IV. Emergency Response Measures Primarily Implemented outside the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station in Response to the Accident 1. Environmental Radiation Monitoring (1) Preparedness for environmental radiation monitoring before the accident occurred and the initial situation regarding monitoring after the accident a. Role sharing among the central government, local governments, and nuclear power operators before the accident occurred See Chapter V 1. (1) a. of the Interim Report. b. The initial monitoring activities that were conducted outside the premises of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS after the accident (a) Initial land area monitoring after the accident See Chapter V 1. (1) b. of the Interim Report1. (b) How aircraft monitoring started The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) started to discuss monitoring by aircraft from around March 12 (see Chapter V 1. (2) b. of the Interim Report), and decided to have staff of the Nuclear Safety Technology Center embark on a helicopter of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to conduct monitoring, after coordination with the SDF and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). As a result, the Ministry of Defense dispatched an SDF helicopter to a sports park in Rokkasho Village, Kamikita County, Aomori Prefecture2, and the helicopter arrived at the park around 13:00 of the same day. However, as the monitoring staff had not arrived at the park yet, the helicopter left the park at around 13:10 that day3. The Nuclear Safety Technology Center 1 The subsequent investigation found that monitoring by monitoring cars by the Fukushima prefectural government from early in the morning of March 12 was conducted with the participation of staff of the Nuclear Emergency Assistance & Training Center (NEAT) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, who were sent to the Environmental Radioactivity Monitoring Center of Fukushima and arrived early in the morning of the same day, together with employees of the Fukushima prefectural government. 2 The sports park was chosen as a meeting spot on the morning of March 12 at the request of the Nuclear Safety Technology Center. 3 At that time, the helicopter crew of the Self-Defense Forces could not use wireless communication equipment they -243- staff, meanwhile, arrived at the sports park by 14:30 of the same day and stood by, but as the SDF helicopter had already taken off, the monitoring staff and the SDF helicopter failed to join together4. Subsequently, the MEXT continued to consider the implementation of aircraft monitoring and engaged in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and other parties concerned. However, monitoring by the SDF aircraft could not be carried out due to the impact of an explosion at the Reactor Building of Unit 3 at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter referred to as the “Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS”) of Tokyo Electric Power Company (hereinafter referred to as “TEPCO”) on March 14. As it turned out, the MEXT measured the levels of air radiation dose rates by aircraft beyond 30km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS on March 25 for the first time, with the cooperation of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), an independent administrative organization (see Chapter V 1. (2) b. of the Interim Report). c. The monitoring activities conducted within the premises of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS after the accident See Chapter V 1. (1) c. of the Interim Report. (2) Efforts to assign responsibility for radiation monitoring and the subsequent enhancement of monitoring activities a. Efforts to assign responsibility for radiation monitoring within the government for the land area more than 20km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS5 carried with them, and thus were not able to check with or report to the headquarters, etc. 4 In this regard, in hearings conducted by the Investigation Committee, the MEXT claimed that the MEXT “told the SDF that it wants the SDF helicopter to get together with the monitoring staff at the sports park at 14:30 on March 12.” On the other hand, the SDF helicopter crew actually dispatched to the sports park said that they were “instructed to fly to the sports park as soon as we are ready.” Whether this communication was made through NISA is not clear, and the possibility cannot be ruled out that the communication was made directly between the MEXT and the Ministry of Defense. In any event, one of the reasons for these different accounts appears to be the lack of sufficient coordination about the get-together time and other matters among the parties concerned. Exactly what gave rise to the difference in their accounts was not necessarily made clear, however. 5 Though we covered the efforts to assign responsibility for radiation monitoring within the government for the land area more than 20km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS in Chapter V 1. (2) a. of the Interim Report, we discuss them again in this section on the basis of facts confirmed in the subsequent investigation and verification. -244- As described in Chapter V 1. (1) b. of the Interim Report, since the Fukushima prefectural government and other parties concerned, due to the impact of the earthquake and the ensuing tsunami, were not able to conduct sufficient monitoring based on the Emergency Preparedness and Response Center (hereinafter referred to as the “Off-site Center”), where the Nuclear Emergency Response Local Headquarters (hereinafter referred to as the “Local NERHQ”) of the national government, starting around March 13, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Mr. Goshi Hosono (hereinafter referred to as "Special Advisor Hosono") and others within the government asked executive officials at MEXT several times to conduct more proactive radiation monitoring activities on a national basis. Under these circumstances, in the evening of March 15, the monitoring of the radiation levels in the air conducted by the MEXT using a monitoring car traveling around in Namie Town6, Futaba-gun, Fukushima Prefecture, observed radiation dose rates as high as 330μSv/h. The MEXT recognized that it might also be necessary to explain its evaluation of these levels, including their hazardous nature and the judgment of necessity of evacuation, but it might be difficult to conduct the evaluation of the monitoring data on its own because it did not have data on plants at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. And so, Vice Minister Kan Suzuki of the MEXT (hereinafter referred to as “Vice MEXT Minister Suzuki”) consulted with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Tetsuro Fukuyama (hereinafter referred to as “Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuyama) over the night of March 15 and early in the morning of March 16, and decided to seek the holding of a meeting on the assignment of responsibility concerning radiation monitoring activities within the government chaired by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano (hereinafter referred to as “Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano”). Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano, for his part, had felt for some time that not only the monitoring of radiation levels was not being carried out sufficiently but also the results of 6 The Interim Report specified the location where this high radiation dose rate was observed as “Hirusone, Namie Town, Futaba-gun, Fukushima Prefecture.” Later, however, the MEXT explained to the Investigation Committee that there was an error in the press release announced by the MEXT on March 16 and in related materials the MEXT submitted to the Investigation Committee. When the Investigation Committee looked into relevant facts, the location above turned out to be “Kawafusa, Namie Town.” On February 10, 2012, the MEXT announced a correction to the press release announced on March 16, 2011. -245- monitoring conducted by the MEXT, the police, the SDF, electric power companies and other relevant organizations were not consolidated and shared to the fullest extent. Following these developments, the meeting was called hurriedly at the Crisis Management Center of the Prime Minister’s Office at around 8:00 of March 16, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Tetsuro Ito (hereinafter referred to as “Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Ito”) and relevant officials from MEXT, NISA and the Nuclear Safety Commission (hereinafter referred to as “NSC”) participating7. At the meeting on the roles and responsibilities for monitoring within the government, Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano instructed as follows: MEXT should compile and publish the monitoring data collected by individual organizations concerned in land areas beyond 20km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS; the NSC should evaluate the monitoring data; and the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (hereinafter referred to as “NERHQ”) should take any necessary measures based on the evaluation of the NSC. No one at the meeting made any reference to whether the evaluation of the monitoring data assigned to the NSC under Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano’s instructions would include predictions by the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI). From March 16, based on the government’s instructions regarding these roles and responsibilities, the Local NERHQ, located at the Fukushima Prefectural Office, decided to deliver the monitoring data compiled on its own to both the ERC of METI and the Emergency Operating Center (EOC) of MEXT while MEXT compiled the data to deliver to the NSC for its evaluation and started publishing it from the same day. Moreover, the NSC shared the results of its evaluation of the monitoring data with the all relevant ministries and agencies by delivering the data to the ERC, EOC, and the Prime Minister’s Office. The Commission did not initially release its evaluation results when the roles and responsibilities within the government were determined on March 16 as Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano had continually held press conferences, addressing some of the evaluation of the monitoring activities.