The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 66 16-31 January 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 The targeting of military and less than the 60% growth While the circumstances 6 Northern Region political leadership by both noted in the January 2009- surrounding the murder of Western Region 11 sides of the conflict was a 2010 rate comparison. a female NGO staff mem- regular feature of reporting in While this can be attributed ber in Parwan this period Eastern Region 14 2010. Early indicators sug- to a variety of factors, the remain unclear, it does Southern Region 19 gest that this year will follow key variables are the sus- mark the first casualty for in a similar vain, supported tained IMF/ANSF opera- the community this year. 24 ANSO Info Page by the killing of the Kanda- tional levels over the past As well, it accounts for the har Deputy Provincial Gov- few months as well as the first NGO incident to oc- ernor (IED strike) this pe- ‘saturation’ that has been cur outside of the North. YOU NEED TO KNOW riod. This incident also reached in many of the key Last year, this region ac- marks the most senior local contested areas. Nonethe- counted for over 40% of • Targeting of the political & official hit since the death of less, the January figures all NGO incidents, and military leadership by both parties of the conflict the Kunduz Provincial Gov- provides a glimpse into the January figures are sugges- ernor in October of last year. levels of instability to be tive that this trend will per- • 30% growth between January In addition, there was an at- expected in the coming sist into 2011, as also at- 2011 & 2010 AOG incident levels tempt against a District Gov- months. tested by the periods other ernor in Khost, also with an The ISAF operational NGO incident, this one in • ISAF operational tempo sus- IED. It is not unexpected Badakhshan. The likeliest tained throughout the winter tempo has also been sus- that these incidents occurred tained over the winter cause of this trend is the • NGO incident rates remain in the 2 most kinetic regions months, with this period existing blend of a perva- highest in the North (South & East) of the coun- being no exception. This sive NGO presence, multi- try and serves to illustrate offensive has been particu- ple contested areas, and a continued AOG efforts to larly prevalent in the North, leavening of active criminal ANSO is supported by destabilise/intimidate gov- South and East; where groups along many of the ernance structures despite the these efforts are being ex- major roads in the region. seasonal downturn in their pended in anticipation of The recent suicide attack at ‘military campaign’ this pe- the projected 2011 troop a grocery shop in Kabul riod. level reductions announced captured headlines and In regards to this, the mild previously. As well, these attention due to the profile winter and AOG strategic also mark attempts to dis- of the venue and the com- gains made last year has al- rupt AOG networks and position of those targeted. lowed them to maintain mo- supply routes prior to the The casualties included mentum during January. opening of the ‘fighting numerous Afghans and While there has been the ex- season’. Wresting momen- expatriates, this latter pected seasonal decrease tum from the opposition group primarily comprised (when compared to summer remains one of the key of staff from nearby em- months), this month still ISAF objectives and will bassies and ISAF facilities marked an est. 30% increase also serve as a metric for (please see Kabul section over AOG attributed events ‘transition’. for further analysis). last year. However, this is THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 The most significant incident re- 40 ported from Kabul this period likeliest scenario suggests an IEA- 30 was the dramatic AOG strike sanctioned operation with in- 20 against a grocery shop in Wazir volvement of the Haqqani net- 10 work, with the attack being Akbar Khan, a location popular 0 with the expatriate community. claimed by IEA as an operation On Friday 28 January in the early against the personnel of a promi- nent international PSC. The afternoon, a single suicide opera- KABUL AOG KABUL Crime tive entered the Finest Supermar- strike is suggestive of previous surveillance, efforts that would ket by a side street door, circum- come more vulnerable to such attacks. As of venting the adjacent ANP check- have identified the venue as a tar- get-rich environment, frequented yet, the probability of similar attacks being car- point and passing by armed ried out in Kabul City is assessed as low, with guards stationed at the entry. by perceived ‘legitimate targets’ such as armed personnel of Em- long-term patterns revealing that the over- Once inside, a fast chain of events whelming majority of AOG suicide missions in ensued with the attacker opening bassies or PSCs, though the strike did not affect any such targets (for the past targeted ‘legitimate targets’, primarily the assault with fire from a hand- ANSF and IMF. gun against individuals in his im- instance, no PSC personnel were mediate proximity. This was fol- reported amongst the casualties). While the security situation in Kabul Province lowed by the detonation of at least In this light, the PSC link men- has been praised by the IMF leadership as an one hand grenade against others, tioned in the IEA statement ap- illustration of on-going stabilization achieve- and ultimately concluding in the pears to be an attempt to justify ments, certain accomplishments, such as ca- detonation of his IED charge. At the attack post incident. The exe- pacity development of ANSF, a brief look into the time of writing, reports indi- cution of this event appears typi- data and trends indicate that despite such ef- cate that 9 people were killed and cal of a targeted strike, and pro- forts, AOG kept their activity at par, basically an additional 18 were wounded. vides ground for the assumption maintaining constant levels and distribution of Besides the perpetrator, the casu- that the primary objective of the armed attacks in the province over the last alties were primarily civilians, in- attacker was not to cause massive three years. For instance, in counterpoint to cluding an entire Afghan family of casualties. the combined 10 AOG attacks reported so far six. Foreign casualties largely con- Unless further investigation pro- in January 2011 (incl. the suicide motorcycle- sisted of civilian personnel from vides contradictory evidence, the mounted IED in Saraye Alauddin, and the lat- the nearby Embassies and IMF strike should be considered a ge- est BBIED strike), 11 AOG attacks were re- bases. 1 INGO staff member also neric targeting of expatriates in a pre- corded in January 2010 (including 1 SVBIED received light injuries. sumably high-profile and easily accessible strike and 1 complex attack with multiple BBIEDs). 11 incidents were also reported in Shortly afterwards, both IEA and location. The aforementioned fea- tures also constitute the starting January 2009 (featuring one suicide VBIED HIG claimed authorship of the strike against an IMF vehicle in Wazir Akbar attack. Whereas the involvement point for risk analysis and conse- quent identification of venues and Khan, and an IED attack against another IMF of HIG does not appear credible, convoy in Surobi). the IEA connection does. The timings where/when NGOs be- NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 26th of January 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 In total, 18 incidents have been reported from Kapisa, reflecting a sion of AOG willingness to chal- 30 continued lull in AOG kinetic lenge IMF-ANSF access while 20 attacks, accounting for only 5 thus limiting exposure to direct clashes 10 while in the west, IEDs often re- far. All of these happened in Ta- 0 gab District in the vicinity of the late to personal or community main road and the IMF base. On disputes. Three such cases were one occasion during this cycle, the reported during January 2011, KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime IMF FOB in Tagab received SAF with two cases alone in the past combined with indirect fire, while cycle. In the Mirkhel Area of Ko- histan I, an IED emplaced in a did not target the organization, but resulted a premature IED explosion was from an ongoing clash between two settle- also reported from Yatman, re- graveyard detonated and injured a father who was mourning his two ments, a dispute that has resulted in casualties portedly resulting in 3 AOG fa- on both sides. talities. sons who had recently been killed in a community dispute. In the IED activity remains a dominant second case, an IO vehicle was feature of the security environ- affected in a makeshift IED blast ment in Kapisa. This month, 9 on the road between Mahmudi cases of IED discovery have oc- Raqi and Koh Band in Karezi. curred with 5 in Tagab, 2 in Ni- Although the investigation of this jrab, and 1 each in Mahmudi Raqi incident is still on-going, the local and Kohistan II. In the east of community claimed that the blast the province, it is often an expres- NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 0 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 Compared to previous weeks, 80 Wardak has seen a lull in AOG dents, 14 combined incidents), 60 reflecting both more favourable activity, which can be explained 40 both as a seasonal break following climatic conditions this year, but 20 a long fighting season last year also, despite the IMF-ANSF tar- along with a recent gains in initia- geting efforts, a gradually expand- 0 tive by IMF and ANSF following ing command of AOG networks over large parts the province.