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Curriculum Vitae JOHN HAWTHORNE Updated October 2018 PERSONAL DETAILS: BORN: Birmingham, England May 25, 1964 ADDRESS: USC School of Philosophy 3709 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles CA 90089 EMAIL: [email protected] AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS Part of three person Templeton Award (with Yoaav Isaacs and Aron Wall) for two year project on fine-tuning. Fellow of British Academy (elected 2013) Visiting Fellowship, Australian National University (for Summer 2014) Project Leader of New Insights In Religious Epistemology, a three year project at Oxford funded by the Templeton Foundation (since 2012). Visiting Lecturership, University of Helsinki, 2012. Nelson Visiting Fellow, Michigan University, 2011. Centre for Study of Mind and Language Project at University of Oslo. Project Associate since 2009. Visting Fellowship at University of Oxford 2005. Visiting Astor Lecturer, Oxford 2004. Research Fellowship at Australian National University (1993-1995) Grant from Australian Research Council for work on Grammar of Meaning book, 1991- 1993. Dissertation Prize for best Dissertation at Syracuse University (1991) First Class Honors, University of Manchester (1985) ACADEMIC POSITIONS: 1 Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA (part-time 2013-July 2015, full time from July 2015). Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, Magdalen College, Oxford, UK (2006 to July 2015) Professor of Philosophy (part-time), Princeton University (2009-2012) Professor, Rutgers University (2001-2006) Professor, Syracuse University (1996-2001) Assistant Professor, Arizona State University (1995-1996) Assistant Professor, University of New South Wales (1991-1995) EDUCATION: PhD. Syracuse University (1991) B.A. in Philosophy and Politics, University of Manchester (1985) 2 PUBLICATIONS: BOOKS Monographs Narrow Content (with Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, Oxford University Press, 2018). Metaphysics (forthcoming, Princeton University Press) (with David Manley),The Reference Book (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) (with Herman Cappelen),Relativism and Monadic Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. (with Jan Cover),Substance and Individuation in Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). (with Mark Norris Lance),The Grammar of Meaning: Normativity and Semantic Content (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Collected Papers Metaphysical Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 1-312 (includes six previously unpublished essays.), Epistemological Essays (in preparation for Oxford University Press, will include some previously unpublished essays). Edited Collections (with Matt Benton and Dani Rabinowitz) God, Belief and Knowledge: New Insights (Oxford University Press, 2018) (with Lee Walters), Conditionals, Probability and Paradox: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, forthcoming Oxford University Press. (with Theodore Sider and Dean W. Zimmerman), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). (with Tamar Szabó Gendler),Perceptual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 3 (with Tamar Szabó Gendler), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). (with Michaelis Michael), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1994). CHAPTERS AND ARTICLES “The Necessity of Mathematics (with Juhani Yli-Vakkuri), forthcoming Nous. ‘Pragmatic Encroachment and Closure’ (with Charity Anderson), forthcoming in volume of papers on pragmatic encroachment, edited by Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath (Routledge). ‘Operator Arguments Revisited’ (with Juhani Yli-Vakkuri), forthcoming Philosophical Studies. ‘Plenitude in Metaphysics’ (with Maegan Fairchild), forthcoming in special issue of Philosophy. ‘Possible Patterns’ (with Jeffrey Russell), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics ‘Reflections on Reasons’ (with Ofra Magidor), forthcoming in Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity. ‘Fine-tuning fine-tuning’, with Yoaav Isaacs, Hawthorne, Rabinowitz and Benton (eds.), God, Belief and Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 2018 (also co-author of introduction to that volume). ‘More Misapprehensions abut the Fine-Tuning Argument’ (with Yoaav Isaacs), Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement, volume 81, 2017. ‘Scotus on Universals’, Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 4, 2017 . ‘Scepticism’ (with Billy Dunaway), forthcoming in Abraham and Aquino, eds., Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Theology. ‘The Epistemic ‘Ought’’, forthcoming in Hawthorne and Walters, eds., Conditionals, Probability and Paradox: Themes from the philosophy of Dorothy Edgington. 4 ‘Belief is Weak’ (with Daniel Rothschild and Levi Spectre), Philosophical Studies, 173, 2016, 1393-1404. ‘Some Remarks on Imagination and Convention,’ Mind and Language 31, 2016, 625- 634. ‘Higher Order Free Logic and the Kaplan-Prior Paradox’ (with Andrew Bacon and Gabriel Uzquino), Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, 2016, 493-541. ‘General Dynamic Trivality Theorems’ The Philosophical Review 125, 2016, 303-339. ‘Evil and Evidence’ (with Yoaav Isaacs and Matthew Benton), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 7, 2016, 1-31.. ‘Cretan Deductions’ (with Rachel Fraser), Philosophical Perspectives 29, 2015, 163-178. ‘Comments on Transient Truths’, Inquiry 2015, 619-626. ‘Knowledge, Practical Adequacy and Stakes’ (with Charity Anderson), forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology. ‘Embedding Epistemic Modals’, (with Cian Dorr) Mind 122 (2013), 867-914. ‘Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports’ (with Cian Dorr), The Philosophical Review 123, 2014, 281-338. ‘Knowledge from False Belief’ (with Dani Rabinowitz), forthcoming in OUP volume on Gettier problem. ‘Knowing Against the Odds’, (with Cian Dorr and Jeremy Goodman), Philosophical Studies 170, 2014, 277-287. ‘Groupthink’ (with Lara Buchak and Jeffrey Russell), Philosophical Studies 172, 2015, 1287-1309 (reprinted in The Philosophers Annual). ‘Naturalness’ (with Cian Dorr) Zimmerman and Bennett, eds., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (2013). ‘Aquinas on Faith and Knowledge’ in John Marenbon, ed., Continuity and Innovation in Medieval Philosophy, Oxford University Press (2013) ‘Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity,’ Philosophical Studies 158, 2012, 493-501. 5 ‘Some Comments on Fricker’s ‘Stating and Insinuating’,Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86, 95-108 (2012). ‘Disagreement without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts’ (with Amia Srinivasan) in Lackey and Christensen, eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement, New Essays, Oxford University Press, 2013. ‘Replies to Lasersohn, Macfarlane and Richard’ (with Herman Cappelen), Philosophical Studies. Replies to Glanzbert, Soames and Weatherson’ with Herman Cappelen), Analysis Reviews. ‘Assertion and Epistemic Opacity (with Ofra Magidor), Mind 119, 1087-1105 (2010). ‘Words’ (with Ernie Lepore), Journal of Philosophy 108, 447-485 (2011). ‘How Many Angels Can Dance on the Head of A Pin?’ (with Gabriel Uzquiano), Mind 120, 53-81 (2011) ‘A Metaphysician looks at the Everett Interpretation’, in Saunders, Barratt, Kent and Wallace eds, Many Worlds? Oxford University Press, 2010. (with Maria Lasonen-Aarnio),‘Knowledge and Objective Chance’, Williamson on Knowledge ed. Patrick Greeugh and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). ‘Superficialism in Ontology,’ Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology ed. David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 213-30. (with Ofra Magidor),‘Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility’, Mind, 118, 2009), pp. 377-97. (with Andrew McGonigal),‘The many minds account of vagueness’, Philosophical Studies, 138 (2008), pp. 435-440. (with Jason Stanley),‘Knowledge and Action’ Journal of Philosophy, 105 (2008), 571- 590. ‘Three Dimensionalism vs Four Dimensionalism’, Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics ed. Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean Zimmerman (Blackwell Publishing, 2008). 6 (with Elisabeth Camp), ‘Sarcastic ‘Like’: a Case Study in the Interface of Syntax and Semantics’, Philosophical Perspectives, 22, (2008), pp. 1-21. ‘Eavesdroppers and Epistemic Modals’, Philosophical Issues 17, 92-101 (2007) ‘A Priority and Externalism’ in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology ed. Sanford C. Goldberg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 201-18. ‘Cartesian Dualism’, in Persons Human and Divine ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 87-98. ‘Eavesdroppers and Epistemic Modals’, Philosophical Issues, 17 (2007), pp. 92-101. ‘Craziness and Meta-Semantics’ (a reply to Williams), The Philosophical Review, 116 (2007), pp. 427-41. ‘Context-Dependency and Comparative Adjectives,’ Analysis, 67 (2007),pp. 195-204. ‘Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia’ Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge ed. Torin Alter and Sven Walter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 195-208. (with Herman Cappelen),‘Locations and Binding,’ Analysis, 67 (2007), 95-105. ‘Religious Knowledge’ , Philosophical Exchange, 2007. ‘Testing for Context-Dependence’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73 (2006), pp. 443-50. (with Karson Kovakovich and Scott Sturgeon),‘Disjunctivism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106 (2006). ‘Epistemicism and Semantic Plasticity’ in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Vol. 2 ed. Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 289-322. (with Tamar Szabó Gendler),‘Perceptual Experience’ in Perceptual Experience ed. John Hawthorne and Tamar Szabó Gendler (Oxford: Oxford University
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