic alternative is for a successful in uncovering vital information congress to take over. However, this alternative regarding national security matters, these is questionable because, while legislative bodies investigative institutions are not necessarily can effectively investigate the use of powers and suitable to implement effective intelligence expenditure after the fact, they are not capable oversight because they lack the focus and security of directing and managing real time intelligence protocols present in specialized department activities unlike the executive branch of or committees of more advance democratic government.36 states like Argentina, the United Kingdom and the United States.34 The succeeding Congressional Oversight section discusses the two dominant types of intelligence oversight mechanisms which could The international norm is for Congress to be appropriate for the Philippine government. create a specialized body which is mandated to provide oversight of the intelligence services. Executive oversight Without a specialized committee, it is difficult if not impossible for the Congress to exercise The definitive authority and legitimacy of systematic and focused oversight of the intelligence agencies rest on legislative intelligence services. The extent of the approval of their powers, activities and budget. mandate of the Congressional intelligence However, for practical reasons and because of the oversight committee is critical for its success. sensitive nature and urgency of the tasks of One option is for the mandate to be involving intelligence, effective external control comprehensive, reviewing both policy and of these agencies must rest with the executive operations (Germany and United States). A branch of government.35 Congressional oversight body that focuses on operations may have greater credibility and There is no inherent conflict between executive may be given greater powers, such as powers control and congressional oversight. In fact, the of subpoena. However, it will encounter congress depends on the executive for effective unavoidable restrictions on how it undertakes oversight because congress can only reliably investigations and on what can be reported call members of the executive branch to account to the Congressional Committee or the for the actions of intelligence agencies only if public. It will operate in effect within a ‘ring of these officials have actual powers of control and secrecy’ and that will create a barrier between have sufficient information about the operations the specialized body and the remainder of the

33 34 Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh (eds.), Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Publishers, 2005). 35 Born and Leigh, Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services. 36 Ibid, pp. 10-11.

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Congressional Committee. As long as the security of a state. More specifically, secrecy committee establishes a reputation for is absolutely vital in protecting the sources of independence and thoroughness, this barrier intelligence and the methods utilized to obtain should not affect its legitimacy. With this intelligence. arrangement, the Congressional Committee and the public will have to trust that there exists In terms of structure, the Philippine proper oversight of operational matters even Intelligence Community is generally patterned without readily available supporting evidence.37 after the US Intelligence Community prior to 2004. Much like the United States, the President of the The alternative approach is to limit the mandate of Philippines is the highest authority on matters the Congressional oversight committee to certain involving national security while the National aspects particularly policy and finance (United Security Adviser is the most influential senior Kingdom) or human rights and the rule of law staff member when national security matters are (Norway). These aspects are generally examined involved. The NSC which is also patterned after in the public arena with fewer restrictions on the American National Security Council, is the disclosure, although the publication of exact President’s principal forum for deliberating on budgetary details may be damaging to national national security and foreign policy matters with security. The difficulty of this approach, however, his senior national security advisors and cabinet is that it undermines one of the key tasks of officials. To implement policies developed within Congressional scrutiny: ensuring that the NSC, the President relies on the NICA, which government policy is carried out effectively and is the main intelligence agency of the Philippine within the boundaries of the law. Without access to government. Under the NSC, there is also the operational details, an oversight body can have National Intelligence Board where the highest or give no assurance about the efficiency or the forum for intelligence exchange among senior legality of the intelligence agencies.38 officials from selected government departments and units take place.

Conclusion With the emergence of transnational security threats originating from state and non-state The concept of “intelligence” in the Philippines actors, there is no question that intelligence is dominated by Western ideas which define agencies are necessary for states to survive in intelligence as not only information but also the twenty first century. While there are different a process and an organization. Since a patterns and procedures for organizing dominant notion of intelligence is that it is stolen intelligence agencies, achieving intelligence information, secrecy is absolutely necessary transparency will always remain a main challenge to prevent damage to the prestige and national for democratic states.

37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.

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Increasing public transparency and developing practical oversight mechanism because with intelligence oversight mechanisms are the sensitive nature and urgency of the tasks of recommendations to develop intelligence involving intelligence, effective external control transparency in the Philippines. As discussed of these agencies must rest with the executive previously, intelligence agencies can increase branch of government. public transparency by developing an official website, publishing documents regarding the On the other hand, Congressional oversight Philippine Intelligence Community and is the dominant mechanism adopted by collaborating with academics and researchers. different democratic states because these Intelligence oversight is still an emerging committees are generally effective in investigating concept in the Philippines. Executive the use of powers and expenditures of intelligence oversight and congressional oversight are agencies. However, the problem with these two dominant mechanisms to ensuring that committees is that they are not capable of intelligence agencies are a countable for their directing and managing real time intelligence actions. Although definitive authority and activities that the executive branch of legitimacy of intelligence agencies rest on government can implement. legislative approval, executive oversight is a

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, AFP

86 8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 9 Civil-Military Operation: Models of Institutional Engagement in the Philippines by Maribel Daño-Luna Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

It is recognized that a transparent, effective, and institutionalized civil-military engagement is one of the characteristics of a modern defense force. Additionally, civil-military relations is a necessity for reforms in the defense force to be sustained. In the case of the Philippines, this is enshrined in the Philippine Constitution, which recognizes a ‘civilian authority (that is) supreme over the military”, and characterized by the robust involvement of various civil society organizations in the country.

The paper foregrounds the evolution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Civil-Military Operations in support of Security Sector Reform amidst different contexts and realities regarding implementations on the ground. Emphasis is also placed on how the shortcomings in the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Civil-Military Operations implementations can be addressed.

The author reiterates the importance of Civil-Military Operations to enacting Security Sector Reform. However, there is a need to clearly define the focus of Civil-Military Operations, aligned with the apparent paradigm shift brought forth by a post-agreement security arrangement.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Introduction

In the broader frame of security sector reform stakeholders as “partners-to-be-engaged”.5 The I(SSR), there is recognition that a modern defense importance of this paradigm shift is emphasized force is not only a function of upgraded capability in the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan but also a result of transparent, effective and (IPSP) Bayanihan indicating the “involvement institutionalized civil-military engagement.1 In of all stakeholders in the pursuit of internal order for the reforms to take root, a healthy civil- peace and security” 6 as a strategic imperative military relation is a necessity.2 This relationship is in pursuing military mission. anchored on unique Philippine democratic context – first, the Philippine Constitution’s principle that However, there are realities surrounding CMO the “civilian authority, is at all times, supreme implementation that has to be taken into mind. On over the military;” 3 and second, the vibrant civil the part of the AFP, they operate under conditions society organization (CSO) involvement in the of “limited funding, weak combat capabilities, Philippines. The manner in which the military poor human rights records, corruption…”7 cultivates relationship with stakeholders on among others, which affect how they perform the ground is concretized through civil-military their mandate and consequently, how they operations (CMO). professionalize their ranks. On the part of the civilians, history of antagonism brought about The Philippines’ rich history as a democratic by military human rights abuse stays in the nation tells us that strengthening of civil-military discussion table and affects the quality and to a relations over the years paved the way for gains certain extent, transparency of the engagement. in SSR in the Armed Forces of the Philippines Moreover, implications of CMO activities on (AFP) to be instituted. After the EDSA Revolution communities remain points of debate as to how in 1986, there had been sustained efforts it addresses insurgency while raising community for CMO to veer away from treating dependence on the military and militarization in civilians as “subjects-to-be-won-over” 4 to treating the area. 8

1 OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (2007) mentions a similar argument “ A recognition that SSR is not only about increasing operational capacity but also about enhanced service delivery, governance and accountability highlights that other skills are required…” 2 C. Pangatungan, “Implementing Security Sector Reform in the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Issues and Prospects,” AFP Office of Strategic and Special Studies (AFP-OSS) Digest 18 Number 2 (2013): 8. 3 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 3 of Article II of Declaration of Principles and State Policies, page 1. 4 R. Alcudia, “Civil Military Operations or Civil-Military Operations? What’s in a Hyphen?,“ Philippine Army Journal (2007): 4, accessed at http://www.army.mil.ph/e_publications/pa_journal/pa_journal_2nd.pdf. 5 Ibid. 6 AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan (2010), page 27. Ava. 7 D. Russel, “Examining the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Civil Military Operations. A Small Power Securing Military Relevancy in Nontraditional Military Roles,” Small Wars Journal Vol. 6 Issue 1 (2010): 15. 8 Oreta, J. and Tolosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessment: Assessing the readiness of the military institution and the commitment of security stakeholders’ to the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP). Working Group on Security Sector Reform, Ateneo de Manila University.

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Against this background, the following questions On the other hand, the UN humanitarian context are raised – since its inception, how did the AFP’s calls for “coordination between the military CMO evolve in support of security sector reform? component and the civilian components of the What are the means in confronting dilemmas in same integrated mission…” 11 Responsive to CMO implementation? How do we imagine civil- the context and security environment, CMO military operation in support of a modern defense implementation varies in different countries. force? In the Philippines, the concept of AFP-CMO is With reference to the context discussed, regarded as “sui generis” (Russel, 2010) where this paper presents practices in civil-military concepts have been developed from unique operations of the AFP and how it contributed to military culture and rich military history of the gains in security sector reform. Equal emphasis AFP. As early as 1950’s under the administration is put in the discussion on how predicaments in of President Ramon Magsaysay, the elements AFP CMO implementation can be addressed. of CMO are seen in efforts towards Corollary to this, the paper presents models counter-insurgency and nation building.12 of institutionalized clear feedback mechanism This continued until democratization efforts between the Philippine military and the civilians – post-EDSA 1986. However, it was only until both civilian government and civil society. 2006 when the AFP CMO Doctrine was crafted – regarded as a broad doctrine providing the scope and necessity for CMO while leaving room for Fundamental Concepts of subjective interpretation.13 Also, this doctrine has Civil-Military Operation not yet updated upon arrival of IPSP Bayanihan. In 2013, the CMO Handbook was developed to There are two concepts recognized by the United provide clear guidelines in the conduct of CMO Nations system in the performance of civil military activities. coordination (CIMIC), that is, humanitarian and military.9 These two concepts differentiate how the NATO and the UN conduct CMO. The NATO AFP-CMO Pillars and Components is “generally deployed as a military force”10 hence the need for them to establish their separate The AFP defines civil-military operations as mandate from UN and other groups performing “planned activities undertaken independently or peace building activities in the same country. in coordination with civilian entities in support

9 Coning and Holshek, “United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) Course Manual,” Peace Operations Training Institute (2012): 16, accessed at http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/course_promos/civil_military_coordination/civil_military_coordination_english. pdf. 10 Ibid., page 26. 11 Ibid., page 27. 12 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, “AFP CMO Doctrine,” AFP CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment Tools. 2013. 13 AFP CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment Tools. (2013). Published by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, page 31.

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to the accomplishment of the AFP mission categorized into three pillars targeting a to gain popular support and weaken the will specific audience: Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, of the enemy to fight.”14 AFP-CMO activities and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) or can take many forms from model behaviors of Information Support Affairs (ISA).18 While each soldiers on the ground to big-ticket projects for pillar addresses specific concerns of CMO, the community facilitated and or participated by “one pillar must always be supported” by the AFP. Put simply, CMO takes a the other two to ensure maximum effectiveness. counterinsurgency stance while dictated Programs under each pillar are in coordination largely by developmental orientation.15 CMO with the civilian government and civil society doctrine is founded on winning the hearts organizations (CSO) while being implemented in and minds of the people while facilitating three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. the cooperation of stakeholders to support Below is the summary discussion of AFP-CMO operational objectives. As will be discussed pillars and its respective components.19 in more details later, this poses challenges both for the military and the civilians. All in all, The Public Affairs (PA) pillar is concerned with CMO efforts “complement Intelligence and gathering support from the public in order to Operations as an integral part of the AFP Triad” 16 accomplish military missions. Its activities where commanders on the ground ensure that are geared towards acquiring support from these three components (intelligence, operations, the people through Public Information (PI) and CMO) work in support of each other towards Community Relations (COMREL) activities. accomplishment of AFP mission. Balancing these three is important, as efforts given to one must The second pillar, Civil Affairs (CA), “encompasses augment the other two. socioeconomic development activities undertaken by the AFP in coordination with or independent of Primarily, the objective of CMO activities is civilian government and non-government entities to reduce the will of the armed threat groups in support of national development.”20 Among to fight and to gain popular support for the three pillars, the CA is where the military can the AFP. The secondary objective is to support directly affect the people by facilitating the delivery the government’s development activities, of basic services through strengthened linkages protect the environment, and help the people in civil relations (CIVREL) and mobilization of prepare for and cope with the hard realities of resources in coordination with stakeholders disasters/calamities.17 CMO activities are during civic action (CIVAC) activities.

14 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, “AFP CMO.” 15 Russel, D. (2010)., page 15. 16 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, “AFP CMO.” 17 AFP CMO Doctrine Powerpoint Presentation by ARESCOM, shared in 2011. 18 AFP CMO Doctrine (2006) as cited by Russel (2010)., page 16. 19 Discussion of this section is majorly sourced from the AFP CMO Handbook. (2013). 20AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 6.

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Formerly known as Psychological Operations Evolution of AFP-CMO Practices (PSYOPS), the third pillar is Information Support in the Philippines Affairs (ISA). It includes activities that “are geared to redirect or influence the beliefs, emotions, Albeit absence of clear CMO doctrines in the attitudes, opinions and behavior of a given target past, the AFP has adapted CMO strategies audience.” 21 This pillar is also responsible in responsive to the prevailing context and pressing processing former rebels and in helping their needs of the country at specific periods in time. reintegration into the communities.22 Primarily as an instrument of national policy, the AFP inched its way towards achieving a more Similar to the AFP triad, care and balance is comprehensive CMO approach by initially varying required in the conduct of activities under the the application of the present AFP-CMO pillars. three pillars and its components. The strength Especially during the critical transition years of of intended impact of AFP-CMO activities 1986-1998,23 the CMO has played an important is dependent on its interconnectedness as role in national reconciliation and has influenced exemplified in the history of AFP-CMO practices the onset of peace negotiations with the different in the Philippines. armed groups. Critical to understanding the present AFP-CMO is tracing the history of how civil-military engagement shaped AFP-CMO practices through the years.

As far back as 1950’s, CMO has always been a vital part of the Philippine military’s history. CMO elements were employed together with armed combat right from the start when the rise of communist insurgency began with threats from the Hukbalahap (Huks)25 to topple down the government and cause chaos in the countryside. Dubbed as one of the best counterinsurgency practices, the method of President Ramon Magsaysay, which attempted to address the Figure 1. AFP CMO Pillars and components, socio-economic-political roots of Huk rebellion, Adapted from the AFP CMO Handbook (2013) failed to fully eradicate insurgency as a small

21 Ibid., page 7. 22 Interview of Russel, D. (2010) to LTC Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia in AFP NADESCOM, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City Philippines, October 8, 2007. 23 Hernandez, C. (1999). 24 Russel, D. (2010)., page 16. 25 “an agrarian-based and Soviet-influenced insurgency”, (Hernandez, 1999), page 2.

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faction of the Huks – committed to the political with OPLAN Mamamayan, with focus on the goals of the movement – still remained in the protection of the people rather than the state. This society. was coupled with the 1987 counterinsurgency strategy seeking to encourage insurgents to In 1965, President Ferdinand Marcos began turn in their arms and return to the fold of law his office touting economic development as the in exchange of loans so they can start their permanent solution to internal security threats. new life.29 Replaced by OPLAN Lambat Bitag, He then deployed the AFP to the countryside CMO was first introduced in Special Operations to embark on a “socioeconomic program of Teams (SOTs),30 which is a composite of combat, unprecedented scale under the banner of ‘civic intelligence gathering and CMO that gave birth to action’.” 26 Meanwhile, the late 1960s saw the AFP Triad.31 This involved holding dialogues in recovery of insurgency which gave birth to two the communities to undo insurgency in the area. groups: the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) and the Moro In 1994, when the AFP engaged in CMO activities National Liberation Front (MNLF).27 With these under OPLAN Unlad Bayan, modest gains were developments, President Ferdinand Marcos seen as evident in the turnover of 236 firearms placed the country under Martial Law in 1972. from the Moros.32 The administration of President This gave rise to military corruption and human Fidel V. Ramos and President Joseph Estrada, rights violations “negating any impact civic action more AFP and PNP33 coordination was seen had on the community.” 28 under OPLAN Pagkalinga, Kaisaganaan, and Balanga from 1996-2000. Cleared areas were After the Marcos dictatorship was toppled in 1986, turned over to DILG-PNP while establishing the government underwent Democratization development programs.34 However, AFP turned under President Corazon Aquino. Because the its attention to modernization brought about by the security forces were used as abusive instruments closure of US Bases. At this point, CMO was not during Martial Law, the Cory administration placed a top priority in the AFP.35 When President Gloria emphasis in restoring civilian authority over the Macapagal Arroyo took office, OPLAN Bantay military. The AFP replaced OPLAN Katatagan Laya was launched, implementing a new security

26 Hernandez, C. (1999)., page 2. 27 Ibid., page 2-3. 28 R. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 144. 29 Pobre, A History of the Armed Forces, p. 596. Cited by Hernandez (2005), Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the Philippines. A Background paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005., page 11-12. 30 AFP CMO Doctrine (2006) as cited by Russel (2010)., page 16. 31 Discussion of this section is majorly sourced from the AFP CMO Handbook. (2013). 32 AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 6. 33 Philippine National Police. 34 L. Pena, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 35 Russel, D. (2010), page 17.

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operations where instead of the traditional of internal peace and security” as a strategic methodology of ‘clear, hold, consolidate and imperative. This is an “admission and recognition develop’, the new methodology is ‘clear, hold and by the military” that purely militaristic solution support’. This is in admission of the fact that the alone cannot solve the pressing problems in military is not equipped in handling development peace and security.38 Under the IPSP, “CMO and the last phase should be done by the civilian emerges as the best tool available to manifest the government. However, territorial defense forces paradigm shift from a predominantly militaristic were still used in the hold phase.36 Up until this solution to a people-centered security strategy time, even though elements of CMO are seen in that is founded on broad-based consultations the implementation of AFP campaign plans, there and engagements with key stakeholders.”39 It is was no clear doctrine outlining its conduct. therefore critical for the AFP-CMO to be clearly translated on the ground through guidance Nonetheless, CMO was renewed in 2006 with and protocols. After all, the abolishment of the publication of the first CMO doctrine, the AFP the National Development Support Command Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.37 Under (NADESCOM) and some engineering brigades the 2011 IPSP Bayanihan, SOTs are replaced was done under the expectation that all units by Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) must be able to conduct CMO embedded in their or Bayanihan Teams giving equal importance respective operations. Thus far, the AFP has to combat and non-combat operations on the published the CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment ground. It is under this plan that the role of civil- Tools in 2013, which outlines detailed steps in the military operations in the achievement of military conduct of comprehensive CMO in an area. For goal is most pronounced. the institutionalized engagement with the civilian government and civil society, the following models are presented. Paradigm Shift: Models of Institutionalized Engagement Signing Memorandum of Agreement “The IPSP acknowledges that the contribution of with National Government Agencies each and every government agency, civil society organization, and even local community, is vital in Enshrined in the constitution is the supremacy of ensuring peace and security.” the civilian authority over the military at all times. The President, who is also the Commander-in- - President Benigno S. Aquino III Chief of the military, exercises this. Likewise, the civilian government agencies and local Clearly spelled out in the IPSP Bayanihan is the chief executives are also inherently involved in “involvement of all stakeholders in the pursuit the conduct of CMO. Without encroaching on

36 Hernandez, C. (2005). Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict, page 16-17. 37 Ibid. 38 2011 Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan. 39 AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 2.

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the responsibilities of concerned agencies, the Bantay Bayanihan as AFP must also learn to project a cooperative Civil Society Oversight stance. The Office of the Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations (OJ7) created lines of The Philippines enjoys the vibrant presence convergence with the civilian government by of civil society organizations (CSOs) from entering into Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) non-government organizations (NGOs) catering with national government agencies. Indicated in to the needs of marginalized sectors to a broader CMO Plan, the MOA indicates areas progressive think tanks pushing for policy for joint cooperation where tasks of both parties reform in the country. CSOs acts as enablers, are indicated.40 This partnership addresses making them an important partner in pushing two concerns in the conduct of CMO. One, it for peace and security. The crafting of the IPSP breaks the notion of military as the only face of Bayanihan opened doors to this partnership government in far-flung areas. Two, it clarifies when they were invited by the military to provide the tasks of government agencies in peace and inputs to the Bayanihan plan. With reference to security. When people in the communities see the strategic imperative in the IPSP Bayanihan, different government offices working together with the institutionalized engagement of the AFP the military, this raises the bar for the involvement and CSOs was born. Formally launched in of all stakeholders in the pursuit for peace. With 2011, the Bantay Bayanihan (BB) carries out its clear objectives, expectations are managed within mandate41 as the network of CSOs performing the bounds of the agreement in terms of how the an oversight role on the implementation of projects can support peace and security.Although IPSP Bayanihan. The tangible expression of the not perfect and in need of a more policy-aligned network’s monitoring role is the Bantay Bayanihan approach, the MOA partnership facilitates a clear Assessment Matrix,42 a tool that guides the feedback mechanism on the functions of the AFP dialogue between local CSO members and local and government agencies on the ground. AFP commanders. Deviating from the numbers game, the assessment is focused on how the AFP performs their mandate in light of adherence to Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and Rule of Law while being transparent and accountable. The nature of engagement is both critical and constructive where monitoring results are discussed with the AFP with shared recommendations on how they can address negative findings. Although noticeable positive

40 Interview with BGen. Lysander Suerte at the Office of the Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations (OJ7), Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, February 21, 2014. 41 Indicated in Bantay Bayanihan Manifesto, a document signed by the former AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Eduardo Oban, Bantay Bayanihan founding convenor Dr. Jennifer Oreta, OPAPP Sec. Teresita Deles and other stakeholders. 42 The assessment matrix was jointly developed and localized by the AFP and CSOs in 2012.

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improvements are seen on the ground, the part of the civil society, this feeds the historical challenge is in the policy gaps to ensure that antagonism between the military and the CSOs, reforms take root and continue even under a which affects the transparency and effectiveness different leadership. This engagement, the first of civilian-military relationship towards security of its kind in the Philippines and conceivably sector reform. in Southeast Asia, is a relevant institutional mechanism for civil society to engage defense Civilians and military vary on how they think reform issues. and how they operate, a nuancing that has to be considered in an environment where CMO is implemented. Confronting Dilemmas of AFP-CMO

As AFP-CMO does not exist in a vacuum, its Conclusion implementation in support of and complementing other military functions creates issues that need Strong, transparent and institutionalized civilian to be confronted. The deployment of Peace engagement is an imperative towards security and Development Teams (PDTs) in far-flung sector reform. communities makes them wear the development hat in a conflict-affected area where there is Balancing CMO in AFP Triad practically absence of the face of government. The prolonged stay of the military in communities, Similar to how UN recognizes two (2) concepts although for facilitating the delivery of basic of CIMIC, counterinsurgency strategies have services, poses challenges as to shaping the utilized the right hand and left hand approach. In mindset and attitudes, both of the military and the conduct of such, clarity should be shed on the the communities. One of them is the perspective main purpose of CMO. Is it to support the internal of some soldiers that CMO breeds soft soldiers. security operation, which is militaristic in nature? Another concern is the dependency of the In the evolution of AFP CMO, are we on the right communities, even civilian government, on the track towards a modern defense force? military in ensuring peace and security in their area.43 With developments in the peace process, CMO must be recalibrated to balance the AFP triad. An Looking from within the AFP, the function of CMO epitome of an armed forces focused on territorial in a triad, which is in support of counterinsurgency defense does not conduct heavy CMO activities.44 strategies, becomes problematic when this puts In a post-agreement security arrangement, CMO the military in a position where simple profiling in support of counterinsurgency may not be the of progressive CSOs leads to harassment and best utility for civil-military engagement. Instead, consequently human rights accusations. For the activities related to humanitarian and nation

43 Oreta, J. and Tolosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessment. 44 R. Hall, “Modern soldiery interrogated: cataloguing the local military’s task and their perception of local civilian actors,” Philippine Political Science Journal 33 (2012): 18.

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building is seen as the likely focus in support of to outline clear sharing of efforts towards peace the envisioned modern defense force. and security. Transparency in the performance of mandates ensures that both parties, civilian and The AFP’s mandate to perform ISO functions military, perform their tasks while combining and does not only prevent them from improving complementing their efforts. on other mission areas but causes serious implications in the community. It is thus crucial for Balance implementation of activities the civilian units (LGU and PNP) to take the lead role in ISO.45 As a major contributor to internal security operations, the deployment and employment of Institutionalized engagement CMO must be reviewed. Perhaps capitalizing from the gains of the PNoy administration, CMO can be The AFP provides security of the state and its widened in such a way that shared responsibility people while bearing capacity to influence the in peace and security can now be sustained. This democratic processes and still contribute in the also goes without saying that the developments pursuit of just and lasting peace.46 In a democratic in the security environment and peace process country such as the Philippines, where the military have to be taken into consideration in the review plays a vital role in peace and security, it is only of CMO. fitting to create a safety net on how best to be in a critical and constructive stance when it comes Some CMO activities are mere dole-outs which to the performance of their mandate. Stakeholder perpetuate the culture of dependency on the engagement must not only be aligned with the military of local communities and local security national security policy, but institutionalized as providers (e.g. tanod, barangay captain, police).47 well. Reviewing CMO’s shift towards the other AFP In terms of how civilians can contribute in engaging mission areas (e.g. disaster risk management and defense reform issues, there is a need to clearly regional security etc.) and how it can contribute understand the roles and functions of different to a modern defense force should be examined. stakeholders. Blurred lines must be clarified. The existing AFP-CMO Handbook 2013 has to Previously in the National Internal Security Plan, be implemented with strong monitoring to ensure the tasking of different government agencies in balance in the implementation of CMO pillars and terms of peace and security was underscored. components. However, the tasking was not known to the government agencies because the NISP was Taking into consideration the historical context of a secret document. Current efforts of the AFP- AFP-CMO evolution, the dilemmas that emanated CMO to ink memoranda of agreement with from it and the developments in the security government agencies is just a stopgap measure. environment and peace process, a review of There is a need for a national security strategy the conduct of AFP civil-military operation is

45 Oreta, J. and Tolosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessment. 46 Arugay, A. (2007). 47 Alcudia (2010).

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strongly recommended. In imagining a modern civilians must be continuously engaged with clear defense force, there must be clear protocols and taskings to allow the stakeholders to do their part. guidelines in moving away from simple support After all, a modern defense force is not only a to internal security operations but towards function of upgraded capability, but also a result complementing territorial defense. Aligned of transparent, effective and institutionalized with national policies in peace and security, the civil-military engagement.

SOURCE: BANTAY BAYANIHAN

98 9CIVIL MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 10 Gender Inclusiveness in the Military by Carla Isabel M Ravanes Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE MILITARY

The Women’s Movement in the 50’s and 60’s increased the participation of women in various working sectors. Since 1980’s, there is a considerable rise in the percentage of women in armed forces. However, this increase in proportion does not even exceed the 15 percent threshold, which would elevate it to more than just being token membership. Aside from the low percentage of women in the military, there is a lower number of women who perform direct combat roles.

The author discusses how physically suited women are for direct combat and consequently the effect of the presence of women in combat units on its effectiveness.Additionally, she also examined how women are integrated into the Philippine forces.

The author argues that increased female participation in the defense forces is practical, necessary and beneficial in operations. However, more interventions should be conducted in order to realize this potential.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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The integration of women in various working issue may lead one to ask how physically suited Tsectors has increased since the Women’s women are for direct combat, consequently, Movement of the ‘50s and ‘60s (Harries-Jenkins, would the presence of women in combat units 2002). This can be observed in virtually all negatively impact effectiveness. aspects of the workforce, such as in law, politics, business, and of course, the security sector. Several studies have demonstrated that with the Since the late ‘80s, there has been a considerable proper physical training methods and given an rise in the percentage of women in armed forces appropriate amount of time, women volunteers (Segal, 1988). could effectively execute duties traditionally carried out by men in the military (Wilson, n.d.; However, comparing this increase in involvement Casey, n.d.). Furthermore, it has been shown to that of the civilian sector, most Western (or that in mixed-gender groups, members have Western-style) military forces seem to have a identified leadership and teamwork as more low degree of integration of women. Despite the important factors than gender in determining increase in recruitment of women over the past variations in morale, lack of cohesion, and military decades, one would still be hard-pressed to find performance (Harrell & Miller, 1997; London a military force with a proportion of women that Ministry of Defence, 2002). would approximate 15 percent. Fifteen percent, as such, is an important number in organizations It is important in this subject matter to consider since leading analysts have pointed out that women’s views on being assigned to combat women must number 15 percent of an organization units. A survey of female cadets on West Point in to be considered more than a token (Kanter, the ‘90s showed that only 30 percent would join a 1977). Being extremely underrepresented in the combat arms branch if these were opened up to contemporary military, women are not only a women. From those who did not have a desire minority population; they actually form an even to enter combat units, only 12 percent expressed smaller classification – the token population. a lack of faith in their physical capabilities as To address this, positive recruiting policies and motivating their decision. Majority of those who strategies that are reflective of the best practice said no were just not interested in combat arms in major organizations must be adopted. Said (Field &Nagl, 2001). From this, it can be deduced policies must be effective in military systems, as that a possible key reason as to why women do well (Harries-Jenkins, 2004). not have the same population in combat units as men is because they are, first and foremost, not Aside from the aforementioned population issue, drawn to it. a widespread military concern, in terms of gender inclusiveness, is the small number of women who In connection to this, it has been proposed perform direct combat roles. Although personnel that the main hurdle for women integration policy in various countries do not discourage into numerous military roles is the “warrior women in filling combat roles, majority still serve in framework” that is present in the military culture non-combat roles (e.g., military nurse) or combat (Davis & McKee, 2004). The warrior framework service/support roles (e.g., clerk, radar operator) reinforces the traditionally ideal military image of (Harries-Jenkins, 2002). The commonness of this a physically strong, emotionally tough, masculine SOURCE: PAO AFP

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war-fighter. The emphasis on masculinity, with its 2.64 percent of the total population of enlisted associated attributes such as courage, tolerance personnel (“Percentage Fill-up of Enlisted of pain, sense of sacrifice, etc.; are in contrast to Woman in the AFP”, 2012). An equally significant those qualities socially ascribed to women. It is statistic shows that female officers, as of March propositioned that military women are stigmatized, 2012, are at a relatively high proportion of 9.22 “simply because they [are not viewed as having] percent (“Percentage Fill-up of Female Officers those socially legitimate qualities that define in the AFP,” 2012). Even with the comparatively soldiers,” (Sorin, 2004). Woman as a Soldier is large percentage of women officers in the country, not easily deemed as a natural social concept. the presence of women in the higher positions It is up to each military force, then, to determine paints a different picture. Most outstandingly, if there should be any changes in its structural Brig. Gen. Ramona Go, the Assistant Deputy relationships so that it would be able to combat Chief of Staff for Personnel, is the first female line this inherent conflict. Specifically, this would officer to become a general. She is currently the target the issue of the retention of the masculine only female general in the active service (“More culture, as opposed to gender-neutral norms, and women joining in AFP,” 2012). This circumstance its supposed importance to the effectiveness of mirrors the state in other countries wherein military forces (Pinch, 2004). women are almost inexistent in the more senior ranks (Sorin, 2004). It is recognized that women often possess a variety of skills which make them better at The Women’s Auxiliary Corps (WAC), an all- defusing and de-escalating potentialy violent woman division in the AFP which was based on confrontations, and are less likely to be involved the now defunct Women’s Army Corps of the US in problems with use of excessive force. In Army, has been deactivated. This progression addition, women not only have a useful skill is parallel to the fate of the US Army WAC, as set, but in certain contexts, their inclusion may well as to the closure of Écoleinterarmées du become an operational imperative since they personnel militairefémini (EIPMF) – the joint can carry out tasks that men can have a difficulty service women’s school of the French Army. taking on, if at all. These include: screening of Similar to the closing of the US Army WAC and the female ex-combatants, assisting in the aftermath EIPMF, the deactivation of WAC aims to improve of sexual violence, performing the cordon and the circumstances of the women in the force by search of women. Anecdotal evidence also points discontinuing the gender-based segregation and to women as more able to gain the trust of the by giving women greater chances to get to the community, ensure the full involvement of local service of their choice. women, and exercise communication and crowd control skills (Valasek, 2008). And while the intent may have been great, the AFP failed to couple the deactivation with the necessary adjustments and preparation in terms Gender Integration in the of addressing the impact of the dissolution of the Philippine Forces Office of the Chief WAC, AFP to its members. For instance, WAC has no representatives in various As of March, 2012 there are 2,905 enlisted functional areas of personnel and logistics women serving in the AFP. The 2,905 constitute management. And though the integration of the

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WAC members to the Major Services is possible, While examining the gender-inclusiveness of the there is still a need for a clear-cut policy and Philippines’ defense forces, it is also important to uniform procedure for the implementation of the look at the gender-mainstreaming condition of the integration process (Gat-Eb, 2008). Philippine Military Academy (PMA).

Through the implementation of RA 7192 (Women The PMA first opened its gates to female cadets in Nation Building Law), the AFP recruited female in 1993 (Romero, 2012). Since then the AFP has line soldiers. This action enabled the Filipino seen an increase in the number of women in the women to now have a chance to study military military. While this may be the case, the gender- science in the Philippine Military Academy, inclusiveness of the academy is still found to be participate in combat operations and mobilize wanting. In 2010, Rivera subjected the The Cadet military assets. But the AFP overlooked the Core AFP Regulations (CCAFPR) 2008, also crafting of implementing rules and regulations known as the gray book, to a limited textual analysis that will address the proper utilization of this new to determine its gender-sensitivity, particularly, if set of females in the AFP (Gat-eb, 2008). it is free of any sexist word. Unsurprisingly, the research showed that only 2/27 of the document’s Similar to the need for clear-cut policies in dealing sections are completely free from any sexist term. with the deactivation of WAC, there is also a Since language used articulates consciousness, lack of clear-cut policies in handling “Gender reflects culture, and affects socialization (Gender- and Development (GAD)” as mandated by RA Fair Language, 2008), it would be safe to say 9710 (Magna Carta for Women). GAD policies that the gender-insensitive terms in the current and programs are vital instruments for any CCAFPR are highly reflective of the academy’s organization if it wants to promote and/or further framing of the cadets and officers. develop gender-inclusiveness. Also, by comparing the surveys on the perceived On the national policy level, gender and capacities and capabilities (physical, intellectual, development concerns are not integrated into and emotional) of male and female cadets the plans and programs of the government answered by the PMA classes 2000, 2001, and on defense or armed forces, which is basically 2002 with those from the classes 2010, 2011, and what the essence of gender mainstreaming is 2012; the study (Rivera, 2010) showed that there all about. On the ground level, many offices of has been an increased favouring of the male the armed forces are conducting efforts related cadets over the female cadets. to GAD simply to follow the word of the law and for substantial compliance. In effect, these GAD efforts are short term and nominal. Without an Institutional Interventions implementation strategy, GAD is not utilized as a strategic tool to boost the morale of the armed The Department of National Defense (DND), since forces or to enhance the capability of the military 2009, has been conducting Gender Sensitivity organization. This is further aggravated by the Training (GST) with military officers. The program misleading perception of the military leadership aims to: identify, assess, and analyze the gender on “gender” and “gender and development” issues and gaps that is present in the society, and (Caluag, 2010). in the participants’ personal and work situation;

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recognize the significance of attaining gender More than the recruitment and education of female equality, and develop in the participants the cadets, substantial retention of the female military confidence to do their work as gender advocates. personnel will give the necessary weight to the (“Gender Sensitivity Training Module”, n.d.) There gender-inclusive efforts of the AFP. This will be are at least three GSTs held every year, with 30 achieved by strengthening gender-mainstreaming participants for each training session. in the AFP, through the development of substantial and long-term GAD programs. Initially, majority of the participants of the GSTs were women, but for 2012, the male participants It has been suggested that a three-pronged, constituted 55.56 percent of the total participant integrated institutional strategy of changing the population for all GSTs held that year. It could be thinking, attitude and practices in the military said that over the years, the GSTs conducted have institution should be pushed forth (Oximoso- encouraged male officers to be more participative Ignacio, 2004, as cited in Caluag, 2010). The in the said program. three strategies identified were: 1) A Championing strategy aimed to obtain support from the highest Apart from the GSTs, there is also the Trainer’s ranks of the military; 2) A Social Marketing/ Trainee Program designed to create a larger and Information Campaign Strategy aimed to change better skilled pool of trainers among the military the way military personnel of the AFP think and officers for the Gender Sensitivity Trainings. This behave regarding gender and development; is held once a year (Quinzon, 2012). and 3) An Organizational Development Strategy aimed to make the GAD initiative relatively The efforts undertaken by the DND, although easier by eliminating organizational barriers commendable, are far from sufficient. For the such as gender-bias regulations, policies gender issues present in the PMA, it has been and facilities and establishing mechanism suggested (Rivera, 2010) that the next revisionists that would complement the change process of the CCAFPR, should consider language (Oximoso-Ignacio, 2004, as cited in Caluag, reform as an approach to gender-sensitize it. The 2010). change in identification will be a step towards the needed change in framing and thinking with A strategy to make GAD program more responsive regards to gender-sensitization. This effort should and effective should include a strategy to extend to the reviewing, revising, and removal of enhance the capability of the primary unit/office any form of gender bias in all military documents/ that would see the fruition of the GAD program. references. This strategy should cover the need for mandate, the operational need of the organization and The PMA should also conduct its own regular the mechanism for control, management and Gender Sensitivity Seminar among the cadets, oversight (Caluag, 2010). This way, the overall officers, and civilian employees to further GAD strategy will ensure that the organization raise gender awareness. Moreover, a GAD that will handle the GAD-related concerns would Focal Person or committee in PMA should be be able to address the GAD issues of the armed institutionalized and strengthened. forces with maximum effect.

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Further, the success of any GAD initiative with concrete output and/or recommendations. greatly depends on the support of the higher In Fiji, this strategy has brought forth significant leaders or commanders. To increase the leaders’ recommendations which include: Inclusion of the commitment, they must be made accountable to Minister of Women as a member of the National the actual achievement of gender mainstreaming. Security Council, women should be effectively Making them realize that gender is actually and equitably represented on Provincial and a force multiplier for its mission’s success District Security Committes, etc. (Valasek, 2008). and acknowledgement of such benefit would require acceptance, support, actual involvement On the part of the military as regards engagement and accountability in its implementation and with stakeholders, they need to take steps to achievement of its goals. Similarly, to effectively ensure that, not only the concerns of the primary persuade the other commanders, a “gender stakeholders are addressed, but also that champion” must rise from the ranks that can these primary stakeholders are encouraged to positively influence the commanders. participate in the creation, implementation and assessment of GAD programs. Apart from the effective integration of women into a crucial mission structure and functions, it is also a It is mandated by law that 5 percent of the budget component of the efforts on gender-inclusiveness allocation of a government organization must to recognize the need and importance of be for GAD program, with an option to increase improving the health and living condition of both allocation by 10-20 percent after five (5) years. male and female personnel. To achieve this, other However, most are not able to meet the 5 percent GAD-related training programs and seminars, budget appropriations. Since 1995, only an especially those focused on health and education, average of 0.33 percent of the expected 5 percent such as breast cancer examination and education is actually allotted for GAD programs (Caluag, campaign should be conducted. Improvement of 2010). Nonetheless, the defense force should physical infrastructure, like living quarters, should still aim to appropriate the supposed 5 percent for also be constructed for the benefit of the women their GAD programs. members of the various military units. Forecasting for the worst case scenario in The constructive but critical engagement of budgeting for the implementation of GAD CSOs with the AFP should not only be on internal programs, only 0.33 percent of the 5 percent security operations (ISO), territorial defense (TD), would be allocated. On the other hand, with the but should also include gender-mainstreaming in implementation of GAD program in best-case the Armed Forces. Women’s groups should push scenario, there could be at least 10 percent for greater engagement of women in civil society budget allocation for GAD. But given the present (Valasek, 2008). A strong and influential CSO that restriction on military funds, it is likely that strict can effectively represent the women’s needs in implementation of 5 percent GAD appropriation gender-inclusiveness should hold a dialogue with program would be maintained. the military wherein both parties can come up

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Conclusion GAD policies/programs still need to be established to enable more women to actively participate and There is growing recognition that increased female contribute in addressing security (“Initiatives for participation in the defense forces is practical, Women in the Military”, 2011). necessary and beneficial in operations. A more gender-inclusive defense force will ultimately If there are no interventions done, the movement lead to an increased access to additional human towards forming a modern defense force would resources and will create a more diverse pool to be incomplete. The advantages of a gender- select better qualified staff (Valasek, 2008). inclusive defense force would not be experienced by the AFP. The Philippines’ defense forces would While the AFP has formulated and issued not be able to maximize the utilization of citizens several gender supportive policies such as the to directly be involved in the military. Moreover, increased quota allocation for female cadets and the females of the armed forces may continue to officer candidates from its previous quota of5 be perceived as a marginalized population. percent to the present quota of 20 percent, and the authorization for female military members As such, in order to fully realize a modern defense to marry upon completion of only 1 year active force, it is essential to factor in the effective service instead of the previous waiting time of promotion of a gender-inclusive defense force. three (3) years, more substantial and long-term

References:

“Annual Review of Women in NATO’s Armed Forces.” (2000- “Gender Sensitivity Training Module.”(n.d.)Department of 2001). Defense, Republic of the Philippines.

Caluag, Z.M. (2010). A Strategy for gender mainstreaming Harries-Jenkins, G. (2002). The Extended Role Of Women in the Philippine Army.Unpublished dissertation. Master in In Armed Forces: CRMI Report. Hull: University of Hull Development Management, Asian Institute of Management. Harries-Jenkins, G (2004).Institution to occupation to Davis, K. D. & McKee, B. (2004). Women in the Military: diversity. . In Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., Browne, P., Facing the Warrior FrameworkIn Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., &Okros, A.C., (Eds.). Challenge and Change in the Military: Browne, P., &Okros, A.C., (Eds.). Challenge and Change in Gender and Diversity Issue (pp.26-53). Canadian Defence the Military: Gender and Diversity Issue (pp.52-75). Canadian Academy Press: Canada Defence Academy Press: Canada “Initiatives for Women in the Military.” (2011). [PowerPoint Gat-eb.N.E. (2008).Assessing the utilization of the Women’s Slides]. Presented to US Embassy Mindanao Working Group Auxiliary Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Unpublished dissertation.AFP Command and General Staff “More women joining in AFP.”(2012). In Edge Davao. College, Armed Forces of the Philippines. Retrieved from http://www.edgedavao.net/index.

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php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6400:more- Quinzon, T. (2012, April).Gender-Sensitivity Training. (C.M. women-joining-afp&catid=68:the-big-news&Itemid=94. Ravanes, Interviewer).

“Organizational Survey and Annual Reports from Committee Rivera F.J. (2010). Towards a gender-mainstreamed Philippine of Women in the NATO Forces.” (2002). Military Academy.Unpublished dissertation.AFP Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces of the Philippines. Oximoso-Ignacio, M. L. (2004). Gender mainstreaming in the Armed Forces of the Philippines in parallel with its Romero, A. AFP cites increasing role of women in military. In Modernization Program: an Institutional Strategy. Unpublished Philippine Star.Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/Article. dissertation. Master in Development Management : Asian aspx?articleId=786369&publicationSubCategoryId=63 Institute of Management. Segal, S. (1988) Organizational Survey: Annual Reports of the “Percentage Fill-up of Enlisted Woman in the AFP.” (2012). Committee of Women in the NATO Forces. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines. Sorin, K. (2004). Women in the French forces: Integration vs “Percentage Fill-up of Female Officers in the AFP.” (2012). conflict In Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., Browne, P., &Okros, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines. A.C., (Eds.). Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issue (pp.76-96). Canadian Defence Academy Pinch, F.C. (2004). Diversity: Conditions for an Adaptive, Press: Canada Inclusive MilitaryIn Pinch, F.C., MacIntyre, A.T., Browne, P., &Okros, A.C., (Eds.). Challenge and Change in the Military: Valasek, K. (2008). Security Sector Reform and Gender. Gender and Diversity Issue (pp.171-194). Canadian Defence In Bastick, M. & Valasek, K., DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN- Academy Press: Canada INSTRAW (Eds.). Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. SRO-Kundig :Geneva “Primer on Gender-Fair Language,” (1998).

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 11 Ethnic Representation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines by Carla Isabel M Ravanes Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

The 140 indigenous groups of the Philippines collectively represent nearly 20 percent of the country’s population. They are mostly concentrated in the Northern Luzon and Mindanao regions. In 2003, the Department of National Defense (DND) committed to giving five percent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) recruitment quote to indigenous peoples (IPs). Accordingly, the AFP lowered its height and education requirements to accommodate IPs. It was also in this year that the AFP was geared to draft “lumads” (indigenous or native) as regular soldiers and members of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

The paper discusses how the efforts to make the AFP more inclusive of IPs have polarized sides. There have been claims that the IPs are placed at the frontline in the fight against the Communist threat group New People’s Army (NPA), thus making their communities permanent battlegrounds. On the other hand, the recruitment and reintegration processes can be perceived as efforts in creating a more diversified army.

The author argues that the initiation of affirmative action for greater ethnic diversity in the AFP must be jointly conducted by the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP), given that it is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies for Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) / IPs, and the General Headquarters (GHQ), being the policymaking arm of the AFP. Furthermore, in order to bring in more IPs to the AFP, a unique and culturally-sensitive employment strategy must be crafted.

SOURCE: BADZ PATAÑAG, WGSSR

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Majority of the Philippine population are official in Republic Act 6734 during the Cory Mdescendants of the Austronesian peoples, who Aquino administration, to differentiate these ethnic hails from Southeast Asia and Oceania. But communities from the Bangsamoro (Ulindang, because of the long history of Western colonial n.d.). rule, combined with visits from merchants and traders, it is often difficult to accurately distinguish To safeguard the rights of the indigenous cultural the lines between the numerous ethnicities communities (ICCs)/(IPs), RA 8371 or the present in the country. In addition, the National Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 Statistics Office (NSO) does not account for the was enacted. The IPRA states that: racial background or ancestry of each Filipino, thus rendering it almost impossible to produce an The State recognizes the inherent dignity and official population count of mixed-race Filipinos. equal and inalienable rights of all members of Philippine society as the foundation of freedom, In this regard, the initiation of affirmative action justice and peace. The rights of indigenous for ethnic representation in this paper will cultural communities/ indigenous peoples mainly refer to the ethnic representation of the are universal, indivisible, interdependent and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) in the Armed Forces of interrelated. It is, therefore, the policy of the the Philippines (AFP). state to recognize and promote all individual and collective rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development in accordance Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines with the Constitution and applicable norms and principles. The 140 indigenous groups of the Philippines collectively represent nearly 20 percent of the country’s population. The estimated 14-17 million AFP Recruitment and IPs are mostly concentrated in the Northern Integration of IPs Luzon and Mindanao regions, with a few groups situated in the Visayas. During the time of former Secretary of National Defense Angelo T. Reyes in 2003, the Department The IPs of the Northern Luzon are found in the of National Defense (DND) committed to giving Cordillera Mountain Range. The peoples of the five percent of the AFP’s recruitment quota Cordillera could be grouped according to the to indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the AFP following major ethnolinguistic groups: Kankaney, lowered its height and education requirements Ibaloy, Bontok, Kalinga, Isneg, Itneg, Ifugao, to accommodate high school graduates standing Iwak, and Gadang (Florendo, n.d.). below five feet and four inches.

In Mindanao, the IPs are referred to as “lumads,” It was also in the same year that the AFP was a Visayan term meaning “native” or “indigenous.” geared to draft lumads as regular soldiers The name was adopted by a group of 15 Mindanao and members of the Citizens Armed Forces ethnic groups to distinguish themselves from Geographical Unit (CAFGU). In Region 11, the other main groups of Mindanaoans, namely the recruited lumads became a part of the Philippine Moros and the Christians. Its usage was made Army’s 4th Infantry Division.

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Then Defense Secretary Reyes proclaimed that of the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army the commitment of drafting lumads (and other (CPLA), an armed group of indigenous people IPs) into military service “comes with appropriate in the Cordillera Region, into the AFP. Through and adequate education, training package AO 18, fifteen (15) members of the CPLA were and assurance that the AFP will guard against integrated as officers while 249 were integrated discrimination of IPs not only in recruitment but as enlisted personnel. Other CPLA members also in the duration of their service in the military who were not accommodated in the 264 quota (“AFP open recruitment,” 2003). for integration were given an option to join the CAFGU Active Auxiliary Companies that were This effort of the DND to make the Armed Forces organized and deployed in each of the provinces more inclusive to IPs has been met with numerous in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). criticisms from various organizations such as the human rights group Karapatan, the Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines-Episcopal Affirmative Action Commission on Indigenous Peoples, as well as from an alliance of lumad organizations called the By providing quota allocation in its recruitment Pasaka Regional Lumad Confederation. and integration processes, the AFP is actually implementing some form of affirmative action for Groups opposing the AFP’s recruitment of lumads the indigenous groups of the Philippines. This claim that the motive of the military is to put them promotes diversity in the Armed Forces, albeit it at the frontline in its fight against the New People’s is still not completely representative of the IPs in Army (NPA), and in the process, this transforms the country. their communities into permanent battlegrounds (Ribaya, 2007). It has also been purported that However, majority of the criticisms on the steps the civilian recruitment of IPs is contradictory to taken by the government to bring in IPs into the provisions stated in the IPRA, one of which the AFP revolves around the central idea that is under Chapter 5, Section 22, prohibiting the the critics do not percieve the recruitment and recruitment of indigenous peoples “… for use integration processes as efforts to diversify against other ICCs/IPs.” the armed forces. Instead, these are seen as direct tactical approaches to augment the AFP’s The AFP, has negated these claims, stating that counterinsurgency operations. the recruitment of IPs, through self-volunteering, is part of the regular civilian recruitment for the On the AFP’s part, it is yet to proclaim any CAFGU. This does not violate any laws and as a intention to increase the ethnic diversity among matter of fact, the recruitment constitutes the IPs’ its military personnel, or to aid in promoting equal constitutional right to self-protection, as provided opportunities among IPs and non-IPs. Based in the IPRA. on the AFP’s latest operational plan, the IPSP “Bayanihan”, it will impose “training programs In 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo which give importance to indoctrination on... enacted Administrative Order (AO) No. 18 ethnic sensitivity, and indigenous peoples,” as part (2001) which integrated qualified members of its thrust to carry out Security Sector Reform

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(SSR) initiatives in its institution (AFP, 2010). It that is culture-sensitive to IPs. Cultural awareness does not mention conducting further affirmative training for military personnel involved with action programs for IPs. recuited and integrated IPs and their corresponding ICCS could be conducted.

Necessary Interventions Due to the differences in cultures and traditions of the various ICCs/IPs, a “one-size-fits-all” IPs The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples employment strategy may not be feasible. Instead, (NCIP) is mandated to protect and promote the there should be an overall general framework that rights of the ICCs/IPs. Additionally, the NCIP has will ensure a consistent approach for recruitment the power to formulate policies and regulations and retention, though the actual implementation for the proper implementation of IPRA. The plans will utilize a more specific and nuanced commission was designed to function as an approached to account for the differences among independent agency with its members being the indigenous groups. representative of IPs themselves (Muhi&Pasimio, 2009). As such, any actions to be taken concerning IPs will require the involvement of the Implications in the Absence of NCIP. Interventions

Therefore, initiation of affirmative action It is important to note, however, that affirmative for greater ethnic diversity in the AFP must action programs for IPs, the Armed Forces may be jointly conducted by the NCIP, and take several years or decades to produce an theGeneral Headquarters (GHQ) since it is the increase in the representation of minorities among policy-making arm of the AFP. However, both senior military officials. the NCIP and the AFP must have the desire and follow-through to create a military force whose Without implementing meaningful affirmative cultural diversity will enrich the activities and action programs for IPs, the armed forces will fail operations of the Armed Forces. to benefit from the unique inputs that could be contributed by a culturally diverse AFP. Further, In order to effectively bring in IPs into the the armed forces will miss out on the opportunity to AFP, an IPs employment strategy must be bridge its security operations and the indigenous crafted. The employment strategy must focus communities. on the recruitment and retention (including integrated IPs) in the forces, including the creation Further, initiating half-hearted or misguided of an inclusive environment and meaningful affirmative action programs that will not effectively communication lines for IPs. To avoid violations improve the opportunities and progress of minority of Rule V, Section 2 of IPRA which states that, groups will only fuel the speculations of of groups “The state shall not require indigenous accusing the AFP of using IPs for token roles. individuals to work for military purposes under discriminatory conditions,” the AFP must foster an environment, especially on the ground,

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References:

Administrative Order No. 18 of 2001, PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF QUALIFIED MEMBERS OF THE CORDILLERA PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY INTO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, (2001): http://www.gov.ph/2001/08/31/administrative-order-no-18-s-2001/.

Armed Forces of the Philippines-Civil Military Operations. “AFP to open recruitment for lumads.” Retrieved on October 30, 2012. http://afp-cmo.tripod.com/articles-2003/04-27-afp-to-open-reruitment-to-lumads.html.

Armed Forces of the Philippines. “Internal peace and security plan ‘Bayanihan.’” Retrieved April 30, 2012. http://www.afp.mil.ph/ pdf/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf.

National Commission for Culture and the Arts and Florendo (n.d.). “Ethnic History (Cordillera).” Retrieved on November 14, 2012. http://www.ncca.gov.ph/about-culture-and-arts/articles-on-c-n-a/article.php?igm=2&i=192.

Muhi, A.R. and Pasimio, J.P. “Legal overview of Philippine Indigenous Rights. Customary Land Rights in Southeast Asia Conference.” Retrieved on November 14, 2012. https://customarylandrightssea.wordpress.com/2009/10/22/going-beyond-the- indigenous-peoples-rights-act-ipra-in-the-philippines-ana-rhia-muhi-legal-rights-and-natural-resources-center-friends-of-the-ear- th-philippines/.

Republic of the Philippines, “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA).” Official Gazette 94 (1997). Ribaya, R.R. “Armed forces seek budget to hire 8.400 CAFGUs.” The Manila Bulletin. Retrieved October 31, 2012 from http:// www.mb.com.ph/node/36630#.UKWgYuQvXz4

National Commission for Culture and the Arts and Ulindang, F. (n.d.). “Lumad in Mindanao.” Retrieved November 14, 2012 from http://www.ncca.gov.ph/about-culture-and-arts/articles-on-c-n-a/article.php?igm=2&i=189.

Montañez, Jaime Frumencio J. “The Need For Qualified Contracting Officers In The Armed Forces Of The Philppines (AFP) Modernization Programme.” Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2001.

114 11 ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 12 Self-Reliant Defense and People-Centered Security by Joseph Raymond Franco Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE AND PEOPLE-CENTERED SECURITY

Sharing the vision and core principles of the Filipino First Policy, the Self-Reliant Defense Program (SRDP) was enacted through the late Ferdinand Marcos’ Presidential Decree (PD) 415 issued in 1974. The program was envisioned to enable the Philippine Government with a “self-reliant defense posture” through the promotion and/or establishment of strategic industries essential to national defense and security.

The article provides a historical examination of SRDP’s development from its inception to its present state under the current administration. Citing various cases of local industries which once thrive under the auspices of SRDP, the article sheds light on the multiple factors that hindered its successful implementation. It asserts that a combination of different factors – political, economic, and technical – continue to pose significant challenges in pursuit of the country’s self-reliance objectives. Fund support from the government remains the primary obstacle to its effective implementation, further aggravated by policy arbitrariness, limited market base, and intermittent institutional and bureaucratic discontinuities.

However, the article expresses optimism on the the country’s future self-reliance initiatives, taking into consideration the renewed interest of the new administration for indigenous defense materiel production. The recent success stories of ARMSCOR’s small arms industry and the joint Propmech Corp. – Philippine Iron Construction and Marine Works Inc.’s shipbuilding capability prove the viability of small arms and watercraft manufacturing in the country. In order to fully realize SRDP capability, the article recommends greater policy interventions from the government through organizational/bureaucratic reforms and adequate funding allocation.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Introduction

Developing self-sustaining capabilities is one of began in March 19, 1974.1 Nonetheless, optimism theD hallmarks of a modern defense force. From remains as recent initiatives in small-arms2 an operational standpoint, a self-reliant Armed and watercraft3 manufacturing show the Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is better poised potential rebirth of a defense industry in the to contribute in fulfilling the goals, aspirations Philippines. Thus, appropriate government and well-being of the Filipino people as a intervention is necessary to encourage the tool of national policy. Under the overarching growth and sustainment of these enterprises. theme of security sector reform (SSR) and Along with proper policy, stakeholders must “people-centered security,” a self-reliant defense demonstrate commitment to the long-term posture has two strategic benefits. First, it is gestation associated with building a viable defense consistent with initiatives for enhanced civilian industry. The passage of the 2011-2016 oversight over the military: with more independent Philippine Development Plan (PDP) and the means, the AFP could readily transition into a National Security Policy (NSP) marks an more depoliticized institution. Related to this opportunity for policymakers and all stakeholders is the issue of making the Philippine security to bring SRDP into fruition. Amongst other sector more resilient in pursuing modernization specific security sector reform initiatives, effort, which unfortunately has become a ‘buyer’s SRDP is fully aligned with the three broad market’. Second, self-reliant defense accrues strategies of the PDP, namely: for high and benefits for the whole nation by opening up sustained economic growth; opportunities across opportunities for synergy among industries/ geographic areas and across different income commercial enterprises and the nascent defense and social spectrum; and the implementation of industry. effective and responsive social safety nets. SRDP can also be aligned with the earlier thrust But except for a few success stories, the of the P-Noy Aquino administration to pursue and Self-Reliant Defense Program (SRDP) has encourage “public-private partnerships” (PPP) in largely failed to live up to expectations since it various areas of the economy.

1 Presidential Decree (PD) No. 415 of March 19, 1974, “Authorizing the Secretary of National Defense to enter into defense contracts to implement projects under the self-reliant defense programs and for other purposes,”. 2 The Government Arsenal has just embarked on a project to restart the in-country production of AR-15 type carbines and assault rifles to meet the domestic requirements of the security sector, which includes the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP). 3 Propmech Corporation (based in Subic Bay, Zambales) was awarded a contract to build “the largest locally-built naval vessel”, the BRP Tagbanua(AT-296) in 2010. The ship was subsequently commissioned into service by the Philippine Navy in November 2011. Propmech was also responsible for the construction of three (3) Multi-Purpose Attack Craft (MPAC), “an all-Filipino designed and built watercraft”—an improved and indigenized version of a Taiwanese Coast Guard watercraft. These MPACs joined the Philippine Navy on 22 May 2012.

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A Review of the Self-Reliance Defense AFP was entirely dependent on the American Program security umbrella with almost all ordnance and ammunition coming from US stockpile. In short, SRDP, the “Filipino First” policy, and the 1987 the SRDP was a response for the need to provide Constitution the AFP “necessary materiel to accomplish its mandate of upholding the sovereignty of the state On March 19, 1974, Presidential Decree (PD) and protecting the national territory.”6 No. 4154 has initiated the Self-Reliant Defense Program, premised on the objective to attain a At the policy level, SRDP is a tacit continuation “self-reliant defense posture.” It was intended to of the prevailing “Filipino First” policy that started establish strategic industries deemed necessary with Republic Act (RA) 5183.7 RA 5183, Section for national defense and security. Reflecting 1 states that: the zeitgeist at the time (i.e. the ascendance of import-substitution industrial policies)5, PD 415 “No contract either through a public bidding envisioned SRDP implementation to “generate or negotiated contract for the supply to, or labor, spur industrial and commercial activities, procurement by, any government-owned or and conserve foreign currency.” Funding controlled corporation, company, agency or appropriated for SRDP was pegged at PhP municipal corporation of materials, equipment, 100 million annually under the purview of the goods and commodities shall be awarded to Secretary of National Defense. any contractor or bidder who is not a citizen of the Philippines or which is not a corporation or Sans the ascendance of import-substitution association at least sixty percent of the capital of policies in the Philippines’ external environment, which is owned by Filipino citizens…” the stronger imperative for SRDP was the prevailing internal security situation at the time. Decades on, the 1987 Constitution would In the early seventies, the escalation of Muslim reiterate this stance with Article II, Section 19 secessionism, specifically the campaign waged stating that “The State shall develop a self-reliant by Nur Misuari’s Moro National Liberation and independent national economy.” It would be Front, shook up the government and brought further stated in Article XIV, Section 10 that the to fore a strategic vulnerability. At that time, the State “shall support indigenous, appropriate,

4 The full title of PD 415 is “Authorizing the Secretary of National Defense to enter into defense contracts to implement projects under the self- reliant defense programs and for other purposes”. 5 Import-substitution industrial policies were first adopted in Latin America in the 1970s as a result of global oil shock. The concept gained currency amongst developing countries such as the Philippines as a proactive response to offset the dominant position of foreign governments and/ or multinational corporations in local economies. 6 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program witnessing a rebirth,” Retrieved at http://www. afp.mil.ph/afpmpmo/SRDP/srdp.html. 7 Republic Act No. 5183 is known as “An act regulating the award of contracts for the supply to, or procurement by, any government-owned or controlled corporation, company, agency or municipal corporation of materials, equipment, goods and commodities, and providing penalty for the violation thereof”.

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and self-reliant scientific and technological Other land warfare systems were also developed, capabilities, and their application to the country’s but most only got as far as the concept development productive systems and national life.” phase; even fewer were built as actual prototypes such as the Santa Barbara11 multiple rocket SRDP’s mixed record launcher. Prototypes of more complex projects such as aircraft were seen with the Defiant12 The explicit support of the Philippine government and Hummingbird13 projects spearheaded by to SRDP has resultedin varying levels of success, the state-run Philippine Aerospace Development mostly during the 1970s. But by 2002, the Corporation (PADC), which, though not formally estimated PhP 4 billion spent on SRDP failed to under the SRDP, followed the “spirit” of this achieve its main objective since the small number initiative. Most of these projects, however, were of industries established were most often not terminated after funding and support dried up. sustained.8 The various SRDP-related projects While the PADC was never formally within the came in various forms, which included combat ambit of the SRDP14, it cannot be argued that its clothing and individual equipment for soldiers initiatives were fully aligned and advanced the such as the AFP Bolo-Bayonet9 and combat objectives of PD 415. boots by the now-defunct, Marikina-based Ang Tibay brand. Vetronix Corporation, on the other These examples demonstrate the inherent hand, was able to manufacture locally in 1974, difficulty of starting projects under SRDP. the URC-187 and URC-601 radios for frontline Research and development (R&D) requires infantry units. substantive start-up costs and, more importantly, time for institutional knowledge to be accumulated The SRDP was able to produce relatively more and utilized. The success stories associated with complex items. To help satisfy the mobility SRDP did not come from in-house R&D by the requirements of the AFP’s ground (Army) and Department of National Defense (DND) / AFP. Constabulary units, Delta Motors started to manufacture the ¼ - ton “Mini-cruiser” in 1974, One success story was achieved by a private a jeep which became the most proliferated land corporation in the production of small arms with mobility asset of the AFP.10 support from the Philippine government. As part

8 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program”. 9 The Bolo-Bayonet was an indigenously designed bayonet incorporating features of the ubiquitous jungle bolo. It was issued in limited numbers to deployed infantry units. 10 Carolina Hernandez, “Arms Procurement and Production Policies in the Philippines” in Chandran Jeshurun, ed. Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989). 11 The Santa Barbara was a truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher system, designed to complement the howitzers (large cannons), the latter solely comprised the inventory of AFP artillery units. 12 The Defiant was an aircraft designed for pilot training. 13 The Hummingbird wasdesigned and built as a light helicopter. 14 Currently, the PADC is under the supervision of the Department of Transport and Communication (DOTC).

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of the SRDP, Arms Corporation of the Philippines Elisco Tool Manufacturing Company.19 It is a little (ARMSCOR) developed in-house production known fact that for nearly four years, from 1983 to capability for 5.56 mm ammunition used in the 1987, the Philippines was able to be self-reliant AFP’s standard-issue weapon, the M-16 rifle. in the production of standard-issue firearms used ARMSCOR credits itself as “one of the very few by the security forces. Facing financial difficulties surviving SRDP participants, if not the only one” in the United States, Armalite Inc. sold the rights as a result of its business model which pursued for the production of the M-16 to the Elisco Tool the “commercial market and not relying solely on Manufacturing in 1983. government contracts” (emphasis added).15 Inventory, tooling, and machinery were Other positive examples of relatively successful subsequently shipped from Armalite’s Sterling SRDP is through license-based production plant to the Philippines. Within a few months, full- of defense materiel. Still in service with the scale production of the M-16 commenced and Philippine Navy are the 44-meter Aguinaldo- met the domestic requirements of the AFP. What class patrol gunboats, which were built in the terminated the operation of Elisco was the shift in Philippines based on a West German design.16 government priorities in 1987, which emphasized Decades later, the Philippine Army would lead other productive sectors of the economy. Elisco the initiative for the in-country assembly of ceased production of the M-16, with its production the Simba Fighting Vehicle17 in Clark Field, assets falling into a decrepit state. Consequently, Pampanga under license from GKN Simba by the Elisco ceded rights to the M-16 license, with most Philippines’ Asian Armored Vehicle Technologies of its machinery sold as scrap by the mid-nineties. Corporation.18 While it was a licensed design, the domestic assembly of the Simba proved the The Challenges to Self-Reliance viability of taking the initial steps for in-country armoured vehicle production. However, due to Hurdles faced by Philippine self-reliance the limited production runs of the Simba, the initiatives are an amalgamation of different factors start-up local corporation which undertook them reflecting the overall state of the economy and either closed shop after the fulfillment of their society. An examination of the various SRDP contracts or reverted to their non-defense related projects discussed above reveal the multiple core businesses. factors that hinder SRDP to take flight. Discussed below are the political, economic, and technical Elisco Tool: a missed opportunity for self-reliance? factors that pose a challenge to self-reliance. Focus will be on the SRDP’s small arms and The most compelling case that illustrates the watercraft manufacturing experiences, together challenges faced by SRDP is the short-lived with analogous initiatives overseas. production of the M-16 rifle in the Philippines by

15 Quotes from ARMSCOR 70th Anniversary publication dated17 November 2011. 16 There are two active Aguinaldo-class ship bearing the pennant numbers PG-140 and PG-141. 17 The Simba is the workhorse of the Philippine Army’s light armor and mechanized infantry units. It replaced the Vietnam-era M113 and V150 armored personnel carriers. 18 GKN is a British corporation specializing in land warfare systems. 19 The account of Elisco Tool Manufacturing is culled from “A Historical Review of Armalite” dated 04 January 2010 by Armalite Inc.

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Political A decade later, a similar story would emerge, this time on the area of aircraft production. In As the Elisco Tool case illustrates, SRDP the mid-nineties, a single-engine trainer plane initiatives suffer from changes in the priority of the called the Defiant was designed and envisioned national leadership. At the time of the acquisition to fulfill a counter-insurgency role. At the same of Armalite Inc. assets (1983), the in-country time, a prototype of a Philippine-made light manufacturing of the AFP’s standard-issue utility helicopter named the Hummingbird was M-16 rifle not only marked a logistical/technical also completed. By July 1997, the Ramos milestone. It was also viewed as a political administration authorized spending for the statement, an embodiment of national pride of projects with the PADC spearheading the effort. being able to produce assault rifles with little Unfortunately, just a year after, the succeeding dependence on foreign actors. Notwithstanding Estrada Presidency terminated both projects.20 the positive nature of the Elisco acquisition, While both are non-military, non-SRDP projects, the production lines at Bataan were allowed to they would have nonetheless formed the core of atrophy. a budding Philippine aerospace industry, which would have synergized well and strategically align Even earlier, another missed opportunity showed itself with a prospective military aviation sector. the impact of political expediency in hampering SRDP, this time in the more complex aircraft In general, the high degree of political patronage manufacturing sector. In 1968, the Philippines and support required for a defense contractor to embarked on a project to convert the US Navy’s flourish bodes ill for the SRDP. Political backing T-610 Pinto trainer aircraft into the Super Pinto. for any project is co-terminus and co-dependent This variant was marketed by its proponent, on the incumbent. As such, the time horizon American Jet Industries, as a low-cost light for project gestation — from inception to full- attack aircraft for counterinsurgency missions. scale manufacturing — becomes severely By 1974, the Philippine Air Force’s Self-Reliant limited and short. This bodes ill for research Development Wing bought the schematics, and development, which is intrinsically time- patents, and flight test data for the T-610, which consuming and resource-intensive. Even led to the manufacture of the first Super Pinto simpler projects that do not require research and prototype, christened as the Cali Pinto. The first development incubation, the actual construction example, while built in the United States, was and manufacturing would take a substantive subsequently followed by a second unit; that was amount of time. The construction of the Tagbanua manufactured in the Philippines. Both prototypes (to be described below) was an illustration of the were flight-tested over Manila. Unfortunately, the challenges facing SRDP as a whole, “noteworthy then Ministry of Defense pulled the plug off the for the numerous twists and turns in its three year project due to serious doubts over the commercial run” which included the deferment of bid opening viability and marketability of the aircraft. in eleven occassions.21

20 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/industry.html. 21 http://adroth.ph/afpmodern/?p=845>.

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To further illustrate the long time horizons In 1999, the AFP office primarily tasked to manage required by R&D, Singapore Technologies and implement the program, the Office of the Kinetics (ST Kinetics) took nearly two decades Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Development before establishing the knowledge base, (OJ9) was deactivated in 1999, relegating its industrial capability, and financial sustainability main function to a division of the Office of Deputy to produce the SAR-21, the Singaporean Armed Chief of Staff for Logistics (OJ4).24 A succeeding Forces’ standard issue rifle.22 The AFP Bolo- reorganization did not fail to arrest the dilution Bayonet case illustrates a type of “quick-win” of the SRDP, wherein25 its functions were project, reminiscent of backyard industries and subsumed under the AFP Modernization Program the resulting low production outputs. Simply Management Office (AFPMPMO) in 200426. put, the temporality of political favors and the This implicitly sidelined SRDP projects as the arbitrariness of political backing preclude the AFPMPMO was more focused in administering accumulation of long-term sustainable support and fulfilling secretariat functions in support of the needed for R&D. various AFP project management teams (PMTs) assigned to acquire defense materiel from foreign Organizational/Bureaucratic sources.27 This trend of institutional discontinuity was further illustrated by the reversion of OJ9/ Arbitrariness in SRDP also manifests not only AFPMPMO/SRDP functions back to the OJ4. with the national leadership but within the defense and military establishment itself. The build-up The lack of attention to SRDP in recent years also institutional knowledge has been hampered by seemed to manifest with the omission of provision the cyclical activation-reactivation of units/entities of R&D funding. As late as the 2011 General which are indispensable to SRDP. Following PD Appropriations Act (GAA), an explanatory note 415, General Order (GO) No. 187 was issued for the DND under the sub-heading “Research, which activated the Material Development Feasibility Studies, Development Projects, and Planning and Programming Office (OJ8) as a Test and Evaluations” stated that: Special Staff at the General Headquarters (GHQ), AFP.23 The OJ8 subsequently went several “The Secretary of National Defense, upon restructurings and deactivation. direction of the President of the Philippines, and

22 ST Kinetics was incorporated in 1967 as the Charter Industries of Singapore with the primary mission of making ordnance (i.e. ammunition) for the Singaporean Armed Forces. While there had been several small arms projects made by the ST Kinetics, only the SAR-21 had a very extensive production run. Use of ST Kinetics as an example is due to its analogous nature to the effort of Elisco to produce the M16 in-country. 23 Hernandez, Arms Procurement, 135. 24 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program” 25 While the SRDP is formally under the Secretary of National Defense, the implementation of projects are under the effective control of the Chief of Staff, AFP. 26 “Big structural reforms set at AFP; 3 offices to be abolished” Manila Bulletin dated 27 December 2012. 27 Culled from “Issues and Concerns” section of the 2007 AFP Modernization Program Annual Report.

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upon favorable recommendation of the Chief of SRDP. While the intent of the law is laudable, in Staff, AFP, is authorized to conduct research, trying to stem corruption, it did not discriminate feasibility studies, and development studies for over the the distinct nature defense acquisitions. projects planned and approved under the Self- As stated in successive AFPMPMO reports, RA Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Program, 9184 can hamper the purchase of either time- including materiel requirements of the AFP sensitive or classified military materiel. Further on weapons and armaments, air and naval compounding the problem is inherent tendency armaments, air and naval materiel requirements, of start-up defense projects to lack institutional ammunition, communication - electronics and robustness. Simply put, there is a lack of nuance quartermaster items, the cost of which shall be for the uniqueness of defense acquisition. chargeable to the appropriations provided for the SRDP Program, Research and Development (R & Economic/Commercial D) Program and other special funds as provided by law. The Secretary of National Defense, upon While government-provided financial support is favorable recommendation of the Chief of Staff, essential, public funding cannot and should not AFP, is likewise authorized to farm out R & D be expected to fully support manufacturers of projects to private entrepreneurs or government defense materiel. After domestic security sector scientific agencies when these are not within the contracts are fulfilled, the local defense industry capability of the AFP to undertake: PROVIDED, should endeavor to tap outside markets, whether That the amount to be spent for such research, civilian or military. Without an expanded market feasibility and development studies shall not base, it is just a matter of time before sunk and exceed four percent (4%) of the contract price of operating costs would diminish industry revenues the direct cost of each project.” (emphasis added) and lead to bankruptcy.

Omission of this provision in the subsequent 2011 Aside from possible public equity issues (i.e. the and 2012 GAA illustrates the lack of commitment oft-quoted guns-and-butter dichotomy), heavy in supporting SRDP. It neglects the fact that public subsidies are inimical to the market-oriented PD 415, which is still in force, allocates a fixed nature of the Philippine economy. Government amount of PhP 100 million for SRDP. Without the should instead focus on creating a policy and provision on R&D, SRDP projects are deprived political environment that would be conducive to of specific legislative clause that would empower defense industries. Specifically, the “Filipino First” stakeholders in the defense industry to obtain Act (RA 5183), while laudable, limits the sources and leverage government support. It is a belated of capitalization for potential and existing defense reflection of the declining support for SRDP, a manufacturers. As discussed earlier, R&D is trend which started in the mid-nineties.28 inherently capital-intensive, with the necessary financial resources not easily accessible from Another complicating factor is the Government domestic sources. Procurement Act or RA 9184 which stifled nascent

28 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program”

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To illustrate, the sole commercially-viable SRDP economies of scale — as per-unit cost would be company in the Philippines, ARMSCOR, thrived driven down by foreign sales.32 because it capitalized on economies of scale. Aside from the manufacture of ammunition Technical required by the Philippine government, it also embarked on commercial products such as Even with extensive government support or hunting and sporting firearms. Anticipating the financial capital, another factor which prevents relatively smaller non-government market in the the emergence of a self-reliant defense industry Philippine domestic sector, ARMSCOR made is the diminished state of industries in the exports to the United States a core business Philippines. As early as 1998, it has been imperative.29 The ability to tap foreign markets recognized that SRDP can only meet its is therefore a critical part of any defense-related full potential with deliberate and protracted corporation currently or potentially based in the “foreign procurement coupled with technology Philippines. The key challenge here is to maintain transfer”.33 The same Defense Policy Paper the potential of private defense industries to pointed out that it takes a long process to support national policy objectives while not develop infant industries before it can be prejudicing their profitability—and ultimately, their “initially capable of at least providing repair and sustainability. maintenance support” and evolve into mature industries with sufficient investment in research Compounding this problem is the lack of an explicit and development. Ultimately, it will be capable and specified SRDP policy document.30 Although of “providing upgrades and even move into the PD 415 contained the underlying objectives and [commercial-scale] manufacture of defense basic principles of the SRDP program and DND products.” Circular 24 prescribed policies, organization and procedures in the management of SRDP projects, The most critical technical hurdle is the lack of there is a perceived lack of an explicit program a manufacturing base for defense industries. The that defines priority areas for development.31 substantive public debt of PhP 1.46 trillion means Thus a gap between the development and the there is no room for establishing an entirely new independence stages emerge. With the process state-run weapons manufacturing complex.35 of weaning away industries from government But even with unlimited funding, efforts to support still unclear, SRDP failed to benefit from jumpstart SRDP will be hampered by the lack

29 ARMSCOR secured an ISO 9001 certification in 1997 and claims to be the largest privately-owned arms and ammunition manufacturer in Southeast Asia. 30 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program” 31Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 From “Chapter 6-Policy Areas” 1998 Defense Policy Paper. 34 Ibid. 35 Philippine Defense Today, “Sustainable weapons manufacture in the Philippines.” Retrieved at http://adroth.ph/?p=608.

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of upstream industries.36 Theoretically, although be self-sufficient in meeting its small arms needs. manufacturing may grow at an enormous rate, Upon acquisition of manufacturing equipment the technology of upstream industries may not at no cost to GA, the project will operate as be able to cope with the demands for specialized part of a joint venture or similar agreement materials such as high-quality metals and alloys. with another entity, most likely of foreign origin. Costs are estimated at PhP 1.4 billion for the joint venture with no cost to the government from Realizing Self-Reliance years one to five. An annual production rate of 20,000 units is envisioned to meet AFP and PNP Notwithstanding the challenging circumstances, requirements. self-reliant initiatives persisted, with recent initiatives demonstrating the viability of small The following year, in November 2011, the arms and watercraft manufacturing in the Philippine Navy (PN) commissioned with the Fleet Philippines. These two industries warrant special its first 51.43-meter landing craft utility (LCU), the attention as they represent areas that exhibit a Tagbanua (AT-296).39 The Tagbanuas are jointly more established knowledge base and, at the constructed by Propmech Corporation (engine same time, greater salience for the AFP. Small and propulsion system) and the Philippine Iron arms are the foundation of the inventory of any Construction and Marine Works Inc. of Misamis defense force, while watercraft is a necessary Oriental (hull). The project is intended to provide enabler for the AFP’s maritime strategy to secure the PN an additional “inter-island and coastal the archipelago. operations watercraft capable of logistics transport and amphibious operations.” Manned Recent Developments by a crew of 15 members, the Tagbanua has a freight capacity of transporting 200 soldiers with In 2010, the Government Arsenal (GA) embarked a cargo space area of about 250 square meters, on a program to undertake in-house production or a maximum of 110 tons. Specifically, the ship of a line of rifles based on M-16.37 The project is optimized: is intended to meet the requirement of the AFP for standard-issue and special purpose rifles. “to transport combat personnel, vehicles, It includes the Recon/ Special Operations, artillery equipment, and cargoes in support Service Rifle and Special Purpose Variants.38 of military amphibious operations and The end-state is for the Philippine Government to secondarily, to perform noncombatant

36 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program” 37 Jonathan C Martir, “The Government Arsenal (GA) M-16 Manufacturing Project,” GA Bullet-In Vol. 1 No. 2 (2011). 38 The Recon model adheres to the M-4A1 system as used by most Western and allied Special Operations Forces (SOF). The Service rifle model will replace the standard service rifle for the AFP, the M16A1. The Special purpose model is aa continuing development from the 5.56mm Marine Scout Sniper Rifle (MSSR). 39 Business Mirror, “Navy prepares for first PHL-made landing craft.” Retrieved at http://businessmirror.com.ph/home/nation/19621-navy- prepares-for-first-phl-made-landing-craft-.

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evacuation, medical mission, disaster, Policy Interventions rescue-and-relief operations and transport- logistic mission, in support to national These recent developments illustrate the nascent socioeconomic projects of the government.” viability of defense contractors in the Philippines, (Emphasis added) notwithstanding the multi-faceted challenges. Hence, the response of all stakeholders through The Tagbanua is the largest locally-manufactured policy interventions should also be comprehensive Philippine Navy ship to date.40 The previous as well. This paper argues for broad strokes to record holder was the Marcos-era 44-meter reinvigorate the fledgling defense corporations in Aguinaldo class patrol gunboat. The Tagbanua in the Philippines. comparison, is 51 meters, making it 15 meters longer than existing LCUs. Costing the DND At the level of national policy, the symbiotic PhP 189.934 million, it was intended to initiate a relationship between SRDP and the wider viable production line that would replace the ex- national development agenda should be fully US Navy LCU Mk.6s which were remnants of the emphasized. A new SRDP plan should both Second World War.41 The 2011 commissioning complement and support the proposed 2011-2016 was the culmination of a protracted project National Development Plan. It would not suffice to management process, which started with the have vague references to SRDP. Specific, time- LCU being conceptualized as part of the 2002 bound project goals should be conceptualized Revised Reprioritized Project List of the AFP with consultation of the widest stakeholder base. Capability Upgrade Program. To initiate an industry-wide knowledge base, sustained research and monitoring process should Propmech would be involved in another project, be considered to periodically determine policy this time for the construction of three (3) Multi- gaps. For instance, the PADC’s organizational Purpose Attack Craft (MPAC) via a joint venture and institutional relationship with the Department with Safehull Marine Technologies, costing PhP of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) 268.9 million.42 The high-speed MPACs can needs to be reconsidered. One option is to accommodate 16 soldiers each and is optimized enhance its interactions with entities such as the for the insertion and extraction of special PAF, which would in effect bring the producers operations forces in hostile operational areas. of materiel to their most important stakeholder: Its ability to operate in harsh environments also the prospective end-users. At the same time, makes it an appropriate asset for search and legislation pertaining to acquisitions (RA 9184) rescue mission in areas which could not be must be reviewed periodically reviewed to ensure accessed by ordinary watercraft.43 that it does not stifle innovation.

40 Philippine Defense Today, “Landing Craft Utility acquisition project.” Retrieved at http://adroth.ph/afpmodern/?p=845. 41 Ibid. 42 Philippine Star, “Only one firm bids for P 276-M Navy craft.” Retrieved at http://www.philstar.com/Article. aspx?articleId=635716&publicationSubCategoryId=63. 43 Ibid.

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Next, it must be stressed that policy intervention Memoranda of Understanding or processes for by the government should ensure that local liaising between government / defense entities industries are weaned off direct support (i.e. and corporate stakeholders. government funding) or indirect assistance (i.e. tariffs and non-tariff barriers to competing Funding Requirements (Long-term) products) once local defense corporations achieve a viable level of sustainability. Admittedly, the Aside from a responsive policy, a critical threshold for industry independence would have requirement for SRDP is adequate funding. The to be made on a case-to-case basis, albeit with following prescriptions require a longer time well-defined general criteria. Sans these criteria, horizon due to the need for legislative action. As it would suffice in the interim to explicitly inform discussed above, funding from the government local defense manufacturers that government should be focused on jumpstarting entities that can assistance (financial/non-financial) would not be demonstrate viability. First, the synergy between provided indefinitely. To reiterate the points raised the SRDP and the AFP Modernization Program earlier, it is imperative that local defense materiel (formally known as Republic Act 7898) must be be marketed not only domestically. Fixation over enhanced and fully institutionalized. The lapse of cornering the relatively small Philippine market the AFPMP and the current initiative to legislate an would only lead to a repeat of the short-lived extension (Senate Bill 3164) is an opportunity to life cycles of local corporations in the defense highlight its dynamics. Supplemental funding set industry. aside for the AFPMP has been proven effective in stimulating the acquisition process (i.e. the AFP Finally, it must be recognized that government Capability Upgrade Program or CUP). A similar, and government-led institutions do not have a separate funding stream for SRDP should be monopoly over good management practices— considered as well.44 especially in the realm of R&D and constructing viable business models. Corporate or private To emphasize the nuanced appreciation required stakeholders must be brought on board. A critical by SRDP within the context of the AFPMP, requirement is for a publicly-known, transparent the government should consider legislating a SRDP Roadmap that would highlight which specific SRDP Law along the lines of the lapsed specific areas prospective corporations can RA 7898 or SB 3164 that is currently being pitch in, in support of the overarching national deliberated on. While there is nothing intrinsically goal of attaining a self-reliant defense force. The undesirable about the subsuming of the SRDP to thrust of the government should be on providing the broader AFPMP, it would insulate the former the institutional framework to operationalize from the sudden shifts in modernization-related the PPPs being promoted by the government. acquisitions. For example, a deterioration of the Operationalizing PPP would require going internal security environment in 2003 (due to beyond speaking engagements with the plethora the 2003 Buliok Campaign) led to the Capability of chambers of commerce and business (i.e Upgrade Program, which relegated acquisitions of the Makati Business Club). This should include external defense-related materiel as a secondary basic steps such as the creation of templates for priority.

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Funding Requirements (Short-term) The selection criteria could follow on the tack proposed in a 2002 policy paper that would see In the interim, there are funding policies that can SRDP: be pursued which could lead to quick wins and “SRDP programs should give emphasis on projects serve to initiate the protracted process of building for which the country has comparative advantages a knowledge base for SRDP. For starters, the and should avoid one-shot projects or projects SRDP would benefit from the reinstatement of whose economic viability is doubtful. Beyond the four-percent clause found in the pre-2011 achieving defense self-reliance, a local defense GAAs. To further the funding of SRDP projects, industry, arising from today’s self-reliant defense appropriations should be allocated to specific line posture programs, will provide employment items, not simply as discretionary financing by opportunities, enhance the depth and diversity the Office of the Secretary of National Defense of the Filipino’s technological expertise and help (OSND). This proposal is not in any way an build an industrial base for economic growth.”45 attempt to circumvent civilian oversight for SRDP but to make sure that even with operational imperatives, SRDP funding is not sidelined Conclusion inadvertent as it may be. The preceding discussion presents the To maximize this prospective funding, limited as it challenges and opportunities in attaining a self- may be, a specific SRDP fund can be handled as reliant defense posture. While there have been a venture capital fund. The DND, with its military significant setbacks and substantive hurdles, and government stakeholders, can disseminate small successes have shown the potential for or publicize defense-related requirements, indigenous defense corporations to thrive and accept unsolicited project proposals, or consider prosper. The multi-faceted nature of problems potential dual-use projects for integration with requires a comprehensive approach by all security sector procurement plans. Companies stakeholders both public and private. The thrust with potential would then be provided seed money. of the Aquino administration to engage the entire If needed, the government can act as guarantors nation — the Filipino people as a collective force for such corporation to apply for financing — bodes well for a self-reliant defense posture. from government or government operated and In the short-term, feasible policy and financial controlled corporations (GOCCs) such as the interventions must be made available to jumpstart Development Bank of the Philippines. SRDP. Ultimately, these small successes will

44 For several years, the AFP Capability Upgrade Program (an internal-security focused sub-program of the AFPMP) was provided PhP 5 billion annually. It allowed the AFP to expedite the acquisition of mission-critical equipment for forward-deployed units. The specific capabilities acquired were focused on move-shoot-communicate ability for infantry units. The CUP also had a specific focus on improving the individual survivability of soldiers in the field through the procurement of Combat Life Saver kits.

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accrue towards a deliberate and sustainable vision of having a modern, professional security SRDP initiative. What is needed now is for the sector which is in step with the well-being and political will and commitment to see through the prosperity of the Filipino nation.

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, AFP

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Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 13 AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation by Melanie Rodulfo-Veril Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION

The Philippines, despite the country’s strategic advantages from its geographic positioning, has perennially been challenged by a multitude of security issues emanating from a volatile regional environment. Having a military force that has relatively outmoded materiel and equipment, the country remains vulnerable to traditional and non-traditional regional security concerns capped by rival claims over the South China Sea, instability in the Korean peninsula, environmental hazards due to climate change, and political and economic impacts of oil dependency and rapid expansion of emerging industrialized states.

The article provides a substantial overview of the AFP’s International Defense and Security Engagement (IDSE) framework. It highlights relevant defense cooperation arrangements entered by the Philippine Government, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with allied countries and strategic partners such as the United States, Australia, South Korea, and the ASEAN. The implementation of AFP’s IDSE serves as an essential component of the government’s national policies and strategies aimed at establishing a credible AFP which is capable of addressing the myriad of threats and challenges to national security. Moreover, leveraging on its cooperative framework, the Philippines can gain a stronger stance for the promotion of its interests over key geopolitical and strategic security issues (e.g. expedition of a binding Code of Conduct or establishment of a Joint Authority over the South China Sea).

In conclusion, the article calls for the enhancement of the country’s bilateral and multilateral security-defense cooperative engagements toward maximizing derived benefits in pursuit of national interests. Comprehensive review and/or reassessment of various policies and IDSE programs are strongly recommended to enhance relations with emerging powers (i.e. China) and to support prevailing defense programs (i.e. prioritization of defense materiel and equipment transfer or acquisition to support shift to territorial defense operations).

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The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) national interest.2 Tis striving to promote defense and security cooperation based on the principles of equality, Nevertheless, over the years, the West Philippine mutual benefit and full respect of sovereignty Sea dispute has remained a potential flash point as with the desire of strengthening mutual concerned countries have different perspectives cooperation at the operational level. The AFP in resolving their conflicting positions. China remains committed to the promotion of regional favors bilateral negotiations, and subsequently and international peace and stability through its opposes internationalization of the issue and continued presence and involvement in various the involvement of the US. On the other hand, international engagements.1 multilateral negotiation is favored by ASEAN member-claimants, including the Philippines, which strongly pushes elevating the issue to the The Philippine Security Landscape International Tribunal on the Laws of the Sea.3 However, the multilateralism was constantly As a country located in a politically strategic, but repudiated by China, which maintains its claim to environmentally cataclysmic area, the Philippines undisputed sovereignty over the West Philippine is inundated with several security challenges Sea. In response, President Aquino in his 2011 topped by a number of potential flash points in State of the Nation Address (SONA) said that the the region. Philippines is prepared to use military force to protect its territory in the West Philippine Sea and With the politics of oil, geopolitics of navigation subsequently ordered the fast tracking of the new and politics of marine resources, there is no doubt programs for AFP modernization to support this that the West Philippine Sea will remain a primary objective.4 security challenge in the Philippines’ relations with claimant nations, most recently with that The security in the Korean peninsula also remains of China. The potential economic benefits from a potential flash point with the North and South the resources in the contested islands and the Korea, in principle, still at war. Recent North political leverage derived from effective control Korean missile tests and continued proliferation of the area is urging countries in the region to of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons an arms race thereby increasing tensions and development program have not discounted the rigidities among claimant states’ militaries and possibility of military conflict in the peninsula. affecting the regional security. Despite not siding Filipinos living in South Korea will be the main with any of the claimant states, The US declares concern of the Philippines with a number of and upholds the freedom of navigation in the its citizens estimated at 70,000 permanently West Philippine Sea an integral component of its residing in said countries based on official records

1 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, “The Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Regional Security.” 2008. 2 Zha, Daoijing, “Security in the South China Sea,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 26 (2001) 3-51. 3 Carolina Hernandez, “Changing Discourse on Security: 1946 to the Present,” in Enhancing Philippine National Security Against External Threat Report and Selected Paper Discussion, ed. Rowena Pangilinan (Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 2008). 4 Baviera ,Aileen San Pablo. The South China Sea Disputes: Is the Aquino Way the ‘ASEAN Way’?. Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore. 2012. 13 AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION 133 Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

with another estimated 14,000 - 15,000 Filipinos and environmental degradation, this current undocumented.5 With North Korea embarrassed phenomena creates greater unprecedented by the failed missile launch in April 2012, risks to the country. The most prominent of these tensions between the two Koreas and instability environmental risks is evident in the significant in the entire East Asian region are not completely increase in the number and intensity of storms tempered and may even be exacerbated by the and weather disturbances which have occurred strong possibility of future missile launches by in the Philippines in recent years.8 In 2010 alone, North Korea. the country was severely affected by at least 22 typhoons, to include super typhoons Ondoy A full blown China-Taiwan armed conflict will also and Pepeng which left nearly 1,000 people have serious repercussions on the Philippines. dead and resulted in about USD 700 million Although “unlikely, but not impossible”, cross- damages in infrastructures particularly those strait conflict has a spill-over impact to Philippine around Manila.9 In 2013, super typhoon Yolanda interests wherein the eventual war between the caused catastrophic damages to affected mainland China and Taiwan will jeopardize the provinces. The Philippines is still on its way safety of its citizens in the said territories.6 to recovery from the destruction the typhoon left on its wake. In the last decade, on average, Most Philippine security policies are still more than 200 million people were affected anchored on the realist perspective which and about 10,000 people were killed by disaster centers on the protection of the country’s and calamities in the country which accounts territorial integrity and sovereignty from to 25 percent of the world total. The extent possible aggression and threat intentions of of these damages to life and property other states. The theory downplays the effects of caused by these disasters is comparable non-traditional security issues which, in recent to that caused by war.10 Given the impact years, have emerged as more urgent concerns of environmental hazards brought about by among states.7 natural disasters to national security, the AFP Most critical of which are climate change has been deputized and delegated with an and disaster management. Climate change expanded role and involvement in disaster is apparent, and with increasing populations management.11

5 Esplanada, Jerry. “Philippines readies evacuation of Filipinos in South Korea”. March 27, 2012. Inquirer. Net. Retrieved from: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/30565/philippines-readies-evacuation-of-filipinos-in-south-korea. 6 Hernandez, Carolina. “Changing Discourse on Security: 1946 to the Present” in Pangilinan, Rowena (ed).”Enhancing Philippine National Security Against External Threat” Report and Selected Paper Discussion Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman. 2008. 7 Ibid. 8 Habito, Cielito F. Climate Change and National Development. A presentation made at the Meeting on Climate Change and National Development in the Philippines, held on November 8, 2002 at the Justitia Room, Ateneo Professional Schools, Rockwell Center, Makati City, Philippines. 9 H.Y. Kim, “Disaster Management In Asia: Where Are We Now?,” Asian Journal of Public Affairs 3 (2010). 10 USAID, 2008. Retrieved from: www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/pdf/AIDRF_Feasibility_Study_Report_annex6-10.pdf. 11 Dencio Acop, “Assessing the Expanded Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Nation-Building.” Asia-Pacific Social Science Review. Retrieved from http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/journals/apssr/pdf/200612/science_5.pdf.

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Moreover, though the Philippines is classified as of the various international engagements of the an oil-importing country, energy security remains AFP is facilitated through the interaction of underappreciated in the country. The country’s three (3) key different systems: the J5-network dependence on oil and coal as energy sources [i.e. overseeing of the overall IDSE implementation accounts for 50 percent of its electricity, with in accordance with the country’s security-defense the remainder sourced from renewable energy agreements); the J2-network (i.e. utilization of sources. A recent study suggests that the country the intelligence network through the various may suffer from potentially dangerous energy Defense Armed Forces Attaché (DAFA)]; and, shortage in the future.12 China, with its expanding J4-network (logistics network). economy realized this early on and has been hoarding oil for its reserves since 2008 which For the Philippines, its alliance with the US add to the build up in global oil demand. This continues to be its single, most important can also explain their increased movements bilateral relationship.15 Albeit the withdrawal in the Spratlys for the search of oil fields, and of US military bases in the Philippines in construction of dams in the Mekong region for 1992, the treaty allies have maintained their hydroelectric power.13 cooperative ties through the regular conduct of joint military activities on counterterrorism and maritime security. The relationship was further Call a Friend: AFP’s Strategic strengthened through the recent signing in 2011 Networking and Defense Cooperation of the “Manila Declaration” by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and DFA Secretary Albert In the previous article, it was explained that F. del Rosario. The joint declaration “reaffirmed the country has limited defense capability to the bilateral security relationship and called for address these challenges. Amidst gaps and multilateral talks to resolve maritime disputes shortfalls in the modernization of AFP, the in the region” in the American’s “return to defense department relies on cooperation and Southeast Asia.”16 In June 2011, the Philippines relationship with its friends and allies to uphold its submitted to Pentagon a “wish list” of military mission and objectives. Consistent with national equipment for securing the country’s maritime policies and strategies, the AFP continues to territory. The US has likewise provided an leverage its alliances and engagements with initial fund for the Coast Watch System.17 foreign militaries to augment and/or enhance its PH-US cooperation also extends to humanitarian sorry-state capability to effectively address and assistance and disaster response, civil-military respond to security threats.14 The implementation operations, and peacekeeping operations among

12 Kevin Punzalan, “Aquino’s Challenge: Energy Security,” RSIS Commentaries (2010). 13 Carolyn Cui, “China Seen Bolstering Oil Reserves.” The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052 702304587704577335722040019632.html. 14 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, “The Strategic Direction of AFP International Military Affairs,” 2010. 15 Ibid. 16 Thomas Lum, ”The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests,” (Washington: Congressional Research Services, 2012). 17 Pia Lee-Brago, “US willing to help Phl get F-16 jets,” The Philippine Star, Retrieved December 25, 2011 from http://www.philstar.com/ Article.aspx?articleId=761971.

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others. Despite the entrenched relationship of capability enhancement.” This is manifested by the two countries, the strength of this relationship the USD 90 million worth of military assistance will be tested on whether the US will support the from South Korea. The AFP continues to support Philippines in case tensions in the West Philippine the Honor Guard Company which provides Sea escalate into an armed conflict. ceremonial security and support to the United Nations Command (Korea) in the 38th Parallel The Philippines also sees Australia and South pursuant to the Treaty of Armistice between the Korea as potential allies. Next to the US, Australia Two Koreas. The Philippines, being one of the is the largest provider of training to AFP personnel original parties who partook in the Korean War under the Defense Cooperation Programme was given honorary slots to this “Company” which (DCP). The Australian government has provided is part of functions of the current DAFA in South assistance to the Philippines on counter-terrorism Korea.21 (CT) in the wake of the US-led global war on terrorism in 200218 and have likewise assisted Other agreements on Defense and Logistics the maritime needs analysis (MANA) to determine Cooperation were also forged with countries such specific requirements for the Coast Watch South as Spain, Japan, India, and United Kingdom. (CWS)19 project initiatives. Most importantly, with These countries have uttered their willingness to the recent concurrence of the Philippine Senate assist in the AFP modernization. with the ratification of the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) between the two, military cooperation between the Philippine and Power of 10: The Role of ASEAN Australia are expected to become more robust in the coming years through the conduct of more As a member of the ASEAN, the Philippines is military-to-military trainings and engagements.20 committed to the establishment of a peaceful region which is free of conflict and anchored Common security concerns also strengthens on a friendly and cooperative relationship. The Philippines-South Korea defense relations which armed forces of ASEAN nations recognizes the was formalized under an MOU on Logistics need for a strong ASEAN Security Community and Defense Industry Cooperation. Under (ASC), which acknowledges the principle of this agreement, the two countries “assist each comprehensive security, and commits to address other through defense logistics and defense the broad political, economic, social and cultural industry agencies and manufacturers and aspects of building an ASEAN Community. It also the development of a workable framework for acknowledges that political and social stability,

18 ______. Living in the Shadow of the Hegemon: Philippine-Australian Relations and the Global War against Terrorism Australasian Political Studies Association Conference. University of New Castle 25-27 September 2006. 19 The Coast Watch South (CWS) is a national mechanism for securing the borders and addressing maritime security of the Southern Philippines. It is envisioned to stage a surveillance, control and response capability covering the critical maritime domain of the Sulu and Celebes Seas. It is a coordinating body for joint civil, military and law enforcement surveillance and response operations. This has been further expanded to the Coast Watch System which covers a bigger strategic maritime area. 20 IMA, 2010. 21 Dr. Azmi Mat Akhir, “ASEAN Regional Security: The Threats Facing it and the Way Forward,” Retrieved April 10 2006 from http://www. aseansec.org/18394.htm.

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economic prosperity, narrowed development gap, poverty alleviation and reduction of social Within the framework of ADMM, besides disparity would constitute a strong foundation for preparatory meetings such as ASEAN Defense a sustained ASC given the ASEAN’s subscription Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM) and ADSOM to the principle of comprehensive security.22 Working Group (WG), it is worth to mention the Track II Network of ASEAN Defense Institutions To complement this goal of attaining an ASC, (NADI) as a supporting tool for the ADMM. ASEAN strongly encourages military-to-military Founded in 2007, NADI is a forum where scholars engagements among ASEAN member-states and researchers in ASEAN meet and exchange to further facilitate community cooperation insights and perspectives on defense and security and shared identity in the region. It recognizes matters that are relevant to ADMM, with a view of defense cooperation and synergy among ASEAN seeking innovative recommendations to ADMM. militaries as important elements in preserving the peace and security of the region. This is ASEAN military-to-military cooperative activities because Defense Security Cooperation involves have been conducted at various levels through the provision of financial and technical support, the conduct of annual or regular top-level military transfer of defense materiel, provision of training meetings such as ASEAN Chiefs of Defense and services to allies, and promotion of military-to- Forces Informal Meeting - ACDFIM (since 2001), military contacts. It fosters and oversees security- ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting - cooperation arrangements and promotes security ACAMM (since 2000), ASEAN Navy Interaction relationships among allies or partner countries. – ANI (since 2001) ASEAN Air Force Chiefs The goal is to lead, resource, and educate the Conference - AACC (since 2004) and ASEAN Defense Security Cooperation community in order Military Intelligent Informal Meeting (AMIIM). All in to shape, refine and execute innovative security all, the growth and expansion of military-to-military solutions for partners in support of their respective interaction and cooperation have contributed to national interest, and regional or global security. building mutual confidence and understanding, In realizing the Blueprint for establishing ASEAN thus, deepening and strengthening solidarity Political-Security Community, the Association among ASEAN defense forces.24 has increased cooperation activities, establishing the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) With regard to external cooperative relations, which is the highest ministerial defense and ASEAN has been increasing the defense security consultative and cooperative mechanism cooperation with its partners outside the region for regional security issues among the ASEAN under the framework of the ASEAN Regional Member States.23

22 VietNews, “Briefing on developments of ASEAN defence and military cooperation by ADMM+ Chairman,” Retrieved October 12, 2010 from http://www.dztimes.net/post/politics/briefing-on-developments-of-asean-defence-and-military-cooperation-by-admm-chairman.aspx. 23 “Briefing on developments of ASEAN defence and military cooperation by ADMM+ Chairman” VietNews, 12 October 2010, http://www. dztimes.net/post/politics/briefing-on-developments-of-asean-defence-and-military-cooperation-by-admm-chairman.aspx. 24 Ralf Emmers, “The De-Escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations,” RSIS Working Paper Series (2007).

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Forum (ARF), specifically the ARF Security Policy recognized principles of international law and Conference (ASPC), ARF Defense Officials’ the UNCLOS”.26 However, the DOC implementing Dialogue (DOD) and ARF Heads of Defense guideline was just adopted in 2011. This Universities/ Colleges/ Institutions Meeting however is non-binding, and a policy with more (HDUCIM). At these meetings, participants teeth and hold is needed to manage tensions engage in extensive discussions on regional between ASEAN claimant states and China.27 security issues, taking stock of the role of defense establishments in the evolving regional security The ASEAN must strengthen its security architecture, and mapping out future plans for cooperation mechanisms and guideline, ARF defense cooperation aimed at boosting institutionalize the peaceful resolution of the experience exchange in maritime security, conflict and make these binding on member- HADR, natural disaster and climate change. states. Because of the securitization of many non-traditional threats,28 ASEAN militaries ASEAN political instruments also continue must synergize their roles thru the framework to influence confidence building measures, of the ASEAN Political-Security Community preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution Blueprint. This Blueprint aims to intensify shared among members. These instruments include responsibility on regional security by ASEAN the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, member states.29 To do this, ASEAN militaries and Neutrality (ZOPFAN 1971), the Treaty of must lay the groundwork for information Amity and Cooperation (TACSEA 1976), and the sharing, mutual support and assistance, Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone especially on common security concerns. (SEANWFZ 1995). To address the issue on Second, a common understanding on the West Philippine Sea, claimant countries signed promotion and protection of human rights as the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) an essential element of human security is of Parties in the West Philippine Sea in 2002.25 also recommended. Realistic assessment of Aside from the Philippines, other ASEAN member the defense capabilities of ASEAN militaries claimants are Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. is necessary in order to outline cohesive However, competing claims on the ownership responsibilities or roles and to ensure of the islands continue to be a source of transparency of military actions among members. security anxieties in the area. The DOC Finally, continuous dialogue and exchange on elucidates that “parties reaffirmed their respect best practices in defense security and peace to the freedom of navigation in and over flight operations that are applicable at the regional level above the SCS, as provided for by universally must be promoted.

25 Emmers, Ralf, “The De-Escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations”, RSIS Working Paper Series(6 June 2007). 26 Rommel Banloi, Philippines-China Security Relations: Current Issues and Emerging Concerns, (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012). 27 Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Briefing for the New Commander in Chief (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Office of Strategic and Special Studies, July 2010). 28 Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Briefing for the New Commander in Chief (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Office of Strategic and Special Studies, July 2010). 29 “Chinese Drilling Ship Leaves Disputed Waters,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 4, 1992.

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To address the tensions in the West Philippine its capabilities, the Philippines aims to bolster Sea, a legally-binding regional Code of Conduct and leverage its alliances.33 In reality, however in the West Philippine Sea that is aimed to proactive the Philippines is, it lacks the power to establish an open and co-operative engagement fully leverage. In addition, despite the willingness framework in the area should be pursued. A of allies and partners for mutual defense creation of a joint authority dedicated to common agreements, defense materiel transfer is often development of resources within the Spratlys not utilized or maximized since the Philippines area may also be adopted as a logical solution does not have excess or even advanced materiel for a territorial disputes as convoluted as this worthy of being exchanged. one the West Philippine Sea case. Establishing a “Spratly Resource Development Authority” would For this reason, the Philippines can use its be consistent with statements by the Chinese reliable human resources activities such government which aver that while sovereignty as peacekeeping missions, training and over the Spratly Islands is non-negotiable, joint education exchange, where the AFP has vast ventures to exploit the natural resources of the experience, as the bargaining piece. The West Philippine Sea may be discussed.30 Thus, exchange of military exercises has been a kind of multilateral “Authority” analogous to consistent in the Philippines particularly that for mining the deep seabed in the 1982 LOS with the United States. To enhance its military Convention may be established, which would be operations other than war (MOOTW) capabilities, responsible for managing resource exploitation, the AFP conducts bilateral and multilateral including fisheries, the environment, and safety exercises with the US such as the Balikatan of navigation.31 Measures of engaging all the Exercises. The AFP also regularly participates parties for a discussion must be explored to in the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against resolve the issue; otherwise a status quo will Terrorism (SEACAT) which is a regional likely prevail and will be most favorable to the cooperation mechanism in support of cooperative country with the most dominating military force - response to terrorism and transnational China.32 crimes at sea.

Since the Mutual Defense Treaty with the US is The Prospects for AFP Advantage the only defense treaty of the Philippines, it must therefore be maximized. A review to reprioritize Despite all challenges, the AFP is committed to U.S. security assistance programs to make them have a professional and capable armed force responsive to the AFP’s shift from internal security responsive to various challenges confronting the to territorial defense is essential.34 The Pentagon Philippines and the region where it is situated. and AFP can also explore acquisition of defense While the AFP is on the process of modernizing equipment (newer and not just Excess Defense

30 Mark J. Valencia, “A Spratly Solution,” Far Eastern Economic Review (1994). 31 Valencia, Mark J. “A Spratly Solution,” Far Eastern Economic Review (31 March 1994): 1. 32 Dagdag, 2011. 33 Renato Cruz De Castro, ”Balancing Gambits in Twenty-First Century Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible Demise?,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2011). 34 De Castro, “Balancing Gambits”.

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Articles) through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) engage with China, and curb the view that China since government-to-government transactions is an imminent threat. The AFP must play the are faster than the bidding process of the AFP. “China Card” to gain diplomatic leverage.35 The AFP must be clever in the international playing In the midst of issues and tensions in West field, as they say; countries have no hearts but Philippine Sea, the Philippines must learn to only national interest to protect.

35 De Castro, Renato Cruz. “Balancing Gambits in Twenty-First Century Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible Demise?” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2011.

References: Kim, H.Y.. “Disaster Management in Asia: Where Are We Now?.” Asian Journal of Public Affairs 3 (2010). Banlaoi, Rommel C. “Broadening Philippine-Australia Defence ______. “Living in the Shadow of the Hegemon: Philippine- Relations in the Post 9/11 Era: Issues and Prospects.” Australian Relations and the Global War against Terrorism”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2003. Australasian Political Studies Association Conference. Baviera, Aileen San Pablo. The South China Sea Disputes: Is University of New Castle: 2006. the Aquino Way the ‘ASEAN Way’?. Singapore: Rajaratnam Long, Bernard Fook Wen. “Transforming the Strategic School of International Studies Singapore. 2012. Landscape of Southeast Asia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia Baviera, Aileen San Pedro. “China-Philippines Relations: 27 (2005): 388-405. Cautious Cooperation.” Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Lum, Thomas. The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Security Studies, 2004. Interests. Washington: Congressional Research Services, Chau, Andrew. “Security Community and Southeast Asia: 2012. Australia, the U.S., and ASEAN’s Counter-Terror.” Asian Office of Strategic and Special Studies. Briefing for the New Survey 48 (2008): 626-649. Commander in Chief. Quezon City: Office of Strategic and De Castro, Renato Cruz. “Balancing Gambits in Twenty- Special Studies, 2010. First Century Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. “The Role of the Demise?” Southeast Asian Affairs (2011). Armed Forces of the Philippines in Regional Security.” 2008. Emmers, Ralf, “The De-Escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. “The Strategic Sino-Southeast Asian Relations”, RSIS Working Paper Series Direction of AFP International Military Affairs.” 2010. (2007). Pangilinan, Rowena. “Enhancing Philippine National Decurity Habito, Cielito F. “Climate Change and National Against External Threat.” Report and Selected Paper Development.” Paper presented at the Meeting on Climate Discussion Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Change and National Development in the Justitia Room, Philippines, Diliman. 2008. Ateneo professional Schools, Rockwell Center, Makati City, Philippines Philippines, November 8, 2002. Punzalan, Kevin. “Aquino’s Challenge: Energy Security.” RSIS Commentaries. 2010. Hernandez, Carolina. “Changing Discourse on Security:

1946 to the Present.” In Enhancing Philippine National Valencia, Mark. “A Spratly Solution.” Far Eastern Economic Security Against External Threat Report and Selected Paper Review, 1994. Discussion, edited by Rowena Pangilinan. Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 2008). Zha, Daoijing. “Security in the South China Sea.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 26 (2001): 3-51.

140 13 AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 14 The Evolving Role of the AFP: Skewing Towards Non-Traditional Roles by MERENIZA C GOMEZ Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES

In international relations, security is associated with sovereignty while focusing on deterrence, power balancing, and military strategy. Traditionally, security is equated with the non-existence of military threat and protecting the state from subversion and attacks posed by external forces. In the post-cold war era, security has broadened to include unprecedented and emerging sources of insecurity such as terrorism, transnational crimes, health crises, environmental degradation, hunger, unemployment, social conflicts, and political repression. This changing concept of security consequently reshapes a military’s mission, which was evident in the case of the Philippines and its armed forces.

The author discusses the changing roles of the AFP and how these affect not just the military but also civilian actors. The author also examines the various factors that redefine the capacities of the members of the armed forces.

After examining the evolving role of the AFP, the author concludes that the changing concept of security continues to dictate how militaries of the modern world behave. Thus, refocusing military operations to non-traditional security concerns is not a zero-sum scenario, ‘where the performance of one is detrimental to the other.’

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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“The AFP of the 21st century shall be a highly include terrorism, transnational crimes, health effective, technologically driven, efficient crises, environmental degradation, hunger, combatant but socially oriented institution; it shall unemployment, social conflicts, and political possess the versatility to undertake non-military repression, among others.4 roles in aid of development and governance and its members shall remain role models for the This changing concept of security continues to Philippine citizenry.” reshape a military’s mission, and this has been - The AFP 2020 Vision evident in the case of the Philippines and its armed forces. Since its formation more than a century ago, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Introduction has played an important, if not a central role, in the process of nation-building and state formation In international relations, security has been over the past decades. The primary mission conventionallyI associated with the concepts of of the AFP is “to protect the people and secure sovereignty, often with focus on the dimensions the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of of deterrence, power balancing, and military the national territory.” 5 However, as the concept strategy.1 In its traditional sense, security is of national security becomes conventionally equated with the non-existence of military threat, more comprehensive, the basic role of the AFP or is identified with safeguarding a state from broadens from a traditional defense and military subversion and attack posed by the external force into an agent of political, social, and forces.2 economic development in the country.6

Since the decline of the Cold War Era, security This backdrop frames the discussion on the has evolved from being a single function of changing roles of the AFP and how these geo-politics and power-balancing of major powers emerging new roles affect not just the military into a nexus of economic, political, and societal but also the civilian sectors. It will identify various forces.3 Thus, security has broadened its scope factors that redefine the capacities of the military to include prevalent, often unprecedented and over time and present some possible scenarios emerging, non-traditional sources of insecurity. for the AFP as it is continuously influenced by the These alternative sources of security challenges changing concept of security.

1 Boutin and Tan, Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2001). 2 Ibid., p. 6. 3 E. Rothschild, “What is Security?,” Daedalus 124 (1995): 53-98. 4 Boutin and Tan, Non-Traditional Security Issues. 5 1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 2 of Article II Declaration of Principles and State Policies, p. 2. 6 C. Hernandez, “Controlling Asia’s Armed Forces.” (International Forum for Democratic Studies, 1996).

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The Traditional Roles of the AFP claims and likewise, is of utmost importance in the pursuit of the Philippine’s economic and strategic The evolving concept of security has been interests. The overlapping EEZ in the West influential in shaping and defining the AFP’s Philippine Sea (WPS) shared by at least six Asian mission. The 2002 National Military Strategy countries and territories has adversely affected (NMS), which sets the strategic direction of the relations of claimant countries and has since the military leadership, identifies five mission been regarded as a potential flashpoint for military objectives on how the AFP shall address the conflict in the region. The continued military various threats to national security. Among these developments and the increasing aggressive mission objectives, only two can be construed as stance and show of force in the contested WPS traditional roles: area pose serious threats to national security.

1. to maintain territorial integrity and defend the national territory; and, The Non-Traditional Roles of the AFP 2. protect the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The remainder of the mission objectives identified Maintain territorial integrity and defend the in the NMS can be classified as non-traditional. national territory. As provided in the Philippine These include: Constitution, the AFP shall be the protector of the people and the state.7 In line with this mandate, 1. decisively defeat all armed internal security territorial defense remains the top priority threats; mission of the AFP. This means that it is the 2. contribute to regional peace and stability; core responsibility of the AFP to ensure that the and, country’s vital interests are protected and that 3. support national development. all intrusion into the national territory by external aggressors are detected, identified, documented, Decisively defeat all armed internal security intercepted, and if necessary, neutralized. threats. As a result of the country’s persistent Territorial defense ensures the dominance of the insurgency problem, the AFP has assumed state powers over all Philippine-claimed territories responsibility over the government’s internal and features, including airspace and territorial security operations (ISO) by virtue of Republic seas, and the prevention of any dismemberment, Act (RA) 8551.9 Although internal security encroachment, or foreign occupation over these presupposes comprehensive solutions and areas.8 approaches, AFP’s focused military operations remain at the center of the government’s efforts Protect the EEZ. Protection of the EEZ to suppress insurgency, reduce internal armed is paramount to defending and upholding threats, and subsequently establish peace and sovereignty over national territory and territorial order in conflict areas.

7 1987 Philippine Constitution. 8 AFP National Military Strategy (2002). 9 Hermogenes C. Esperon, “Progress in Counter-Terrorism: The Philippine Experience” (paper presented at the 6th Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 2-4, 2007).

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Contribute to regional peace and stability. occupation of the Philippines that the concept The AFP supports the government’s diplomatic of a “professional armed forces” was first initiatives through continuous participation introduced. A professional military would mean an in confidence-building measures, security rmed force that possesses expertise in managing dialogues, and other defense cooperation violence, has an unwavering responsibility to the activities with allies and friends. In consonance state, and a corporate interest of protecting its with national policies, the AFP shall implement traditions and organizations.10 and participate in various bilateral and multilateral engagements with foreign partners to further The signing of various bilateral defense national security and interests. agreements, such as the Military Bases and Military Assistance Agreements in 1947 and the Support national development. National Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, paved the way for development is of paramount importance to the institutionalization of an independent Philippine national security. It is for this reason that the AFP military. The nascent AFP’s culture, equipage, has always been tapped to perform peacetime organization, training, education, doctrines, roles in support of infrastructure, disaster relief operations, logistics, and personnel management and rehabilitation, search and rescue, protection were all patterned after the US military systems. of national resources, preservation of the The professionalization of military personnel environment, and civic action, among others. was further facilitated through the creation of the Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), which was instituted to give advice to the AFP Looking into the Factors: and supervise the implementation of various Catalysts for Change military agreements between the US and the Philippines.11 Various factors can be accounted as major catalysts for the changing roles of the The professionalism of the military, however, military. Issues regarding professionalism and deteriorated in the post-World War era. politicization of the AFP remain the greatest With some elements of the military joining challenges the Philippine military as an institution the insurgencies against the newly-formed must face. Lack of professionalism emanates government, the Defense Department, under from within the armed forces while politicization then Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, introduced comes from the outside of the AFP. reforms in the training and equipage of the armed forces in order to boost their morale and fighting Historically, the native Filipino fighters who performance.12 The role of the AFP further mounted the resistance against Spanish and expanded with the creation of the Economic American colonizers were driven by deep martial Development Corps (EDCOR), which took charge traditions of bravery, sacrifice, resourcefulness, of giving resettlement areas to rebel returnees in and ingenuity. It was only during the American the process of reintegration.

10 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 1988), 20-21. 11 Cesar P. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000) ,76.

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Under the Marcos administration, the AFP The role of the RAM in the restoration of became a “close partner” of the government democracy enabled the AFP to regain the trust for national development under the “New and confidence of the Filipino people as the Society” movement. In addition to suppressing military was perceived to be a powerful balancing violence and lawlessness, the military performed force in the nation’s political life. Meanwhile, the substantial socio-economic roles. Former role of the AFP as the “protector of the people and President Marcos, although for a different reason, the State” was codified in the 1987 Constitution.15 “deployed the AFP in development projects, As such, it is the AFP’s core responsibility to be particularly in areas where civilian agencies the guardian of democracy, the Constitution, and lacked the resources to undertake the project people’s freedom and liberties. themselves.”13 But beyond being a partner in nation-building, the AFP became the regime’s However, the same provisions of the Constitution self-preservation apparatus, used to suppress which legitimize the role of the military are the opposition, control media, and curtail the being used by some sectors to justify its people’s freedom of expression. involvement in the political affairs, claiming that as the protector of public interest, the AFP must The imposition of martial law exposed the support calls to unseat an incumbent president. military’s vulnerability to patronage politics and Even with a regime change, there remain clear corruption as it was made to perpetuate politicians indications that the military are not entirely free in power, thereby effectively alienating it from from political partisanship. This phenomenon of public interest. This resulted in public distrust military interference has been evident through against the regime and the military, with many various coups d’état that have challenged post- people joining the communist movement and the Marcos presidencies. Notable among these were middle class demanding drastic political reforms. the series of coup attempts against President The politicization of the military however took its Corazon Aquino between 1987 and 1989, the toll on the dictatorship and the AFP as calls for military’s withdrawal of support from President reforms brew within the uniformed services. The Joseph Estrada in 2001, the failed Oakwood assassination of then Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. Mutiny in 2003, and the unsuccessful withdrawal in 1983 became an impetus for the creation of the of support by two Brigade Commanders in 2006 REFORM the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) during the term of President Gloria Macapagal- by young military officers in 1985.14 Calling for Arroyo. reforms in the military, RAM became instrumental in the ouster of the dictatorship as its failed coup The political interferences of military elements in d’état spurred the first People Power Revolution recent years are manifestations of continued, if not in February 1986. renewed, calls for reforms within the organization.

12 Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, (USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2005), 196. 13 Patricio N. Abinales, “American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview.” (East West Center Working Papers, 2004), 196. 14 The acronym R.E.F.O.R.M. meant Restore Ethics Fair-mindedness Order Righteousness and Morale. 15 1987 Philippine Consitution, Article II, Section 3.

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The thwarted Oakwood mutiny resulted in Philippines was able to save more than USD 7 the creation of the Feliciano Fact-Finding Billion for a ten-year period of US bases presence Commission by former President Arroyo to in the country.19 investigate the incident. The report acknowledged the “reality and legitimacy” of the grievances of The greatest challenge to the Philippine security the disgruntled junior military officers involved framework came upon the non-renewal and the as compelling factors to execute such mutiny.16 eventual closure of American military bases in The report concluded that the issues of graft 1992. The eviction of the military forces severely and corruption and the poor conditions of reduced the strong deterrence of the country soldiers in combat operations create a “powerful against external aggression and the significant emotive force” for soldiers to be easily recruited amount of military assistance needed to develop to stage coup attempts.17 These grievances of AFP’s capabilities. Albeit presenting opportunities the mutineers have underscored the need for for the Philippine government to assert full corruption control mechanisms and modernization sovereignty and independence, the capability of of the AFP. the AFP to defend the state and national territory has since deteriorated. Similarly, even the AFP’s capability to address internal security concerns The US Connection has weakened in order to sustain both combat and non-combat operations. To date, the current The enactment of the Military Bases Agreement armed forces lacks a credible defense capability between the US and the Philippine governments due to the government’s inability to acquire new in 1947 ensured a large American military equipment for the AFP or, at the very least, even presence in its former colony. With American maintain the military’s ageing equipment. bases operating in the country, the AFP was able to benefit from US military assistance through military capability upgrade and training, while From Modernization to Back-to-Basics extending a security umbrella for the Philippines. Territorial defense of the country was guaranteed Losing the security benefits from the US military through the air and naval support of the US bases in the country, it became imperative for the forces.18 Moreover, the Philippine Government Philippines to modernize the capabilities of the logically gained savings in defense expenditures, military to effectively perform its constitutional which were further complemented by additional mandate. In 1995, the Philippine Congress compensation and grants in return for allowing enacted Republic Act (RA) 7898, otherwise known American bases to operate in the country. as the AFP Modernization Act in order to develop Between 1980-1989 alone, it is estimated that the a self-reliant and a credible strategic armed

16 Florentino P. Feliciano, “Report on the Fact-Finding Commission.” (Pasay City: 2003), 36. 17 Ibid. 18 Raymund Jose G. Quilop, Bilateralism, Regional Security and the Philippine-US Alliance (OSS Working Paper) (Quezon City: Office of Strategic and Special Studies, AFP, 1999), 8. 19 Eriberto C. Varona, “An Economic Analysis of the US Military Bases in the Philippines” (Thesis).

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force which is capable of defending sovereignty all funds for the Trust Fund were sourced out from and territorial integrity of the Philippines and the AFP’s share from proceeds of subsequent preserve national patrimony. Under the law, the bases conversion, from the Government Arsenal, AFP’s Modernization Program was intended to sale of excess AFP assets, and the Malampaya be implemented over a period of 15 years with Gas Project, from which the AFP received a PhP 50 billion budget ceiling for the first five PhP 1 billion. Despite the law authorizing the years. The program’s implementation was to be Congress to appropriate annual funds for funded through the AFP Modernization Act Trust AFP modernization, it was only in 2007 that Fund (the breakdown shown in Figure 1) which appropriations was made by the Congress was to be sourced out mainly through the annual amounting to PhP 5 billion. Almost twelve (12) appropriations by Congress and other prescribed years into the program, the Trust fund only holds complementary sources.20 roughly 36 percent of the PhP 50 billion intended for the first five years of the modernization However, no funds were allocated by Congress program. Notwithstanding the fact that while the for the modernization program in its nascent PhP 50 billion should have been appropriated by years. It is only through the AFP’s initiative the National Government, only PhP 10 billion has that the Modernization Trust Fund was initially been disbursed to date. financed using the AFP’s share from the proceeds of the sale of Fort Bonifacio in 2002, amounting to Aside from the expected appropriations from PhP 5.4 billion. For more than half of the Congress, the sale and lease of military lands intended duration of the modernization program, through the BCDA has been a primary source of

GA REMITTANCES Figure 1: 51,257,165 0% AFP Modernization FY 2007 GAA Trust Fund 5,000,000,000 BCDA Shares 27% 6,943,770,376 39%

MNGP Proceeds 1,000,000,000 5% BCDA Shares FY 2002 GAA 271,144,000 5,000,000,000 Source: AFP MPMO 1% 28%

20 In addition to the annual appropriations made by the Congress, RA 7898 provides that the AFP Modernization Act Trust shall also be sourced out through the proceeds of the sale, lease, or joint development of military reservations not covered under the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA); shares of the AFP from the proceeds of the sale of military camps; proceeds from the sale of the products of the Government Arsenal; proceeds from the disposal of excess and/or uneconomically repairable equipment and other movable assets of the AFP and the Government Arsenal; funds from budgetary surplus, if any, as may be authorized by Congress; and, all interest income of the trust fund.

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the Modernization Fund. RA 7227, as amended of the Trust Fund. As of the end of 2006, the Trust by RA 7917, stipulates that the AFP shall receive Fund has already generated PhP 256.77 million a 35 percent share from the proceeds of sale or in interest income. Given that this interest income transfers of military camps while the rest of the is earned by the Trust Fund, it is but logical that proceeds are then to be divided up to at least the said amount be transferred from the Bureau fifteen (15) other government agencies.21 The of Treasury to the Trust Fund. It would also be logic of these government agencies receiving worthy to look at the possibility of exempting shares from the proceeds of military camps is the said interest income from tax deductions to being questioned by the Feliciano Commission, maximize the various of resources for the Trust especially since the functions of these said Fund. This would remain true to the spirit behind agencies are deemed “non-military-related”. the creation of the Trust Fund, which is ensuring Moreover, the Commission recommended that peak and sustained availability of funds for the shares allocated to the AFP Modernization projects under the program. Program should be increased substantially. The Commission held that it appears only reasonable The insufficiency of the Trust Fund is further that all the “proceeds from the sales of military aggravated by the continuous tapering of the AFP land should be shared only by the AFP (for its annual budget, which is distinct and separate modernization program) and the BCDA.”22 from the modernization appropriation. Not only Indeed, if the 37.5 percent of the proceeds being is the AFP now faced with the responsibility of shared by said government agencies were to stepping up and filling in the air and naval support be shared solely by the Modernization Program lost from the US bases pullout, it was also forced and the BCDA, there would be a considerable into a dwindling budget. As shown in Figure 2, increase of much needed resources for the the budget appropriated to the AFP vis-à-vis the Modernization Program. country’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been on a continuous decline in the most recent Another issue that demands attention is that years: from 1.42 percent in 2002, to 1.29 percent while the Trust Fund generates its own interest in 2003, 1.14 percent in 2004, 1.00 percent in income, these earnings are deposited with the 2005, and 0.90 percent in 2006. Notably, the Bureau of Treasury and therefore do not form part country’s budget for defense in 2006 is even

21 Section 1 (d) of RA 7917 dated February 24, 1995, names the following government agencies: BCDA (27.5%), National Housing Authority; National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (12%); Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (3%); Department of Public Works and Highways and Department of Transportation and Communications (5%); Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (2%); Commission on Higher Education (1%); Department of Science and Technology (2%); Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice and the Ombudsman (1%); National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Corrections, Philippine National Police and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (2% but not to exceed P2 Billion); Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts, Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals (1% but not to exceed P1 Billion); Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Department of Social Welfare and Development (2%); Department of Labor and Employment (½% but not to exceed P5 Million); Department of Social Welfare and Development (1%); Mount Pinatubo Assistance, Rehabilitation and Development Fund (3%); and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (2%). 22 The Report of the Fact Finding Commission Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 78 of the President of the Republic of the Philippines Dated July 30, 2003, Part Three, October 17, 2003, p. 142.

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smaller compared to the budget in 1991 when the air and naval support from US bases, and the US military bases were still in the country. absence of bases compensation. It thus comes as no surprise that from one of the finest armed Equally important to delve into is how the forces in Asia, Philippine defense capability annual appropriations of the AFP are being is now considered as “a perennial joke within spent. On average, 70 percent of the total AFP ASEAN” and “the weakest military force among appropriations are used to compensate personnel ASEAN states”.23 This sentiment is shared by services, while the remainder is primarily Zachary Abuza of the U.S. Institute of Peace, used to sustain its operations. On the other hand, who discredited the role of AFP in the regional capital outlay receives very minimal funding, security arena since it has “almost no navy” and which could have been used to complement the its “ability to protect its exclusive economic zones Modernization Trust Fund for capability upgrade and maritime resources is nil.”24 and acquisition. Unfortunately, the Philippine Government could The decline in AFP appropriations and the not easily brush off these criticisms as the AFP virtually non-existent allocation for capital outlay itself concedes to the fact that the military has have been detrimental to the AFP modernization, long been burdened with capability challenges. A which was further worsened by the reduction capability assessment of the AFP in 2007 reported in military assistance from the US, the loss of various inadequacies and gaps in the military’s

Figure 2: Real AFP Appropriations (% of Real GDP)

2.50 %

2.00 %

1.50 %

1.00 %

0.50 %

0.00 %

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

Source: AFP RMO TOTAL AFP APPROPRIATIONS CAPITAL OUTLAY

23 Sheldon W. Simon, “Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External Tasks and Capabilities,” NBR Analysis, Accessed May 2000, http://www. taiwandocuments.org/nbr01.pdf. 24 Carlos H. Conde, “Corruption Troubles Philippine Military,” International Herald Tribune, Accessed http://www.iht.com/ articles/2005/05/25/news/ phils.php.

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adeptness to support both traditional and non- aircraft, and mine sweeping capabilities for traditional operations.25 The apparent incapability modern naval warfare. Serviceability of air of the AFP for territorial defense, or for some, the assets, with ages averaging almost 30 years, “lack of it”26, can be summarized as follows: is likewise low due to insufficient funds for maintenance, communication support, and • The Philippine Air Force does not have a night-flying capabilities.30 credible air defense capability to perform its mission of territorial defense.27 It does not • The Philippine Army has no modern fire have any modern air-defense, surveillance, control systems. It has no air defense airlift, and ground attack capabilities.28 Its system and anti-aircraft weapons except for air assets cannot fully conduct and sustain small arms and machine guns. Similarly, the operations,29 particularly with its fighter Army has no capability for inshore defense fleet being severely depleted with the except for the fire support assets of the decommissioning of the F-5s. Its surveillance infantry divisions. Communication equipment equipment are either obsolete or non- are likewise insufficient while intelligence functional and its radars are unable to provide highly relies on human assets and lacks nationwide coverage. Meanwhile, most air technological capability. Mobility assets, bases do not even meet the requirements of logistics support, and bases maintenance are a standard air force base. also hampered by lack of funds.31

• The Philippine Navy is greatly challenged The modernization of AFP’s capability for in the conduct of maritime defense over the territorial defense was further encumbered by the country’s territorial waters and EEZ. Out of shifted focus towards internal security operations. the Philippine Navy’s more than 50 patrol In 2005, the AFP leadership implemented the first ships, ten are almost 50 years old. A limited block of the military’s Capability Upgrade Program number of naval assets are also worsened (CUP), which was dubbed as “back to basics”. by the non-existence of anti-submarine, anti- The upgrade of AFP capabilities was focused

25Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, AFP, AFP Capability Assessment Report, September 2007. 26 Kathleen C. Villamin, as quoted in Renato Cruz De Castro and Walter Lohman, “U.S.–Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense,” The Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011, Asia-Pacific Section, Accessed http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/us- philippines-partnership-in-the-cause-of-maritime-defense#_ftnref19. 27Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, AFP Capability Assessment Report. 28 De Castro and Lohhan, “US-Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense.” 29The AFP Capability Assessment Report states that the F-5s of the Air Force, its last fleet of fighter jets,have reached peak performance and were eventually decommissioned after more than three decades in operation. Its current air assets mainly composed of the S-211s, which are primarily trainer aircrafts, and OV-10As, which are primarily as observation aircrafts but are converted into de facto bombers for internal security operations, are old and lack the necessary capabilities. The MG-520s are the only light attack helicopter of the PAF. Its flyable aircrafts are decreasing in number. Lack of armaments has also become one of its main problems aside from its lack of instrumentation for night flying missions. 30 AFP Capability Assessment Report. 31 Ibid.

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on providing the basic and critical capabilities of a security paradigm shift is the utilization of to support internal security operations, such as the military in operations other than war, wherein mobility, firepower, communications, command armed forces will no longer be employed just to fight and control, force protection, and combat life wars but also to support peacetime government support for individuals and units. An examination activities to achieve national objectives. of the procurement program would reveal that one of the first items procured are for force In the absence of any clear external threats to protection such as helmets, body armor, and the national territory or indications of external combat life-saver kits, which are generally aggression against the state, the future mission considered and should have been basic and and activities of the AFP are likely to be driven by regular provisions to soldiers on the ground. non-traditional security challenges. This shifting role of the military is not completely remote to In addition to its internal security functions, the AFP as the military has been utilized not to solely AFP also takes an active role in support of the confront threats to national security that emanates government’s national development initiatives. externally, but also those that exist within its Notable among these is the use of the military’s territorial boundaries. That is, the AFP has engineering brigades to support infrastructure since been at the forefront of the government’s projects such as roads, bridges, school building, counter-insurgency efforts, despite such core shelters, and water systems. Taking operations being constabulary and not traditionally into consideration all of these expanded roles military in nature. of the military, substantial increase in the AFP’s budget is an apparent imperative. On the contrary, Given the geographic exposure of the country the AFP remains hard-pressed to spread its to natural hazards such as typhoons and meager resources to cover both its core and earthquakes, the military will remain a critical force expanded missions. of the government for humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). Despite being theoretically “non-military” in nature, it has been What Lies Ahead? Possible Scenarios increasingly evident that armed forces around for the AFP the world play a crucial part in responding to natural calamities in support to civilian authorities. The traditional professional specialization of Particular to the case of the AFP, the geographic soldiery is fighting wars. That is, the military’s deployment of military personnel and equipment traditional role is to ensure the continued across the archipelago allows the military to be existence of the state amidst external threats first-responders in times of calamity. Albeit being of aggression. However, the conclusion of the considered as below par to international standards, Cold War era has significantly changed the the AFP has capabilities and equipment that may international security landscape wherein threats not be readily available to civilian government no longer come primarily from outside the agencies. Moreover, the military’s organizational state’s territorial boundaries as given the structure, discipline, and operational conduct emergence of non-traditional security threats are added advantage for the conduct of HADR such as terrorism and climate change. Corollary operations.

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In terms of internal security operations, the promote and direct interagency efforts and further AFP is still at a much superior stance over the civil-military interactions. national police to quell insurgency and acts of terrorism in the country. However, looking at the live case of Afghanistan, combating terrorism Conclusion and insurgencies should not be construed as pure and traditional military operations. Rather, The changing concept of security continues such operations necessitate a comprehensive to dictate how militaries of the modern world civil-military approach for humanitarian behave and operate. Historically, the evolving assistance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. security landscape, both at the international and domestic levels, has been redefining the role The increased involvement of the military in of the country’s armed forces, or at the least, operations other than war directs the AFP towards a determinant for the military’s internal or external a future centered on maintaining domestic order security missions. and fostering the nation’s social and economic development. However, a caveat should be It could be argued that refocusing military considered since veering away from traditional operations for non-traditional security concerns operations may compromise the military’s combat is not a zero-sum scenario that is completely readiness and deviate from its core mission. detrimental against traditional security missions. While the end of international ideological conflict However, long-drawn prioritization in favor of has led to widespread acceptance of democracy non-traditional military missions could produce and capitalism, the need for combat-ready armed adverse effects on the armed forces’ traditional forces has not disappeared. The central task security missions, particularly in the modernization of the armed forces should remain the defense of its territorial defense capabilities, wherein of the nation’s territory against external attack the latter are tempered, if not superseded, and the preservation of Constitutional order. by more pressing requirements of internal Even when such traditional security threats and non-traditional security operations. Needless do not manifest, the AFP must remain vigilant to say, modernization efforts are further against their resurgence. To ensure its potency hampered by budgetary constraints. in territorial defense, the AFP should continue pursuing internal reforms designed to improve It is indeed the sovereign right of a state to the military’s technological sophistication and determine how it intends to utilize and employ quick-response capabilities. its military. However, the perception of other states as regards the capability of a certain It is within the legal prerogative of the central country to defend itself from external aggression government to exercise oversight and effective is a matter of great consequence to its sovereign control of the armed forces to achieve national standing in the international community. objectives. However, utilizing the military for The current international system continues to non-traditional security purposes presupposes exist as a function of power – political, economic, a clear legal construct that will not only identify or otherwise – that is solidified by considerable AFP’s responsibilities, but more importantly, will military might.

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A state without a credible external defense is a non-traditional military missions may be very vulnerable state. It is therefore prudent for undertaken without compromise to the military’s any state to balance its priorities by employing core traditional missions. The military should a right mix of traditional and non-traditional always ensure that the sovereignty of the state military capabilities. A state must continuously is never threatened and its people protected from look at the evolving security landscape wherein any danger.

References:

Hernandez, C. Controlling Asia’s Armed Forces. International Center Working Papers: 2004. Forum for Democratic Studies. 1996. Feliciano, Florentino. Report on the Fact-Finding Commission. Rothschild, E. “What is Security?.” Daedalus (1995). Pasay City: 2003.

Boutin, K., and Tan. Non-Traditional Security Issues in Quilop, Raymund. Bilateralism, Regional Security and the Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Philippine-US Alliance (OSS Working Paper). Quezon City: Studies, 2001. Office of Strategic and Special Studies, APF, 1999.

Esperon, Hermogenes. “Progress in Counter-Terrorism: The Varona, Eriberto C. “An Economic Analysis of the US Military Philippine Experience.” Paper presented at the 6th Shangri- Bases in the Philippines.”, Thesis la Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 2-4, 2007. The Report of the Fact Finding Commission Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 78 of the President of the Republic Lucero, Daniel. “Development and Security: The Role of the of the Philippines Dated July 30, 2003, Part Three, October AFP.” Digest (1997). 17, 2003

Finer, S.E. The Man on Horseback. Colorado: Westview Simon, Sheldon. “Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External Press, 1988. Tasks and Capabilities.” Accessed May 2000. http://www. taiwandocuments.org/nbr01.pdf. Pobre, Cesar. History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000. Carlos H. Conde. “Corruption Troubles Philippine Military.” International Herald Tribune, Asia-Pacific Section. Accessed Abinales, Patricio, and Amoroso, Donna. State and Society in http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/25/news/ phils.php. the Philippines. USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2005. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, AFP, AFP Abinales, Patricio. American Military Presence in the Southern Capability Assessment Report, September 2007 Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East West

154 14 THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines 15 Regional Cooperation on Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response – Crisis or Opportunity? by Saya Kiba, ph.d. and Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D. Invited contributors Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE – CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY?

The military’s engagement in humanitarian assistance/ disaster response is seen as a double- edged sword. On the one hand, it opens up an avenue for dialogue between the military and civilian actors such as NGAs, LGUs, NGOs, and international humanitarian organizations, which in turn leads to enhanced military accountability and encourages oversight on the military’s performance. On the other hand, it can undermine local civilian authorities who are perceived as “weaker” or “less” effective than the military.

The paper examines how the globalization of disaster response norms and emerging international cooperation have affected civil-military relations in the Philippines and Thailand.

In the case of the Philippines, the authors conclude that there is little danger of undermining civilian control tasks since soldiers generally accept local government leadership in disaster response. However, there is much room for improvement in the Philippine military’s asset-poor condition (air and land vehicles) for disaster response, thus making coordination and linkages with international humanitarian agencies and foreign militaries crucial and imperative.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

156 15 REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE – CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY? Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

Introduction Disaster response by the military gives soldiers a chance to encounter civilians and offers great While frequently-occurring natural disasters possibility to stimulate professionalism and Whave threatened Southeast Asian countries, civil- improve the capabilities of the state security military cooperation has been a crucial issue forces. But it can also undermine civilian control on disaster relief operation. Some scholars and and initiatives in this functional area, where the practitioners expect that the military’s involvement military is presumed to have no core capability in humanitarian assistance/ disaster response (assuming that the military is, primarily, a (HA/DR) opens up opportunities for mutual war instrument). Under what condition can communication between military and civilian civil-military engagement in disaster response be actors, such as central government agencies, local a good trigger point? And in what condition does government units, non-government organizations it turn to an unfavorable opportunity? (NGOs) and international humanitarian organizations. Experiences of civil-military engagements are argued to eventually create Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster more military accountability or better public Response: Setting Parameters on relation policies, which in turn can change Military Involvement the military’s professionalism or the behavior of high-ranking soldiers. It might also encourage Civil-military cooperation in disaster management parliament, media, and civil society organizations is not only a trend among Asian countries, but to exercise more oversight on the military’s also a new model of international cooperation. performance and defense budget. It is inevitable that multi-sector and multinational actors such as military, international humanitarian On the other hand, it is also true that the military organizations, NGO, and private sectors takes advantage of its HA/DR activities as a “encounter” each other on the ground in disaster tool to achieve its own objectives – for instance, relief operations. All countries now take it for to integrate themselves to local communities granted that disaster management is a matter through psychological operation, to publicize of governing global and diverse actors and its civilian-friendly image to enjoy future public stakeholders. The United Nations Office for support. However, an unintended effect could Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) be a feeling of inadequacy of other civilian and other international humanitarian agencies government agencies which have less assets have tried to institutionalize coordination in HA/DR and human resources. In societies where the among these multiple and diverse stakeholders, military traditionally played an important domestic including the military, by the crafting of guidelines. political role (e.g. Thailand and Philippines), The Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil the institution’s involvement in HA/DR can be Defense Assets in Disaster Response (Oslo parlayed to somehow demoralize local civilian Guidelines) and 2003 Guidelines on the Use authorities, which are seen as “weaker” and “less of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) to effective” than the military. support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex

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Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines) govern the areas in foreign countries to provide assistance; use of foreign military assets and their interface enabling the armed forces to diversify its role, with UN humanitarian organizations. The Oslo which the US armed forces doctrine categorizes guideline addresses natural disasters in peace as “military operations other than war.” The time while the MCDA guideline assumes the US Department of Defense Joint Publication presence of armed conflict. Both instruments 3-07.6 defines foreign humanitarian assistance see the use of military assets, especially in as “operations intended to relieve or reduce logistics and planning as “last resort” and clearly the results of natural or man-made disasters of articulate that the primary responsibility for other endemic conditions...” (Thompson 2012, response lies with the affected country’s civilian 3). Unlike combat operations, humanitarian agencies. Although these guidelines are non- assistance exercises are limited in scope and binding to states, UN agencies and international duration, while also assumed as add-ons to humanitarian organizations try to “nationalize” efforts by host nation’s civilian authorities or its principles by negotiating with individual agencies which have the primary responsibility governments to come up with country level for providing humanitarian assistance. Natural guidelines. The norm of “last resort” however, is disasters and conflicts create different operational far from normative; many national governments environments for humanitarian assistance. As rely habitually on their armed forces as primary such, the US military further distinguishes between responders to large scale natural disasters humanitarian assistance as disaster response (Madiwale and Virk 2011, 1089). (HA/DR) from humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies defined as “internally, The military has traditionally played a crucial socially derived disasters that may be incited by role in disaster response and reconstruction some kind of violent political event.” (Thompson in many Southeast Asian countries. 2012, 3). In the latter, the latent or overt security Role-sharing and command and control between concerns underpin relief distribution. The notion civilian government agencies and military have of HA/DR as a military mission area has since been widely discussed in each country as a matter found great conceptual resonance among other of democratic control over the military. While military institutions. multi-sectorial and multi-national stakeholders, such as national/local governments, military, The years following the outpouring of international international organizations, private business assistance to large scale disasters like the 2004 sectors, religious groups, and local and Indian Ocean tsunami saw the mainstreaming of international NGOs, are engaged in disaster HA/DR as a key mission area for many overseas relief, civil-military relation is not yet fully military deployments. From the Pakistani floods institutionalized based on consensus of the in 2010, Haiti earthquake in 2012, and the recent military’s role and division of work in order to Typhoon Haiyan destruction in the Philippines, secure democratic governance over disaster more and more foreign militaries are being management. deployed as part of their government’s assistance package. In the Southeast Asian region, the HA/DR has also attained international import as erstwhile “traditional” military focused on internal many militaries have been deployed to affected security/ defense has responded with relatively

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flexible attitude towards the recently-emerging 4. engagements with civilian actors also involved regional activities on HA/ DR. The ASEAN in disaster response – elected authorities, Defense Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM UN agencies and NGOs – on the ground Plus are the arenas to discuss international and how these are informed by the presence cooperation on massive or large-scale disasters and functionality of the Oslo Guidelines and for which international assistance will be needed. country-level iterations that confine these In June 2013, the ADMM countries conducted engagements to the emergency phase with a joint HA/DR exercises in Brunei. The ASEAN limited timetable. Regional Forum (ARF) also started practical cooperation among 26 member courtiers and Belo (2006) and Sheller (2012) issue a reminder the European Union. It organized disaster relief that while foreign militaries bring much needed exercises in Indonesia in 2011 and in Thailand mobility assets and logistics expertise crucial in 2013. Pacific Partnership, which has been led to relief operations, their presence could not be by the U.S. since 2007, is another framework readily separated from the geopolitical strategic for conducting multi-nation medical exercise considerations at play. In the Haiti earthquake, and cultural exchange aimed at smoothening Sheller (2012, 187) argues that the militarization coordination among governments, military, of the relief operations logistics was connected international organizations and NGOs. Although to efforts at controlling migration and the border, multinational security cooperation is still a new ultimately conferring differential mobilities between concept in Asia Pacific, the East Asian countries victims who can go out versus the internally- are now trying to strengthen regional cooperation displaced population who cannot. The tsunami through HA/DR. operations was dovetailed with US interests in opening Indonesia for the war-on-terror efforts Notwithstanding, there remains outstanding in Asia and was regarded as a preview to later debates surrounding these deployments: amendments of Indonesian law resuming normal military exchanges with the US (Belo 2006, 282). 1. legitimacy of HA/DR role for the military given Concerned over how foreign military presence lingering concerns that shift in resources may affect the internal conflict (i.e. insurgents towards this task compromises the military’s may take advantage of foreigners to advance combat readiness (Farrell 2005, 6; Thomas political and military objectives), the Sri Lankan 2012, 3); government asked the US military to scale down 2. greater military (foreign)-to-military (host) its deployment in the island (Samaratunge et interface that provides both broader al. 2008, 694). Madiwale and Virk (2011) point operational experience but also sharpened out the gray area between “natural disasters” duality (separation from civilian stream) in and “complex emergencies” set out in the Oslo disaster response (Hall 2009, 29); and MCDA guidelines, such as in the case 3. the foreign military’s integration into the of the international response to the Pakistani affected country’s civilian mechanisms for 2010 floods that also affected conflict areas. In disaster response with due considerations for their analysis, civil-military engagements were respect of sovereignty and cultural sensitivity nuanced and context specific; that there remains to foreign presence (Hall 2008); and, differential understanding whether the crisis was

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seen as a disaster or complex emergency and and military streams of coordination, owing partly that local and international NGOs diverge on the to the division of tasks (search and rescue, relief) use of military assets as “last resort.” and areas of operations (ground zero, town proper). The military units provided logistical help For many militaries, HA/DR deployments in relief operations but were largely confined in ushered new structures and demands for greater search and rescue as well as in providing physical integration modalities. Civil-military operations security (with the police) for relief goods and center (CMOC) and joint command and control personnel/equipment at ground zero. The officers centers (CCC) are now standard features took policy direction from civilian authorities (the in this type of short-term and area-confined provincial governor) on deployment, activities, mission. CMOCs serve as liaison nodes with tasking, reporting procedure, and timetables. civilian actors while CCCs are used to plug into However, it is noted that the governor appointed the host nation’s military. Thompson (2012, all military officers to lead the various operations. 11) argues that the deployment of Task Force As one of the early examples of US forces Griffin for response to the Kashmir region flood participating in HA/DR mission in the Philippines, in 2005 portrayed the effectiveness of the unit’s the case illustrates remaining gaps in the disaster vertical nesting strategy which allowed the US response: troops to operate seamlessly under the mission directives from Pakistani authorities and with a 1. How foreign troops are to be plugged into conscious effort to take the back seat even with given the specific security ecologies of the their logistics expertise (they offered the army disaster area are not fully articulated; aviation tasking chain to the Pakistani leaders without taking credit). In his assessment, the 2. There is no standard rule on how local civilian US troops formed good relationship with the agents may access military assets, especially Pakistani authorities by accepting any tasks communications. given to them and earned good points with some civilian actors for the transparency in the way This paper is based on a research project which they ran their airlift operations. Hall and Cular’s analyzed how the globalization of disaster (2010) study on the patterns and dynamics of response norms, and the emerging international civil-military engagement in the St. Bernard, cooperation on disaster relief, has affected civil- Southern Leyte, Philippine mudslide response in military relations in the Philippines and Thailand 2006 reveal nuances of how the legal framework along three dimensions. and military mechanisms intersect on the ground. Among their findings, there is dense interface First is legal framework to support democratic between civilian and military actors with the local governance of disaster response including: Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) personnel acting as lynchpin. The • military’s role on disaster relief as a mandate; Philippine military dealt almost exclusively with • policies and practices that define the role the foreign troops, while the only civilian link for sharing between the military and government; the foreign military was the Red Cross. There and, were separate and largely independent civilian • guidelines, either developed by civilian

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authorities or by the military institution, that Globalizing Disaster Management and define military’s involvement and NGO- Royal Thai Armed Forces military cooperation in HA/DR Legal framework to support democratic Second is peacetime communication mechanism governance among government, military, and civil society organizations, including: As the 2007 Constitution of The Kingdom of Thailand tasks the military to protect • opportunity of joint evacuation drill, shared independence, sovereignty, national security, the emergency plan or emergency contact institution of monarchy, and “national interests network; and the democratic regime of government • opportunity for soldiers to participate in with the King as Head of the State and for the forums/ conferences organized by civilians development of the country,” there is a widespread such as business or international NGOs; and, consensus that national development and • opportunity for civilians to participate in disaster management are military principal roles.2 military’s training or joint exercises. In terms of mechanism, the prime minister’s order is necessary to mobilize the military in large- Third is the awareness of civilian Defense scale disasters. However, city mayors who are Ministries and military officers including: appointed by the Ministry of Interior can request commanders of each Region’s Army to deploy the • self-evaluation on the military’s role in troop for relief operation in case of disaster in a disaster relief; small area. • ideal/actual role-sharing between military and civilian; and, Disaster Management Act 2007 defines that the • perspective towards NGOs. Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) of the Ministry of Interior plays prior role The research was done both in the Philippines in disaster management. However, both Ministry and Thailand from June 2013 to December 2013.1 of Interior and Ministry of Defense admit that disaster relief has actually been led by military. The authors examined the relevant laws and Policy on disaster management is decided at the policies of the two countries and interviewed Disaster Relief Division, Office of Civil Affairs of military officers and NGO representatives. Ministry of Defense, while actual relief operation is

1 This research was supported by The Nippon Foundation’s Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Collaborative Grant “Comparative Analysis on Military-NGO Cooperation Policies in Asia.” The views of the author do not reflect those of the API Fellowships Program, The Nippon Foundation, the API International Selection Committee, the API Regional Coordinating Institution, and/or the Partner Institutions. 2 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, B.E. 2550 (2007), Section 77. “The State shall protect and uphold the institution of monarchy, independence, sovereignty and integrity of the territorial jurisdiction of the State and shall provide such armed forces, military weapons and technology as are modern, necessary and sufficient for protecting and upholding the independence, sovereignty, national security, the institution of monarchy, national interests and the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State and for the development of the country.”

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led by Disaster Relief Center of Thai Royal Army. adopted the ASEAN Defense Establishments and Exercises and training are managed by Joint and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Cooperation Combined Exercise Planning Office, Royal Thai on Non-traditional Security Concept Paper4 Armed Forces Headquarters. Disaster Relief he says. He also stresses the hope that the Center has regional offices which correspond to guidelines, as a Thailand model, will contribute to four (4) Army Region command offices, which future disaster cooperation within the ADMM and coordinate with DPMM regional offices in each ADMM Plus framework.5 One of the facilitators of province. the said workshop, Group Captain “W” of Air Force Civil Affairs Office, also states that the momentum In 2013, the Ministry of Defense drafted of civil-military dialogue has emerged in the Thai “Guidelines of Civil-Military Coordination in military after ASEAN agreed on the Asia-Pacific Disaster Response,” which is expected to be Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military finalized by 2015. In November 2013, it organized Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations a 3-day international workshop on the guidelines in 2009 and started drafting Standard Operating in Pattaya, inviting DDPM, Ministry of Foreign Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements Affairs, Ministry of Public Health, Diplomatic and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Corps, Center for Excellence in Disaster Emergency Response Operations (SASOP). He Management and Humanitarian Assistance of admits that the experience of the 2011 flood was U.S. Pacific Command, and NGOs such as the also an opportunity to strengthen civil-military Thai Red Cross. cooperation.6

Colonel “B,” who is in charge of drafting says Peacetime communication mechanism that the Ministry expects the guideline to “clarify organizational structure of government agency, In the closing ceremony of the workshop, Colonel military, and NGOs so that everyone can easily “B” said to participants, “it is important that find its counterpart to smoothen interagency military and civilian talk to each other in the same coordination,” and “make rules and regulations language. We need to minimize the gap among on how military provides its assets upon NGOs’ us.” 7 In the provinces, the Thai Army’s Disaster requests.” He says that those are high priority Relief Center held joint exercise coordinating with during 2011 flood in Thailand.3 On the other DDPM regional offices. Local evacuation drills hand, drafting the guidelines has been one of the are done separately and independently by each important agenda of the Ministry even before the village chief. However, the military has tried to 2001 flood . This has been a priority since February organize the sharing of emergency contacts and 2009, when Thailand hosted ADMM Plus, which evacuation plans.

3 Interview conducted on November 5, 2013 at Ministry of Defense. 4 http://www.adpc.net/cso/Downloads/CD/Documents/2ADOPTED%20Concept_Paper_ASEAN_Defence_Establishments_and_CSO. pdf. 5 Interview conducted on November 5, 2013 at Ministry of Defense. 6 Interview conducted on November 13, 2013, during International Workshop on the Guideline for Civil-military Coordination in Disaster Response, in Pattaya. 7 November 13-15 2013, Pattaya. The author attended it as an Adviser of Embassy of Japan in Thailand.

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The Thai military has been positively encouraging unit, not a main service provider. However, it NGOs to participate in these joint exercises. Cobra is usual practice for the military to be the first Gold, the largest Asia-Pacific Military exercise responder on the disaster scene. Therefore it held in Thailand every year, includes medical is necessary that guidelines defining roles and exercises or non-combatant evacuation operation norms are crafted, recognizing and accepting (NEO) which involves local villagers and civilians. actual practice and action. “Civilian organizations In May 2013, the 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum are not at all competitors to the military,”8 he Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx) hosted by says. Group Captain “W” of the Air Forces insists Thailand and South Korea invited international that the purpose of making the guidelines is to organizations. The Thai military is now planning share the military’s tools for needs-assessment to host the ASEAN Disaster Exercise (AHEx) with civilians so that DDPM and NGOs can also with Malaysia in April and May 2014, inviting local follow the military’s good practice.9 All military governments, volunteer organizations and local informants were quite confident in the military’s and international NGOs. comparative advantage over NGOs. Colonel “J” recalls his relief operation for 2011 flood victims in Meanwhile, the military’s approach to the NGOs the Army’s Disaster Relief Center. “As water came is not a new trend. Colonel “J,” who served in the little by little, politicians in the affected area used Army’s Disaster Relief Center in the 2001 flood, to ask military to save his/her own constituents. points out that the Thai military has been always I received phone calls from them every day and “ready” to closely work with ordinary citizens commanders always must consider such ethical and NGOs because the Army’s Staff College problems. NGOs are even worse in coordination. provides special education on civil affairs. The military always try to eliminate political bias He says that staff officers over lieutenant and cooperate with local government.”10 colonel have the opportunity to learn communication skills with civilian classmates Colonel “A” of the same Center also criticized who have different ideas and mindsets. Other NGOs, saying “NGOs never approach the soldiers also mentioned that civil-military military, they are overconfident in their ability cooperation is already embedded in Thai and assets although Thai NGOs are small-scale military’s training program as civil assistance, and less effective. Civilian organizations cannot including rural development which is one of the start action immediately because it takes too principal mandates of military. much time for administrative arrangements. For ordinary people, military is the one who comes Awareness of Defense Ministries and military first and serves first.”11

No informant said that military’s role in HA/DR On the other hand, it is remarkable that some must be scaled down. Colonel “B” of Ministry of soldiers find the “new identity” of the military in Defense said, ideally, military should be a support disaster relief. Scholars also point out that the

8 Interview conducted on November 5, 2013 at Ministry of Defense. 9 November 13-15 2013, Pattaya. The author attended it as an Adviser of Embassy of Japan in Thailand. 10 Interview conducted on November 4, 2013 at Channel 5 (military’s channel). 11 Interview conducted on November 5, 2013 at Army Headquarters.

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military recovered its public support by helping assumed since the 1970s (Hall 2004). Under flood victims, perhaps changing the bad image Presidential Order 1566 (1978), the military is of 2006 Coup and 2010 Red-shirts crackdown. one of the many agencies tasked for disaster Colonel “S” of Civil Affairs Office of the 3rd Region response, which in turn is coordinated by a civilian Army said military’s involvement in disaster National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) relief is not a psychological operation, unlike with the Office of Civil Defense as administrative development aid or defense medicine. For him, hub. The Philippine’s tiered disaster response “It is the soldiers’ duty to help people. However, it system (there are disaster coordinating councils at is true that disaster relief benefits us if the image the regional, provincial, municipal, and barangay of ‘military for people’ is rooted in people’s mind or village level) locates the primary responsibility and it helps our other operations.”12 to local government units and the civilian local government executive (governor, mayor, barangay captain) to spearhead coordination, The Philippine Military: allowing further for a “scaling up” where the Disaster Response Veteran affected areas extend beyond administrative boundaries. A later shift to a cluster-based system Legal Mandates and the Philippine Military’s placed the military under the tasks of search and HA/DR Role rescue, transportation and communication. In line with the Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Following the democratic transition in 1986, the Plan (1988), the military formed reaction teams Constitution has been amended to confine the for natural disasters in each military unit (Quilop military to non-political roles. Prohibition against 2009, 119). Disaster response task groups in the government appointment of active duty military installations (both regular and reservists) personnel and political partisanship were provided and disaster response coordinating centers in the Constitution. In turn, the Philippine military are collocated with the civilian-led DCCs. Each was reorganized, removing the constabulary disaster response task group is required to under its control, placing the entire administration provide communication linkages, assist the local under the supervision of the civilian Ministry of police; assist in reconstruction, and provide Defense and instituting greater administrative transportation of relief goods and personnel. The oversight (by the Congress and Commission military is also tasked to ensure peace and order in on Audit) over its budget and procurements. support of the police and provide force protection Further inroads on human rights accountability where disaster happens in a conflict zone (Quilop were made by placing the jurisdiction for cases 2009, 127). The Philippine military also has a involving human rights violations by soldiers to standing HA/DR mechanism for integration of civilian courts and by putting restrictions on the deployed US forces in a disaster area, there is hiring of paramilitary personnel. a provision for a Combined Coordination Center (brigade level and up) for both forces. In such Disaster response was formalized as one of the a case, the military serves as a focal point for Philippine military’s seven mission areas, thus coordination between the US forces and civilian institutionalizing a role which it has historically agencies.

12 Interview conducted on October 17, 2013 at the 3rd Army Region Headquarters, Pitsanulok.

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In 2010, a new legal framework for disaster the military has been assigned to the (Republic Act 10121) came into force, which shifts logistics and telecommunications clusters. This the focus from disaster response to risk reduction assignment considerably narrows down what and management. The new framework locates the military may be deployed for and limits responsibility for these tasks to local government its coordinative relationships to organizations that units, with help from other agencies including the deal with food and health. military. More emphasis and fiscal investments are given to community-based early warning The new Philippine disaster law firmly assigns the system, geo-hazard and vulnerability mapping, task of coordinating government agency efforts risk assessment & contingency planning, to civilian authorities at applicable tiers: local maintaining a database of disaster volunteers chief executives for municipalities and provinces and education and awareness-raising. Unlike while the National Disaster Risk Reduction the previous framework which was government- and Management Council is chaired by the centric, the new law recognizes the participation Office of Civil Defense Chief (a Presidential of civil society, private sector, and volunteers in appointee). The law requires for an Incident these tasks. It also follows international norms and Command Post within the affected area to standards for humanitarian assistance/disaster be established for information sharing and response including cluster-based coordination coordination to transpire. The military is a among actors (e.g. logistics, telecom, evacuation member of local and national DRRM councils, center management, relief distribution). The law as are the local police. While the law does not authorizes the President to declare need for explicitly mention the military as first responder, international assistance and provides explicit it is the standard practice of many local chief mechanisms for international humanitarian executives to call on the military for assistance. assistance. This linkage is not unusual, as there are other existing institutional mechanisms This law has important implications to the military (e.g. Peace and Order Councils) where the responding to disaster. According to Colonel local civilian authorities and the armed forces work “P”, a multi-year military liaison officer at the together. Moreover, given the advance alert and OCD, the new framework entails that the military early warning systems for typhoons especially, must invest in capital outlay for risk reduction.13 much can be done as “preparation” including To finance this, a Quick Response Fund under evacuation and forward deployment bases the Department of National Defense (DND) or for relief stockpiles and personnel, for which pooled funds under the line-item budget of each military logistics could be utilized. military unit are set aside specifically for these tasks. It also means more robust organization of This new mandate for disaster response also reserves and engineering units (for rehabilitation/ transpired within the military’s new Internal Peace reconstruction) as opposed to reliance on regular and Security Plan (IPSP) dubbed “Bayanihan.” forces, which in the past have been tapped more Bayanihan anchors the armed forces’ activities in for this mission area. In terms of coordination, support of the government’s peace efforts. With

13 Interview conducted on September 21, 2013 at Iloilo City.

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more emphasis on non-kinetic means, Bayanihan locations makes for an interesting study on how makes it imperative for the military to engage military-civil society engagements transpired civilians (local authorities, agencies, NGOs and during the emergency phase. peoples organizations) in all its mission areas. Premised upon “whole-of-government” effort, the A national alert was issued for Typhoon Pablo military is seen as not taking the lead, but rather three (3) days before its landfall, thus not requiring providing support to civilian efforts. The premise individual declarations of state of calamity by local behind this “support role” is because the military councils in affected areas. Mindanao, already can’t solve conflict or bring about peace on its has a standing framework for international own. NGOs specially are engaged as partners, humanitarian assistance (Humanitarian Action since they have the resources and capabilities that Plan in Mindanao) in place since 2008. This can benefit communities. In disaster response, means that international humanitarian actors this translates to deference to local government already have prior structures with which to executives (Mayor and Governor) and DSWD coordinate their actions on the ground. For personnel for operations falling within the military Typhoon Bhopa, a UN Humanitarian Action Team unit’s area. (formerly interagency standing committee) was created involving 15 major UN and international Meaning versus Doing: Civilian-Military agencies (e.g. Christian Aid, Oxfam). A direct link Engagements during Disaster Response was made between this team and the NDRRMC Operations to Typhoon Pablo in Manila, allowing for a quick processing of paperwork needed for foreign goods and The following section describes how the personnel to come in.14 A one-stop shop center Philippine military’s new HA/DR role and the was created at the Davao International Airport for Bayanihan framework intersect and mapped customs, immigration, and quarantine matters to out on the ground using Typhoon Pablo be settled. Assistance from ASEAN also came relief operations as template. Typhoon Pablo quickly with several C130 load of stockpiles from (international name Bhopa), which struck the the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center provinces of Davao Oriental and Compostela stockpile in Jakarta, a bilateral assistance from Valley (Mindanao) in December 2012, was the Malaysia. That said, the international actors all first large scale disaster to which these new understood and respected the norms surrounding frameworks were applied. The response featured relief assistance, which puts the Department of a strong international element with contributions Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as from UN agencies and ASEAN countries. The lead. The DSWD template for family access card typhoon’s ground zero (the municipalities of New as basis for distribution and documentation was Bataan, Cateel and Baginga) also happened to followed. be an active communist conflict zone, with two army battalions from the 4th Infantry Division On the ground, there were two parallel (4ID) in place for internal security operations. The mobilizations following the landfall in Davao confluence of disaster and armed conflict in these Oriental and Compostela Valley. On the military

14 These insights were shared by Colonel “P”, who was directly involved in the operations. Interview conducted on September 21, 2013 at Iloilo City.

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side, a unified command (army, navy, air force) interesting dynamics. On the whole, the military was created at the 4ID level.15 A Joint Peace officers interviewed were aware of the principle and Security Coordinative Center was also set of civilian supremacy in emergency situations up with the Philippine National Police. Having not and deferred to DSWD personnel on relief received communication from the 66th and 67th matters. Colonel “G” was the officer-in-charge Infantry Battalions (on ground zero), a decision behind Hub 1; when queried why a different hub was made to send one company each from the from that of DSWD was created, his response unaffected 84IB and 39IB to Davao Oriental and was that DSWD region has limited space and Compostela Valley, respectively, as advance could not accommodate voluminous third party party on Day 1 following the landfall. Said troops assistance.16 The DSWD personnel were also were only able to reach ground zero on Day 2 deployed in the Panacan Hub (1) but they were by foot and immediately went on search, rescue generally seen by the NGO representatives and retrieval operations. On Day 3 additional interviewed as less reliable and efficient than troops were sent out to clear the roads from their military counterpart in organizing the relief Davao City and also from Caraga, Agusan del operations.17 More third party assistance and Sur. Only on Day 3 has communication been volunteers were recorded going to Hub 1 than firmly established with DSWD for relief delivery Hub 2 prior to December 16. by land to Compostela Valley. In Davao Oriental, relief operations was easier as Philippine Navy To analyze civilian-military engagements, this and other ships could make deliveries by sea. paper offers viewpoints derived from interviews of 66IB (whose area of operations included Within Davao City, two hubs came into being: Campostela Valley) and 67IB (headquartered at Hub 1 at Panacan near the 4ID Headquarters Baganga, Davao Oriental) commanders at the organized by the military’s Civil Relation Service ground level. Because the affected areas are also (CRS, brigade level) unit using the neighboring communist conflict areas, very few NGOs had DPWH warehouses for relief stockpiling, sorting presence in the communities prior to Typhoon and deployment, and Hub 2 at the DSWD Regional Pablo. Given the known security concerns, many Office. Hub 1 only operated for a limited period; NGOs also feared going there directly. The local from December 16, 2013 onwards, management governments of New Bataan, Campostela Valley was turned over to DSWD and to other military and Baginga, Davao Oriental, which had been officers at the Division level. The hubs were designated as Incident Command Posts also had centers for relief drop-offs and for volunteers. All differential capacities in handling the response NGOs interviewed who participated in the relief operations. In New Bataan, 66IB commander efforts were cognizant of the two hubs and their Colonel “F” initially acted as Incident Commander

15 The succeeding discussions came from the interview of General “B” conducted on October 7, 2013 at Camp Panacan, Davao City. 16 Telephone interview conducted on October 3, 2013. 17 This view came from Ms. “F”, Dr. “Y” and Ms. “A” who represented local NGOs. Interviews conducted on October 5, 2013 and October 7, 2013, respectively, in Davao City.

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because the mayor was himself a survivor and In relief deliveries, this means the NGOs come to couldn’t immediately attend to his duties.18 the local army unit to report where they are going The post was quickly turned over to the mayor (often); ask for transportation assistance (few); or after a few days. Unlike in New Bataan where request for security escort (rare). The NGOs in the mayor was on top of the situation, the local most cases already had parish and civil society government leaders of Baginga disagreed with contacts they want to deliver the goods to. The each other, leading 67IB commander Colonel local military unit did little to persuade them to “M” to be appointed by the Governor as Incident change the destination of relief operations. In Commander until May 2013. In his capacity as fact, all local commanders strongly suggested Incident Commander, Colonel “M” had numerous for NGOs to coordinate with the LGU to avoid engagements with NGOs who came through duplication of efforts. Given Colonel “M’s” unique his office for coordination of relief deliveries. position as Incident Commander, he was able to He also directed civilians (teachers and health direct NGOs coming for the first time to deliver personnel).19 relief goods in the upland areas with the military. If NGOs returned for more deliveries, they usually At New Bataan, the 66IB spearheaded the go on their own sans the military. search and retrieval operations which lasted for almost a month and involved a large number of For rehabilitation activities, NGO-military personnel (apart from military augmentation from engagements differed depending on activities the 10th Infantry Division, they also had numerous initiated solely by the NGO or by the battalion. volunteers from Davao, MMDA and foreigners). For the 66IB, the NGOs typically coordinate Colonel “F” was able to focus his unit’s work on to ensure that no pending military operations search and retrieval as the task of taking care are happening in or around the area where of VIP visitors was carried out by the Brigade they wish to go (something which the military Commander. For deliveries (mostly directed to is reluctant to disclose for concerns of leakage the LGU), the 66IB partnered with parishes by to the insurgents).20 The ICRC which provided using military vehicles for relief transport. cash-for-work in the affected barangays of Padsabanga, Manurigao, and Cagan is an There were two types of NGO-military example of such coordination linkage. Colonel “F” engagements that transpired. Coordination or observed that while relief operations were carried informing the military about NGO activities in out in an ad hoc fashion, more careful planning the area comprise the bulk of the engagements. and deliberation were made with rehabilitation The standard practice was for the NGOs with activities by the municipal government. The projects at hand to report to the military about it, Kiwanis, by contrast, which had a school-based as these have security implications in the area. feeding and water supply project, asked and

18 Interview conducted on October 10, 2013 at Davao City. 19 Interview conducted on October 7, 2013 at Davao City. 20 Interview conducted on October 7, 2013 at Camp Panacan, Davao City.

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were provided with manpower, security and person and lynchpin for engagements with other transportation assistance by the military. Other government agencies. For all commanders projects with this type of engagement include interviewed, they emphasize that the LGU is those funded by TV5, a retired military personnel their first priority for civilian engagement; second, group and an OFW family circle. For the 67IB, other government agencies and NGOs last. The local commander Colonel “M” opined that NGOs officers likewise distinguish between NGOs which that came to their area typically: are “outside of the community” organizations and people’s organizations that are community- 1. have narrow, confined goals that do not based, says 66IB commander Colonel “L” whose correspond to actual needs on the ground; AOR also includes Lumad (indigenous) areas, 2. have no prior on-the-ground needs and have a distinct mandate of engaging Lumad assessment and have limited timelines for communities.22 But for Colonel “M” no distinction engagement; exists between the types as both bring in 3. come in with their pre-selected target sites resources on the ground. While the commanders and project templates.21 expressed openness (to accept any NGO help), it was nevertheless the practice to be selective In his experience, the NGOs initially relied on when it comes to NGOs they wish to partner with military assessment data but later came up for military-conceptualized undertaking. Residual with their own. He lists the International Labor concerns about the “leftist” connections of some Organization (ILO), World Health Organization NGOs require vetting or screening of groups who (WHO), Merlin, UNICEF, and UNDP as having want to come into their area. However, they were undertaken rehabilitation projects in their area also careful not to be accused of “red baiting.” covering health, shelter construction, agriculture, Colonel “L” says that his unit’s strategy when an and livelihood and rehabilitation of public NGO of suspicious credentials indicate that they infrastructure. want to do a medical mission, they usually put together a counterpart mission themselves and Battalion-initiated engagements with NGOs schedule it ahead (“inuunahan”) of the NGO.23 are understood as part and parcel of the unit’s Yet even in military-initiated medical missions, overall Bayanihan mandate. The requirement for for instance, the commanders are careful not “multi stakeholder engagement” under Bayanihan to mix such with armed operations. Colonel “L” encompasses all mission areas, including related that in one instance, their intel revealed disaster response and puts premium on the that communist rebels were initially in the vicinity officers’ negotiating and social skills. Structurally, where the unit was holding a medical mission; he every military unit has a designated civil-military opted not to pursue said rebels because that was operations (CMO) officer who serves as point NOT the unit’s mission for that day.24

21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.

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Two cases of post-Pablo responses illustrate the civilian authorities; nor were there local DRRC how the military puts Bayanihan to practice for assets or manpower to tap given the widespread self-initiated projects. Colonel “G”, then key destruction. What is notable is that the military Civil Relations Service officer for the Brigade, self-organized the search-and-rescue operations organized a fund-raising concert featuring local themselves; and even took the initiative to create a and national musicians. The concert was his relief operations hub in Davao City. Only by Day 3, first engagement with NGOs, although he had after the military has established communication considerable experience putting together youth and mobility, have the civilian agencies made camps and had been previously posted in Aceh it to ground zero. The time frame points to where he had a chance to observe NGO work the civilians actors relatively conceding to the close at hand. In the interviews, he lamented military’s lead (where to go; how to get there) in about how NGOs have serious time commitments; the first few days following the disaster. However, are personnel deficient (relies only on volunteers, in succeeding days, when more information is no permanent staff) so that many were unable available and prior relief delivery run has been to deliver on the tasks consistently until the made, NGOs gain confidence and become more completion of the project.25 While the project independent. To many local NGOs, working with ended up earning little money, he considers it the military appeared to be a non-issue. The a relative success for its advocacy component. military also displayed little concern for physical/ Second, the military carried out its own Task Force kinetic security of relief distribution; they offered Tambayayaw in which 40-50 teams of engineering to escort or provide transportation assistance to units were deployed for shelter construction/ NGOs delivering relief goods but did not insist repair from a one million peso donation by NGOs on it nor did they make strong efforts to channel matched by the Department of National Defense relief distribution in certain villages. NGO-military (DND). The limited proceeds from the concert coordination where they transpired was limited also went to Task Force Tambayayaw. to reporting; NGO requests for military logistics and security assistance were few or rare. Even HA/DR Convergences and Divergences in rehabilitation, the military has taken a back seat; NGOs with projects only coordinate with the The nature of civil-military engagements in the local unit for information purposes (making sure context of Typhoon Pablo disaster response did the project staff will not be adversely affected not vary much from the observations made by Hall by planned military kinetic operations). Similar and Cular (2010) that the military are the de facto to relief operations, NGOs come to the area primary responders, and that civilian agents and prepared with their own templates for project communities are accepting of the military’s key goals, planning, and implementation. The local role in the crucial emergency phase. There was military unit suggests that it would be better for no test for “last resort” (were there other civilian NGOs to coordinate with the local government alternatives to military assets and personnel?) by than with them. Even with limited resources, the

25 Telephone interview conducted on October 3, 2013.

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military also tries to conduct its own rehabilitation countries and also facilitated the entry of foreign initiatives by actively seeking partnership with medical personnel and other foreign emergency NGOs, although they tend to be selective and responders. This set up is a marked improvement more inclined towards charitable outfits with from the CCC that limits engagements between whom the commander has personal connections. military-to-military. However, as the research did The fund-raising concert to support Task Force not cover interviews of international humanitarian Tambayayaw was one such initiative, although agencies, no arguments can be made regarding the military officer in-charge of the event admitted issues that have arisen from relief distribution that it made more inroads in improving the involving these actors. military’s profile among Davao-based NGOs. Synthesis The engagements between local military units and local elected authorities are fundamentally The prevailing norms and practices in HA/DR different. It was clear that military officers and operations in regional and international settings local civilian authorities alike have a shared do not necessarily influence the Thai military, understanding of civilian supremacy in keeping which has a long experience of undertaking with the country’s disaster response guidelines-- civil assistance as a physiological operation and the local chief executive is in charge and the intelligence, and also mobilized for disaster relief military takes direct order from him/her. The three operations if necessary. Perhaps on account of battalion commanders interviewed conceded just experiencing more large scale disasters control immediately to the mayors/governors than any other country in the region (and with of the affected towns (mindful that in the first the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Mindanao due few days, the mayor/s also being a survivor to the Moro conflict) the Philippine military, by may be initially psychologically immobilized). contrast, has far more experience under its belt Colonel “M’s” position as Incident Commander working with international humanitarian actors. was an exception, but it was an appointment These encounters have made the Philippine made by the governor on account of the political military more attuned to international norms (e.g. squabbles between the local elected authorities. protocols for receiving international aid; use of It was also interesting that the commanders are military assets for relief operations), yet when it generally differential to mayors and the local comes to local civilian actors, its engagements are government when it comes to relief distribution more nuanced. The Philippine military historically and rehabilitation plans. performed disaster response role, separate and distinct from internal security operations. Given On the whole, the military exhibits openness to the likely confluence between disasters and working with international humanitarian agencies conflict, the Philippine military surprisingly is not as was evident in its involvement in the crafting of all too kinetic security conscious when it comes guidelines for humanitarian action in Mindanao. to relief operations, nor are NGOs necessarily The establishment of a one-stop shop at the reliant on military assets or assessments for relief staging area (Davao City airport) made for the deliveries. easy entry of relief deliveries from ASEAN

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The globalization of disaster management consideration of gaining public support. There cooperation framework has helped Thai civil- remains a serious gap between the Thai military military relations to be more democratic. The rhetoric of respecting civilian control and on- drafting of guidelines or the inclusion of NGOs the-ground reality. More inquiry is needed as to military joint and combined exercise are to whether recent “encounters” of military and relatively new activities. As Colonel “B” of Ministry multi-spectral civilian actors in table top exercises of Defense says, the ASEAN’s momentum about disaster relief has really changed the encouraged the Thai military to lead, making military or civil-military relations. Still, peacetime such a good example in institutionalizing civil- communication and joint activities among military cooperation mechanism. A Thai political civilian and military, particularly in transnational scientist also remarked that Thailand could start setting, can provide good opportunities for both thinking “civil defense” from a different angle of military and NGOs to know different cultures and “civil-military cooperation” thanks to multinational organizational restrictions. One example is the dialogue among ASEAN countries. Japanese Ministry of Defense-organized Tokyo Defense Forum. In 2013, the forum focused on HA/ In the Philippines, a civil defense framework is DR coordination. Japan’s Ground Self Defense already in place since the 1970s, clearly putting Forces have likewise been inviting counterparts civilians on the driver seat when it comes to from the region since 2006 to the Multinational decisions on disaster response. The military’s Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP). role is confined to search and rescue and relief A SDF officer who was sent to Leyte in response operations, mainly as support or assistance to local to Typhoon Hayan recalls that he could achieve civilian efforts tasked under the framework. There good coordination with AFP and foreign military is a convergence between what the framework in Camp Aguinaldo as he was trained to do so stipulates and actual practice: as indicated in Hall in table top exercise in MCAP. Moreover, he met (2009) and in this research project’s examination several MCAP participants in the Philippines.26 of the Typhoon Pablo response, the military defers to and takes directions from local civilian The Philippine military, being a veteran in HA/ authorities, even to the DSWD when it comes DR role, is continuously learning and developing to relief operations (for which the military offers denser networks with civil society groups, indirect assistance). including NGOs. Under Bayanihan, the imperative for multi-sector engagement in disaster response, For the Thai military, civil-military cooperation in whilst limited to its cluster-based assigned role HA/DR remains conceptual or at the dialogue of food and health, nevertheless is enabling level; and is a conversation initiated by the soldiers and civilians to get to know each other military. As revealed in the interviews, the military more from across the ideological (communist has incentive to work with civilian organizations insurgency) divide. The ASEAN framework and not because of pure sincerity but for pragmatic various opportunities for joint exercises with

26 Newspaper ASAGUMO, January 2, 2014.

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other militaries in the region are also providing is the Philippine military’s asset-poor condition fertile grounds for military-to-military interface, (air and landing vehicles) for disaster response, from which it is hoped more global norms on which makes the country ever more dependent conducting humanitarian activities will filter. on external logistics assistance for large-scale There is little danger of undermining Philippine disasters. For this reason, coordination and civilian control in this task, as Philippine soldiers linkages with international humanitarian agencies generally accept local government leadership and foreign militaries are crucial. in this disaster response. What is more critical

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, AFP

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Belo, Walden. “The rise of relief and reconstruction complex.” in Emergency Relief, edited by Rosalie Arcala Hall. (Quezon Journal of International Affairs 59, 2 (2006): 281-296. City: Central Book Supply, 2009).

Dimitrova, Sevdalina, and Nichev, Nikolay. “Analysis of Hall, Rosalie, and Anita Cular. “Civil-military relations in Modern Humanitarian Operations Concepts and Parcticipation disaster rescue and relief operations: Response to the of Military Units.” Military Art and Science 4, 64 (2011): 348- mudslide in southern Leyte, Philippines.” Scientia Militaria: 355. South African Journal of Military Studies 38,2 (2010): 62-88.

Farrell, Lawrence Jr. “Military not the only solution to gaps in Madiwale, Ajay and Kudrat Virk. “Civil–military relations in disaster response.” National Defense (2005). natural disasters: a case study of the 2010 Pakistan floods.” International Review of the Red Cross 93,884 (2011): 1085- Hall, Rosalie. “Exploring New Roles of the Philippine Military: 1106. Implications to Civilian Supremacy.” Philippine Political Science Journal 25, 48 (2004): 107-130. Quilop, Raymond. “Responding to Disasters: Framework, Challenges and Prospects for the Philippines.” In Civil-Military Hall, Rosalie. “Civil-military cooperation in international Cooperation in Emergency Relief, edited by Rosalie Arcala disaster response: the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Hall. (Quezon City: Central Book Supply, 2009). deployment in Aceh, Indonesia.” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 20, 4 (2008): 383-400. Samaratunge, ramanie, Ken Coghill and HMA Herath. “Tsunami engulfs Sri Lankan governance.” International Hall, Rosalie. “Disaster in a Conflict Area: The Indonesian Review of Administrative Sciences 74 (2008): 677-702. Military’s Role in the 2004 Tsunami Response in Aceh Province.” In Civil-Military Cooperation in Emergency Relief, Sheller, Mimi. “The islanding effect: post-disaster mobility edited by systems and humanitarian logistics in Haiti.” Cultural Rosalie Arcala Hall. (Quezon City: Central Book Supply, Geographies 20, 2 (2012): 185-204. 2009). Thompson, Wiley. Success in Kashmir: a positive trend in Hall, Rosalie. “Civil-Military Cooperation in International civil–military integration during humanitarian assistance Disaster Response: the Japan Self Defense Forces’ (JSDF) operations. Disaster 34, 1 (2010): 1-15 Deployment in Aceh, Indonesia.” In Civil-Military Cooperation

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JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippineS

Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D. Kathline Anne S Tolosa Atty Noel del Prado Melanie Rodulfo-Veril Francis Domingo Carla Isabel M Ravanes Joseph Raymond Franco Iren C Gumpal COL ISIDRO L PURISIMA (GSC) PA CAPT ROY VINCENT T TRINIDAD (GSC) PN COL AMADOR T TABUGA JR (GSC) PA LTC ISMAEL P MANDANAS JR PA LTC CHARLEMAGNE F BATAYOLA JR INF PA MAJ JO-AR HERRERA PA

All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2014

ISBN 978-971-550-691-5

JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP 175

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D. JENNIFERJ SANTIAGO ORETA holds a PhD in Political Science. Her research interests include security sector reform and development, peace and security, arms and gun-violence, gender and social movements. Dr. Oreta is Asst. Professor on Political Science at the Ateneo de Manila University. She has been appointed as Assistant Secretary to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) last February 2013. She is in-charge of the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) program, as well as the Knowledge Management and Resource Center of the institution. She is also the focal person in mainstreaming the cross-cutting issues of gender, children, indigenous communities, human rights, and security sector reform, and ensuring there is consistency in policy as regards these issues.

Kathline Anne Sigua Tolosa KATHLINE ANNE S TOLOSA is Co-Convenor of the Working GroupK on Security Sector Reform. As the head of the National Secretariat, she convenes the Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations performing oversight on the Philippine military, creating dialogue spaces, and building a constituency for peace and security issues. She has co-authored Pagpati’ut: Mediating Violence in Sulu, published by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Revisiting the Policy Environment on Peace and Security, published by the Australian Aid-The Asia Foundation partnership in the Philippines. She has served in various capacities at the Department of National Defense, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Department of Transportation and Communications, and the Office for Transportation Security.

Atty. Noel del Prado NNOEL ROMERO DEL PRADO graduated from the Ateneo de Manila University with a degree in AB Philosophy in 1992, and the Ateneo de Manila University College of Law in 1997. He teaches Filipino Literature at the Ateneo de Manila University. He is a Board Member of the Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) and the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). He worked as the Legal Service Director of the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and as a Legal Consultant in the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Department of Education (DepEd), UNICEF and USAID. He served as the Chief of Staff in the Senatorial Campaign of Hon. Grace Poe. He is also a volunteer lawyer for Bantay Bata 163, the Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC), and the National Council on Disability Affairs.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 177 Melanie Rodulfo-Veril MELANIE ROSE RODULFO-VERIL is a graduate student from theM University of the Philippines majoring in Asian Studies. Her area of research is in comparative Southeast Asian politics and is particularly interested on issues on Philippine security relations, disaster management, and disaster diplomacy. As a professional, she has been involved in several foreign-funded peace and development programs, including those implemented in conflict and post conflict affected areas in the Philippines. She currently works for the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program of the Department of Social Welfare and Development as a Planning Officer.

Captain Roy Vincent T. Trinidad (GSC) PN CAPTR ROY VINCENT TRINIDAD PN (GSC) is currently the Chief of the Territorial Defense Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3. Prior to his serving as the Chief TDD, he is the Assistant Division Chief of the Manpower and Organization Division, and at the same time the Chief of the Administrative Division of OJ3. He has been working with OJ3 for three (3) years.

Colonel Amador T. Tabuga Jr. (GSC) PA COL AMADOR T TABUGA, JR. graduated fromA the Philippine Military Academy in 1986. He is the Chief of Unified Command Staff of Western Mindanao Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines which covers the whole of ARMM region, Zamboanga Peninsula and the two Lanao provinces. Prior to this, he was the Assistant Chief of the AFP Doctrine Development Center and was the Team Leader of the Poject Management Team (PMT) in the revision of the AFP Basic Doctrine and Joint Doctrine manuals which were approved for publication by the CSAFP.

178 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Colonel Isidro L. Purisima (GSC) PA COLONEL ISIDRO LA MADRID PURISIMA is currentlyI the Chief of Staff of 3rd Infantry (Spearhead) Division, Philippine Army based in Panay Island, Western Visayas. His recent assignments include Chief, Research and Doctrine Division and Executive Officer of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, AFP. He is a member of PMA ‘Sandiwa” Class of 1985. He finished his Diploma in Strategic and Defence Studies in University of Malaya in Malaysia and is a graduate of Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies at the National Defense University, USA.

Iren C. Gumpal IRENI CACHOPERO GUMPAL is a Research Analyst of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, GHQ, Armed Forces of the Philippines. She took her Master of Professional Studies in Development Communication at the University of the Philippines Open University, and her BS in Development Communication at the University of the Philippines Los Baños. She is currently under the Research and Doctrine Division of OJ3.

FFrancis Domingo FRANCIS DOMINGO is an Assistant Professor at the International Studies Department of De La Salle University and concurrently a postgraduate research student at the Department of Politics and International Relations of University of Reading. Before joining academia, he was a military analyst with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Associate Managing Director of RVD Business Intelligence Consultancy, a pioneering competitive/business intelligence consultancy firm based in Makati City for several years. He completed a BA in Political Science from De La Salle University in 2004 and an MA in Intelligence and Security Studies from Brunel University in 2009.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 179 Maribel Daño-Luna MMARIBEL DAÑO-LUNA is a researcher for peace and security from the Working Group on Security Sector Reform. She serves as the coordinator of Bantay Bayanihan, a nationwide network of CSOs that acts as oversight for the implementation of the AFP’s IPSP Bayanihan on the operational and policy level. Her first-hand experience in promoting civilian and democratic control of the armed forces stems from her background both from the civil society and the military. She began her career as a researcher for Task Force Mapalad, an NGO helping farmers in Mindanao and Negros. After her transitory residence in Mindanao, she proceeded to work as a researcher/analyst for the Armed Forces of the Philippines where she took on research positions in the Philippine Navy and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (OJ3). She studied BA Communication Research in the University of the Philippines Diliman.

Carla Isabel M. Ravanes CARLA ISABEL M. RAVANES is a graduate of Bachelor of Science Cin Psychology from the University of the Philippines Diliman. She has previously worked for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, OJ3 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines under the said office’s Research and Doctrine Division. Currently, she is a part of the Policy Unit of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) which aims to mainstream the different cross-cutting concerns on gender, children, human rights and international humanitarian law, indigenous peoples, and security sector reform in the various Philippine peace tables.

JosephJ Raymond Franco JOSEPH FRANCO is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He holds a BA in Political Science from the University of the Philippines-Diliman and an MSc in International Relations from RSIS (ASEAN Graduate Scholarship). Joseph is currently working on issues surrounding radicalization in the Southern Philippines. His other research interests include internal conflict, counter-insurgency, special operations forces and peacekeeping.

180 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mereniza C. Gomez MMERENIZA DELA CRUZ GOMEZ is a member of the Ateneo de Manila University Working Group of Security Sector Reform (WGSSR). She was a faculty of the Makati Medical Center College of Nursing teaching Philippine History, Government and Constitution. She is also a part-time faculty of De La Salle University Department of International Studies. She worked for the Armed Forces of the Philippines as a Defense Analyst for International Affairs from 2008-2011 under the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. She is a graduate of BA Organizational Communication from UP Manila and earned her graduate degree, Master in International Studies, at UP Diliman.

Saya Kiba, Ph.D. Saya Kiba is a political scientist. She studied at the Graduate School of InternationalS Cooperation Studies, Kobe University (Ph.D. in Political Science 2010) and the Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines (2003-2004, 2010). Her major fields of interest are civil-military relations, international cooperation studies, and social movements especially in urban poor communities. She has worked in the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines and the House of Representatives of Japan. She is currently an adviser in the Embassy of Japan in Thailand. In 2013, she is awarded The Nippon Foundation’s Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Collaborative Grant for her joint research project, “Comparative Analysis on Military-NGO Cooperation Policies in Asia.”

Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D. ROSALIER ARCALA HALL is a Professor of Political Science and University Scientist I at University of the Philippines Visayas Miagao, Iloilo. She earned her graduate degrees (Ph.D. in Public and International Affairs; MA Political Science) from Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts under a Fulbright Fellowship. She published articles on civil-military relations in the Philippine Political Science Journal, Asian Security, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis and Scientia Militaria. She has completed various research projects on civil-military engagements during counterinsurgency, humanitarian, disaster response and anti-terror operations; gender issues inside the armed forces and police; and rebel integration into the armed forces with grants from The Nippon Foundation, Toyota Foundation, East Asian Development Network, Fulbright Advanced Research, and the Austrian government North-South Exchange Program.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 181