DOCSLIB.ORG

Ebook-Mumford-Laws-In-Nature.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ebook-Mumford-Laws-In-Nature.Pdf Laws in Nature What are the laws of nature? Do they control the actions and movements of the other things that exist in our world? Is there a sense in which such laws are real things? Both scientists and philosophers have been attracted by the view that the world contains laws of nature. It is such laws that dictate the behaviour of particulars, rather than any of those things’ intrinsic or internal forces. In this book Stephen Mumford argues against this popular view. He shows that no adequate account has been produced of what such laws in nature would be, or how they would perform the work that has been required of them. In their place, he argues that there are other necessary connections in nature that can do all the work for which we thought laws were needed. This book offers a holistic and connected account of reality in which the world’s elements do not need to be activated or controlled by laws. It is not possible that these elements behave other than they do. The world is more of a jigsaw than a mosaic: its pieces can form only one picture, and laws are no part of it. Stephen Mumford is Reader in Metaphysics in the Department of Philo- sophy at the University of Nottingham. He is the author of Dispositions (1998) and various papers in metaphysics. He is editor of Russell on Meta- physics (2003) and Powers by the late George Molnar (2003). Routledge studies in twentieth-century philosophy 1 The Story of Analytic Philosophy Plot and heroes Edited by Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar 2 Donald Davidson Truth, meaning and knowledge Edited by Urszula M. Zeglén 3 Philosophy and Ordinary Language The bent and genius of our tongue Oswald Hanfling 4 The Subject in Question Sartre’s critique of Husserl in The Transcendence of the Ego Stephen Priest 5 Aesthetic Order A philosophy of order, beauty and art Ruth Lorland 6 Naturalism A critical analysis Edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland 7 Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy Richard Gaskin 8 Rules, Magic and Instrumental Reason A critical interpretation of Peter Winch’s philosophy of the social sciences Berel Dov Lerner 9 Gaston Bachelard Critic of science and the imagination Cristina Chimisso 10 Hilary Putnam Pragmatism and realism Edited by James Conant and Urszula Zeglén 11 Karl Jaspers Politics and metaphysics Chris Thornhill 12 From Kant to Davidson The idea of the transcendental in twentieth-century philosophy Edited by Jeff Malpas 13 Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience A reinterpretation Giuseppina D’Oro 14 The Logic of Liberal Rights A study in the formal analysis of legal discourse Eric Heinze 15 Real Metaphysics Edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra 16 Philosophy After Postmodernism Civilized values and the scope of knowledge Paul Crowther 17 Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger Brian Elliott 18 Laws in Nature Stephen Mumford 19 Trust and Toleration Richard H. Dees 20 The Metaphysics of Perception Wilfrid Sellars, critical realism and the nature of experience Paul Coates 21 Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action Praxeological investigations Roderick T. Long Laws in Nature Stephen Mumford First published 2004 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxfordshire OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. © 2004 Stephen Mumford All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mumford, Stephen. Laws in nature / Stephen Mumford. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Law (Philosophy) 2. Power (Philosophy) 3. Philosophy of nature. I. Title. B105.L3M86 2004 117–dc22 2004000286 ISBN 0-203-45842-7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-34443-X (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-31128-4 (Print Edition) Contents List of illustrations xi Preface xii Acknowledgements xvi 1 Laws in science and philosophy 1 1.1 Laws and explanations 1 1.2 Apology for metaphysics 4 1.3 Laws in nature 8 1.4 Laws in science 10 1.5 Lawlessness 13 1.6 Overview of the book 15 PART I Humean lawlessness 19 2 The lawless world 21 2.1 Just one little thing and then another 21 2.2 A sceptical duty 22 2.3 Humean lawlessness 23 2.4 Necessity is in the head 24 2.5 Regularities and science 26 2.6 Conjunctions, connections and laws 27 2.7 Humean ‘theories of laws’ 30 3 Regularities and best systems 31 3.1 Regularity and less-than-universal regularity 31 3.2 Irrefutable but unappealing32 3.3 The critique of the regularity theory 35 3.4 The best systems theory 40 3.5 Problems for best systems 45 3.6 Humean supervenience 48 viii Contents 4 Hume’s argument 50 4.1 The Humean view of necessity and laws 50 4.2 The arguments of the Treatise and Enquiry 51 4.3 Was Hume a sceptical realist? 57 4.4 Humean scepticism 61 4.5 Conjunction as evidence of necessity 63 PART II Nomological realism 65 5 The nomological argument 67 5.1 What is nomological realism? 67 5.2 Do we need a nomological argument? 68 5.3 The argument 69 5.4 Without laws, there would be no order 72 5.5 Without laws, there would be nothing74 5.6 Without laws, there would be no science 76 5.7 How compelling is the nomological argument? 77 5.8 Cosmic coincidence 79 5.9 Patterns without laws 81 5.10 A less direct argument for laws? 82 6 Natural necessitation relations 83 6.1 Real laws and their role 83 6.2 The basic DTA theory 85 6.3 Key virtues over the regularity theory 87 6.4 Variants on the DTA theory 89 6.5 Some perceived weaknesses of DTA 92 6.6 Armstrong’s nomological argument 96 6.7 The nomic relation 99 6.8 Instantiation and supervenience 101 6.9 How can Armstrong’s laws govern? 102 6.10 Quidditism 103 7 Necessitarian essentialism 105 7.1 The New Essentialism 105 7.2 The essentialist theory of laws 106 7.3 Natural kinds 110 7.4 Essential properties 113 7.5 The universal accidental 116 7.6 From reference to essence? 118 Contents ix 7.7 From science to essence? 118 7.8 Essentialist laws? 120 7.9 Necessary laws? 122 7.10 Essentialist laws not proved 123 PART III Realist lawlessness 125 8 Are natural laws a natural kind? 127 8.1 Conclusion 127 8.2 The elusive and ineffable nature of laws 128 8.3 Laws as a kind? 130 8.4 Disagreements 132 8.5 The diversity of laws 134 8.6 A family resemblance between laws? 139 8.7 Modernization? 141 9 The Central Dilemma 143 9.1 The Central Dilemma: introduction 143 9.2 The argument: summary formulation 144 9.3 The governing role of laws 145 9.4 The Central Dilemma, first horn: externalized laws 146 9.5 External laws and quidditism 149 9.6 First horn: summary 152 9.7 The Central Dilemma, second horn: internalized laws 153 9.8 Newtonian spirits 156 9.9 Second horn: summary 157 9.10 Full statement and conclusion 158 10 Modal properties 160 10.1 Necessity in nature 160 10.2 Full strength necessity in laws 161 10.3 Contingent natural necessity 163 10.4 De re necessity 166 10.5 Is a power’s necessity merely analytic? 168 10.6 Powerful properties 170 10.7 Shifting potencies 174 10.8 Restricted combinatorialsim 175 10.9 Possible properties 180 10.10 Natural necessity 181 x Contents 11 Objections and replies 182 11.1 Responses 182 11.2 Holism versus discreta 182 11.3 Relativity 185 11.4 Do all properties have a causal essence? 187 11.5 Epiphenomena 188 11.6 How might the account be extended to relations? 190 11.7 Meinongianism 192 11.8 Why is this not a theory of laws? 195 11.9 Why is this theory not subject to the Central Dilemma? 197 11.10 Am I looking for the wrong kind of law? 198 11.11 Can all laws be replaced by powers? 198 11.12 Powers are no better understood than laws 199 12 Conclusion: law and metaphor 201 12.1 Law as metaphor 201 12.2 Law as the wrong metaphor 202 12.3 Law as a harmful metaphor 203 Notes 206 Bibliography 218 Index 225 Illustrations Figures 1.1 The three metaphysics 15 9.1 Lowe’s four-category ontology 154 10.1 Model of restricted combinatorial possibility 176 11.1 Epiphenomenal properties 189 11.2 Epiphenomenal properties somehow directed by laws 189 11.3 Connections between relations 191 Tables 2.1 The three metaphysics contrasted 29 7.1 The leptons 111 7.2 The quarks 111 7.3 The mediators 111 Preface Both philosophers and scientists speak of laws of nature. They quantify over laws and can use the term as a count noun. Hence, they may speak of a law of nature, three laws of motion, the laws of nature (meaning the set of them all), and the laws of thermodynamics (meaning a particular subset of all the laws).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Concepts As Correlates of Lexical Labels. a Cognitivist Perspective
    This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 Sławomir Wacewicz Concepts as Correlates of Lexical Labels. A Cognitivist Perspective. This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 CONTENTS Introduction………………………………………………………………... 6 PART I INTERNALISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LANGUAGE IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE Preliminary remarks………………………………………………………… 17 1. History and profile of Cognitive Science……………………………….. 18 1.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………. 18 1.2. Cognitive Science: definitions and basic assumptions ……………. 19 1.3. Basic tenets of Cognitive 22 Science…………………………………… 1.3.1. Cognition……………………………………………………... 23 1.3.2. Representationism and presentationism…………………….... 25 1.3.3. Naturalism and physical character of mind…………………... 28 1.3.4. Levels of description…………………………………………. 30 1.3.5. Internalism (Individualism) ………………………………….. 31 1.4. History……………………………………………………………... 34 1.4.1. Prehistory…………………………………………………….. 35 1.4.2. Germination…………………………………………………... 36 1.4.3. Beginnings……………………………………………………. 37 1.4.4. Early and classical Cognitive Science………………………… 40 1.4.5. Contemporary Cognitive Science……………………………... 42 1.4.6. Methodological notes on interdisciplinarity………………….. 52 1.5. Summary…………………………………………………………. 59 2. Intrasystemic and extrasystemic principles of concept individuation 60 2.1. Existential status of concepts ……………………………………… 60 2 This is a submitted manuscript version. The publisher should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint the material in any form. Final published version, copyright Peter Lang: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05287-9 2.1.1.
    [Show full text]
  • LAWS and LAWLESSNESS Are There Laws of Nature of the Sort Discussed in Much Recent Metaphysics?
    STEPHEN MUMFORD LAWS AND LAWLESSNESS ABSTRACT. I develop a metaphysical position that is both lawless and anti-Humean. The position is called realist lawlessness and contrasts with both Humean lawlessness and nomological realism – the claim that there are laws in nature. While the Humean view also allows no laws, realist lawlessness is not Humean because it accepts some necessary connections in nature between distinct properties. Realism about laws, on the other hand, faces a central dilemma. Either laws govern the behaviour of properties from the outside or from the inside. If the former, an unacceptable quidditist view of properties follows. But no plausible account of laws within properties can be developed that permits a governing role specifically for laws. I conclude in favour of eliminativism about laws. At the conceptual core, the notion of a law in nature is misleading. It is suggestive of an otherwise static world in need of animation. 1. INTRODUCTION: PRIMITIVISM, REDUCTIONISM AND ELIMINATIVISM Are there laws of nature of the sort discussed in much recent metaphysics?1 While these discussions tend to disagree over the nature of such laws, they have in common a commitment to laws being an ineliminable part of an adequate metaphysics for our world. In this paper, I challenge that assumption. The question with which I began can be recast in ways that puts emphasis on the issue of eliminability. Do laws of nature deliver some feature to the world that would otherwise be lacking? Could a world be just like ours if it didn’t have laws? Did God have to create laws once he had created all the other things, such as particulars and universals? And so on.
    [Show full text]
  • Academic CV Vero
    Giacomo Giannini Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet, DH1 3HN, United Kingdom [email protected], [email protected] Areas of Specialisation: Metaphysics. Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Logic and Language, Modern Philsosophy. EDUCATION PhD 2016-2020 Durham University Title of Dissertation: ‘Powers for Dispositionalism: A Metaphysical Ground for New Actualism’. Supervisors: Matthew Tugby, Stephen Mumford, and Anna Marmodoro. Viva passed with Minor Corrections. Examiners: Barbara Vetter (FU Berlin), Robin Hendry (Durham). MA Philosophy (Distinction) 2016 Università di Bologna. Title of Dissertation: ‘Truthmakers for Modal Claims’. Supervisors: Walter Cavini and Fabrice Correia (Université de Neuchâtel). BA Philosophy (Distinction) 2014 Università di Bologna Supervisor: Eva Picardi. PUBLICATIONS 2020 “Actualism minus Naturalism Equals Platonism?” co-authored with Matthew Tugby, Philosophical In- quiries, S.I. on Barbara Vetter’s Potentiality (OUP, 2015), 2020. Forthcoming “Formal Causes for Powers” co-authored with Stephen Mumford, to appear in Sandstad & Jansen (eds.) Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation, Routledge, 2020. Under Review “Powers, Processes, and Eternalism” (R&R, Erkenntnis) “New Powers for Dispositionalism” (R&R, Synthese) Work in Progress “Universals Cannot Be Manifestations of Powers” 1 “The Source of Independence and the Source of Necessity” “Can There Be a Fundamental Level in a Powerful World?” SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS 2019 Royal Institute of Philosophy Bursary. 2019 Durham Excellence in Learning and Teaching Award. 2016 ARHC - Northern Bridge Doctoral Training Partnership Doctoral Scholarship. 2015 University Award for Academic Excellence (Borsa di studio per merito) for the year 2013/14. 2014 University Award for Academic Excellence (Borsa di studio per merito) for the year 2012/13.
    [Show full text]
  • Essentiality Without Necessity
    Essentiality without Necessity Petter Sandstad Abstract It is widely accepted that if a property is essential then it is necessary. Against this I present numerous counterexamples from biology and chemistry, which fall into two groups: (I) A property is essential to a genus or species, yet some instances of this genus or species do not have this essential property. (II) A property is essential to a genus, yet some species of this genus do not have this essential property. I discuss and reject four minor objections. Then I discuss in depth whether a distinction between constitutive essence and consequential essence is able to handle these counterexamples. I conclude that this distinction is better put as one between (1) the essence, which is necessary, and (2) the essential properties, which are not formally necessary. An essence of an object X is the substantial universal expressed by its real definition. An object X has a property P essentially iff the property P is explanatory and non-trivial, and P follows from the essence of X. Keywords: essential properties, necessary properties, essence, exceptions Kripke, Putnam, and others defended the tenability of essentiality as de re necessity, orthodoxly analysed as something that is true of a thing in all possible worlds where it exists (cf. [27] for a historical survey). According to this modal view, a property is predicated essentially if and only if it is (physically) necessary. If an object X essentially has a property P, then it must have P in all possible worlds where X exists (i.e. it must be necessary).
    [Show full text]
  • Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
    Jean-Paul Sartre: BasicWritings 'This immensely useful volume makes it possible for readersto get a substantialand comprehensiveknowledge of Sartreanphilosophy. It is a remarkableachievement.' HazelE. Barnes,University ofColorado at Boulder ' ... this is a worthwhile andilluminating book.' BaronessMary Warnock ' ... bringstogether just the right texts,ordered in the right way, to draw the studentinto Sartre.' JohnJ. Compton,EmeritusProfessor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University 'StephenPriest's succinct, analytical introductions are invaluable ... a wide- rangingcollection of extracts.' ChristinaHowells, WadhamCollege, Oxford Jean-PaulSartre is one of the most famous philosophersof the twentieth century. The principal founder of existentialism,a political thinker and famousnovelist and dramatist,his work hasexerted enormous influence in philosophy,literature, politics and cultural studies.lean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings is the first collection of Sartre'skey philosophicalwritings and providesan indispensableresource for all studentsand readers of his work. StephenPriest's clear and helpful introductionsset each reading in context, makingthe volume an idealcompanion for thosecoming to Sartre'swritings for the first time. A key featureof the anthologyis that it includesthe full text of Sartre's famousExistentialism and Humanism. The selectionsare from: Existentialismand Humanism Beingand Nothingness Transcendenceof the Ego The Psychologyof Imagination Whatis Literature? Searchfor a Method Notebooksfor an Ethics The Family Idiot Critique
    [Show full text]
  • References Indrek Reiland Institut Jean Nicod Stephen Mumford And
    Philosophical Review BOOK REVIEWS References Pautz, Adam. Forthcoming. “Propositions and Properties.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Reiland, Indrek. 2013. “Propositional Attitudes and Mental Acts.” Thought 1: 239–45. ———. n.d. “Predication and the Frege-Geach Problem.” Unpublished manuscript. Soames, Scott. 2014. “Cognitive Propositions.” In New Thinking about Propositions, ed. J. King, S. Soames, and J. Speaks, 91–126. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Indrek Reiland Institut Jean Nicod Philosophical Review, Vol. 126, No. 1, 2017 DOI 10.1215/00318108-3683712 Stephen Mumford and Matthew Tugby, eds., Metaphysics and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. ix þ244 pp. Metaphysics of science, according to Stephen Mumford and Matthew Tugby, is “the metaphysical study of the aspects of reality, such as kindhood, lawhood, causal power, and causation, which impose order on the world and make our scientific disciplines possible ...and also the study of the metaphysical relation- ship between the various scientific disciplines” (14). The editors explicitly rule out such studies as the metaphysics of space, for instance, as mere “specific metaphysical debates as they arise within specific scientific sub-disciplines” (6), such as physics in this case. The core of the metaphysics of science, as they insist, consists solely of those Kantian issues of extreme generality that concern the very possibility of science. The editors seem to suggest that the consideration of these points, as a truly first philosophy, prior to any scientific work, does not require any detailed competence in actual science. And they appear confident that work on kindhood, lawhood, and the relation among the sciences by the first philosopher will not suffer the embarrassing fate of Kant’s a priori pronouncements on the metaphysics of space.1 It is from the armchair, then, that “core” metaphysicians of science proceed to divine the fundamental order of things.
    [Show full text]
  • Cvii (7): 333–359
    L.A. Paul [email protected] Appointments 2021–. Millstone Family Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Cognitive Science, Yale University. 2020–. Professor of Psychology (secondary appointment), Yale University. 2018–2020. Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Yale University. 2014–2018. Professorial Fellow, Arché Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews. 2016–2018. Eugene Falk Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 2012–2016. Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 2008–2012. Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 2007–2008. Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona. 2001–2007. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona. 2001–2005. Institute for Advanced Studies Research Fellow, Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. 1999–2001. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale University. Education Ph.D., 1999, Philosophy, Princeton University. M.A., 1996, Philosophy, Princeton University. M.A., 1996, Philosophy, Antioch University. B.A., 1990, Biology and Chemistry, Antioch College. Areas of Specialization: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, Formal Epistemology, Philosophy of Science. 1 Publications Books In Progress. Who will I Become? (provisional title) Under contract with Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2020. Was können wir wissen, bevor wir uns entscheiden?, German translation of “What you can’t expect when you’re expecting”,
    [Show full text]
  • Metaphysics and Natural Kinds: Slingshots, Fundamentality, and Causal Structure
    METAPHYSICS AND NATURAL KINDS: SLINGSHOTS, FUNDAMENTALITY, AND CAUSAL STRUCTURE By ANDREW LEE MCFARLAND Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________ Chair: John Symons ________________________________ John Bricke ________________________________ Armin Schulz ________________________________ Clif Pye ________________________________ Philippe Huneman Date Defended: May 16, 2014 The Dissertation Committee for Andrew Lee McFarland certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: METAPHYSICS AND NATURAL KINDS: SLINGSHOTS, FUNDAMENTALITY, AND CAUSAL STRUCTURE ________________________________ JOHN SYMONS Date approved: May 16, 2014 ii DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Metaphysics and Natural Kinds: Slingshots, Fundamentality, and Causal Structure Andrew Lee McFarland My dissertation addresses a question relevant to metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science: What are natural kinds? I explore a view that holds that natural kinds are complex, structural properties that involve causal structure. Causal structure describes the idea that for the many properties associated with natural kinds, these properties are nomically linked – that is causally connected – in such a way that the properties of non-natural kinds are not. After criticizing arguments in favor of a nominalist theory of kinds – one that holds that a natural kind just is to be identified with its class of instances – and after defending the notion of a complex structural property from several prominent objections posed by David Lewis, I apply a causal account of natural kinds to a set of problematic cases, paying special attention to isomeric kinds from chemistry. iii Dedication I dedicate this doctoral thesis to my family and to the tireless support they have given me over the years.
    [Show full text]
  • The Resemblance Structure of Natural Kinds
    The Resemblance Structure of Natural Kinds A Formal Model for Resemblance Nominalism Javier Belastegui Lazcano Supervisors: Dr. Thomas Mormann Dr. Jon P´erezLaraudogoitia A thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of the Basque Country November 2020 (cc)2021 JAVIER BELASTEGUI LAZCANO(cc by-nc-sa 4.0) Declaration of Authorship I hereby declare that this dissertation, entitled \The Resemblance Structure of Natural Kinds: A Formal Model for Resemblance Nominalism" and written under the supervision of Thomas Mormann and Jon P´erezLaraudogoitia, is the result of my own original research. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where it is explicitly acknowledged in the text. No part of this thesis has been submitted for a degree at any other university or institution. Javier Belastegui Lazcano 1 Para Ane, que se sabe todas mis canciones. Abstract The aim of this thesis is to better understand the ways natural kinds are re- lated to each other by species-genus relations and the ways in which the members of the kind are related to each other by resemblance relations, by making use of formal models of kinds. This is done by first analysing a Minimal Conception of Natural Kinds and then reconstructing it from the ontological assumptions of Resemblance Nominalism. The questions addressed are: 1. What is the external structure of kinds? In what ways are kinds related to each other by species-genus relations? 2. What is the internal structure of kinds? In what sense are the instances of a kind similar enough to each other? According to the Minimal Conception of Natural Kinds, kinds have two components, a set of members of the kind (the extension) and a set of natural attributes common to these objects (the intension).
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 5. Language: Private, Public, Solitary, Shared on the Received
    Chapter 5. Language: private, public, solitary, shared On the received reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations1, the book contains an argument purporting to show the impossibility of a private language. There has been a lively debate, however, on how the relevant notion of a private language is to be understood, and what considerations should be taken to rule it out. Some have understood Wittgenstein to mean that a language must be something that several speakers actually share, while others take him to mean that a language must be something that they could, in principle, share. Or, slightly differently put, on one view, speaking a language presupposes the actual existence of a linguistic community upholding certain shared standards of meaning and correctness, while on the other view, it only presupposes that such a community might have existed. These views have come to be known as the ‘community view’ and the ‘solitary speaker’ view, respectively.2 Furthermore, supporters of the community view tend to think that the discussion about privacy holds a central place in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, whereas those who support the solitary speaker view usually see its bearings as limited to the issue of the privacy of experience. 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958). References to this work will be indicated with the abbreviation PI followed by paragraph number. 2 Rather than two monolithic positions, what we have here is a spectrum of views ranging between two extremes. To mention but a few examples: the best-known formulations of the community view are to be found in Norman Malcolm, “Following a Rule” in his book Nothing is Hidden (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), as well as in his essay “Wittgenstein on Language and Rules” in Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays 1978-1989 (ed.
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein, Anxiety, and Performance Behavior
    Incapacity Incapacity Wittgenstein, Anxiety, and Performance Behavior Spencer Golub northwestern university press evanston, illinois Northwestern University Press www.nupress.northwestern.edu Copyright © 2014 by Spencer Golub. Published 2014 by Northwestern University Press. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Golub, Spencer, author. Incapacity : Wittgenstein, anxiety, and performance behavior / Spencer Golub. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8101-2992-4 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889–1951. 2. Language and languages—Philosophy. 3. Performance—Philosophy. 4. Literature, Modern—20th century—History and criticism. 5. Literature—Philosophy. I. Title. B3376.W564G655 2014 121.68—dc23 2014011601 Except where otherwise noted, this book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. In all cases attribution should include the following information: Golub, Spencer. Incapacity: Wittgenstein, Anxiety, and Performance Behavior. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2014. For permissions beyond the scope of this license, visit http://www.nupress .northwestern.edu/. An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high-quality books open access for the public good. More information about the initiative and links to the open-access version can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org. For my mother We go towards the thing we mean. —Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §455 .
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein and Haydn on Understanding Music
    Contemporary Aesthetics (Journal Archive) Volume 4 Volume 4 (2006) Article 15 2006 Wittgenstein and Haydn on Understanding Music Yael Kaduri Bezalel Academy of Art and Design, Jerusalem, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/liberalarts_contempaesthetics Part of the Aesthetics Commons Recommended Citation Kaduri, Yael (2006) "Wittgenstein and Haydn on Understanding Music," Contemporary Aesthetics (Journal Archive): Vol. 4 , Article 15. Available at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/liberalarts_contempaesthetics/vol4/iss1/15 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberal Arts Division at DigitalCommons@RISD. It has been accepted for inclusion in Contemporary Aesthetics (Journal Archive) by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@RISD. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Wittgenstein and Haydn on Understanding Music Yael Kaduri About CA Abstract Journal Wittgenstein's remarks about music have motivated philosophers to build a comprehensive picture of his philosophy of music, concentrating on the central Contact CA issues of musical meaning. It is often claimed that, according to Wittgenstein, understanding music consist in grasping the internal relationships between Links musical events. Musical practice, however, is naturally saturated with what philosophers often call extra-musical meanings. The present study, by Submissions considering a musical issue in Haydn's instrumental music, attempts to show that musical language games in the Wittgensteinian sense involve explanations Search Journal of music that enhance the listener's ability to understand music by broadening his musical competence. Nevertheless, constituting understanding of music, these explanations might use professional musical terms as well as non-musical terms, comparisons, gestures and so on.
    [Show full text]