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Group Identity and Civil-Military Relations in India and Pakistan By
Group identity and civil-military relations in India and Pakistan by Brent Scott Williams B.S., United States Military Academy, 2003 M.A., Kansas State University, 2010 M.M.A., Command and General Staff College, 2015 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2019 Abstract This dissertation asks why a military gives up power or never takes power when conditions favor a coup d’état in the cases of Pakistan and India. In most cases, civil-military relations literature focuses on civilian control in a democracy or the breakdown of that control. The focus of this research is the opposite: either the returning of civilian control or maintaining civilian control. Moreover, the approach taken in this dissertation is different because it assumes group identity, and the military’s inherent connection to society, determines the civil-military relationship. This dissertation provides a qualitative examination of two states, Pakistan and India, which have significant similarities, and attempts to discern if a group theory of civil-military relations helps to explain the actions of the militaries in both states. Both Pakistan and India inherited their military from the former British Raj. The British divided the British-Indian military into two militaries when Pakistan and India gained Independence. These events provide a solid foundation for a comparative study because both Pakistan’s and India’s militaries came from the same source. Second, the domestic events faced by both states are similar and range from famines to significant defeats in wars, ongoing insurgencies, and various other events. -
The Other Battlefield Construction And
THE OTHER BATTLEFIELD – CONSTRUCTION AND REPRESENTATION OF THE PAKISTANI MILITARY ‘SELF’ IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE PRODUCTION Inauguraldissertation an der Philosophisch-historischen Fakultät der Universität Bern zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde vorgelegt von Manuel Uebersax Promotionsdatum: 20.10.2017 eingereicht bei Prof. Dr. Reinhard Schulze, Institut für Islamwissenschaft der Universität Bern und Prof. Dr. Jamal Malik, Institut für Islamwissenschaft der Universität Erfurt Originaldokument gespeichert auf dem Webserver der Universitätsbibliothek Bern Dieses Werk ist unter einem Creative Commons Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Keine Bearbeitung 2.5 Schweiz Lizenzvertrag lizenziert. Um die Lizenz anzusehen, gehen Sie bitte zu http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/ oder schicken Sie einen Brief an Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California 94105, USA. 1 Urheberrechtlicher Hinweis Dieses Dokument steht unter einer Lizenz der Creative Commons Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Keine Bearbeitung 2.5 Schweiz. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/ Sie dürfen: dieses Werk vervielfältigen, verbreiten und öffentlich zugänglich machen Zu den folgenden Bedingungen: Namensnennung. Sie müssen den Namen des Autors/Rechteinhabers in der von ihm festgelegten Weise nennen (wodurch aber nicht der Eindruck entstehen darf, Sie oder die Nutzung des Werkes durch Sie würden entlohnt). Keine kommerzielle Nutzung. Dieses Werk darf nicht für kommerzielle Zwecke verwendet werden. Keine Bearbeitung. Dieses Werk darf nicht bearbeitet oder in anderer Weise verändert werden. Im Falle einer Verbreitung müssen Sie anderen die Lizenzbedingungen, unter welche dieses Werk fällt, mitteilen. Jede der vorgenannten Bedingungen kann aufgehoben werden, sofern Sie die Einwilligung des Rechteinhabers dazu erhalten. Diese Lizenz lässt die Urheberpersönlichkeitsrechte nach Schweizer Recht unberührt. -
Pakistan Response Towards Terrorism: a Case Study of Musharraf Regime
PAKISTAN RESPONSE TOWARDS TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF MUSHARRAF REGIME By: SHABANA FAYYAZ A thesis Submitted to the University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science and International Studies The University of Birmingham May 2010 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT The ranging course of terrorism banishing peace and security prospects of today’s Pakistan is seen as a domestic effluent of its own flawed policies, bad governance, and lack of social justice and rule of law in society and widening gulf of trust between the rulers and the ruled. The study focused on policies and performance of the Musharraf government since assuming the mantle of front ranking ally of the United States in its so called ‘war on terror’. The causes of reversal of pre nine-eleven position on Afghanistan and support of its Taliban’s rulers are examined in the light of the geo-strategic compulsions of that crucial time and the structural weakness of military rule that needed external props for legitimacy. The flaws of the response to the terrorist challenges are traced to its total dependence on the hard option to the total neglect of the human factor from which the thesis develops its argument for a holistic approach to security in which the people occupy a central position. -
Comparing Camels in Afghanistan and Australia: Industry and Nationalism During the Long Nineteenth Century
Comparing camels in Afghanistan and Australia: Industry and nationalism during the Long Nineteenth Century Shah Mahmoud Hanifi [James Madison University, Virginia, USA] Abstract: This paper compares the roles of camels and their handlers in state building projects in Afghanistan and Australia during the global ascendance of industrial production. Beginning in the mid-1880s the Afghan state-sponsored industrial project known as the mashin khana or Kabul workshops had significant consequences for camel-based commercial transport in and between Afghanistan and colonial India. Primary effects include the carriage of new commodities, new forms of financing and taxation, re- routing, and markedly increased state surveillance over camel caravans. In Australia the trans-continental railway and telegraph, and other projects involving intra-continental exploration and mining, generated a series of in-migrations of Afghan camels and cameleers between the 1830s and 1890s. The port of Adelaide was the urban center most affected by Afghan camels and cameleers, and a set of new interior markets and settlements originate from these in-migrations. The contributions of Afghan camels and their handlers to state-building projects in nineteenth-century Afghanistan and Australia highlight their vital roles in helping to establish industrial enterprises, and the equally important point that once operational these industrial projects became agents in the economic marginalization of camels and the social stigmatization of the human labour associated with them. __________________________________________________________________ Introduction: camels, political economy and national identities The movement of camels through the Hindu Kush mountain passes was greatly transformed beginning in 1893. That year the Durrani Amir of Kabul Abd al-Rahman signed an agreement with the British Indian colonial official Sir Henry Mortimer Durand acknowledging there would be formal demarcation of the border between their respective vastly unequal powers, one being a patron and the other a client. -
MEI Report Sunni Deobandi-Shi`I Sectarian Violence in Pakistan Explaining the Resurgence Since 2007 Arif Ra!Q
MEI Report Sunni Deobandi-Shi`i Sectarian Violence in Pakistan Explaining the Resurgence Since 2007 Arif Ra!q Photo Credit: AP Photo/B.K. Bangash December 2014 ! Sunni Deobandi-Shi‘i Sectarian Violence in Pakistan Explaining the Resurgence since 2007 Arif Rafiq! DECEMBER 2014 1 ! ! Contents ! ! I. Summary ................................................................................. 3! II. Acronyms ............................................................................... 5! III. The Author ............................................................................ 8! IV. Introduction .......................................................................... 9! V. Historic Roots of Sunni Deobandi-Shi‘i Conflict in Pakistan ...... 10! VI. Sectarian Violence Surges since 2007: How and Why? ............ 32! VII. Current Trends: Sectarianism Growing .................................. 91! VIII. Policy Recommendations .................................................. 105! IX. Bibliography ..................................................................... 110! X. Notes ................................................................................ 114! ! 2 I. Summary • Sectarian violence between Sunni Deobandi and Shi‘i Muslims in Pakistan has resurged since 2007, resulting in approximately 2,300 deaths in Pakistan’s four main provinces from 2007 to 2013 and an estimated 1,500 deaths in the Kurram Agency from 2007 to 2011. • Baluchistan and Karachi are now the two most active zones of violence between Sunni Deobandis and Shi‘a, -
Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan
Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan Asia Report N°255 | 23 January 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Peshawar: The Militant Gateway ..................................................................................... 3 A. Demographics, Geography and Security ................................................................... 3 B. Post-9/11 KPK ............................................................................................................ 5 C. The Taliban and Peshawar ......................................................................................... 6 D. The Sectarian Dimension ........................................................................................... 9 E. Peshawar’s No-Man’s Land ....................................................................................... 11 F. KPK’s Policy Response ............................................................................................... 12 III. Quetta: A Dangerous Junction ........................................................................................ -
6455.Pdf, PDF, 1.27MB
Overall List Along With Domicile and Post Name Father Name District Post Shahab Khan Siraj Khan PESHAWAR 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Sana Ullah Muhammad Younas Lower Dir 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Mahboob Ali Fazal Rahim Swat 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Tahir Saeed Saeed Ur Rehman Kohat 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Owais Qarni Raham Dil Lakki Marwat 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Ashfaq Ahmad Zarif Khan Charsadda 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Saud Khan Haji Minak Khan Khyber 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Qamar Jan Syed Marjan Kurram 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Kamil Khan Wakeel Khan PESHAWAR 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Waheed Gul Muhammad Qasim Lakki Marwat 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Tanveer Ahmad Mukhtiar Ahmad Mardan 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Muhammad Faheem Muhammad Aslam PESHAWAR 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Muslima Bibi Jan Gul Dera Ismail Khan 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Muhammad Zahid Muhammad Saraf Batagram 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Riaz Khan Muhammad Anwar Lower Dir 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Bakht Taj Abdul Khaliq Shangla 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Hidayat Ullah Fazal Ullah Swabi 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Wajid Ali Malang Jan Mardan 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Sahar Rashed Abdur Rasheed Mardan 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Afsar Khan Afridi Ghulam Nabi PESHAWAR 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Adnan Khan Manazir Khan Mardan 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Liaqat Ali Malik Aman Charsadda 01. Station House Incharge (BPS-16) Adnan Iqbal Parvaiz Khan Mardan 01. -
ETHNICITY, ISLAM and NATIONALISM Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) 1937-1947
ETHNICITY, ISLAM AND NATIONALISM Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) 1937-1947 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research Centre Of Excellence Quaid-I-Azam University (New Campus) Islamabad, Pakistan 2015 ETHNICITY, ISLAM AND NATIONALISM Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) 1937-1947 NIHCR Publication No.171 Copyright 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing from the Director, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. Enquiries concerning reproduction should be sent to NIHCR at the address below. National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University, (New Campus) P.O. Box No.1230, Islamabad - 44000, Pakistan. Email: [email protected] , [email protected] Website: www.nihcr.edu.pk Editing/Proofreading: Muhammad Saleem Title: Zahid Imran Published by Muhammad Munir Khawar, Publication Officer. Printed at M/s Roohani Art Press, Blue Area, Islamabad, Pakistan. Price Pak Rs.700.00 SAARC Countries Rs.900.00 ISBN: 978-969-415-113-7 US $.20.00 CONTENTS Map vi Acknowledgements vii Abbreviations x Introduction xii 1 NWFP and its Society 1 2 Government and Politics in the Province 15 3 The Frontier Congress in Office 1937-39 51 4 Revival of the Frontier Muslim League 91 5 Politics During the War Years 115 6 Moving Towards Communalization of Politics 153 7 Muslims of NWFP and Pakistan 183 Conclusion 233 Appendices I Statement of Khan Abdul Akbar Khan, President of the 241 Afghan Youth League and Mian Ahmad Shah, General Secretary of the Afghan Youth League, Charsadda II Speeches Delivered on the Occasion of the No-Confidence 249 Motion against Sir A. -
Putting It Together Southern Afghanistan
P UTTING IT T OGETHER IN S OUTHERN A FGH A NI S T A N Cultural & Geographic Research TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER MAY 2009 Putting it Together in Southern Afghanistan P UTTING IT T OGETHER IN S OUTHERN A FGH A NI S T A N Copyright © 2009 Tribal Analysis Center, LTD All Rights Reserved Cultural & Geographic Research TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER About Tribal Analysis Center Tribal Analysis Center, 6610-M Mooretown Road, Box 159. Williamsburg, VA, 23188 Putting it Together in Southern Afghanistan Putting It Together in Southern Afghanistan One aspect of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan that seems to escape a great deal of scrutiny is its similarity to the situation in eastern Afghanistan and the Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is nearly axiomatic that an insurgency having its base areas within a neighboring country’s safe havens is nearly impossible to defeat and time remains the insurgent’s best ally. FATA is clearly recognized as an insurgent base area. Little discussion has resulted from reviews of the similar situation found in southern Afghanistan and its border with Pakistan. It is, however, crucial to the survival of the western insurgency with its north-south infiltration routes emerging from Pakistan through a generally uncontrolled border. These follow old, established trade and nomad migration paths that allow the insurgents, as well as drug smugglers, relatively unrestrained access into central Afghanistan. Much of the southeastern border region between Afghanistan Map No. VII Southeastern Afghanistan Nomad Routes and Pakistan is blocked by a large barrier of drifting sand. This geographic reality generally has forced insurgent infiltration routes to shift westward into southern Helmand Province. -
Civil-Military Relations: a Comparative Study of Pakistan: from Barracks
International Research Journal of Interdisciplinary & Multidisciplinary Studies (IRJIMS) A Peer-Reviewed Monthly Research Journal ISSN: 2394-7969 (Online), ISSN: 2394-7950 (Print) Volume-I, Issue-VIII, September 2015, Page No. 34-44 Published by: Scholar Publications, Karimganj, Assam, India, 788711 Website: http://www.irjims.com Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of Pakistan: From barracks to corporate culture (Paths toward Re-democratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations) Dr. Arshad Javed Rizvi Associate Professor, Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology, Pakistan Abstract This research report, mainly focus on the supremacy and evolution of military in Pakistan, giving out lines of short back ground of Pakistan’s political history before and offer independence. Scholarly focus on civil and military relations since 1947, military interventions in to the political domain and its withdrawals. Pakistan has seen four military coup, how and why these military regimes have ended, the conditions that led to end the Military Regimes in 1968, 1971, 1988 and 2008, causes were based upon the divergence of interests between the leaders of the military regime, who wanted to keep their strong ship on political power and the active leaders of the armed forces they seek to protect, promote and advance the corporate interests of military. Given Pakistan’s volatile relationship with India, centered on the decades-long conflict for control of Kashmir, Pakistan has always been a ‘security state’, and the national military has historically been a key player in the geopolitical arena. However, information on Pakistan’s armed forces is very limited, and interaction with Western civilian and military institutions is heavily controlled. -
Minority Ethnic, Race and Sect Relations in Pakistan:Hazara Residing in Quetta
The Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2019, Vol. XXVII, No.2 Minority Ethnic, Race and Sect Relations in Pakistan:Hazara Residing in Quetta Sarfraz Khan Professor, Area Study Center, University of Peshawar Noor Ul Amin1 Islamia College Univeristy, Peshawar Abstract This paper charts systematic persecution, ethnic profiling, target killing, kidnapping, harassment, racial discrimination and ghettoization, ethnic Hazara face in Quetta.The Hazara, a marginalized ethnicity severely discriminated, began migrating initially into British India, from Afghanistan, in 1890s. During 1962- 63, the government of Pakistan granted ethnic Hazara citizenship rights. Constitutionally, they were to enjoy equal rights, might form political parties, to represent them in elected bodies of Balochistan and Pakistan. Previously, ethnic Hazara individuals rose to the positions of:Generals; rather, Chief of the Army Staff; and to Federal/ProvincialMinisters/Governors, in Pakistan. However, the Hazara began facing discrimination and ethnic, cultural as well as confessional (a majority of Hazara profess Shia sect of Islam) persecution, in Pakitan, in the last two deacades of the previous mellenium, at unofficial, and continue to face, both, at official and unofficial levels. Since 2012, computerised National Identity Cards of ethnic Hazara in Quetta have been suspended/blocked, a step tentamount to denial of citizenship rights of Pakistan. A Sunni militant terrorist outfit, Lashkar-Jhangive, warned ethnic Hazara of turning Pakistan into their graveyard, in case, they did not leave this country. Following Iranian revolution enusuing Iran/Saudi (Shia- Sunni) conflict resulted into proxy war. Hazara leaders suspect, systematic persecution of Hazara, aims at, evicting them of expensive land they occupy in and around Quetta. -
A Diplomatic Surge in Afghanistan, 2011-14
A Diplomatic Surge in Afghanistan, 2011–14 Daryl Morini The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and their coalition partners—encompassing some 40 democracies—are not the only players with high stakes in the current war for Afghanistan. Influ- ential players such as Russia, Pakistan, Iran, India, and China all have legitimate interests.1 Without a commensurate multilateral diplomatic surge, efforts toward lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan will most likely fail. But the potential of international cooperation in facilitating a long-term political settlement in that country remains woefully under- exploited. Diplomatic cooperation among the main external players, along with coalition forces, will be essential to success in the Afghan campaign. Only by tapping into the global convergence of interests in Afghanistan can the United States and its NATO–ISAF (International Security Assis- tance Force) partners hope for a political victory or, at the very least, an international environment conducive to the conflict’s peaceful resolution. The strife in Afghanistan is variously conceived as an Afghan civil war, an inter-Pashtun ethnic conflict, or an Islamist upheaval. No consensus presently exists on the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, neither in academic literature nor within NATO–ISAF headquarters.2 The focus here is not on the military operations and campaigns which make up the international intervention in Afghanistan per se, nor does it pretend to contribute to these debates in any meaningful way. Instead, this analysis frames the war from an international relations perspective. This approach has thus far been conspicuously absent in many existing accounts of the conflict.