Media and Politics in the GDR: Distorted Visions of West Germany 1971-1989
RHIANNON HEALEY BA History (Hons) MAY 2019
Presented as part of the requirement for an award within the Academic Regulations at the University of Gloucestershire. DECLARATION
This dissertation is the product of my own work and does not infringe the ethical principles set out in the university’s Handbook for Research Ethics.
I agree that it may be made available for reference via any and all media by any and all means now known or developed in the future at the discretion of the university.
Rhiannon Healey
07 May 2019
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Throughout the writing of this dissertation I have received an immeasurable amount of support and guidance. I would first like to thank my supervisor, Professor Melanie Ilic, whose expertise was invaluable throughout the formulation of my research topic and the methodology required to carry out this project.
I would also like to thank Martina Seidel (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv) and Sieglinde Hartmann (Bundesarchiv Dienststelle Berlin) for their correspondence and assistance in the conduction of my research during my time in Berlin and Potsdam. With their help, I had the opportunity to broaden the scope of my topic. I would also like to acknowledge Eusbio Locatelli (Staatsbibliotek zu Berlin) for granting me access to the Zeitungsinformationsystem so that I was able to browse relevant newspaper articles.
Additionally I would also like to thank Subject Librarian Rachel Reid who kindly provided me with a wealth of secondary material that perfectly befit my topic, and to Lisa Print for encouraging me to develop my interests in history over the years.
I am especially grateful to my friends Lisa Weigel and Gwen Milka with their native knowledge of the German language for their help in the translation of numerous documents.
Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their support during this process.
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ABSTRACT
On 9 November 1989, 30 years ago, Berlin was reunited, marking the end of an era of division between the East and West both physically and emotionally. However, life in Germany, particularly the East in the aftermath of the Second World War was not always so simple.
During the later years of the German Democratic Republic, East Germany was essentially run by ‘the two Erichs’ for almost two decades. Honecker was considered the face of East Berlin while Mielke was responsible for the surveillance of not only the Republic’s own population, but also of the enemies in the Federal Republic of Germany. Both men were committed to socialist principles and to a system of authoritarian control until the end of the GDR in 1989.
Consisting of a one-party system, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands were keen to repress political dissidents and reassert the superiority of the GDR by strategically projecting the FRG as the enemy of the state. One method was the monopolising of the press and media. However, the absence of the freedom of the press meant that GDR citizens sought alternative information services for the truth. These saw the increase in the consumption of Western media outlets, especially television and radio broadcasts as well as the creation of alternative spaces.
Despite attempts to bring the media under central control, the presence of West German media was inescapable. The same policies of censorship that were designed to protect the GDR would also be the ones that were responsible for undermining the credibility of the state, thus bringing Communist rule in Germany and Eastern Europe alike to an end.
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Table of Contents
DECLARATION ...... i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... ii
ABSTRACT ...... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... vi
Introduction ...... 1
Chapter 1: How was West Germany portrayed as the “class enemy” through various media outlets? ...... 5
Chapter 2 – Why was the SED unable to fulfil its political agenda despite the use of censorship and manipulation of the media? ...... 15
Chapter 3: A Case Study of Censorship – Punk as Subversion ...... 27
Conclusion ...... 38
Bibliography ...... 42
Primary sources: ...... 42 Archival Sources; ...... 42 Books; ...... 45 Unpublished Sources; ...... 45 Newspaper/ Magazines / Periodicals / Journals; ...... 46 Music Albums: ...... 47 Secondary sources: ...... 48 Books; ...... 48 Journal Articles; ...... 52 Unpublished Dissertations and Thesis’s ...... 56 Websites; ...... 57
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List of Figures
Figure 1, Konsequenz einer Gesetzesverletzung/Consequence of a violation of the law, ZEFYS Zeitungsportal / DDR-Presse, Berliner Zeitung, Di. 15. Mai 1979,
Jahrgang 35 / Ausgabe 113 / Seite 2 ...... 22
Figure 2, Stasi map showing the jamming campaign against the dissident radio show, Radio Glasnost...... 25
Figure 3, Stasi Museum exhibition of a police mugshot of an arrested punk...... 29
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ADN – Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtendienst (General German News Service)
ARD – Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Consortium of public-law broadcasting institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany)
DFF – Deutscher Fernsehfunk (this would later change to ‘Fernsehen der DDR in
1972-1990)
FRG – Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
GDR – German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
IM – Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter (Unofficial Informer)
SED – Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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Introduction
As Europe saw an increasing development in technology in the post-war years, it was in 1948 that the head of broadcasting in the Soviet occupation zone of Berlin,
Hans Mahler predicted that in the near future:
“a new and important technical step forward in the field of broadcasting in
Germany will begin its triumphant march: television. There still stand
numerous obstacles in the way of its development, but of this I am sure: they
will be overcome”.1
Following the firm establishment of the socialist GDR state in 1949, the responsibility for media directives was transferred from the Soviet authorities to the SED leadership. In turn, the SED administration retained central control of public life through the apparatus of mass media, in order to ensure ideological and political conformity were adhered to. Moreover, the state’s burgeoning interest in the capability of television meant that in 1950, plans for a nationwide television service began to take shape, with test transmissions beginning in 1952, although a definitive network was not established until 1956. Meanwhile, over in West Germany, test broadcasts had already started in 1949 and daily broadcasts were televised to audiences in 1952. These West German television programs were popular in both states but especially with the East German population, thus posing a significant threat to the GDR's own television stations and other media outlets alike.
1 Joerg-Uwe Fischer, ‘Fernsehzentrum Berlin/Deutscher Fernsehfunk/Fernsehen der DDR 1952-1991’ in Das Schriftgut des DDR-Fernsehens. Eine Bestandsübersicht. (Potsdam-Babelsberg: Deutsches Runfunksarchiv, 2001) p.13 1
All too often the rivalry between the two German nations has been overshadowed by the overwhelming nature of the Russo-American discourse, thus leaving in its wake an abundant lack of serious scholarship regarding the importance of the GDR media in understanding how state antagonism further fuelled the division of the twentieth-century dreamworlds of the two nation states. Additionally, what little academia exists on this topic comes from the intellectual sphere, characterised by the ‘Western lens’. A large proportion of the published historiographical material is predominately concerned with the state usage of the media, and only examines the operation of these outlets from a top-down approach, while simultaneously ignoring the significance and capability of the media – particularly the development of radio and television as weapons for opposition forces to utilise. Hence this dissertation seeks to challenge and rectify this issue by examining the characteristics of the different GDR-controlled media forums during the specified time period, as well as exploring how numerous groups of GDR citizens utilised the media to challenge the regime through a variety of methods.
This dissertation addresses the latter years of the German Democratic
Republic media, due to the unique circumstances of the political changeover of the country's leadership, from Walter Ulbricht to Erich Honecker in 1971. This political shift also gave way to radical developments in the competition between the East-
West media against a backdrop of détente between the Soviet Union and the USA.
While in one respect this period of détente witnessed the emergence of the
‘normalisation’ of relations between the two Germanic states, it did not de-escalate the longstanding ‘war on the airwaves’, but gave rise to an intensified struggle in the
2 face of the enemy media.2 Additionally, unlike its Soviet counterpart, the GDR did not undertake a process towards liberalisation in the 1980s – by contrast, the Honecker- led SED leadership actively opposed the USSR’s new direction, particularly following
Gorbachev’s election to leadership in 1985. Despite the GDR’s various attempts to tackle subversion through means of tight media regulation and censorship, it was this desperation to maintain tight control of information that caused many to accuse the SED of hiding the ‘truth’, especially when considering the volatile nature of the
Stasi, and like its socialist neighbours, the GDR regime ultimately collapsed.3
Although this paper will deal with a limited scope of post-war German history, the role of the media has been undoubtedly overlooked and dismissed as insignificant in the consideration of the German discourse in the historiography of the
Cold War period. However, while the state began to consider other media platforms such as television, and has been argued as a definitive factor in determining the political agenda of the state, its horizons were mainly limited to propaganda channels that regurgitated Western broadcasts with socialist commentary. There will be a distinct emphasis placed on several newspaper outlets due to their status as the primary method of communication in the GDR, which have been gathered from extensive field research in Berlin and Potsdam; the majority of these works have been carefully selected from the Federal Archives and the German Radio Archives respectively. That is not to say that the importance of radio transmissions was diminished, but rather, unlike newspapers and periodicals, the SED was unable to tap their potential as a vital instrument of control. Additionally, it is vital to acknowledge the role of media as a form of ‘agitation’ through a bottom up approach
2 Heather Gumbert, Envisioning Socialism: Television and the Cold War in the German Democratic Republic. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2014) p.34 3 Ibid., p.73 3 by investigating the alternative considerations of this notion that sought to provoke and challenge the SED leadership as “an active participant in the collapse of the
GDR”.4
To understand the multi-dimensional and complex relationship between journalism and state influence, this dissertation will explore several case studies that are, in some part, indicative of the full narrative of the East German state and endeavour to illustrate an otherwise forgotten part of German history. By tackling various aspects of the East German discourse through substantive discussions, this work seeks to contribute to the exploration of the post-war state by offering an alternative investigation to the already existing literature. This includes looking in depth at the reasoning behind the state portrayal of West Germany as the ‘class enemy’ and how the pressure mounting against the SED to legitimize its authority dictated the official media narrative. The next point of consideration is how the subsequent development in policies of censorship and manipulation of the media outlets were still not enough to fulfill the political agenda of the SED against political dissidents. Finally, as a rebuttal to the government influence, this dissertation will explore the subversive punk scene that threatened the stability of the regime and the challenges that it posed to Communism.
4 Franca Wolff, Glasnost erst kurz vor Sendeschluss. Die letzten Jahre des DDR- Fernsehens (1985-1989/90) (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2002) p.277 4
Chapter 1: How was West Germany portrayed as the “class enemy” through various media outlets?
“Massenmedien – das sind kampf instrumente in der klasse auseinandersetzung”: mass media – this is a fighting instrument in the class struggle.1 The idea of the
‘class enemy’, or Klassenfeind has been adapted from Marxist literature and most commonly understood to define anyone who posed a significant challenge to the working-class political struggle for liberation.2 This term, when considered in the context of the political ideology of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
(often characterised by the acronym ‘SED’) is thought to apply specifically to the capitalists in the West and the subsequent western sphere. 3 Moreover, it particularly targeted the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the USA. Official dissemination capitalised on the notion of an omniscient ‘other’ by reiterating phrases such as: "The class enemy never sleeps" and "The class enemy hears".4
Consequently, the government’s tireless efforts to shroud the class enemy narrative in ambiguity placed emphasis on the imminent threat that had arrived on the doorstep. This generated apprehension and fear, paving the way for ‘protective measures’ to be taken by justifying these as defence mechanisms, imploring all citizens of the GDR to be vigilant in the struggle against these external oppressive forces.
1 Werner Syndow, "Massenmedien – Das Sind Kampf Instrumente In Der Klasse Auseinandersetzung" (Berlin, 1982), Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv, M010-162a1. 2 This specifically refers to Marxist theory on class antagonism see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Karl Marx u. Friedrich Engels: Manifest d. Kommunistischen Partei (2. Proletarier u. Kommunisten).”
The contentious comparisons drawn up between the GDR and the emphasis placed on its political constraints and materialistic deficiencies in contrast to the prosperous West German state dominated their asymmetrical relationship, but more importantly provided the grounds for the SED to justify its “binding doctrine and the confrontational cold war policy” when dealing with the enemy.5 This firmly established the rivalry between the two German states and thus put strong pressure on the SED to legitimize its dictatorship: thus the notion of ‘othering’ presented itself as an opportunity for the state to: “legitimize its regime and put significant efforts into propaganda campaigns that sought to enhance public acceptance”.6 The GDR is a peculiar case study because it encompasses the paradoxical intent to create a deliberate collective community made up of numerous social identities while simultaneously undermining the “very solidarity which it hoped to stipulate”.7 As such, official channels endeavored to promote the idea of complete mass mobilization against the enemy - in the words of Erich Mielke, served as head of the
Stasi, from 1957 until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989: “Nobody shall be allowed to escape the influence of this society”.8 This required all echelons of the state to take
5 Anna Wolff-Poweska, The German Democratic Republic’s Attitude Towards The Nazi Past (Poland: PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNI, 2011)
“The SED had considered all crimes directed against the socialist order in principle to be an expression of a hostile attitude or inspired by the class enemy”.9
As a result of the state perpetuated paranoia, the GDR attempted to influence the population by aiming for and emotional life of every GDR citizen. The fundamental basis for this rigid media control in the GDR was the coordination and propagation of the knowledge in circulation in the state-sponsored “public sphere”.10 This commenced with the deployment of a systematic propaganda apparatus that produced a plethora of socialist agitation through a variety of communication networks, the most substantial being the mass media, particularly electronic and print platforms because of their expansive reach: “the flagship paper, Neues
Deutschland…published over a million copies a day for the country’s population of
16 million”.11 This was achieved through the construction of production centres for radio and television production in Berlin and its neighbouring suburbs.12 Meanwhile, the print media, especially the regional newspapers were organised into a Bezirk
(district) system that directed party ideology from Berlin to each district-level, some
9 Uwe Backes, Steffen Kailitz, and Steffen Kailitz. “Legitimation, Repression, and Co- Optation in the German Democratic Republic UDO GRASHOFF.” Ideocracies in Comparison, October 23, 2015.
However, the SED only had minor influence on state affairs despite the control it retained on the distribution of propaganda: “theoretically, party authority came from the SED’s members…the real decision-making authority was with the head of the party…with significant input from Politburo members”.14 This is consolidated by Gunter Holzweissig’s consideration of the amount of time that
General Secretary Erich Honecker spent each day in editing and writing newspaper articles and commentaries, describing it as “unimaginable”.15 In similar stead to his predecessor, Walter Ulbricht, Honecker was meticulous in his scrutiny of the party media. His methods included proofreading the first few pages of the Neues
Deutschland and: “…made corrections down to the level of punctuation and diction, read a plethora of West German papers, scribed acrimonious and sometimes cryptic responses to them, and handed these on to the Politburo’s Secretary of Agitation for general circulation”16. It has been made evident that the entire structure of the party- state committed itself to public cultural production as a means of actualising class consciousness: for Honecker, the unwavering persistence of the national question of the two disjointed German nations became conveniently synonymous with the class
13 Ibid., p.523 14 Randall L. Bytwerk, Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic: Hierarchies (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004) p.226 15 Gunter Holzweissig., Massenmedien in der DDR (Berlin: Verlag Gebr. Holzapfel, 1983) 16 Dominic Boyer, Censorship As A Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, And Cultural Logic Of Media Control In The German Democratic Republic (Cornell University, 2003)
The SED’s conceptualisation of the Volk (the literal translation being ‘folk’, but most commonly defined as ‘the people’) is a clear indication of the state’s commitment to pushing the class enemy agenda into wider circulation.18 The origins of the Volk were derived from völkisch thought, which were characterised as:
“extreme forms of political conservatism and the most virulent types of nationalism”.19 While the notion of the Volk was established in the nineteenth century as a feature of the imperialist Bismarck agenda, it became more widely synonymous with Nazi ideology: “in Mein Kampf, Hitler clearly stressed the fact of belonging to the
German Volk, namely the conception of nationality (Volkstum, from Volk)”.20 The ambiguity of the meaning of the word Volk thus provided ample opportunity to construct a socialist narrative for the working classes with a nationalist sense of belonging to the state. The utilisation of a class struggle narrative by means of:
“stigmatization (class enemy), or by threatening with detention, public scapegoating, supervision, and intimidation”.21 The negative and dialectical tropes of the false
17 Joanna Patricia Mckay, The Official Concept Of The Nation In The GDR: Theory Versus Pragmatism (London: Proquest Llc, 1995) Through continual restructuring of the institutional passages of information, the government was able to guarantee a substantial amount of homogeneity in the various media formats.23 However, in its desperate attempts to create a separate nation-state and distance itself from the class enemy from 1970 onwards, the SED leadership knew that the GDR lacked definitive legitimacy – in addition to this, a fundamental feature of the SED leadership was the: “thinking in the framework of enemy-friend categories and the ensuing irrational sense of being encircled and endangered”.24 This notion was then promulgated onto the citizens of the nation 20EAST%20GERMAN%20SOCIALIST%20INTELLECTUALS%20AND%20THEIR% 20ATTITUDES%20TOWARDS%20THE%20REUNIFICATION%20WITH%20WEST %20GERMANY%20%20%5D%20Klaus-Georg%20Riegel.pdf> [Accessed 11 November 2018] p.61 22 Dominic Boyer, Spirit and System: Media, Intellectuals, and the Dialectic in Modern German Culture: Dialectical Politics of Cultural Redemption (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) p.127 23 Dominic Boyer, Censorship As A Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, And Cultural Logic Of Media Control In The German Democratic Republic (Cornell University, 2003) Nachrichtendienst (ADN)”.25 The ADN was thus able to exercise an abundance of critical and selective influence over what information would appear in the GDR mainstream media, especially in regard to foreign affairs. Radio and press coverage would consequently produce replications of ADN reports that denounced West Germany as the imperialist enemy. This was based on the universal knowledge among journalists of the serious professional repercussions of inaccurately rephrasing an ADN report. The unrelenting grip of the SED monopoly on the media institutions meant that scholars within such organisations like the Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft had to adhere to the concept of ‘historical materialism’. With the controversy surrounding the validity of GDR, the state was in an especially vulnerable position; henceforth the SED could not rely on the usual sources of legitimacy. As such, state usage of the myth-building process not only attempted to promote the legitimacy of the position of the SED and the identity of the GDR through the myths of Kultur, antifascism and friendship with the Soviet Union, it also synonymously renders the West akin to the Nazi regime: “…This was apparently what the Nazis had done, taking advantage of Germans' typical Prussian submissiveness and deference to authority, submerging the class-consciousness of 25 Dominic Boyer, Censorship As A Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, And Cultural Logic Of Media Control In The German Democratic Republic (Cornell University, 2003) “Political-ideological subversion is ultimately the origin of all kinds of enemy activity”.30 It was not only the dissemination of ordinary publications – official state 26 Joanna Patricia Mckay, The Official Concept Of The Nation In The GDR: Theory Versus Pragmatism (London: Proquest Llc, 1995) Court of the GDR served to protect the …establishment of the GDR. From such a verdict…the image of ‘state enemy’ emerged: they were enemies because they stood against the establishment of the GDR”.31 Various collaborations took place between the KGB and Stasi officials with the intention to mislead and weaken the enemy – this was attained by the dispersion of misinformation as means of discrediting the West as an enemy of the democratic establishment. This conciliation was based upon exchange of various information but was also reliant: “upon mutual utilization of implementation channels, provision of background data for individual operations, monitoring the progress of operations, their impact and reaction to them”.32 Mielke himself interpreted the activities of the “class enemy” with such ambiguity that the justifications for the promotion of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as the class enemy were virtually unlimited. As such: “‘enemy’ activities could be clandestine or open, Mielke asserted”.33 from German for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. By using the media to identify and promote the idea of the fascist class enemy in the West, the state was able to ensure ideological and political uniformity and conformity. However, the print media, especially newspapers functioned as the primary channel of public communication in the GDR. Printed word was of particular importance because all aspects of society were predetermined by the Politburo leadership. As the organ of the SED party, the paper Neues Deutschland’s responsibility was to reiterate the official position on the imperialist West; this was accomplished by attributing the GDR’s problems as the result of antagonism by the class enemy. However, while the SED leadership regarded Neues Deutschland as the crucial source of information for all East German citizens, it too was subjected to the stringent media control exercised across all journalistic practices in the GDR. As such, the SED’s ideology was concerned with the repression of open discourse from as a means of protecting itself from not only external influence, but also internal dissidents seeking to challenge the state’s legitimacy. Censorship ultimately became a definitive component that dominated the GDR media until its inevitable demise. 14 Chapter 2 – Why was the SED unable to fulfil its political agenda despite the use of censorship and manipulation of the media? The mounting paranoia of the GDR in relation to the perceived threat that it faced from a multitude of opposition groups seeking to challenge the government’s authority, meant that the SED needed a way to assert its legitimacy. In addition to the propagation of the class enemy narrative as aforementioned, the government attempted to bring all media outlets under central surveillance in efforts to quell ‘seditious’ writings from the ‘enemy on the doorstep’ in the FRG, though it was more important to silence any internal dissent that had the potential to disrupt the artificial stability of the GDR. While amendments to the GDR constitution in 1968 meant that the term ‘censorship’ did not explicitly exist in official legislation and guaranteed freedom of the press, radio and television.1 Irrespective of this, an uncompromising and multidimensional censorship apparatus was established, enabling the SED to implement a policy of “censorship without censor”.2 Censorship was a vital tool in maintaining the SED’s monopoly on power and public discourse, which operated on four distinctive levels within the GDR: “within the Ministry of Culture, the SED, the individual publishing houses, and oneself”.3 While SED Central Committee members would occasionally review literature themselves, the main task of censorship fell to the Hauptverwaltung Verlage und Buchhandel 1 Artikel 27, Sektion 2 von Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 6. April 1968 “Die Freiheit der Presse, des Rundfunks und des Fernsehens ist gewährleistet” – the guarantee of freedom of the press, the radio and television. 2 Gunter Holzweissig, Zensur ohne Zenson Die SED‐Informationsdiktatur / Censorship Without Censor: The SED‐Information‐Dictatorship (Bonn: Bouvier, 1997—DM 48, ISBN 3–416–2675–6) p.239 3 David Bathrick, The Powers of Speech: The Politics of Culture in the GDR (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1995) pp.38-39 15 (Head Office of Publishers and Bookstores) within the Ministry of Culture. The almost arbitrary decisions made within the Party made individual censors’ work difficult, especially because a single slip could cost that censor his or her position as was the case with Gunter Schabowski who made the error of announcing the opening of the Berlin Wall. Censorship was therefore often delegated to these designated organisations to prevent the publication or broadcast of topics that were seditious or seen as anti-socialist elements – yet regardless of these restrictive measures, it was almost impossible to prevent all subversive material from slipping through the cracks. One of the most important aspects of the regime was the implementation of ‘official language’ in reports, speeches and newspaper articles. The media fell under the auspices of the departments for agitation and propaganda. The policies that these organisations were required to adhere to are defined in the GDR Political Dictionary: “Agitation…educates the workers in socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, as well as builds their strong class position in the battle against the enemies of peace and socialism. Propaganda contributes to the class consciousness of the workers of the GDR, the consciousness of their responsibility in the fight for peace…[against] the constant threat to world peace and the future of humanity by the most aggressive circles of Imperialism”.4 GDR journalists in this context were therefore considered ‘agitators’ because of their role in explaining the decisions of the SED, but more so in their responsibility of explaining current events from a class perspective. The authorities instead of 4 Kleines politisches Wörterbuch: Neuausgabe 1988. (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1988) pp. 17-18, 795-797. 16 providing a space for communication and decision-making processes, the GDR controlled discourse resulted in ‘a staged public’.5 One of the strongest taboos was the explicit mention of the term ‘censorship’ – in the GDR, with its constitutional guarantee of free expression and a free press but also: “the constitutional duty to prevent the spread of anti-socialist ideology, ‘Druckgenehmigungpraxis’ was the euphemism for the censorship process exercised by the Press Office of the SED”.6 A crucial example was Gorbachev’s brand of perestroika (restructuring) in 1985, which was considered a taboo in the GDR, especially within the television industry: “A press which only reported a ‘desired reality’ does nothing but ‘robs itself of effectiveness, makes agitation and propaganda inauthentic, must have the experience of having a paradoxical effect”.7 However, the SED with became so fixated with ‘the top down’ approach regarding the projection of ‘public language’ that ultimately the official public discourse finally devolved into a hapless parody of its claim to actualize the language of the Volk.8 East German radio and television stood under a particularly strict system of control as centrally controlled monopolies which were part of a differentiated and 5 Verena Blaum and Werner Holes, kind. "Public", in: Wolfgang R. Langenbucher (ed.), Cultural-political dictionary: Federal Republic of Germany / German Democratic Republic in the comparison, (Stuttgart: 1983, S. 452-546, here S. 546. 6 Patricia A Herminghouse, “Literature As ‘Ersatzöffentlichkeit’? Censorship And The Displacement Of Public Discourse In The GDR.” German Studies Review, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 85–99. JSTOR, “First; the practice of repressive personnel policies and restrictive recruitment; second, the establishment of a centrally organised institutional structure with a multilevel planning system; third, the distribution of current topics and programs as well as the regulation of language (so-called weekly “arguments”); and finally methods of surveillance through censorship and Stasi activities”.9 From the beginning of its conception, East German television in particular was the subject of the state. Its broadcasts, however, were not considered a serious news source despite the transition from the experimental phase of television in the 1970s to a phase of consolidation in the 1980s. The evolution of the DFF following a series of reforms in 1972 and 1983 respectively and dropping the appearance of being an all-German service, the newly-named DDR-FS became almost completely separate from the state apparatus: programs such as Der Schwarze Kanal (the Black Channel) targeted East German viewers who tuned into West German broadcasts by acting as a guideline in helping: “to uncover [West German programmes] real ideology and meaning”.10 Despite the assumptions of presenter Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler in his scathing commentary that West German journalists were puppets of the FRG government, it was rather ironic that the East German programme relied 9 Konrad Hugo Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR. (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 1999) p.214 10 Kirsten Bönker, Julia Obertreis, and Sven Grampp. Television Beyond and Across the Iron Curtain – Campaigning Against West Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016) p.41 18 completely on the monitoring and recording of West German television.11 Spanning a thirty year period, the dependence on ‘suitable’ West German programmes as well as the lack of insight from von Schnitzler himself witnessed the decline in the programme’s viewership and credibility towards the end of the 1980s. The extensive surveillance of the media exercised by the SED can be attributed to a policy of intense antifascism as well as subsequently being forced into defence by their Western superiors – the existence of a ‘double media landscape’ permanently undermined the credibility of the SED information policies while simultaneously affirming popular acceptance of Western media. Despite the state’s elaborate attempts to regain control of the information its citizens received; the SED nevertheless remained inferior in comparison to its Western counterpart. Wolfgang Emmerich describes the effects as a ‘loyalty trap’ for intellectuals in the GDR, especially those that had “experienced and participated in Nazism as young adults”.12 For these individuals, they were confronted with a new totalitarian world view: Marxism. However, this adherence by the state to Marxist thought meant that the media was treated as instruments of propaganda and agitation. However, the reality was that the attempts of implementing these ideals were unfeasible; these antagonistic policies were unsuited to the circumstances of a post-war Germany, with one of the key issues being the exclusive reliance on the press and the subsequent inability of the authorities to differentiate between audio-visual and print media. Additionally, the continued practice of centralisation of the media hindered the potential for reforms and developments to be made, instead, the constant 11 Jochen Staadt, Tobias Voigt and Stephan Wolle, Operation Fernsehen, Die Stasi und die Medien in Ost und West (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008) p.26 12 Wolfgang Emmerich, “Between Hypertrophy and Melancholy – The GDR Literary Intelligentsia in a Historical Context,” Universitas, 8 (1993) pp.273-85 19 reiteration of ‘journalistic optimism’ amidst a backdrop of increasingly worsening economic and social crisis significantly weakened the credibility of the SED. Methods of media control were complex and often ambiguous – however, the appearance of this stringent control and SED evaluation of published material led to the development of ‘censorship without censors.’ This ‘loyalty trap’ was a decisive factor in the scheme of censorship – writers would soften their criticism of the SED primarily out of fear of being excluded from the overall consensus. However, this delegation of censorship practice of selbstzensur by the SED to journalists themselves meant that authors inevitably “participated in the maintenance of the very power which oppressed them and their fellow citizens”.13 This subsequently led to the widespread practice of schere im Kopf (literally ‘scissors in head’) in which journalists tried to anticipate the party’s desires for publication and would edit their writing based on what they determined was acceptable. As such, the symbiotic union between the SED leadership and socialist writers can be understood as a threefold consensus: “firstly, they understood themselves as socialists, secondly they accepted that literature had a moral and social function and thirdly they retained the concept of a social utopia as a central category”.14 The process schere im Kopf continued not only out of fear and duty, but also because journalists believed that the GDR state was still oriented towards a nobler goal rather than its capitalistic Western counterpart. This concept was actualised in a Neues Deutschland interview with a high-ranking Stasi official who maintained that: 13 Patricia A Herminghouse, “Literature As ‘Ersatzöffentlichkeit’? Censorship And The Displacement Of Public Discourse In The GDR.” German Studies Review, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 85–99. JSTOR, “’The total surveillance,’ ‘the omnipresent informant system,” exist only in the fantasies of Western media. The Ministry for State Security does not keep the people under surveillance, ‘it works with the citizens and in the interests of all…’".15 Neues Deutschland printed the interview without comment. A major factor in the newspaper’s reluctance to offer commentary on Stasi activities was its own central role in the SED regime and the fundamentally close links between the two state apparatuses. However, the reality of the public verdict on the GDR information policy in contrast to the official statements given was a devastating blow to the authorities – it was clear that these remarks were overwhelmingly untrue. The role of Inoffizieller Mitarbeiters (IMs were known as ‘unofficial collaborators’) infiltrated both private and social spheres, especially those that were created as alternative ‘havens’ and kept the Stasi informed about dissenting persons. “The Stasi may have mainly focused on surveilling East Germany's own population, but …discrediting West Germany as an exploitative and warmongering state was part of the East's standard repertoire”.16 Despite the attempts of portraying the media as an ‘all-inclusive’ German service at the start of the 1970s through state approval of Western programming and the recognition of television and radio stations as entertainment industries. This façade was short-lived, however, as despite the GDR signing of the Helsinki Accords in an effort to reduce tension with its Western counterpart, from 1978 began a series of expulsions of West German 15 Randall L. Bytwerk, Neues Deutschland After The Wende (New Hampshire Symposium on the GDR, 1992), p. 26 Figure 1, Konsequenz einer Gesetzesverletzung/Consequence of a violation of the law, ZEFYS Zeitungsportal / DDR-Presse, Berliner Zeitung, Di. 15. Mai 1979, Jahrgang 35 / Ausgabe 113 / Seite 2 17 Harry Math, “Konsequenz einer Gesetzesverletzung” ZEFYS Newspaper Portal / GDR Press, Berliner Zeitung, Tue May 15, 1979, Volume 35 / Issue 113 / Page 2 Often it was the SED itself which ‘created’ its opponents through obstruction and ‘political misinterpretation’.18 This became particularly clear in its response to alternative cultural forms that were formed as a way of escaping the state-sponsored aesthetics for art and literature, especially youth culture that could be considered subversive, such as the avant-garde punk scene and its progression into a myriad of subgenres: these subcultures were expressions of social differences and generational conflict and not genuinely politically motivated.19 However, the SED considered any indications of opposition treacherous and thus suppression became a matter of state security and of the press who continued to adhere to the contradictory rubric of Kulturpolitik (cultural policies). Daniela Dahn points to an important distinction between control of media and the culture of talk in the context of a Suböffentlichkeit: “Anything printed or broadcast was strongly censored; what was said beyond this so-called public sphere was astonishing”.20 The öffentlichkeit (generally understood in a modern context to refer to the ‘public sphere’) was controlled by the state through the various formats of media. However, public participation in official socialist spheres, coupled with the inability of the authorities to block transmissions from the West despite the use of signal jammers, saw an increasing disparity between the state and society. 18 Michel, Vale and Siegfried Kupper. “Political Relations with the FRG.” International Journal of Politics, vol. 12, no. 1/2, 1982, pp. 261–321. JSTOR, This gap gave the opportunity for activists and dissenters of the state to voice their criticisms through the means of illegal radio broadcasts. Though the SED policies of media control made it difficult to launch a pirate radio station, left-wing West Berliners were in a position to act. Thus began Radio Glasnost, which consisted of a makeshift studio that also included East German citizens that had been expelled from the GDR, and was responsible for the broadcasting of radio reports back to the east that would inform of: “…upcoming demonstrations and meetings. It aired dispatches about the reality of life under Stasi surveillance and covered issues distorted or ignored by the state media in the east and neglected or misunderstood by the mainstream media in the west”.21 Despite the lacklustre quality due to the use of amateur reporters, Radio Glasnost’s editors in West Berlin never made any attempts to improve upon or even edit the reports they received to avoid misperceptions of appearing to censor the reality of life in East Germany. However for Radio Glasnost to operate successfully, a large degree of compromise had to be shared by the East and West dissidents as demonstrated by founder and editor Roland Jahn: "The dissidents in the East had to trust us," he says. "But we had to trust them too. We weren't in a position to fact check whether an arrest at this or that demonstration had really taken place”.22 It comes as no surprise that Stasi were some of the show's most dedicated listeners, but their activities were not limited to monitoring. While in the Soviet Union Gorbachev’s policies of glastnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) meant the end of jamming American and British radio broadcasts, the East German authorities 21 Esme Nicholson, “The Cold War Broadcast That Gave East German Dissidents A Voice.” NPR.org. 8 November 2014 November 9th 1989. Figure 2, Stasi map showing the jamming campaign against the dissident radio show, Radio Glasnost. The methods and policies of censorship in the GDR were the target of almost unbroken criticism. The immediate reaction by the state authorities to the inevitable disparities between intentions and outcomes was a result of state paranoia which 25 then led to more centralization through the politicisation of the media, the restrictive control and distribution of propaganda and a continuing increase in security measures. Censorship not only functioned as an administrative tool of control, but also a process of give and take between different groups and was therefore an ever- present phenomenon that through the politicisation of the media attempted to level the various social differences that existed in the GDR. However, the transformation of the GDR in its later years left journalists in an awkward position; these were reporters who had risen to prominent posts through their support and advocation (at least on a surface level) of a system that was diminishing in credibility. Before the events of October 1989, Neues Deutschland, the state’s official newspaper had been tasked with setting the precedent for other GDR journalists; however the aftermath of widespread demonstrations against the GDR regime saw a turn of events where the paper was then struggling to keep up with other media publications and broadcasts. In turn, the “Jahrzehntelangen Efahnungen mit dem Mißbrauch der Medien zusammen” – decades of experience with the misuse of the media resulted in a deep mistrust of the GDR, giving rise to alternative and ‘subversive’ spaces such as the punk scene which would play a major role in the disintegration of the media and of the state itself.23 23 Dieter Dietzel, Dieter Krebs and Heiner Fachmann, “Öffentliches Nachdenken Hunderttausender über unser Land und unsere Zukunft”, Berliner Zeitung, Mo. 6. November 1989 Jahrgang 45 / Ausgabe 261 / Seite 4 Info: 13.002 Zeichen, 1.770 Wörter, 877 Zeilen Chapter 3: A Case Study of Censorship – Punk as Subversion Punk music was the antithesis of the SED’s principles – the state characterised the subculture as Western decadence: it was a perceived threat that challenged the authority of socialism. As with other media formats, musical expression in the GDR had to adhere to and was subjected to a series of stringent regulations that had been implemented since the conception of the state. Punk music, with its roots firmly derivative from scenes of chaos, rebellion and demands for rapid change, threatened to topple the rigid structure of the established SED socialist project. Punk music was therefore not only a domestic concern for state officials, it also became the focus of the ideological battle between the East German state and the detrimental influence of a fascist West Germany. Developed in a culture where freedom of expression was limited, punk emerged primarily as an underground movement; the first definitive ‘movement’ drew its inspiration from the British punk scene: “a number of youths in Halle, Erfurt, and East Berlin had heard of punk through foreign radio stations such as RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor) and Radio Luxembourg, or from John Peel’s program on BFBS”.1 Punk music from the West was first discovered by tuning into West German television and radio channels, where bands such as the Sex Pistols and the Clash garnered increasing attention as key influencers of the Ostpunk 1 Jeff Patrick Hayton, Culture From The Slums: Punk Rock, Authenticity And Alternative Culture In East And West Germany (Illinois: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013) p.370 27 movement.2 The first real punks appeared in 1979, and just like their progenitors: “ripped their clothes and crafted homemade patches with slogans on them…critiques such as “destroy what’s destroying you” and the logo of Poland’s Solidarity movement”.3 This first wave of punk was largely characterised by non-conformity and the expression of anti-establishment views, which subsequently led to the SED to associate punks with subversion, especially due to their appearance: “believing that their scruffy clothes and dyed hair portrayed an aggressive, provocative manner”.4 State officials perceived punk as a potential threat to the regime of the GDR, whose future relied on a politicised youth; instead, punk represented a substantial challenge to the existing social and cultural norms. As shown in Figure 1, even the aesthetic factor of the punk movement was often sufficient for the authorities to take punks into custody where they were subjected to: “arbitrary detainment, brutal police beatings, and invasive searches of apartments and other spaces where they congregated”.5 2 Kate Gerrard, “Punk and the State of Youth in the GDR” in Youth and Rock in the Soviet Bloc: Youth Cultures, Music, and the State in Russia and Eastern Europe, ed. by William Jay Risch (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014) pp.153-154 3 Tim Mohr, “Did Punk Rock Tear Down the Wall?”, November 8, 2009. Figure 3, Stasi Museum exhibition of a police mugshot of an arrested punk. The state was insistent that the music scene was being manipulated by the Western media as an extension of the Klassenfeind narrative. The use of music as a method of voicing discontent against a regime of real existierender Sozialismus (literally translated as ‘real-existing socialism’) meant that the mobilisation of the punk genre posed a serious threat. For authorities, it was due to the volatile nature of punk music and the challenge it represented in questioning the legitimacy of the SED state: “musical expression was thus a site that authorities viewed as rife with potential subversion”.6 Music was an essential utensil in the importance of cultural production as a cog in the state’s ‘didactic dictatorship’ that ultimately intertwined music with considerable political significance.7 The increasing popularity of the East German punk genre among the youth movement alarmed state officials who interpreted the genre as: “an insidious foreign plot to corrupt Eastern youths as they 6 Jeff Hayton, Härte gegen Punk: Popular Music, Western Media, and State Response in the German Democratic Republic, German History Vol. 31, No. 4, (Oxford University Press on behalf of the German History Society, 2013) One of the ways was through the integration of previously excluded and fringe groups in East German society such as women into the music industry, demonstrating the centrality of social equality and liberty as part of the punk movement. For many youths experiencing a period of reinvention during the 1970s and 1980s, punk thus provided a decisive answer to the question posed by the Hamburg fanzine Hamburger Mottenpost: “Living means more than simply existing: Are you living?”.11 The SED information dictatorship attempted to intervene with the construction of alternative spaces and communities by employing a variety of resources into musical production that complied with the official vision of socialist society: “Professional training, talent competitions, record production, concert halls, music television and youth radio all expanded under Erich Honecker, who never tired of trumpeting socialist musical superiority”.12 Both the press and the MfS (Ministerium 8 Ibid., p.527 9 Michael Boehlke and Henryk Gericke “SUBstitut | Produktion, Publikation, Archiv.” East German youth embodied a paradoxical combination of hope and fear in terms of continuing on the socialist legacy of the GDR. On the one hand, they represented the future of socialism and was important for the SED in terms of planning, policies and propaganda for the continuation of the GDR. Yet on the other hand, youths: “often bucked against the efforts of total SED control, and were frequently seen as unreliable elements liable to be influenced negatively by Western propaganda”.13 As such, youth was considered an entity that could be shaped significantly by external influences, making the consumption of popular music a potentially dangerous utensil of Western political subversion, particularly the punk genre. Whenever youths found various methods to consume music beyond the SED area of control, they directly challenged the state authorities who interpreted these independent activities as political acts of dissent: “enemies in the GDR were ‘determined by the system’ because the state categorized all activity not under its control as dissent”.14 (Oxford University Press on behalf of the German History Society, 2013) To combat the growth in the consumption of seditious material, the SED consequently sought to transform youth subcultures such as music into ‘highly charged confrontations with power’ – the government set out to seize back control by endowing popular music with such political meaning, which in turn allowed the state to position itself to tackle subversive elements. It was fundamental for SED authorities to take decisive action against punks: one of the most notable ways this was carried out was through the policy of Härte gegen Punk (Hard against Punk). In addition to a system of "relentlessness against the punks", Erich Mielke as the head of the Stasi also hinted at "orchestrating a disintegration of the scene".15 This became a reality with the turn of the decade; this was due to the growth of Western influence along with the intensified contact between punks and youths involved in oppositional church movements. However, perhaps most concerning to the SED authorities was the increasing presence and impact of punks on the public through the creation of alternative spaces, especially music concerts. The state exerted this change, beginning around 1980 ultimately through the use of pejorative language that appeared in official documents and newspapers. In the flagship paper Neues Deutschland, an article entitled “Krisenkultur von der Müllhalde” (‘Cultural Crisis from the Garbage Dump’) classified punk as a “counter-culture” (Gegenkultur).16 Other articles were quick to follow suit by diminishing the significance of punk through the reassertion of the importance of the SED as the vanguard of socialism. Stasi files such as the circular “Information on young Punks in the GDR” are indicative of the punitive measures taken against punks – the authorities followed a three-step process whereby previous attempts at re-education were replaced with opposition, 15 Michael Boehlke and Henryk Gericke “SUBstitut | Produktion, Publikation, Archiv.” 1981 onwards as a means of repressing the threat that punk posed to the GDR: “in official forms "examination of a circumstance " would always be cited as the reason for punks being called in for interrogation”.19 A definitive illustration of the SED’s intolerance of punks is the story and the subsequent legacy of the ‘first wave’ punk band Namenlos (Nameless). Their lyrics were especially seditious because of their criticisms against the repressive and authoritarian practices of the state: “One Namenlos song went: ‘Minefields and barbed wire, so that no one dares to go over them/ Walls and electric fences that rob us of our freedom/ Automatic weapons and a minefield so that we like it here.’ In another song entitled “MfS-SS”, the band compared the Stasi to the Nazi SS 17 Juliane Brauer, “Clashes of Emotions: Punk Music, Youth Subculture, and Authority in the GDR (1978-1983).” Social Justice, vol. 38, no. 4 (126), 2012, pp. 53– 70. JSTOR, [Schutzstaffel]…the refrain went: ‘Look out, you’re being watched by the MfS, MM-ff-SS!’”.20 Other song lyrics were rife with references that equated the East German state with the fascist Third Reich, however none were clearer than the Namenlos song Nazis wieder in Ostberlin (Nazis again in East Berlin).21 This prompted the Stasi to label punks as ‘criminal elements’, with orders coming from the top echelons of the state authorities to crush “the illegal punk music group Namenlos”.22 1983 would be a crucial year in determining the future of punk as the authorities moved relentlessly to undermine the movement. Namenlos was especially sought out for persecution – all members were arrested and placed in detention while awaiting trial. Drummer Mita Schamal was a minor at the time of the group’s arrest and was assigned to a psychiatric clinic, while the rest of the band were sentenced between one year up to eighteen months in prison for: “publicly treating the state’s organs and their activities and measures in an undignified way”.23 The apparent success of the Stasi crackdown was short-lived; instead, the oppression of this first wave of punk bands like Namenlos not only saw their return to the scene following their stint in prison, but also paved the way for a new generation of punks to emerge. However, this second wave of punks would only consist of a minority of youths in the GDR. The development of the music scene after 1984 marks a distinctive break between the first and second generation of punks in the GDR. Punk re-emerged in this period characterised by a myriad of subgenres that reflected the transition of a subculture into a fragmented multitude of sub-scenes, mirroring the changes of its 20 Paul Hockenos, Berlin Calling: A Story of Anarchy, Music, The Wall, and the Birth of the New Berlin (New York: The New Press, 2017) n.p. 21 From the Namenlos album, Namenlos 1983-89 (Höhnie Records 097, 2007) 22 Ibid., n.p. 23 Ibid., n.p. 34 British predecessor. Gone was the visceral style of the first movement, replaced with vigorous dress codes and uniformity to differentiate between the Hardcore Punks, Anarcho-Punks, Wannabes, Art Punks, Skinheads and Neo-Nazi punks; nevertheless, the authorities were unable to make a distinction between these different groups. One factor that remained unchanged in the subversive behaviour displayed by the East German punks was the consumption of Western music. In the Federal Republic, the West was a experiencing a similar transition, with the emergence of a new wave of punk in the 1980s known as Deutschpunk, which subsequently gave rise to prominent bands such as Die Artze and Die Toten Hosen with a style of ‘humorous’ punk, especially characterised by the satirical schlager (meaning ‘popular’ or ‘mainstream’) album ‘Nevermind the Hosen, Here’s die Roten Rosen (aus Düsseldorf).24 These commercially successful groups brought the genre of Deutschpunk: “to a new level of popularity” by introducing anti-fascist music into the top ten charts.25 Fundamentally, 1983 was a missed opportunity for the SED to silence punks – after this crucial period, the punk scene became more prolific and chaotic as it became more difficult for authorities to identify a singular punk movement in the last years of the GDR; dissent remained a decisive challenge because of its status as a functioning platform for the potential destruction of the state. While punk in the GDR came to be associated with liberty and equality, the extent to which it challenged the gender restrictions within music can be contested. Despite claims that punk was an egalitarian movement, participation in the punk scene by women was scarce in contrast to their male counterparts. Women were 24Michael Ahlers and Christoph Jacke., Perspectives on German Popular Music (London: Taylor & Francis, 2016) p.209 25 Ibid., p.210 35 almost entirely excluded from the production aspect of the music industry, with relatively few exceptions such as Namenlos, who came to be regarded as icons synonymous with the concept of rebellion. Official statistics place the number of female punk musicians around the ten percent mark – additionally, MfS files corroborate this figure: “of the 42 individuals identified by the Stasi, only 9 were women”.26 Women in the GDR never accounted for more than a fifth of punks in any one movement, and this was most often considerably less. Women in the GDR still suffered from the double burden at home, and consequently had less time to devote to subcultural activities. Girls were expected to: “remain in the homes and not hang around publicly with morally questionable characters”.27 To become a punk meant to cease being a woman, but to also experience the full force of the disciplinarian regime. Such was the case of fifteen-year-old Britta Bergmann, better known by her nom de punk (punk name) ‘Major’. Upon hearing the Sex Pistols’ song “Pretty Vacant” on Radio Luxembourg: “She hacked off her hair the next day, affecting the look she knew from the black-and-white photo of the Pistols... She cut out a swatch of white cloth and wrote ‘destroy’ on it with a black pen…”.28 Consequently, her nonconformist behaviour led to the state, to charge her with: “asoziales Verhalten,” or anti-social behavior, along with the failure to work and “incitement to antisocial lifestyle” and sentenced her to a stint in the women’s labour prison in Dessau for her 26 Jeff Patrick Hayton, Culture From The Slums: Punk Rock, Authenticity And Alternative Culture In East And West Germany (Illinois: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013) p.404 27 Leonore Ansorg and Renate Hürtgen, “The Myth of Female Emancipation: Contradictions in Women’s Lives,” in Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio- Cultural History of the GDR, ed. by Konrad H. Jarausch, trans. by Eve Duffy (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), pp.163-176 28 Tony Daniel, “How Punk Rock Helped Topple The Berlin Wall.” The Federalist, November 30, 2018. As the GDR attempted to regulate the music scene, both in terms of what people were listening to and the creation of alternative spaces, the authorities struggled to keep up with the developing transition from a singular punk movement to a multitude of sub-genres. The continual insistence by the state that the scene was being instigated or manipulated by the West created a paradox by which the authorities persecuted these ‘delinquents’ while simultaneously attempting to promote the liberalisation of music in the radio and recording industry. “The regime’s political reaction to divergent youth culture was not so much a demonstration of its power as a sign of uncertainty and fear that sowed the seeds of further rebellion”.30 Following the botched efforts of 1983 to fully quash seditious elements, the state grew increasingly desperate to remove the threat by regularly exceeding the limits of the law. While punk in itself was symbolic of frustrations against the regime, even more were the attempts to rectify the situation that ultimately resulted in the demise of the socialist state. 29 Ibid., n.p. 30 Juliane Brauer, “Clashes of Emotions: Punk Music, Youth Subculture, and Authority in the GDR (1978-1983).” Social Justice, vol. 38, no. 4 (126), 2012, pp. 53– 70. JSTOR, Conclusion Censorship was a predominant trait that defined the SED regime until the end of the GDR. The authorities set out to repress public forums from both the surrounding external influences, as well as internal dissidents and critics that set out to challenge the legitimacy of the East German nation. The state simultaneously used its position of authority and control to promote the struggle against the fascist class enemy in the West, while also ensuring the absolute political and ideological conformity of its citizens. The restriction of the media was not only a means of controlling what information was received by the public sphere, it also functioned as a process of give and take between the state authorities and writers themselves. This co-optation by journalists into a systematic monopoly remained therefore an ever-present phenomenon that was unique to the GDR when considered in the wider discourse of the Cold War: thus the politicisation of the media as a potential weapon, was, on a surface level, the state’s attempts to level the various social differences that existed in the GDR. One of the most controversial methods of silencing dissent was the extensive surveillance exercised by the Stasi, who acted as an extension of the SED leadership by launching campaigns and moving against seditious elements. These were defined as and ranged from the construction of alternative public spaces to the creation of ‘pirate’ radio stations, such as ‘Radio Glasnost with its slogan “out of control”. Using unofficial informers to keep tabs on particular activities, the Stasi were especially harsh in suppressing these countercultures by deploying a series of tactics that asserted the importance of the SED’s role; failing these – opposition, persecution and punishment. Many of the various media outlets were unwilling to 38 speak out against Stasi activities due to their own central role in the SED regime, particularly newspapers such as Neues Deutschland, who was considered the main mouthpiece of the GDR leadership. Despite the authorities’ best efforts to regulate and retain its monopoly over the media, ultimately, these were not enough as the state battled against a changing political background that saw the developing increase in various countercultures – the most significant among them being the punk scene. The repression of punk was treated as a priority for the SED due to its aggressive nature and thus perceived as an attack on the existing foundations of the GDR state. It was essential for the SED to prevent youth from becoming susceptible to such subversion, but by the attribution of punk by the authorities as a Western cultural policy, they were forced to explain why East Germans were turning away from the ‘staged-public’ activities and showing an interest in countercultural material. While the SED and Stasi organs moved to rectify the situation by obstructing various movements through arrests, interrogations and conscription of men, it was impossible to stamp out a movement that had gained considerable momentum. The continuous propagation of the West German manipulation myth did not serve to aid the East German authorities in their promotion of the GDR brand of socialism against the neighbouring practice of capitalism. The official information dictatorship was struggling to detach itself from the experimental period of the 1970s and early 1980s. In an era where the East-West tensions were deescalating, programmes such as Der Schwarze Kanal, with its distorted perception of events were fast losing credibility as genuine news sources, as were many of the other GDR-sponsored broadcasts. It was at this point that media in the GDR had reached a point of no return: the persistent symptoms of unreliability that continued to plague 39 the GDR media were responsible for the loss in viewership and readership of broadcasts and prints. For East Germany, the practice of censorship of the media played a key role in the weakening and eventual collapse of the GDR nation. The SED’s use of excessive control left behind a legacy that through attempts to exert influence over the GDR, the regime was ultimately responsible for the destruction of the very state that they sought to protect. While the notion of censorship has been considered in an East German context, perhaps it would also be worth examining responses to these measures in the Federal Republic of Germany, as a way of understanding and being able to construct an accurate account of the post-war German discourse in both German nations. The notion of punk music as a subversive counterculture was not simply an exclusive phenomenon to the GDR, as we have seen – it was also regarded by numerous West German youths as a potential weapon to express dissatisfaction with an oppressive system of government. It has been fascinating throughout this process to investigate the methods in which dissidents on either side of the Berlin wall were able to undermine obstructions through co-operation with one another to achieve their mutual goal of discrediting the censorship barrier. This is therefore a factor that is worthy of further exploration as an additional research project, should such opportunity arise. While the scope of this dissertation has been limited to the ‘Second Generation’ of the German Democratic Republic, it would be intriguing to consider the post-Honecker era in more depth, whereby responsibility fell to the new coalition government, although at this point the GDR was living on borrowed time before its integration into the Federal Republic, just as the rest of the Soviet Bloc was. Whilst there is a general consensus that the reunification period was a time for celebration 40 as a Western ‘victory’, the merger left the former GDR in a state of limbo. Despite the assimilation of former East German media outlets into the West, journalists were ostracised from the new state because of their affiliations with a broken system that many were quick to vilify. 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