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Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, Second Report, 15 S

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Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, Second Report, 15 S Attachment Attachment II-1 Equipment to be Used in Controlled Areas Attachment II-2 Emergency Response Support System (ERSS) Attachment II-3 Trends in the number of temporary access for residents into the restricted area Attachment II-4 Regarding Response to the Specific Spots Estimated to Exceed an Integral Dose of 20mSv Over a One Year Period After the Occurrence of the Accident Attachment II-5 Regarding Establishment of Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation in Date City Attachment II-6 Regarding Establishment of Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation in the City of Minami Soma Attachment II-7 Regarding Establishment of Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation in the City of Minami Soma Attachment II-8 Regarding Establishment of Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation in the Village of Kawauchi Attachment II-9 Restricted Area, Deliberate Evacuation Area, Evacuation-Prepared Area in case of Emergency and Regions including Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation (As of August 3, 2011) Attachment II-10 Regarding Lifestyle in “Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation” Attachment II-11 Overview of Heath Management Survey for the Residents in Fukushima Prefecture Attachment II-12 Health Management Survey for the Residents in Fukushima Prefecture (for all the prefecture’s residents) Attachment II-13 Provisional regulations limits regarding the radioactive materials contained in foods based on the provisions of food hygiene law Attachment II-14 Food Safety Risk Assessment Radioactive Nuclides in Foods (DRAFT) Attachment II-15 Concepts of Inspection Planning and the Establishment and Cancellation of Items and Areas to which Restriction of Distribution and/or Consumption of Foods Concerned Applies Attachment II-16 The instructions associated with food by Director-General of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (Restriction of distribution in Fukushima Prefecture) Attachment IV-1 Roadmap for Immediate Action for the Assistance of Residents Affected by the Nuclear Incident (As of July 19) Attachment IV-2 Main Points of the Progress Status of the “Roadmap for Immediate Actions for the Assistance of Residents Affected by the Nuclear Incident” Attachment IV-3 On Reduction of Dose Rate in School Building and School Yard of School in Fukushima Prefecture (Notice) Attachment IV-4 Notice: Reducing radiation doses at child-care facility buildings and playgrounds in Fukushima Prefecture Attachment IV-5 Basic Policy of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan on Radiation Protection for Termination of Evacuation and Reconstruction Attachment IV-6 Standpoint of the Nuclear Safety Commission for the Termination of Urgent Protective Actions implemented for the Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Attachment IV-7 The Basic Approach to Reassessing Evacuation Areas Attachment IV-8 Holding of Monitoring Coordination Meeting Attachment IV-9 Comprehensive Monitoring Plan (Provisional translation) Attachment IV-10 Decontamination Measures in Date City Attachment IV-11 The Basic Approach to Cleanup Work (Decontamination) in Residential Areas (Except Restricted Area and Deliberate Evacuation Area) in Fukushima Prefecture Attachment IV-12 Guideline on Disaster Waste Processing in Fukushima Prefecture Attachment IV-13 Interim Storage for the Disposal of Disaster Waste in Fukushima Prefecture Attachment IV-14 Incineration Facilities and Monitoring of Disaster Waste Disposal in Fukushima Prefecture Attachment IV-15 Measurement of Incineration Ash and Interim Handling Thereof at Incineration Facilities for General Waste Attachment IV-16 Promotion of Regional Disposal of Disaster Waste Attachment IV-17 Regarding “The Approach to Immediate Handling of Secondary Byproducts of Water and Sewage Treatment in which Radioactive Materials were Detected” Attachment IV-18 Temporary treatment of waste detected radioactive material Attachment IV-19 Measurement Results for the Concentration of Radioactive Cesium in Incinerated Ash at General Waste Treatment Facilities Attachment IV-20 Monitoring of Radioactive Materials at General Waste Treatment Facilities Attachment IV-21 Handling of General Waste Possibly Contaminated by Radioactivity at General Waste Treatment Facilities Attachment IV-22 Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Work Attachment VI-1 Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in charge of Nuclear Safety Regulation (Cabinet Decision) Attachment VI-2 Review on an Organization in charge of Nuclear Safety Regulation (Understanding by Relevant Ministers) Attachment VII-1 The matters that the Nuclear Safety Commission is requested to advice etc. Attachment VII-2 Near-term policy to ensure the safety for treating and disposing contaminated waste around the site of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plants Attachment VII-3 Basic Policy of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan on Radiation Protection for Termination of Evacuation and Reconstruction Attachment VII-4 Basic Policy on Radiation Monitoring from Now on Attachment VII-5 Standpoint of the Nuclear Safety Commission for the Termination of Urgent Protective Actions implemented for the Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Attachment VIII-1 Assessment Procedures and Implementation Plan Regarding the Comprehensive Assessments for the Safety of Existing Power Reactor Facilities Taking into Account the Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc. Attachment VIII-2 Request to the NISA to report on Comprehensive Safety Review of Existing Nuclear Power Plants Based on the Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Incident This page intentionally left blank Attachment II-1 Equipment to be Used in Controlled Areas 1. Values for various categories of controlled areas Category by degree of Contamination-A area Contamination-B area Contamination-C area contamination (No contamination) (Contamination-B) (Contamination-C) Surface concentration of contamination No contamination Less than 4 Less than 40 (Bq/cm2) Radioactive material concentration in the air No contamination Less than 1 10−4 Less than 1 10−3 (Bq/cm3) Note: • Natural nuclides are not included in the reference values. • The reference values for surface concentration of contamination are based on the smear method. • Radioactive material concentration in the air is based on 60Co as a representative. 2. Standards regarding the wearing of protective clothing and equipment Area category *1 *2 *2 Contamination-A Contamination-B1 Contamination-B2 Contamination-C Protective clothing Standard work clothes *3 — Clothes B — *4 — Clothes C — — — anorak — — — *5 Gloves B — — Gloves C — — — *5 Thin rubber gloves — — *6 Socks B — Socks C — — — Shoes B — — — Shoes B2 — — — Shoes C — — — Cap C — — — Standard work helmet *3 — Helmet B — *4 — Helmet C — — — *1 Wear protective clothing specified for Contamination-B1 areas when entering a Contamination-A area through a Contamination-B1 area. *2 These areas are classified as Contamination-B1 and B2 areas based on the degree of contamination. *3 This type of clothing may be used in place of Clothes B and Helmet B if it is considered unnecessary in terms of protection from radiation (e.g. during patrols). *4 This type of clothing may be used in place of standard work clothes or standard work helmets as required. *5 This type of clothing may be used as required. *6 This type of clothing does not need to be worn if it is considered unnecessary in terms of protection from radiation (e.g. during patrols). 1 Attachment II-1 3. Examples of protective clothing and equipment Standard work clothes, Clothes B, Clothes B, Gloves B, Clothes C, Gloves B, Shoes B Gloves B, Shoes B thin rubber gloves, thin rubber gloves, Cap C and Helmet B and Helmet B Shoes B2 and Helmet B and Socks C Full-face mask Clothes C, thin rubber gloves, Wind breaker jacket Cap C, Socks C, and pants Shoes C and Helmet C (Gloves C as required) Hooded mask 2 1 Attachment II Attachment Figure 1 Data on the Progression of the Accident at Unit 2 - 2 2 Attachment II Attachment Figure 2 Data on the Progression of the Accident at Unit 1 - 2 3 Attachment II Attachment Figure 3 Data on the Progression of the Accident at Unit 3 - 2 This page intentionally left blank Attachment II-3 Trends in the number of temporary access for residents into the restricted area NumberNumber of residents of residents and and households families entering entering the thehazard restricted area area 0 200 400 600 800 1000 5/10 5/12 5/22 5/25 5/26 5/27 6/4 6/5 6/6 6/7 6/8 6/9 6/11 6/12 6/14 6/15 6/18 6/19 6/21 6/22 6/25 6/26 6/28 Date 6/29 Number of residents entering 7/1 立入人数the restricted area 7/2 7/6 Number立入世帯数 of households 7/7 entering the restricted area 7/9 7/10 7/14 7/15 7/16 7/17 7/22 7/23 7/24 7/25 7/26 7/30 7/31 8/1 8/2 8/3 8/4 8/6 8/7 8/8 8/9 8/10 8/11 8/12 1 This page intentionally left blank Attachment II-4 Regarding Response to the Specific Spots Estimated to Exceed an Integral Dose of 20mSv Over a One Year Period After the Occurrence of the Accident June 16, 2011 Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters 1. The Government’s response to the spots where an integral dose will exceed 20mSv per year ・Outside the Deliberate Evacuation Areas as well as the Restricted Area, there exists plural spots inside certain areas that are not wide spread in region to warrant the designation of a Deliberate Evacuation Area, at which air dose rates have been maintained at a level that is estimated to exceed an integral dose of 20mSv over a one year period after the accident. ・The radiation dose decreases when going away from these spots, therefore, a risk of exceeding 20mSv per year through daily life in general is low. Considering that the level of 20mSv per year was adopted because it was the lowest figure within the range that ICRP and other organizations have indicated as a reference level, being different from the Deliberate Evacuation Areas where high dose areas expand in entire region, the spots are not in a situation that the Government should instruct across-the-board evacuation or restrict industrial activities from the standpoint of safety.
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