The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 1 JWC Public Affairs Office Cover _ French Air Force PO Box 8080, Eikesetveien General Stéphane Abrial, 4068 Stavanger, Norway Commander of NATO’s Allied Tel: +(47) 52 87 9130/9131/9132 Command Transformation Internet: www.jwc.nato.int (ACT). Collage by SSG Brandon Chhoeun, USA A, Assistant Technician, Media Simulation Section, Joint Warfare Centre.

Dear Reader, I heartily welcome you, all the new members is, however, that they bring some pretty bad weather, exactly the kind of the JWC, and wish you all the best for your that locals love! The snow skiing season is not far away either… Ski- endeavours, hoping that your transition will ing is synonymous with fun, fitness, and freedom as it takes you away bring you and your family much fun and sat- from the daily grind. Skiing is playing with acceleration and centrifugal isfaction in Norway. Some of you may already forces. It is also the ultimate thrill, provided you get the rhythm of it have gained a first impression of the Nordic and let go of any thoughts or feelings that may hold you back. At its summer, which never fails to create a fairytale best, it feels like pure bliss. A ski boat takes Stavanger skiers and snow- atmosphere of endless days and nights soft as boarders at express pace (less than two hours) from the Skagenkaien velvet. If, like many Norwegians, you appreci- Quay to the Sauda Skiing Centre, one of the major skiing arenas of ate eating in idyllic outdoor dining spots, maybe chatting away with West Norway. Not every day, is it, that you go by boat straight to a ski- next-table neighbours, it really pinches your heart that it will take al- ing arena. Alternatively, you may travel by car to Sirdal and rent a cabin most a year for those lazy, laidback moments of life to return. placed at your disposal by the host nation. The low autumn light now beams through autumn foliage. Shorter I wish all of you a very happy autumn and winter. And I urge you days bring changes in our routines. Outdoor activities move indoors, to spend much of your spare time in outdoor activities. I for one enjoy and life will slip into a lower gear over the next two seasons. The cold, taking my kids to the woods in autumn and winter evenings. We make dark months of winter are coming, as are those long cosy evenings a makeshift fire and lie down on the woodland floor to watch the stars around the dinner table with friends and family, indulging in culinary in the sky above us. A few words from the visionary medieval poem of pleasures such as traditional Norwegian fare, often given a modern Draumkvedet will then come to mind: The moon now shines brightly, twist. The autumn’s favourite Norwegian meat is probably lamb, which and the road ahead seems long, sending you off in a reverie where comes in dozens of high-quality varieties. Potting for lobster is another anything seems possible! Happy Reading! characteristic of the season, as the lordly crustacean represents the supreme taste from the sea. I recently learnt that lobster was hard to Lt Col Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF, sell 70 years ago. Stavanger’s lobstermen worked hard for little and Chief Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre got only NOK 1.50 per kilo, which was down to NOK 0.25 per lobster in rural areas. With lobster today being seen as a luxury, prices have risen sharply, so you have to delete the decimal point and multiply by four to get the current price! PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN THE THREE SWORDS! One of the very best things about autumn is the opportunity it offers We are always looking for good articles written to slow down in pace with nature. Keeping a ‘weather eye’ by watching by our readers. If you have got something to clouds and making a note of changes in the winds and the seas often say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider becomes like a sport. Being able to identify different types of clouds will it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to help understand the kind of weather to expect. Cirrus, cumulus con- JWC CG PAO Common (CRONOS) or gestus, cumulonimbus calvus and cumulonimbus incus are all mystical [email protected]. and musical names that may sound like sweet poetry to you. The truth

The Three Swords

JWC PAO: The Three Swords is the authorized unofficial Thanks Lt Col Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF publication produced by the JWC Public Affairs HQ Rapid Reaction Maj Markus Beck, DEU A Office. It represents a compilation of articles, Corps - France PAO; Inci Kucukaksoy, NATO Civilian reports, news and general information related to Capt (N) Jeffrey Bender; Bente Heill Kleven, NATO Civilian JWC personnel and their families. The articles and Roy Thorvaldsen; opinions expressed in this publication are those SGT Lars Lenvik; of the authors and do not necessarily represent Tore Ellingsen; Production and Layout: the official policy of NATO. The Editor reserves SGM Leszek Wojtalik Inci Kucukaksoy the right to edit or shorten submissions. (Back Cover photo). PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR

2 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 foreword

Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte German Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

ive months have already change in the JWC, one thing stands passed since the last issue firm: the last quarter of this year will of The Three Swords. Again, be the busiest ever. From mid-Octo- Fit has been a busy and chal- ber, we shall conduct the IKLT 13, lenging time and, on top of that, the which will be immediately followed by summer months saw a lot of person- ISAF 10/02. Moreover, in the weeks nel rotation. Eventually we moved into before Christmas, we shall train Allied our new offices and exercise building Joint Force Command Naples and the with all of our permanent staff and Component Commands of the 16th finally got rid of the container village rotation of the NATO Response Force in front of our headquarters. All this in our STEADFAST JUNO 10 exercise. emerged as we were in the middle In this edition of The Three Swords of the implementation of our new magazine, you will again find a wide Peacetime Establishment (PE). The range of articles on our current is- regular rotation in connection with sues and future challenges. Just to the PE implementation has for the mention but a few: Dr Dave Slog- first time brought the JWC down to gett writes about “Developing COIN less than 85 percent of full person- Doctrine in Contact” which is applied nel strength. For a small organization at all our training events. There is a like the JWC, which is only one-deep retrospect on his time at the JWC by in many of its areas of expertise, this Capt (N) Stuart Furness, our previous becomes a major challenge when conducting exercises. Also Joint Exercise Division Head. Also in this issue is the speech to note is that the JWC saw more newcomers this year than in SACT gave at the 2010 Joint Warfighting Conference, along- the past. In an effort to help them integrate more quickly, we side with an article on NATO’s New Strategic Concept by Dr continue to run our comprehensive internal training and educa- Stefanie Babst, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for tion programme, and I would like to thank all those involved in Public Diplomacy. JWC Subject Matter Expert, Lt Col Matthew making this happen. In addition, I wish to extend my thanks to Skuse shares “Thoughts on Modern Counterinsurgency”. those of you who supported the numerous community activi- Last but not least, I would like to take the opportunity to ties, such as boat trips and BBQs, designed to make newcomers thank a member of the JWC, Ms Inci Kucukaksoy. Without her and their families feel welcome. Furthermore, this year’s OTX excellent work, this magazine would not have become what it took us to Szczecin, Seelow and Berlin, providing an insightful is today. For five years now, she has been doing an outstand- account of the years and historic events that led towards the ing job and putting massive effort into creating the magazine. fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as the chance to hear from eye- Without her daily support and advice, we would not be able to witnesses how Poland changed from a communist regime to a publish The Three Swords, which is recognized in NATO as one democratic country and ally, and how the people of East Ger- of the best researched, balanced and fun-to-read magazines, many overcame an unjust system and achieved their freedom. thus contributing to the overall credibility of the Joint Warfare During a one-day terrain walk, we explored the Seelow Heights, Centre. Moreover, without her, the recently published JWC His- or Seelower Höhen, which were the scene of the final major tory Book would not exist. I have received letters from outside battle of World War II. organizations that have received a copy of the book. They not In Stavanger, we have successfully conducted our first In- only send their thanks, but also praise how well the magazine dividual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Training for ISAF, taken and book are designed, presented and edited. Ms Kucukaksoy part in the Summer Congress Symposium of the Inter-Allied is a very modest person who does not like to be put into the Confederation of Reserve Officers and hosted the Norwegian spotlight. For this reason, I would like to take this opportunity Minister of Defence. However, no matter how many things you to thank her on behalf of all JWC and all readers.

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 3 Joint Warfighting Conference 2010

2010 JOINT WARFIGHTING CONFERENCE

By U.S. Navy 1st Class Petty Officer Sarah R. Langdon, HQ SACT Photos by Michael Carpenter

Combatant and Coalition Commanders: What will they need five years from now?

O-SPONSORED by the Armed ing and what capabilities they need to years down the road our emphasis will Forces Communications and achieve those goals. Each day of the be on the coalition,” Abrial said to the Electronics Association (AF- conference featured plenary addresses more than 500 guests assembled for CEA) International, the U.S. by military leaders to include French Air the speech. “Our commanders will not Naval Institute and the U.S. Force General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme be fighting alone. They will be fighting CJoint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Allied Commander Transformation; U.S. alongside nations and will be cooperat- fourth Joint Warfighting Conference Navy Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., Com- ing with other nations. (...) Save a few took place from May 11-13, 2010 at the mander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; exceptions, all future military operations Virginia Beach Convention Center. For U.S. Army General David Petraeus, the will take place in the multinational envi- three days the conference provided a then Commander, U.S. Central Command ronment. The multinational environment venue for several influential government (current Commander of ISAF and U.S. is here to stay.” and senior military leaders from both forces in Afghanistan); and U.S. Marine General Abrial also emphasized the the United States and NATO to discuss Corps General James N. Mattis, the then importance of building the collaborative future capabilities and important issues Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command relationships ahead of time and avoid- facing future joint warfighters. (current Commander of U.S. Central ing ad-hoc coalitions, which he admit- This year’s theme, “Coalition and Com- Command). ted were easy to assemble, but just as batant Commanders: What Will They General Abrial kicked off the second easily prone to fall apart. He discussed Need Five Years From Now?”, aimed to day of the Joint Warfighting Conference the need for commanders to pay atten- provide insight into the NATO and coa- with an opening speech on the future tion to public opinion and underlined the lition goals of proactive coalition build- of warfighting and the coalition. “Five need to understand the importance of

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4 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Strategic Communications. One subject Throughout the three-day confer- the importance of collecting and dissem- General Abrial stressed was the need to ence, ACT and USJFCOM leadership and inating Lessons Learned, because it di- change the way all nations and partners Subject Matter Experts provided a joint rectly impacts protecting and saving the view and share information. speaking engagement booth; the first in warfighter’s life no matter the country or “We need to move toward an envi- the four-year history of the conference, military. “The bottom line is you have to ronment where caveats are rare, where and presented specific topics such as figure out how to improve the warfight- protecting sovereignty and protection of changing the operational environment, ing capabilities,” Crutchfield said. “I don’t sources are the exception,” he said. “We Information Technology (IT) needs and care what uniform you wear or what flag need to shift from the ‘need to know’ capabilities, the multinational environ- is on the shoulder of your uniform. We’re to the ‘willing to share’.” This included, ment, information sharing and evaluat- all fighting and dying together. We ought he added, integrating with Non-Govern- ing Lessons Learned. to be learning from each other.” mental Organizations (NGOs) and civil- U.S. Army Brigadier General Anthony Netherlands Royal Air Force Major ian organizations. The new hybrid threat Crutchfield, Director of USJFCOM’s Joint General Jaap Willemse, Assistant Chief has many characteristics, General Abrial Centre for Operational Analysis, and Dan- of Staff for ACT’s Command, Control, said, which fall outside traditional mili- ish Air Force Brigadier General Peter Son- Communication, Computers, Intelli- tary strategies. He said that recognizing neby, Commander of ACT’s Joint Analy- gence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance these characteristics, whether they cause sis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) (C4ISR) and NATO Network Enabled Ca- humanitarian crisis or have an economic gave a joint presentation on the partner- pability (NNEC), spoke with JFCOM’s U.S. impact, often times require assistance ship between their respective agencies. Navy Captain Shawn Lobree, Deputy Di- from civilian organizations. During his brief, Crutchfield emphasized rector C4 Systems Directorate, on “Joint

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 5 Joint Warfighting Conference 2010

QUOTES:

General Abrial: “The coalition commander will need, in five years, a strong and confident North Atlantic Alliance as the core of his coalition. He will then reap the rewards of years of Alliance work on interoperability, information sharing, and consensus building.”

General Mattis: “I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are; if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you really need to go home.”

Brigadier General Crutchfield: “We’re all fighting and dying together. We ought to be learning from each other.”

Major General Willemse: “We need an open and free information exchange if we really want to win that battle [in Afghanistan].”

and Multinational Information Sharing.” need to go home, because your leader- Willemse explained how NATO is imple- ship in today’s age is obsolete. We have menting the Afghan Mission Network; a got to have officers who can create har- network designed to be used as a prima- mony across all those lines.” ry Coalition (C4ISR), or C5 network for Along with the USJFCOM and ACT International Security Assistance Force booth, the conference featured other (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which will allow military organizations and commands to the free flow of information between include the Joint Forces Staff College, ISAF and Partner Nations. Major General Navy Warfare Development Command Willemse said: “When you look at the and the Navy League of Hampton Roads, operational problem, the bottom line is as well as industrial representatives Coalition forces cannot effectively com- showcasing the latest in communication municate. We need an open and free systems, computer, electronic warfare information exchange if we really want equipment, global positioning systems to win that battle [in Afghanistan].” In and intelligence gathering systems to addition to outlining specific technologi- name just a few.  cal, cyber and communication capabili- ties needed by warfighters in the future, the representatives all stressed the im- portance of coalition building and push- ing nations, partners and the coalition to THE PANELS INCLUDED: • Power Shifts: Who’s Up? Who’s share information. Down? What’s Changing? The last day of the event closed with • Fresh from the Fight: What Do a speech from General Mattis who spoke Company Level Leaders See as The at length on the importance for com- Threats? What Should Be Done to Secure the Homelands? What Needs manders to have the ability to unite their to Be Done to Make the Interagency forces and create harmony among all Pieces Work? services, alliances, partnerships and ci- • Battles of Competing Narratives: Why vilian agencies. “In this age, I don’t care Do They Matter? • Small Unit Excellence: What Will It how tactically or operationally brilliant Take? you are; if you cannot create harmony • How Do We Fight Through a Digital – even vicious harmony – on the battle- Meltdown? field based on trust across service lines, • What Needs to Be Done to Make the Joint/Coalition Force Acquisition across coalition and national lines, and Interoperable? across civilian/military lines, you really ►►►

6 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Joint Warfighting Conference 2010

SPEECH b y Gener al Stéphane Abrial, Supr eme Allied Commander Tr ansf ormation (S ACT) at the Joint Warfighting Conf er ence, 12 Ma y 2010

Thank y ou so much, Gener al Mat tis, f or Sadly, I believ e that the assumption that keep them in the fight in the Pacific. The such a kind intr oduction, but mainly f or ther e will be oper ations fiv e y ears f r om five-year horizon is a tricky one. No one y our f riendship and y our constant and now is a saf e bet. This leads to one of is afraid of making predictions for 2050 determined action in f a v our of cooper a - m y main messages as a custodian of – by the time they find out we’re wrong tion between us and between our com - NAT O’ s military f utur e: that we need to all we risk is some serious teasing in the mands. Thank y ou f or y our in vitation to balance the ener gy and at tention we de- nursing home. But five addr ess an audience upon whose work so v ote to the oper ations of toda y with that years is a tangible if man y in our Alliance depend. I am hon - dev oted to pr eparing f or the oper ations elusive future. In 1987, our ed to launch the second da y of this of tomorr ow . Striving f or ex cellence in who would have pro- gathering that is quite clearly the most our support to Gener al McChrystal(1) and jected a European se- pr ominent of its kind an ywher e. This is IS AF, to which Allied Command Tr ans - curity environment by pr ecisely the sort of ev ent that should be f ormation is wholeheartedly commit ted, 1992 with no Warsaw r eplicated thr oughout the Alliance and I can be no ex cuse f or neglecting the Mc- Pact or Soviet Union? of f er m y admir ation f or the f or esight of Chrystals of 2015 or 2025. No situation, Five years ago, who its sponsors and partners. What a f asci - howev er challenging, can justif y com - would have predicted nating series of panels y ou ar e tr eating pr omising the f utur e. The book ‘7 Dead- a French Supreme Al- us to thr oughout this da y. And what a ly Scenarios’(2) cites as an example the compelling question y ou ha v e giv en us wise y et agonizing decision b y the U .S . (1) This speech was made when General Mc- to work on, Gener al Mat tis: “Combatant Na vy to send its v ery best carrier pilots Chrystal was Commander ISAF. (2) 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist and Coalition Commanders: What Will back to the Continental U .S . after P earl Explores War in the 21st Century by Andrew They Need Fiv e Years Fr om Now?” Harbour to tr ain new pilots r ather than Krepinevich.

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 7 Joint Warfighting Conference 2010

the British Royal United Service Institute assessed that collaboration between Al- lies in Afghanistan, imperfect though it is, was perceived as better than in Iraq, and drew the conclusion that “an estab- lished military Alliance (NATO, in this case) is likely to prove more effective than ad hoc coalitions.” And that point is made despite even the fact that all but one among the national contribu- tions of over 1,000 men in Iraq in 2004 were from NATO members – bringing to the operation much of the accomplish- ments in interoperability made through the years. My point is: all other things being equal, NATO operations are more effective than ad hoc coalitions, and ad hoc coalitions are more effective when Industrial representatives at the Joint Warfighting Conference 2010. they capitalize on common practices and standards developed through NATO than lied Commander in Norfolk? I know that try’s Defence White Paper two years ago when they don’t. I don’t know if we fully the great American philosopher Yogi stated that “save in exceptional cases, appreciate what 60 years of the Alliance Berra once said, “it is difficult to make all our [future] military operations will have accomplished in that respect, and predictions, especially about the future”. take place in a multinational framework”. how much more divergent our forces But for the sake of stimulating our dis- France’s full participation in NATO’s Inte- would be without it. Multinational opera- cussions, I will offer six reflections on grated Military Structure is partly a rec- tions are not simple – but investing time our combatant and coalition command- ognition of this, but this is true of almost and effort in NATO today is one of the ers’ needs five years down the road all our Nations, for several reasons. Even most efficient ways in which to help the – with, as you would expect from me, if imperfectly, it shares the burden – the commanders of 2015. an emphasis on the word coalition – for stress on finances and the stress on of- foremost among my assumptions is that ten overstretched forces. It shares the My third point is that coalition com- those commanders will not fight alone. political responsibility and increases le- manders will need political support. They will fight alongside other nations gitimacy – at home, on the international Over the last eight years, ISAF contrib- and in cooperation with other organiza- scene, and in the host nation. And, in uting governments have suffered, as a tions – and we must consider together a break perhaps from the times of Wel- result of their commitment, to a degree what we can do today to meet their lington, Foch or Eisenhower, it may now none anticipated in the beginning. The needs of tomorrow. bring a specific operational added value political price European leaders have had in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. to pay at home has often been consider- So, my first observation is that coa- The 2006 U.S. Army-Marine Corps Coun- able. One European Nation’s governing litions will be the rule. Coalition work terinsurgency Field Manual states that: coalition even unravelled specifically over is tough and has long been counter-in- (quote) “Many other countries’ military its Afghan policy. The appetite for other tuitive – you may be familiar with the forces bring cultural backgrounds, his- such operations in the coming years has observation by French Field Marshal Fer- torical experiences, and other capabili- been greatly diminished, and Secretary dinand Foch, who had himself struggled ties that can be particularly valuable to Gates himself notes in the latest issue of in leading the Coalition of Allied Forces COIN efforts.” So multinational opera- Foreign Affairs that (quote) “[t]he United at the end of World War I: (quote) “I lost tions are here to stay. States is unlikely to repeat a mission on some of my respect for Napoleon when the scale of those in Afghanistan or Iraq I learned what it was to fight a coali- However, and this is my second anytime soon” citing the “institutional tion war.” Another Supreme Commander, point, you can’t just improvise a challenge” they have represented. Since General Eisenhower, echoed Foch’s re- coalition. Well, as history shows, some- the trend towards protracted engage- marks almost to the word in 1948. But times you have to play a pick-up game ments may well continue, the coalition as Churchill said, “The only thing worse – but you should avoid it. Coalition work commander of 2015 will need to pay than fighting with Allies is fighting with- should be prepared well upstream, and close attention to public opinions in doz- out them”. Despite the difficulties, work- that’s one of the basic functions of the ens of Troop Contributing Nations, and ing as a coalition has become more and Atlantic Alliance. Contributing to an IBM never underestimate the importance of more our default mode – my own coun- Global Business Services study last year, Strategic Communications. He will great-

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8 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Joint Warfighting Conference 2010

or the protection of sources, that should be the exception rather than the rule. Some of the main obstacles to a satisfac- tory flow of information in a multinational operation are also technical. That is why one of the most important of ACT’s many collaborations with JFCOM, and others, is the Afghan Mission Network being imple- mented in ISAF, and which should reach Initial Operational Capability this coming July. For the first time, this network will link COMISAF and his staff with all his sub- ordinates’ national networks. It will be a notable improvement on the current cum- bersome practice of the ‘sneaker net’, of putting the information on a disk or drive and manually moving it from one system to another, which is not secure, is very General Petraeus participated the Joint Warfighting Conference 2010 via video-conference. labour intensive and ensures that infor- mation is never fresh. This system, part of ly benefit from the stability and political- political pressure many leaders have to our NATO Network Enabled Capability, will military capital conferred by a consen- endure and are the price for their coun- not be ISAF specific, but will be used from sus-based mandate, and must take care try’s commitment to an operation. Some the outset in future operations. Informa- to promote the health of that consensus. caveats are the results of national legal tion and intelligence sharing is difficult, it The ISAF Coalition has proven remark- or even constitutional requirements, and is sensitive, and it needs to begin with a ably resilient. By holding firm despite the will not be easily resolved. But in our Al- first circle of trusted partners. For all our pressures upon it, it has given General liance and in our Coalitions we need to countries, this first circle is NATO, which McChrystal a chance to implement a new move towards a culture where caveats for each and every one of its members is counterinsurgency strategy that will, I are increasingly rare. It is a question of not just one Alliance among many, but its believe, deliver encouraging results in effectiveness, and it is a question of faith preeminent international commitment. It the coming months. This resilience is and trust in the coalition commander, as is the natural framework through which due in no small part to the Alliance and well as in the common rules of engage- rules and protocols can be developed, its consensus-building mechanisms. Yes, ment. There is a corollary to reducing ca- and eventually expanded to partners in a it takes longer to achieve agreement in a veats: the sharing of intelligence. I know broader coalition. consensus-based organization, but once I’m far from being a lone voice on this that agreement is reached, its members topic, and that moving from the “need My fifth point is that coalitions will are more strongly committed to seeing to know” to a “will to share” is a man- consist not only of nations’ armed the mission through. Ad hoc coalitions tra at JFCOM to the point that I wouldn’t forces but of various civilian organi- may be easier to assemble, but they are be surprised if General Mattis decided zations as well; the commander will also quicker to unravel. Looking into the to have “will to share” tattooed on his need a Comprehensive Approach. I future after the Kosovo campaign he had knuckles. Well, he’s right – about shar- can no longer imagine a serious security led in 1999, General Wes Clark wrote ing, not about the tattoos. crisis that can be resolved by military that (quote) “the United States will be And, I am very grateful to Lt Gen means alone. There is every reason to fortunate indeed if it has alliance politi- Oates, who in the kickoff address yester- believe that operations in five years will cal and military ‘machinery’ like NATO to day morning emphasized that very point increasingly deal with hybrid threats in assist in forging and sustaining shared in the field of Counter-IED. Trust is a two- one configuration or another. The com- interests and common commitments.” way-street, and if an ally or partner can mon characteristic of these threats is entrust a coalition headquarters with the that they often bypass the conventional My fourth point is that coalition command of its troops to conduct, for ex- strengths of our militaries by using mixed commanders will need the trust of ample, kinetic targeting, that ally cannot modes of operation – for example irregu- Troop Contributing Nations – and be kept away from relevant intelligence lar, anti-access, terrorist or criminal. Our participating Nations will need to by anomalies such as ‘for eyes only’ rules response has to include a whole range of trust each other. I am referring in this that create duplication and frustration. economic, informational, social and po- case to the issue of caveats. I’m not here While there will be some intelligence that litical effects, which the military cannot to bemoan or vilify caveats: they are nations are not willing to fully share for deliver alone. Hence the Comprehensive most often a direct result of the internal legitimate reasons such as sovereignty Approach, which is all about mobilizing

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 9 Joint Warfighting Conference 2010

capabilities that may already exist but are dios to communicate with four national formation sharing, and consensus build- insufficiently resourced or synergized, contingents, and that Friendly Forces ing. He will also need the skills required because they belong to players who are Tracking Systems allowed nations to to lead a combined joint multinational inadequately networked: Nations outside track only their own forces – despite the civilian-military operation. We therefore NATO, as well as national, international, fact that so much Close Air Support, for need NATO to reaffirm its purpose and or Non-Governmental Organizations. example, is provided by one ally’s forces clarify its Level of Ambition. That is why This is particularly true in peace sup- to another. We all know this is inefficient, our Alliance is engaged in the elabora- port, humanitarian or counterinsurgency costly – because in trying to solve the tion of a new Strategic Concept that will operations; and as the panel yesterday problem, we end up spending twice for be finalized next November. on “Securing the Homeland” forcefully the same capabilities – and sometimes I am fully confident that NATO will showed, threats such as terrorism also lethal. I would like to say that things are come out of it strengthened, notably in call for an integrated response. Our own improving through the years, and they its determination to guarantee its mem- NATO maritime anti-terrorist operation are – those who, like me, served as fight- bers territorial integrity – sometimes ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediter- er pilots in the first Gulf War know that a precondition for them to confidently ranean has for example shown us how we’ve come some way since then. But commit troops to expeditionary opera- important it is to coordinate with the port as operations in ISAF demonstrate every tions. We need a NATO that is also more authorities of bordering countries to fight day, we are not moving forward quickly systematically engaged with its clos- the smuggling of illicit materials. or effectively enough. Real progress in est partners: not only with its adjacent NATO is well placed to contribute to a common standards and protocols, often neighbours, such as non-NATO EU coun- flexible Comprehensive Approach frame- acquired through NATO, has been made, tries, but with the Nations throughout the work, where the military in general, and but it has often been offset by the in- world that are by her side in her efforts specifically the coalition commander, can creasing technological gap between the to promote world peace. Improving their be, depending on the situation, a coordi- U.S. and even its closest allies. And we interoperability and giving them access nating, facilitating or enabling force for all know that this gap will not be filled to our training makes perfect sense giv- multiple players. A key-word on bringing by a sudden boost in European defence en the odds that they will keep on taking together such a diversity of actors is flex- spending in the near future. But in five part in coalitions built around NATO. ibility: each situation is often very specif- years I do want my successor to be able And finally, we need NATO to reform ic, and will require its own type of collab- to say with confidence that things have its Command Structure, which is widely oration. Basically, what I wish to foster is improved in this regard. considered to be outdated. That process a deeply ingrained culture of cooperation To be sure, interoperability is a cloth also is well underway, and I believe a and mutual respect, on our part and on woven from many threads, of which ed- NATO combatant commander in 2015 will the part of the other stakeholders. Such ucation, training and the experience of be better supported by a clearer, leaner, a shift cannot be instituted by decree. working together are among the most more flexible and less costly chain of Groundwork has to be conducted over important. But integrating the impera- command. We only need to turn on our many years to build trust with, for ex- tives of alliance and coalition interoper- TVs to know that challenging times are ample, NGOs, IOs or even national gov- ability in the very DNA of every defence ahead, with our investment in defence ernmental agencies whose cultures are industrial programme is also critical, and under growing budgetary pressure, and different from ours. As for the military, is an important rationale behind the ini- the level of foreseeable threats not di- there is long-term work to be done in the tiatives ACT is taking to develop a real minishing. Maintaining our collective education and training of leaders who strategic partnership with industry from security in this context will be possible will develop the mindset needed to oper- both sides of the Atlantic. That is the only through more intensive cooperation ate with players who will not fit neatly way forward, and I am encouraged by among allies, and with active involve- into our organizational charts. I like the the very positive response I have had ment and cooperation of the industrial expression in the U.S. COIN Field Manual – not least by companies represented in representatives in the room. Together of not seeking OpCon (Operational Con- this room – to our new ‘Framework for we can continue to make great improve- trol) or TaCon, but “Handshake-Con”. Collaboration with Industry’. Likewise, ments in our ability to operate effectively The future commander will not aspire to I am resolutely strengthening our links and with more interoperability in our mil- unity of command, but to unity of effort. with the European Defence Agency to itary and non-military endeavours. The Comprehensive Approach will be the make sure that the current development In times like these, and with an eye environment in which future command- of a European Defence is a force for in- to operations five years from now, we ers will need to operate. creased interoperability. strongly need to recommit ourselves to an Atlantic Alliance that forms the back- My sixth and last observation is that TO SUMMARIZE what I believe a coalition bone of multinational operations, ena- interoperability must be hardwired commander will need in five years: he will bles improved operational effectiveness, into a program’s initial DNA. The need a strong and confident North Atlan- and in the words President Obama used NATO Secretary General recently lament- tic Alliance as the core of his coalition. in Oslo, continues to be “indispensable”. ed that the ISAF Commander in Helmand He will then reap the rewards of years Thank you, and I will be happy now to province needed four different sets of ra- of Alliance work on interoperability, in- take any question you might have. 

10 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Visit

VISIT OF NORWAY’S MINISTER OF DEFENCE

The Minister with JWC PAO Kucukaksoy, Inci Lieutenant General

Wolfgang Korte, s by Commander JWC. hoto P

orwegian Minister of De- fence Grete Faremo visited the Joint Warfare Centre on 6 September 2010 to meet with Lieutenant General Wolf- Ngang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre. During her visit, the Minister re- ceived briefings and detailed updates on the Centre, all of which covered a broad range of topics such as the way ahead on NATO’s transformation, the comprehen- sive training and exercise programme of the JWC, innovative concepts and exper- imentation, as well as Lessons Learned. While there, the Minister also toured and was briefed on the Centre’s new state- of-the-art training facility. To conclude her programme, she had an interview session with the local media where she reiterated her support to NATO’s trans- formation and the Joint Warfare Centre’s important role in that important mission. She also commended the Centre for its well-functioning organization and strong professional community. 

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 11 Chief of Staff Handover Ceremony

JWC welcomes new Chief of Staff

Brigadier General

Steven J. DePalmer By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

.S. Air Force Brigadier General In his keynote speech Lieutenant Gen- West’s time at the Joint Warfare Centre, Steven J. DePalmer assumed eral Korte thanked the outgoing Chief of Lieutenant General Korte said that Brig- responsibility as Chief of Staff, Staff for his outstanding contribution, adier General West had been the most UJoint Warfare Centre (JWC), professionalism and unwavering com- suitable, trustworthy and competent from U.S. Air Force Brigadier General mitment to the Joint Warfare Centre. He advisor, which he pointed out had been Scott D. West during a Handover Cer- emphasized the important role of the highly rewarding for the Centre. emony on Thursday 12 August 2010 at Chief of Staff in terms of mission and In his turn, Brigadier General Steven J. the 426th Air Base Squadron’s Commu- commented on Brigadier General West’s DePalmer said in his speech that he was nity Activity Centre in Jåttå, Stavanger, vision, energy and leadership. Lieuten- looking forward to his new assignment. Norway. German Army Lieutenant Gen- ant General Korte said: “The Chief of He thanked everyone for the welcome eral Wolfgang Korte, Commander JWC, Staff is without doubt the most impor- given to him and his family since their ar- presided over the ceremony. He said tant position at the Joint Warfare Centre. rival. “Thank you for the warm welcome goodbye to Brigadier General West and The Chief of Staff is the alter ego of his this afternoon as well as for the fantastic warmly welcomed incoming Chief of Staff Commander. The relationship between reception provided to Sheila and I and Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer, to the Commander and his Chief of Staff our three daughters when we arrived on whom he tendered his best wishes for a is based on absolute trust and mutual Monday in this wonderful country. ‘Tusen successful mission. loyalty.” Reflecting on Brigadier General takk!’” he said.

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12 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Chief of Staff Handover Ceremony

Reflecting on the Joint Warfare Cen- tre’s place in NATO, Brigadier General DePalmer said: “For the last 61 years much has changed in the world since the creation of NATO. But, a few things remain the same. Our member states re- main committed to promoting peace and security. However, if diplomatic efforts Brigadier General fail, NATO must possess the capabil- Steven J. DePalmer ity through a Comprehensive Approach U.S. Air Force to undertake crisis management and, if Chief of Staff necessary, conduct collective defence Joint Warfare Centre through civil-military operations. And this is where the Joint Warfare Centre is critical to NATO’s success. In the spirit RIGADIER General of collaboration and cooperation, the Steven J. DePalmer professionals of the Joint Warfare Cen- is the Chief of Staff of NATO’s Joint BWarfare Centre, Stavanger, NATO must possess Norway. The Joint Warfare Centre is comprised of representatives of NATO and Partnership for Peace mem- the capability through ber countries, and promotes and conducts joint and combined experimentation, a Comprehensive concept and doctrine development, and operational-level training to improve Approach to undertake NATO’s capabilities and interoperability. Key responsibilities include battle staff training for the operational headquarters of International Security Assistance crisis management and, Force in Afghanistan and NATO Response Force. The Joint Warfare Centre also if necessary, conduct conducts Iraqi Key Leader Training for senior representatives of the Iraqi Ministry collective defence through of Defence and Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Brigadier General DePalmer graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in civil-military operations.” 1985 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering. He completed “ pilot training at Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas and lead-in fighter training at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. He learned to fly the F-15C at Tyndall tre continue to provide the best training Air Force Base, Florida and was assigned to the 71st Tactical Fighter Squadron for our NATO forces. Whether preparing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, from May 1987 to December 1989. His next ISAF staff for duty in Afghanistan, train- tour was with the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Keflavik Naval Air Station, ing the NATO Response Force or sup- Iceland, and he returned to Langley with the 71st Fighter Squadron and the 27th porting experimentation projects, the Fighter Squadron from July 1991 to June 1995. He then attended the Air Com- excellent reputation of the Joint Warfare mand and Staff College and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Centre continues to spread throughout Air Force Base, Alabama. In July 1997, he was assigned to Naples, Italy as the the Alliance.” Executive Officer to the Commander, 16th Air Force. From July 1998 to July Brigadier General DePalmer added, in 2002, he was assigned to the 48th Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Lakenheath, regard to his predecessor, that he was United Kingdom, and commanded the 494th Fighter Squadron. He then attended grateful for Brigadier General West and the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy and assumed command of the 32nd Air his wife Jane’s outstanding leadership Operations Group, Ramstein Air Base, Germany in May 2003. at the Joint Warfare Centre and in the In May 2005, Brigadier General DePalmer was assigned as Vice Commander, local Stavanger community. “I want to 48th Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom. In February recognize the enormous contributions 2006, he became Vice Director of Operations at HQ NORAD, Peterson Air Force of my predecessor, Brigadier General Base, Colorado. He subsequently commanded the 53rd Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, from April 2008 to May 2009, and then served as Vice Commander, West. Sheila and I know that we have 14th Air Force, (Air Forces Strategic), Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. He big shoes to fill and as a family we look joined NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger, Norway in August 2010. forward to the adventure. Thank you,” A command pilot, Brigadier General DePalmer has logged over 3,000 hours in he concluded. the F-15C/E, AT-38B, T-38, and T-37 aircraft. His awards and decorations include The incoming Chief of Staff, Brigadier the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Fly- General Steven J. DePalmer assumed his ing Cross, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal with three oak leaf clus- new duties immediately after the Hando- ters, and the Combat Readiness Medal with four oak leaf clusters. ver Ceremony. 

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 13 Interview Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO Kucukaksoy, Inci

Interview: Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer s by hoto P

You have worked in Italy, United King- tractive to current and future member states. ing Audiences to appreciate their JWC dom, and Germany – how does multi- Often we think of transformation as a tech- experience so much that they look forward national experience help you in this job nological leap forward, but really it is more to future interactions with the JWC and and your future endeavours? of a deliberate and disciplined process. Our ACT as a whole. One way to do this is to Working in a multicultural environment can improvements in capability, whether in the be humble, approachable, and credible to be an enlightening experience – you learn areas of lethality or decision-making, are our customers. It also helps to be willing as much about yourself as you do about usually the sum of small improvements in to learn new concepts for accomplishing others. You also learn to see issues from training, tactics, procedures and equip- NATO missions. multiple perspectives, allowing a better as- ment. In the end, transformation requires sessment of the challenges. As member hard work to accomplish. Do you have people that you look for of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) team, guidance or inspiration? I hope to contribute to NATO’s continued What has struck you most about the Yes, I have been lucky to work for and with success in defence and security. Joint Warfare Centre so far? some great leaders – officers, civilians, and The diversity of talent throughout each Divi- enlisted. It seems with every job I learn What experience from them do you con- sion. Given our aggressive Programme of more about leadership and followership sider directly applicable to your position Work, each JWC member is critical to deliv- – both are necessary skills for successful here? ering a quality product to our NATO forces. organizations. I have worked in organizations where op- It is satisfying to see how well everyone erations were distributed geographically pitches in to help make each Joint Warfare Why did you join the Air Force? – the JWC is similar. For instance, this week Centre exercise a success. To serve my country and to see the world. (second week of September) we have per- So far, so good. sonnel directing training at seven different Do you believe that we are making a dif- European locations as part of the NATO ference in theatre in Afghanistan? Who are your favorite writers? Response Force spin-up. We also have the Absolutely. I saw it this week in the feed- David McCullough is a great writer – he JWC personnel in Afghanistan preparing for back provided by personnel who completed definitely does his research. I am now the ISAF Mission Rehearsal Training in No- our first ISAF pre-deployment training pro- reading In the Graveyard of Empires vember. With so much decentralized execu- gramme in Ulsnes. Our objective is for eve- by Seth Jones. It is well documented and tion, it is important to push decision-making ryone to arrive in theatre ready to perform provides a good perspective on the recent to the lowest level to ensure success. their job with only minor updates – I believe history of Afghanistan. we were successful. In your own words, what does NATO’s What are your favorite sports game? transformation mean to you? How would you describe success? I enjoy all sports, but right now I enjoy play- NATO’s transformation is a critical task re- I think of success as achieving an objec- ing soccer and basketball. I also enjoy run- quired to keep the Alliance credible and at- tive or goal with style. We want our Train- ning and hiking – Norway is great for this!

14 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Newcomers

HE CHIEF OF STAFF Hando- ver Ceremony took place at a critical period for the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). As an YOU outcome of the recent Allied A R E TCommand Transformation Peacetime Es- HERE tablishment Review, the Joint Warfare Centre implemented a reorganization effective 1 August 2010, and reassigned some key components of its workforce. The NATO Peacetime Establishment (PE) is known as the document that con- tains North Atlantic Council authorized structure of any NATO body. Endorsed by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Virginia, Norfolk, U.S., the new Peacetime Establishment of the ACT and its subordinate commands aims to maxi- mize operational excellence, and more efficiently discharge resources for trans- formational capabilities such as Lessons Learned, Doctrine, Training and Educa- tion programmes in order for all com- mands to accomplish their respective missions, roles and tasks. New Faces and a New PE Structure By Inci Kucukaksoy for the Joint Warfare Centre JWC PAO

The reorganization aims to utilize the consists of all together 256 posts at the has been the creation of the DCOS Joint best from the Joint Warfare Centre’s Joint Warfare Centre, of those 195 mili- Force Trainer, a three-star General based outstanding workforce and enable it tary filled by 19 NATO Nations and 1 PfP at ACT. To this effect, the Commander to more efficiently and effectively ac- Nation as well as 61 posts for civilians Joint Warfare Centre will be assigned as complish responsibilities as charged by coming from 10 NATO Nations. The big- a two-star General, based in Stavanger, NATO. The new JWC PE establishment gest impact for the Joint Warfare Centre Norway, falling under the pillar of the three-star DCOS Joint Force Trainer in the future. Despite the 8.5% rate of reduction in numbers of military personnel posted to the Joint Warfare Centre, the new JWC PE has further strengthened the focus on Training, Doctrine/Concept Develop- ment and Interoperability. As per the changes, the Operations output is now spread across three Divisions at the Joint Warfare Centre: Joint Training Division (JTD), Joint Exercise Division (JED), and Joint Capability Integration Division

Left: In terms of number of personnel, the French Contingent is one of the largest at the Joint Warfare Centre with the new PE.

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 15 Newcomers

Joint Warfare Centre End State Peacetime Commander Command Group: Establishment (ESPE) JWC 32 posts 2010, 256 posts Special Chief of Director of Advisor Staff Staff

Simulation, Joint Training Joint Exercise Joint Capability Support Division Modelling & C4 Division (59 posts) Division (56 posts) Integration (42 posts) Division (41 posts) Division (26 posts)

(JCID). A large number of General Offic- tures left the rest of the workforce over- and personal life.” Royal Air Force Squad- ers have already taken up their positions stretched. During this period, the Joint ron Leader Bob Dixon said the following: in accordance with the new allocations of Warfare Centre said goodbye and thanks “I, too, am joining the throng of people these posts to each Nation. to Chief of Staff Brigadier General Scott departing the Joint Warfare Centre this The Administrative/Support area is West as well as officers in leadership po- Summer. Thank you to all who have made up of two Divisions: Support Divi- sitions such as British Navy Captain Stu- made my time here rewarding!” Polish sion and SMC4 Division; as well as the Of- art Furness, Chief Joint Exercise Division; Navy Commander Piotr Folta comment- fice of the Director of Staff (DOS) under and Canadian Army Colonel Charles At- ed: “I have enjoyed very much my mili- which falls Functional Areas such as Pub- twood, Chief Joint Training Development tary tour in this beautiful and awesome lic Affairs including Linguistic Services; Division. Since June, farewell messages country. It has been a great privilege Information and Knowledge Management of employees have piled up, all speak- to work with you. I will never forget it.” (IKM), Protocol, Graphics and Registry. ing about their enthusiasm for working While working at the Joint Warfare Cen- and living in Norway. Indeed, for many, tre was a “continuous challenge and an New faces working at the Joint Warfare Centre had amazing opportunity” for Spanish Army Since June this year, the Joint Warfare been an amazing opportunity: Lt Col Luis Garcia-Peris; Turkish Air Force Centre has been challenged with a surge “I leave this beautiful host country Colonel Fidan Yuksel thanked for the “ex- of ‘end-of-tour’ departures and new ar- with fond memories, wonderful experi- cellent work, friendship and the happy rivals: So far, 67 military staff members ences and new friends throughout Eu- memories.” And, Hellenic Navy Com- have left the Centre and 53 newcomers rope and North America,” said U.S. Air mander Dimitris Adamis strongly urged have arrived(1). Although such a situa- Force Lt Col Rich Messina, former COS people to visit Norway: “I will encourage tion is not uncommon in a multinational M/A. German Air Force Lt Col Dieter Stoll, military HQ, there has been an initial said: “My tour in Norway was outstand- (1) The figures are for the Joint Warfare Centre challenge as the high number of depar- ing and highlight of my military career only; it does not include NCSA or NSEs.

Farewell Ceremony for the Command Group personnel, 9 June 2010.

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16 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Above: JWC staff in Afghanistan, April everybody in Greece to visit Norway at excellent opportunity for new person- 2010. Photo by SGM Michel Estrade, least once in their lifetime!” nel to get an overall picture of the Joint FRA A, Joint Exercise Division. There is no doubt that the newcomers Warfare Centre. The information they are high performers and, following their are presented with during the training easily connected and committed. So, in newcomers orientation training where is a good basis to start working in the the end, it is their commitment to the they will be given full exposure to the individual areas.” One of the lectures mission as well as the Centre’s unique Joint Warfare Centre’s Programme of she supported had been TOPFAS, which organizational climate that will boost Work, they will soon excel. The week- is a software tool that helps planners their performance, help creating dy- long Newcomers Training helped to iden- share information between headquarters namic networks for both personal and tify and support Divisional training needs (Strategic, Operational and Tactical) and organizational achievements and make and develop cross-Divisional cooperation. manage planning within their own head- them at least as efficient and productive Constance Benen, Joint Training Division quarters. Even though the Joint Warfare as their predecessors. Every staff mem- Information Manager, who also took part Centre’s Programme of Work is very de- ber is critical to the Joint Warfare Cen- in the Newcomers Training programme, manding, the Centre has created a mis- tre’s mission, which is: promoting and said: “The Newcomers Training is an sion and culture to which employees feel conducting NATO’s joint and combined Training, Experimentation, Doctrine De- velopment and Evaluation to maximise transformational synergy and improve

Left: Lt General Korte, Commander JWC, adresses the staff during the Newcomers Training. Below: Constance Benen, JTD Information Manager.

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 17 Newcomers

NATO’s capabilities and interoperability. Congratulations and Welcome to the Joint Warfare Centre! We wish you every success and hope that you will enjoy a Joint Warfare Centre fulfilling career with us. The Joint War- ULSNES fare Centre in Stavanger is a great place to live and work! 

ISAF 10/01

way JWC does business is that we have any other. For us this change is a great Interview a clear mission and some very clear strength as it creates a constant flow of Colonel Colin Nobbs, outputs that are linked to sustaining the new manpower, which if we have writ- GBR A, Chief Support Division ISAF mission and delivering transfor- ten our job descriptions properly, brings mation. Whilst the demand on all of the those with current operational level ex- What is the impact staff within the JWC are high, we deliver perience into the staff. Recent operation- of the new PE on because we apply a remarkable degree al level experience is the building block the Joint Warfare of flexibility, common sense and prag- of any warfare centre staff. In essence, Centre (JWC)? matism to the way we man our structure. it is the insights that those who have Since formation, we If we could do anything to improve, it actually been there coupled with the have been working would perhaps be to better understand ethos of JWC, that adds value to those on a series of in- what we are not doing. on or about to deploy on operations. The terim establishment turbulence can of course be seen as a Col Nobbs tables. Therefore, in Do you believe it is a challenge or an weakness, which we mitigate by invest- many ways the impact of the new PE is opportunity to have so many new peo- ing time and resources into our induction minimal in that it simply aligns the struc- ple in a work environment at once? training and by having a coherent con- ture we are all used to with the official Every military organization, be it national tinuity plan for key tasks. Furthermore, PE. However, a NATO PE is a long term or NATO, accepts turnover as a fact of in posts where we perceive the need for view of our structure and it will therefore life as all nations move their military continuity, rather than recent operational never be completely aligned to current manpower on a regular basis. Within experience, we look to use non military outputs. In practical terms, the trick is Joint Warfare Centre the cumulative manpower. It is for this reason that the therefore to understand the pressures affect of all the different national tour number of NATO civilians has increased created between the PE, the current length policies is that about 25% of the in the last review. Unfortunately, we have outputs and the Nations’ manning poli- military personnel turnover every year. failed to co-ordinate the removal of the cies in order to maximize our ability to This year, once the changes that result military manpower and the recruiting of deliver the Commander’s outputs. So from the introduction of the new PE the NATO civilians and it is this which for me one of the great strengths of the are excluded, is actually no worse than has increased our turbulence this year.

18 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Training

A RETROSPECTIVE , JED, JWC. , JED, ; SSG Brandon Chhoeun, Media Simulation Section Brandon ; SSG Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO Kucukaksoy, Inci s by s by hoto P and some thoughts FOR THE FUTURE…

By Capt Stuart B Furness, GBR N Former Chief Joint Exercise Division Joint Warfare Centre acters and enthusiastic people, and one worthy of a little reflection.

Introduction Achievements Military life is one of constant change, I have had the real pleasure to lead a both personal and professional, and as Division of 72 multinational military of- “I believe Joint Warfare I approach the end of my tour as the ficers from all services, NATO civilians Centre is set to continue Chief of the Joint Exercise Division at the and scenario contractors with a remit to to run exercises using the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), it’s time to develop exercises to prepare NATO and wealth of experience it has reflect on an enjoyable and profession- Partner personnel for operational duty, accumulated even as we all ally rewarding appointment. I would not either immediately in the case of ISAF rotate to our next positions.” suggest that it’s all roses in the garden Mission Rehearsal Events (MREs) or for of NATO exercises, but it’s certainly an standby periods in the case of NATO Re- interesting area to work in; full of char- sponse Force (NRF) exercises.

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 19 Training

My five Exercise Planning Teams, led ercise Media Section. I choose the term Changes by the Officers of Primary Responsibil- ‘Grey Cell’, rather than the more tradition- Founded in 2003, Joint Warfare Centre ity (OPRs), have successfully coordi- al ‘White Cell’, because it now includes now has a wealth of NRF/ISAF exercise nated with SHAPE, HQ SACT, HQ ISAF, not just exercise International and Non- experience. Some of the changes I have ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the NRF Governmental Organizations (IOs and seen since 2007 are: headquarters that rotate between Joint NGOs), Governmental Organizations and [Force] Commands (JFCs) Brunssum, Police, but also Role Players from many 1) Three-level NRF exercises. The focus Lisbon and Naples, and their support- other non-NATO entities in the real world for training remains on the Operational ing Air, Land and Maritime Component of Afghanistan and the NRF world of (JFC) level for JWC exercises, but more Commands, to deliver eight NRF (termed Cerasia. Cerasia is the detailed fictitious exercise activity has been generated for ‘STEADFAST’) exercises and seven ISAF world developed by the Scenario Section the Strategic (SHAPE) and the Compo- MREs. We have trained approximately and used during STEADFAST exercises for nent levels. 1,500 personnel in each NRF exercise non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. and 300–500 personnel in each ISAF The Cerasia scenario is highly regarded 2) Two-level ISAF exercises. The stand-up MRE. My exercise role was as the Chief and has also been adapted for use by of the IJC has changed the focus of the of the 400-strong Exercise Control Cen- many NATO Nations and commands for ISAF MREs. They now concentrate on tre (EXCON), the behind-the-scenes cen- their own exercises. the IJC staff, while retaining training for tre that ‘runs’ the exercise. And for all Finally, I have seen increased coordi- the lower number of HQ ISAF person- exercises but one, where we deployed to nation of the reduced resources (people nel. To balance this, in September 2010, Kabul to support the short notice train- and budget) as a host of NATO meet- JWC ran the first (and pilot) Individual ing of the new HQ IJC last October, this ings, most notably the Steering Group on Augmentees Pre-Deployment Training Centre was based in Ulsnes in Norway. Exercise, Training, Education and Evalu- (IAPDT) event, which gave priority to Ulsnes is an old Norwegian naval base, ation (SG ETEE), the Exercise Scenario HQ ISAF personnel. now used as our Interim Training Facil- Management Board (ESMB) and the ity, and I really liked working there. It Five-Year Military Training and Education 3) Exercise Planning Conferences. I was had that ‘deployed’ look and feel, and Programme (MTEP) Working Groups. involved in NATO’s exercises about 10 could easily be configured exactly as we Our inputs to these meetings has been years ago and a standing comment then wanted, given the constant support of well coordinated following the setting up was that most Final Coordination Con- our top-notch support, communications of the JWC-wide and JED-led Resources ferences were like Initial Planning Con- and simulation personnel. and Planning Team (RAPT). ferences. I believe that Joint Warfare My Exercise Support Branch has been Centre’s experience, and the new role equally busy developing scenarios, build- of Officer Directing the Exercise (ODE), ing up a Grey Cell and running an Ex- have meant that each JWC OPR knows

We have trained approx. 1,500 personnel in each NRF exercise and 300–500 personnel in each ISAF MRE.

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20 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Training

Joint Warfare Centre

exactly what is required at each event ing comment of those commands partici- together with a host of role players, sim- and can now make more decisions and pating in an exercise afterwards is that ulating functions as diverse as local May- accomplish more coordination. “you get out of it what you put in” and ors and port authorities to Cerasia Union the involvement of their training staffs in leaders, together with a Media Section 4) Scenario Information. The requirement MEL/MIL Scripting pays real dividends. I with the look and feel of a major news to provide supporting scenario data has believe we have made real progress in channel. increased dramatically. Reacting to the more sophisticated (and intense) MEL/ requirements from the exercise partici- MILs through dialogue with participating 7) Lower Control (LOCON) Response Cells. pants, I believe we now provide more commands. Going into any exercise, one of my main structured and significantly more de- concerns was the numbers and skill sets tailed information. 6) Grey Cell. In 2007, we were faced with in the LOCON Response Cells. These are the situation of a semi-formal protest staffs, provided by the exercise Compo- 5) Master Events List/Master Incidents List by the UN participants, as we had in- nent Commands, to replicate their subor- (MEL/MIL). The MEL/MIL drives exercise vited them to an NRF exercise and then dinate formations and forces (i.e. receive activity. It is based on the JFC’s exercise couldn’t give them access to the exer- and issue orders and reports). They also Training Objectives, or in the case of cise computer systems. Today, we have provide the ‘atmospherics’ of in-theatre ISAF, the Training Specification. Consid- arguably achieved the Comprehensive activity, plan and implement the move- erable effort has been made to ensure it Approach in our exercises, and replicate ment of the forces in the simulation does not just concentrate on short term the interaction that NATO’s forces would systems, maintain the ‘ground truth’ “ops” activity, but provides something encounter when deployed into a theatre, through coordination with the Exercise for all the branches and staff elements with over 40 percent of the MEL/MIL for Control Centre and coordinate with the throughout all levels, notably the new NRF exercises coming from a 50-strong other Response Cells. This is particu- split Joint Headquarters following de- Grey Cell. This consists of IO and NGO larly important for injects such as Time velopment of the NRF Deployable Joint personnel, including former UN Ambas- Sensitive Targeting (TST). Less formally, Staff Element (DJSE) concept. An endur- sadors and retired three-star officers, they give the MEL/MIL injects their final

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 21 Training

NRF Exercise Cycle. The introduc- tion of SACEUR’s Annual Guidance on ETEE (SAGE) has been welcomed by the exercise community, but I believe that the exercise planning process would benefit from a careful study in order to create more room for clear direction, de- lineation of responsibilities and creative thinking. Some thoughts are:

MTEP: The utility of this document could be enhanced with the addition of the aim and scenario to each exercise. As an example, this would allow an From left: Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, Advisor to the Commander JWC; Royal Air Force Air incoming NRF Commander to have an Marshal Christopher Harper, Deputy Commander Joint Force Command Brunssum; Lieutenant Gen- oversight of where he is exercising the eral Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre and Lt Col Antonio Barone, JWC. various types of operations he could be called upon to command, i.e. where review to take account of daily changes of personnel in the Exercise Centre and is he exercising Crisis Response Opera- and propose new injects to ensure their Training Teams, and reduced daily JWC tions and where is he exercising higher Components is achieving as much train- activities in areas such as Concept and intensity conflict operations? It could ing from the exercise as possible. Having Doctrine Development and Experimenta- also show the consistency of scenario the whole LOCON based in Ulsnes is re- tion across the whole JWC. Of note, the use between NRF STEADFAST exer- quired to ensure a coherent exercise, but SMEs for ISAF MREs are provided by HQ cises and the associated Component providing their LOCON Response Cell is a ISAF, HQ IJC and personnel recently from certification exercises. Additionally, I struggle for many Component headquar- theatre. This is a complicated task that is would propose more detailed consid- ters. JWC knowledge of past structures, only achieved through constant dialogue eration, in the MTEP, of the MEL/MIL where risk (gaps!) can be taken and con- and pays huge dividends for the incom- Scripting Events as these invariably stant dialogue has proved invaluable. ing personnel. create programming challenges dur- ing the HQ SACT-led Collective Train- 8) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). The origi- — So to sum up, as a consequence of ing Support Programme of Work (CTS nal training facilities Capability Package these changes, we have achieved better POW) discussions and subsequent re- saw JWC providing the Operational Level planned, more dynamic, more intense visions to the MTEP. training, and the Joint Force Training exercises involving more commands and Centre (JFTC) the Tactical Level. Unsur- use a high percentage of the whole JWC Documentation: Here, I believe prisingly, given its size and tasking, JFTC for each exercise. that one exercise order that matures is now dedicated to ISAF training, which throughout the process, combining the has required JWC to provide SMEs to the Requirements current Exercise Specification, Exercise Component Training Teams. This has To quote the comic Bill Bailey “I’m Eng- Planning Guidance and Exercise Plan been achieved to a large extent for most lish, therefore I crave disappointment,” and would considerably reduce duplication exercises, but required careful balancing in the Introduction, I mentioned that, and provide clearer direction. In any in my personal opinion, there are a event there is a need for a reduction in number of significant demands yet to the overlap between those documents be achieved and adjustments that could and the removal of unnecessary infor- ease the current bureaucratic processes. mation (e.g. repetition of HQ Operat- Before getting into details, I would high- ing Procedures). light that JWC has limited resources but considerable enthusiasm, so my impres- Phases: The various phases of the sion is that we can achieve ‘anything but STEADFAST exercise cycle could do not everything’, and for future exercise with a little Standardization: planners, including those involved in any • Phase 1b (Academics)/1c (Key future ETEE review, I would urge you to Leader Training). Phase 1b aims to build your plans on ‘realities not dreams’ conduct team building on current and consider all three elements of the practices, new Doctrine and Con- Laura Loflin DuBois of World News Today. ‘ends, ways and means’ triangle. cepts and Best Practices. It is oc-

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22 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Training

Article 5 Exercises. I suspect that the scenario information dilemma will become clear during development of the Article 5 scenario “SKOLKAN” due in 2012. There is well known desire for increased kinetic activity in NRF exercises and that will drive the next step change in scenario information requirements. I suspect it will also drive a sharp increase in the size of the LOCON Response Cells, and there is the unexplored area of Joint War- fare Centre’s role in any future Article 5 Live Exercise (LIVEX).

 Infrastructure Capacity. There is ENDEX for STEADFAST Juncture 10, which was then followed by a Coin Ceremony. a desire to increase the size of the Train- ing Audience in ISAF MREs, in particular casionally confused with ‘refresher duce NATO Response Force activity. the number of Individual Augmentees training’ and would ideally be com- deploying to both HQ ISAF and HQ IJC. bined with Phase 1c. 24/7 Exercises. The well-known ‘train There is an (as yet) unknown limit to as you fight’ desire is mentioned for the Training Audience size in JWC’s new • Phase 2 (Crisis Response Planning). every exercise. The current compro- building, which will be in use for training The length and outputs from this mise of long days for the Exercise Con- from 2012/3, and any subsequent need Phase vary considerably from JFC to trol staff matches available resources for temporary exercise facilities. JFC. The DJSE concept would sug- and does not prevent overnight Train- gest a standardisation of this phase. ing Audience activity. Full 24/7 exercise  Grey Cell. We still have a way to go activity would come with a manpower to satisfy all desires for the Grey Cell in • MEL/MIL Development. JWC is not bill that is unknown and its availability ISAF MREs as getting the right people always able to support the JFC in is not readily apparent. from Afghanistan, outside NATO com- Phase 1d (Battle Staff Training) due mands, is still a real challenge. to overlapping events in the MTEP, Scenario Information. Recent devel- but combining the development of opments to NATO’s functional serv- Conclusion the MEL/MIL for the Phase 1d, the ices (or ‘software’) have meant that In the past, I’ve handed over staff jobs Phase 3b (Execution) and the rela- the delivery of Scenario Information with the comment that “in six months tively new and successful ‘Warm-Up’ to support effective Operational Level you will not have the same job that I period at the start of Phase 3b ap- training requires greater Tactical Level did”. I’m sure that is still true and I wish pears to offer considerable advan- information. This has been particularly my successor Col ‘Pep’ Jeffrey Devore, tages and best use of resources. It noticeable in the Logistics and Intel- USAF, all the best. In conclusion, despite will be tricky to arrange, but nomi- ligence communities, with the Knowl- my theme that we should be looking nated lead officers from the JFC for edge Development (KD) concept wait- for realities not dreams, I believe Joint Phase 1d and the ‘Warm-Up’, em- ing impatiently in the wings. I believe Warfare Centre is set to continue to run bedded in the MEL/MIL planning, this is a classic case of ‘realities’ rather exercises using the wealth of experience seems not unreasonable. than ‘dreams’ as Cerasia is fictitious, it has accumulated even as we all rotate there are no real forces, no actual to our next positions. This tour has been  Personnel. country, no real people, no World Wide a fascinating insight into managing ‘ac- MTEP Programme. The reduction Web and it’s down to the 15 people tivities’ and ‘characters’ and one that I from three to two STEADFAST exercis- in the Scenario Section to write all the have tho roughly enjoyed. I would like to es per year in 2009 was a direct result information for all JWC exercises each thank all I have interacted with over the of JWC’s capacity to absorb increasing year. As I noted earlier, Cerasia has last three years for your leadership, sup- requirements and a reduced Peacetime been adapted by many commands for port and camaraderie. I will not say fare- Establishment (PE). Additional require- their own uses and JWC does ask for well as I hope to take up a NATO civilian ments, particularly those relating to the revised scenario information to be position in the office of the Joint Force support to current operations, or any sent back. That helps, but there is a Trainer in HQ SACT in the near future further reduction in PE, will swing JWC limit on what can be produced and that and to continue to work with you all in in the same direction as JFTC, and re- has limit has yet to be fully scoped. NATO’s ‘exercise’ community. 

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 23 STEADFAST JUNCTURE 10

NRF 15: first revised NRF rotation

By Inci Kucukaksoy JWC PAO

XERCISE STEADFAST JUNC- been designed that is capable of provid- tional Level command element in theatre TURE 10 (a NATO joint deci- ing a rapid demonstration of force and that acts as an extended arm of the sta- sion-making and Command the early establishment of NATO military tionary headquarters in Europe; Post [CPX]/Computer Assisted presence in support of an Article 5 or Cri- — reduced overall force size of 13,000 [CAX] exercise), started on 3 sis Response Operation. Lieutenant Colo- troops resulting from a restructured EMay 2010 with the preparation phase nel Andreas Heselschwert explained in force and more differentiated unit readi- and continued until 15 May 2010 simul- EUROCORPS magazine (Issue No: 108) ness requirements. taneously at seven locations. The exer- that the main NRF mission remains the The revised NRF construct is built on cise trained expeditionary forces of the same: fast demonstration of NATO pres- the operational Command and Control NATO Response Force (NRF 15). ence and the provision of capabilities to that includes: a DJSE, the Immediate The exercise was sponsored by Allied support an Article 5 or a Crisis Response Response Force (IRF) with pre-designat- Command Transformation (ACO) and tai- Operation. However, he added, the main ed forces and the Response Forces Pool lored within the constraint of a Smaller features of the new concept as: (RFP) which complements the basis. As Joint Operation as a result of the changes — new Command and Control structure mentioned, the IRF, which is the core of within the NRF concept. According to the at the Operational Level with a Deploy- the revised NRF, may be comprised of up revised NRF concept, effective from July able Joint Staff Element (DJSE) designed to 14,000 troops. Although the imple- 2009, a smaller-scale force structure has to ensure the fast presence of an Opera- mentation plan is in progress, the NRF

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24 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 STEADFAST JUNCTURE 10

15 rotation was the first to be run en- DJSE exercise; FC Madrid’s fourth time tirely within the revised concept. acting as the Forward Element. The ex- NRF 15 FORCE COMPOSITION Exercise STEADFAST Juncture 10 in- ercise was conducted on all three main • Joint Force Command Brunssum volved 2,500 military and civilian per- levels: Strategic, Operational and Tacti- (Lead HQ) and Force Command sonnel from various headquarters and cal. The exercise locations were: Valda- Madrid (DJSE); units assigned to or supporting the 15th hon, France (main exercise location with • Air Component Command Izmir rotation of the NATO Response Force, over 1,000 participants); Joint Warfare (CC-Air Izmir); • French High Readiness Force Mari- which covers the period from 1 July to Centre’s Ulsnes Interim Training Facility, time Headquarters (MCC); 31 December 2010. The exercise was Stavanger, Norway (Exercise Centre with • HQ EUROCORPS; designed to train, validate and certify the 300 participants); Brunssum, the Neth- • Turkish Special Operations Compo- Command and Control elements dedicat- erlands (Commander NRF 15); Mons, nent Command and other Augmen- tees; ed to the NRF 15 (NRF force activation, Belgium (SHAPE); Toulon, France (F.S. • other joint enablers for CBRN and tailoring, force generation and deploy- Mistral, French Navy); Izmir, Turkey (Joint PSYOPS. ment) in a joint environment as well as Force Air Command) and Larissa, Greece to train and evaluate the DJSE concept. (Combined Air Operations Centre). NRF-assigned headquarters and forces It ultimately aimed to test NATO’s expe- As always, the exercise was based on in a fictitious exercise scenario (CERASIA ditionary capabilities (from initial deploy- Exercise Objectives. To test these, EXCON II) in which the NATO force is deployed ment of operational Command and Con- had 302 incidents with a total number of in support of UN mandated peacekeep- trol, through deployment and expansion 1,061 injects. Some of the other support- ing operation in compliance with a UN- of forces in theatre) within the revised ing exercise objectives included planning SCR (an expeditionary NATO-led Crisis NRF concept to provide the Alliance with and executing a Crisis Response Opera- Response Operation conducted under a credible operational capabilities and a tion with support from Chemical, Biologi- Chapter VII of the UN Charter beyond crisis management tool. cal, Radiological and Nuclear Joint As- NATO’s geographical area). The fictitious STEADFAST Juncture 10 was conducted sesment Team (CBRN-JAT); practicing scenario is based on extensive challeng- by General Egon Ramms, German Army, NATO intelligence capabilities; exercising es related to an asymmetric environment the then Commander Allied Joint Force NATO Theatre Missile Defence; practic- (including security and environmental Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum). ing multinational medical support and threats, piracy, interaction with key lead- JFC Brunssum currently leads NRF 15 meteorological and oceanographic func- ers and contingency planning) as well as and it is one of the three Operational tions; exercising CIS linkages; integrat- the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Level NATO Headquarters that is capable ing media planning within an operation and refugees. In summary, the ultimate of commanding one major and two small in a complex asymmetric environment aim of the exercise was to develop the operations concurrently. The exercise was as well as improving relationships, in- capabilities and structures of the NATO directed by Lieutenant General Wolfgang teraction and practical cooperation with Response Force as a catalyst for NATO’s Korte, German Army, Commander Joint Partners, Nations and International and transformation and to ensure that the Warfare Centre. STEADFAST Juncture 10 Non-Governmental Organizations. NRF 15 headquarters were well trained was the fourth DJSE exercise with ‘One Overall, the training and exercise and certified to Command and Control HQ’ concept. It was JFC Brunssum’s first events focused on the integration of the missions. 

BACKGROUND: REVISED NRF

Meeting of NATO Chiefs of Defence from more (NRF). As such, the Military and Partner Chiefs of than 40 countries, together with Committee analysed the options Defence, NATO’s Supreme Allied Com- studied in order to make the 6–7 May 2009. mander for Operations and NRF more deployable, sustain- Photos by NATO. NATO’s Supreme Allied Com- able, interoperable and, thus, mander for Transformation, more usable. The operational attended the NATO Military command of the NRF alternates Committee Spring Meetings in among NATO’s Joint (Force) their various sessions over 6 and Command Brunssum, Naples, 7 May 2009, chaired by Admiral and Lisbon. The participation Di Paola, Chairman of NATO’s in the NATO Response Force is Military Committee. Here, preceded by a six-month train- SACEUR updated the Military ing programme, which includes Committee on the ongoing revi- testing the units’ capabilities in sion of NATO Response Force complex exercises.

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 25 STEADFAST JUNCTURE 10

WHAT THE OPRs SAY Exercise planning is all about teamwork, driven by Core Planning Teams at various levels of the organization, each team with an Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR) nominated.

STEADFAST Juncture 10 OPRs at Ulsnes (from left to right): JWC’s Lt Col Fauskrud; ACO’s Cdr Carmona and JFC Brunssum’s Lt Col Jansen.

Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR) the same, the biggest challenges tradi- nominated. The key is good coordination tionally are proper expectation and time and communication. For the STEADFAST as well as resource and consequence Series of Exercises, the most important management. These are the issues that planning teams/groups are: have the highest level of organizational • At the Strategic Level (Officer Sched- involvement and commitment through- uling the Exercise, OSE) at SHAPE, the out the exercise cycle. Lt Col Gunnar Fauskrud, Exercise Planning Group (EPG), which is Following an exercise cycle from NOR A, JWC responsible for developing the strategic cradle to grave as OPR is like riding a specification and direction in the form roller coaster: you have your fair share “With ENDEX declared 15 May, another of an Exercise Specification (EXSPEC); of ups and downs. So what is there to STEADFAST exercise was completed • At the Operational Level (Officer say about SFJE 10? The final exercise and a new NRF rotation ready to start Conducting the Exercise, OCE) at one numbered 2,500 participants gathered their standby period. For exercise plan- of the JFC/JC HQ, the Core Planning at seven locations across Europe. This ners, a one-year exercise cycle was over. Team (CPT), which is responsible for three-level (Strategic, Operational, Tacti- Remaining is the all important Stage 4 the process leading up to the develop- cal) event involved a Training Audience (Post Exercise Analysis and Reporting), ment of the Exercise Plan (EXPLAN); of 1,750 from more than ten headquar- which provides a basis for lessons and • At the JWC Level (Officer Directing ters. The Exercise Control organization improvements to feed into future exer- the Exercise, ODE), the Exercise Plan- alone numbered 450. Prior to Phase 3- cises. The support of the NRF STEAD- ning Team (EPT), which is responsible CPX in May, the Training Audience com- FAST Series of Exercises (SFS) is a never for coordinating various defined exer- pleted a Phase 1B ‘Academic Seminar’ in ending story with the JWC supporting a cise support and training aspects linked January, a Phase 2 ‘Crisis Response Plan- rolling exercise and training programme to the execution of the exercise. ning’ in February, and a Phase 1D ‘Battle and conducting a set of repeatable train- Staff Training’ in March. In addition, all ing and exercise events. Exercise plan- As a process, exercise planning is not so the Component Commands (CC) final- ning is all about teamwork, driven by complicated. The methodology to follow ized their CC level certification exercises Core Planning Teams at various levels is well documented in the Exercise Direc- in March/April. SFJE 10 combined train- of the organization, each team with an tive Bi-SC 75-3. Although no exercise is ing with exercises, and evaluation with

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26 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 STEADFAST JUNCTURE 10

certification in a package. From an exer- training objectives achieved. I would like tives defined by the Strategic Command, cise planner’s perspective, there were a to take this opportunity to express my Allied Command Operations. On that, I number of things that made this exercise gratitude to all planners and participants could rely within SHAPE, with the ex- special and challenging: for the support they provided through cellent support of my Exercise Planning • SFJE 10 was the first time JFC HQ the planning, preparation and execution Group, as well as with the close coopera- Brunssum trained the new Deployable in order to make this happen. tion and collaboration of the Operational Joint Staff Element concept in a Joint Now, as I am rotating out of the JWC Command (JFC Brunssum) and the Offic- Headquarters structure, simultaneously after seven years, I leave with good feel- er Directing the Exercise (JWC). Reach- exercising a major and a smaller Joint Op- ings and the strong conviction that the ing the end of the exercise gives me a eration (ISAF/NRF). With SFJE 10, all of JWC will be able to provide high quality great satisfaction because you know that the three operational headquarters gained training in the years to come. The key you contributed to the operational readi- experience with the new concepts. to success is to continuously refine the ness of the NATO Response Force HQs • SFJE 10 was the first time the new product to ensure it stays focused and and thus to strengthening NATO’s pre- Cooperative Operative Planning Directive remains relevant and sustainable. I be- paredness for future operations.” was practised during Phase 2 in support lieve achieving a better balance of am- of the three-level operational planning, bitions and available resources and sup- using the new version of the TOPFAS port will be a good start. When it comes planning tool. In addition, the Operation- to ambitions, focusing more on ‘tailoring al Liaison and Reconnaissance Team con- to the need’ rather than on perfection cept was practised as part of Phase 2. may be helpful. I wish you good luck and • SFJE 10 was on an extremely tight all the best for the future.” January-April timeline. As a result of the aim of the OSE, which was to replicate Lt Col Frank J.T. Jansen, JFC BR as many of the activities and processes leading up to a deployment as realisti- “During SFJE 10, JFC Brunssum had to cally as possible, the last four months do justice to the responsibility of leading prior to the CPX in May saw little or no two operations at the same time because headspace between individual delivera- the ISAF operation is an ongoing process bles and events. This posed a challenge in JFC Brunssum. SFJE 10 was the first both for the planners and the support. time that JFC Brunssum could train with a Deployed Forward Element from FC Cdr Pedro Carmona, ACO Despite some limitations due to various Heidelberg. It takes more than planning operational limitations and priorities af- “Planning a major joint exercise becomes to bring an exercise to a good end. In my fecting the participation and augmen- a living process that lasts a little more opinion ‘commitment’ is the magic word. tation of the exercise organization, my than one year. An enormous effort is This commitment, together with the ex- general impression is that SFJE 10 was required to coordinate all the details for cellent support of the JWC resulted in a a success, with most of the exercise and the achievement of the exercise objec- very good NRF certification exercise.”

The best time to take a picture: ENDEX!

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 27 ISAF 10/01

ISAF 10/01 Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF) and ISAF Joint Command (HQ IJC) Mission Rehearsal Training Event (ISAF TE 10/01) took place at the Joint Warfare Centre’s Ulsnes Interim Training Facility from 10-25 June 2010 with the participation of more than 800 service members from HQ Rapid Reaction Corps-France; Force Command HQ Heidelberg and United States Army V Corps. Following interviews were made during the exercise. (Photos by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO and HQ Rapid Reaction Corps-France PAO.)

BACKGROUND: ISAF TE 10/01 was the Our success was a direct result of four last and most extensive training session of main factors: detailed planning between several conducted so far this year by the Joint Force Command Brunssum, Joint Allied forces for their July deployment to Warfare Centre, HQ ISAF and ISAF Joint Afghanistan and it was designed to repli- Command Staff; stringent preparation by cate the misson in theatre. The planning with the Subject Matter Experts coming the French Rapid Reaction Corps, Force process started at the beginning of Feb- from the two theatre headquarters (HQ Command Heidelberg and United States ruary in close coordination between Joint ISAF and HQ ISAF Joint Command). Ger- Army V Corps; high participation rate of Force Command Brunssum, HQ ISAF and man Army Lieutenant General Wolfgang individual augmentees and invaluable the Joint Warfare Centre. The exception- Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre, mentoring by Flag and Field Grade of- al training results was mostly due to the said: “All training objectives are achieved ficers who currently serve, or recently meticulous planning and coordination during the Mission Rehearsal Training. served, in Afghanistan.” 

28 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Q&A cheaper but lower in quality. In fact, a $200 Elizabeth Mader million tender for combat boots has just closed this week and will be awarded to Economic Officer at the U.S. two to four Afghan firms. Embassy in Kabul At the U.S. Embassy, we’ve also begun purchasing and commissioning as much What is your impression about ISAF 10/01 as possible locally. For example we’ve Training Event so far? worked with local woodworkers to pro- I’m honoured to be part of this training ex- duce office and residential furniture, help- ercise, both to prepare the Training Audi- ing these woodworkers hone their skills. ence and also as an opportunity to meet so With profits earned, their companies have many interesting people. I wish I could have invested in better equipment, positioning done this earlier during my tour in Kabul, of themselves to take on even bigger con- course, then I wouldn’t be as useful here! tracts in the future. USAID hires Afghans My role is to represent the diplomatic com- and contracts with Afghan firms in the munity, as well as other role-playing as re- roads, energy, vertical construction, and quired. As a regional Subject Matter Expert, agriculture sectors. For example, USAID’s I’m also pleased to have the chance to in- Elizabeth Mader Strategic Provincial Roads Programme teract with the Training Audience on issues employs 5,500 Afghans who are building such as energy, roads, water, agriculture, goods and services. In many cases local nearly a thousand kilometres of roads. All and natural resources. products and services may already meet design and construction contracts go to Af- the standards of imported alternatives, or ghan firms and include hands-on training Any remarks for the soon-deploying staff? with focused and sustained effort they may in how to meet international quality stand- If I could deliver only one message to the be raised to world standards. ards. Construction contracts require that Training Audience, it would be to reach This policy enables procurement offic- 70 percent of the workers be local, which out to other organizations, including the ers to favor Afghan vendors over other spreads the employment and training ben- Afghan Government, other countries’ Em- competitors. For smaller contracts they efits across the country. bassies, and NGOs. Very often, someone can reach out directly to Afghan suppli- Nearly one thousand Afghans have else has been doing the same job, con- ers to do business. For larger contracts worked on the new 105 megawatt power sidering the same issue, or answering they can limit the competition to Afghan plant in Tarakhil (Kabul) under the USAID the same questions for years. You don’t firms or firms that employ a majority of Af- Energy Programme. In addition, 28 Afghan have to start from zero! Share information ghan citizens. Acquiring more goods and operators, engineers and mechanics have whenever you can. Maybe you have a new services from Afghan companies boosts been trained on plant operation and man- report and I have a useful contact: if we employment, and fosters the competition agement. The power plant is now com- can pool our information, we both end up and entrepreneurial spirit essential to a pleted and ownership of the plant will be with better analysis. Learn from other peo- growing free market economy. Promoting transferred to the Afghan government in a ple’s mistakes so you don’t have to make and encouraging the purchase of Afghan Handover Ceremony on June 27. The train- them yourself, and build on other people’s products and development of the Afghan ees, along with Afghans who have worked successes for the good of the mission and labour force directly contributes to our mu- with the U.S. contractor to build and oper- Afghanistan. tual goal of building long-term peace and ate the plant, have become the core plant prosperity in this country. Local procure- work force. In addition, USAID will link its What is the “Afghan First” initiative? ment on the military side is booming with procurement process to the United States This is a particularly good time to discuss projects like those through the U.S.-led Department of Defense tendering website, Afghan First, since the first anniversary of Combined Security Transition Command which will allow the two agencies to pool the policy is approaching. The Afghan First – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and its work information and vet contractors using the policy encourages local procurement of Af- with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and same standard leading to a more transpar- ghan products to benefit and improve the Afghan National Police (ANP) – which ent and effective procurement process. well-being of the Afghan people. Greater purchases 156,000 uniforms per month. An Afghan First website will also soon local procurement by military and civilian Afghans perform the cutting, sewing and be launched. AfghanFirst.org will offer a programmes serves the mutual interests of finishing on the products. Six Afghan local consolidated ‘how to’ website that will in- both our countries. Afghan firms can often manufactures share the contract, with 300 clude all available solicitations from the provide goods and services with compa- to 600 employees each. CSTC-A is now official United States contracting website rable quality, at competitive prices. With a buying boots in country as well. These FedBizOpps.gov. The new site will also be shorter supply chain, local procurement is boots price at $60-65/pair in Afghanistan available in Dari and Pashto and contain often the best way for the buyer to maxi- compared to $80-100 in the United States. available opportunities with a synopsis of mize value and timely delivery of needed Imported boots from Pakistan or China are solicitations to make the process easier for

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 29 ISAF 10/01

prospective bidders, definitions of what con- stitutes an Afghan business, specifications Grey Cell meeting on how to submit a proposal, and links to related websites. Currently, we see more civilian-military co- operation. Do you think this is a result of a more cohesive approach in Afghanistan? I definitely think we are benefiting from an increasingly cohesive and integrated approach in Afghanistan. There are chal- lenges as we all work more closely, but the benefits outweigh the occasional growing- pains. To give insights into civilian-military cooperation, I’d like to provide a bit of [U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan], Karl Eiken- berry’s June 11 speech to the Command and General Staff College Graduation Cer- emony (the entire speech can be found at or later the military will go home, but the ci- work with you but not for you. Once you’re http://kabul.usembassy.gov): vilian work will continue. Your job is to syn- in country, invite civilians to your meetings, Ambassador Eikenberry on chronize the military need for speed and and go to theirs. Remember that, like you,  Civil-Military Cooperation: the diplomat’s and development expert’s they are professionals far from home, ap- need for anchored, long-term impact. By plying their skills to build a safer world. I «In Afghanistan, we use a Dari language the way: that is not to say that soldiers can tell you that the civilian-military part- term to refer to the close, mutually support- can’t and don’t use diplomatic tools as nership has definitely improved since 2007 ive partnership that exists between ISAF well. In Afghanistan, our military attend when I was last in Afghanistan. Our closer and Afghan forces: ‘Shohna ba Shohna,’ local Shuras with tribal and village elders, collaboration is already having an impact, or ‘Shoulder to Shoulder.’ I think that term, and listen to their grievances. These are and I look for even greater results in the that commitment to support each other, valuable engagements and help establish months ahead. Like the military, we are also applies to the way our military and trust. But an Afghan farmer who looks at a experiencing a tremendous civilian surge. civilians must partner to bring enduring se- soldier sees the uniform, sees the weap- By January 2011, we will have tripled the curity – and the accountable governance on, and is understandably uncomfortable, number of civilians we had on the ground and economic development that anchors no matter how adept that soldier may be at as recently as August 2009. But, I under- it – to Afghanistan. Our military and civil- establishing rapport. The civilian in jeans stand that there are those who are wary ian personnel do not and should not play and tennis shoes may well be able to set of truly partnering with civilians in the bat- identical roles in Afghanistan, but none the tone for a less threatening, more pro- tlespace. One reason is the misconception of us can accomplish our mission there ductive engagement. And he or she can that civilians only get in the way when the without our partners in the fight. Now in bring years of specific expertise to bear going gets rough. Yet civilians share the any partnership, there are bound to be when speaking with Afghan interlocutors. dangers of indirect fire and IEDs. As the differences in perspective, in outlook, and So, my second piece of advice is to see Ambassador, I make a point of calling our in approach. I’d like to share some of my your civilian counterparts as empowered civilians when I hear they have been in a thoughts about these differences with you partners who complement your work, and convoy under attack or on the receiving – why they genuinely strengthen us. welcome them as part of your engagement end of rocket fire. When I ask them how First, let’s talk about differences in team. Take them with you, and provide the they’re doing, the answer is always hum- speed. While the military is ready to ad- security they need to do their jobs. Another bling, typically, ‘Thanks for calling, Ambas- vance at mach speed, at times diplomats difference I’d like to talk about is language. sador, but I’m just here doing my part.’ must take a more nuanced approach – we Speaking from first hand experience there So, my fourth piece of advice is: don’t move at the speed of trust. So my first is a real civilian-military language barrier, worry that diplomats, or development or piece of advice to you is to understand and and, trust me, it has nothing to do with Dari agriculture experts won’t step up to the appreciate these differences in approach or Pashto. Use English, not professional plate when you need them; they will. I be- and perspective. Throttling back to con- jargon or acronyms, when speaking with lieve that we now have the right pieces in sult fully with your civilian partners – not your civilian counterparts. place. We have the right strategy, we have to mention our Afghan friends, upon whom My third piece of advice is build personal the right balance of troops, and we have success in Afghanistan must, of course, ul- relationships. Talk often and communicate. the right resources available or on the way. timately rest – will prove in the long run to Drink coffee with the civilians who share And we have the right partnership between be the faster way to lasting victory. Sooner your battlespace, and remember they our military and civilians, and with the Af- ►►►

30 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 ISAF 10/01

ghan Government. As the military effort in What are your expectations from ISAF Afghanistan ratchets down our civilian ef- 10/01 Training Event? forts will ratchet up. As our U.S., Afghan I expect that at the end of this training, all and Coalition Forces create stability, our of the participants will have a good working civilians will expand the governance and knowledge of what is expected from them development efforts that will allow lasting in theatre. The training brings together the stability to take root. soldiers from the French Rapid Reaction Both the civilians and military must rely Corps, FC Heidelberg and the V Corps. It on each other — without one, the other will allow them to enhance team building, can make no lasting headway. So, I advise communications, cooperation and leader- you to embrace this partnership, because ship between them. When they deploy to without it, you may be spending a lot more Afghanistan the team will be able to con- time away from home. In closing, please BG Charles Estes centrate solely on having a productive ‘left remember that we have a lot of work to do, seat/right seat’ ride with the soldier they but I believe that with commitment, with are replacing. courage, shoulder to shoulder with all our Brigadier General partners and with civilian-military unity of Charles Estes, USA A effort, we will succeed in Afghanistan.» Chief of Staff US Army V Corps Protocol meeting Many of the V Corps soldiers are combat experienced. Do you think that might chal- One question lenge the realism of the training? interview with No, being combat trained and being trained HQ ISAF CJ5 Plans to operate as staffs in combat are different skill sets. A lot of the soldiers here are com- — Is there a unity of effort bat trained; they have been on the ground between counter narcotics and fighting the war. However, they still need In your opinion how does COIN fit the and counterinsurgency? the pre-deployment training as it provides problems we face in theatre? deeper working knowledge of a stimulat- I think we have always been fighting a The all-pervading influence of nar- ing headquarters environment. The soldiers counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. cotics corrupts many aspects of Af- will exercise and improve Command and ISAF’s mission is to help Afghanistan ghan life; undermining governance through corruption, funding the Control, Electronic Working Practices, and defeat the insurgency threatening their insurgency, fuelling instability and execute Functional Area Training with Sub- country. It has gotten a new meaning to- discouraging the transition to a licit ject Matter Experts. Simultaneously, they day due to General McChrystal’s change economy. Counter Narcotics activi- are working to enhance their capabilities to of mission. Protecting the Afghan people ties therefore present both challenge respond to future tasks. is the mission. Afghan people will decide and opportunity in our COIN cam- paign. They can be used to counter corruption through a highly effective narcotics judicial process and simul- taneously stress both the insurgen- cies funding and its links and legiti- Information Dominance Centre macy with the population. It equally provides ISAF with the opportunity to consolidate its security gains by con- necting with the population through alternative livelihood programmes. ISAF’s role is to support the Govern- ment of Afghanistan in the applica- tion of its comprehensive National Drugs Control Strategy. In doing this, ISAF seeks to ensure unity of ef- fort between Counter Narcotics and COIN activities to ensure that they remain an accelerant rather than a hindrance to achieving our COIN campaign goals.

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The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 31 ISAF 10/01

who wins the war and together with the Government of Afghanistan we are in a struggle for their support. We will not win the war by killing the insurgents. The aim is to make the people safe, promote good leadership within the Afghan Government that will provide Afghan people necessary things to live a good life and, when neces- sary, kill the Taliban. COIN has always been a kinetic fight. Now, it is more of a humani- tarian fight with kinetics being a secondary or tertiary form of resolving the problem.

What is your message to the troops de- ploying to Afghanistan soon? Be safe. Don’t let your guard down just be- cause you are in a headquarters environ- Functional Area Training ment. Do the job and get back safe.

Afghanistan: Battle of Media Aziz Hakimi, Afghan journalist/Media Subject Matter Expert

Winning hearts and minds is the most crucial Role of the Local Media part of the new war strategy in Afghanistan. There are an increasing number of young Afghans who choose But, this can be difficult to achieve without journalism and reporting as their career and pay attention to the rethinking the role of the media as another details of well-known foreign media in an effort to ensure accuracy front in the battle. Media is an inseparable and impartiality of the media content they produce. It is important, component of Strategic Communication however, to be observant of the fact that the mentality of Afghan and communicating with the Afghan people local journalists about the current affairs in the country is totally dif- whose lives are directly affected by ISAF/ ferent than those of foreign reporters. Their questions can be more Aziz Hakimi NATO’s presence in their country is part of about what affects their target audience, and answering such ques- Strategic Communication. It is estimated tions sometimes can be trickier, as it would require a degree of local that more than 400 print publications, (including at least 20 daily news- knowledge. It is also crucial to ensure that the local media have a papers) 60 local radios and a dozen of TV stations are registered in direct access to ISAF/NATO as a source of information. Publishing Afghanistan. In fact, one can argue that press, as the fourth estate of the press-related information on ISAF/NATO relevant websites with democracy is one of the few most outstanding achievements in the easy-to-remember links, more face-to-face interviews with local past ten years of war. The local radio, TV stations and newspapers media, participation of ISAF media team members in debates and are the only sources of information for the Afghan population. And, talking points can all be effective means of delivering basic but key Afghan mainstream media have a far greater influence over Afghan messages to local population. public opinion than international media. Media handling Tactical and Strategic approaches Afghans are canny users of media and plain news does not satisfy Similar to ISAF/NATO’s press conferences and statements, the them. They want to know what is behind the events. That is why insurgents’ sources too, have a crucial role in the news feeding analysis and opinion are perhaps the most important elements in process. The insurgents try to use the media as tactical means in Afghan media and it is also true that some local press might come their war of propaganda and they are not necessarily committed to up with controversial analysis about the events to attract more audi- the accuracy of their information nor they have complex procedures ence or readership. And it is in the absence of reliable and truthful for speaking to the media. ISAF/NATO however, in order to ensure information that conspiracy theories, welcomed and fuelled by in- accuracy, is slower in disseminating information to the media and surgents are going to thrive. In addition, although Afghan press is to the public. While accuracy is well appreciated, there is a growing inching forward towards professionalism and independence, many need to develop mechanism for ISAF/NATO to ensure timely me- of the well-known newspapers, radios or TV stations, one way dia-related reaction when it is required. Some Afghan analysts be- or another, are connected to different ethnic, religious or political lieve that ISAF/NATO and other international military players need groups. Thus, monitoring the local media provides a rich source of to rethink the role of the media, particularly local media in the battle local knowledge that can serve as supplementary input for analyz- to win the hearts and minds. ing the overall situation in Afghanistan.

32 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 ISAF 10/01

CDR Len Remias, USA N and negative impact of everything we do and our ability to respond to even subtle HQ ISAF COIN Advisory and or fail to do. Understanding is a prerequi- changes in conditions will be decisive. I Assistance Team (CAAT) site for success. ask you to challenge conventional wisdom Ensure Values Underpin our Effort. and abandon practices that are ingrained Editorial: this interview was made when We must demonstrate through our words into many military cultures. Ge neral McChrystal was Commander ISAF. and actions our commitment to fair play, Act with courage and resolve. Hard Please explain CAAT’s mission. our respect and sensitivity for the cultures fighting, difficult decisions, and inevitable The CAAT observes, assesses, and re- and traditions of others, and understand- losses will mark the days ahead. Each of ports on counterinsurgency (COIN) ac- ing that rule of law and humanity don’t end us, from our most junior personnel to our tivities; identifies best and worst practices; when fighting starts. Both our goals and senior leaders, must display physical, and advises and assists commanders at conduct must be admired. mental and moral courage. Our partners all levels to enable effective integrated Listen Closely – Speak Clearly. We must trust our commitment; enemies must COIN operations in Afghanistan. must listen to understand and speak not question our resolve. clearly to be understood. Communicating What does COIN mean for ISAF? our intentions and accurately reflecting our What are your training expectations? It means everything. The way we think and actions to all audiences is a critical respon- I expect JWC to provide deploying person- act in a COIN fight will be critical to our sibility and necessity. nel with a baseline understanding of the success and the success of the Afghan Act as one team. We are an Alliance COIN and ISAF/IJC staff planning and proc- Government and people. In one way COIN of Nations with different histories, cultures, esses and how forces and personnel will is an exercise in ‘competitive governance’. and national objectives – united in sup- contribute to the COIN fight in Afghanistan. It requires constant balancing of kinetic port for Afghanistan. We must be unified in However, the learning doesn’t stop when operations, key leader engagement, part- purpose, forthright in communication, and you get to theatre and personnel and staff nering and messaging. Insurgent shadow committed to each other. must remain flexible and be able to adapt to governments have proven effective and Constantly adapt. This war is unique, the dynamic conditions in theatre. formidable, especially in providing justice. We have to both separate insurgents from the population and link that population to their government. Media training

What are the principles behind the coun- terinsurgency strategy? Our COIN campaign is about protecting the Afghan people and providing a secure environment allowing good government and economic development to undercut the causes and advocates of insurgency. General McChrystal has laid out eight key COIN imperatives for our success: Protect and Partner with the People. We are fighting for the Afghan people – not against them. Our focus on their welfare will build the trust and support necessary for success. Conduct a Comprehensive COIN Campaign. Insurgencies fail when root causes disappear. Security is essential; but I believe our ultimate success lies in partnering with the Afghan Government, Partner Nations, NGOs and others to build the foundations of good government and economic development. Understand the Environment. We must understand in detail the situation, however complex, and be able to explain it to others. Our ability to act effectively de- Functional Area Training mands a real appreciation for the positive ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 33 IS AF 10/01

best one to portray what they are going to meet over there. The only thing you cannot portray here, because of the sheer num - bers, is the complexity and vastness of the staf f over there. That is something you will have to experience once in theatre. Functional Area Training W h a t a r e t h e c u rr e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s? Our strategic main ef fort is the Afghan na- BG Leo Beulen tional security forces, which means that groups has allowed media and its role as we build the Army and the Police so that the purveyor of public opinion and senti - they can create a security environment in ment to become an integral part of mod - Brigadier General which the Government can operate. The ern warfare. Present day militaries must Leo Beulen, NLD A NTM-A was organized eight months ago consider and prepare for the impact media Director DJSE 2, FC Heidelberg and is doing a tremendous job to increase will have on all aspects of their ability to its capacity of training people. Other lines achieve their operation mandate. These Wh a t i s y o u r r o l e i n I S A F 1 0 / 0 1? of operations include development and implications range from political and citi - My role is Senior Mentor for the HQ ISAF. governance. So we also help build the zen support for troop deployment in their W e have a team of mentors coming from governance capacity of the Government of home countries to local understanding of theatre, which includes 19 from HQ ISAF Afghanistan. But that, more than anything their roles and mandates in their place of and 32 from ISAF Joint Command. W e else, is the primary focus of the interna - deployment. The evolving role of the me - also have Subject Matter Experts coming tional community. W e provide support in dia (public opinion domain) experienced from 1 GE/NL Corps; 20 of those that just those areas. The other development is that by modern militaries requires a change recently redeployed who are still current we encourage the Government of Afghani- in the way in which militaries prepare on the issues they took care of. Our role stan to take ownership of its p r o b l e m s a n d and train. Media and public opinion is no is to bring reality into the exercise as best t h e m e a n s t o p i c k u p i t s r o l e i n t h e o n g o i n g longer the sole domain of the Public Af - we can. W e know exactly how things are c o n fl i c t , w h i c h i s i n c r e a s i n g m o r e a n d m o r e , fairs/Information Officers. All elements of being run in the HQ, and our main role is to e s p e c i a l l y o v e r t h e l a s t s i x m o n t h s . T h i n g s an HQ must consider and engage with the explain that to the T raining Audience (TA). a r e m o v i n g s l o w l y b u t s t e a d i l y i n t h e r i g h t impact the media environment has on the Last December, I was a member of the TA d i r e c t i o n . I t w i l l t a ke a w h i l e f o r u s t o s e e t h e success of the operation. As a result, the myself. What is better this time than the fi n a l r e s u l t s t h o u g h . complexity of the environment should not last time, I note, is that you get teambuild- be the driver for ef fective exercise media; ing between the HQ and individual aug - Hope Carr rather, the ability of the exercise media mentees. They show up here, see each Media SME environment to require the T raining Audi - other for the first time and then start team- ence to communicate internally, analyze building to ensure they know each other What is the significance of media training? and prioritize media impact and strategize when they meet again in theatre. This is The development of 24-hour news pro- methods (throughout the HQ) to manage actually the end of the training. So, next to gramming, citizen journalists, embed- the environment through multiple means the reality of Kabul, it is, I would say, the ded media, and media cells of extremist should be the driver.

34 The ThreeENDEX Swords – CombinedMagazine 18/20Joint10 Ops Centre NATO Strategic Concept

NATO’s new Strategic Concept: Inspired by the Masses?

By Dr Stefanie Babst, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy

Article published with permission from “Turkish Policy Quarterly”(1) journal, Spring 2010.

N SEPTEMBER 2009, NATO’s still-then-new Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, an- nounced that the Transatlantic Alliance would develop its new IStrategic Concept and that the process leading to the new Strategy would be “the most open and inclusive process ever in the history of the Alliance”. He invited a group of 12 national experts to begin substantial discussions about NATO’s future and called upon the public at large to participate in these and other discussions. On Monday 17 May 2010 at NATO Headquarters, the Group of Experts, chaired by the former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, presented their report, “Analysis and Recommendations on a new Strategic Concept for NATO” to the Secretary General and NATO Ambas- sadors. This brought nine months of in- tensive discussions and consultations to Joint press conference with the NATO Secretary General and Madeleine Albright: presentation of the recommendations of the Group of Experts on NATO’s New Strategic Concept, 17 May 2010. an end and with it the so-called period of Photo by NATO. “inclusiveness and reflection.” Now that the work of the Group of Ex- INCLUSIVE CONSULTATIONS: perts has come to a conclusion, it is time Broad Audiences, Diverse Topics, to assess the consultation process. Was One Central Message the Secretary General’s idea to initiate a Most of the experts’ discussions took tions. Each of these seminars had parts broad-based public discourse about the place in the public limelight and offered open to the media, and all of them were Alliance’s future a failure or a success? the opportunity for those who were inter- accessible to the general public through How public were the discussions? Who ested to follow and join in the debates. different websites. participated in them? Was the “inclusive Between September 2009 and May 2010, In addition to the official activities of period” only an attempt to create the il- the experts conducted four international the Group of Experts, NATO’s Public Di- lusion, as some NATO critics claim, that seminars (in Luxembourg, Slovenia, Nor- plomacy Division (PDD) organized more our publics had a say in this process? way and the United States) and engaged than 140 outreach activities on the new Should the public have a say at all? Or in an impressive number of consultations Strategic Concept in member countries, should such strategic reviews be left to with civilian and military officials from all including conferences, seminars, work- the experts? Allied and Partner countries, independ- shops, background briefings for journal- ent security experts, Non-Governmental ists, essay competitions for students to- Organizations (NGOs), national and Eu- gether with multiple digital discussions, (1) Published since 2002 on a quarterly basis, ropean Parliamentarians and representa- with an aim of providing young people TPQ can also be reached through the website at www. turkishpolicy.com. tives from other international organiza- the opportunity to post their ideas and ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 35 NATO Strategic Concept

Joint press point with the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Chair of the Group of Experts and Jonas Gahr Støre, Foreign Minister of Norway, 14 January 2010, at the “Opening of the third Seminar on NATO’s Strategic Concept: NATO’s Partnerships and Beyond”, in Oslo. Photo by NATO. comments about the Alliance’s future Strategic Concept. Between late sum- est compared with Michael Jackson’s roles on web platforms. As well as the mer 2009 and spring 2010, NATO hosted facebook site – but impressive for an four official seminars, there were numer- more than 8,500 visitors from both Allied international defence organization. PDD ous “unofficial” seminars held in Allied and Partner countries to explain why the published 48 web stories on the new and Partner countries. Members of the Alliance wanted to elaborate a new strat- Strategic Concept, covering background Group of Experts participated in some of egy and why engagement with the pub- information, a bibliography, key events, these events. lic in this process was important to the speeches and visits of the Secretary NATO organized, in close cooperation Alliance. It goes without saying that the General and the Group of Experts. The with local think-tanks, NGOs and respec- NATO Secretary General played a key role interested viewer could choose between tive governments, more than 42 public in the entire process. Since August 2009, 70 short videos featuring debates about debates, including TV programmes, in Anders Fogh Rasmussen gave more than NATO’s future role in Afghanistan, the Partner countries together with 17 special 100 interviews to leading newspapers, Allies’ relations with Russia, the Com- information programmes for journalists TV broadcasters and radio stations – un- prehensive Approach, NATO’s contribu- and interested public groups at NATO’s derpinning every time the importance of tion towards the implementation of the Headquarters in Brussels. Interest was developing NATO’s new strategy with a UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on particular high in Russia, Georgia and process which was transparent and one Women, Peace and Security and many the Ukraine but also other Euro-Atlantic which engaged with the public. He also more themes. The videos were regularly Partnership Council (EAPC) countries as used his blogs and public speeches to ex- uploaded on YouTube, Daily motion, Live well as the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) plain why a new Strategic Concept mat- leak, Vimeo, Google Videos, Yahoo vid- and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) tered and what he expected it to deliver. eos, mySpace TV, metacafe and others countries. As regards to the ICI coun- In order to reach out to new audiences, and thus reached thousands of primarily tries, PDD supported public seminars in the use of new media is paramount for young people. Morocco, Egypt, Qatar and Mauritania NATO. On 3 August 2009, PDD launched The discussion forum, a central ele- – all of them open to the media. a dedicated web module(2) and discus- ment of NATO’s offer to the public to Additionally, NATO invited several thou- sion forum(3). From its launch until early sand visitors, many of them students, to May 2010, the module received more (2) www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html discuss the key components of the new than 122,000 visitors – which is mod- (3) http://natostratcon.info

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36 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 NATO Strategic Concept

participate in live online discussions, was curity Strategy nor the United Nations of nuclear missiles and increasingly de- visited by almost 10,000 people. People has conducted their strategy discussions bilitating cyber attacks to energy secu- from many corners of the world, includ- in public. NATO, in turn, can proud itself rity and religious extremism. In contrast ing Australia, Russia and Pakistan partici- – and rightly so – that it has not simply to the Cold War, NATO’s enemies cannot pated in the online discussions, express- talked about engaging the public but ac- be deterred any longer by battalions of ing often very detailed proposals and tually embarked on a dedicated process. tanks and conventional forces taking po- views on how NATO should cope with the sition in well-defined geographical spots. new security challenges. 2. The consultation process on the new Today’s threats come in very different A special highlight of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept provided a unique forms than only some ten years ago. digital outreach was the ‘Security Jam’, opportunity for further engagement The new challenges are not just looming an initiative jointly organized by NATO, with the public on this particular is- on the horizon. They are already in our the European Union and a Brussels think sue. Many factors influence how NATO is doorstep. Addressing them effectively tank (Security and Defence Agenda). For perceived. These include the leadership is what NATO needs to do. Against this six consecutive days, a quasi ‘permanent of the organization, success or failure in background, NATO’s new Strategic Con- online discussion’ allowed 3,000 security Afghanistan, the state of U.S.-European cept must offer more than diplomatic and defence experts from around the relations, enlargement or issues related buzz words – otherwise, it will fade away globe to exchange their views about key to the immediate neighbourhood of a only too quickly in the public’s mind and international security issues, including country. A guiding political document, the Allies risk to lose credibility. the transatlantic Alliance’s new strategy, which is important to the organization, with prominent policy-makers. In the may not be perceived as important by 4. National governments must continue consultation process on the new Strategic the public, in particular at a time when to engage their publics on transatlantic Concept, NATO engaged with over two the organization is engaged in a major issues and convincingly explain why it is hundred thousand people – thus reaching campaign. Therefore it was crucial that important to forge a strong transatlantic far beyond the community of transatlantic the public were involved in contributing partnership. It is not sufficient if only the security and defence experts. to the debate which will shape the pos- Secretary General passes this message ture of the Alliance over the next dec- on. Both at home and towards foreign LIVING UP TO PUBLIC ades. The emerging security challenges audiences Alliance leaders must demon- EXPECTATIONS: Five Observations – such as cyber security and climate strate that they remain committed to the The consultation process with the public, change – means that post-Afghanistan Alliance and ready and capable to lead academia, experts, think tanks, NGOs, NATO must be ready and willing to act NATO with resolve and determination into Partner Countries and other international in the face of such challenges. In order the next decade. The Lisbon Summit in organizations is over. Between now and to remain on the right side of public sup- November 2010 will be the ideal moment the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, port, emerging security challenges must to convey this message to the public in the discussions about the Alliance’s new be explained to the public. This consulta- Allied countries and beyond. However, a strategic direction will take place in the tion process did just that. short historical moment that is captured political and diplomatic arenas of Allied in the traditional family portray at the capitals and NATO Headquarters. Over 3. The final product, which is the new NATO Summit will not do the trick. the coming months, using the report of Strategic Concept, must offer clear and the Group of Experts as a guiding docu- compelling responses to the questions 5. The new Strategic Concept must be ment, NATO’s Secretary General will raised during public discourse about translated into practice. NATO’s ”D-Day” write his own draft of the new Strategic NATO’s future strategic direction. What starts on 21 November 2010 when the Concept. In mid-September, the Secre- exactly is the Allies’ strategy to effec- Heads of State and Government have ap- tary General’s draft will be presented to tively protect their citizens from exter- proved the new strategy at their Summit the Allies for formal negotiations. nal security threats? Which threats can meeting in Lisbon. The publics in Member NATO realistically cope with and which and Partner countries will carefully watch 1. NATO, like any other international ones are out of reach? How will the Allies how the Allies will implement what they organization, relies on the political and better connect to other international or- have approved on a piece of paper. public support of its Member countries. ganizations and actors to deter potential So, there is nothing wrong with engaging enemies and tackle security risks before THE GROUP OF EXPERTS, in their com- the public to contribute to the debates they arrive at our doorsteps? Given the prehensive and detailed report, have about the organization’s future strategy. hard realities of the current strategic en- made some good proposals on how Their opinions matter to this organization vironment, answering these and other NATO’s future strategy could look like. It is which is charged with the responsibility key questions are mandatory. NATO is now up to the Allies do follow-up on these of defending the territories in which they fighting terrorists six thousand kilome- proposals in order to develop a strategy live in. In this regard, it is noteworthy tres away from Europe. It is confronted which will help the Alliance to navigate to point out that neither the European by a host of threats that come in multi- through the troubled waters of the 21st Union when developing its European Se- ple forms, ranging from the proliferation Century security environment. 

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 37 DEVELOPINGDEVELOPING COIN DOCTRINECOIN DOCTRINE IN CONTACIN CONTACT T

SPECIAL FORCES TEAMS, DESPITE THEIR AGILITY AND FLEXIBILITY, ARE UNABLE TO OPERATE THE COIN MISSION ALONE.

By Dr Dave Sloggett Intelligence and COIN Advisor

HE EXPERIENCES IN IRAQ Iraq, for example, have been analysed or Tupamaros; the application of princi- AND AFGHANISTAN have and discussed in detail under the leader- ples and fundamentals to deal with each had a profound effect upon ship of General David H. Petraeus, Com- varies considerably”. These are important the approach to counterin- mander of NATO’s International Security insights that set the backdrop against surgency (COIN) warfare Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces which COIN doctrine is continuing to be Tthat has been developed by the United in Afghanistan, and resulted in the pub- developed. States Army and its NATO partners. The lication of Field Manual 3-24 on Coun- The world moves on; sometimes at a days when commentators could quote terinsurgency in December 2006. The frightening pace. The adage of Thomas the British Army’s experience in Malaya Foreword to this document, co-written Malthus that “necessity is the mother of as the basis for developing a ‘hearts and by General Petraeus states “The Army invention” applies, and the team assem- minds’ campaign are over; their limita- and Marine Corps recognize that every bled by General Petraeus to develop a tions are all too apparent as role models insurgency is contextual and presents its new COIN doctrine did so in record time for contemporary COIN operations. own set of challenges”. It goes onto say The obvious differences between the “You cannot fight the former Saddamists Above: Helicopter door gunner surveys the success story that was the British ap- and Islamic extremists the same way you ground. Photo by U.S. Army Public Affairs Of- proach in Malaya to what was needed in would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros, ficer Sadie Bleistein. ►►►

38 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 COIN

and whilst ‘in contact’. It is a wise man ing treatments to reduce the impact of scape it is hardly surprising that tried and that does not underestimate the collec- tsetse fly upon local cattle had an obvi- tested approaches from the past come to tive power of the United States military ous and enduring impact upon the local the fore. Rumours and allegations of cor- when they have been stirred into action. population. Increased milk production ruption also play into this environment; It is absolutely clear that the approach to mattered in the daily lives of tribesmen undermining confidence in the govern- DEVELOPING COIN developed markedly in the course in Oman. ance structures. The situation is difficult of the United States campaign in Iraq. A symbiotic relationship between the and experiences from the campaign in The combination of the military surge led Special Forces work targeting the irrec- Iraq need to be adapted and developed by General Petraeus and the actions of oncilable elements of an insurgency has to create the conditions on the ground the tribes in Al Anbar province in Iraq to sit alongside a wider series of shaping in Afghanistan where progress can be was to dramatically alter the operational operations, conducted by regular forces, made; in effect setting the conditions for COIN DOCTRINE situation in that area. The local people designed to secure the support of the reconciliation of the grievances that ex- reached a tipping point. The daily drum wider population; some of whom have ist within Afghan society. This is not a beat of indiscriminate violence perpetrat- major disconnects with the ideas of de- simple task. ed by the insurgents became an anath- mocracy and the idea of centralized gov- Contemporary social psychology, in- ema to the local people. They decided to ernance. The language is now of clear: ter alia the ideas emerging from Social IN CONTACT act and reject the strictures under which build and hold; not of the kind of brigade Dominance Theory, provide some insights they had been placed. sweeps that is now largely discredited as that may provide levers that enable those Despite these developments the evolu- an approach to contemporary COIN op- communities that are reluctant to coop- tion of COIN doctrine has to be defined as erations. The idea of a permanent pres- erate with ISAF within the broader Af- work-in-progress. It is clear that some ge- ence, where indigenous security forces ghan society to become more engaged. neric elements of a future Comprehensive help protect the local population in ar- Social Dominance Theory posits that Approach to COIN have been developed eas where security and stability foster a people who are subjected to structural through the Iraq campaign. Some of those positive reaction from the local people change within their societies feel afraid elements have been carried forward into towards ISAF, is based upon the notion and vulnerable if their previous appar- Afghanistan. General McChrystal’s (the of creating small centres of control (ink ent position in society becomes threat- former ISAF Commander) strategy builds spots) from which governance and con- ened. In Afghanistan it has been gener- upon the insights from the Iraq campaign trol can be spread. ally accepted that since the creation of in which he played a notable part lead- The ink spot approach does have some what can be thought of as the state of ing the activities of the Special Forces of ideas based in the British approach Afghanistan that its leaders have mainly teams employed in various task forces in to moving the population in Malaya into been derived from the Pashtun tribal Iraq. The tempo of operations of those camps where they where physically dis- confederation. The Muhammadzai Clan elements of the military commitment was connected from the insurgents by fences is regarded by many to have provided truly staggering as they disrupted the ac- and barbed wire. Contemporary insur- traditional leadership of the country. In tivities of the insurgents. gents in Afghanistan react to such opera- contrast the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara But Special Forces teams, despite their tions by melting back into the community, population has often been thought of as agility and flexibility, are unable to oper- which complicates the process of separat- having a lesser standing in society. Old ate the COIN mission alone. In the 21st ing the insurgents from the wider popu- enmities do not fade away easily. To un- Century, to secure the support from the lation. Social identity matters and people derstand and try and change attitudes population requires a very different form rely upon local tribal, clan and family con- and behaviours in Afghanistan today it of approach to those embraced by the nections and traditions to gain sanctuary. is vital to understand the cultural history British in Malaya. In fact, the first evolu- Many people in Afghanistan, for exam- of the country. tion of COIN from the jungles of Malaya ple, are fractious and being deeply dis- Equally it is important to also compre- to the deserts and high terrain of Oman trustful of the kind of mechanisms used hend the ways in which tribal customs provides a much better base for analysis by leaders of such states to exert their and creeds modulate the day-to-day lives as local factors increasingly were recog- influence over what can often be a com- of the people of Afghanistan. In a society nized as being important; within an over- plicated societal landscape. Patronage is dominated by oral traditions, parables, all strategic framework with changes in a method of governance well understood fables and stories are used to define governance implemented from the cen- historically by the current leadership in the morality and social behaviour that tre by a progressive leader who recog- Kabul and by previous administrations. is acceptable within societies; some of nised the needs of his people. These attitudes can often be quite paro- which can be quite small and set against Arguably, it was in Oman that the chial in their viewpoint and locally based a very rural backdrop. Jirgas in Afghani- Special Forces gained their spurs in cre- with strong ethnic overtones. Insurgents stan, that set out to arbitrate between ating the conditions where the hearts also use marital ties to try and bind local people in dispute over a subject, often and minds of local populations could be people to their agendas. When faced by commence with several elders speaking secured. The role of the medic, apply- such an ethnically diverse societal land- of parables and fables that provide prov-

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this situation, where a major disconnect exists between the central government and people on the ground, what can be done to help create the conditions for progress in Afghanistan? One part of the solution is for ISAF to become more adept at selling its mes- sage of hope for the future. Where the central government fails ISAF must try and offer its view of the future in a more coherent way. Strategic Communications has traditionally not been a strong area for ISAF. The fragmented nature of the coalition has not helped. An overall nar- rative has not been created that reso- nates with the wider public in Afghani- BUILD and HOLD: General Petraeus, COMISAF, visits Shahdarak Market. He walked from the ISAF stan. The rather fragmented nature of Headquarters to the market, where he met with local businessmen, purchased and shared bread with the locals, and even found time for a little football match with a few local Afghan children. coalition strategic messaging creates in- Photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Bradley A. Lail. consistencies that our adversaries seem able to exploit. They conduct operations enance from past judgements on similar of the population out on the streets wel- that target coalition countries where res- cases. Customary Law in Afghanistan is coming the coalition forces into Iraq as ervations are expressed in public opin- based upon a restorative justice system; liberators, which were so reminiscent of ion. The globalised world in which we not the retributive form practised in the the pictures of the populations of France, operate today is so very different from West. Revenge is a key element of the the Netherlands and Belgium welcoming the restricted environment that charac- ways in which the people of Afghanistan the Allies in 1944, quickly faded as the terised the backdrop to military opera- settle feuds and past enmities. A Pashtun situation in Iraq descended into turmoil. tions in Malaya and Oman. proverb suggests that a Pashtun that is The optimism of those that suggested the Different government’s within the coa- able to take revenge for a crime commit- Iraqis would wish to throw off the shack- lition all have their own national publics ted against his family within 100 years is les of the regime of Saddam Hussein was to keep onside. Political drivers have im- a “person in a hurry”. rapidly shown to be misplaced. New ap- pacted ISAF’s ability to create a coherent Feuds and grievances that last for proaches to COIN had to be developed. approach to communications. This has several generations are commonplace Central to the overall problem of cre- been especially telling when it comes to within Afghan society. Understanding ating a truly generic approach to COIN, the fall out that often occurs in the case this backdrop is crucial to making any i.e. one that will survive the test of time of civilian casualties who are caught in sort of progress and inevitably requires and be applicable in a much wider set the cross-fire of warfare. Whilst it is clear deep insights to be developed at a local of circumstances, is to understand how statistically that since General McChrys- level. From these insights state-building best to create a balance between initia- tal assumed command of the military op- can start from a bottom up approach. tives at the local level, designed to build erations in Afghanistan far fewer civilians The ink-spot strategy can try to develop support from the population in small vil- have died as a result of NATO military ac- positive movements of individual com- lages, hamlets and towns, into the kind tivities, the perceptions already created munities from which the kind of tidal ef- of momentum that enables progress to in the mindset of the population is a leg- fect seen in Al Anbat province in Iraq can be made at the district and eventually acy that is hard to move. How can a tip- develop. Social psychology shows how province levels of government. ping point be created that moves many populations can reach tipping points; the With all of this focus upon building the reluctant people from opposing ISAF to question for commanders is how can the state from the local level, it is important being wholeheartedly in support? How conditions be created for such a move- to question the role of the central gov- can we create the conditions to secure ment that has a positive outcome for ernment in creating a stable and secure the hearts and minds of the population? ISAF? Social Movement Theory is an im- Afghanistan. There is little doubt that Before answering the question it is im- portant source of insights in this regard. few people in Afghanistan see the cen- portant to probe the ideas of the phrase Some commentators suggested in the tral government in a particularly positive ‘hearts and minds’ in a little more detail. weeks running up to the Second Gulf light. Tribal and clan overlays do modu- For people motivated by religious beliefs War that we would see the results of late opinion but the overall view seems to it is possible to suggest that in practice the central ideas expounded in Social be of a distant government that has little the heart guards the mind; implying that Movement Theory in the immediate af- power, or capabilities, to do things that the emotional aspects of the conflict termath of the invasion of Iraq. Images have a positive local effect. Considering plays more on a persons behaviour and

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attitudes. If this is indeed the situation the dialect in which it has been created. then ISAF needs to recognize that any Arabic is a hugely evocative language that approach to Strategic Communications allows ideas to be expressed in ways that that is based upon the kind of classic create emotional responses. Insurgents logic that derives from messaging and understand these subtle levers and the narratives that work in western culture ways in which they operate. needs to be tempered. We need to de- To counter these arguments ISAF velop culturally resonant messaging; needs to change its approach to Strate- communications that can reach beyond gic Communications. It must find ways the emotional barriers that exist in our of leveraging the emotional levers that target audiences. can reach out and appeal to local popula- With language playing such an im- tions in ways that western society does portant part in Afghan culture and the not readily utilize. Western societies tend ideas and visions expressed in parables to be more homogeneous and therefore T.S. Eliot Photo by the estate of T.S. Eliot T.S. of the estate by Photo and fables are instrumental to the ways subject to messaging that does not re- in which Afghan society operates it is quire too many cultural insights. The footprint of military forces and achieving important to reach into Afghan customs, heterogeneity of the societal landscape more through Strategic Communications, creeds and traditions for clues as to how in Afghanistan requires the development at the national, regional and local levels, this might be achieved. Poetry is a key of messages that operate at a local level will become the imperative. The art of part of Afghan culture. In the early part whilst fitting within an overall strategic creating culturally resonant messaging is of 2010 the Taliban specifically sent out narrative. Culturally resonant messaging therefore a crucial element of the continu- messages for Afghan poets to write po- has to work at the local level and appeal ing evolution of COIN doctrine. The ideas etry in support of Jihad. It is possible to to specific ethnic populations whilst be- of exploring how to create emotional con- view this as a direct attempt to shore-up ing consistent within a broader national nections with an audience were, argua- or reinforce the emotional barriers to any narrative that is inevitably simplistic. Al bly, first explored by the American paint- ISAF messaging or narrative. Poetry can Qaeda’s single narrative, citing the ob- er Washington Allston when he referred be evocative and create powerful images ligation to fight jihad against those who to the idea of the “objective correlative” in the minds of those that not only listen wish to destroy Islam, is an example of in 1840. The concept was taken forward to what is being said but hear the subtle such a simple narrative. by the writer T.S. Eliot in 1919 when he messages being delivered. This is cultur- In countries such as Afghanistan, and wrote in an essay on Shakespeare’s play ally resonant messaging. Often it will use other potential future theatres of opera- Hamlet the following: “The only way of the hidden power of some key words in tion, the emphasis upon reducing the expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which can be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when exter- nal facts, which must terminate in a sen- sory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked”. For those, such as the insurgents in Afghanistan, who readily draw upon their own insights into the culture, cus- toms and traditions of their countrymen, this is natural territory. For ISAF, seeking ways of breaking through the barriers of the heart and reasoning with the logic of the mind, the sense of this concept so carefully outlined by T.S. Eliot is one that STRATEGIC we need to understand and implement. Through developing Strategic Communi- MESSAGING cations based upon this form of thinking we may well elevate Strategic Commu- In countries such as Afghanistan, the emphasis upon reducing the footprint of military forces and nications to new levels of importance in achieving more through Strategic Communications, at the national, regional and local levels, will become the imperative. ISAF Spokesman media roundtable: German Army Gen. Joseph Blotz, COIN campaigns and gain new ways of answers questions from Afghan and international media during a roundtable discussion on 13 July influencing those really important target 2010. Photo by ISAF PAO SFC Matthew Chlosta, U.S. Army. audiences. 

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 41 By Dr Dave Sloggett Intelligence and COIN Advisor

A perspective on the continuing Iraqi COIN operations Who paints the landscapes of war in the 21st Century?

ISTORY shows us that the stabilize and rebuild a country and put These inadequacies endure in Afghani- main association between into place effective governance struc- stan with its subtle differences from the the military and art occurs tures. Iraq went through this transition tribal and societal structures and cus- in the depiction of major at the end of 2004 as an insurgency toms in Iraq. Highlighting that progress, scenes of battles that adorn gained traction with disaffected groups in the representation and depiction of HOfficers’ Messes illustrating the heroic of people left on the margins of society these landscapes, has not been made. deeds of our military forefathers, high- as new political processes shaped the Art, with its ability to provide a very dif- lighting the locations where victories immediate destiny of the country. ferent perspective on things, may also were secured and wars won and lost. As the insurgency developed so it frac- provide important insights into ways of This stilted relationship may, however, tured and split; sometimes along ethnic presenting from a culturally sensitive be about to change. Today, it is becom- lines and on other occasions building viewpoint what are increasingly com- ing increasingly difficult to win wars. upon established family and tribal con- plex societal landscapes that are likely to Conflicts mutate from conventional sym- nections and past loyalties. In this fluid form the backdrop to future stabilization metrical warfare to asymmetric forms and difficult situation, current social net- operations. of warfare as people disenfranchised by working technologies were rapidly found The appreciation of art in its many the victory of one side decide to embark to be inadequate; failing to provide ways forms has been a central part of Iraqi upon an insurgency campaign to wear of describing the complicated societal culture for centuries. Baghdad is famed down forces that become labelled as oc- landscapes that lay underneath the for its role as a crucible in the creation of cupiers; when in practice their role is to shifting alliances and power structures. new sciences, technologies and expres-

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Below: Head of Lion. Neo-Assyrian. 8th sions of art forms. Iraq was, after all, Century B.C. (Iraq Museum in Baghdad In the early part of 2010 the Iraqi Se- - Traveling Exhibition Photo Archive). the cradle of civilization and home to the curity forces, working in concert with Sumerians, Assyrians and the Abbasids. their American counterparts, succeeded Today, the streets of Al-Asfar District in in arresting or killing over 34 of the 42 Baghdad are home to the latest genera- key leaders of the insurgency. Despite tions of Iraqi artists seeking to ply their these successes and the obvious impact trade and paint pictures that celebrate they have had on the rate of attacks in their history and traditions. Baghdad, the insurgents have managed The evolution of the insurgency in Iraq to still mount several spectacular attacks in the immediate aftermath of the Sec- where large numbers of people have ond Gulf War in 2003 surprised many been killed and injured. The death of two analysts. The multi-nodal structure of of the key leaders of the Islamic State of the insurgency, which has been likened Iraq [ISI] in May 2010 led to a number to a Hydra, was difficult to understand. of retaliatory attacks being conducted It appeared to be able to withstand the across Baghdad. kind of pressures placed upon it by the «Art, with its ability to provide Defeating the VBIED is a key priority for actions of the Iraqi Security Forces and a very different perspective commanders in the campaign. One ele- their coalition colleagues. Developing in- on things, may also provide ment of the approach is to map the social sights into the structures underlying the important insights into networks that support IED emplacement. insurgency, to identify specific courses of But this has limited utility. Currently, ex- action to disrupt its activities, was com- increasingly complex societal isting social networking tools do not pro- plicated. Many paradoxes existed in the landscapes. » vide a sufficiently nuanced approach to intelligence material that was collected. portraying these networks and the tribal The pictures that were formed often had and coalition forces mounted military and clan networks upon which they rely, large parts missing and that which was operations designed to disrupt these allowing bomb makers and their associ- visible was also on occasions allegori- networks, the people involved in the in- ates to be protected and to hide within cal. It was the Duke of Wellington that surgency showed agility in reconstruct- the civilian population. opined “All the business of war, and in- ing the links allowing them to maintain Defeating the VBIED threat will only deed all the business of life, is to endeav- the tempo of their operations. The COIN come about through a combined ap- our to find out what you don’t know from doctrine that is now being applied in Iraq proach that creates the conditions in what you do.” This quotation seems to by the Iraqi Security Forces has had to which local people decide to oppose the sum up really well the situation faced evolve in contact as their adversaries development and emplacement of these by the intelligence teams deployed into make use of asymmetric tactics to try devices. The key to the C-IED campaign Iraq to work alongside the Iraqi Security and foster civil war; targeting Iraqi public is to find and understand the levers that Forces after the initial combat operations opinion through the use of indiscriminate will shape the relationships between local had been completed. and sectarian bombings. people and the insurgents; marginalizing The Iraqi insurgency was able to grow the insurgents and alienating them from in strength at a time when the counterin- VBIED: weapon of choice an increasingly small part of the popula- surgency (COIN) doctrine being applied Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are tion, often in highly localized areas, from by the coalition forces was ill prepared an established and effective element of which they currently gain support. for the evolving and protean nature the tactics employed by insurgents. The To create the conditions where this of the conflict. It needed to evolve. In Counter-IED battle is complex and multi- separation of the local people from the particular the approach to situational faceted with no single solution providing insurgents can occur, military command- awareness needed to develop; harness- a Comprehensive Approach. Insurgents ers must gain greater insights into the ing HUMINT and other sources of intel- enjoy a great deal of manoeuvre room underlying societal landscape to find ligence material to build pictures of the in which to employ the devices and their potential fault lines that they can exploit insurgency and its many links within Iraq means of activation; often choosing to to shape the battlefield. This was how and to organizations in border areas that explode several devices over a short the Awakening Councils developed in Al were involved in supporting the insur- period of time to create additional pres- Anbar province in Iraq; local tensions be- gency and smuggling suicide bombers sures on the emergency services and tween tribal leaders and the extremists into Iraq through a series of safe houses their partners in the security forces. The operating in the area boiled over, result- located along major communications Vehicle Borne IED is a particularly effec- ing in the Al Qaeda factions in the area routes. Developing a granular picture tive weapon combining mobility and sur- being ejected by the tribes. This was a of the nature of these supply routes in prise with a greater killing power than a significant moment in the development order that measures could be taken to single suicide vest. It is now the weapon of the whole approach to COIN; where disrupt their activities took time. As Iraqi of choice in Baghdad for the insurgents. the local population took matters into

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their own hands and rejected the ex- sensitive red lines. A common theme securing positions of responsibility and in- tremist’s ideology. At this point, in the to emerge from the Brigade debriefs on fluence in governance structures. Under- Iraq campaign Al Qaeda was displaced to their return from contemporary theatres standing how these attitudes and beliefs the north of Al Anbar, creating safe ha- of war is the criticism of the intelligence percolate through local societies is crucial vens in places like Baaquba, Diyala and collection and analysis processes. It is to developing options for the applications al-Kut. Recent operations conducted by a common complaint that current intel- of soft and hard military power. Iraqi Security Forces and their American ligence operations are based more on As NATO COIN doctrine has emerged partners have continued to constrain the reporting than analysis and assessment. using lessons from operations in Malaya, operational manoeuvre room originally At the heart of this problem is the need Oman, Northern Ireland, through Iraq experienced by the insurgent groups. for commanders to give direction. Doc- and into Afghanistan the need to map In the run up to the tipping point that trinally the intelligence cycle starts with the societal landscapes in greater detail happened in Al Anbar intelligence mate- command direction. It is the first stage has become apparent; commanders, at rial from a variety of sources was pro- in the process and is crucial as it sets all levels, need to understand the emo- viding insights as to the changing nature the framework for subsequent activities tional undercurrents that exist at the of the relationships between the insur- in collecting, analyzing and disseminat- local levels. Intelligence material is the gents and the tribal leaders. Hindsight ing intelligence information; before the sine qua non of developing the required is always a wonderful thing, but getting cycle repeats. insights, with particular emphasis placed ahead of the fractures appearing in the It is possible to liken the role of an upon the value of HUMINT in its contri- insurgency and creating the conditions intelligence analyst to that of an artist. bution to mapping social networks and for these disagreements to develop is They paint pictures for commanders its ability to provide insights into the pre- crucial to the ways in which COIN opera- through their reports and briefings. Com- vailing atmospherics in an area. Much of tions need to be conducted in the future. manders, however, struggle to interpret the material collected in the intelligence In many ways the Lessons Learned from these pictures. Current social networking process is, however, uncertain. Clause- Iraq need to be interpreted and care- toolkits are simply not able to provide witz noted of intelligence that “A great fully understood so that future stabiliza- the degree of resolution and nuanced part of the information obtained in war tion operations, wherever they may be understanding required by command- is contradictory, a still greater part is false conducted on the international stage, ers in contemporary ethnically-complex and by far the greatest part is of doubt- can avoid the pitfalls and difficulties that theatres such as Afghanistan for them ful character.” It can also be complex, plagued the initial part of the COIN cam- to apply the correct balance of hard equivocal and ambiguous. paign in Iraq. In many ways NATO must and soft power in the campaign. Getting Our adversaries also attempt to de- learn lessons from the early part of the this balance right is crucial. Too often ceive; which adds further complexities Iraqi campaign as these can assist in kinetic attacks have resulted in civilian to building the overall picture. The jig- planning and executing future missions casualties that have caused setbacks in saw puzzles that should be pieced to- to stabilize other states where terror- the campaign to secure the hearts and gether from the individual sources of ists have occupied the vacuum left when minds of local people. intelligence material do not integrate governance structures fail. It is now widely accepted that our into smooth pictures. Fault lines appear military forces cannot fight their way to a between pieces of the puzzle where in- New toolkits for intelligence analysts victory in the classical sense when fight- consistencies emerge between sources Understanding the intelligence material, ing an asymmetric war against an agile of intelligence material; highlighting and creating visual representations of adversary; the incursion into Somalia by contradictions and creating paradoxes the various interactions between the ac- American forces to try and assist a failing for intelligence analysts. These are areas tors involved, requires new ideas to be state proved that beyond doubt. Military of concern where intelligence collection developed that challenge existing ways forces must be part of a wider range of assets need to be deployed to help re- of representing the societal landscape. A measures that draw upon economic and solve these contradictions. Through this renaissance is therefore required in the political instruments in a combined effort approach, and from the ‘informed’ direc- current capabilities of social network- to create the conditions for progress to be tion of the commander, the rough edges ing toolkits and it is to the world of art, made. At the heart of this problem is gain- and inconsistencies can be smoothed and its depiction of images, to which we ing an understanding just how and why into a more coherent picture. might turn to develop culturally sensi- the population behave in the way they do Using the artistic metaphor some in- tive representations of the societal land- and what motivates their actions. telligence pictures resemble that of a scape. In making the point about being Developments in social psychology, piece of art work painted by an Impres- culturally sensitive it is vital to acknowl- such as Social Dominance Theory, show sionist, such as Monet or Cézanne. In edge that the Iraqi Security Forces need that when long-standing communities some situations it is possible to think of to be equipped with toolkits that respect face structural change they can be re- the picture that emerges as being highly their values and beliefs based on their sentful and wary of the changes; it can complicated and difficult to appreciate; Islamic traditions. The depiction of spe- threaten established societal structures. with some of the material used being al- cific elements within scenes needs to This is an acute problem in Afghanistan legorical. These pictures can be likened be achieved without crossing culturally where patronage often plays a key role in to the work of the Surrealists, such as

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Picasso and more recently Salvador Dali. In practical situations the pictures that are painted for commanders are often a «It is possible to mosaic of different forms of art, blend- liken the role of an ing the Impressionist school with that of intelligence analyst Surrealists and those with a more scien- to that of an artist.» tific representation of the real world, like Clockwise: Picasso’s Canaletto, Michelangelo and Leonardo Da Vinci. In such situations it is not dif- Girl with Red Beret; ficult to appreciate why commanders Kurt Wenner’s Fishing sometimes find it difficult to gain suffi- in Old Shanghai; cient situational awareness to give direc- sketch of Da Vinci’s tion. The current intelligence doctrine is Flying Machine and an therefore flawed. This is a point accepted by many working in the intelligence field. impressionist depiction New approaches to training are being of the landscape, which developed for intelligence staff across is very difficult to define. NATO to equip them with insights in psychology, sociology and anthropology. This will allow intelligence officers, and their teams, to create value-added brief- ings that can help commanders to shape and apply soft skills on the battlefield; the key to influence and to changing be- haviour of those either directly involved in the insurgency or tacitly supporting them from the sidelines. Key to gaining a greater understanding of these complex societal landscapes, and their day-to-day dynamics, is to access new methods of visualising their structures. Since the Renaissance the world of art has seen a number of major develop- ments as artists sought to render per- spective and light with greater accuracy. More recently developments in anamor- phic art pioneered by Kurt Wenner in his 3-D depictions have added new insights into the use of perspective. Artists, such scientific knowledge of the skeleton and etal landscapes to be drawn and painted as Masaccio, also strove to represent the muscle formation. His fusion of studies in ways where the underlying points of human form in greater detail. Turner is into science, engineering and biology tension, emotion, fear and resentment one artist that paid specific attention was innovative. It sets the trend for the that fuels the insurgency can be better to the use of light and colour to depict kind of multi-disciplinary approach now understood. Through gaining these in- scenes. Canaletto, in contrast, is noted required in theatre to create the levels of sights Iraqi Security Forces command- for his accuracy and detail – with many understanding required for commanders ers and their opposite numbers operat- of pieces of art based upon studies of to apply soft power in ways that mitigate ing against equally complicated societal architecture. the risks to the local people. Insights landscapes can develop greater insights Leonardo Da Vinci is widely regarded drawn from the world of art will allow and understanding and deliver the kind as one of the leaders of the Renaissance new toolkits to be specified and devel- of balanced approach to conflict that se- movement. His personal contribution to oped. These will allow the complex soci- cures the support of the population.  the development of linear perspective is noted by historians as being at the heart of new developments in the field of art.  Dr Dave Sloggett has nearly 40 years of working in the intel- Leonardo Da Vinci is also perhaps best ligence arena during the Cold War and recent conflicts. He is a known also for his attention to detail and frequent visitor to operational theatres and a contemporary writer the ways in which he sought to bridge on approaches to Counter Insurgency. He can be contacted on his the gap between the artistic representa- email: [email protected] tions of human forms and the developing

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 45 COIN

By Lt Col Matthew Skuse, GBR Royal Marines Joint Plans, Execution, Coordination Section Head SME Branch, Joint Training Division Joint Warfare Centre Photo by ARRC PAO (ISAF 9). (ISAF PAO ARRC by Photo

THOUGHTS ON MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY

N JULY 2010, I FLEW TO AF- an eighteen year old Afghan. He spoke insurgency Training Centre–Afghanistan GHANISTAN on a fact finding immaculate English. His family had fled (CTC–A). The Camp is mostly Afghan tour in preparation for my role in Kabul when he was two and had cho- National Army with a couple of small en- November’s ISAF Training Event. sen now to return to visit relatives and claves of ISAF. It is overlooked on one This was not the first time I had friends. He was worried about under- side by the now ruined King’s Palace Iflown into Kabul on a commercial flight, standing the language but expressed no (as seen in the picture above) and on but the last occasion was well over a concerns about security. He and his sis- the other by the equally broken Queen’s year ago and this felt different. Previ- ters were clearly looking forward to an Palace. Built in the 1920s both buildings ously, I had been surrounded by UN offi- adventure. We approached Kabul from survived the Soviet occupation only to cials, journalists and security contractors the South, the rugged red mountains be- be destroyed during the ethnic infighting – the background noise had been loud low enthralled him, he pressed his face that preceded the fall of the city to Mul- American. Today, I was one of about 20 tight into the port hole, awkward be- lah Omar’s Taliban in September 1996. Westerners, including two relaxed look- cause it was me that sat in the window They are both massive palaces, dominat- ing German policemen in uniform. The seat – “we live in Holland” he explained. ing the sky line and still potent symbols rest of the seats were occupied by Af- We swapped seats. of an almost forgotten golden period in ghanis; I could pick out only the odd Dari I spent my first week of the trip in Kabul’s history, more of which later. But or Pashtu word but the noisescape, both Camp Julien just outside Kabul, attend- equally dramatic was the message being in the departure lounge and in the air- ing the first part of the Training The sent out at the CTC–A. We were under a craft, was distinctly Afghan. I sat next to Trainer Course (T3C) run at the Counter- hundred students, a few were Colonels,

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46 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 U.S. Army General David H. Petraeus, Commander, International Security Assistance Force, speaks to U.S. and NATO forces at the Counterinsurgency THOUGHTS ON MODERN Training Centre – Afghanistan, at Camp Julien, 13 July 2010. U.S. Air Force photos by Sgt. Bradley Lail. most were Captains and Sergeants. The He explained his logic. We got the mes- not, say that General McKiernan under- course aims to orientate you to the new sage. To beat the insurgency the Govern- stood the nature of COIN and was start- counterinsurgency thinking, so that we ment of Afghanistan needs to be a more ing to turn ISAF in a new direction. But could return to our training jobs in the attractive proposition than the alterna- during this period, in the name of force COUNTERINSURGENCY ISAF donor nations and spread the word tive – this is a political struggle. ISAF will protection, ISAF vehicles drove in the – I was expecting lectures on culture and succeed when the Afghan people believe middle of two lane roads and demanded doctrine from a well drilled American-led their interests are best served by the na- the Afghan drivers push off the road as training team. Instead, General Petraeus tional government in Kabul – any military ISAF passed, and keep at least 200m came to talk to us for an hour, fresh from activity that makes them suspect other- away if they were following. ISAF driv- his confirmation hearing in Washington. wise, however effective it is at attriting ers were ordered to glue and tape meter He was humane, self effacing, utterly the insurgency, is counterproductive. square red warning signs to our vehicles clear and completely uplifting. Such open and determined talk of and soldiers on top cover fired warnings, Then came General Rodriguez, the counterinsurgency is relatively new in with pen flares and tracer rounds at any Commander of ISAF’s three-star Inter- ISAF. Western troops have been on the Afghans they felt were encroaching on national Joint Command HQ. Then there ground in Afghanistan since October their space. ISAF vehicles were an an- were Generals Flynn, Mayville and Lin- 2001, but it was several years before a noyance, if not a danger, to commercial ington, and the charismatic Dr Kim of coherent insurgency began to show it- and private Afghan road users. General the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan. self. I argue that it was not until the au- McCrystal took over from General McKi- The stream of top players from ISAF, the tumn of 2009 that ISAF as a whole really ernan in June 2009. A couple of months Afghan Security Forces and the Afghan started pursuing a counterinsurgency or after taking over, General McCrystal Government kept coming. Clearly, they COIN strategy. started pushing out letters and directives wanted us to get the message – this is a ISAF’s approach to driving on Afghan that changed the nature of the ISAF ef- counterinsurgency campaign. roads is a good example. I did a tour fort. Under McCrystal, ISAF got a Driv- Some were shocked to hear General of Southern Afghanistan in 2008–2009; ing Directive: ISAF was to share the road Petraeus put the insurgency in third place General McKiernan was COMISAF. Those and move at the pace of the local civilian on his list of threats to the ISAF mission. who worked closely with him, and I did traffic; the signs came off. Other Direc-

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ferent cultures and traditions. This is important, because when confronting an insurgency, campaign discipline is key. Of course, in what is actually a politi- cal struggle, this discipline needs to go beyond the military, the civil and secu- rity plans need to be coherent. So these various institutions need to communicate with each other, which brings me nicely to the next feature of AJP 3-4-4. AJP 3-4-4 will be classified NON SEN- SITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC. I could hand out copies of it at a meeting with the host nation, or indeed publish sections of it in the news- paper. This sort of transparency is an- other COIN innovation that requires the militaries of NATO and ISAF Contributing Nations to embrace a cultural change, and it’s a remarkably hard change to COIN briefing at the Joint Warfare Centre by the author, 1 July 2010. make. That balance between transpar- ency and security, or perhaps better de- tives followed, as well as statements, vis- and UK doctrines, it is not Afghanistan scribed as transparency and discretion, its and all imaginable forms of personal specific but, in my opinion, it gets across is very hard to find. As COMISAF, General appearance. the key COIN message better than the McCrystal was known to be a determined In November 2009, ISAF published the UK’s AFM Vol 1 and is simpler and more sharer of information, ruthlessly declas- ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency digestible than the US FM 3-34. It ex- sifying briefs and documents so that Guidance; it listed General McCrystal’s plains the nature of counterinsurgency they could be shared with other agen- five themes of COIN, which included the and goes on to give guidance on how cies that needed to be in step with ISAF. observation that “the conventional war- to structure a force for COIN. Notably, it Ultimately, of course, he shared a little fare culture is part of the problem.” The outlines some dramatic changes in the too much with Rolling Stone magazine change was very tangible. He also sent way we should think about intelligence. – which brings me back to where I came his message back to Washington and to But most importantly it will be a NATO in. General Petraeus had been COMISAF his NATO masters. COIN was already a product – endorsed by the donor Na- just over a week when he took a helicop- few years into a new renaissance. Op- tions – it will be a tool for pushing for a ter to the outskirts of Kabul to talk to the erations in Iraq had brought the subject common approach to counterinsurgency students on the Train the Trainer Course. to the fore and the U.S. Army had pub- amongst 28 militaries with distinctly dif- For an officer who had been rushed into lished its new COIN Doctrine, FM 3-34, in 2006. The UK also published its own work, AFM Vol 1 Part 10, in 2007. But it was the pace of events in NATO, fol- lowing the arrival of General McCrystal in Kabul, that I find striking. The new NATO COIN Doctrine for ex- ample; NATO called for the formation of a Counterinsurgency Task Force (COIN TF) in January 2010. They assembled a writing team for the new COIN doctrine in February and the draft went forward for ratification by the member Nations in April. Keen to get the word onto the street NATO even published it in a pre- ratification Joint Operational Guidance or JOG format, in May 2010. AJP 3-4-4, as it will come to be known once ratified, is actually a very good read. Like the U.S. The Queen’s Palace in Kabul – prior to its destruction during interethnic fighting in the 1990s.

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a job with no handover, and no lead in, he was remarkably comfortable with his portfolio; and using some good old fash- ioned ‘General magic’, without ever mak- ing the challenge seem less than over- whelming, he made us feel it was within our grasp. But then he was the man that, some claim, turned the tide in Iraq single A group of handed; the man that reinvented COIN women board a tram. The for the modern world. Indeed, General city had a well Petraeus himself made some favourable developed public comparisons between Iraq at its low transport system. point and Afghanistan as it is today and Kabul in the 1950s. by a number of metrics, including civilian death rates, Iraq appears to have been a much harder challenge. That said, Af- For the last 30 years an appendicitis has – until then the recruiting pool for these ghanistan’s darkness has a great deal been a fatal medical condition. People important posts will be dangerously more momentum than Iraq’s. have grown up learning to depend on small. I think it’s no exaggeration to say family, village and tribe; not state, health that illiteracy is limiting the rate of real IN THE 1950, KABUL had an extensive service or police. In some areas I have development in Afghanistan, and will tram and bus system, district nurses and visited, no one had paid any government continue to do so for another decade. midwives visited outlying villages and tax in living memory. General Petraeus had made it very clear the central government worked in some No surprise then that the Karzai ad- – the problems here are vast, but there form of harmony with the traditional ministration is facing some challenges is lots that is good here – we can do it, conflict resolution systems. Then in 1973 getting accepted – even in areas with lit- but we have to do it right. To that end Mohammed Daoud Khan ousted the Za- tle or no insurgent activity. Worse still, the rapid production of AJP 3-4-4 is an hir Shah and one of the region’s most lib- poppy and hashish cultivation has re- encouraging sign, its evidence of a sense eral and reforming regimes was replaced cently taken root in several of the coun- of urgency. It means we are starting to by what one US diplomat famously called try’s more troubled provinces, bestowing understand not just the scale of change a “police state.” Then, following another money and power on sections of the required of us, but the pressure of time coup in 1978, the Red Army rolled into society that would traditionally have had we are under. Afghanistan on December 24th 1979, little of either. When these young narco At the end of my trip Karzai closed the signalling the start of 10 years of almost traffickers and middle men challenge the airport over security concerns surround- constant fighting. traditional authority of the local elders, ing a big diplomatic visit. Then there were Worse still was the interethnic fight- the damage to communities can be pro- some road closures and a half hearted at- ing that followed the Soviet withdrawal found. With an average life expectancy tempt to rocket the base I was staying in 1989. Thousands of refugees fled into of 44 years, most people do not even at. Six e-mails and 24 hours later, a new Pakistan and Iran, following those that know what it feels like to live without the ticket in my hand, I went back to the air- had fled a decade earlier. Ninety percent threat of violence; the path back to nor- port. The security at the international air- of the houses in Kabul were destroyed. mality will be a long one for the Afghan port is a very Afghan affair; the lines are Then the Taliban took control of the people. But for me, the most worrying long, the checks are very thoroughly car- country in 1996, first in Kandahar and problem is illiteracy. With so few men ried out (by Afghans) and the few women the South, then in Kabul; only to be re- and women able to read, it is incredibly travellers are screened discreetly, out of moved five years later by a combination difficult to build the institutions needed sight in a side room. The in flight staff of Afghan resistance and British and to deliver effective local government and were polite and professional; the flight American troops. By 2010, the country rule of law to the provinces. left exactly on time and the food was had been in a state of almost perpetual Afghanistan has a centrally controlled good (by airplane standards). I looked conflict for 31 years; 36 if you count the government system; policy and budgets about for my Afghan/Dutch friend but repressive but largely stable period un- are held centrally and pushed down to could not see him. I exchanged pleas- der Daoud. That means that in many the provinces and districts. Even so, lo- antries with the man beside me, who areas there have been three decades cal government offices need staff to be appeared to be with a family group of of little or no investment in infrastruc- able to read letters and fill out ledgers 20 scattered over the full length of the ture, no national medical programs, or – police officers need to be able to fill aircraft. A few rows away there was a inoculations, or dental care and little out forms and submit reports. It will take passionate, but good natured, argument or no education. Anyone under 40 has half a generation to grow through edu- over seating – it seemed the man’s wife probably never been to a regular school. cated young candidates for these jobs could not read her ticket. 

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 49 Knowledge Management

How enhancing the Lessons Learned pillar can promote your Centre of Excellence (COE)

By CDR Michael Hallett, USA N, HQ SACT, Lessons Learned Course Director

A robust Lessons Learned capability will help you demonstrate the excellence of your Centre of Excellence. There are four main components of the Centre of Excellence Lessons Learned pillar.

Remedial Analysis Action Implementation Sharing Formulation Support

Direct Analysis support Provide precise Assist NATO and national Aggregate and sanitize to customers through recommendations action bodies observations, Lessons Subject Matter Expertise based on COE expertise. in implementation. Identified and Lessons provision. Serve as Learned. Disseminate an Analysis project Lessons Identified, coordinator and broker. Lessons Learned and Best Practices.

hile the uti lity of the ences with the brand. The brand thus Partner. As a partner, the COE will work Lessons Learned capa- simplifies customer decision-making, en- closely with customers on customer initi- bility for Nations and abling them to make the best use of one ated projects, providing customers with NATO is obvious, the of their scarcest resources: attention. As an extra set of expert hands. The inten- value of the Lessons applied to the COEs, this brand signifies sity of the partnership and the relative WLearned pillar to a Centre Of Excellence functional area Subject Matter Expertise – contribution of each partner (NATO com- (COE) is not always as clear. This article knowledge based excellence. With brand mand, other NATO organization, national offers an answer to the question: “What development in mind, we can distinguish Lessons Learned organization or national is in the NATO Lessons Learned capabil- three basic forms of COE customer inter- command) will vary with each project. ity for me?” In short, the NATO Lessons action: as a Dot, Partner, or Leader. However, the partnership means that the Learned capability provides the COE Dot on a map. When the COE is, in the COE is considered for inclusion in these with an optimal means through which mind of the customer, as ‘dot on a map’, activities as a normal part of the work to demonstrate the ‘Excellence’ or E in people know where to go when they process – not as an occasional contribu- COE. In some ways, demonstrating COE have a question in the COE’s area of ex- tor or afterthought. excellence is like developing a brand. A pertise. In this form of relationship, the Leader. As a leader, the COE will pro- brand provides information to potential COE is resource like a library – Nations, vide the project guidance, engagement customers by doing two things. First, NATO HQ and commands, and analysis and promotion necessary to initiate and a brand tells customers what to expect organizations turn to the COE for advice complete Lessons Learned related con- from a product or service. Second, it provided by credible Subject Matter Ex- tributions in the functional area. This provides a quick indication that they will perts. However, if the customer does not constitutes the most robust form of in- like what they get from interacting with actively request specific input from the teraction. the branded product or services because COE, the COE will seldom contribute to they have previously had good experi- the customer’s process. Customers and users: All three forms

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Figure1 Figures by Roger Snell and Michael Hallett. Figure 2 of interaction appropriate at times and in lives saved by the NATO operational The environmental gap: As indicated the COE will relate in one way to dif- commanders and the Nations who pro- in Figure 1 above, most of the observa- ferent customers. Who are these cus- vide the forces. Therefore, as shown in tions emanate from operations. Though tomers? Most directly, Allied Command Figure 1 above, ACO and its subordinate many of these observations and Lessons Operations (ACO) and the operational commands, operations, and the nations Identified make their way from the field forces under its control and the nations are the primary actors within the NATO to the Lessons Learned bodies within participating in the COE are critical cus- Lessons Learned capability. These actors the ACO structure and to the national tomers. Indirectly, NATO as a whole is both generate the bulk of the observa- Lessons Learned organizations, there is a customer. The COE Lessons Learned tions, Lessons Identified and Lessons considerable room for improvement in capability will enable you to help these Learned and benefit most directly from the Information and Knowledge Manage- customers collect, analyze, support the implementation of Lessons Identified ment (IKM) associated with these ob- implementation, and share Lessons into Lessons Learned. servations. The primary problem is that Learned related information. We will now In addition to the NATO Command many observations, Lessons Identified clarify the content of these relationships Structure under ACO, Allied Command and Lessons Learned from operation- in three parts. First, we will describe the Transformation (ACT) and its subordi- al forces are sent back to the national NATO Lessons Learned environment and nate commands are Lessons Learned Lessons Learned organizations via the the COE role within it. Second, we will consumers as well. The Joint Warfare deployed national IKM systems. Subse- explain the components of the COE Les- Centre (JWC) and Joint Force Train- quently, these Lessons Learned related sons Learned pillar. We will conclude by ing Centre (JFTC) incorporate Lessons products are not shared with the NATO describing the assistance available to the Identified and Lessons Learned into the Lessons Learned system and therefore COEs to enhance their Lessons Learned pre-deployment training they provide. do not contribute to the NATO knowledge pillar capability. ACT uses Lessons Identified and Lessons base. This sub-optimal sharing prevents Learned to inform the longer-term capa- national forces from benefiting from the The Lessons Learned Environment bility development on which it’s focused experience of other nations, leading to and the COE place within it: We now and to enhance its various training activi- repeated re-learning of mistakes and will briefly discuss the Lessons Learned ties. The Joint Analysis Lessons Learned failure to benefit from good practices as environment. The Lessons Learned envi- Centre (JALLC) helps support the NATO forces rotate in and out of theatre. ronment is populated by the nations, the Lessons Learned infrastructure, primary NATO Command Structure, and other through the management of the NATO COEs can help fill this LI and LL re- interested actors (United Nations, Euro- Lessons Learned Database and perform- lated IKM Gap: Increasing the robust- pean Union, private voluntary organiza- ing joint operational level analysis, gen- ness of the COE Lessons Learned pillar tions, businesses, NGOs, etc.). erating approximately 12–15 Analysis re- can help fill the IKM gaps created by The capability improvements the Les- ports annually. The JALLC also provides sub-optimal National LL sharing.(1) The sons Learned process generate are valu- analysis training, in the form of a week- functional area focus of the COEs, and able to each organization. In the case of long analysis course, and offers advice to NATO, Lessons Learned are applied im- Member and Partner Nations on enhanc- (1) The causes of the sub-obtimal National LL mediately and with the greatest effect ing their analysis capabilities. sharing are beyond the scope of this article.

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their intimate connection with the na- Root Cause Articulation. This is most im- support within the COE functional area tions, enables them to serve as a bridge portant part of the analysis process. is a potential ‘quick win’ for both ISAF between the national and NATO knowl- Remedial Actions that fail to address and the COEs. edge bases within their areas of exper- the root causes are worse than use- tise, and thus dramatically improve Les- less – not only will they fail to solve Subject Matter Expert Provision. Provid- sons Learned related information and the problem, they will divert resources ing experts to augment other organi- knowledge sharing, as seen in Figure 2. from activities that could actually re- zations analysis teams is another way We will now explain how COEs can help sult in an improved capability. If the for COEs to support the analysis com- fill this gap through a detailed discussion root cause is clearly articulated, and ponent of the LL process. For example, of COE LL pillar composition. the designation of the root cause(s) NATO or a Nation could request SME follows clearly and logically from the support from the COE on a research The COE LL Pillar: The Lessons analysis, then the stage will be set for trip to ISAF, or for an external peer re- Learned capability is, at its most basic, agreement on recommended Reme- view of a national LL publication. This a structured way to acquire feedback dial Actions. From the COE perspective, could include collaborating on analysis about an organizations’ activities, the cultivating a consensus that you have projects as a member of a distributed effects those activities generate (both properly articulated the root causes is analysis team. intended and unintended) and make the the most important aspect of the Anal- changes necessary to close the feedback ysis process. If the COE analysis team Analysis Project Coordinator and Broker. revealed gaps between desired and ac- is able to achieve customer ‘buy in’ of While the JALLC may provide the high- tual outcomes. The aim of the Lessons the COE root cause(s) articulation, cus- level Analysis Project Coordination, Learned capability is to use knowledge tomers will embrace the recommended the COE may in some cases serve as gained through experience, (and impor- Remedial Actions. If this buy in is not a central coordination point within its tantly the shared experience of others) achieved, then the Remedial Actions, functional area for analysis projects. to improve capabilities across the full recommendations, and the implemen- This has three dimensions: (1) the range of organizational activities. From tation activities that follow from them COE, as project coordinator, could or- a Comprehensive Approach perspective, are doomed to failure. COE analysis ganize and manage a team of analysts, this means improvement to capabilities activity can be divided into three main composed of analysts from several or- like interaction with development agen- types: direct support to customers, ganizations, as a distributed analytical cies, training local police, fires, manoeu- Subject Matter Expert provision to oth- network; (2) the COE could provide vre, logistics, etc. The aim of the Les- er analysis organizations, and analysis the team with meeting facilities at sons Learned capability is not to create a project coordination. the COE for face-to-face collaboration library – the Lessons Learned related ef- and report production; (3) the COE fort is intended to generate practical im- Direct Analysis Support to Customers could serve as an analysis project bro- provements. The COE pillar includes all and Users. Much of the COE analysis ker, providing visibility on the various elements of the NATO Lessons Learned activity will be initiated by customer re- NATO and national analysis projects. process, (identify, analyze, commit, im- quest for analysis expertise from with- The increased visibility on the various plement and share). However, this article in the functional domain. For example, projects, by enabling collaboration, focuses on the COE Lessons Learned pil- a Regional Command Lessons Learned has the potential to reduce costs and lar elements of Analysis, Remedial Action staff in ISAF, faced with several ob- increase the speed of project comple- (RA) Formulation, Implementation Sup- servations in need of further analysis tion for all actors involved. port and Sharing. within the COE functional area could ask the COE to gather the information II. Remedial Action Formulation I. Analysis from the RC (and other RCs for com- The bundle of root cause and recom- Although COEs will, of course, gener- parative purposes) LI databases for mended Remedial Action (RA) constitute ate their own observations, the majority further analysis. The COE would per- a Lesson Identified. The success of later of their observations will come “second form the analysis and could then rec- implementation activities requires that hand” from national forces in the field ommend to the RC LL organization if these RA speak directly and clearly to and from other Lessons Learned organi- the OBS are worth investing additional the root cause, and are formulated in a zations requiring analysis support from resources to push through the entire way that will evoke consensus about the the COE’s functional area experts. Ac- LL process. As part of this effort, the implementation way ahead. Whereas a cording to NATO, Analysis is “the study of COE would add value by discussing the regionally or nationally based LL gener- a whole by examining its parts and their issue with the Nations to determine if alist may have some insight into the is- interactions.” (AAP-6). Two key outputs the national LL organizations are see- sue, based on the analysis they perform, are generated by the analysis process: ing similar observations, and use this their RA formulation will result from a Root Cause(s) Articulation and Remedial knowledge to inform their recommen- perspective more like that provided by Actions Recommendations. dation to the RCs. This sort of analysis looking through a straw than the syn-

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optic vision of the whole functional area the COE: I trust their judgement, and IV. Sharing through Lessons that the COE staff can provide. The COE will focus on the potential unintended Learned Aggregation, Sanitization perspective on the functional area ena- consequences that the COE may have and Dissemination bles them to offer high quality RAs that been unaware of at their level” instead The COEs, due to their functional special- are both precise and can evoke the con- of doubting the RA validity. This is a not ization and close working relationships sensus required for implementation. insignificant advantage; easing the ap- with the nations are especially well suit- proval process will facilitate increasing ed to support the sharing component of Precision. The COEs, given their Subject capability improvement velocity – more the LL process. This sharing provides an Matter Expertise have the ability to capability improvement will occur in less ideal venue for COE excellence demon- make not just general recommenda- time. Thus the efficiency and effective- stration. Sharing has three components: tions (for example “improve pre-de- ness of the Alliance will be significantly Aggregation of LI and LL from various ployment training in this area”) but improved as a result of the COE efforts sources; sanitization of those inputs, in extremely precise suggestions for in this area. accordance with the appropriate security change. For example, if the doctrine policies; and disseminating those prod- requires modification, the COE can sub- III. Implementation support ucts both by pushing information out mit the recommended text, (“Change Implementation is the most difficult to customers and making it possible for paragraph 6.1 to read ....”) not simply part of the Lessons Learned process. interested units to pull the information point out in the recommended Reme- Although the COE will seldom have the when desired. We will now look at each dial Action that someone needs to do lead in planning or doing the actual im- of these in more detail. the work to make the changes to the plementation work, they are extremely doctrine or training plan or curriculum well place to provide implementation Aggregation. National actors in the in light of the root cause. By enabling support to the responsible action bodies. field constantly generate Observa- the Action Bodies to expend their The COE could provide implementation tions, Lessons Identified and Lessons scarce time and manpower resources support in two ways: as a delegated ac- Learned. However, these bits of infor- on endorsement and implementation tion body or as an assistant to a national mation remain scattered – as a result of recommended Remedial Actions, or NATO action body. collaborative trend analysis, pattern not Remedial Action formulation, the discernment and implementation, increased recommendation precision Delegated Action Body. For example, the where several actors work together to provided by the COE will accelerate COE, upon agreeing to a request from improve capabilities, reducing the ca- implementation. the primary action body, could serve pability improvement cost for all, oc- as an additional action body and help curs infrequently. In other words, in- Consensus. The perspective from which update doctrine, develop training pro- adequate information and knowledge the COE staff perceive the observa- grammes, provide training or send ex- management systems hinder Lessons tions within their area of expertise will perts to support components of larger Learned related sharing. The COEs enable the COE to make recommenda- training programmes, like the pre-de- could help ameliorate this problem tions that not only speak to the root ployment training taking place at the by aggregating the OBS, LI and LL in causes, but that incorporate the best Joint Warfare Centre or the Joint Force their functional area and making them thinking on the subject from within Training Centre. This is already occur- accessible via their own LL database the NATO Command Structure and ring in some cases. For example, the (capable of interacting with the NATO the nations. In addition, the multi-na- CIMIC COE has been tasked to update Lessons Learned database). How could tional nature of the COEs entails that the AJP 9. this be done? National representatives if a recommendation, constituting the in the COE could mine national LL da- expert military advice, is submitted by Assisting NATO and National Action Bod- tabases, perform post-deployment in- the COE, it is already the product of ies. In other situations, the COE could terviews with forces returning to their multinational review. Therefore, when serve as an assistant to NATO or national home countries, and review national submitted to a NATO working group or action bodies. COE assistance to NATO LL products (like newsletters and aca- other approval mechanism, it will ar- and national implementation activities demic papers) and then enter those rive not as the suggestion of a single would both accelerate national imple- items of broader interest into the COE nation or body, but as the result of a ment and contribute to interoperability LL Database. This aggregation would collaborative effort of experts. This will of implemented solutions and thus Al- provide several benefits, in addition to in effect ‘grease the skids’ for approval, liance interoperability as a whole. This the general benefits provided by a LL reducing approval burden on the part assistance could include the provision capability, including the creation of a of those actually responsible for imple- of SMEs, similar to the analysis support larger set of inputs through which to menting the change. The approval au- as discussed above. distinguish trends with the COEs func- thorities will be able to say with confi- tional focus, illumination of coopera- dence, “This is a recommendation from tive opportunities and reduced time for

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to system failure would be a sharable ences for the sharing of LI and LL and insight of great value, especially to publishing proceedings will help both forces unaccustomed to deploy into aggregate and distribute LL related LESSONS the region, or who are deploying with knowledge. Their primary advantage LEARNED PILLAR certain types of equipment for the first will be to use the motivation to pub- time. The LL from the COE could pro- lish to encourage the effort necessary A VALUABLE TOOL vide the needed impetus or justifica- to formulate operational insights and TO INCREASE COE tion for spending the money to weath- share them with others. VISIBILITY WHILE erize the gear before the unit got into – Contributing to the UNCLAS NATO LL HELPING YOU: theatre instead of the country send- Database available on the Internet. ing forces there and learning that the – Contributing to the NS WAN version of NATO standard for air conditioning is the NATO LL Database. — accomplish your unique work inadequate for operations in, for ex- — accelerate NATO ample, Western Africa. Conclusion transformation The narrow, but deep, functional area Dissemination. If the COEs did nothing COE focus supplies the preconditions else but aggregate and sanitize Na- for robust Information and Knowledge tional LI and LL in their functional area, Management necessary to effectively they would add significant value to the support execution of a Lessons Learned solution development by exposing ac- NATO LL capability. However, the final capability. The passion of the COE func- tion officers to pre-existing solutions. sharing component, dissemination, tional area experts provides them with provides an optimal method for both the necessary incentives to create and Sanitization. A question immediately COE brand development and providing share knowledge products that will save arises: What about security? Cur- the most value to the warfighter. The lives and improve operational efficiency rently, sharing is limited not only by heart of Lessons Learned – benefiting in the near term; and over the longer the lack of IKM systems, but also by from the painful experience of others term, generate improved National and the very appropriate limitations placed to make changes necessary to improve Alliance capabilities. The Centre Of Ex- on information sharing by security capabilities instead of paying the costs cellence Lessons Learned pillar refers concerns. Yet, the COEs could use in terms of inadequate capabilities to the capability to perform Analysis, their connections to national Lessons – requires effective dissemination. As recommend Remedial Actions, support Learned organizations to encourage a key disseminator, the COE will show- Implementation, and share the Lessons nations to re-write Observations, LI case its expertise with each LL related Identified and Lessons Learned that re- and LL within the COE functional area, product provided to customers. sult within the COE functional area. An so that they can be shared with NATO. effective LL pillar will both enable the In its most advanced form, sanitiza- Sharing tools. Below is a partial list of COE to perform its own work more ef- tion could come to mean working with Lessons Learned sharing tools COEs fectively and efficiently and enable it to the national LL organization foreign can use in brand development: better accelerate NATO transformation. disclosure officers to remove the data – Standard location on the COE webpage Several forms of assistance are avail- within the Observation, LI or LL that for the link to the COE’s LL database; able. The JALLC has an excellent analyst makes it classified. For example, in- – A format for COE LL Database entries course available, and ACT, in close coop- stead of saying “Person X in unit Y compatible with the NATO LL Data- eration with the JALLC, JWC, and sev- on Monday, 28 September 2008, 10 base to increase the interoperability of eral National LL organizations, offers a kilometres outside Herat observed...” the sharing system; week-long Lessons Learned Staff Officer the shared LL could read “A soldier in – Publishing newsletters, annuals (eg. course. Upon request, ACT can also pro- western Afghanistan...”. Modifications Top 10 COE X LL 2010, Top LL from vide mobile training teams on enhancing of these types, in addition to other RC South 2010), and reports (e.g. a COE LL capability. Utilization of these steps, would facilitate information talking to local government officials in training opportunities will enable the sharing. Of course, some national LL Afghanistan: LI 2010); COEs to quickly improve their own mis- will remain unshared. However, the – Training material production. For ex- sion accomplishment and add even more COE could discern trends or patterns ample, a COE could pull information value to the Alliance and nations while among them that could provide use- from an ISAF regional command, ap- demonstrating their excellence.  ful insight for defence planners. For ply COE Subject Matter Expertise, and example, the failure rates of specific then push out a training manual based pieces of gear may not be sharable, on the material into the national and but the fact that the lack of air condi- NATO training systems;  CDR Hallett can be contacted on his tioning in communication vehicles led – Sponsor conferences. Holding confer- email: [email protected]

54 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 FPOWERriend or foe? POINT

Is the slide mightier

By Paul Sewell than the sword? Lessons Learned Analyst, JCID, Joint Warfare Centre

Introduction In this article you will find how surpris- tations more engaging, interesting and are infected with the same slides full of ingly simple it is to turn your presenta- therefore more valuable. funny cats, cheesy motivational posters tion into something that is engaging PowerPoint is used everywhere, not and Super Bowl videos. Some may argue and enjoyable both for you and your only by the military but also govern- that PowerPoint is the Alliance’s Centre audience. With these in place, learning ments, major corporations and even our of Gravity. Take away PowerPoint and becomes ultimately richer. This is the children’s schools. NATO is no exception you take away one of our main ways of first in a series of articles offering you and this popular piece of software has communicating with each other! Despite new ways to use PowerPoint. They will been used to give direction and guid- being the ‘weapon of choice’ in our world present you with recent research and ance, launch new concepts, maintain of knowledge management, there is still different approaches, which you can ap- situational awareness, as well as adver- no sufficient NATO training in this meth- ply immediately to make your presen- tize the local base barbeque. All of which od of presentation. We’ve made the mis-

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amount of mental energy in our head to use to pay attention to the world around us. As soon as we become overloaded then our attention span drops and so does our ability to learn. The principles of this theory have direct consequences for PowerPoint. How we typically use PowerPoint quickly overloads people with all of its different features. Take a typical slide with too much text, full of animations, and clip art with a present- er reading out loud every single word. Now imagine each of these elements as separate people all talking to you at once, competing for your attention. How much would you be able to pay attention to? This is exactly the same with Pow- erPoint. Therefore it’s our responsibility Example of a ‘good’ slide: simple, precise and the pictures speak 1,000 words as the old saying as presenters to make the material as goes. The author (right) stresses that we should no longer accept lifeless presenting. simple and engaging as possible to help your audience learn. take of assuming that because the tool is nication. Ideally, we are all knowledge so common that no training is required. workers and PowerPoint should be seen However, you only need to endure a full as a useful tool to allow us to commu- COGnitive day of PowerPoint briefings to realize that nicate more effectively, rather than a such training is sadly lacking. blunt object to bludgeon our audience to While PowerPoint definitely serves a sleep. We should no longer accept the OverlOad purpose, its gimmicks and visual tricks traditional method of static, lifeless pre- take us away from its original function: senting. Rather we need to adopt new TheOry to help support a presentation that en- techniques and better still, new bench- gages the audience, allowing them to marks to use when developing our pres- learn, understand and/or appreciate the entations. The remainder of the article material. The key word here is engage: will be spent tackling some of the worst the ability to get the audience involved habits in presentations, why they are so and interested in the material you are counterproductive to our communica- presenting. Without this engagement, tion, and what you can do immediately your audiences will not be open to learn- to improve them. According to the Cognitive Overload Theory, ing anything. If we are honest, the ma- if you read the text on the slide to your audi- ence, they must then now focus on the text jority of presentations we both give and Common Issues and your voice which quickly reduces their receive are far from engaging. Instead Any one of us can list countless examples ability to understand the material. we are forced to sit through slide after of bad presentations. Too many words on slide, hour after hour, without really re- the slide, an overuse of acronyms, inap- Reading out the text on the slide membering or absorbing any of the con- propriate clip art, confusing animations One big mistake which is made all the tent! For some, the aim of their briefing and so on. They all share the same core time is when the presenter reads the text is just to finish it without the Commander bad habit: they take attention away from on the slide out loud. If we step back asking questions. And the more we see learning the real content the presenter and consider it, this is ludicrous. The text videos of herding cats or linebacker Terry wants to communicate. is already there for the audience to read, Tate tackling an unethical staff member, Significant research has been con- so why read it to them? Reading the text the less potent they become in helping ducted on what effects peoples’ atten- is actually worse for learning. According us achieve our aim. tion(1). One particular theory of attention to the Cognitive Overload Theory, if you Few would argue that this powerful which deals specifically with PowerPoint read the text on the slide to your audi- tool is not being used as well as it could is Cognitive Overload Theory(2). Despite ence, they must then now focus on the be. If the Alliance’s main strength is its the title it is actually simple to explain unity, it makes sense to at least try to and its principles can be easily applied to (1) “Researcher points finger at PowerPoint” improve how we use PowerPoint, argu- your own presentations. In essence, the (2007) Sydney Morning Herald. ably one of our main tools of commu- theory says that we each have a limited (2) www.tip.psychology.org

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ple learn better when words and pic- tures are presented at the same time or next to each other on the screen. Following from the first principle, if you do choose to use pictures in your slides, make sure they relate to the text. That is, your audience will be more open to your message if the pic- tures and text you use correspond. For example, maps are often used in slides to convey situational awareness. TAKE AWAY: To increase the learning, consider annotating the map with text highlighting the areas you wish to talk about. This will help focus the audience The New York Times columnist Elisabeth Bumiller titled her article as “We Have Met the Enemy and on what they need to know. He Is PowerPoint” referring to the slide shown to General McChrystal (above), which was “meant to portray the complexity of American military strategy, but looked more like a bowl of spaghetti”. 4) The principle of Modality: peo- ple learn much better from anima- text and your voice (in effect, now ‘two and pictures rather than just words. The tion with spoken text than printed text. separate voices’) which quickly reduces pictures serve as visual reference points PowerPoint is famous (or infamous) for its their ability to understand the mate- to help the audience understand what ability to animate slides. We have all seen rial. This is even more difficult when the you are trying to communicate. slides with blocks and boxes spinning, majority of the audience are non-native TAKE AWAY: Try to reduce the number sliding and disappearing off the page. English speakers who are using even of words in your slides. Don’t use full The presenter is tricked into thinking that more of their mental energy to compre- sentences, just phrases as support for this helps the audience stay engaged or, hend the material. Consider some of the what you are speaking out loud. Use an at very least, awake. Unfortunately, this worst PowerPoint presentations you’ve image only if it supports the text. is rarely the case as animation in slides is seen in your careers, and you will un- often annoying. When there is also text derstand what it means to be overload- 2) The principle of Coherence: peo- on the slide it then becomes only more ed. A perfect example is a slide which ple learn better when extraneous ma- confusing and difficult to concentrate on. was shown to General McChrystal, the terial is removed rather than included. TAKE AWAY: If your slide requires ani- former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan The main thrust of this principle is that mation (really?) then it is more effective last year. NATO presentations are full of simple is better and should be the man- to use the spoken word rather than hav- examples of these kinds of diagrams. tra of anyone making slides. Try to re- ing text on the slide with the animation. member that our brains can only pay The six principles of Cognitive attention to a limited amount of informa- 5. The principle of Signaling: people Overload Theory tion. When we fill a slide with extra clip learn better when the material is organ- The research shows that some of the art or side bars or even our logos, our ized with clear outlines and headings. most common approaches to building audience must then struggle to attend to This would appear to be an obvious princi- and presenting slides are actually doing all of these things on the slide. The more ple but in practice it’s rarely used. A com- all things that overload our audiences. clutter on the slide means more chatter mon offender of bad PowerPoint is the ef- Cognitive Overload Theory gives us six you have to deal with in your mind and fort to cram as much material as possible main principles to take away. Despite therefore more difficult to concentrate. onto the slide assuming that we all have their titles, at the core of each is a simple TAKE AWAY: Only use what you need in photographic memories and can absorb all guideline you can use when making and the slide to communicate your idea. An- the words and diagrams WHILE the pre- delivering your presentations. While ything extra is acting against your effec- senter is reading the text at the same time. reading these you may wish to consider tiveness. Consider the words of Antoine TAKE AWAY: When building a slide how you could apply them to the de Saint-Exupéry: “A designer knows he with a number of elements, consider presentations you need to make. has achieved perfection not when there your audience: where will their eyes is nothing left to add, but when there is go first? If you’re showing a process, 1) The principle of Multimedia: people nothing left to take away”. Consider us- does it flow logically on the slide? What learn better from words and pictures than ing your HQ’s logo on just the first slide is the general language ability of the words alone. Using a visual format like then omit it from the rest. audience? Are they all native English PowerPoint, your audience will learn bet- speakers or is English their third, fourth ter when you use a combination of words 3) The principle of Contiguity: peo- or fifth language? ►►►

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6. The principle of Personalization: peo- delivering presentations that they can ple learn better from conversational style understand and appreciate, otherwise than formal style. Some would say that that time is wasted for all involved. The our approach to PowerPoint as a learning positive side is that this is relatively easy tool hasn’t evolved much since the days to fix, and applying even simple changes of the overhead projector with those old can bring real tangible effects. In fact, if acetate slides. In some ways this is true. you only use the six principles in this ar- However, just because the technology ticle you will find your audience is more has improved it doesn’t mean that our able to understand the content of your approach to giving presentations has. In PowerPoint Shortcuts presentations which makes them more some regards, the habit of formal pres- valuable. entations remains. Research shows that This, however, is only the beginning. Here are simple keyboard shortcuts people learn better when the person de- which are useful to use when you’re The next two articles will take you fur- livers their presentation in conversational in the middle of a presentation: ther and show you how you can make tones rather than using the bleak formal your PowerPoint presentations more im- method. The more conversational you are F5 - starts your presentation from the pacting and memorable. The next article in your approach, the easier it is for your first slide. will describe some simple design princi- audience to move between what you are ples, looking at how you make slides (the saying and what your slides are showing. Shift + F5 - starts your presentation design) to keep your audiences engaged (The next article explores this more deeply). from the current slide. and interested in your slides rather than TAKE AWAY: Learn your material well playing Sudoku or falling asleep. The fi- enough that you don’t have to read from B - blacks out your presentation. This nal article will then focus on what you your notes or your slides. Although this is helpful when you want your audi- put in your slides (the content) and how can be difficult, particularly for non- ence to temporarily focus on just you to transform it in such a way that it be- English speakers, this improves with and not the slide. Press B again to comes engaging for both you and your practice. bring it back. audiences. Finally, we must remember that PowerPoint is just a tool. And like W - whites out your presentation. For Summary any tool it can be used to either help the same reason as above. The sleep-inducing effects of PowerPoint or hinder what you are trying to com- are well known. How many of us have municate. By considering the content in Number Followed by Enter - takes left a day’s worth of briefings, dragging these three articles you will be able to ul- you directly to that numbered slide. our feet out the door and sapped of all timately make better presentations and strength? Unfortunately PowerPoint’s Ctrl + T - brings up the taskbar. This create more engaged audiences.  numbing effect is worldwide. Worse still, is useful if you want to switch to an- PowerPoint is now being taught to our other open programme. children at increasingly younger ages!  Paul Sewell is a NATO civilian from the With PowerPoint being used as widely Ctrl + S - brings up the list of slides. JWC’s Lessons Learned Section. He is an in- as it is, it is critical that we start tak- This can help you quickly locate the structor at the NATO LL Staff Officer Course ing responsibility for the output of our slide you are looking for without stop- and has also been responsible for the creation presentations. Our audiences have given ping the whole presentation. of many After Action Reviews (both the con- tent and the slides) for the JWC’s major NRF us their time and attention and so we and ISAF exercises. He can be contacted on should respect them by creating and his email: [email protected]

Which path will you take?

58 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Environmental Protection During NATO-led Military Operations . K. Smith K. U.S. Air Force Tech Sgt Laura Sgt Laura Tech Force Air U.S. patrol photo by by photo patrol

By Col Kevin Luster, USA A, Former Staff Legal Advisor, Joint Warfare Centre Kabul, Afghanistan -- ISAF -- ISAF Afghanistan Kabul,

I. Introduction II. The NATO Environmental Environmental issues confront NATO its general principles, the North Atlantic Protection Doctrine commanders and their staff at all levels Treaty seeks to promote stability and In establishing NATO’s environmental of operations.(1) NATO legal advisors and well-being through international peace, doctrine, STANAG 7141 provides envi- environmental specialists serve critical security, justice, and the rule of law.(2) ronmental planning guidelines for mili- roles advising their commanders and Additionally, the NATO SOFA recognizes tary activities, recognizes the need for staff on environmental protection laws, the duty of a force to respect the laws environmental risk management, es- regulations, and standards. This article of a receiving state.(3) Since the 1960s, tablishes environmental responsibilities will provide a basic understanding of NATO member nations, as well as many of NATO commanders, announces en- NATO’s doctrine for environmental pro- other states, have adopted a growing vironmental training requirements, and tection during NATO-led military opera- body of domestic and international laws lists national military points of contact tions, identify important environmental and agreements to protect the environ- for environmental matters. The doctrine protection requirements that deployed ment. On 26 February 2008, recognizing acknowledges that operational require- NATO forces are expected to follow, the need to provide environmental plan- ments have priority; however, to mini- and briefly describe international trea- ning guidance for NATO military activi- mize adverse effects of military activities ties concerning environmental protection ties, NATO promulgated its doctrine for without compromising military readiness that NATO commanders and their staff environmental protection in Standardized or mission accomplishment, it states should know of. Agreement (STANAG) 7141, Joint NATO that NATO commanders should consider The North Atlantic Treaty, the NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection the potential environmental impacts of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and During NATO-Led Military Activities.(4) military activities as early as possible in the Paris Protocol do not address envi- the planning process while less damag- ronmental protection; however, within ing alternatives are still available.(5) Ad-

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ditionally, a full understanding of envi- open air burning, disposal of wastewater, may limit the force’s activities. This of ronmental conditions and of applicable oil and petroleum product spills, disposal course is an important role for the com- environmental laws and regulations ena- of solid waste, hazardous waste, medical mander’s legal advisor and environmen- bles commanders and their staff to plan and infectious wastes, use of pesticides tal specialist. Ignorance is rarely, if ever effectively and act appropriately. Further, and herbicides, noise, and activities that a defence to violation of environmental NATO commanders are expected to in- affect wetlands and other environmental laws and regulations. Therefore, it is es- tegrate environmental risk management or culturally sensitive areas. sential that the commander has readily into the overall planning for military ac- available professionals who are knowl- tivities to balance environmental protec- (4) At the beginning of the operation, edgeable about environmental protec- tion against the risks to the force and prepare an Environmental Baseline Study tion requirements. mission accomplishment.(6) (EBS) for any NATO occupied or used site and, at the end of the operation or Environmental Risk Management: Planning Guidelines for Military when handing over the site, prepare a Under NATO’s doctrine for Environmen- A ctivities(7): When planning military closure or handover EBS to document tal Protection during NATO-led military activities, STANAG 7141 provides the fol- the condition of the site. This will enable activities, commanders and their staff lowing guidelines for NATO commanders the headquarters to properly resolve should thoroughly plan both exercises and their staffs: disputes or claims for any environmen- and operations to minimize unnecessary tal damage resulting from the NATO-led risks to the environment and human (1) Indentify activities that could impact operation. health. They should conduct exercises the environment and consider alterna- under peacetime conditions in a manner tives and contingencies. For example, (5) Identify reasonable mitigation meas- consistent with applicable environmental consider the potential consequences ures to reduce the risk to the environ- rules and regulations. During military of handling petroleum products, solid ment, human health and safety pre- operations, commanders may balance waste, hazardous waste, waste water, sented by NATO-led activities. This may environmental protection with mission and emissions into the air. Also, consider include selecting alternative locations, objectives; however, early planning will where the NATO force will draw its po- activities, methods or procedures that enable commanders to avoid conflicts table water and how that activity could will enable the force to accomplish its between environmental protection and impact the local population and envi- mission with less risk to the environment their mission. According to STANAG ronment. Determine whether there are or human health. 7141,(8) the key elements of risk man- reliable contractors available to properly agement are: handle solid waste, including hazardous (6) STANAG 7141 provides six strate- and medical waste, in accordance with gies to prevent pollution and conserve Commander’s Environmental Policy. The host nation and international standards. resources. These are: commander should provide clear guid- If not, identify suitable alternatives. a. Source reduction – reduce or elimi- ance and stated objectives for environ- nate the use of hazardous materials; mental protection as early as possible in (2) Determine the environmental char- b. Preventative measures – take precau- the planning process. acteristics of the area of operation and tions such as placing drip pans under ve- Environmental Planning. In line with the identity those aspects that could impact hicles to prevent oil and fuel spillage; commander’s policy or guidance, devel- NATO operations or be impacted by mili- c. Re-use – when practical, use the same op an environmental plan and include it tary activities, such as the area’s climate, product over again; as an Annex to the Operational Plan (OP- water quality, air quality, natural and d. Recycle; LAN). The Annex should address con- cultural resources, wetlands, birds and e. Treatment – treat hazardous waste to tingencies, identify risks, and prescribe their migration routes, endangered and make it non-hazardous; mitigation measures. exploited species and their critical habi- f. Disposal – as a last resort, ensure that Implementation. Ensure that all person- tat. Additionally, though not specifically waste is properly disposed of. nel are trained, aware of the environ- mentioned in STANAG 7141, it is impor- mental issues, and understand their re- tant to identify man-made objects such (7) Identify the national and international sponsibilities. Commanders should also as dams, dykes, nuclear power generat- environmental laws that apply to NATO- assign responsibilities and resources for ing facilities, chemical plants, and other led activities in the area of operation. As environmental protection, and work with facilities or sites that if damaged or de- early as possible when planning for the local authorities to address problems stroyed could cause catastrophic conse- operation, identify operational limits or and concerns. quences to the local civilian population. restrictions imposed by applicable envi- Checking and Correcting Actions. Con- ronmental regulations and/or policies. It tinuously monitor activities to ensure (3) Indentify potential impacts on air, is especially important to identify host compliance and consistency with the water, soil and ground water from mili- nation laws and requirements, as well commander’s environmental protection tary activities such as vehicle emissions, international laws and obligations that policy and objectives. Conduct periodic

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inspections of sites, monitor for changes, points of origin, transit, and destination and use periodic inspection reports for should receive prior detailed notice of baseline studies. the hazardous waste shipment. After Action Review. Identify and report Lessons Learned in order to improve fu- — The Stockholm Convention on Per- ture planning. sistent Organic Pollutants(14): Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) are organic Commander’s Environmental Re- chemicals, including pesticides, herbi- sponsibilities: The principle respon- cides, industrial chemicals and their by- sibility for all NATO commanders is to products, which can remain throughout achieve their mission; nevertheless, to the environment, accumulate in the fatty the extent possible, under STANAG 7141, tissues of animals, and may cause health NATO commanders should: promote en- problems such as cancer and damage vironmental protection and awareness; to the nervous system. The purpose of assign responsibilities and resources to the Stockholm Convention is to promote achieve environmental protection objec- environmentally sound management of tives; consider environmental impacts Full understanding of environmental conditions POPs, to include limiting their produc- when making decisions; comply with is necessary in the planning process of military tion, preventing unintentional releases activities. ISAF photo by U.S. Air Force TSgt environmental laws and agreements; re- Laura Smith. of POPs into the environment, and re- sponsibly use the natural resources un- stricting their transboundary movement. der their control; address environmental environmental protection. Finally, of par- NATO forces using these chemicals or problems when they arise, and promote ticular concern to commanders and their engaging contractors who use them pollution prevention and resource con- staff, NATO commands should develop should ensure that individuals using servation.(9) Additionally, commanders environmental specialists to ensure that POPs understand and comply with the should plan and specify guidelines for they are readily available to advise com- restrictions for their use. waste management, including agree- manders and their staff on environmen- ments for waste disposal, and ensure tal issues, applicable requirements, and — The Convention on International Trade that any transboundary movements of methods for managing risk. in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and waste comply with international and na- Flora(15): NATO forces deploying to areas tional laws. III. International Treaties where there are endangered or exploited — The Basel Convention on the Control species should know that the headquar- Environmental Training and Educa- of Transboundary Movements of Hazard- ters and the members of the force may tion: Environmental training is a national ous Wastes and Their Disposal(12): The not ship endangered or exploited spe- responsibility and each nation is expected Basel Convention and its subsequent cies or their specimens without proper to analyze the training needs for its forc- amendments, restricts the movement authority; otherwise, the headquarters es and establish its own guidelines for of hazardous waste across international may suffer serious embarrassment and environmental training.(10) Environmental boundaries.(13) It prohibits export of individuals could face severe criminal training and education should develop hazardous wastes to certain countries, sanctions. The Convention on Interna- military personnel’s understanding of particularly developing countries which tional Trade in Endangered Species of environmental protection requirements have prohibited the import of hazardous Fauna and Flora (CITES) restricts inter- and increase commanders’ awareness of wastes or are not capable of managing national trade in species threatened with their environmental protection responsi- the waste in an environmentally sound extinction or over-exploitation through bilities. Environmental protection educa- manner. Additionally, transboundary a system of export and import permits tion should address protection of water movements of hazardous wastes must based on varying degrees of protection. resources, air quality, vegetation and have prior written consent of competent For instance, species listed in Appendix soil, landscape quality (e.g. litter preven- authorities from the countries of export, I of the Convention, which are species tion), natural resources such as wildlife transit, and import, and detailed move- identified as threatened with extinction, and habitat, and natural and man-made ment documents must accompany each may only be imported when the scientific heritage. It should also address pollution shipment of hazardous waste. The Basel authority of the State of import deter- prevention, noise abatement, energy Convention also promotes sound environ- mines that the import of the species or conservation, waste minimization and mental management practices, including its specimen is for purposes which are recycling.(11) Finally, it should address waste reduction and improved technol- not detrimental to the survival of the domestic (sending state) and host na- ogy. Proper transboundary movement of species, the recipient of a living species tion environmental laws and policies, as hazardous waste requires early planning, is suitably equipped to house and care well as NATO’s environmental doctrine specialized advice, and detailed docu- for it, and the management authority of and policies and international laws on mentation. Competent authorities at the the State of import is satisfied that the

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recipient will not use the species for “pri- Convention states that each party to the Footnotes marily commercial purposes.”(16) Convention “undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of 1. Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 7141, Subject: Joint NATO Doctrine for En- — Armed Conflict and the Environment: environmental modification techniques vironmental Protection during NATO Led Mili- In addition to the basic principles of the having widespread, long-lasting or se- tary Activities, 28 February 2008, Annex A, law of armed conflict: distinction, mili- vere effects as the means of destruc- Environmental Doctrine, Footnote 1 defines tary necessity, proportionality, and hu- tion, damage or injury to any other State “environment” as “[t]he surroundings in which manity, there are international treaties Party.” Article II defines “environmental an organism operates, including air, water, that attempt to limit the impact of armed modification techniques” as “any tech- land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans and their interrelation.” conflict on the environment. niques for changing – through deliber- 2. The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Preamble, ate manipulation of natural processes Articles I and II. — Protocol I to the Geneva Convention – the dynamics, composition or structure 3. NATO SOFA Article II. of 1949, Relating to the Protection of of the Earth, including its biota, lithos- 4. STANAG is defined as “[a] normative docu- Victims of International Armed Conflicts, phere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or ment, recording an agreement among several or all NATO member nations, that has been requires care “in warfare to protect the outer space.” (21) ratified at the authorized national level, to im- environment against widespread, long- plement a standard, in whole or in part, with term severe damage,” and prohibits IV. Conclusion or without reservation. Note: NATO member “methods or means of warfare which are NATO’s Environmental Protection Doc- nations may ratify a STANAG without imple- intended or may be expected to cause trine requires commanders and their mentation in their own country, if the prereq- such damage to the natural environment staff to consider environmental impacts uisites for the implementation are not met.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO and thereby to prejudice the health or of military activities as early as possi- Standardization Agency, Allied Administrative (17) survival of the population.” It also ble in the planning process. A deploying Publication No. 42 (AAP-42) Edition 1, 2007, prohibits attacks, destruction or removal command should identify the environ- NATO Glossary of Standardization Terms and of objects indispensable to the survival mental conditions of the host nation, po- Definitions, at pages 2-6 & 2-7. of a civilian population, such as food, tential environmental impacts of its mili- 5. STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for livestock, drinking water facilities, and ir- tary activities, host nation environmental Environmental Protection During NATO-led (18) Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008, rigation works. Additionally, Protocol laws and standards, and the capabili- at page Annex A, page A-1. I prohibits attacks against works and in- ties of the force and the host nation to 6. “Environmental risk management is the stallations containing dangerous forces, properly address environmental issues. process of detecting, assessing and controlling such as dams, dykes, and nuclear elec- Through early and continuous liaison risks arising from operational factors together trical generating stations, if such attacks with the host nation, the deploying com- with balancing risk with mission benefits.” See page A-1, Annex A to STANAG 7141, Joint may cause the release of dangerous mand can properly plan for environmen- NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection forces resulting in severe losses among tal protection and avoid unnecessary and During NATO LED Military Activities, dated 28 civilian populations. However, this spe- costly environmental damage. Addition- February 2008. cial protection may not apply if the fa- ally, in conducting military operations, 7. STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for cility provides regular, significant and it is important to recognize that the law Environmental Protection During NATO Led direct support to military operations and of armed conflict prohibits the dispro- Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008, at pages A-2 thru A-4. if such attack is the only feasible way to portionate use of force, especially as it 8. STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for terminate the facility’s support to military may impact civilian populations. Conse- Environmental Protection During NATO led operations.(19) Of course, the attacking quently, it is unlawful to use a method Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008, force must take all reasonable precau- of warfare likely to release dangerous page A-4. tions to avoid release of the dangerous forces upon a civilian population, result 9. See page B-1, Annex B to STANAG 7141, force. It must also apply the principle of in widespread, long-term damage to the Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Pro- tection During NATO LED Military Activities, proportionality and not use force where environment, or otherwise cause severe dated 28 February 2008. the expected incidental loss of life or in- hardship or jeopardize the population’s 10. See page C-1, Annex C to STANAG jury to civilians or civilian objects is ex- survival. NATO commanders and their 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental cessive in relation to the direct military staff therefore rely upon their legal ad- Protection During NATO LED Military Activi- advantage anticipated.(20) visors and environmental specialists to ties, dated 28 February 2008. 11. See page C-2, Annex C to STANAG know the applicable environment protec- 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental — The Convention on the Prohibition tion laws and standards, to understand Protection During NATO LED Military Activi- of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of environmental issues, and recommend ties, dated 28 February 2008. Environmental Modification Techniques appropriate solutions.  12. The Basel Convention was signed on 22 (EMMOD Convention) prohibits the hos- March 1989 and entered into force on 5 May tile use of environmental modification 1992. There are presently 172 parties to the Basel Convention. See Secretariat of the Basel techniques against the environment Convention International Environmental House as a means of warfare. Article I of the website at http://www.basel.int.

62 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Visit of HMS

13. The Basel Convention defines “hazardous Cossack Association wastes” as wastes considered hazardous by the country of export, transit, or import, or are listed in Annex I of the Convention and pos- sess one or more of the characteristics listed in Annex III, such as explosive, flammable, corrosive, toxic, infectious, etc. See the Basel Convention Article I, Annexes I and III. 14. The Stockholm Convention was signed on 22 May 2001 and entered into force on 17 May 2004. See the Secretariat of the Stock- holm Convention website at: http://www. Photos by chm.pops.int. Sgt Lars Lenvik, NOR A, 15. The Convention on International Trade JWC Graphics Section in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) was signed on 3 March 1973 and en- tered into force 90 days later. CITES currently has 175 participants. See the CITES website Chaired by Admiral (Ret.) Sir James ing this, Association members attended at: http://www.cites.org. Eberle, the HMS Cossack Association a service at the memorial monument in 16. See CITES, Article III, Regulation of Trade visited the Joint Warfare Centre on 31st Jøssingfjord on the subject “The War’s in Specimens Included in Appendix I. May 2010 as part of a four-day famil- Human Sacrifice”. During a lunch held 17. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven- tion of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the iarization visit to commemorate the “Alt- at Jåttå on 31st May, Admiral Sir James Protection of Victims of International Armed mark Incident”, which took place on 16 Eberle said: “The people of Sokndal wel- Conflicts (Protocol I), 9 June 1977, Article 55. February 1940 in Jøssingfjord, Norway. comed our Association with open arms 18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con- The Mayor of Sokndal, Mr Dag Sorensen, and laid out a memorial event that will be vention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to accompanied the party. At Jåttå, the visi- forever remembered in my mind as well the Protection of Victims of International Armed tors were greeted by Brigadier Gunnar as my colleagues’. I was rather moved Conflicts (Protocol I), 9 June 1977, Article 54. E. Gustavsen, who also hosted a lunch with visiting Jøssingfjord where historic 19. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven- for them. events took place. It is also very inter- tion of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the The visit to Sokndal took place earlier, esting and informative to visit the Joint Protection of Victims of International Armed on 29 May 2010. Capt (N) Stuart Fur- Warfare Centre. We thank you for your Conflicts (Protocol I), 9 June 1977, Article 56. ness, the then Chief Joint Exercise Divi- hospitality.” Mr Dag Sorensen, the Mayor With respect to Non-International Armed Con- sion, accompanied Association members of Sokndal, said: “I am very impressed flicts, see Protocol Additional to the Geneva on their programme at sea; a veteran by this visit. The most important thing Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating fishing vessel took them from Sogndal- in life is companionship and community. to the Protection of Victims of Non-International strand to Jøssingfjord in order for them Indeed, a lot of people from Sokndal at- Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 9 June 1977. Ar- to get an impression of the waters where tended the memorial event in Jøssingf- ticles 14 and 15 of Protocol II prohibit attacks, the British Tribal Class Destroyer, HMS jord. That was brilliant. I also invite the destruction or removal of objects indispensa- ble to the survival of civilian population (Article Cossack, operated in the hunt for the JWC community to come and visit Sokn- 14), and also prohibit attacks against works German Support Vessel Altmark. Follow- dal.” (Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO) and installations containing dangerous forces, such as dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations, if such attacks may cause JWC Bicycle Club participation the release of dangerous forces resulting in se- vere losses among civilian populations (Article in Nordsjørittet 15). On 12 June 2010, 19 brave men and two women from 20. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con- the JWC Bicycle Club headed down to Egersund for the vention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to start of Nordsjørittet – a 91km bike race to Sandnes the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 9 June 1977, Article 51. along the beautiful coastline of Rogaland. Little did they 21. The EMMOD Convention was adopted by know what was waiting for them when they signed up the United Nations General Assembly on 10 for the race in January: A lot of rain, wind and cold! The December 1976, and entered into force on 5 Per Erik Sørgaard (white hel- weather couldn’t get any worse. Among almost 9,000 October 1978. See International Committee met) in Bryne. others, JWC cyclists were getting ready to fight the ele- of the Red Cross, Advisory Service on Interna- ments and put their willpower to a test. What normally tional Humanitarian Law, 1976 Convention on could be a 4-5 hour nice ride in the Norwegian summer sun turned out to be a 6-9 the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of hour fight in the mud; against the strong northwest wind in the open landscape. The Environmental Modification Techniques, dated finish line in Sandnes seemed to be infinitely far away! The JWC team even witnessed 01/2003. another cyclist literally being blown off the road. But what a feeling it was when they finally crossed the finish line as true champions – they have beaten the rain, beaten the wind and beaten the inner voice that told them to stop in every five minutes! One thing is certain: Next year can only be better and hopefully the JWC team will be able to participate with even more cyclists! Thanks to the JWC Transportation Branch for providing transport and the JWC Bicycle Club for sponsoring parts of the entry fee! Re- sults, pictures and other info on Nordsjørittet can be found at www.nordsjorittet.no. CAX SUPPORT @ JOINT WARFARE CENTRE By Dr Erdal Cayirci, CAX Support Branch Chief SMC4 Division, Joint Warfare Centre

IN A COMPUTER ASSISTED EXERCISE managing experiments by using CAX data — To fulfil these functions the the Branch (CAX), electronic means are used for the and for compiling and presenting the data organizes and runs the following events: following purposes: collected by the simulation system as well — To immerse the Training Audience in as deriving information from these data. NATO Joint CAX Forum: The JWC started a realistic situation and environment; the NATO Joint CAX Forum in 2006 to — To help the Exercise Planning Group The JWC conducts CAX events mainly maintain JWC expertise and to interact and the Exercise Control staff steer the for NATO Response Force exercises. Lim- closely with NATO and national training Exercise Process (EP) so that the defined ited CAX support is also provided to ISAF centres. The CAX Forum focuses on tech- exercise objectives are achieved. Training Events and Standalone Experi- nical issues and operating procedures A CAX, therefore, can be any type of mentations. The JWC Simulation, Mod- related to simulation-based exercise and exercise (Live Exercise, Command Post elling and C4 (SMC4) Division includes a training support; participants represent Exercise, etc.), and CAX support tools CAX Support Branch, which is responsible simulation/training centre staffs actually are not limited to military simulations for providing CAX support to JWC events. involved in managing CAX events. The only. CAX support tools are involved in all The Branch was set up in 2006 to provide Forum’s primary goal is to promote the stages of an EP to automate processes, the following functions: exchange of information and Best Prac- reduce duplication of work, enhance the  Maintain current expertise on NATO tices among staffs of NATO and national exercise environment and ensure that the and national CAX support capabilities; simulation/exercise centres. The CAX Fo- EP flows towards the objectives. In this  Interact closely with NATO and na- rum has, ever since the first Forum, been perspective, CAX tools can be categorized tional simulation centres and NC3A to a major event for the training and simu- into four classes: improve JWC capabilities; lation centres. Training centres at the 1) Exercise Planning Tools: These tools  Provide planning support to event operational level from almost all NATO can be used for the automation of proc- project teams; and some PfP nations regularly attend esses, information management and infor-  Provide all in-house coordination the CAX Forums. Five CAX Forums have mation exchange throughout an exercise for model/database upgrade require- been organized so far, in Stavanger (two), process. They can help the preparation ments; Bydgoszcz, The Hague and Munich. 130 and management of the scenario as well  Support the operation of CAX sup- participants from 22 nations registered as the Main Events and Main Incident port tools during the execution phase for the last Forum, held in Ottobrunn, Lists (MEL/MIL). They can also have in- of training event; Munich. The JWC plans to transfer plan- terfaces for CAX tools that fall in the other  Provide event CAX support require- ning responsibilities for the Forum to the categories. Through these interfaces, the ments that cannot be fulfilled by JWC NATO Modelling and Simulation Centre data collected during the specification in-house capabilities into action items of Excellence (M&S CoE), Italy, starting and planning stages can be directly fed for NC3A and coordinate and facilitate 2011. The JWC CAX Support Branch will into simulation as well as Command and NC3A support to the JWC. continue to support M&S CoE efforts to Control (C2) software. prepare and execute the programme. 2) Constructive Simulation Systems and Ancillary Tools: These are the simulation systems and the software needed to pre- pare the simulation systems, e.g., database preparation tools, user interfaces, etc. 3) Interfaces to C2 and Operational Plan- ning Tools: Simulation systems should be transparent to Training Audience, who should use C2 systems that can be avail- able during an operation. For this reason, mediation ware between the simulation software and C2 systems are needed. 4) Experimentation and Analysis Tools: Tools are needed also for designing and

64 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 NATO CAX Operator Certification Course: from the nations. They will be contracted ITEC events, which are the largest training The JWC CAX Support Branch has organ- for the SMRs validated in the NTF CCBs. and simulation exhibitions and conferences ized and conducted three NATO CAX Op- Also the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in the U.S. and Europe, respectively. The erator Certification Courses since 2008. participates in those CCBs. Starting 2011, JWC CAX Support Branch also supports The first course was given in the French we expect to run JEMM and JEST CCBs NATO Modelling and Simulation Group Simulation Centre in Paris (2008). The once in each organization (i.e. JWC and (NMSG) activities. For example, the Model- following one was held in the Ataturk JFTC in turn) every year. ling and Simulation Group’s (MSG) techni- Wargaming and Convention Centre in Is- cal activity MSG-068 NATO Education and tanbul (2009). The most recent one took CAX Support to JWC Training Events: Training Network (NETN) has been chaired place in the Hellenic Modelling and Simu- Supporting JWC CAX events is the main by the Branch since 2007. The MSG-068, lation Centre in Athens (2010). In these responsibility of the JWC CAX Support which will end in April 2011, is recognized courses, the JWC certified 117 CAX oper- Branch. This responsibility includes the fol- as a major technical activity by a large in- ators from more than 20 national simula- lowing tasks: ternational community. It created and con- tion centres. At Exercise Loyal Jewel 2009 • To support the exercise planning tributed to both de facto and formal inter- (LJ09), all CAX operator posts that could teams; national standards. A final experiment and not be filled by the JWC CAX Support • To support the scenario preparation demonstration of the MSG-068 NETN will Branch were augmented from this pool efforts; be conducted in November 2010. Twelve of certified NATO CAX operators from na- • To prepare the simulation databases; nations and NATO organizations will par- tional simulation centres, which reduced • To support the MEL/MIL Scripting Con- ticipate from eight remote locations. The the CAX support cost of LJ09 by more ference and STARTEX validation; MSG-068 will deliver a persistent network, than 80%. That also contributed signifi- • To initialize the C2 system databases; a large reference federation of simulation cantly not only to the interoperability ef- • To configure, prepare and test the CAX tools from nations, including Australia, forts, but also to information exchange support hardware and software for the France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, Swe- among national training centres. Starting execution phase; den, and a set of CAX tools for scenario 2011, the responsibility for organizing the • To support the MEL/MIL and scenario management. Again, this means flexibility course will be handed over to M&S CoE. teams during the execution phase; and cost savings for the JWC in short and The JWC CAX Support Branch will con- • To manage and run CAX support tools medium terms. tinue to provide the course content and during the execution phase; instructors. • To stimulate C2 systems during the NC3A Support Provision to JWC: The e xecution phase; JWC CAX Support Branch also manages JEMM, JEST and NTF Configuration Con- • To store, backup and manage the data the NC3A support provision to the JWC. trol Boards: The Joint Exercise Manage- collected during the execution phase. For this purpose, it prepares a statement ment Module (JEMM), the Joint Exercise — Since 2009, the JWC CAX Support of requirements (SOR) every year in Octo- Scenario Tool (JEST) and the NATO Train- Branch can perform all those functions by ber. The SOR is coordinated with HQ SACT ing Federation (NTF), which includes Joint using in-house capabilities. The JWC CAX and all JWC divisions. Once the comments Theater Level Simulation (JTLS), Joint Support PE cannot provide support to fill from the divisions have been incorporated Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) all CAX operator posts during the execu- into the SOR, a programme review meet- and Virtual Battle Space (VBS2), are the tion phase of a CAX event. Those posts can ing is conducted and attended by the JWC CAX support tools used in JWC exercises. be augmented either by the NC3A or na- FINCON and the NC3A. A preliminary Since 2008, the JWC has been organ- tional simulation centres (i.e. from among agreement is reached after a considera- izing Configuration Control Boards (CCB) CAX operators certified in the NATO CAX tion of available resources, and then JWC for JEMM and JEST twice a year. In these Operator Certification Courses). The CAX procurement procedures for NC3A services CCBs, the software modification require- Support Branch PE currently is able to sup- start. The Branch controls the delivery of ments (SMR) are determined, validated port the database preparation of two NRF services, and estimates the amount of re- and prioritized by the users. The CAX Sup- CAX events. sources required to procure NC3A services port Branch uses this information to de- the following year.  termine the required budget and to start MSG-068 NETN Technical Activity: purchasing and contracting procedures The JWC CAX Support Branch is also re- Dr Erdal Cayirci, accordingly. JEMM and JEST are NC3A sponsible to keep JWC CAX support ca- CAX Support Branch Chief. developed tools. Therefore, the SMRs are pabilities up to date. Moreover, according implemented by the NC3A, after which the to the JWC mission statement, the JWC CAX Support Branch tests and accepts the is to assist the development work of HQ results before the new versions of these SACT on new technologies, modelling and tools are used in JWC exercises. The CCB simulation. The Branch, therefore, actively responsibility for the NTF was delegated attends modelling and simulation events. to the JWC by HQ SACT in 2010. Start- Since 2006, the Branch has presented pa- ing 2011, a CCB for the NTF will also be pers and provided tutorials at Summer and conducted every year. The vendors of NTF Winter Simulation Conferences and sup- components are companies and agencies ported ACT demonstrations at I/ITSEC and

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 65 THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: CIOR Symposium explored the Role of Reservists

Extracted from the CIOR website and an article by Lt Col Ann P. Knabe (U.S.) Photos (above) are by Captain (Ret.) Henry E. Plimack, USCGR; Photos (below) are by Sgt Lars Lenvik, NOR A, Joint Warfare Centre

Inter-Allied Confederation of Reserve Of- ficers (CIOR) held a one-day symposium in Stavanger, on 11 August 2010, with the participation of reservists, officers, politicians, government officials and NGO representatives from 30 NATO and Part- nership for Peace countries. The theme of the CIOR Stavanger 2010 Symposium was “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and The Role of Reservists”. Comprehensive Approach is a lead- ing framework within NATO, and in this sis on the current and net) after the symposi- context, reservists are crucial in building future roles that reserv- um, Royal Netherlands bridges between military and non-military ists might play within Army Lt Colonel G. Dijk actors in the operations. Other topics of this doctrine, given the wrote the following: the symposium included Planning and civilian-military aspect “The Comprehensive Conduct of Operations, Lessons Learned, of Comprehensive Ap- Approach is not yet Enhancing Cooperation with External proach,” said Lieuten- well defined, since ac- Actors, Public Messaging, and Stabiliza- ant Colonel Willem tors and nations have tion and Reconstruction. “The CIOR Sta- Verheijen, Royal Neth- different opinions about vanger 2010 Symposium aims to facilitate erlands Army, International CIOR Presi- what it is. [However] From the standpoint dynamic exchange of knowledge, ideas dent 2008-2010. CIOR members also of the NATO military, through Lessons and perspectives about NATO’s Compre- paid a visit to the Joint Warfare Centre on Learned, it is now generally agreed that hensive Approach; an emerging, evolv- 10 August, where they received a briefing military operations executed in host coun- ing and sometimes controversial doctrine by Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, tries cannot reach the end state of that that will shape the future joint operations Commander Joint Warfare Centre. operation by military means alone." in the new era of asymmetric warfare. In the first of a series of five articles The full article can be read at cior.net/ The symposium will place special empha- published on the CIOR website (www.cior. News/2010/comprehensive approach. 

66 The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 Recommended Books CLUB A professional reading list By Paul Sewell Lessons Learned Analyst, JCID Joint Warfare Centre

PRESENTATION ZEN them. In today’s overwhelm of informa- ing” and created the widely popular “six by Garr Reynolds. This beautifully pro- tion, getting your message across is vital thinking hats” method to creativity. This duced book is not only a treat to read but and so this is a must read for those who is simply the most underrated (but best) offers an excellent antidote to the typical want their ideas to ‘stick’ in the minds of book on creativity. Smashing the myth bland NATO briefing. With a focus on others (that is, everyone!) Read it today that creativity is something you are born engaging the audience rather than putting and apply it tomorrow! with, Dr de Bono gives you page after them to sleep, this is an essential read for page of concrete techniques you can use anyone who has to make presentations in SWITCH: HOW TO CHANGE WHEN to become more creative in your daily their job. Read it once and you will never CHANGE IS HARD life. A no-nonsense approach coupled look at presentations the same way again. by Chip and Dan Heath: The follow- with clear explanations of how to get the up book to “Made To Stick”, this book creative best out of yourself and others, shows how change at any level (individ- this is a book you will return to again ual, group, organizational, national) can and again for years. be boiled down to considering three sim- ple aspects. Full of examples, anecdotes and stories, you’ll discover actually how easier it is to change by simply tweak- ing one or more of these three aspects. Like their first book, “Switch” is a really a manual of best practices for change, which you can apply immediately. GETTING THINGS DONE by David Allen: The book on time man- agement. While most books focus on the top-down approach (what are my Do you read comic books? Simple vs clutter big values?), this illuminating book turns time management on its head. It describes why the top-down approach is UNDERSTANDING COMICS MADE TO STICK fundamentally flawed (where does ‘buy by Scott McCloud: Typically seen as a by Chip and Dan Heath: This thorough- milk’ fit in my big values?) and offers in- childhood hobby, “Understanding Com- ly engaging book explains how some stead a practical and tactical hands-on ics” is a well-designed homage to the ideas stick in our brain for years while approach that you can apply immediate- “invisible art form” of comics. On one others are soon forgotten. The authors ly and see the benefits. An easy, logical level, the comic-book format of the book studied everything that ‘sticks’ in our alternative to the traditional time man- is a pleasure to read. But at its core is minds (from annoying advertising slo- agement programmes most of us have an amazing exploration of what comics gans, children’s stories, pop songs, inspir- endured through the years. have to offer us and why they are so im- ing speeches, and famous movies) and portant in our visually dominated world. boiled it down to six simple principles. SERIOUS CREATIVITY Read it as a guilty weekend pleasure, or The book is very entertaining as they use by Edward de Bono: Dr de Bono was instead, as a manual for getting the most these six principles while they explain the creator of the term “lateral think- impact out of your presentations.

The Three Swords Magazine 18/2010 67 17. mai Stavanger 2010