CIVIL AVIATION AND SCHEDULED AIR SERVICES IN COLONIAL BOTSWANA, 1935-1966: A HISTORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

A thesis submitted to the Committee on Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Arts and Science

TRENT UNIVERSITY Peterborough, Ontario, Canada © Copyright by Simon Isaac Bayani 2017 History M.A. Graduate Program May 2017

ABSTRACT Civil Aviation and Scheduled Air Services in Colonial Botswana, 1935-1966: A History of Underdevelopment

Simon Isaac Bayani

This thesis provides an in-depth and chronological study of the development of civil aviation in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (today’s Botswana), and the role played by the British Government in the development of this form of transport. The thesis argues that Her Majesty’s Government’s neglect and very little interest in its protectorate’s civil aviation represented a form of underdevelopment.

The study also reveals the constant contradiction between the neglect of the imperial government and the constant lobbying on the part of colonial administration in the Protectorate for the establishment of an air service. To the colonial administrators, civil aviation represented a symbol of modernity and progress as well as more practical advantages such as mobility. The thesis finally concludes that the Bechuanaland

Protectorate’s first airline was established due to growing nationalism both locally and on the continent, at large. The British Government facilitated the establishment of the airline as an attempt to appear benevolent to the protectorate on the eve of independence.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful to my supervisor, Timothy Stapleton, for his guidance and unrelenting demand for quality work throughout the writing of this thesis. He indefatigably reviewed and edited every chapter of this study, providing me with constructive feedback for the betterment of the thesis. I also applaud members of my supervising committee, David Sheinin and Van-Nguyen Marshall for reviewing the final draft of the thesis and pointing out areas of possible improvement. Director of the

History M.A Program, Jennine Hurl-Eamon also deserves a pat on the back for the care and support she showed me during my stay in Peterborough. She and her husband

Michael Eamon, made my experience at Trent University as well as in Peterborough, a very memorable one.

I am also deeply indebted to the staff at the Trent University Bata Library and

Inter-Library Loan for providing me with the necessary secondary material to aid my research. Lastly, my thanks and love go out to my siblings, Cynthia, Chipo, Kuda, David and Mandy for their love and support throughout my two years away from home.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii CHAPTER 1 ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 6 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AVIATION ...... 13 METHODOLOGY ...... 18 CHAPTER 2 ...... 20 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR SERVICES IN THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE: 1935-1940 ...... 20 CHARLES REY AND THE R.A.N.A ...... 20 NEGOTIATIONS PROVE TO BE FUTILE ...... 25 UNION GOVERNMENT TO THE RESCUE ...... 36 PROBLEMS WITH THE AIR SERVICE ...... 55 CONCLUSION ...... 61 CHAPTER 3 ...... 63 POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION IN THE PROTECTORATE, 1943-1953 ...... 63 STILL IN PURSUIT OF AN AIR SERVICE...... 63 THE RISE AND DEMISE OF ANOTHER AIR SERVICE ...... 74 MORE OFFERS BUT NO AIR SERVICE ...... 81 THE GHOST OF THE C.A.A. OPERATED SERVICE ...... 89 CONCLUSION ...... 95 CHAPTER 4 ...... 97 A GOVERNMENT OWNED AIR SERVICE AMIDST THE WINDS OF CHANGE IN AFRICA, 1956-1966 ...... 97 AFRICA IN THE 1950s AND 1960s ...... 98 LAST BID FOR AN OFF TERRITORY AIR SERVICE ...... 105 THE FIRST LOCALLY REGISTERED AIR TRANSPORT COMPANY ...... 113 TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE AND THE PROTECTORATE’S OWN AIRLINE ...... 119 CONCLUSION ...... 125 CONCLUSION ...... 127 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 130

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION Air services in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (today’s Botswana) began in the 1930s when the British colonial government was making attempts to keep up with the development of civil aviation in Africa. The main use for aircraft at this point was to transport mail and colonial officials. Colonial powers however were at this stage using military aviation to maintain control of African territories and suppress rebellions. At the same time these powers were also using civil aviation and their newly formed airlines as a tool of consolidating their presence in the colonies. In the 1920s, imperialism had been at its apogee and imperial communication and transport, together with economic exploitation was its main emphasis. This meant that if empires were to be maintained, there needed to be swifter and more frequent communication between the colonies and the mother countries. Robert McCormack has therefore argued that it was for this reason that air transport was added to the process of empire-building and colonial rule in Africa. McCormack continues by stating that, as a tool of colonial development, aviation was the ideal response to Africa’s dire need for improved communications and transport. Moreover, Africa was vast and transport infrastructure such as rail and road was limited. Air transport was therefore intended to play an important role in the colonial world of Africa, and this role became evident in the frequent air activities in the years before the Second World War.1

Given these assertions by McCormack, the thesis intends to trace the genesis of air services in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The thesis also aims at scrutinizing the

1 R McCormack, “Airlines and Empires: Great Britain and the ‘Scramble for Africa’, 1919-1939,” Canadian Journal of African Studies, 10. No. 1, (1976): 88.

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British Government’s seemingly ambivalent attitude towards the establishment of an air service in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. For over two decades, the British

Government was reluctant to establish air services that would be fully owned by the

Protectorate, but rather, tenders would be given out to private flying companies in the

Southern African region to run scheduled air services in the Protectorate. The thesis therefore seeks to establish the reasons for this and also find out what led to the British

Government’s decision to establish a national air service for Bechuanaland towards independence in 1966. Post World War II developments in international aviation will also be examined, and their effect on civil aviation in the Protectorate established. Since air services in the Protectorate initially served the purpose of transporting airmail and colonial officers, the thesis intends to establish the point at which air services became available to the general public.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In understanding the genesis and development of civil aviation and air services in the

Bechuanaland Protectorate, this thesis will use theories of development and underdevelopment to support its arguments. The scholarship on these theories is quite vast and therefore discussing some of them is important.

A number of scholars have tried to define development and underdevelopment and their definitions have appeared to converge. A couple of those are Walter Rodney and Atara Otite. Rodney has argued that lack of development should not be mistaken for underdevelopment because people have always developed in one way or the other to a greater or less extent. He then argues that human social development has always been uneven and therefore underdevelopment can only make sense as a means of

2 comparing levels of development.2 These ideas have been corroborated by the Nigerian scholar, Atara Otite, who has argued that underdevelopment is not undevelopment, which is the lack of development. Instead, he argues that underdevelopment can only be seen from a comparative perspective because it does not mean zero-degree of development but greater than zero.3 Even though the idea of underdevelopment is based on politics and economics, it can still be used in understanding the history of civil aviation in Bechuanaland because it can answer the question of why the British

Government did not make it a priority to establish a national air service in

Bechuanaland, while in other British colonies, they were prompt in doing so.

Senanu Kwasi Kutor states that development and underdevelopment as a concept, has subsidiary theories, one of which is the theory of modernization which emerged in the 1950s.4 He further states that this theory argues that societies develop in predictable stages. This development, according to Kutor, depends on the transmission of technology as well as political and social changes that come about as a result.5 This idea can therefore be applied or seen from the perspective of the aviation and air services in Bechuanaland. The thesis will argue that though it took an unreasonably long time to come about, the establishment of national air services in the Bechuanaland Protectorate in the 1960s was a move for development of the Protectorate by the British, fully inspired by impending independence. This would somehow show the crown’s benevolence to the Protectorate and its intention to develop or modernize it as a way of making up for lost time on the eve of independence. The establishment of the national

2 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 13. 3 A. Otite, “Theoretical Framework towards Understanding the Economic Development and Underdevelopment of Nigeria,” African Journal of History and Culture, 3, no. 8 (2011): 123. 4 S. K, Kutor. “Development and Underdevelopment of African Continent: The Blame Game and the Way Forward”, Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 4, no. 7 (2014): 15. 5Kutor. “Development and Underdevelopment,”16.

3 air service would also represent a symbol of independence from neighbouring South

Africa, on which the Protectorate depended heavily.

Kutor has gone further to argue that African underdevelopment is a direct result of colonialism in the sense that exploitation of natural resources from the colonies was always meant to develop the colonial masters to the detriment of the colony itself.6 Keith

Griffin seems to concur with Kutor on this theory of underdevelopment. Griffin is of the belief that for the past five centuries, underdeveloped countries’ histories have been the result of European expansion and development. He argues that by dominating the international economy, Europe caused underdevelopment for much of the rest of the world and even made it difficult for them to escape from this underdevelopment.7

Walter Rodney has made the same argument with regard to Africa. Ronald H. Chilcote has also argued that with underdevelopment, the bottom line is always that there is an exploitation of the backward and peripheral area for the benefit of the more central area.

He gives an example of the theory of ‘internal colonialism’, an idea that was developed by Mexican sociologist Pablo Casanova, in which he argued that a metropolitan centre within the nation gains dominance over the peripheral area and exploits it.8

Ian Roxborough corroborates these ideas of industrialized areas exploiting the marginalized and less developed areas, thus leading to underdevelopment. Roxborough discusses the United Nation’s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which reported that the changes that took place within industrialised countries of the centre and the underdeveloped peripheral countries were connected.9 According to the

6Kutor. “Development and Underdevelopment,”18. 7 K. Griffin, “Underdevelopment in History”, in The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, ed. C K. Wilber (New York: Random House, Inc, 1973), 68. 8R, H. Chilcote, Theories of Development and Underdevelopment, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 10. 9 I. Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), 27. 4

ECLA report, the late nineteenth century and the mid twentieth century had seen development directed outside Latin America. Roxborough argues therefore that Latin

America had become a supplier of raw materials and even food for the industrialised countries and at the same time importing the manufactured products made from their own raw materials.10

Andre Gunder Frank has also argued that underdevelopment is a result of the economic and sometimes political relationship between the satellite underdeveloped countries and the developed metropolitan countries.11 Frank is of the view that these relations between the satellite and the metropolis represent an integral part of the capitalist system. Keith Griffin holds the same sentiments in suggesting that European expansion was due to mercantilist-capitalist states competing for trading areas. Griffin argues that this competition was both violent and peaceful and that in the process of obtaining these trading monopolies, European countries inevitably found themselves forcefully acquiring colonies, dependent territories and satellites.12 Though it was not by force, the Bechuanaland Protectorate was established in the late nineteenth century in the manner that Griffin discuses above. The declaration of the protectorate was important to the British for strategic reasons. The British were very much concerned by

German advancements in South West Africa (Namibia) and Portuguese activities in

East Africa (Mozambique) and feared that if they did not occupy Bechuanaland, the route from Cape to Cairo would be effectively cut. They thus declared Bechuanaland a

10Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, 27. 11 A G. Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment” in Imperialism and Underdevelopment, ed. R I. Rhodes (London: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 4. 12 Griffin, “Underdevelopment in History,” 69. 5

British protectorate in 1885 with the help of the Tswana chiefs who feared conquest by the Boer republics.13

Even though in Africa including Bechuanaland, railroads and other communication infrastructure had been established in the early colonial era to extract minerals and facilitate movement of labour, the air services in Bechuanaland were not like that. They were established for the benefit of colonial administrators for decades before they were made available for all the people. Even before that, the British government was still reluctant to establish those air services for the colonial administrators. The thesis will therefore argue that this was tantamount to the underdevelopment of the colony or in this case the Protectorate, by the colonizer/protector.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Flying is a very important mode of transportation and it is the fastest compared to other modes such as road, sea and railway. The genesis of aviation goes as far back as the early 20th century with the invention of the new flying machine in 1905 by the Wright brothers in America. The special quality of aviation as a form of transport is that, by using the air as their highway, aeroplanes can ignore the obstacles that face mechanical transport on the ground and that the aerial highway covers both land and water.14 In addition, airplanes move faster than other modes of transport. Be that as it may, aviation in its formative years found a more useful role in the military than in civilian transportation.

Historiography

13A. Sillery, Founding a Protectorate: History of Bechuanaland, 1885-1895, (London: Mouton & CO., 1965), 39. 14 D. Cumming, “Aviation in Africa,” African Affairs, 1, no. 242, (January, 1962): 29.

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The field of aviation has over the years attracted historians who have shown a lot of interest in the technical aspects of the field and on aircraft while often abandoning the broader context and developments associated with aviation. The most available scholarship on the history of aviation is of military nature, which is no surprise given that aircraft became incorporated into the military immediately after their invention.

Some scholars have argued that though from the onset aviation had started as just a mode of transportation, manufacturers like the Wright brothers, who arguably designed the first plane, soon realised that it would be far more useful in war and therefore offered it to the United States Army and Navy.15 From then on, the aviation industry would be a predominantly military phenomenon in the Great War (1914-18).

As a result, most of the literature available on aviation is chiefly on military aviation. It therefore becomes difficult for one to discuss civil aviation without tracing it back to military aviation. Military historians like Charles J. Gross, John M. Andrade and Paul

A. Jackson have written histories of different air forces around the world. Their works chronicle the genesis of these air forces and appear to be somewhat of patriotic nature.

Author of Command of the Air, Giulio Douhet is one of the earlier writers who popularised the theory of airpower in the 1920s. He was a major advocate for the use of aircraft in warfare, arguing that with planes, it is quite easy to go far behind the enemy’s lines of defence without necessarily having to break through them. He argued that all this was possible through air power.16 He quickly became associated with the use of aerial attack on civilian populations as part of aerial campaigns.17 Bombing civilians was a way of forcing the enemy to surrender. From a military family, Douhet, served in the Italian army and later became commander of the first Italian aviation battalion even

15 H. M. Deter, “The History of American Aviation”, Military Affairs, 17, no. 4, (1953): 192. 16 G. Douhet, Command of the Air 2nd Edition, (New York: Coward-McCann INC, 1927), 9. 17 S. L. A. Marshal, reviewing G. Douhet, “Command of the Air”, Military Affairs, 7, no.1, (1943): 45. 7 though he was not a pilot himself. After the First World War, he spent the next years writing about airpower with the subsequent publication of Command of the Air.18

Douhet was disappointed with Italy’s incompetence in the First World War and the bloody stalemate against Austria, and his air power theory was a reaction to this. Douhet believed that the unbreakable stalemate on the ground was the result of technology and modern warfare and that airpower was to restore mobility to war.19 It should be noted however that the Italians had been the first country to use aircraft in warfare in 1911 when they invaded Libya.20

Having become popular among military and aviation enthusiasts, Douhet’s ideas about airpower became the foundation of many nations’ desire to develop aviation sections for their militaries. This is apparent in J M Andrade’s 1977 publication, Spanish and Portuguese Military Aviation and P A Jackson’s Dutch Military Aviation published in 1978.21 Having been published a year apart, these works demonstrate the effects of

Douhet’s ideas on these nations and the measures they pursued in order to become highly capable of aerial attack. These scholars’ works are characterized by a lot of technical detail about aviation and aircraft and are simple chronicles of the establishment of air forces.

In 1989 Alfred Gollin published The Impact of Airpower on the British People and Government. Gollin argued that the years 1908 and 1909 were characterized by great tension in Britain, as the British leaders made the people aware of their nation’s

18 Airpower theorist-Douhet, http://www.apc.maxwell.af.mil/l002/pubs/alpha2_script.pdf accessed 15 June 2016. 19 P, Meilinger. “The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine,” Journal of Military History, 64, no. 2, (2000): 472. 20 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 198. 21 For detailed reading, see J M. Andrade, Spanish and Portuguese Military Aviation, (Leicester: Midland Countries Publications, 1977), 9. And P A. Jackson, Dutch Military Aviation, 1945-1978, (Leicester: Midland Countries Publications, 1978), 7.

8 vulnerability to a German invasion.22 This brought a lot of terror to the people. When the German Count Zeppelin began to design an airship that was later named after him, in Britain concerns about the country’s aerial defences kept on rising and this led to the emergence of what Gollin calls “Air Power Politics.” This was a period when different governments’ main concerns and parliamentary debates were about acquiring aircraft and developing aerial defences.23

Air Power and Colonial Control by David Omissi shows how the British tried to control and maintain order in their colonies. He states that in Iraq for instance, the

Royal Air Force was deployed by Britain to bomb rebel troops in the Kurdistan region in 1923. Apart from bombing the rebels in support of the British Army’s ground forces, another role of the RAF was the ferrying of troops, dropping supplies and evacuating the wounded.24 Omissi states that the RAF was deployed in a violent manner in 1919 against rioters in Egypt even though the founder of the RAF, Hugh Trenchard, denied these allegations. In the book, Omissi also alludes to the use of the RAF in suppressing the revival of the Mahdist movement in the Sudan as well as policing and suppressing a Somali rebellion in 1920.25 This shows that air power was perceived as an effective tool of colonial control. Moreover, Omissi’s work also demonstrates the influence of

Douhet’s air power ideas on British leaders who used air power to control their colonies.

Another scholar who has written about air power in Africa, particularly South

Africa is Tilman Dedering. Dedering is of the view that aviation in the Union of South

Africa presented a new means of controlling the black majority in the country. He also shows how the aeroplane was received by the people of South Africa and the fear

22 A. Gollin, The Impact of Air Power on the British People and Government, 1909-14, (London: The McMillan Press LTD, 1989), 49. 23 Gollin, The Impact of Air Power, 65. 24 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, 32. 25 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, 52. 9 associated with it. For example, in 1914, some Pietermaritzburg residents reported seeing a flying machine that had a huge syringe in its tail. They were even convinced that the Germans intended to use these machines to spill paraffin over Natal and set it on fire.26

Dedering also shows that in the case of South Africa, it was well established in the 1920s that the South African Air Force’s (SAAF) main job was to maintain internal security. While the use of the SAAF in supressing the Rand Rebellion of 1922 is a well- known example of this, Dedering also brings out Douhet’s influence on South African policy makers. This influence related to ideas of intimidating the masses through air power. He mentions a 1926 British report on the Union’s defence system, which stated that the dangers of a foreign invasion were very slight, but that the union used every opportunity it could to impress (or rather to intimidate) the Africans by conducting gunning and bombing demonstrations.27 Dedering states that the report even had a section that talked about the possibilities of troubles caused by Africans. This was because the officials were paranoid that the black majority would someday start an uprising as was the case in the Zulu Uprising of 1906. The report basically stated that if the Africans were to attack white people, they would scatter and it would be difficult to identify the culprits. Therefore, if the culprits were to be discovered to be from the same area, it would be a good idea to bomb that area from the air whether the culprits were home or not.28 This would be a way of instilling terror among the Africans.

After the Great War, the aeroplane became a symbol of maturity and military superiority. Scholars who have written about the genesis of civil aviation appear to have

26 T. Dedering, “Air Power in South Africa, 1914-1939,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 41, no. 3 (2015): 453. 27 T. Dedering, “Air Power in South Africa, 460. 28 T. Dedering, “Air Power in South Africa, 460. 10 been writing from an economic perspective. Such scholars as Peter Fearon, Robert

Bluffield, and Mark Dierikx have written histories of civil aviation in Europe. Their works centre on the argument that at the end of the First World War, these countries looked at civil aviation as a tool of national prestige. Peter Fearon has focused on the economic implications of the large surplus of aircraft and pilots at the end of the First

World War. He states that after the war ended, the large surplus of aircraft was used for joyriding and taxi services. His main argument however is that commercial aviation had lots of difficulties during its formative years because air transport companies had a number of challenges, one of them being that they lacked the capital to develop or at least modify aircraft specifically for commercial work.29 In another work, Fearon discussed the economic implications of Britain’s own Imperial Airways on the aviation industry. His argument being that, Imperial Airways created a market for civil aircraft, but only those produced in Britain. He further asserted that the purchasing policy of the airline had a hidden intention to create a market for the British aircraft industry.30 It will be later seen that even with the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate’s first airline, British aircraft would be the ones to be used.

Mark Dierikx has adopted a similar economic approach in his interpretation of the emergence of a civil aviation industry in Britain, France and Germany. He states that in these countries, the aviation industry was unproductive and thus received financial support from the government in the form of subsidies. Dierikx further argues that the most common kind of subsidy involved remuneration for the transportation of mail and he argues that it has been estimated that less than 10% of the money that these

P. Fearon, “The Formative Years of the British Aircraft Industry, 1913-1924,” The Business History Review, 43, no. 4 (1969): 477.29 30 P. Fearon, “The Growth of Aviation in Britain,” Journal of Contemporary History, 20, no. 1 (1985): 30.

11 airlines received for transporting mail can be regarded as a way of paying for the services rendered, while the rest was subsidy.31 Even though Fearon and Dierikx both looked at the economic side of the aviation industry particularly in Britain, Dierikx seems to make more interpretations and uses some statistical evidence even though very nominally.

In 2009 Robert Bluffield took a different approach from his predecessors when he published Imperial Airways. While Peter Fearon had argued that Imperial Airways provided a market for British manufactured aircraft, Bluffield brought out something different about the airline. He argued that the airline was to be seen as the government’s very own instrument just as Pan American Airways would later be seen by the U.S.

Government in 1927. His main point being that politically, a national air carrier was a necessity because it would link the mother country with her empire.32 However,

Bluffield does corroborate Fearon’s argument about Imperial Airways providing a market for British manufacturers. He argues that after the First World War had ended and there was no longer a demand for military machines, Imperial Airways became the ideal enterprise to determine which aircraft to build, more so that it was the only airline in Britain.33

In Africa, just like in the other continents, aviation was first of a military nature before civil aviation began. However, the literature on civil aviation in Africa is very limited. The earliest work on African civil aviation is H. Burchall’s 1933 article, Air

Services in Africa. Burchall was an amateur historian writing at a time when colonialism was still at its peak and therefore his ideas seem to have been in line with that context.

31Dierikx, “Struggle for Prominence,” 333. 32 R. Bluffield, Imperial Airways: The Birth of the British Airline Industry 1914-1940, (Surrey: Ian Allan Publishing, 2009), 39. 33R. Bluffield, Imperial Airways, 39.

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He was also the General Manager (Commercial) for Imperial Airways. Burchall wrote about the development of British, French and Belgian airlines in colonial Africa, showing consolidation of European presence on the continent.34 Robert McCormack began writing about aviation in colonial Africa much later after nationalism and decolonization in Africa. Looking at Britain’s Imperial Airways, McCormack argues that the airline made Cecil Rhodes’ dream of ‘Cape to Cairo’ a reality.35

McCormack’s works ranging from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s seem to have one thing in common. Their main arguments show that aviation was an agent of colonisation and colonial development. McCormack’s view is that the history of air transport development in Africa is like the earlier ‘scramble for Africa’. He shows that even though Great Britain, France and Belgium were the first and major powers of this second conquest of Africa, they did not go unchallenged. He talks about both Deutsche

Luft Hansa and the Junkers Company advancing German ambitions in Africa. It might be worth mentioning that Germany had lost its colonies after the First World War.

Germany however pursued air rights in Egypt, the Gambia, South-West Africa and

South Africa from 1924 onwards.36

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AVIATION

Military Aviation

In the United States the Wright brothers made their test flight in North Carolina in 1903, believing that peace and security would be ensured by their invention. However, when there seemed to be no commercial market for their invention, the brothers looked to the

34 H. Burchall, “Air Services in Africa,” Journal of the Royal African Society, 32, no. 126 (1933): 59. 35 R. McCormack, “Imperial Mission: The Air Route to Cape Town 1918-32,” Journal of Contemporary History, 9, no. 4 (1974): 77. 36McCormack, “Airlines and Empires,” 90.

13 armed forces for business.37 Just like in other countries during that period, America during World War I turned to aviation as a decisive solution to some national security issues. Air power became attractive because for America, it would imply glamour, technological development and modernity.38 In the beginning the U.S. Government was a bit sceptical about military aviation and their aerial technology remained primitive and unreliable. There was a shortage of pilots and no clear military roles for aircraft in the U.S. Also army aviation was not a legal entity until 1914 when Congress passed legislation in July adding an Aviation Section to the Signal Corps.39

Civil Aviation

In the United States the end of the First World War saw the use of aeroplanes grow first in mail services and then passenger services. This was most likely due to aircraft capacity. After the Air Mail Act of 1925 and the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the subsequent years would be characterised by government efforts to stimulate the growth of passenger air traffic at the same time reducing the cost for maintaining the air mail service.40 The ceasing of the air mail contracts between the government and private carriers, even though they would later be reintroduced in 1934 but with reduced compensation rates, allowed for further stimulus in the passenger business.41

In China, just like in the United States, the government’s first use of the plane was to transport air mail. After the China National Aviation Company was established in 1929, two contracts were signed with an American company called Aviation

Exploration Inc. The signing of these contracts meant that some rights were to be

37 C J. Gross, American Military Aviation: The Indispensable Arm, (Texas: A&M University Press, 2002), 3. 38 Gross, American Military Aviation, 3. 39 Gross, American Military Aviation, 22. 40 L C. Sorrell, “Air Transport Industries in Wartime,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 230, Transportation: War and Postwar (1943): 78. 41 L C. Sorrell, “Air Transport Industries in Wartime,” 78.

14 transferred to the American company. These included the rights to operate a flying school, a flying machine factory, air transport and air mail.42 On 20 April 1929 the

Chinese entered into another contract with Aviation Exploration Inc. The Chinese

Minister of Railways signed the contract which provided for the establishment of regular air mail in China.43

Another contract was signed on 21 February 1930 by the Chinese Ministry of

Communication and the Deutsche Luft Hansa (DLH), which provided for the establishment of a joint Chinese-German air transport company.44 The contract stipulated that the Ministry of Communications would own two thirds of the company, which they named the Euroasia Aviation Corporation, while one third of the company would belong to DLH.45 This development was similar to the expansion of Western civil aviation to Africa. The Germans here were also expanding their civil aviation to the Chinese who were at that time experiencing civil wars and foreign domination.46

It has been established that many countries after the Great War had many planes and put them to use in civil aviation. Some European countries established airlines to carry passengers while the U.S and China employed planes in air mail transport before carrying passengers. In Africa, civil aviation was to become very popular as well. It is worthwhile to note that the potential military application was even more apparent than before. Keeping up with air transport was an investment in the future in both peace and war.

Civil Aviation in Africa

42 L. Anderson, A History of Chinese Aviation: Encyclopaedia of Aircraft and Aviation in China until 1949, (Taipei: AHS of ROC, 2008), 200. 43Anderson, A History of Chinese Aviation, 200. 44Anderson, A History of Chinese Aviation, 207. 45Anderson, A History of Chinese Aviation, 207. 46 D C. Wright, The History of China, (Oxford: Greenwood, 1960), 137. 15

Just like in Europe and America, military aviation was a development that preceded civil aviation in Africa. Though in Africa military aviation was used by colonial powers to supress rebellions, in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia it was developed by the self-governing settler states. In 1912, the South African Defence Act provided for the establishment of what was then named the South African Aviation Corps. Its first major use was in January 1915 in the German South West Africa campaign under the command of the modernizing Prime Minister General Louis Botha. The SAAF itself was established in 1920, with its first major campaign being in the 1922 Rand Strike.47

By 1930 however, there were three regular civil air services operating in Africa.

In the Union of South Africa there was Union Airways (which will be discussed shortly below), running a regular service within the Union. In the Belgian Congo a Belgian air transport company called Sabena was also in business. Along the north-west coast of

Africa, the French Aeropostale line flew to South America.48This shows that civil aviation had now spread to the colonies as a tool for colonial development and that there was a bit of a shift from military to civil aviation. It was not a total shift since aircraft were still being used for colonial control.

In 1932 Imperial Airways began operations in Africa and started linking Cape

Town and Cairo. However, before this happened, there were already two developments that had taken place in the Union of South Africa in 1929 regarding civil aviation.

According to McCormack;

The first was a secretly negotiated agreement with Great Britain in which South Africa committed £400.000 to the cost of establishing the Cape Town to Cairo route that started in 1932 operated by Imperial Airways. The second development was to provide an £8,000 per year subsidy to the newly formed

47The History of the SAAF, http://www.af.mil.za/about_us/history.html, accessed 9 July 2016. 48H. Burchall, “Air Services in Africa,” Journal of the Royal African Society, 32, no. 126 (1933): 59.

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Union Airways, a local private company organizing the first scheduled airline services in the country.49

The Union Airways was established in 1929, following Major Miller’s five day,

3, 680 km flight around South Africa the previous year.50 The founding of the airline was national news and it brought great excitement around the country and the press followed everything about it. By 1934, Union Airways had flown about 40, 000 km each year with annual passenger loads of 200 and mail loads of 9,000 kg.51 Other developments included the establishment of flying clubs around South African cities in the late 1920s. By 1928, five light aeroplane clubs had been established in the country with about 27 aeroplanes registered.52 Just about the same time that the Union Airways and Imperial Airways were operating in South Africa, air clubs and air shows were also becoming popular. Gordon Pirie stated that “by January 1933, the Johannesburg Light

Air Club had carried 9,000 passengers and had taught 100 people to fly.”53 These were almost certainly white South Africans.

Another related development was the establishment of the Southern Rhodesia

Air Force. In March 1936 Royal Air Force personnel arrived in Salisbury to give advice on the establishment of an air unit in Southern Rhodesia. The Government Gazette of

16 July 1936 then announced the formation of the Air Section of the Southern

Rhodesian military which would be named the Southern Rhodesia Air Force.54 On 1

April 1940, the No. 1 Squadron, Southern Rhodesia Air Force was officially renamed

49 R. McCormack, “Man with a Mission: Oswald Pirow and South African Airways, 1933-39,” The Journal of African History, 20, no. 4, White Presence and Power in Africa (1979):546. 50 G. Pirie, “British air shows in South Africa, 1932/33: ‘airmindedness’, ambition and anxiety,” Kronos, no. 35 (2009): 53. 51 Pirie, “British air shows in South Africa,” 54. 52 Pirie, “British air shows in South Africa,” 53. 53 Pirie, “British air shows in South Africa,” 53. 54The History of the Rhodesian Air Force, http://rhodesianforces.org/RhodesianAirForceHistory.htm, accessed 9 July 2016.

17

No. 237 (Rhodesia) Squadron Royal Air Force and was deployed in the East African campaign to defend British East Africa from the Italians during the Second World War.

The squadron was also placed under the responsibility of the Royal Air Force as far as pay and maintenance costs were concerned.55 Southern Rhodesia proved to be a significant contributor to the British Empire Air Training Scheme and prepared over

8000 men to serve in the RAF.56

An important point regarding the establishment of the South African and

Rhodesian Air Forces is that it was a clear indication of the fear within white minority regimes. These regimes were quick to establish their air forces for the purpose of controlling the majority black population. This once again demonstrates the use of air power as a tool of colonial control.

METHODOLOGY

This thesis has made use of primary sources obtained from the Botswana National

Archives and Records Services in Gaborone. The primary sources are mainly correspondence between colonial administrators in Bechuanaland and Cape Town, the

Union Government, the British Dominions Office, the Treasury, Air Ministry, Imperial

Airways and several more flying companies in Southern Africa. These materials were pivotal in the production of this thesis as they paint a clear picture of the events and circumstances leading to the establishment of an air service in the Bechuanaland

Protectorate. In order to present a comparative analysis of the development of the air service in the Protectorate and the rest of the continent, the thesis utilised published secondary sources in the form of books and journal articles. Given that this is the first

55 B. Salt, A Pride of Eagles: A History of the Rhodesian Air Force, (Durban: 30 South Publishers, 2000), 71. 56 A. Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War, (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 183.

18 history of civil aviation in Botswana, the thesis depended highly on primary sources.

The challenges that presented themselves in the primary research however, had to do with the physical conditions of the primary sources themselves. Some letters and minutes of meetings were too deteriorated to be used. Another challenge was that some of the sources which appeared to be listed in the archives catalogue, could not be found.

This created a gap in some of the findings of the research. It should be explained that even though sources for this thesis were also from elite bureaucrats, they were useful because the thesis seeks to explore the history of a national institution in Botswana; the national airline, which is today a major air carrier in the region.

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CHAPTER 2

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR SERVICES IN THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE: 1935-1940

Introduction

This chapter deals with the genesis of civil aviation and air services in the Bechuanaland

Protectorate (B.P). It follows attempts made by the B.P administration in establishing an air service that would be used by the colonial officials and for transporting official mail. Air services in the B.P were a development that was established after a series of negotiations between the protectorate, the High Commissioner’s Office in the Cape, the

Dominions Office and the Air Ministry in London. Starting from 1935, Resident

Commissioner of the B.P Charles Rey made it a priority to establish air services for the benefit of colonial officers, even though the British Government dragged its feet in lending a helping hand. Given lack of help from the British Government, the protectorate would eventually have an air service run by the Union Government which unfortunately had to cease operations after just one year in 1940.

CHARLES REY AND THE R.A.N.A

When Colonel Charles Rey became Resident Commissioner in 1930, the B.P had no scheduled air services at all. Even though there were no aviation activities taking place in the territory, several aerodromes existed. The oldest of these was the Palapye aerodrome, located about one mile west of the Palapye Railway Station. This 600 x 600- yard strip was built in 1919. Other aerodromes were made at Serowe, Francistown and

20

Artesia at which aircraft landed between 1919 and 1921 for navigation and mapping purposes.57 These were probably the first flights ever to happen in the country.

In his quest to find a way to establish an air service in the B.P, Resident

Commissioner Rey turned his attention to Rhodesian and Nyasaland Airways Limited

(R.A.N.A). This was an air transport company that was formed in 1933 with a view to facilitate the amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

These three territories would later be joined together in 1953 to form the Federation of

Rhodesia and Nyasaland, a move that was believed would bring tremendous economic growth to the three governments of the white settlers.58 R.A.N.A was formed from the remnants of the Rhodesian Aviation Company which had voluntarily gone into liquidation after operating at a loss.59 In February 1935, Rey met with Captain G.

Thomson, who was the Operations Manager at R.A.N.A. Rey explained to Thomson that what he needed was an air service that would make a complete circular tour of the

Protectorate once per fortnight. If R.A.N.A was to provide such a service, Rey suggested that the aeroplane be stationed at Bulawayo.60 This was because in Southern

Rhodesia, Bulawayo had always been the hub of civil aviation and railways, and was a commercial city. Moreover, Bulawayo was close to the BP and was also where R.A.N.A was established on 12 October 1933.61 Furthermore, Rey also made it clear that it was his intention to have wireless communications between all main settlements in the B.P so as to ensure the safety and efficiency of the air service. Thomson, however, pointed out that he would have to return to Salisbury (now Harare) to prepare the estimates for

57 Botswana National Archives and Records Services (Hereafter referred to as BNARS), S. 12/6, Bechuanaland Protectorate, Aviation Report for the Half-year ended 30 September 1921, nd. 58 A Robinson, “1961, the Year of Decision in Rhodesia and Nyasaland,” African Affairs, 60. no. 240, (1961): 401. 59 Birth of an Airline, http://www.rhodesia.nl/Aviation/rana.htm, accessed 16 September 2016. 60 BNARS, S. 367/2, Memorandum of conversation between Col. C. Rey and Cpt. G. Thomson, 5 February 1935, Mafikeng. 61 Birth of an Airline, http://www.rhodesia.nl/Aviation/rana.htm, accessed 16 September 2016. 21 running the proposed air service and send them to Imperial Airways, who were the operational managers and technical advisors of R.A.N.A. If and when Imperial Airways approved the figures, the R.A.N.A Board would then provide the B.P with a final quotation for the proposed air service.62

Rey informed High Commissioner Herbert Stanley of the outcomes of his meeting with Thomson on February 5th 1935. He explained that Thomson had provided him with a memorandum detailing the type of aeroplane to be supplied, the number of passengers and weight of luggage and mail to be carried. He stated that the full cost of the service was subject to confirmation by Imperial Airways, and that Thomson was sending them the details of the proposed air service on February 13th.63 Rey further stated that it would be very advantageous for the protectorate administration to have its air service provided by R.A.N.A because they were financially stable and therefore reliable. The enthusiasm that Rey showed with regards to the air service in the B.P was great. He had the Protectorate administration’s interests at heart even though the British government would make this a little hard for him. Even though Rey had this interest, it is worthwhile mentioning that it was solely for the benefit of the colonial administration and not the people of the B.P.

In 1935 when William Clark took over from Herbert Stanley as High

Commissioner, he touched base with the Secretary of State at the Dominions Office,

James Henry Thomas regarding the proposed air service in the B.P. Clark stated that he was in no position to offer an opinion on the proposed scheme but that he could tell that

62 BNARS, S. 367/2, Memorandum of conversation. 63 BNARS, S. 367/2, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 12 February 1935.

22 it had the advantage of providing an air service for a fixed sum and therefore relieving the B.P of the responsibility for purchasing aircraft and engaging staff.64

On 16 April 1935 a meeting was held at the Air Ministry offices in London regarding the proposed air service in the B.P. Present at this meeting was Resident

Commissioner Charles Rey on behalf of the B.P. There were also representatives from the Dominions Office, the Air Ministry and Imperial Airways.65 Many issues were covered at this meeting regarding the proposed air service. It was agreed that permission would have to be acquired from the Union government for the operation of an air service in their territory. This was because Mafikeng, the capital of the B. P., was located in the

Union. Though the Dominions Office offered to find ways of getting permission from the Union government, Charles Rey suggested that he should speak with the South

African Minister of Railways, Harbours and Defence, Oswald Pirow on the subject.

Two months after the meeting at the Air Ministry, Charles Rey heard from the

Dominions Office. He received a letter that basically stated that there was a new Heads of Agreement that Imperial Airways had drawn up based on the notes of the previous meeting. Imperial Airways had made revisions to the agreement and had set a date for another meeting on June 27, 1935 at the Air Ministry offices.66 The Dominions Office attached a revised Heads of Agreement to the letter. The new Heads of Agreement stated that R.A.N.A was to provide an agreed upon aircraft, and with that aircraft operate a service leaving Bulawayo at regular fortnight intervals on a circuit starting from and returning to Bulawayo via Palapye Road, Mafikeng, Tsabong, Lehututu, Ganzi, Maun,

Rakops, Serowe and Palapye Road or otherwise as agreed upon by the B.P government

64 BNARS, S. 367/2, High Commissioner at the Cape to British Dominion’s Office, 18 February 1935. 65 BNARS, S. 367/2, Air Services for Bechuanaland Government: Notes of a meeting in Room 26 Gwydr House at 3:15pm, 16 April 1935. 66 BNARS, S. 367/2, Dominions Office to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 22 June 1935. 23 and the company.67 This meant that the B.P also had a say in air route to be taken by the aircraft.

At the second meeting in June 1935, the new Heads of Agreement was discussed as it had been revised by Imperial Airways. The parties in attendance were representatives from the Air Ministry, Imperial Airways, the Dominions Office and

Charles Rey as the B.P representative. The new document was not very different to the first Heads of Agreement. The meeting was arranged to determine if the B.P. government and R.A.N.A were satisfied with the terms of the agreement, and for the most part it seems the two parties were content with it.

With regards to the wireless facilities that Rey had offered to set up at the different stations, he stated that some offers had been received to equip Mafikeng and four other stations with wireless telephony for £ 1,000 and to operate the stations.68He did not explain where the offers had come from. He did, however, explain that the stations would not be provided exclusively for the air service. Facilities would just be made available for the air service at fixed times and for intermittent short periods during the day for all purposes necessary. The other stations to receive these facilities in addition to Mafikeng were Maun, Ghanzi, Tsabong and Lehututu. 69 Charles Rey was anxious to know whether or not these arrangements would be regarded as sufficient for the requirements of the air service but Colonel Burchall and Captain Galpin from

Imperial Airways stated that they were sufficient. The latter gentlemen also stated that it had to be understood that the regularity of the service would suffer if the facilities did

67 BNARS, S. 367/2, Heads of Agreement Between the Government of Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesian and Nyasaland Airways Limited, 22 June 1935. 68 BNARS S. 367/2, Air Service fir the Government of Bechuanaland Protectorate: Notes of a meeting held in Room 26, Gwydr House at 2: 45 p. m, 27 June 1935. 69 BNARS S. 367/2, Air Service fir the Government of Bechuanaland Protectorate. 24 not meet expectations.70 At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that the Air Ministry circulate the minutes of the meeting (revised if possible). Furthermore, it was agreed that when Imperial Airways had acquired R.A.NA’s consent to the revised agreements, the Dominions Office would put the case to the Treasury, whose sanction of the scheme was required, and when the Treasury’s authority had been received, an arrangement would be made with the company agents for the initialization of the air service.71

NEGOTIATIONS PROVE TO BE FUTILE

At the beginning of 1936 the Bechuanaland Protectorate Air Service had still not been established regardless of the talks that ensued from February to July 1935. An agreement had not yet been reached and it was still difficult to identify the source/cause of the delay. It is clear, however, that this was not the fault of the Resident

Commissioner’s office nor the High Commissioner’s. Even R.A.N.A at this stage was not to blame for the delay. Blame could all be placed somewhere between the British

Treasury, the Air Ministry, the Dominions Office, and Imperial Airways.

In 1936 Imperial Airways’ Captain Galpin wrote to Mr. Burkett in the Air

Ministry apologising on behalf of Imperial Airways that there had yet been no further information about the proposed Bechuanaland Service. Galpin also mentioned a new aircraft that De Havilland’s company had designed called the Dragonfly. He was of the opinion that the concerned authorities should not stick to the Dragon Rapide aircraft but choose instead the Dragonfly because though it was smaller, it appeared to have better performance and would be cheaper to operate.72 Galpin stated that it had occurred to him that the Dominions Office may have been uncertain whether the expenditure of the

70 BNARS S. 367/2, Air Service fir the Government of Bechuanaland Protectorate. 71 BNARS S. 367/2, Air Service for the Government of Bechuanaland Protectorate. 72 BNARS S. 367/4, Imperial Airways to Air Ministry, 1 February 1936. 25

Dragon Rapide was justified, and therefore he found it necessary to mention the production of a cheaper type since the estimates had already been put in.

The Dominions Office’s Mr. Harding soon informed High Commissioner Clark that Charles Rey had suggested to him that if talks with Imperial Airways had not gone too far, an opportunity should be given to South Africa’s African Air Transport

Company of tendering for the proposed service in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. It is quite understandable why Rey made this suggestion. He was interested in having an air service for the B.P. and negotiations with R.A.N.A were not getting anywhere.

According to Harding, the Air Ministry in London did not really support Rey’s suggestion. The Ministry was of the view that the scheme in its form at that time had been devised by Imperial Airways as the agents of R.A.N.A in order to meet the requirement of the B.P. administration as explained by Rey at the two meetings the previous year.73 The main point here was that the Dominions Office together with the

B.P. could face a charge of breach of faith if another company was offered a chance to run R.A.N.A’s scheme, which had been amended in detail to fit in with the view that

Rey had expressed.

Furthermore, Harding informed the High Commissioner that the Air Ministry felt that the scheme should not be put out to tender but that, if other companies were to be invited to quote, the B.P. government should start de novo and clearly frame its own requirements and conditions which it desired to enforce. After this, tenders could be invited and R.A.N.A. possibly be given an opportunity with others to make its offer.74

Harding also stated that they noticed, however, that they could not proceed with the

Imperial Airways scheme without obtaining permission from the Union government for

73 BNARS S. 367/4, Dominions Office to High Commissioner at the Cape, 14 March 1936. 74 BNARS S. 367/4, Dominions Office to High Commissioner at the Cape, 14 March 1936. 26 flying over its territory. Therefore, it was not going to be a surprise if the Union government was to raise the question of South African Airways undertaking the service, especially if it was contemplating a regular air service between Pretoria and Windhoek across the Bechuanaland Protectorate.75 This would actually be the case. Harding, however, also stated that he was disturbed that there had been so much delay over the air service and that he was hoping that something definite could be settled upon. Again, this just showed how unfruitful talks about this air service were. Almost all parties did not understand why it was taking time for there to be progress. This perhaps showed something about the balkanization of colonial territories in the region. There were many different territories and administrations and this made it difficult to coordinate transport services for them.

High Commissioner Clark later informed Resident Commissioner Rey about the correspondence that he and Harding had a couple of weeks prior and he sought to get

Rey’s opinion on the matter. Clark reiterated that given the fact the Union government was contemplating to establish an air route to Windhoek through Bechuanaland, it might just offer to run the B.P. air service.76 He continued to tell Rey that he did not believe that if the Union government took over the service, it would use German machines. This was because the Air Ministry had stated that even if the B.P. called for companies to make offers to run the air service, they should give priority to companies that used

British aircraft. After the First World War, Imperial Airways was the only airline in

Britain and it had the authority to determine what aircraft it would use.77 This is where

75 BNARS S. 367/4, Dominions Office to High Commissioner at the Cape, 14 March 1936. 76 BNARS S. 367/4, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 28 March 1936. 77 R. Bluffield, Imperial Airways, 39. 27 the Air Ministry adopted the idea that companies to be considered must employ British machines.

Clark explained that in a memorandum, South African transport minister Pirow proposed to use Airspeed Envoy aircraft for three feeder services, including the

Germiston-Windhoek service, and German Junkers on the main Germiston-Lusaka service by South African Airways. By virtue of this, Clark believed that the Airspeed

Envoys would be more suitable than the Junkers for the B.P air service.78 He felt that the aircraft’s small size would be perfect for the small air service that the B.P. needed.

Rey’s response, however, did not seem to follow what Clark had told him. He suggested that Pirow be asked not to raise any objection to the B.P air service flying 15 miles into the Union of South Africa. Furthermore, Rey advised that Pirow be told that the

Protectorate service would purely be for internal purposes and not commercial, and that the reason why there was need to fly into Mafikeng was because the Protectorate

Headquarters was situated there.79 As a way of getting Pirow to permit the Protectorate air service to fly into Union air space, Rey also told Clark that it would be necessary to make Pirow aware that this connection between the Protectorate and Mafikeng was for administrative purposes. Pirow was to be told that the air service did not contemplate in any way competing or interfering with commercial services in the Union whether passengers, freight or mails. Further, it was to be made clear that this arrangement could last for five years, after which it could be reconsidered.80

78 BNARS S. 367/4, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 28 March 1936. 79 BNARS S. 367/4, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 1 April 1936. 80 BNARS S. 367/4, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 1 April 1936. 28

Charles Rey also expressed his willingness to allow for the protectorate air service to link up at Mafikeng with any proposed Union service if desired. Apart from reiterating that the B.P administration would be willing to allow the Union air service to fly across the Protectorate, he had also provided facilities for them to complete their surveys for the proposed service. He, therefore, felt that for these reasons, there was no way that Pirow would raise any objections to the Protectorate air service flying 15 miles from Ramatlabama to Mafikeng which is all the B.P. administration was asking for.81

High Commissioner Clark expressed his views in a follow up letter to Charles Rey stating that if Pirow did offer the Union service at a cost not exceeding that of R.A.N.A, he did not see grounds on which such an offer could be refused. However, he did agree that if Pirow did not make the offer, talks with Pirow should go the way that Rey had suggested, thus abandoning consideration of the offer they had received from the

African Air Transport Company.82

Resident Commissioner Rey felt that if Pirow were to make an offer, it could only be considered after two years from the initial agreement with R.A.N.A. He believed that any new arrangements would cause unnecessary delay. Rey also pointed out to Clark that should any issues arise with regards to the protectorate service flying

15 miles into Union territory regardless of the facilities that the protectorate had made for the Union’s South West Africa route, the protectorate could easily establish an air base at Ramatlabama within the protectorate instead of Mafikeng. By so doing the protectorate would avoid the necessity for any discussion with the Union government.83

Lastly, Rey argued that incidentally, it could be pointed out that the Union government

81 BNARS S. 367/4, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 1 April 1936. 82 BNARS S. 367/4, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 3 April 1936. 83 BNARS S. 367/4, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 4 April 1936. 29 could not prevent protectorate machines from flying between the protectorate and

Mafikeng which was stated on article 2 of the International Agreement Convention of

13 October 1919.84 This was a Convention that was held in Paris and attended by different countries desiring to come up with peaceful interactions of nations through aerial navigation. It was an international agreement that was recognised by all the nations that attended.85 Article 2 that Rey was referring to stated that;

Each contracting State undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting States, provided that the conditions laid down in the present Convention are observed.86

High Commissioner William Clark, after consulting with Oswald Pirow, informed the British Secretary of State for Colonies in London of the outcomes of the meeting. According to Clark, Pirow was most cordial in stating that the Union government would raise no objection to the protectorate’s proposals. He, however, enquired what machines would be used and urged the use of the British made Airspeed

Envoys.87 This was because Pirow himself was pushing for the use of these aircraft in the Union. When Clark mentioned possible difficulties in terms of expenses, Pirow threw out a hint that he might be prepared to contribute to the excess cost. Clark believed that Pirow probably had his usual desire to secure further aeroplanes for possible military purposes and was not necessarily thinking of co-operation.88

84 BNARS S. 367/4, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 4 April 1936. 85International Agreement Convention, http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/library/aviation/IntAgr/multilateral/1919_Paris_conevention.pdf, accessed 21 September 2016. 86 International Agreement Convention, http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/library/aviation/IntAgr/multilateral/1919_Paris_conevention.pdf, accessed 21 September 2016. 87 BNARS S. 367/4, High Commissioner at the Cape to Secretary of State in London, 21 April 1936. 88 BNARS S. 367/4, High Commissioner at the Cape to Secretary of State in London, 21 April 1936. 30

On 22 May 1936 Resident Commissioner Rey had a meeting with Mr Trace from Imperial Airways to discuss the long envisaged Bechuanaland air service. Though he did not state the venue for this meeting, Rey’s notes showed that present at the meeting besides Mr Trace and Rey, were the B.P Assistant Resident Commissioner, the

Government Engineer and the Deputy Commandant of the Police. At the meeting, Rey explained the status of the negotiations in regard to the air service. He recommended proceeding with the negotiations with the adoption of the Dragon Fly aircraft instead of the Dragon Rapide.89 Mr Trace then referred to his conversation with Pirow with regard to the use of Airspeed Envoys. After Trace talked about his conversation with Pirow and showed them the particulars of the Airspeed Envoy, Rey was now of the view that while it was clear that the Dragon Rapide would be adequate and suitable for the protectorate’s service, there was no doubt that the Airspeed Envoy was much better even though it would be more expensive.90 Rey stated that if the Airspeed Envoy was adopted by the Union government, as would definitely be the case, and by the government of Southern Rhodesia, as was Pirow’s wish, it would obviously be in the general interest that the protectorate should also adopt the Airspeed Envoy.91 Rey believed that the Imperial Treasury would, no doubt, be willing to agree to the extra cost. Mr Trace, however, informed Rey and his men that he was still to meet with the board at Imperial Airways and make decisions about the way forward with the proposed air service and the type of machine to be used for the service.92

89 BNARS S. 367/4, Bechuanaland Protectorate Air Service: Note of Conversation with Mr Trace, Imperial Airways, 22 May 1936. 90 BNARS S. 367/4, Bechuanaland Protectorate Air Service: Note of Conversation with Mr Trace, Imperial Airways, 22 May 1936.

91 BNARS S. 367/4, Bechuanaland Protectorate Air Service: Note of Conversation with Mr Trace, Imperial Airways, 22 May 1936. 92 BNARS S. 367/4, Bechuanaland Protectorate Air Service: Note of Conversation with Mr Trace, Imperial Airways, 22 May 1936.

31

After being convinced by Mr. Trace and Rey, High Commissioner Clark informed the Secretary of State in London about the opinion that he and Rey held regarding the machine to be used for the B.P. air service. Clark explained that at the meeting with Trace, it was established that the Dragon Fly would not be suitable as carrying capacity and safety factors had deemed it inadequate. Difficulty of obtaining spare parts was another adverse factor.93

On the question of having Air Navigation Regulations, Rey believed that this was not necessary for the small B.P. air service. Clark’s legal advisor Sir Cecil Fforde even advised him that Rey was right to think that it was premature to worry about Air

Navigation Regulations before the air service itself was established. The question of compensation for damage caused to third parties by aeroplanes operated by the B.P. would be determined by the law of torts.94 In view of the fact that R.A.N.A would be operating the air service in the protectorate, and that this company was registered outside the protectorate, and that the B.P. was merely, in effect, hiring an aeroplane from them, it would be assumed that the company would register in the ordinary way either in Southern Rhodesia or in the Union of South Africa according to the base from which they decided to operate.95

After receiving air service schedules from Rey’s office, Clark recommended that provisions be made in the estimates of the territory for the financial year 1937-38.96

Rey, however, informed Clark that after giving it some consideration, he felt that the air service must stand over until the B.P. administration had found a total of £196,000

93 BNARS, S. 367/4, High Commissioner at the Cape to Secretary of State in London, 29 May 1936. 94 BNARS, S. 367/4, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 7 May 1936. 95 BNARS, S. 367/4, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 12 June 1936. 96 BNARS, S. 367/4, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 20 October 1936.

32 for ordinary expenditure.97 He, therefore, withdrew the provisions that Clark had asked him to make for the air service in the 1937-38 financial year.

Based on the Resident Commissioner’s suggestion, High Commissioner Clark informed the British Secretary of State for Colonies in London of the situation with the

B.P. air service. He explained that in view of the heavy expenditure involved, the

Resident Commissioner had recommended that the establishment of an air service for the B.P. should be delayed for a while.98 This seemed a little ironic looking at how proactive the resident commissioner had been since 1935 to get the air service established. He was now the one putting things on hold. Clark also apologized for any inconvenience that would come out of this but explained that in the present stage of the development of the territory, he was doubtful whether advantages of the air service were commensurable with its cost, which had now greatly exceeded original estimates.99

The British government informed the Air Ministry about what the resident commissioner had decided, and told Clark that while on general grounds they greatly regretted the conclusions reached, they felt bound to agree with the B.P. administration’s view in relation to financial consideration. Clark was also told that

Imperial Airways and the Treasury would also be notified.100 Another year had come and gone with negotiations on the B.P. air service still continuing. Financial constraints had proved to be the enemy this time around. It should be noted that this process was taking place in the middle of the Great Depression, usually dated from 1929 to the beginning of the Second World War.101 This perhaps was the reason the British

97 BNARS, S. 367/4, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 27 October 1936. 98 BNARS, S. 367/4, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Secretary of State, London, 3 November 1936. 99 BNARS, S. 367/4, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Secretary of State, London, 3 November 1936. 100 BNARS, S. 367/4, Secretary of State, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 6 November 1936. 101 R J. Samuelson, “Revisiting the Great Depression,” The Wilson Quarterly, 36, no. 1 (2012): 38. 33

Treasury could not assist the B.P. in establishing its much needed air service. Another likely reason however, could have been the fact that the B.P. was being underdeveloped by the British government because the British did not foresee any benefit in investing in it. As a colonised or in this case, a protected territory, the B.P looked to the British government for assistance but received none. This proved Andre Gunder Frank’s argument that there is an erroneous view that most underdeveloped countries have always had, which is that their development would come about only by diffusing capital to them from the more developed colonisers.102 This was the case with the B.P. In the same light, Patrick McGowan has stated that underdevelopment in many countries came about as a result of dependency on the more developed metropolis states which was a consequence of economic exploitation by European- organised colonialism and imperialism.103 Similarly, the B.P. administration had hopes that the British would lend a helping hand in establishing the Protectorate’s air service. But according to Bernard

Bourdillon, assistance to colonies has been invariably given not for development, but rather to create deficiencies. He has argued;

Colonies in receipt of such assistance were regarded as poor relations who could not, in all decency, be allowed to starve but whose first duty was to earn a bare subsistence and to relieve their reluctant benefactor of what was regarded as a wholly unprofitable obligation. While they were in receipt of a dole, their finances were subject to a strict Treasury control, which, since its main object was to ensure that the receipt of the dole did not act as an incentive to over- indulgence, was scarcely conducive to a forward policy of development.104

The B.P. administration had made it clear that the air service which they needed was to be purely administrative and not commercial. This meant that the service would

102 A G Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” in R I Rhodes (ed), Imperialism and Underdevelopment, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 5. 103 P J, McGowan, “Economic Dependence and Economic Performance in Black Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 46, no. 1 (1976): 26. 104 B H, Bourdillon, “Colonial Development and Welfare,” International Affairs, 20, no. 3 (1944): 370. 34 less likely bring any economic growth to the protectorate and the British government would have little or nothing to benefit from it. Looking at Bourdillon’s argument, it becomes apparent that the Protectorate was very unlikely to receive assistance from the

British government for their air service as the British were being careful not to create over-indulgence. Furthermore, compared to the dire need for economic assistance in some other British colonies, the B. P.’s need for assistance became rather trivial as there were more pressing needs in the rest of British Colonial Africa.

The British government’s lack of assistance can, however, be tied to politics in

Britain. From the 1920s Britain’s policy toward colonial development was characterised by a struggle between the Colonial Office and the Treasury. According to Neal

Malmsten, whenever the Colonial Office came up with colonial development proposals, the Treasury officials would be very quick to express opposition to the proposals as they were always concerned with the recovery of the funds expended.105 The B. P.’s underdevelopment was, therefore, a result of on-going struggles within the British government. Furthermore, from around 1933 to 1939, during the Great Depression, the

Colonial Development Advisory Committee, which was responsible for administering the Colonial Development Fund, was requested by the Treasury to concentrate its recommendations on schemes that were to bring great and speedy benefit to the United

Kingdom.106 As a result, the Colonial Development Fund began to be used in Britain for employment creation and for improved housing. Any project of colonial development had to really be of great benefit to the British. Malmsten argues that there were instances where aid from the Colonial Development Fund benefited particular

British interests. He alludes to the building of the Zambezi Bridge, which would create

105 N R, Malmsten, “British Government Policy toward Colonial Development, 1919-1939,” The Journal of Modern History, 49, no. 2 (1977): D1269. 106 N R, Malmsten, “British Government Policy, D1275. 35 a demand for British steel and he also mentions a £ 240,000 loan to the government of

Northern Rhodesia to be given to a corporation for the construction of a copper refinery.107 Gordon Pirie corroborates Malmstein’s assertions by stating that in 1933 a total of £105,000 was awarded to different civil aviation projects in Africa including the laying down of concrete aviation ground facilities in East Africa to aid landing during wet seasons. Though only a third of this money would return to Britain, the

Advisory Board for the Colonial Development Fund claimed that the use of the money would create a demand for British aircraft and parts in British Colonial Africa.108

Under circumstances like these, the B.P. air service was not a profitable project from the perspective of the British government. The protectorate would have to wait until it came up with all the necessary capital unless another option presented itself, which is what happened.

UNION GOVERNMENT TO THE RESCUE

Before a month had gone by from the time when preparations for the B.P. air service had to stand over due to financial constraints, another option had presented itself to the protectorate. The Union government’s Minister of Railways, Harbours and Defence, Mr

Oswald Pirow made an offer to Resident Commissioner Rey as soon as he found out that the protectorate’s negotiations with R.A.N.A had been ceased. According to High

Commissioner Clark, when Pirow spoke with Rey, he referred to the proposed Union service across the protectorate to Windhoek via Lehututu and Ghanzi and offered to alter the route so as to go through Mafikeng and Maun on the outward journey and stop

107 N R, Malmsten, “British Government Policy, D1275. 108 G Pirie, Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation, 1919-39, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 171.

36 at Lehututu on its way back.109 Pirow said the service would cost the protectorate nothing as the Union would carry protectorate mails and passengers for free. He continued to propose that service would be weekly or bi-weekly and even offered to take it up officially if the protectorate was willing to accept the offer. Looking at Pirow’s offer, Clark made it clear to the British Secretary of State that this would be advantageous to the protectorate more especially that its own air scheme had been deferred. He also asked if the Secretary of State had any objections to the Union service flying across the protectorate.110

The Secretary of State explained to Clark that there was no objection to Pirow’s offer as long as no adverse effect on the African opinion was to be anticipated. This was a long standing issue that hung over the Union’s attempts to annex the B.P. and the other High Commission Territories of Basutoland and Swaziland. Africans in these territories were unwilling to be absorbed into the white minority ruled Union and they were quite apprehensive of Afrikaner ambitions. They became even more sceptical about joining the Union of South Africa after the Natives Land Act of 1913 was enacted to limit Africans’ acquisition of land.111 This explains why the Secretary of State suggested that the Union air service in the B.P. was acceptable as long as no adverse effect on the Africans was to be encountered.

The Secretary of State also advised Clark that consent of the Batswana chiefs would also have to be obtained for the use of landing grounds in their reserves. He was aware that the Union government’s desire to absorb the B.P. was not an idea that

109 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Secretary of State, London, 21 November 1936. 110 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Secretary of State, London, 21 November 1936. 111 R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion: 1908-1948, (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1972), 78.

37

Batswana chiefs received very well, especially the ones in the Bamangwato Native

Reserve, an area where the proposed air service was to land. From Khama III to

Sekgoma II and Tshekedi Khama, the Ngwato royalty had made it clear that their allegiance was to the British only and that for the people of Bechuanaland, there was no good reason for them to support the incorporation of their territory into the Union.112

As far as communications were concerned, the Secretary of State stated that the proposed air service would indeed be advantageous to the protectorate particularly given the carriage of mail and protectorate officials.113 However, Pirow soon indicated that the B.P. would be expected to pay for the transportation of mails. In as much as this would amount to vastly less than operating an air service, Pirow’s proposal presented no insuperable objection for the protectorate.114

It is worthwhile mentioning that at this point, Resident Commissioner Rey left office and was succeeded by Charles Clarke in January 1937. Rey was responsible for starting negotiations with R.A.N.A. and Britain about establishing an air service in the

B.P. After two years of negotiations, he left office without any progress as far as the air service was concerned. The new Resident Commissioner nevertheless picked up where

Rey left in January and worked with the High Commissioner to make Pirow’s offer a reality. Resident Commissioner Clarke noticed from Rey’s records that the B.P. was going to be expected to pay for the carriage of mails in the proposed Union service. He explained to High Commissioner Clark that he had gathered from the Post Master

General in Pretoria that the rates for air mail were £1.00 per lb and that he had to plan

112 L. Hailey, The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission Territories, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 100. See also J. Halpern, South Africa’s Hostages, (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1965). 113 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Secretary of State, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 8 December 1936. 114 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Secretary of State, London, 19 January 1937.

38 how much mail would have to be transported a year so as to avoid excessive costs.115

From his projections, Clarke told Clark that the amount of mail to be carried in one year to Maun, Ghanzi and Lehututu would not exceed 5000 lbs or 8000 lbs when parcels were included. At the rate of £1.00 per lb, this would cost the protectorate £5,000 to

£8,000 a year, a cost that Clarke believed could be considerably reduced in actual practice.116

For purposes of being prepared and having sufficient funds, High Commissioner

Clark enquired with Resident Commissioner Clarke what saving they would have to effect in the existing mail contract services if letters and parcels were now to be transported by air.117 Clarke provided details of the mail service that existed at that time with the costs of transporting mails within the different districts. He, however, explained that all the costs would be covered under the new scheme. For the purpose of estimates,

Clarke stated that it could be said that there would be a gross saving of £410 on the mail contracts with increases in charges for freights reducing this figure to a net saving of approximately £250 to £300.118

When Pirow first offered to alter the Union’s proposed South West Africa air service so as to carry the B. P.’s mail and officials, the air service was to land at

Mafikeng, Lehututu, Ghanzi and Maun. As time went by, there were considerations of further altering the proposed route to include Palapye Serowe and Rakops. For this reason, the Resident Commissioner had to inform the district commissioners for Serowe

115 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 16 February 1937. 116 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 16 February 1937. 117 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 26 February 1937. 118 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 26 February 1937.

39 and Maun about this and ask them to speak with the chiefs of the respective districts and obtain permission for the development of landing grounds in their territories.119

Furthermore, Clarke advised the district commissioners to suggest to the chiefs that since no objection had been raised in regard to the railway being run by the Union authorities, it would not appear reasonable that any objection should be raised to a similar service for the transport of passengers and mail by air being run by the same authorities.120

With regard to the transportation of passengers by the proposed Union service, the Resident Commissioner believed that there would be a very small number of officers transported by air. When he discussed the issue with the High Commissioner, Clarke stated that the air service would be confined chiefly to senior officials on inspection duty. Other officials stationed for duty in different parts of the protectorate would continue using cars for transportation.121 This, therefore, meant that the only cost to the protectorate would be for the transportation of mails. The High Commissioner then touched base with Pirow regarding the proposed air service, explaining that though they had gathered some rates on the possible cost of the transportation of mails and possibly passengers, they still knew it was up to him how much the service would cost the protectorate. He, however, gave Pirow the same rates that he had received from

Resident Commissioner Clarke and asked Pirow if the same rates would apply to the proposed service in the B.P.122

119 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to District Commissioners at Serowe and Maun, 20 February 1937. 120 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to District Commissioners at Serowe and Maun, 20 February 1937. 121 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 24 March 1937. 122 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at the Cape to Oswald Pirow, 9 April 1937. 40

The High Commissioner also alluded to the routes to be used in the proposed air service. He explained that the B.P. administration assumed that the route from Mafikeng to Maun would be via Palapye or Serowe in order to avoid taking aeroplanes direct across the Kalahari Desert, away from all emergency landing grounds or existing transport routes in a single flight of about 450 miles with no possibility of refuelling.

He also stated that landing grounds existed in a few places and that it would be good if

Pirow could indicate his requirements in respect to them before a cost could be estimated.123

High Commissioner Clark soon expressed concern over the route of the proposed Union air service. He told Resident Commissioner Clarke that he was in possession of a letter from South African Airways and the British High Commission in

Pretoria. From this letter, Clark stated that Clarke would be equally concerned with the omission of Mafikeng from the proposed route.124 Clark feared that the omission of

Mafikeng from the route would deprive the service of a good deal of its value so far as the protectorate was concerned, particularly in view that the B.P. administration was based in Mafikeng. He further stated that there was also the question of more landing grounds being built at Toteng, Fort Rietfontein and Olifantskloof to be considered.125

There was indeed something to be concerned about on the part of the B.P. administration. Col. Holthouse of the South African Airways Department had written to Mr Antrobus of the British High Commission in Pretoria, sharing the Airways manager’s views regarding the Union air service across the B.P. The Airways manager had suggested that the service route should include Germiston, Palapye Road, Maun,

123 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at the Cape to Oswald Pirow, 9 April 1937. 124 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 27 May 1937. 125 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 27 May 1937. 41

Ghanzi, Gobabis and Windhoek.126 Mafikeng, the headquarters of the B.P., had been eliminated from the route the air service was to follow. This would present a great disadvantage to the administration of the protectorate because the service was being provided for administration purposes in the first place. The Airways manager also explained that it would be necessary for emergency landing grounds to be built in the protectorate. With the Union government’s desires to absorb the B.P., excluding

Mafikeng from the proposed air route would make more sense. Mafikeng would become irrelevant if the B.P. became part of South Africa. The Airways manager stated that if his suggestions were acceptable to the B.P. administration, the new service would be brought into operation on 15 June 1937, but only after the existing landing grounds had been inspected. Furthermore, he intended to send an aircraft to carry out a survey of the route and wanted some B.P. officials to accompany the machine on the survey flight.127

Even though the Airways manager had wished for the survey flight to take place before June, the B.P. administration was not yet ready for it. Resident Commissioner

Clarke suggested to Col. Holthouse that the survey flight be postponed until the second week of July, as it was necessary to have some of the aerodromes, which were very overgrown, put in order. As per the request for some B.P. officials to accompany the survey flight, Clarke stated that it would be possible to arrange either for Mr Brind, the

Government Engineer or for Mr Hobday, the Chief Veterinary Officer, who had already flown his personal aircraft all over the protectorate, to accompany the survey flight.128

If Holthouse was to have no problem with the postponement of the flight, Clarke was to give instructions for the aerodromes at Palapye, Serowe, Maun and Ghanzi to be put in the best possible order, and for the emergency grounds between Palapye and Maun

126 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Col. Holthouse to Antrobus, 25 May 1937. 127 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Col. Holthouse to Antrobus, 25 May 1937. 128 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Col. Hothouse, 4 June 1937. 42 to be cleared of the grass smothering them.129 Col. Holthouse responded four days later showing no objection to the postponement of the survey flight, but requesting to be informed once the B.P. administration had ensured the aerodromes and emergency landing grounds were in good condition.130

The District Commissioners were immediately instructed to clear all aerodromes and clear up emergency landing grounds in their jurisdictions which they cordially did. The District Commissioner at Maun seemingly being the only one who had challenges, wrote a report to the Resident Commissioner explaining how their task went. He explained that after inspecting the area around the Mabeleapudi beacon, a device used to attract attention to a location and signal information about the landing ground, they noticed that the land was flat but thickly wooded, of which clearing would be a little costly and take a longer time. However, he stated that 3 miles north of the beacon there was an area that could make an excellent landing ground. This was a thinly wooded level plain of at least one square mile in which it would take a gang of ten men about four days to clear an 800x200 yard area.131 This area would later become the emergency landing ground between Palapye and Maun.

In as much as the omission of Mafikeng from the air route was going to represent a disadvantage to the protectorate, the Union government showed no intentions of including it. After speaking with Pirow on 19 July 1937, High Commissioner Clark explained to Resident Commissioner Clarke that the reason why the Union was so keen on excluding Mafikeng from the route was that they wanted to conclude the trip from

Johannesburg to Windhoek in one day, going through Palapye Road, Maun, Ghanzi and

129 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Col. Hothouse, 4 June 1937. 130 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Col. Holthouse to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 8 June 1937. 131 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, District Commissioner, Maun to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 14 June 1937.

43

Gobabis in the Protectorate before reaching Windhoek. This would roughly total around

1000 miles.132 Pirow’s argument had been that they would not be able to make the trip in one day if they went through Mafikeng and that stopping at Mafikeng would create difficulties for the Union as they would be under pressure to alter the service from the purely Mafikeng point of view. Even though Pirow’s point here was not clear, he did mention that another problem of going through the protectorate’s headquarters was that people would book space at Johannesburg and potentially fill the plane leaving no space for passengers at Mafikeng. 133 Even Clark expressed his opinion on this to Clarke, arguing that none of Pirow’s reasons were good enough except for maybe the one to do with making the trip in a day since landing in Mafikeng would indeed add to the total distance. Oswald Pirow, who was inclined to make light of the drawback from the protectorate’s point of view, offered a solution. He suggested that the protectorate’s mail and passengers from Mafikeng could be transported by train to Palapye Road where the plane would be landing. When Clark explained that this could be very inconvenient if it involved having to wait for the plane, Pirow assured him that the

Railway Company would arrange for a train to connect with the air service. This could be a night train from Mafikeng connecting with the plane in the morning.134

Just like High Commissioner Clark, Resident Commissioner Clarke began to recognise Pirow’s reasons for excluding Mafikeng and even accepted Pirow’s alternative of having the train connect with the air service at Palapye Road. He explained to Clark that it seemed to him that Pirow’s arguments for omitting Mafikeng

132 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 20 July 1937. 133BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 20 July 1937.

134 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 20 July 1937.

44 were logical and convincing when balanced against theirs’ for its inclusion, which gave the protectorate no more reason to press for a stopover at Mafikeng.135 Even though the proposed arrangement would not be so convenient for the official passengers, its extra travelling time was not so much of a problem as to keep pressing for the inclusion of

Mafikeng to the air route. After all, the B.P. officials were now dependent upon the

South Africans to make the air service a reality and were in no position to make demands.

Within a few days, the High Commissioner informed the Resident

Commissioner that he had been made aware by the Union government that Pirow would be landing in the Protectorate to see the route which the proposed Union service would be taking once it began operating.136 Minister Pirow not only intended to visit the

Bechuanaland Protectorate, but also South West Africa, Angola, Belgian Congo,

Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia.137 The minister was to leave Germiston in the Union on 9 August, travelling via Palapye Road and staying the night at Maun, leaving at noon the next day. Traveling with him was to be Col. Stallard, Dr Schoch and Col. Holthouse and several other men.138

After Pirow and his men left the Protectorate, Resident Commissioner Clarke received reports from the two district commissioners who had the opportunity to meet with Pirow’s party. On the day that Pirow left Palapye Road, the District Commissioner for Serowe wrote to Clarke stating that the planes made good landings at Palapye for a

135 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 20 July 1937. 136 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 28 July 1937. 137 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Union Department of External Affairs, Pretoria to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 28 July 1937. 138 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Union Department of External Affairs, Pretoria to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 28 July 1937. 45 little under an hour before leaving for Maun later during the day.139 In the same manner, the District Commissioner for Maun informed Clarke of Pirow’s landing and departure.

Pirow and his crew were reported to have arrived in Maun on the 9th and left the following morning. A few hours after landing in Maun, Pirow and his men went for a flight over the Okavango Delta where they saw a large quantity of game. When they left however, Col. Holthouse advised that the north-south part of the aerodrome be extended for 200 yards at the north end and that one or two trees on the western side be lopped off.140 This seemed to be the only suggestion that the protectorate received from the survey flight of the route.

A month later, the Union’s Department of External Affairs expressed gratitude for the courtesies extended to Pirow and his men during their visit to the Protectorate.

Special thanks were extended to the District Commissioner for Maun, Mr McKenzie, and his wife for their hospitality to the party.141 After the survey flight, the High

Commissioner was keen to know what Pirow and his men thought about the state of the landing grounds. He asked Pirow if he had any suggestions to make with regards to the landing grounds in the B.P. or any other matters concerned with the proposed air service as it might affect the protectorate. Furthermore, he asked if Pirow could also arrange for the train to connect with the aeroplane at Palapye Road for the return trip and not just the outbound one.142This was because when Pirow told Clark that Mafikeng was to be excluded from the route, he promised to arrange for the railway service to carry mail and officials from Mafikeng to meet the aeroplane at Palapye Road. Clarke was

139 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, District Commissioner at Serowe to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 9 August 1937. 140 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, District Commissioner at Maun to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 10 August 1937. 141 BNARS, S. 367/5/1, Union Department of Externl Affairs, Pretoria to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 10 September, 1937. 142 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Oswald Pirow, 22 September 1937. 46 therefore asking Pirow to ensure that the railway service connected with the aeroplane at Palapye Road to carry passengers and mail headed for Mafikeng.

When Pirow replied to Clark, he explained that it was highly desirable that the runways of the Maun aerodrome be increased in size to a minimum of 1, 050 yards, and that wireless direction finding stations be provided there and at Palapye Road. He, however, also stated that there was an intention to make a more detailed survey of the route and a closer examination of the intermediate emergency landing grounds.143 Soon after, the BP administration took measures to extend the runways at the Maun aerodrome as was the wish of Pirow. As for the wireless direction finding stations that

Pirow suggested for Palapye Road and Maun, the Resident Commissioner seemed to find them redundant. High Commissioner Clark was informed by the Resident

Commissioner that even though costs for these wireless stations had not yet been worked out, it was estimated that the cost of each station would be approximately £ 3,

000.00. Furthermore, full-time operators would be required at each station, which would increase the annual maintenance cost.144 Clark, therefore, enquired with Pirow if these stations were really necessary, taking into consideration the costs that would come with them and the B. P.’s financial difficulties. He further explained to Pirow that the resident commissioner had stressed the point that in the climatic conditions of the protectorate, visibility was usually good and fogs did not occur and therefore the direction finding stations could be dispensed with since even in the Union most aerodromes were not equipped with these stations.145

143 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Oswald Pirow to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 12 October 1937. 144 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Oswald Pirow, 9 November 1937. 145 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Oswald Pirow, 9 November 1937. 47

In January 1938 High Commissioner Clark had the opportunity to meet with

Minister Oswald Pirow and discuss some issues about the proposed Union air service.

Pirow informed Clark that he had proposed that the Union government take over the cost of the wireless direction finding stations at the landing places. However, he explained to Clark that this would take some time since Union expenditures outside the

Union had to go before the cabinet first. Pirow was yet to submit the matter to the cabinet.146 As for the connection of the train with the air service at Palapye Road, Clark gathered that the outward journey appeared to be satisfactory as the plane from

Windhoek on Wednesdays and Saturdays would connect with the 8:18 pm train from

Palapye to Mafikeng. The trouble seemed to lie with the outward journey. The Tuesday railway service appeared to have been scheduled in such a way that passengers would arrive at Palapye Road a couple of hours after midnight while the aeroplane would be arriving after dawn. 147 Pirow, recognizing that this would be a hardship, assured Clark that for officers of any importance, there could be a carriage detached at Palapye for them to remain in while awaiting the plane. Clark then sought Resident Commissioner

Clarke’s opinion regarding these arrangements before the Union inaugurated the air service.148

The Office of the Ministry of Railways and Harbours in Pretoria soon informed the Resident Commissioner that the South African Airways administration had established two landing grounds between Warmbaths in the Transvaal and the Limpopo

River. The distance between Palapye Road and the landing ground near the Limpopo

River, however, was roughly 60 miles. Therefore, on account of the nature of the

146 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 11 January 1938. 147 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 11 January 1938. 148 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 11 January 1938. 48 surrounding country, they felt that it would be advisable to have another landing ground established between Palapye Road and Limpopo River.149 The Ministry stated that if no landing ground existed between the junction of the Pongola and Limpopo Rivers and

Palapye Road, then the protectorate should consider establishing one there, preferably near Mabeleapudi or Sofala. They explained that the landing ground needed not necessarily to be in the form of a square, but that even a runway of about 800 x 200 yards into the prevailing wind would suffice.150 The Resident Commissioner’s office was very quick to take action after getting these instructions from the Union government. The district commissioner for Serowe was instructed to select a suitable site with the local chief and submit an estimate of the cost of constructing the landing ground. Even though labour was to be paid for by the B.P. administration, the chief was, if possible, to assist with its provision.151 The district commissioner was further informed that though the Union government was given particulars of the landing grounds at Sherwood and Saas Post respectively, it had been intimated that these grounds were too far out of the direct line of flight and that the site to be selected should be on the halfway point of the 60-mile flight from Limpopo to Palapye.152 The district commissioner obliged and he and the headman of Serowe selected a site for the emergency landing ground some 4 miles west of Mabeleapudi Hill and arranged for work to commence right away. The estimated cost of construction was expected to be

£ 83. 00.153 Even though there was some progress in establishing an air service to meet

149 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Office of the Ministry of Railways and harbours Cape Town to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 29 January 1938. 150 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Office of the Ministry of Railways and harbours Cape Town to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 29 January 1938. 151 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to District Commissioner at Serowe, 4 February 1938. 152 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to District Commissioner at Serowe, 4 February 1938. 153 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, District Commissioner at Serowe to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 12 February 1938.

49 the B. P.’s dire needs, it had now been three years since former Resident Commissioner

Rey had a dream of establishing an air service for the protectorate. The establishment of an air service in the protectorate for administrative purposes was long overdue.

In the Maun District’s annual report for 1937, the District Commissioner stated that mails were still delivered fortnightly by a lorry service from Palapye while the long- hoped for air service had not come into operation. He lamented that despite Pirow’s survey of the proposed route, the building of two landing grounds between Maun and

Ghanzi and the extensive repairs and additions to the Maun aerodrome, there was still no air service.154 He continued to state that the advantages of a service that would place

Palapye and Johannesburg within two and half hours and four and half hours for Maun respectively, could only really be appreciated by those who had lived in Maun for long enough to travel for two days over 360 weary, sandy miles to reach the railway.155

However, in February 1938 Pirow’s ministry sent Resident Commissioner

Clarke the new schedule for the proposed air service. The air service was no longer to run on Tuesdays but Wednesdays. This was good news for the protectorate because the air service and the train would meet at the right time at Palapye Road without delays or waiting for long.156 The Resident Commissioner then sent out a memorandum to all his district commissioners informing them of the new air service schedule.

Soon after that, the resident commissioner was informed by the Union government that the Palapye aerodrome was small according to their understanding.

154 BNARS, S. 367/ 5/2, Annual Report of the District Commissioner, Ngamiland for the Year Ended 31 December 1937, nd. 155 BNARS, S. 367/ 5/2, Annual Report of the District Commissioner, Ngamiland for the Year Ended 31 December 1937, nd.

156 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Office of the Ministry of Railways and Harbours, Cape Town to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 18 February 1938.

50

The aerodrome was 600 x 600 yards, and the Union government felt that this was rather small for an aerodrome on which to land the type of aircraft the South African Airways intended to use in their Germiston-Windhoek route via Bechuanaland.157 They did not, however, state what type of aircraft it was going to be. The Union government suggested that this aerodrome be increased to 800 x 800 yards and that the resident commissioner’s office also provide details about the aerodrome to be established at Mabeleapudi.

Furthermore, the B.P. administration was asked to inform the South African Ministry of Railways and Harbours of the progress made in terms of each landing ground on the proposed route so far as markings and surface conditions were concerned and whether these would be suitable for landing on, all of which the Resident Commissioner was able to do.158

All the while, High Commissioner Clark wrote to Pirow expressing gratitude on behalf of the B.P. authorities for the revised train service schedule which was now to coincide with the air service at Palapye Road. He explained that the train service was much more satisfactory and that he was grateful that Pirow had considered their representation. While he was at it, Clark asked if Pirow could give any indication regarding the approximate date when the air service would begin to operate in the protectorate.159 Pirow’s response about a month later was that immediately when the resident commissioner provided an update on all landing grounds within the protectorate, there would be a survey flight of the route. If the survey flight indicated that the landing grounds were satisfactory in every way, arrangements would be made

157 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Office of the Ministry of Railways and Harbours, Cape Town to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 22 March 1938. 158BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Office of the Ministry of Railways and Harbours, Cape Town to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 22 March 1938.

159 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Oswald Pirow, 24 March 1938. 51 for the service to be inaugurated within a month thereafter.160 This would, however, be a second survey flight. Pirow, therefore, made it clear that the commencement of the air service depended entirely on the date on which the landing grounds would be complete.

At the time of this correspondence, the B.P. administration had fixed all aerodromes that needed fixing and the only one remaining was the last one to be required of the protectorate which was the Mabeleapudi aerodrome, halfway between Limpopo River and Palapye Road. A report by the district commissioner for Serowe on the progress of this aerodrome was written and sent to the resident commissioner on 25 April 1938161, two days before Pirow wrote the letter to the high commissioner explaining that the commencement of the air service depended on the completion of all landing grounds. It is possible, therefore, that when Pirow wrote to Clark he had not heard that the

Mabeleapudi aerodrome was complete.

Within a month, the landing grounds in the protectorate were complete. Clarke had also furnished the general Manager of the South African Railways and Harbours with details regarding the landing grounds which was briefly to the effect that those at

Palapye, Maun, and Ghanzi were suitable for landing and taking off throughout the year.162 Certain emergency landing grounds were also shown in a list, communicated to the general manager at the same time, as being available for use. Provided the aircraft in the proposed air service was not to land at other landing grounds than those shown suitable by Clarke, the proposed survey flight could take place.163

Pirow, however, soon brought up an issue about the schedules of the air service which was discussed the previous year. He explained that due to the alterations in the

160 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Oswald Pirow to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 27 April 1938. 161 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, District Commissioner at Serowe to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 25 April 1938. 162 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Oswald Pirow, 25 May 1938. 163 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, High Commissioner at Pretoria to Oswald Pirow, 25 May 1938. 52

Imperial Airways timetables, it became necessary to alter the Union’s schedules of the outward service to depart from Germiston on Mondays and Wednesdays. In connection with the train service that was to connect with the air service, Pirow also sent the new schedule to High Commissioner Clark.164 The schedule showed the times the train would depart from Mafikeng and its arrival at Palapye Road, and the departure of the airplane. He explained that just like it was in the initial schedule, arrangements could be made to provide suitable accommodation on the goods train departing from

Mafikeng at 9:30 am on Wednesdays for the benefit of the Bechuanaland officers on representations being made to the station commander at Mafikeng, whenever the officers wished to travel by the train in question.165

The resident commissioner would, however, later seem not satisfied with the air service schedules. Clarke felt that while the connection for the Monday plane was not unsatisfactory, the Thursday plane left much to be desired as it involved a waste of time, the loss of an entire working day with nearly seventeen hours in a goods train, and considerable discomfort and inconvenience owing to the time of arrival in

Palapye.166He wished for a better arrangement to be devised for the Thursday connection. This was, however, of no use as the resident commissioner’s wishes did not come true. Once again, the B.P. administration’s dependence on the South Africans made it hard for them to air their grievances.

The survey flight before the inauguration of the air service took place on 8

September 1938. The Deputy Commandant of the Bechuanaland Police wrote a report on the survey flight for the Resident Commissioner. The report stated that the party

164 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Oswald Pirow to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 3 June 1938. 165 BNARS, S. 367/5/2, Oswald Pirow to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 3 June 1938.

166 BNARS, S. 376/5/2, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at Pretoria, 14 July 1938.

53 consisted of Mr Brink, Director Civil Aviation in the Union, Major. Vos, Chief Wireless

Engineer of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs in the Union and Mr Mills and his assistant, who were the District Engineers at Pretoria.167 The Palapye aerodrome was found to be satisfactory and the plane left Palapye at noon, reaching Maun at 2:20 pm.

The Maun and Ghanzi aerodromes were also found to be in good condition and the only advice to the protectorate was the digging of wells so as to increase the water supplies at the aerodromes. The protectorate authorities were also advised to guard against ant hills on the runways.168

On 17 October the Resident Commissioner was informed that the air service from Windhoek via Palapye and Maun would operate as from 1 November 1938.

Without any explanation, Ghanzi was omitted from the air route. The first westbound aircraft was to leave the Rand Airport at 7:20 am on a Tuesday, while the eastbound flight would be on Saturday the 5th of November.169 A copy of the Airways timetable was also enclosed with this letter. The long envisaged Germiston-Windhoek air service was finally just about to begin. The air service was also to be beneficial to the B.P. because it was going to help in the transportation or mails and government officials.

Despite the fact that the air service was to land only in Palapye and Maun, there would be instances where it might be needed to land in other places in the protectorate so long as they were within the service’s route. One such example almost presented itself before the air service even began operating. The director of Public Works in the

Protectorate enquired with the Air Service manager if arrangements could be made for

167 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Deputy Commandant B.P Police to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 30 September 1938. 168 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Deputy Commandant B.P Police to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 30 September 1938. 169 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Office of the Ministry of Railways and Harbours, Cape Town to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 17 October 1938.

54 the aeroplanes to land at Ghanzi, in the event of officers or passengers requiring to go to or leave Ghanzi. He asked this because he had received notification to the effect that

Mrs. Cairns, the wife of the District Commissioner at Ghanzi, wished to travel by air to

Palapye in the following month.170The Air Service manager stated that he had no objection at all with regards to the plane landing at Ghanzi, as long as he was notified in advance and the landing ground was in good condition.171 The plane, however, did not end up landing in Ghanzi on the day it was required because the Air Service manager was informed that the district commissioner’s wife had made other plans and was no longer in need of the plane. The Director of Public works nevertheless made a promise to him that the landing ground was well kept and under the process of being extended.172

PROBLEMS WITH THE AIR SERVICE

The Union’s Germiston-Windhoek air service via Palapye and Maun in the

Bechuanaland Protectorate started operation on 1 November 1938 but by the end of

December there were already complaints from the Union government, particularly the ministry involved. The B.P resident commissioner was informed by the Air Service manager that there had been complaints from the commanders of the aircraft used in the air service that some landing grounds were badly in need of marking.173 The landing grounds in question were at Rakops, Toteng, Mabeleapudi and the first landing ground beyond Serowe, which the Air Service manager did not state by name. He asked the

170 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Director of Public Works at Mafikeng to Air Service Manager, Germiston, 27 October 1938. 171 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Air Service Manager, Germiston to Director of Public Works at Mafikeng, 2 November 1938. 172 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Director of Public Works at Mafikeng to Air Service Manager, Germiston, 4 November 1938. 173 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Air Service Manager, Germiston to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 24 December 1938.

55 resident commissioner to see to it that these were marked at the earliest opportunity.174

It should be observed, however, the aircraft in the air service were not scheduled to land at any of these landing grounds that were said to be in need of marking. This appeared to be a precautionary measure, should the aircraft have to make emergency landings.

Given the open terrain, it was probably hard for the pilots to actually see the landing sites from the air without any markings.

The District Commissioner for Serowe was immediately informed about the Air

Service manager’s complaints. In response, he acknowledged that the landing grounds in his district were not marked and asked the director of Public Works if funds were available for permanently marking the corners of these grounds; and if so, he asked if he could be forwarded the necessary materials.175 The director of Public Works, on the other hand, while indirectly answering the question of availability of funds, responded by advising that owing to the cost of permanently marking all aerodromes in the Serowe

District, the district commissioner should only mark the first one beyond Palapye and the one at Rakops.176 This showed that the B.P. was a marginal territory with limited resources.

The Resident Commissioner soon informed the Air Service manager that work was going on to improve the landing grounds in the Serowe District. However, he aired his concerns about the way the Air Service manager handled the issue of giving feedback about landing grounds. He stated that the B.P. administration had waited since the survey flight which took place in September the previous year to receive particulars

174 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Air Service Manager, Germiston to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 24 December 1938. 175 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, District Commissioner, Serowe to Director of Public Works at Mafikeng, 3 January 1939. 176 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Director of Public Works at Mafikeng to District Commissioner, Serowe, 10 January 1939.

56 regarding improvements, if any, required for the landing grounds on the route. He argued that the Union should be aware of its total commitments in that respect, rather than making complaints abruptly to the B.P. administration.177 Furthermore, Clarke stated that they had noticed that the landing ground at Palapye Road was most likely to be negatively affected by heavy rains. As a solution, making an emergency landing ground on the west side of the railway for use during excessive rainfalls was being investigated since it would appear that the cost of making such an emergency ground would be considerably less than that of improving the present ground to the extent of being fit for excessive rains. In the meantime, reports of the weather forecast were to be sent to Germiston on Tuesday mornings by telegraph, to Windhoek on Saturday mornings and to Mafikeng by radio.178

When the Air Service manager responded to the resident commissioner’s remarks, he pointed out that unless the Palapye landing ground could be improved so as to make it an all-weather one, South African Airways would have no alternative but to abandon the service through the protectorate. The same argument applied should the

Maun aerodrome become unserviceable.179 In as much as the Union air service through the Bechuanaland Protectorate was valuable to the protectorate notably for transporting mails and officers, it was becoming a little too frustrating as the Union government seemed to perceive it as if they were granting the protectorate a favour by going through

Palapye and Maun. The Air Service manager further added that the meteorological reports that were to be transmitted to Germiston on Tuesdays and Windhoek on

Saturdays should include the rainfall for the preceding twenty-four hours. He stated

177 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Air Service Manager, Germiston, 28 January 1939. 178 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Air Service Manager, Germiston, 28 January 1939. 179 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Air Service Manager, Germiston, to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 28 January 1939.

57 that the Union government was proceeding with the negotiations to establish wireless direction finding stations at Palapye and Maun. Lastly, he stressed his point to say that,

South African Airways was keen to provide an uninterrupted service through the protectorate but that this could only be done with the aid of the B.P. administration in providing adequate facilities for the type of aircraft they operated.180

For an air service that was giving the B.P. administration this much trouble, its effectiveness left a little to be desired. The District Commissioner for Maun expressed concern to the Resident Commissioner about the handling of first class mail and the air service. He stated that on 16 February 1939 the post lorry which left Palapye on the 13th arrived at Maun with a considerable amount of first class mail including an official correspondence from the government secretary contained in envelopes addressed to the

District Commissioner, Maun via Germiston and labelled ‘Air mail’.181 If the Union’s

Germiston-Windhoek service via the protectorate was meant to bring some efficiency to the B. P.’s administration, then the service was failing dismally. The Union was enjoying free access and facilities in the protectorate as well as payments for the transportation of protectorate mail while the protectorate saw no improvement as first class mail was still being delivered by the post lorry, which took longer than the air service would. The Maun District Commissioner went on further to state that there were also private letters that were delayed by being transported by lorry instead of air mail, and asked that the issue be taken up with the Post Office authorities.182

180BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Air Service Manager, Germiston, to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 28 January 1939. 181 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, District Commissioner at Maun to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 20 February 1939. 182 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, District Commissioner at Maun to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 20 February 1939.

58

While the Resident Commissioner forwarded the District Commissioner’s complaint to the post master general on 5 April 1939, he would only get an explanation a month later. In the meantime, the situation with air mail was not getting any better as the problem persisted. The Maun District Commissioner argued that despite his previous complaint, first class mail continued to be carried by the post lorry instead of coming by air. When the post master general finally responded to the Resident

Commissioner’s letter from the month before, he explained that after enquiries made at

Palapye and Serowe, he learnt that the officials at the two offices were under the impression that unless official letters bore an air mail label, they were to go forward per surface mail, which he said was wrong.183 It would appear that the postal officials were not telling the post master general the truth because the District Commissioner had explicitly stated in both his letters of complaint that there were letters addressed to him labelled ‘Air Mail’ which still travelled by surface. In any case, the post master general explained to his officers that all official letters were to travel by air and promised Clarke that the same mistake would not happen again.184

The air service would then run smoothly throughout 1939 without any problems or complaints from either the Union government or the Bechuanaland Protectorate administration. The only problem that was encountered was in April 1940, when the

District Commissioner at Ghanzi reported that aircraft were no longer landing in Ghanzi even when a request had been made for them to do so. When Pirow offered the Union service to the B.P. administration, he had promised that it would carry the protectorate’s mail and officers. Also, when Ghanzi was removed from the air route, it was agreed that

183 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Post Master General, Mafikeng to resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 3 May 1939. 184 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Post Master General, Mafikeng to resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 3 May 1939. 59 whenever there were officers who wished to leave or go to Ghanzi, the plane would make a stop in Ghanzi for them as long as the Air Service manager was informed in time.185

On 26 April 1940, however, the District Commissioner at Ghanzi reported that on two occasions, requests for the planes to land in Ghanzi had been refused and that it appeared as if the commanders of the planes had exercised the prerogative of deciding whether or not they would land in Ghanzi.186 He explained that a passage was booked and confirmed for the 22nd of April for one Mrs. Taylor, from Maun to Ghanzi.

However, the plane never showed up at Ghanzi and it was not until the next day on enquiry, that it was ascertained that Mrs. Taylor had been left at Maun.187

While the B.P. was struggling to establish a satisfactory air service, other British colonies seemed to have been enjoying smooth running air services courtesy of the

British government. As early as 1930, the British government entered into an agreement with Imperial Airways for the operation of a weekly London-Cape service for mails and passengers for the territories on the route. These territories were the Union of South

Africa, the Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Southern

Rhodesia.188 This raises the question of why the B.P. was not afforded the same opportunities as the other British colonies. The B.P. was certainly along the route with some of the territories mentioned above, but neither Imperial Airways nor the British

185 BNARS, S. 367/5/3, Air Service Manager, Germiston to Director of Public Works, Mafikeng, 2 November 1938. 186 BNARS, S. 367/5/4, District Commissioner at Ghanzi to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 26 April 1940. 187 BNARS, S. 367/5/4, District Commissioner at Ghanzi to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 26 April 1940. 188 H, Burchall, “Air Services in Botswana”: 60. 60 government showed any interest in it. This shows that the B.P was not important enough for the British Empire and there was no need to invest in it.

The Germiston-Windhoek air service was, however, suspended in 1940. The only correspondence that hints at the reason for this was a letter from the post master general in Pretoria to the Resident Commissioner, dated 5 July 1940. In the letter, the

Post Master General informed Resident Commissioner Clarke that in consequence of the fact that civil air services had been suspended, the Palapye and Maun stations were idle and, since the operators were required for urgent government work elsewhere, it had been decided to close the stations and have the buildings and apparatus safeguarded.189 This appeared to have been the last official correspondence regarding the Union air service in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The air service was probably suspended by the Union Government due to the Second World War that was going on.

CONCLUSION

The genesis of air services in the Bechuanaland Protectorate began as a result of a series of negotiations initiated by Resident Commissioner Charles Rey in 1935 and High

Commissioner Herbert Stanley which were completed by their respective successors

Charles Clarke and William Clark. Because of lack of sufficient funds in the B.P. administration to start the protectorate’s own air service, Rey looked to the R.A.N.A.

Company in Southern Rhodesia to run an air service in the protectorate for a certain annual cost. After a year of negotiations, the talks between R.A.N.A. and the B.P. had to be suspended because the Treasury in London stated that there wasn’t enough money to pay for such an air service. The Union Government saw an opportunity to intervene when it had proposed an air service to South West Africa which was under its

189 BNARS, S. 367/5/4, Post Master General, Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 5 July 1940.

61 administration. The air service had to go through the protectorate and so the Union

Government immediately offered to carry protectorate mail and officials. In desperation, the B.P. administration accepted this offer even though it took two years for the service to start operating. The Union air service, though better than having no air service at all, presented some problems to the protectorate. The aircraft would sometimes not show up at Ghanzi even though requested to do so and a great deal of official correspondence labelled ‘Air Mail’ would still arrive late by Post Office lorries, which defeated the whole purpose of the air service. The protectorate also had to bear the cost of establishing and maintaining new landing grounds at the command of the

Union government.

It has been established that this was in its own way, a form of underdevelopment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate by the British. Because Bechuanaland was a protectorate from which the British had nothing to gain, they saw no need to spend money on it, let alone on an air service that could have brought some efficiency to the administration of the protectorate. Even though in most cases the theory of underdevelopment has been used to show how the West extracted mineral wealth and labour from the underdeveloped countries, the case of Bechuanaland’s air service shows neglect of a protectorate by the coloniser/protector, and how this amounted to another form of underdevelopment. The Union of South Africa’s desire to absorb the High

Commission territories can also be considered to have been the reason behind the British government’s reluctance to help in the establishment of the B. P.’s air service. Ronald

Hyam has argued that the reason why it was hard for the House of Commons to transfer the Protectorate to the Union was the fact that the Batswana were not willing.190 It is

190 R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, 85.

62 quite evident, therefore, that this South African desire for expansion affected the development of the B.P. as the British government was also not ready to spend money on a protectorate which may or may not have ended up under Union control.

CHAPTER 3

POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION IN THE PROTECTORATE, 1943-1953

Introduction

This chapter follows the developments in civil aviation that took place in the

Bechuanaland Protectorate after the Second World War. Even though the war ended in

1945, the chapter discusses issues going back to 1943. The Union of South Africa’s

Germiston to Windhoek air service via the Protectorate had ceased after the war began.

Towards the end of the war the Bechuanaland Protectorate administration was already looking into the future of the Protectorate’s civil aviation. With uncertainties as to whether the Union Government would resume its Germiston to Windhoek service, the chapter shows how the B.P administration quickly sought other ways of getting an air service running for the Protectorate. With little or no help from the British Government, the Protectorate would eventually enter into an agreement with the government of

Southern Rhodesia and start an air service that lasted one year followed by a financial claim by the Rhodesians against the B.P administration.

STILL IN PURSUIT OF AN AIR SERVICE

During the latter years of the war, civil aviation in all the British territories was put under review and new procedures put into place. Britain, France and the United States of America were of the view that there was a dire need for the internationalized control

63 of civil aviation. Science and technology expert Waqar Zaidi has argued that these three countries’ proposals for the internationalized control of aviation represented a call for the removal of both forms of aviation (military or civil) from the jurisdiction of the nation-states or governments.191 This view was informed by the massive and destructive use of strategic bombing during the war. The three countries believed that aviation was too dangerous to be left in the control of warring nations.192 For Britain and her empire, it was decided that since the normal procedure was for a colonial territory to have a

Director of Civil Aviation, it would be best for High Commission Territories like the

B.P to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Civil Aviation in Southern

Rhodesia because there were private aviation companies there. After all, the same director served Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.193 If and when companies were to be established in the Protectorate and the two other High Commission Territories

(Basutoland and Swaziland), it would become necessary to have independent Directors of Civil Aviation available to give Resident Commissioners advice on such subjects as the licensing of aeroplanes, communications and the registration of such companies.

Suggestions were made to train individual employees from the territories for the position and that a course of that nature would be available in the United Kingdom at the end of the war.194

Regardless of such proposed developments, the B.P administration was still longing for an air service of its own, even though they neither had the capital nor the necessary know-how of establishing such a service. By 1944 the B.P administration was contemplating the possibility of hiring aircraft from the Union of South Africa or from

191 W Zaidi, “Aviation Will Either Destroy or Save our Civilization: Proposals for the International Control of Aviation, 1920-45,” Journal of Contemporary History, 46, no. 1, (2011): 152. 192 W Zaidi, “Aviation Will Either Destroy or Save our Civilization, 152. 193 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Secretary of State, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria, nd. 194 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Secretary of State, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria, nd. 64

Southern Rhodesia to use for its own internal purposes. High Commissioner Lord

Harlech was, however, very doubtful that the B.P would be able to hire planes from the two neighbours after the war and therefore suggested approaching the Dominions Office for assistance in acquiring an aircraft for the B.P administration. He, therefore, advised

Resident Commissioner Forysth-Thompson to decide which aerodromes in the

Protectorate he was to maintain and also to consider the possibility of acquiring an aircraft for administrative purposes should neither the Union Government nor Southern

Rhodesia be willing to supply any planes for hire.195

The Resident Commissioner was also of the view that it would be advisable for the B.P administration to have planes available for administrative purposes after the war. Even though he acknowledged that this would depend on what the South Africans decided to do about the Germiston-Windhoek service after the war, Resident

Commissioner Thompson enthusiastically had plans for the Protectorate’s air services.

He believed that in order to have good air services, the Protectorate would need three aircraft. First, an autogyro type, which was a small aircraft with an unpowered rotor to develop lift and an engine powered propeller capable of flying safely at slow speeds.

This would be perfect for inspections of development work and visiting inaccessible areas. Secondly, they would need a twin engine six-seater for long journeys to carry officials and for evacuation in cases of disease outbreaks or other emergencies. Lastly, he felt that a two or three-seater single engine aircraft was also needed for short and quick journeys.196

195 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, High Commissioner at the Cape to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 2 March 1944. 196 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 28 March 1944.

65

Thompson also felt that two pilots would be needed to operate these machines and one certified mechanic to look after them. This, however, would cost more money as these people would need to be trained and paid or just paid if they already had experience. It must be argued, however, that even though the British Government was not really helpful in the development of aviation in the Protectorate, in 1943 the

Dominions Office had sent a memorandum to all British territories offering to train personnel in various fields of civil aviation likely to be needed in the territories after the war.197 The B.P administration could have taken advantage of this opportunity and send people to the United Kingdom for training. Seemingly unaware of the benefits that would come from accepting this offer, the Resident Commissioner had refused to send anyone for this training arguing at the time, that it would be more economical to maintain previous arrangements or hire planes from the Union and thus considering the

Dominions Office offer unnecessary.198 Resident Commissioner Thompson displayed a level of short-sightedness, because for someone who wanted to develop civil aviation in the Protectorate, he could have sent people for the relevant training.

As he had already suggested, High Commissioner Harlech approached the

Dominions Office about the B. P’s air service in June 1944. As this was his last dispatch about the affairs of the Protectorate as High Commissioner, Harlech wished he would get the B.P some attention from the Dominions Office. He explained that he had attended a meeting in Mafikeng with Thompson and all his heads of departments, and therefore wished to submit matters of interest and future concern regarding civil aviation in the Protectorate. He argued that the Protectorate was vast and that existing

197 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Dominions Office, London to High Commissioner at the Cape, 29 October 1943. 198 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 8 February 1944.

66 means of communication were too slow and expensive which meant that the cost of travelling to both government and individuals entailed a quite unusual proportion of necessary expenditure.199 He, therefore, suggested that after the war, internal aviation services should be developed so as to alleviate the problem of contact between heads of departments and their districts. He further gave an example of the High Court’s location at Lobatse, 50 miles north of Mafikeng, arguing that if there was a murder in Maun, the suspect, prosecutors and witnesses would have to trek 350 miles by road to Francistown and another 350 miles to Lobatsi and the same going back home, a journey that would be made considerably easier by an internal air service.200 The Dominions Office would, however, not be moved by Harlech’s suggestions.

As it has been argued in the previous chapter, Britain’s policy toward colonial development was such that, projects undertaken to develop the colonies had to bring some sort of financial gain to Britain. The B.P. had not proven to be that economically valuable and, therefore, its civil aviation was not a priority for the British. It was well known that governments of small colonies, which depended for their finances on selling a few primary products, could not maintain administration and keep up with technical and social services at a steady rate. It was for this reason that these colonies had to be given ‘grant-in-aids’ by the British Treasury even though this assistance came with conditions of total subservience to the British Government.201 The B.P., however, does not seem to have been fortunate enough to be afforded such assistance.

One point to be considered is that by virtue of having contributed soldiers to fight for the British during the Second World War one would have thought this enough

199 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Dominions Office, London, 5 June 1944. 200 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Dominions Office, London, 5 June 1944.

201 R Frost, “Reflections on British Colonial policy,” Pacific Affairs, 18. no. 4, (1945): 311. 67 to warrant British assistance to the B.P. After all, such an air service would have definitely made recruiting for the war much easier. Ashley Jackson has shown that in the B.P, the local chiefs were willing to send men to fight for the British and that when a military role for the High Commission Territories finally came about in 1941, they were able to do so. The basis of traditional mobilization was used as chiefs called out the age regiments to enlist.202 According to Jackson, 11,000 soldiers were recruited from the B.P and apart from the chiefs, only a handful of Batswana knew that they were at war. Most of the people who were there at that time thought the war started in 1941, because that is when recruitment began.203 Even though the soldiers recruited were

Africans and at this point the B.P. air service was not desired by the Africans but by the

European officials, the British Government had gained something from having the B.P. as a territory and thus should have lent a helping hand in establishing an air service in the Protectorate.

The B.P. administration, however, did not lose heart as it continued considering all possible ways of making the air service a reality. Later, in October 1944, the Director of Public Works discussed with the Government Secretary the possible requirements in connection with post war airways developments. He was apparently in possession of a pamphlet from the Air Ministry in Britain that had the types and layouts of aerodromes expected to be built in all British territories. It would seem that an expenditure of about

£ 175,000 would be required at Maun. This estimate was based on the cost of providing for the construction of runways, a hanger, and a few other buildings such as residence for the airport manager.204 The Director of Public Works, however, advised that it would

202 A Jackson, “Supplying War: The High Commission Territories’ Military-Logistical Contribution in the Second World War,” The Journal of Military History, 66. no. 3, (2002): 731. 203 A Jackson, Botswana, 1939-1945: An African Country at War, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 35. See also D A Schmidt, The Bechuanaland Pioneers and Gunners, (London: Praeger Publishers, 2006). 204 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Director of Public Works, Mafikeng to Government Secretary at Mafikeng, 12 October 1944.

68 be best to wait till the end of the war and see what was being contemplated by the Union and other territories in regard to air routes in general.

From 29 March to 6 April 1945, Mr Cross, the advisor on civil aviation to the

Secretary of State in London, visited the B.P. and had the opportunity to discuss the fate of local air services with Resident Commissioner Thompson. Cross believed that there was every prospect of an air service in the B.P. becoming self-supporting within the next two years. He explained that he believed that if the Witwatersrand Native Labour

Association (W.N.L.A) decided to transport mine labourers from the B.P., an arrangement could be made with them for an administrative air service to be established.205 In view of Mr Cross’s favourable report, the Resident Commissioner felt that steps should be taken without delay to inaugurate an air service in the B.P. He believed that in two years’ time, when trade returned to normal and with government revenue probably having declined, residents of the Protectorate should have been sufficiently air-minded to accept the air service as a regular means of transport.206

Furthermore, Resident Commissioner Thompson had recently had unofficial talks with Sir Earnest Guest, the Minister of Air, Southern Rhodesia and Air Vice-

Marshal Meredith, the Rhodesian Director of Civil Aviation. These men had apparently informed the Resident Commissioner that they were not only prepared but anxious to serve the B.P. without making profit, and that they already had the suitable aircraft to do so.207 In similar unofficial talks with Mr Hoffe, the General Manager of South African

Railways, Resident Commissioner Thompson was told that the Union Government had

205 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 14 April 1945. 206 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 14 April 1945. 207 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 14 April 1945.

69 no intentions of resuming their Germiston-Windhoek air route via Palapye and Maun in the B.P. In these circumstances, two alternatives would appear to have opened to the

B.P administration. They could avail themselves of the Southern Rhodesia offer and consider their proposal or they could attempt the formation of a private company.208 A private company would have no doubt been more favourable as it would have most likely run the service economically. Moreover, it would have the advantage of eliminating any political complication and subservience to any neighbouring territory willing to run the air service. Such issues were seen when the B.P. administration compromised and accepted some inconvenient aspects of the Union run air service through the B.P. The formation of a private company, however, was not going to be easy as it was very costly.

For the rest of 1945, the B.P. administration would continue to communicate with the W.N.L.A and the association was willing to operate an air service that would carry migrant workers from different villages to Francistown where they would get on the train headed for the Union mines. W.N.L.A would also run an administrative service for the B.P. In February 1946, however, the W.N.L.A informed the Resident

Commissioner that the South African mines had come to the conclusion that the transportation of labourers from the B.P. was premature and had to be suspended for some time.209 This meant that plans for the W.N.L.A to operate an air service in the B.P. had to be suspended.

The B.P. administration, therefore, remembered that the Southern Rhodesians had offered to operate an air service in the B.P. The Resident Commissioner then asked

208 BNARS, S. 368/1/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner at the Cape, 14 April 1945. 209 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 13 February 1946.

70 the Rhodesian Director of Civil Aviation, Air Vice-Marshal Meredith if he could send someone to the Protectorate to investigate the local conditions and inform the B.P. administration what conditions the Southern Rhodesia Government would like to run an air service under.210 Air Vice-Marshal Meredith indeed complied and sent Mr.

Longmore to the B.P. where he met with Government Secretary Mr. Nettelton and

Director of Public Works Mr. Brind. Longmore told the two gentlemen that the

Southern Rhodesian government had established two entities. The first was the Central

African Airways Authority which was to be a licensing body for civil aviation in

Southern Rhodesia. The second was the Central African Airways Corporation, which was to be taken over from Southern Rhodesia Air Services and run the B.P. air service if talks were to be successful.211

The proposed B.P. air service was also discussed and Mr Longmore outlined the type of service the Rhodesians could operate and the type of aircraft they could use for such a service as well as the various implications. In terms of guarantee against loss,

Longmore proposed that the B.P. administration should guarantee a minimum of £

1,500 per annum for the operation of a once weekly service from Bulawayo-

Francistown-Maun-Livingston and back. For the same service but twice a week, the

B.P. would have to guarantee £2,500 per annum.212 Mr Longmore’s proposal was met with much interest by the B.P. administration and so he advised the Ministry of Air in

Rhodesia to enter into an agreement with the B.P. for the inauguration of the service.

210 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Air Vice-Marshal Meredith, Salisbury, 10 May 1946. 211 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Government Secretary at Mafikeng: Note of Discussion with Mr D.D Longmore, Southern Rhodesia Air Services, 29 May 1946. 212 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Southern Rhodesia Air Services, Salisbury to the Secretary for Air, Salisbury, 3 June 1946.

71

Before the service could even start, the Department of Civil Aviation in

Rhodesia told Thompson that there were small recommendations that the B.P. might want to attend to first in terms of improving certain aerodromes. Longman soon informed the B.P. administration that the Minister of Air in Southern Rhodesia had agreed that an offer should immediately be made to them. This, therefore, meant that if the B.P. administration accepted, there would be two services. First, a Bulawayo,

Francistown, Palapye Road, Gaborone, Mafikeng return service and secondly, a

Bulawayo, Francistown, Maun, Livingstone return service. The services would be operated entirely at the cost of the Central African Airways Corporation (C.A.A) and that the B.P. would not immediately be called upon for any form of guarantee.213

After considering the offer for about four months, the B.P. then got back to the

C.A.A. explaining that before they could even make a recommendation to the High

Commissioner, there were a couple of points on which they needed clarification. First, on the Mafikeng service, the offer did not make any mention of a potential extension to

Johannesburg and they wanted to know if the C.A.A. could make arrangements for that since passengers from the B.P. would in many cases be travelling to Johannesburg on business affairs.214 Secondly, they were convinced that the majority of passengers affected by the Maun service would prefer a direct service of Bulawayo-Francistown-

Maun, returning by the same route and that a circular route via Livingstone would entail a delay and additional costs to persons travelling to Maun. Finally, the B.P. administration desired to raise the question of the rate of carrying mails. The C.A.A.

213 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Southern Rhodesian Air Services, Salisbury to Government Secretary at Mafikeng, 14 June 1946. 214 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Central African Airways, Salisbury, 18 September 1946.

72 had quoted this at £2.00 per pound and the question was whether or not this included parcels.215

The C.A.A. had no problem with extending the route to Johannesburg. They had simply not included it in their proposals because they assumed that the Union Airways were about to commence their own internal feeder services. They also cautioned that permission would have to be obtained from Union authorities. The C.A.A. also happily agreed to eliminate Livingstone from the Maun service and explained that as far as mails and parcels were concerned, mails would be carried for £2.00 per pound irrespective of distance. Parcels, on the other hand, would be charged differently as they were considered to be freight.216

The new Resident Commissioner, Anthony Sillery suggested that High

Commissioner Sir Evelyn Barring should be the one to approach the Union authorities about the Mafikeng-Johannesburg extension. The C.A.A. felt that since the air service would be for the Protectorate, it would be wiser if the High Commissioner did it. They also asked if he could ask the Union authorities to declare the Mafikeng air field as a customs airport.217

High Commissioner Barring asked the Union authorities for permission for the

C.A.A. to fly into Mafikeng which was in the Union. He, however, told Acting Resident

Commissioner Vivian Ellenberger that he was in no position to intervene with the Union authorities as regards the proposed Mafikeng-Johannesburg extension as this was not really an essential part of the B.P. air service. The extension also had the potential of

215 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Central African Airways, Salisbury, 18 September 1946. 216 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Central African Airways, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 27 September 1946. 217 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 27 November 1946.

73 competing with the Union’s internal services.218 The High Commissioner had also informed the Dominions Office of the developments in civil aviation in the B.P. since the end of the war. He outlined all options the B.P. administration had and what they chose to go with and why. He explained that the Southern Rhodesians were ready to start the service with the existing facilities and that the service was going to be on a six- month trial basis. All they needed was the approval of the Dominions Office to start the service.219

THE RISE AND DEMISE OF ANOTHER AIR SERVICE

The C.A.A. indicated that there were some aerodromes in the Protectorate that needed improvement, even though they did not necessarily mind starting the service before these were improved. As usual, the B.P. administration had looked to the British

Government with hope of getting some funding for the improvement of these aerodromes but received no assistance. The Dominions Office made recommendations that the improvement of the aerodromes would amount to £3,300. They, however, explained that the British Treasury felt that the money would have to be financed from the B. P.’s own revenue and not from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, whose expenditures always had to go through the test of essentiality.220 The Treasury’s argument here was that while the air service in the B.P. was a form of development, it was not necessarily worthy of funding from the Colonial Development and Welfare

Fund and that since it was to be an administrative service, it should be financed from the Protectorate’s revenue.221 The British Government was still not willing to spend on the B.P.’s air service even though they also did acknowledge that it would represent a

218 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Vivian Ellenberger, 6 December 1946. 219 BANARS, S. 368/1/2, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Dominions Office, 27 November 1946. 220 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Dominions Office, London to High Commissioner at the Cape, 11 March 1947. 221BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Dominions Office, London to High Commissioner at the Cape, 11 March 1947.

74 form of development. They appeared to be deliberately under-developing the

Protectorate by refusing it financial assistance. After all the development of African territories depended solely on the expansion of their exports. Ghanaian economist

Robert K Gardiner argued that most African territories were poor because their home market was too small and highly dependent on foreign trade. Moreover, their economic structure was characterised by high agricultural activity albeit at a low level of productivity.222 This was the case with the Protectorate.

The new B.P. air service, however, commenced on 6 March 1947 with a once weekly flight from Bulawayo-Francistown-Maun and back to Bulawayo. Even though the Southern Rhodesians were kind enough to provide such a service at a very low cost, it became apparent that they also wanted to make profit out of it. When the commercial manager for the C.A.A. was in Maun in June 1947, he inquired into ways and means of making the air service more profitable financially.223 The manager had a meeting with the Assistant District Commissioner and discussed several things.

The corporation’s manager stated that even though there was no intention of withdrawing the service from Maun, he was keen to find ways to make it pay better. He suggested that the air service schedule be amended to allow for the plane to fly from

Salisbury-Bulawayo-Francistown-Maun and back on Saturdays and Mondays. The idea here was that businessmen could come to Maun or go to Rhodesia for either a weekend or for five days, and that tourists from Rhodesia visit Maun for the weekend.224 Though not in a position to give an official answer, the Assistant District Commissioner suggested a number of ways to go about the issue. He suggested that the C.A.A. apart

222 R K A Gardiner, “Development and Trade in Africa,” African Affairs, 65, no. 258, (1966): 3. 223 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, District Commissioner at Maun to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 8 July 1947. 224BNARS, S. 368/1/3, District Commissioner at Maun to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 8 July 1947.

75 from the passenger service, could consider carrying freight as well. Furthermore, Maun could be advertised in the two Rhodesias as a ‘weekend spot’ and the B.P. administration officials could be advised to make more use of the plane.225

Despite the fact that they were not entirely satisfied with the Maun service, the

C.A.A. then went on to introduce the second scheme of the air service, which was to be a flight from Bulawayo to Mafikeng and back, with the possibility of extending to

Johannesburg. The issue was discussed by the South African Air Transport Council

(S.A.A.T.C). The Council agreed that the Mafikeng service had been delayed because they had not approved the use of the Mafikeng airfield as a customs airport and therefore decided to declare it as such.226 At the same S.A.A.T.C meeting, the Union Minister of

External Affairs informed the Council that he had for a long time been in communication with the C.A.A. with regards to the extension of the service to

Johannesburg. It was then decided that since the Union’s feeder service from Mafikeng to Johannesburg was not operating, there was no grounds for objecting to the C.A.A. operating on that route. Once the license to operate on that route had been given to a

South African Company, it was suggested that the picking up and discharging of passengers between Mafikeng and Johannesburg would be amicably arranged between the two companies concerned.227

The High Commissioner was then informed by the Union Department of

External Affairs that permission for aircraft of the C.A.A. to land at Mafikeng had been granted and that similarly, there had been no objection to the extension of the Bulawayo-

225 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, District Commissioner at Maun to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 8 July 1947. 226 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Report of the S.A.A.T.C, Item 24: Proposed Air Service from Bulawayo to Mafikeng by C.A.A, nd. 227 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Note Submitted by the Union Delegation to the 2nd S.A.A.T.C Meeting: Proposed Air Service from Bulawayo to Mafikeng by C.A.A, nd.

76

Mafikeng Service to Johannesburg.228 In January 1948 Resident Commissioner Sillery informed all heads of department, District Commissioners and the Post Master General of the new addition of the Mafikeng service which was to commence on 17 January

1948. He also furnished them with information about the type of aircraft to be used and provided the schedule on which it was going to operate.229

Within three months of the trial service, things began to look unpromising for the B.P. administration. High Commissioner Barring was informed that the C.A. A.’s

1948-49 financial year was not looking good and that the Central African Air Authority had discovered that there had been a loss of £11,256. Moreover, the B.P. administration’s liability to reimburse the corporation for losses was limited to £1,500 per annum.230 The authority, therefore, felt compelled to inform the three Central

African territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland of the completely unremunerated nature of the service which was being operated by the corporation outside the confines of the territories. After all, the corporation mainly provided air services for these three territories and they were all participants in the financing of the corporation.231

The High Commissioner was, therefore, told that the recommendation from representatives of the three territories was that the B.P. air service be abandoned or suspended within three months unless arrangements which would avoid any loss to the corporation could be negotiated before 30 June 1948. While the three territories appreciated the B.P. administration’s need for an air service, they were unable to concur

228 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Department of External Affairs, Pretoria to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 24 October 1947. 229 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Air Service: Resident Commissioner’s Memorandum to Heads of Departments, District Commissioners and Post Master General, 14 January 1948. 230 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Central African Council, Salisbury to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 April 1948. 231 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Central African Council, Salisbury to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 April 1948. 77 on the maintenance, by the corporation, of a service operating on such an uneconomic basis in a territory which was not a direct participant in the financing of the corporation.232

When Resident Commissioner Sillery received the news, he argued that since the introduction of the Mafikeng service, the B.P. air service had proved thoroughly unsatisfactory. He stated, however, that it was not in the interest of the B.P. administration to continue the service to Mafikeng even though the weekly service between Francistown and Maun was important and had to be kept so long as the subsidy required was reasonable.233 The Central African Council, however, explained to Sillery that even if they allowed the corporation to keep the Francistown-Maun service, estimates showed them that the service would require to be subsidised to the tune of at least £2,500 a year. The Central African governments, therefore, had to insist that the

C.A.A. discontinue the service as the B.P. administration was only willing to pay a subsidy of £1,500.234 The reason why Sillery insisted that the B.P. administration would only pay a subsidy of £1,500 was that High Commissioner Barring had told him that there was very little chance that the Protectorate would make a case to get money for the subsidy from the United Kingdom.235

The B.P. administration was now in an uncomfortable position where they had two air services, one of which was very successful but could not be maintained because of the loss incurred due to the other service. It was quite important for the Maun service to be continued but the C.A.A. was in no way ready to continue operating at a loss. Mr.

232BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Central African Council, Salisbury to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 13 April 1948. 233 BNARS, S. 368/1/3, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 24 April 1948. 234 BNARS, S. 368/ 1/6, Central African Council, Salisbury, to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng 18 August 1948. 235 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 2 June 1948.

78

Riley, a member of the European Advisory Council in the B.P. and owner of the Riley’s

Hotel in Maun, was very concerned about the termination of the Maun service. He told

Government Secretary Nettelton that he had tried to reason with the C.A.A. on behalf of the government because it was a pity that the Maun service was being terminated when people were only beginning to appreciate it and their support being more evident in the advance booking enquiries at the hotel.236

It is, however, difficult to separate the motive behind Mr Riley’s attempts to intervene from his desire to keep his business afloat. Due to the air service, more people were making it to Maun and thus bringing more business to his hotel. It is no surprise that he would go to the lengths of addressing the C.A.A on the issue. The points he raised when he tried to reason with the corporation did, however, reflect the truth. He told the C.A.A. manager that Maun’s geographical position was such that air travel other than road transport was the only means of communication they had to and from the rail-head, a distance of some 330 miles by road, a journey that was most unpleasant even under the best of conditions.237 He stated that he appreciated the loss that was inevitably suffered on the Bulawayo-Mafikeng section which he felt had not received the support anticipated. He argued, however, that the Bulawayo-Mafikeng service also had a good road and convenient train service, something which the Maun section did not enjoy.238 Mr Riley was, of course, not going to make any difference when both the

High Commissioner and Resident Commissioner were unable to convince the C.A.A.

The C.A.A then introduced the B.P. administration to one Mr Pritchard of

Airwork Limited, London. The C.A.A claimed that this company was a concern with considerable financial backing and undisputed integrity, which was becoming interested

236 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Riley’s Hotel, Maun to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 23 August 1948. 237 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Riley’s Hotel, Maun to Central African Airways, Salisbury, 21 August 1948. 238BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Riley’s Hotel, Maun to Central African Airways, Salisbury, 21 August 1948. 79 in Rhodesian Aircraft Maintenance Services Limited (R.A.M.S), a Southern Rhodesia company based in Salisbury.239 The C.A.A. had suggested that Mr Pritchard proceed to

Mafikeng to have discussions with the B.P. administration about the possibility of

R.A.M.S taking over air services in the Protectorate. They believed that their suggestion had much merit in that, by the operation of smaller and more economical aircraft, it would be possible to provide services in a more economical manner without any loss of efficiency.240

It is worthwhile to note that a year before the C.A.A. terminated the B.P air service, the British Government had established the Colonial Development Corporation

(C.D.C), which was meant to be an instrument for colonial development. This was after both the Colonial Office and the Treasury concurred that there was a dire need to reinforce the principle of territorial self-sufficiency of the colonial governments.241The

C.D.C. would be instrumental in alleviating colonial dependency on the British

Government. Its mandate was to formulate as well as carry out projects for the development of the colonies with a view of expanding their production of foodstuffs and raw materials as well as industry or trade development. The C.D.C. could either own and carry out these projects or work with the private enterprise and colonial administrations.242

Civil aviation in the B.P. would have benefited greatly from the C.D.C had the corporation paid any attention to it. It would have been the perfect opportunity to establish a good air service in the Protectorate. C.D.C activities did actually take place

239 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Central African Airways, Salisbury, to Government Secretary at Mafikeng, 27 August 1948. 240 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Central African Airways, Salisbury, to Government Secretary at Mafikeng, 27 August 1948. 241 M. Cowen, “Early Years of the Colonial Development Corporation: British State Enterprise Overseas during Late Colonialism,” African Affairs, 83, no. 330 (1984): 63. 242 E R. Wicker, “The Colonial Development Corporation (1948-54),” The Review of Economic Studies, 23, no. 3 (1956): 214.

80 in the Protectorate for a little while. The Resident Commissioner at one point mentioned to the Commonwealth Office that the C.D.C had been looking into the Chobe crownlands in the B.P with a view toward tourism development. He was anticipating that the C.D.C would be a great customer for a B.P air service if it could be established as soon as possible.243 The C.D.C later worked on the development of the abattoir and cold-storage scheme at Lobatsi through the help of a Southern Rhodesia consultant who succeeded at a similar scheme.244 It appears the C.D.C was more concerned with issues of water supply, agriculture and food production as well as industry. Communication in the Protectorate, particularly civil aviation was not paid much attention even though in other colonies it was. This revealed how the Protectorate was seen by the British.

MORE OFFERS BUT NO AIR SERVICE

On 19 August 1948 R.A.M.S introduced themselves to the B.P. administration. They explained that they had learnt from the C.A.A. that the B.P air service had been terminated due to financial losses by reason of not getting enough passengers on the service. They explained that they felt that the B.P air service therefore required smaller aircraft, which they fortunately had.245 Though their closest aircraft to the B.P. were based in Bulawayo, they did not mind keeping one or two at Mafikeng if the Resident

Commissioner so wished. The company made sure to remind the B.P. administration that they were associated with Airwork Limited and that with their combined experience, any flying they did for the B.P. would be done with maximum efficiency,

243 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Sir Walter Harragin, 11 January 1950. 244 J M. Wordie and E Barring, “The Kalahari Today: Discussion,” The Geographical Journal, 118, no. 1 (1952): 23. 245 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Rhodesian Aircraft Maintenance Service, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 19 August 1948.

81 economy and safety. They were even prepared to fly to Maun and discuss the offer in more detail.246

While the offer from R.A.M.S was appealing to the B.P. administration, the

Director of Public Works in the Protectorate felt that the use of single engine aircraft such as the ones suggested by R.A.M.S might not be a very good idea. He argued that based on the terrain and distance of the Francistown-Maun route, twin engine aircraft were much more favourable.247 R.A.M.S, however, made it clear that while the qualities of a twin engine aircraft were well known, it was still a very expensive aircraft to operate. Unfortunately, they did not have any small twin engine aircraft to take the place of the Rapide that the B.P. administration was used to.248 The company stressed the fact that for over a year they had been operating Bonanza single engine aircraft in the three

Central African territories and considered the aircraft’s excellent wireless and retractable undercarriages preferable to two-engine aircraft that could not remain airborne should one engine fail.249

While the R.A.M.S offer was still on the table, the B.P. administration received another one from a Bulawayo based company called Commercial Air Services

(Rhodesia). They had a sister company with the same name in the Union. Commercial

Air Services (Rhodesia) expressed desire to render its services to the B.P. with the use of small aircraft that could carry three to four passengers. They explained that their sister company in the Union was using the same aircraft for a feeder service under

246 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Rhodesian Aircraft Maintenance Service, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 19 August 1948.

247 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Director of Public Works, Mafikeng to Government Secretary at Mafikeng, 3 September 1948. 248 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Rhodesian Aircraft Maintenance Services, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 7 September 1948. 249 BNARS, S. 368/1/6, Rhodesian Aircraft Maintenance Services, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 7 September 1948. 82 contract to the Union Government.250 The B.P. had now become a market for various private flying companies in the neighbouring territories. The Union Government and

Southern Rhodesia had already operated unsuccessful services and private companies were trying their luck. This revealed a lot about how far behind developments in the

B.P. were compared to its neighbours. It also showed a level of expansionist ambitions from the Protectorate’s neighbours and the desire to be dominant in the region.

It is worthwhile mentioning that 1948 was the year in which the National Party in South Africa won the election. This marked the beginning of apartheid in the country.

Despite the Union’s previously known expansionist ambitions, during the year 1948 there was no offer from the Union for an air service in the B.P as the Union was preoccupied with politics. It is, however, unlikely that the beginning of apartheid had anything to do with the lack of Union interest in the B.P air service. In fact, it has been argued that the National Party’s victory in the 1948 elections did not bring about such drastic changes as it is often implied.251

The Protectorate was by no means cared for by the British Government and this as has been the argument, represented a form of underdevelopment. The Protectorate was, as Julie Livingstone has called it, a ‘British Colonial Backwater’. She argued that the only thing that the British could gain from the Protectorate was taxes though they were barely enough to keep the colonial civil service afloat.252 Because there were no known raw materials to be extracted and no industry to be fed, the Protectorate then became a labour reserve for the Union of South Africa. The only valuable thing except

250 BNARS, S. 368/1/7, Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia), Bulawayo to Resident Commission at Mafikeng, 27 September 1948. 251 P Maylam, “The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South Africa,” African Affairs, 89, no. 354 (1990): 68. 252 J Livingstone, “Physical Fitness and Economic Opportunity in the Bechuanaland Protectorate in the 1930s and 1940s,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 27, no. 4, (2001): 796.

83 the tax, was the agricultural industries centred on Lobatse abattoir. As George Henry has observed, however, the British made sure that law and custom would ensure the monopoly rights and privileges that the British had always enjoyed. According to

Henry, by 1955, 74% of the dealers’ licenses in the B.P. were owned by Europeans,

15% by Africans and 11% by Asiatic people.253 It was no surprise, therefore, that civil aviation in the Protectorate was a development that was struggling.

The B.P. administration, however, acknowledged the offer made by

Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia) and expressed an interest in it. They asked the company about the amount of subsidy they would require if they established a weekly service.254 In response, the company expressed their unfamiliarity with the demand for passenger seats on the said route, and for that reason would prefer to operate the service under charter to the government. On this basis, the B.P. Government would pay the charge for the aircraft at the rate of £1,00 per mile whilst all passenger fares collected would be for the government’s credit.255 The company informed the Resident

Commissioner that the annual charge for the service would, therefore, be £2, 229. 18.

However, knowing that a certain prejudice existed in the Protectorate against single engine aircraft, the company suggested that the B.P. administration purchase a Rapide twin engine aircraft, which they would operate on behalf of the B.P. administration.256

This, of course, would mean more money for the maintenance of the aircraft, which the company was also willing to do. The idea of purchasing an aircraft to be owned entirely

253 G Henry, “The Economy of Botswana” in Lesotho, Botswana & Swaziland, ed. R P. Stevens (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 168. 254 BNARS, S. 368/1/7, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia), Bulawayo, 10 December 1948. 255 BNARS, S. 368/1/7, Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia), Bulawayo to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 4 January 1949. 256 BNARS, S. 368/1/7, Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia), Bulawayo to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 4 January 1949.

84 by the B.P. excited Resident Commissioner Sillery even though his administration did not have the money do so.

Surprisingly, however, the Resident Commissioner’s idea had changed in seven months. He informed the Commercial Air Services company that there was no longer any likelihood of the B.P. administration buying aircraft and that as a government, they did not favour the use of single engine aircraft.257 It was a surprise that after seven months of no communication the Resident Commissioner would suddenly state something so different. This could only mean that he was anticipating a better alternative elsewhere and indeed that was the case. On the same day that he wrote to the Commercial Air Services company turning them down, Sillery also responded to another company called Zambezi Airways Limited, who apparently had approached him with an offer. He informed them that he was definitely interested in a periodic air service and asked if they could suggest the terms of an agreement from their experience elsewhere.258

The Zambezi company suggested two routes to operate on. The first could be

Livingstone-Bulawayo-Francistown-Maun with a night stop and return the same way on the next day. The drawback with this route, however, would be that the company might be prohibited to carry passengers between Livingstone and Bulawayo, except with the consent of the C.A.A, whose service at that period was very much reduced.259

The second alternative would be a service from Livingstone-Maun-Francistown with a night stop or Livingstone-Maun-Francistown-Maun with a night stop at Maun and

257 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia), Bulawayo, 4 August 1949. 258 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Zambezi Airways Limited, Livingstone, 4 August 1949. 259 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Zambezi Airways Limited, Livingstone to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 2 September 1949.

85 returning to Livingstone the next day. They were willing to operate a Rapide at £2,00 per mile and leave the bookings and profits of passenger fares to the B.P. administration.260

Amidst all these offers from various companies, the C.A.A. drew the B.P. administration’s attention to a matter that they least expected. On 2 September 1949 the

Corporation informed Resident Commissioner Sillery that according to their records, the B.P. administration owed them some money for the losses incurred from 6 March

1947 to 3 September 1948. As the agreement between the two parties provided for a guarantee against loss not exceeding £1,500 by the B.P. administration, the corporation was informing Sillery that after gathering all the necessary records, they would be claiming a sum of £2,265.17 from the B.P.261 The B.P. administration did not seem bothered at this point as they did not even respond to the C.A.A. Perhaps they were waiting for the corporation to present the necessary documentations before the claim could be settled.

When the B.P. turned down the Commercial Air Service (Rhodesia) on grounds that they as a government did not favour the use of single engine aircraft, the company seems to have referred the issue to their sister company in Johannesburg who then tried their luck with the B.P. The company explained that they had been operating under government contract in the Union of South Africa and that the experience they had gathered there would be suitable for the B.P. They proposed using a reserve twin engine

Rapide from the service they were operating in the Union.262 The service they were

260 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Zambezi Airways Limited, Livingstone to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 2 September 1949. 261 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Central African Airways, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 2 September 1949. 262 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Commercial Air Services (Johannesburg), to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 20 October 1949.

86 proposing to run for the B.P. administration would be a Johannesburg-Mafikeng-

Palapye Road-Francistown-Maun return flight. The company also told Resident

Commissioner Sillery that their estimated cost for the air service would be £10,000 per annum.263 Sillery, however, felt that the proposition made by the company was too ambitious and told them that what he wanted was a modest scheme that would also be affordable.264

R.A.M.S, the Salisbury company that Sillery had asked to draw up a proposal for him in 1948, finally wrote back to him in December 1949 explaining that they had gone through some re-organisation and that they were no longer associated with

London’s Airwork Limited, an association they at that time seemed to think would win them the favour of the B.P. administration. They informed Sillery that they were now running air services with Rapide aircraft in Nyasaland in conjunction with C.A.A.265

Sillery told them that the B.P. administration was now considering the use of single engine aircraft on their proposed air service and asked if RAMS was in a position to do so. The B.P. administration’s outlook on single engine machines had changed due to financial constraints. They even asked Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia) if their offer still stood, even though they had turned it down. The company had, however, disposed of their last single engine aircraft since the B.P, had made it clear that they did not favour the use of such.266

From 1948 when the C.A.A. service was terminated to 1950, there had been several offers to the B.P. administration from various private companies. Some

263 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Commercial Air Services (Johannesburg), to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 20 October 1949. 264 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Commercial Air Services (Johannesburg), 24 December 1949. 265 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Rhodesian Aircraft Maintenance Company, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 13 December 1949. 266 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Sir Walter Harragin, 11 January 1950. 87 discussions broke down because the offers were too expensive, while some like the

Zambezi Airways offer broke down because the Resident Commissioner felt that their suggestion to fly Livingstone-Maun-Francistown, could not be entertained because of search and rescue difficulties.267 For the first few months of 1950, negotiations with a

Bulawayo company called Rhodair Charter Services would ensue but just like all the others, they would come to nothing. There appears to have been a proliferation of air transport companies in the region at the end of the war which was most likely due to the abundance of trained pilots, engineers and mechanics. In America, it was anticipated that by the end of the war, there would be about two million aviators because thousands of young men were receiving training as pilots and mechanics.268 It can only be imagined how many aviators would have come out of Britain or Europe in general. This, coupled with the fact that a large potential demand for private flying had been disrupted by the war could only lead to the increased establishment of flying companies in the Southern

African region and everywhere else after the war ended.

With such a proliferation of air transport companies in the region, the underdevelopment of the B.P. became more apparent as it brought up the question of why neighbouring territories would have such success in their civil aviation while the

B.P lagged behind. Many British colonies received systematic support to stimulate their economies but the B.P. was not as fortunate for reasons already expounded. This form of underdevelopment by virtue of neglect was well justified before 1929, when the basic principle of the British colonial policy was that the mother country and her dependencies should be independent of each other financially.269 This meant that the

267 BNARS, S. 368/1/10, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Director of Public Works at Mafikeng, 4 January 1950. 268 A. Albert and B S. Trynin, “The Aircraft Industry after the War,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 222, no.1 (1942): 169. 269 K.G, “Development of Colonial Resources: The African Groundnuts Scheme,” The World Today, 4, no. 3 (1948): 2.

88 colonies had to provide for their needs from their own revenue, developing only what they could afford. After 1929 when the Colonial Development Act was passed, the neglect of the B.P. administration’s needs then represented sheer underdevelopment.

In the 1940s, when funds became available for the purpose of colonial development, many colonies benefited from these. Various schemes were coordinated covering lots of British colonies, undertaking economic and social development projects ranging from public health, education, housing, prospecting for minerals as well as communications.270 This is not to say that the B.P. administration never received any assistance in other fields. It has already been shown that the C.D.C. did some work in developing the abattoir and cold-storages at Lobatsi. However, the argument of underdevelopment is centred on the issue of communications. Unlike the railway, civil aviation in the Protectorate as a form of communication was badly neglected. It has been suggested that perhaps the reason why some colonies never received any significant development (economic, political & infrastructural) despite the availability of funds from the mother country was that colonial officials moved from post to post and sometimes to different colonies without staying long enough to understand the needs of one colony.271 This, however, cannot be the argument in the case of the B.P. because every Resident Commissioner from Charles Rey in1935 to Edward Beetham in

1950 were all actively vocal about the need for an air service in the Protectorate that would be owned and operated by the B.P administration.

THE GHOST OF THE C.A.A. OPERATED SERVICE

270 K.G, “Development of Colonial Resources,”:3 271 M van Beusekon and D Hodgson, “Lessons Learned? Development Experiences in the Late Colonial Period,” The Journal of African History, 41, no. 1 (2000): 31.

89

After the letter they sent to the B.P. administration in September 1949, the C.A.A. finally submitted a financial claim for services they had provided from 1947 to 1948.

The company broke down the figures into the total miles flown from the beginning of the service to the end, and the amount of losses incurred in the air service. Since according to the Draft Agreement, the B.P. was to guarantee £1,500 per annum against losses, the corporation explained that losses incurred surpassed the B.P. administration’s guarantee and hence the £2,2265.17 they were claiming.272

The Director of Public Works in the Protectorate reviewed the figure submitted by the C.A.A. and it became apparent to him that the air service had not been operated efficiently. He, however, argued that the figures did not materially assist the B.P. administration in resisting or reducing the corporation’s claim.273 It appears as if the first instinct here was to avoid settling the claim instead of accepting it for what it was. He, however, told the Resident Commissioner that it would be wise to re-visit the Draft

Agreement between the corporation and the B.P. administration, a copy which even he as Director of Public works claimed to have never laid his eyes on. He also felt that it might be wise for the administration to seek a legal advisor on the issue.274 The Resident

Commissioner requested the chief accountant of the C.A.A. to furnish him with a copy of the Draft Agreement so that he may be able to understand the root of their claim and the clauses to which they kept referring to in support of their claim.275 This revealed a lot about the professionalism or lack thereof on the part of the B.P. administration and

272 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Central African Airways, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 17 April 1950. 273 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Director of Public Works at Mafikeng to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 5 June 1950. 274 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Director of Public Works at Mafikeng to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 5 June 1950.

275 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Central African Airways, Salisbury, 7 August 1950.

90 perhaps the C.A.A. as well. Both the Director of Public Works and Resident

Commissioner were not familiar with the agreement they had entered into with this corporation. Perhaps it also showed how desperate the B.P. administration was that formalities were the least of their concerns when they were in search of their air service.

While the Corporation complied and sent a copy of the Draft Agreement, they also expressed their confusion as to how the administration could possibly not have the document. They, however, explained that their claim was also based on the exchange of correspondence between them and the B.P. administration.276

The B.P. administration adopted a defensive stance on the whole issue and they seemed convinced that they did not deserve to pay the C.A.A. The Government

Secretary argued that their legal position was that they never obtained the authority from the Secretary of State for any subsidy even though they had budgeted for it. He, therefore, felt that upon the expiration of the six months’ trial, the issue of subsidy should have been brought up.277 His view was that the B.P. administration had to decide whether they intended to be bound by the subsidy for which they had applied but never received approval to do so, even though they had intended to pay it, or they could just tell the C.A.A. that at no time had they given them such a guarantee as £1500 per annum.278

Resident Commissioner Sillery, when touching base with High Commissioner

Barring about the issue, also adopted the point of view of his Secretary. He explained that it had been the intention of the B.P. administration to guarantee the corporation

276 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Central African Airways, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 16 August 1950. 277 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Government Secretary at Mafikeng to Director of Public Works at Mafikeng, n.d. 278BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Government Secretary at Mafikeng to Director of Public Works at Mafikeng, n.d.

91 against loss up to an annual figure of £1500 but no agreement was entered into and the corporation only presented the Draft Agreement in August 1950 when they were making the claim.279 There were definitely communication problems when the trial service started. It looked like the corporation had never provided the B.P. administration with the Draft Agreement and only mentioned the £1500 per annum subsidy in the letters they sent outlining how the air service would be operated if they were to run it.

Resident Commissioner Sillery, however, felt that an offer of £1,750 should be made to the C.A.A. without admitting any liability or concluded agreement. He argued that the corporation was not justified in continuing and extending the service to Mafikeng despite repeated warnings and reminders from the government that the legal and financial position required clarification and settlement.280

High Commissioner Barring referred the issue to the British Government and explained everything that the Resident Commissioner had told him. He, however, felt that even though the extent of the B.P. administration’s obligation was not clear, it was necessary for the corporation to be paid its full claim for £2,265.17, since the

Protectorate did indeed enjoy the benefit of the service for the period covered by the claim. He suggested that the £1,750 recommended by the Resident Commissioner be paid first and then the balance could be paid when the B.P. administration’s obligation to the subsidy was determined.281 The Commonwealth Relations Office was completely perplexed with what was going on with the B.P. administration. They only recalled approving the commencement of a six-month experimental service without guarantee against loss. They, therefore, felt that if any agreement was subsequently entered into,

279 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 9 October 1950. 280 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 9 October 1950. 281 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Outward Saving Telegram from High Commissioner to Secretary of State, London, 9 March 1951.

92 any guarantee contained in it would be retrospective to the date of commencement of the service.282

The B.P. administration’s advisor Mr. Kelly reckoned that while the responsibility of no agreement being signed rested with the company, the B.P administration could not be held liable under an agreement which was never submitted.

He, however, did state that when the B.P. administration told the C.A.A. that permission had been obtained from the British Government, the company was by law entitled to assume that they were prepared to guarantee £1500 on the original basis.283

By August 1951, the C.A.A. had lost its patience as the B.P. administration had last said the matter had been referred to Britain and never got back to the corporation.

The chairman of the corporation argued that in spite of five reminders between

November 1950 and June 1951, it appeared that no progress had been made about resolving the issue.284 He further added that he never at any point suggested that the claim was up for dispute and that as the corporation had furnished the B.P. administration with all the necessary information, he felt justified to ask that the claim be paid immediately.285 The corporation felt strongly that the B.P. administration owed them money and were completely unware of the fact that the B.P. was actually not legally bound to pay the claim. It was just a moral obligation that could make the B.P. administration pay, not a legal one.

The Resident Commissioner, however, responded politely and apologised for the delayed settlement of the matter. He told the corporation that the matter was still

282BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Commonwealth Relations Office, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 21 April 1951. 283 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, C.A.A Claim from the B.P: Report by Legal Advisor, Mr Kelly, 16 June 1951. 284 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Central African Airways, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 24 August 1951. 285 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Central African Airways, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 24 August 1951. 93 under consideration by the Secretary of State and that the difficulty about it arose from the failure of the corporation and B.P. administration to conclude a formal agreement for the continuation of the service after the initial experimental period of six months.286

No decision would be made in 1951 and the matter was only revisited again in 1952.

On 5 May 1952, the Commonwealth Relations Office informed High

Commissioner John Rougtel that they agreed that the B.P. administration was under no legal obligation to meet the demands that the C.A.A. had put forward and that there was only a moral case for making the payment.287 The Commonwealth Office argued that the C.A.A. had only themselves to blame for continuing the service after April 1948 and that the £1750 that the Resident Commissioner was willing to offer them was unnecessarily generous. They suggested that the corporation rather be offered £1200 as an ex gratia payment in full settlement.288

When Resident Commissioner Edward Beetham offered the C.A.A. the £1200 that had been authorised by the Secretary of State, the corporation was not impressed at all. They argued that the offer did not in any way represent the costs incurred by them, nor did it approach what was morally due by the B.P. administration. However, acknowledging that their claim rested only upon an unsigned draft agreement, the chairman of the corporation stated that he would albeit reluctantly, accept the settlement offered.289 Five months after the B.P. administration sent the cheque to the corporation,

Resident Commissioner Beetham was told by High Commissioner Rougetel that after careful consideration, it had been decided that the B.P. administration should pay the

286 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to Central African Airways, Salisbury, 10 September 1951. 287 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Outward Telegraph from the Commonwealth Relations Office to the High Commissioner, Pretoria, 5 May 1952. 288 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Outward Telegraph from the Commonwealth Relations Office to the High Commissioner, Pretoria, 5 May 1952. 289 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, Central African Airways, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 25 June 1952.

94 full amount of £2,265.17 claimed by the C.A.A. Since the B.P. administration had already sent a cheque for £1200, they were to send an extra £1,065 to the corporation.290

It appears the moral obligation mentioned by the Secretary of State when authorising the first cheque to the C.A.A. had fully grown to allow for the B.P. administration to pay the entire claim by the corporation. It is surprising that this change took place so easily and there is no evidence as to what eventually led to the Commonwealth

Relations Office ordering the full payment of the claim. While the corporation happily accepted the settlement, this was most likely a big financial blow to the B.P administration.

CONCLUSION

The outbreak of the Second World War had caused the cessation of air services in the

Union of South Africa and many other territories. This meant that the then newly found

Union’s Germiston-Windhoek air route via the Protectorate had to be suspended. Before the end of the war, however, the B.P. administration was already looking for ways in which it could maintain an air service in the Protectorate. With confirmation that the

Union air service was not going to be resumed and an offer from the government of

Southern Rhodesia for an air service, the B.P. administration had two options. It could either avail itself of the Southern Rhodesian offer or establish a private company in the

Protectorate. Financial constraints, however, made the latter a near impossible task.

The B.P., therefore, had to take the Southern Rhodesian offer which was operated by the corporation called Central African Airways (C.A.A). The corporation operated an air service in the B.P. without a formal agreement and the service only lasted for a year and a half when it had to be terminated because of its non-remunerative nature. The

290 BNARS, S. 368/1/11, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 29 November 1952.

95

B.P. administration began to attract many private companies from both the Union of

South Africa and the two Rhodesias. It appears as if the end of the war had stimulated the air transport industry in the region.

The British Government was consulted in every decision that was made regarding the question of air services in the B.P. However, it offered very little or no help in these post-war developments of civil aviation in the territory. At many points the British

Government could have stepped in and assisted the B.P. administration with the capital it needed to establish a flying company of its own but this never happened. The

Protectorate added no value to the British Crown and, therefore, did not receive all the attention it deserved at least in terms of the development of civil aviation. With the somewhat remote and marginalized nature of the B.P, the development of an air service would have been a way of reducing or changing that status. Even after providing men to fight for the British Government during the war, the Protectorate would not receive any help as gratitude.

96

CHAPTER 4

A GOVERNMENT OWNED AIR SERVICE AMIDST THE WINDS OF CHANGE IN AFRICA, 1956-1966

Introduction This chapter discusses the development of civil aviation in the Bechuanaland

Protectorate during the period of nationalism and decolonization in Africa. It follows negotiations that led to the establishment of yet another air service that would be operated in the B.P from a neighbouring territory. Just like all the previous air services, this new service would subsequently operate at a loss even though the B.P administration would find justifications for its continuance. Without the involvement of the British Government, the B.P would later register a privately owned air transport company in the Protectorate which would carry out air services in the early 1960s. A few years after that, the B.P colonial officials would establish the Protectorate’s first government owned air service, which was a great accomplishment for the B.P given the fact that the British imperial government had paid very little attention to the

Protectorate’s civil aviation. It should be mentioned that these developments were

97 taking place within a period of great political and social change in Africa. Post-war nationalist agitation in the continent resulted in the independence of many former colonies and the High Commission Territories were not left unaffected.291

AFRICA IN THE 1950s AND 1960s

In 1957 when the B.P was still pushing for the establishment of an air service, Ghana became the first Sub-Saharan colony to gain independence and the rest of the colonies began to look at it as a leader on the road to self-governance.292 Even though Ghana had no local air service before independence, the British Overseas Airways Corporation

(B.O.A.C.) was operating several routes in the colony linking it to the rest of West

Africa and London. Ghana Airways was established by the new independent government on 4 July 1958 as a symbol of independence, and took over operations from the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC).293 Colonial Ghana’s aviation needs were adequately served by the B.O.A.C., an airline that never made any appearance in the B.P. This revealed the British Government’s selective and biased colonial development. The B.P was of no value to the British Crown but the Gold Coast had been a source of wealth due to its cocoa export and its much larger population. This

291 J Zaffiro, “Twin Births: African Nationalism and Government Information Management in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1957-1966,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 22, no. 1 (1989): 51. For decolonization in Africa, see also David K Fieldhouse, Black Africa, 1945-80: Economic Decolonization & Arrested Development, (London: Allen Unwin, 1986); David Birmingham, The Decolonization of Africa, (London: UCL Press, 1995) and R Pearce, “The Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization in Africa” African Affairs, 83, no. 330 (1984), pp. 77-93. 292 W R Bascom, “Tribalism, Nationalism, and Pan-Africanism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 342, no. 1, (1962): 22. 293 B R Guttery, Encyclopedia of African Airlines, (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc, 1998), 74. 98 neglect of the B. P’s civil aviation due to its lack of economic importance to the colonial master nevertheless represented a form of underdevelopment of the Protectorate.

Shortly after Ghana’s independence, Pan-Africanism, an intellectual movement that called for the political unification of both the Africans in the diaspora and in Africa, was coming of age. Pan-Africanism began at the beginning of the twentieth century, and is usually attributed to earlier African-American intellectuals such as William E. B.

Du Bois and George Padmore. These black intellectuals believed in the promotion of national independence for the Africans under African leadership for the benefit of the

African people.294 Du Bois’ ideas eventually resonated among the urban lower middle classes of Africa and the West Indies, in trade unions and among the unemployed educated people.295 After Ghana gained independence in 1957, Prime Minister Kwame

Nkrumah began a Pan-Africanist crusade. Nkrumah himself had studied in the U.S which is where he probably came across Pan-Africanism. Invitations to the first conference of independent African states in 1958 were extended to Ethiopia, the Sudan,

Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Liberia, and South Africa. The last of these, however, refused to be part of this movement.296

During this period of decolonization and African nationalism on the continent, the B.P was surrounded by white settler states that still refused to grant civil rights to the African majority. South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were governed by white supremacist minorities who did not have any intention of handing over or sharing power with the Africans. In South Africa, the coming of the Nationalist Party into power in

1948, marked the beginning of apartheid, with the government aiming to maintain white

294 K Nantambu, “Pan-Africanism Versus Pan-African Nationalism: An Afrocentric Analysis,” Journal of Black Studies, 28, no. 5 (1998):561. 295 I Geiss, “Pan-Africanism,” Journal of Contemporary History, 4, no. 1 (1969): 192. 296 H Kohn and W Sokolsky, African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, (Toronto: D Van Nostrand Company, Ltd., 1965), 87.

99 superiority and domination in the country as well as enforce a strict and thorough system of racial segregation.297 In 1950 the government passed the Population Registration Act which required the classification of all South Africans according to race, using the criteria of physical appearance. It was these classifications that the policy of separate development and many more discriminatory laws would be based upon.298 In 1955

South African Prime Minister J.G Strijdom argued;

Call it paramountcy, baaskap or what you will, it is still domination……. Either the white man dominates or the black man takes over……. The only way the European can maintain supremacy is by domination.299

Apartheid was, however, accompanied by social unrest as there were confrontations between blacks who were protesting discriminatory laws and the South African security forces. In 1960, for example, a peaceful black demonstration against Pass Laws in

Sharpeville ended in an altercation with the police. The policed opened fire on the demonstrators and 69 were killed while 178 were wounded.300 Many more riots would follow, with more civilians and police officers getting killed in the process.

In 1953 the British Government created the Central African Federation, which comprised of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. It was a common assumption among the Europeans in the three territories and the British government that the Federation would lead to better economic and administrative efficiency. The major proposition for the Federation was the fact that the three territories were economically interdependent and complementary. The main economic engine of the federation was the copper mining in Northern Rhodesia, while Nyasaland supplied labour and Southern Rhodesia

297 A G Mezerik, “Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa,” International Review Service, 12, no. 92, (1967): 4. 298 D M Smith, Apartheid in South Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 2. 299 Mezerik, “Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa”, 4. 300 Smith, Apartheid in South Africa, 76. 100 supplied white administration.301The establishment of the Federation also gave the three territories control over their defence, finance, as well as policies of trade, all areas in which Britain’s dependencies had no control over.302 This, however, did not make the

Federation a sovereign state as its affairs were still the concern of the Commonwealth

Relations Office. Perhaps a more important reason for the creation of the Federation was that the relationship between Britain and apartheid South Africa was deteriorating.

The British Government needed the apartheid government to change its race policies to be more consistent with the expectations of the multiracial Commonwealth, but South

Africa had no intentions of changing its race policy.303 Therefore, London needed to create a new powerful ally in the Southern Africa region, hence the Federation.

The creation of the Federation had, however, not gone without any opposition.

Among some of the reasons given by African leaders in the three territories for opposing the Federation was the racial discrimination that prevailed in Southern Rhodesia where the establishment of trade unions was prohibited. Also, the Southern Rhodesian legislature did not include any Africans. There were also laws defining separate places for whites and blacks with blacks requiring passes to be in urban areas.304 Africans had, therefore, boycotted the preparatory conferences between the British Government and the Central African representatives for the creation of the Federation. Although Africans also staged protests and made appeals to both the British Government and the United

Nations, this did not affect the proposals for the Federation.305

301 W A Hance, “Economic Potentialities of the Central African Federation,” Political Science Quarterly, 69, no. 1, (1954): 29. 302 G Carl and Jr Roseberg, “The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Problems of Democratic Government,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 306, no. 1, (1956): 98. 303 F Hayes, “South Africa’s Departure from the Commonwealth, 1960-1961,” The International History Review, 2, no. 3 (1980): 462. 304 E Clegg, Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 177. 305H S Albinski, “The Concept of Partnership in the Central African Federation,” The Review of Politics, 19, no. 2 (1957): 196.

101

It is important to mention that the Federation’s government was dominated by the tiny European settler minority. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had very few whites compared to Southern Rhodesia and this is what made the Federation unpopular in the two northern territories. The system of representation in the territories’ legislatures and the Federal Assembly did not include Africans in the decision making process.306 Anti-Federation campaigns, therefore, intensified after 1957 due to the excitement brought about by Ghana’s independence. African nationalism then flourished, being fuelled by the aim to prevent Federal independence on European settler terms. Disorder spread in all three territories and a state of emergency was declared and African nationalists were arrested.307 African nationalism would keep growing and the British Government would eventually succumb to the pressure of

African demands. By 1962, Hastings Banda of Nyasaland, who had won the previous year’s territorial elections, came to power and this confirmed the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation.308 At the same time, elections in Northern Rhodesia had resulted in the victory of the nationalists, which led to a coalition between Kenneth Kaunda and

Harry Nkumbula who in 1963 demanded and were given the right to secede from the

Federation.309 In 1964, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became the independent and majority ruled states of Zambia and Malawi, respectively.

The Federation, therefore, came to an end because Northern Rhodesia and

Nyasaland, territories which had never experienced self-government, were granted independence while Southern Rhodesia on the hand remained an internally self- governing territory. This evoked feelings of resentment among the whites in Southern

306 Carl and Roseberg, “The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,” 104. 307 L J Butler, “Britain, the United States and the Demise of the Central African Federation, 1959- 1963,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 28, no. 3 (2000): 132. 308Butler, “Britain, the United States and the Demise….”, 138. 309 J D Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa, (London: Longman Inc., 1989), 202. 102

Rhodesia more so that it had exercised responsible government since 1923.310 The situation in Southern Rhodesia, however, was different because the British Government was not willing to grant independence unless there was a constitutional representation for Africans including a system of one man one vote in the elections. The British policy was to hand over power to African majority governments only.311 The Southern

Rhodesian whites, however, particularly those of the Rhodesian Front, which was the party with the majority of seats in government, continued to advocate for white social and political superiority. Coming into power in 1964, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D

Smith, therefore, began to challenge the British Government regarding the independence of Southern Rhodesia, threatening to make a Unilateral Declaration of

Independence (UDI). This was because the white politicians in Southern Rhodesia believed that they had been promised independence, which to them meant dominion status along the lines of Canada, if they agreed to the dissolution of the Federation.312

In an attempt to discourage the UDI from taking place, British Prime Minister Harold

Wilson made a statement in October 1964 warning Smith of diplomatic and economic sanctions should he go on with the UDI.313 This, however, did not work because on 11

November 1965, Prime Minister Smith, announced a UDI, an action that was illegal, and was referred to the United Nations’ Security Council by the British Government.314

While the British Government was displeased with Ian Smith’s actions, they were reluctant to use force to topple it as they did not wish to fight fellow white people

310 H D Sills, “The Break-up of the Central African Federation: Notes on the Validity of Assurances,” African Affairs, 73, no. 290, (1974): 50. 311 A Cousins, “State, Ideology and Power in Rhodesia, 1958-1972,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 24, no. 1 (1991): 38. 312 R Coggins, “Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa,” Contemporary British History, 20, no. 3 (2006): 364. 313 Coggins, “Wilson and Rhodesia ....”, 365. 314 Sills, “The Break-up of the Central African Federation” 59. 103

The 1950s and 1960s were not only years of nationalism, decolonization and

Pan-Africanism, but also years of development in African civil aviation. While most newly independent states took over the operations of the private airlines that were established during the colonial period, decolonization also led to a rise in government owned national airlines after the 1960s which were also symbols of independence and modernization. The government owned airlines were most likely to succeed with the support of public funds.

In Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, for example, East African Airways, which was jointly owned by the three territories and had been the main airline of the then British

East Africa ceased operations in 1977 as the territories it was formed to serve had gained independence in the early 1960s. Uganda Airlines was formed in 1976 to work side by side with East African Airways but it took over as the national carrier when the latter ceased operations in the following year.315 Kenya and Tanzania only established their national carriers after East Africa Airways ceased operations. It took over a decade after independence for Kenya and Tanzania to establish their own airlines, because East

Africa Airways was still operating air services for them. In Northern Rhodesia and

Nyasaland however, national airlines would be formed sooner after independence for reasons explained below.

When Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi (Nyasaland) gained independence in 1964, Central African Airways (CAA) was reconstructed as a jointly owned national carrier for the three territories that had formerly made up the Central

African Federation.316 Zambia Airways Corporation, which was a subsidiary of the

315B R Guttery, Encyclopedia of African Airlines, 215. See also Evaristus M Irandu, “Opening African Skies: The Case of Airline Industry Liberalization in East Africa,” Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, 47, no. 1 (2008): 75. 316B R Guttery, Encyclopedia of African Airlines, 96.

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CAA, took over from the CAA as the national carrier in 1967. Air Rhodesia was also established in the same year. Likewise, Air Malawi had also been established in 1964 as a subsidiary of the CAA.317 The CAA was later dissolved in 1967 as the Central

African Federation had come to an end and the three territories had their own airlines to run their air services. Unlike in East Africa, Zambia and Malawi formed their airlines shortly after their independence most likely as a way of distancing themselves from racist Southern Rhodesia.

Decolonization had brought with it the development of African state owned airlines. This was facilitated by the British Government as an attempt to show the former colonial masters’ goodwill and willingness to see the new African governments run their own affairs. The British also wanted good relations with the former colonies because this would bring business to the British aircraft industry. The former colonies would most likely buy British aircraft and parts.

LAST BID FOR AN OFF TERRITORY AIR SERVICE

After several years of operation in the B. P, the Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia) contract, connecting Bulawayo, Francistown and Maun was subsequently terminated in

1953 due to its non-remunerative nature. By 1956, the B.P administration was looking into ways of re-establishing this service and private flying companies in the region began making offers to the B.P administration.

On 15 August 1956, Air Carriers, a Bulawayo based air transport company, approached the B.P administration with the intention of offering its services. Air

Carriers had been established in 1946 and operated in association with another company

317 B R Guttery, Encyclopedia of African Airlines, 116.

105 called Victoria Falls Airways. In addition to passenger charter flights, Air Carriers was also known for big-game viewing flights as well as sightseeing tours over Victoria Falls in Southern Rhodesia.318Victoria Falls was a fast growing tourist destination on the

Southern Rhodesia border with Northern Rhodesia that had been developed as early as

1900 when the white colonists built a tourist resort there. By the 1930s, the resort, together with the renowned Victoria Falls Hotel which was rebuilt in the 1920s, were marketed in the same manner as the Niagara Falls; as destinations for romance and honeymoons.319 Air Carriers, therefore, derived most of its business from this Southern

Rhodesian tourist industry. With the knowledge of the B.P administration’s preference for twin-engine aircraft, Air Carriers explained that it operated a twin-engine Piper

Apache which was a very fast, safe and comfortable aircraft. These aircraft were available for charter throughout Africa and the company was happy to provide a quotation for a service between Bulawayo, Francistown and Maun at £75.00 per flight.320

In like manner, Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia) expressed delight in learning that the B.P administration was looking to re-establish the air service between

Bulawayo, Francistown and Maun. The company even reminded the B. P administration that it was the one that operated the air service from 1950 to 1953.With an interest in re-introducing another air service on the same route, the company asked the B.P government to provide specific requirements regarding the frequency of flights, numbers of passenger seats required and weight of freight.321 After obtaining the

318 B R Guttery, Encyclopedia of African Airlines, 221. 319 J McGregor, “The Victoria Falls 1900-1940: Landscape, Tourism and the Geographical Imagination,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 29, no. 3, (2003): 733. 320 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Air Carriers Limited, Bulawayo to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 15 August 1956. 321 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia), Bulawayo to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 23 August 1956.

106 government’s estimates, the company intended to then provide a quotation for a contract charter whereby it would provide an aircraft on a mileage basis and all revenue obtained from the service would accrue to the government.322

In South African administered South West Africa, the newly formed company called Oryx Aviation also had desired to win the tender from the B.P government. Oryx

Aviation was a charter operating company that was formed by the Mineral Trading

Company of South West Africa and Owenair, a Cape Town based aircraft operating company.323 In July 1956 Mr D Hutchison of the Mineral Trading Company informed

Mr Midgley, the District Commissioner of Ghanzi about Oryx Aviation and explained that the company was interested in tendering for the B.P administration’s contract for the carriage of mail from Gobabis, South West Africa to various points in the B.P. He explained that they had already carried out surveys in the Ghanzi district and had learnt that an air service connecting Ghanzi and Maun to Mafikeng would be ideal.324 Mr

Hutchison was aware of the District Commissioner’s grievance that Ghanzi had never benefited from the air services that had previously operated in the Protectorate.

In fact, the District Commissioner for Ghanzi later made his opinions known to the Development Secretary and Treasurer at Mafikeng. He made it clear that with regards to the anticipated air service, he had little interest in Maun and even less in

Francistown. The District Commissioner’s main concern was acquiring cream imports from Walvis Bay in South West Africa as well as contact with banks, schools and the administrative centre of Mafikeng. He believed it was for these essential points that

322 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Commercial Air Services (Rhodesia), Bulawayo to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 23 August 1956.

323 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Mineral Trading Company of South West Africa, Windhoek to District Commissioner, Ghanzi, 16 July 1956. 324 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Mineral Trading Company of South West Africa, Windhoek to District Commissioner, Ghanzi, 16 July 1956.

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Ghanzi had to have an air connection.325 It also appears that District Commissioner

Midgley and Mr Hutchison of the Mineral Trading Company of South West Africa became allies in this endeavour because the former began to feed the latter with information about offers that were being made by other flying companies to the B.P administration for the air service.

Upon hearing about the offers by Air Carriers and Commercial Air Services, Mr

Hutchison seemed to have a lot to say about why these should not be given the contract.

Hutchison argued that the Piper Apache aircraft that Air Carriers intended to use if it were to be given the contract was not as good an aircraft as the company claimed. He told District Commissioner Midgley about the disadvantages of using such an aircraft and argued that the air service would not make any profit. Hutchison reminded the

District Commissioner that an air service that failed to make profit for the owner could not be any use to the government as the owner would soon abandon the service.326

Furthermore, according to Hutchison, if an air service was to start in Bulawayo, not only would the service operators get into trouble financially due to the many miles between Bulawayo and Francistown without a stop, but it was also unlikely that

Midgley’s connection between Ghanzi and Gobabis would materialise.327 Mr

Hutchison’s arguments were outright cynical and he was egging-on Migley to push for the Ghanzi-Gobabis connection because he knew that only then could Oryx Aviation get the contract. This, however, would not lead anywhere as Mr Midgley himself lacked the power to determine which company was awarded the contract.

325 BNARS. S. 369/4/1, District Commissioner, Ghanzi to the Development Secretary and Treasurer, Mafikeng, 25 August 1956. 326 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Mr Hutchison, Windhoek to District Commissioner, Ghanzi, 5 September 1956. 327 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Mr Hutchison, Windhoek to District Commissioner, Ghanzi, 5 September 1956.

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Commercial Air Services soon informed the B.P administration that they were not going to be able to provide anything more than single engine 3-4 seater aircraft for some time. Since the B.P administration felt that an air route like Francistown-Maun-

Ghanzi required twin engine aircraft, the administration felt inclined to favour Air

Carriers in preference to Commercial Air Services.328

Since the beginning of 1956, the W.N.L.A. Air Service had been carrying an average of 20 civilian and government passengers monthly, i.e. four per week. It will be remembered that W.N.L.A. operated an air service for transporting mine labourers and employees of the agency to South Africa and had their own aerodrome at

Francistown.329 While it is possible that those who were carried by W.N.L.A. may not have travelled by air if fares had been demanded from them, it appears that many of them were turned away owing to lack of space. Therefore, the Divisional Commissioner of the northern part of the Protectorate, assumed that the weekly average was five to seven passengers both ways, and estimated that with Air Carrier’s Piper Apache, this would require six flights monthly.330

The Divisional Commissioner suggested a timetable for the proposed Air

Carriers air service to the Government Secretary and explained that there was no doubt that the air service would be expensive to run. This was in view of the Bulawayo-

Francistown leg which would be little used, and the Maun-Ghanzi leg which would be used mostly by government personnel and might not carry a full quota of passengers.

He, therefore, suggested placing a government owned aircraft at Francistown, which

328 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Divisional Commissioner (North), Francistown to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 9 October 1956. 329 R Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), 102. 330 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Divisional Commissioner (North), Francistown to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 9 October 1956. 109

W.N.L.A. would probably be happy to operate and service on the B.P administration’s behalf.331 The Government Secretary was to discuss all these possibilities with the

Resident Commissioner who would then consult the High Commissioner.

Resident Commissioner Martin Osterfield Wray touched base with High

Commissioner Sir Percivale Liesching about the two offers that the B.P Government had received and told him that he personally favoured Air Carrier’s quotation even though it was slightly more expensive than that of Commercial Air Services. Resident

Commissioner Wray further explained to the High Commissioner that W.N.L.A. was doing the B.P Government a favour by carrying government officials and passengers and that management was very uneasy about it as this was a contravention of their aircraft operating license.332 W.N.L.A.’s air service, Africair, fell under the industrial aid category of licensing and they were not allowed to carry passengers other than mine recruits and W.N.L.A. staff. The service was also not allowed to charge fares, which explains why it was carrying government officials for free. The carrying of the B.P officials and civilians was done because of the lack of an air service in the Protectorate which the Resident Commissioner considered as a state of emergency.333 This shows that an air service was a priority for local colonial officials. It was also not a surprise that the W.N.L.A would do the B.P administration such a favour as both the mine industry and colonial state were run by British capitalists. The W.N.L.A also did this because Bechuanaland was part of the regional migrant labour system which was important for the success of South African mines. In 1954, the number of foreign

Africans employed in South African mines was around two hundred and eight thousand.

331 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Divisional Commissioner (North), Francistown to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 9 October 1956. 332 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 24 November 1956. 333 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 24 November 1956.

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The number rose to three hundred fifty-two thousand by 1964.334 It should be made clear that the W.N.L.A did not fly the migrant workers to the mines, but rather flew them from different places within the Southern Africa region to Francistown, where they were then transported by train.335

The road between Francistown, Maun and Ghanzi, which corresponded with the proposed air route was in very bad condition. The British administration had been negligent in building infrastructure which is why by the time of independence in 1966 there were only four miles of paved road in the Protectorate.336 It became extremely difficult to maintain moderately good roads, particularly after 1952 when the W.N.L.A. abandoned road transport in favour of air transport and withdrew their road maintenance units on the route that was in question. This shows that in the B.P, colonial development in the form of transport infrastructure was neglected by the colonial masters. The roads were consequently in bad condition and could only be traversed by heavy trucks.337 An air service would be the ideal solution to these problems and it would increase efficiency in the administration of the Protectorate.

The District Commissioner at Ghanzi found out that the Resident

Commissioner’s office was contemplating giving Air Carriers the contract for the proposed air service and informed his friend in South West Africa, Mr Hutchison.

Hutchison cautioned the Government Secretary that if what he had been told by District

Commissioner Midgley was true, then he was afraid the government’s air service was

334 F Wilson, “International Migration in Southern Africa,” The International Migration Review, 10. no. 4 (1976): 455. 335 BNARS, S. 368/1/2, Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, Salisbury to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 13 February 1946. 336 R M Brucken, “Botswana and Nation-Building Theory,” International Journal of Social, Behavioural, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering, 9, no. 4, (2015): 1208. 337 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 24 November 1956. 111 going to fail because of losses it was likely to incur. In the process he asked if there would be any plans of connecting Ghanzi, Gobabis and Mafikeng, an air service that

Oryx Aviation would be very happy to operate.338 Hutchison was, however, informed that circumstances did not allow for a second service to be established.

On 26 January 1957 the weekly air service between Bulawayo and Francistown with a fortnightly extension to Ghanzi was approved for an experimental period of three months. The first flight to Ghanzi was to be on 14 February.339 The Commonwealth

Relations Office in London then made a request that at the end of the three experimental months, it be given details on the savings which resulted from officers travelling by air who otherwise would have travelled by road. The Commonwealth Office wanted reassurance that the experimental period of three months would be regarded as giving a representative picture of the air service over the whole year.340 The Commonwealth

Relations Office’s involvement in this process seemed to be merely bureaucratic. The office was just being consulted by the B.P administration as a formality and it was not helpful whatsoever to the process.

At the end of the three-month experimental period, it was discovered that the air service had been incurring losses but the High Commissioner argued for its continuation. He pleaded with the Commonwealth Office to continue the air service for another eight months, after which the matter could be reconsidered. High Commissioner

Liesching argued that though it was difficult to explain the drop in revenues from

February to April 1957, he believed it could have just been related to a seasonal fall and

338 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Mineral Trading Company of South West Africa, Windhoek to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 14 December 1956. 339 BNARS, S. 369/4/1, Air Service, Bulawayo-Francistown-Ghanzi: Secretary’s Memorandum to European Advisory Council, Heads of Departments, Divisional Commissioner (North) and District Commissioners, 26 January 1957. 340 BNARS, S. 369/4/2, Commonwealth Relations Office, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 29 January 1957.

112 that a clearer picture of the service could be seen at the end of the year.341 The Secretary of State agreed for the continuation of the experimental service for eight more months until 31 January 1958. He also informed the High Commissioner that his case for the retention of the air service could be considerably strengthened if he could show that the

£447.00 that had been lost in the first three months could be considerably reduced.

Furthermore, Air Carriers had to prove that the speedier travel between Francistown and Maun would result in an improvement in administration and that some savings on road transport would accrue if the air service was to be maintained permanently.342These conditions were just a way for the imperial government to avoid assisting the B.P administration in establishing its own airline. The air service would continue to be run on an experimental basis until 1960.

THE FIRST LOCALLY REGISTERED AIR TRANSPORT COMPANY

The B.P air service operated by Air Carriers would continue to suffer losses but would be maintained until 1960 when the opportunity to establish a locally registered air transport company presented itself. In 1960 Air Carriers was merged with Hunting-Clan

Air Carriers, Victoria Falls Airways and Commercial Airways to form a new company under the name Rhodesia United Air Carriers (R.U.A.C.).343 When this merger took place, Captain Herbert Bartaune, who was the Branch Manager for Air Carriers in

Bulawayo and flew the B.P air service for the company, found himself uncertain about his position in the newly formed R.U.A.C.

Apparently Captain Bartaune had been kept in the dark about the merger and the fact that the Commercial Air Services Manager Mr Eardley was to take over not only

341 BNARS, S. 369/4/2, High Commissioner, Pretoria to Secretary of State, London, nd. 342 BNARS, S. 369/4/2, Secretary of State, London to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 28 June 1957. 343 B R Guttery, Encyclopedia of African Airlines, 232. 113

Bartaune’s position as Branch Manager in Bulawayo but also the operations and organization there which included the agency for the B.P service.344 After learning the truth about his future or lack thereof in the new company, Bartaune submitted his resignation at the end of July 1960. Captain Bartaune expressed his fondness for the

B.P and his intentions of establishing an air company therein if the B.P administration would give him the blessing. He planned on purchasing a twin engine aircraft with which he would be willing to operate the B.P air service and charter flights at the same rates as Air Carriers. With a company registered in the Protectorate, Captain Bartaune intended to establish a base in the southern part of the Protectorate at Lobatsi, closer to the capital Mafikeng.345 To show how serious he was, three days after making this proposition, Bartaune had purchased a five-seater twin engine aircraft, which he told the Government Secretary was perfect for the B.P air service as it would increase revenue out of passenger fares.

The District Commissioner at Maun suggested a weekly schedule for the proposed air service should it be based at Lobatsi. The schedule would be as follows;

Monday: Lobatse-Ghanzi-Maun. Tuesday: Maun-Francistown. Wednesday:

Francistown-Maun and Thursday: Maun-Ghanzi-Lobatsi.346 Within a month of his proposal, Captain Bartaune was given the blessing by the B.P Government to operate the B.P air service using his Piper Aztec starting on 1 October 1960. The new air service would be operated on the same schedule and rates of payment as the existing air service by Air Carriers. The only difference was that flights would commence and terminate

344 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Captain Bartaune, Bulawayo to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 13 July 1960. 345 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Captain Bartaune, Bulawayo to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 13 July 1960.

346 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, District Commissioner Maun to Government Secretary, Mafikeng, 29 July 1960.

114 at Lobatsi and not Bulawayo as was the case with Air Carriers’ service. R.U.A.C. was then informed that the B.P air service from Bulawayo to Maun via Francistown would be terminated on 1 September 1960.347

Captain Bataune’s quest for greener pastures in the B.P was met with resentment by his former employers. Sir Thomas Chegwidden of the R.U.A.C. expressed his concern to High Commissioner Sir John Maud. Chegwidden stated that since a change in operators could not be done in a few minutes, he and his colleagues were surprised that Bartaune had already been given the contract to operate the new B.P air service under his new company Bechuanaland Safaris. Chegwidden suspected that negotiations must have been going on while Bartaune was still working for Air Carriers.348 It is unclear whether or not Chegwidden’s intention was to sabotage Captain Bartaune.

However, he did explain that the RUAC board was surprised to hear that the captain was going to provide the service with a larger and faster aircraft for the same rates as

R.U.A.C. They felt that this was impossible and offered to re-enter negotiations with the B.P administration should Captain Bartaune’s service fail.349

When the Resident Commissioner informed the High Commissioner of his decision to entrust the air service to Captain Bartaune until at least the end of the financial year, he explained a few reasons why he had made this choice without any consultation. The main reason had been that Captain Bartaune was to operate the service at exactly the same rates as R.U.A.C.350 As for Sir Thomas Chegwidden’s complaints

347 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Government Secretary, Mafikeng to Captain Bartaune, Bulawayo, 3 August 1060. 348 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Sir Thomas Chegwidden, Salisbury to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 6 September1960. 349 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Sir Thomas Chegwidden, Salisbury to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 6 September1960. 350 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 23 September 1960.

115 about how Captain Bartaune acquired the B.P air service contract, the Resident

Commissioner claimed that the captain had made no proposition to them and that the

B.P Government had not considered the matter in any way whatsoever before he resigned his appointment with Air Carriers/R.U.A.C. Furthermore, there was nothing unsatisfactory about the Rhodesian company except for the fact that it was based outside the Protectorate.351 For a very long time the Bechuanaland Protectorate had depended on its neighbours, particularly South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, for air services and

Captain Bartaune’s locally registered company presented the first step to reducing dependency on neighbouring territories. The B.P administration had a goal of reducing its vulnerability on its powerful and better developed neighbours.352 Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were also governed by white supremacists during a time when black majority governments were coming into power. The establishment of Bechuanaland

Safaris was, therefore, the right move to help distance the B.P from its racist neighbours.

On 4 October 1960 the Resident Commissioner sent out a memorandum to all departments and commissioners in the Protectorate informing them that the operation of the air service had been awarded to Captain Bartaune’s Bechuanaland Safaris (Pty)

Ltd based at Lobatsi. The Resident Commissioner also provided details of the aircraft being used as well as the new timetable.353 Through prior arrangement, the aircraft would be able to land at Gaborone, Mahalapye, Palapye or Serowe during the Lobatsi-

Francistown stage to pick up or drop off passengers. Bechuanaland Safaris was also to

351 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng to High Commissioner, Pretoria, 23 September 1960. 352 R Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy…., 1. 353 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Air Transport Services: Resident Commissioner’s Memorandum to All Heads of Departments, Divisional Commissioners and District Commissioners, 4 October 1960.

116 run a general charter service from Lobatsi available to all classes of passengers going to all parts of the territory.354

It is worthwhile to state that the B.P administration had worked hard to establish an air service registered within the Protectorate albeit a private company and not government owned. For over twenty years and with very little assistance from the

British Government, the B.P had seen different air transport companies from neighbouring territories come and go. The establishment of Bechuanaland Safaris in the

Protectorate was a milestone. Captain Bartaune, however, soon became a little more ambitious with his company and he pushed for an expansion of the air service. A direct flight between Ghanzi and Lobatsi was soon under consideration with a new schedule that would operate every other week. It was believed that the new schedule would permit government officials and members of the public who wished to fly both to and from Maun and Ghanzi to have more time at these places in which to conclude their business.355

The air service also served the Department of Posts and Telegraphs in the conveyance of mail by air. The captain’s proposed expansion would be of particular benefit with regard to mail posted at Ghanzi. This would enable mail to be dispatched from Ghanzi twice fortnightly instead of once per fortnight as was the case.356 Many government departments also supported the suggested schedule with the direct flight

354 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Air Transport Services: Resident Commissioner’s Memorandum to All Heads of Departments, Divisional Commissioners and District Commissioners, 4 October 1960. 355 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Air Transport Services: Resident Commissioner’s Memorandum to all Heads of Departments, Divisional Commissioners and District Commissioners, 29 October 1960. 356 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Controllers of Posts and Telegraphs, Mafikeng to Resident Commissioner at Mafikeng, 8 November 1060.

117 between Lobatsi and Ghanzi. The new flight and schedule were approved and were to commence on 1 January 1961.357

For some time, Bechuanaland Safaris was successful and continued to provide a satisfactory air service in the Protectorate. Captain Bartaune was also fortunate enough to get more tenders from the B.P administration. On 6 February 1961 approval was granted for a charter flight to be arranged from Lobatsi to Tsabong via Mafikeng and return once every other month for a period of one year.358 The Director of Medical

Services had made a request in 1960 for the purpose of transporting a doctor to the health post at Tsabong monthly. A quotation of £61.15 for the return trip had been submitted by Bechuanaland Safaris and accepted. It would be paid by the Department of Health and Medical Services. In the event of officers from other departments wishing to make use of the charter flight, the charge debited to the Director of Medical Services would be reduced by an amount of £12.7 in respect of each officer.359

In 1962 Bechuanaland Safaris found itself in financial difficulties and was granted a government loan of R 14000.00. As security for the loan, government secured a lien on the Company’s Piper Aztec. In the same year the company leased another aircraft which unfortunately was destroyed in a crash in November 1962.360

Bechuanaland Safaris was then acquired by the National Airways Corporation of South

Africa which operated the company as a subsidiary on the same air route in the

Protectorate until 1965.361 Air service in the B.P was therefore, back to being operated

357 BNARS, S. 369/5/1, Air Transport Services: Resident Commissioner’s Memorandum to all Heads of Departments, Divisional Commissioners and District Commissioners, 1 December 1960. 358 BNARS, S. 369/5/2, Government Secretary, Mafikeng to Director of Medical Services, Mafikeng, 16 January 1961. 359 BNARS, S. 369/5/2, Government Secretary, Mafikeng to Director of Medical Services, Mafikeng, 16 January 1961. 360 BNARS, S. 369/6, Government Secretary, Report on Air Services in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, n.d. 361 B R Guttery, Encyclopedia of African Airlines, 26. 118 by a company based outside the Protectorate. This was, however, not the case for too long as the political situation in the B.P would make it possible for a government airline to be established.

TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE AND THE PROTECTORATE’S OWN AIRLINE

It can be argued that the establishment of the Joint Advisory Council in 1951 represented the first step toward the eventual transfer of power to the Africans in the

B.P.362 It had also become apparent that the B.P would never be part of either South

Africa or Southern Rhodesia. The Joint Advisory Council became something of a transitional organisation because it allowed for the establishment of important relationships between the European and African members of the Council and their mutual demand for the creation of a Legislative Council and increased self -rule in the

B.P.363 The early 1950s had also been a time of turmoil in the BamaNgwato Reserve as a result of the British Government exiling the Ngwato heir apparent Seretse Khama for marrying a white English woman. This led to the 1952 Serowe riots, where the

BaNgwato people protested against the British decision to exile their chief.364 These riots were significant because they also represented an uprising against British rule especially in the BamaNgwato reserve which made up half of the Protectorate’s population.365

362 R Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, (Cransbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1977), 34. 363 Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, 34. 364 M Crowder, “Botswana and the Survival of Liberal Democracy in Africa,” in Decolonization and African Independence, eds. P Gifford and WMR Louis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), 463. 365 Crowder, “Botswana and the Survival of Liberal Democracy in Africa,” 463. 119

The new constitution of the B.P in 1960 provided for the establishment of the long awaited Legislative Council, the Executive Council and the African Council.

Interestingly, the B.P administration registered and awarded operations of the B.P air service to Bechuanaland Safaris in the same year. This was no coincidence as the independence of the B.P had now become inevitable. Localizing the base of air services was, therefore, a significant step toward independence.

The African Council was to act as the electoral college for African members of the Legislative Council as well as to advise the Resident Commissioner on issues affecting African customs as far as policy and administration were concerned.366 The

Executive Council, on the other hand, was to act as an advisory cabinet consisting of five official and four unofficial (two Europeans and two Africans) members, which would meet every week under the chairmanship of the Resident Commissioner. The unofficial members were all assigned a position of ‘trainee-minister’. Seretse Khama, the formerly exiled Ngwato chief who would later become Prime Minister, was groomed for the higher position of Government Secretary, while Chief Bathoen II was responsible for local administration.367

Apart from the minor role that the ‘trainee-cabinet’ was given, the Legislative

Council was no better than the advisory bodies that existed before it. The B.P administration was still in control of all legislation and there was no opposition to government rule.368 Historian Brian Mokopakgosi argues that the establishment of the

Legislative Council in the B.P in 1961 was late compared to countries like Tanzania where it was established in 1926. He further states that throughout British Colonial

366 A. Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1974), 156. 367 Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, 36. 368 Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, 36. 120

Africa, the legislative council served as a training ground for future national leaders and that the fact that in the B.P it came so late, shows that the B.P was not considered ready to move toward independence.369

By 1960, however, there had been a rise in national consciousness in the B.P and this was characterized by the founding of political parties in the Protectorate. Under the influence of Africans from neighbouring South Africa, Batswana began to view their territory as a potential independent nation.370 The first political party to be organized in the B.P was the Bechuanaland People’s Party (B.P.P). As soon as the party was established, it began to call for self-government even though Seretse Khama, who would later become President of Botswana, labelled the members of the party as irresponsible because of alleged embezzlement and mismanagement of party funds.371

The party had received money from Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana for a Land Rover and loudspeaker equipment which were instrumental in the party’s initial success. The party, however, soon experienced squabbles over the use of the limited funds from Ghana.372

The B.P.P followed a program that included demands for the expulsion of white settlers, an Africanized constitution as well as radical political and social reforms.373 In response to the B.P.P, Seretse Khama helped form the more conservative and traditionalist

Bechuanaland Democratic Party (B.D.P) in 1962, which unlike the urban concentrated

B.P.P, became more appealing to the rural people as well as the chiefs.374

369 B T Mokopakgosi, “The 1965 Self-Government Elections and the Transfer of Power in the Bechuanaland Protectorate,” South African Historical Journal, 60, no. 1 (2008): 86.

370 E S Munger, Bechuanaland: Pan African Outpost or Bantu Homeland, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 21. 371 B T Mokopakgosi, “The 1965 Self-Government Elections…” 86. 372 Munger, Bechuanaland: Pan African Outpost or Bantu Homeland, 23. 373 Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History, 156. 374 S A Beaulier, “Explaining Botswana’s Success: The Critical Role of Post-Colonial Policy,” CATO Journal, 23, no. 1 (2003): 230.

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The establishment of political parties put the B.P administration under pressure to accelerate the process of political change and transfer of power in the B.P. The B.P.P also heavily criticized the 1960 constitution for its creation of a Legislative Council that was dominated by Europeans. Consequently, the British Government, under pressure both from within the B.P and from the United Nations, decided to convene discussions in 1963 to review the B.P constitution.375 Even though the B.P.P demanded that the

1960 constitution be immediately abolished, the government stuck to its own schedule and talks for the review of the constitution began on 1 July 1963.376 African chiefs,

European members of the Legislative Council and both the B.P.P and the B.D.P were invited to these discussions. By August 1963, a unanimous agreement on a one-man- one-vote arrangement was reached. It was also agreed that no legislative seats would be reserved for Europeans.377

The results of the constitutional talks came out in November 1963 and it was announced that the Protectorate would be granted a form of self-government designed to lead to a smooth transition to independence. The executive branch of government was to be controlled by a cabinet presided over by Her Majesty’s Commissioner

(formerly known as Resident Commissioner).378 This new parliamentary government was modelled after Britain’s Westminster system. There were to be thirty-eight seats in the legislature, thirty-two of which would be elected from the different districts, four to be decided upon by the elected members and two as appointed officials. The cabinet, which would consist of the prime minister and five other ministers, was to be selected from the legislative assembly. While this would represent a considerable level of self-

375 Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, 38. 376 Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History, 157. 377 Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, 38. 378 Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History, 157. 122 government, authority over external affairs, internal security, defence and public service remained under British control.379

In 1964 Her Majesty’s Commissioner Peter Fawcus and the British Government decided to build from scratch the new capital of the B.P at Gaborone within the borders of the Protectorate. The administrative headquarters of the B.P had been based at

Mafikeng in South Africa. The Gaborone Dam was also constructed to ensure adequate water supply for the new capital. The first transfer of government departments to

Gaborone took place at the beginning of 1965.380 This transfer was a symbolic gesture which also represented the death of any ideas of the B.P ever being part of South Africa.

The year 1965 also saw the first parliamentary elections which resulted in an unsurprising victory by Seretse Khama’s B.D.P. The party won over 80% of the vote, and scooped twenty-eight of the thirty-one seats. Seretse Khama was, therefore, asked to form a government and he became Prime Minister of the Protectorate’s first African government.381 In February 1966 the Independence Conference was held in London, where Seretse Khama was told that the independence of the Protectorate would come on 30 September 1966.382 As promised by the British Government, the Republic of

Botswana came into existence exactly on the day that had been chosen and Seretse

Khama, who had been knighted the same year, became president of the new

Botswana.383 The rise of political parties and nationalism in the B.P and the United

Nation’s support for the independence of the High Commission Territories had forced the British Government to recognize the independence of Botswana.384

379 Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, 38.

380 Munger, Bechuanaland: Pan African Outpost or Bantu Homeland, 30. 381 Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History, 158. 382 Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, 40. 383 Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History, 159. 384 Beaulier, “Explaining Botswana’s Success…”, 230. 123

It will be remembered that after 1962, when Bechuanaland Safaris was acquired by the National Airways Corporation of South Africa, air service in the B.P was again operated from outside the Protectorate. With the independence of the B.P being inevitable, the Protectorate took back control of its air service. The British Government facilitated the establishment of a government airline called Bechuanaland National

Airways. The airline was established with the help of the British company Autair

International which also donated two aircraft. The new airline began operations on 15

November 1965 with its base at Francistown. It operated domestic and international flights connecting the Protectorate to Zambia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.385

Unlike previous experiments in the Protectorate, which were contracts given to private companies, the B. P’s first airline was a government owned enterprise. This was done so that the new independent government could inherit and take over the administration of the airline after independence. After many years of failed attempts at establishing a government owned air service in the Protectorate, the British Government had finally come through for the B.P administration. This was because independence was just a year away and the British Government wanted to seem helpful to a colony/protectorate that they had for a long time neglected. There was also a desire to make the future independent country less dependent upon apartheid South Africa, hence the quick establishment of the national airline compared to East Africa, where Tanzania and

Kenya took about a decade to form their national airlines after their independence. The two East African countries did not depend on neighbouring counties for air services and therefore there was no rush to form their national airlines.

Bechuanaland National Airways ceased operations and went into a state of receivership in 1966, the year of the B. P’s independence. At this point, operations were

385 R Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy…., 102. 124 taken over by Botswana National Airways, the new government owned airline. The airline was put under the leadership of D. Morgan who in 1961 was appointed as trainee- minister for townships, works and communications in the legislative council.386

Botswana National Airways linked Gaborone to Livingstone, Lusaka, and

Johannesburg, with Bulawayo being added to the destinations the following year.387

Botswana’s independence had come with the long awaited establishment of an airline fully owned and operated by the government. In the same manner that some African states established their own national airlines right after independence, it was important for the new independent government of Botswana to create its own national carrier, which was to be a symbol of the independence that had just been attained.

The establishment of a national airline in the B.P was a major step towards the reduction of dependence on its neighbours. The B. P’s economy had depended on

Southern Rhodesia and South Africa because they owned the railroad in the

Protectorate. The ownership and management of the railroad by its neighbours made the B.P a hostage to these territories.388 The Protectorate’s airline, therefore, was important in the reduction of this dependence. It also represented a new and modern form of transportation.

CONCLUSION

The operation of air services in the Protectorate was placed in the hands of yet another

Southern Rhodesia company (Air Carriers) during the latter half of the 1950s and just like its predecessors, this company failed. The failure of these companies, however, did not stem from their incompetence but rather from operational costs that the B.P

386 Vengroff, Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid, 37. 387 Guttery, Encyclopedia of African Airlines, 26. 388 R Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy…., 99. 125

Government could not keep up with. Air services operated from outside the territory were expensive and the B.P administration did not have enough money for them, more so that the British Government was showing very little or no interest in the

Protectorate’s air services. After all, the B.P was not a valuable territory to the British

Government and therefore there was no sufficient reason to spend money on it.

The establishment of Bechuanaland Safaris in the Protectorate in 1960 and its take over from Air Carriers marked a change in the long practice of off-territory companies operating the air service in the Protectorate. The establishment of the company came at the same time as the formation of the Legislative Council and political parties, and negotiations for independence in the B.P. Bechuanaland Safaris, therefore, received full support from the B.P administration and operated an experimental air service for a little over a year. This was an achievement for the B.P administration because it had reduced dependency on neighbouring territories, at least as far as civil aviation was concerned. Unfortunately, the company found itself in difficult financial situations that led to its acquisition by a South African company. This showed that the

B. P’s dependence on South Africa was deeply entrenched and was not easy to break.

With the help of a British company, the B.P Government would later establish its own national airline shortly before independence. All these developments in civil aviation in

Botswana had taken place in the context of political changes that had occurred in and outside of the territory during the 1950s right through to the 1960s. The British

Government realized that it would eventually lose control of the B.P because of growing nationalism and thus worked together with the Tswana to establish an independent

Republic of Botswana that would be acceptable to the outgoing colonial power.

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CONCLUSION

The colonial administration at Mafikeng laboured since the 1930s to establish a comprehensive air service in the Protectorate but as a small and quite poor territory, this proved very difficult. For this reason, the theories of development and underdevelopment become informative in understanding why this was the case.

While it has been common for theories of development/underdevelopment to demonstrate how the exploitation of natural resources in the colonies was meant to develop the colonial masters to the detriment of the colonies, the case of the development of civil aviation in the B.P brings a new insight to underdevelopment.

Unlike other colonies, the BP had no known natural resources which meant it was not a priority for colonial development. As a result, the British Government was reluctant to lend a helping hand in establishing air services in the territory. As Nigerian scholar

Atara Otite has argued, underdevelopment can only be understood from a comparative perspective because it does not mean zero-development but greater than zero. The

British Government played a vital role in the development of civil aviation in other colonies in Africa and even established the British Overseas Airways Corporation to provide air service to colonies that had not yet established air services of their own. In the B.P, however, such assistance was never provided. Through a comparative perspective, it can, therefore, be argued that the British Government’s negligence of the

B. P’s civil aviation represented a form of underdevelopment.

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It should be expounded, however, that the argument of underdevelopment here is not focused on the entire colonial history of the B.P. There were other ways in which the British Government was of some help to the B.P. The British Government, through the Colonial Development Corporation, was instrumental in developing the abattoir in

Lobatsi, which led to the Protectorate’s success in the beef production industry.389

Between 1950 and 1960 grant-in-aids were sent to the B.P to improve the standard of administration. It is important to reiterate that the argument of underdevelopment here is restricted to civil aviation as a form of colonial development, and that this was one field where the British underdeveloped the Protectorate. Roads were also neglected in the B.P and, therefore, it is safe to say transport was underdeveloped in the B.P which shows that the Protectorate as a British territory was of little significance to its colonial masters. The only effective form of transport in the B.P had been the railway, which ran

398 miles on the eastern part of the territory joining South Africa and Southern

Rhodesia with the Protectorate. Built from 1896 to 1897 by Cecil John Rhodes’ British

South Africa Company, the railway was vital for foreign trade and the transportation of migrant labour to the mines in South Africa.390

It should be understood that it was the imperial British Government that sought to underdevelop the B.P while the British officials on the ground did try to establish an air service but failed because of lack of support from London and local conditions such as vast distances, the nature of the economy and the small population. The fate of the

B.P was also uncertain as there had been possibilities of the B.P and the two other High

Commission Territories (Basutoland and Swaziland) being incorporated into the Union of South Africa from as early as 1910 when the Union was declared. The B.P

389 Munger, Bechuanaland: Pan African Outpost or Bantu Homeland, 52.

390 R Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy…., 99. 128 administration, therefore, had a historic dependency on its wealthier white minority ruled neighbours and for a long time had given out tenders for the provision of air services in the Protectorate. First, it was South Africa’s Union Airways that operated an air service from Germiston to Windhoek via the B.P in 1938. The service, however was ceased when the Second World War broke out. After the war, the B.P administration began to give tenders to Southern Rhodesian companies. A locally registered company took over air services in the Protectorate in 1960 but only lasted for two years. It was then that the B.P administration, with the assistance of the British company Autair

International, established its first national carrier, Bechuanaland National Airways. This was amidst the process of decolonization in the B.P and the British Government found it fitting to facilitate the establishment of a national air carrier. History had also shown that private companies could not sustain a business in the territory so state support was needed.

The establishment of Bechuanaland National Airways came during a period of political change in the African continent. This was a period of decolonization, nationalism and Pan-Africanism and many African nations gained independence during this period. These political changes also led to the establishment of many new airlines by most newly independent states, while some took over the colonial airlines. In the

Bechuanaland Protectorate, the British Government would make rushed attempts to assist the B.P in establishing its own airline on the eve of independence, as a way of responding to pressures that emanated from the political condition in Africa at the time as well as from within the Protectorate. The establishment of Bechuanaland National

Airways was an attempt to assert independence from the B. P’s white supremacist neighbours: South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. After all, the railway line in the

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Protectorate was owned by the two neighbours.391 The national airline was, therefore, a way to avoid similar foreign dominance in this form of transportation.

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