Asian Conflicts Reports

Asian Conflicts Reports Recent Terrorism Developments in Indonesia China, North Korea-Iran Nuclear Axis Muscular Secularism in Singapore Wahhabism in Sri Lanka Privately Armed Groups in the Philippines ISSUE 12 | JULY-AUGUST, 2010 Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia: Recent Developments and Challenges A=Nelson Rand Indonesia‟s counter-terrorism forces have made significant gains in the first half of 2010, but their success also highlights some crucial shortfalls in the country‟s counter-terrorism program and reveals a new transformation of Islamic militancy in the country. The first major success of the year came in late February when police discovered a jihadi training camp in the jungles of northwest Aceh. A cache of M-16s, revolvers and thousands of rounds of ammunition were found, along with Malaysian Army uniforms and a large amount of cash. Subsequent investigations revealed that the group was planning gun attacks on hotels frequented by tourists and high-profile assassinations, including on President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Over 60 suspected cell members have since been arrested and just over a dozen killed. The group called itself al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah (al-Qaeda in Aceh), and its discovery in late February was unique in two main ways. First, it was the first known time that Indonesia‟s jihadists set up a base in Aceh, the country‟s westernmost province on the tip of Sumatra. Although the province was engaged in a separatist insurgency against Jakarta for over 30 years, radical Islamic militancy had never taken root in the province and it had always remained outside the influence and operational area of Indonesian Jihadist groups, including Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Southeast Asia‟s largest terrorist network. Second, members of the group, believed to number just over 100, were from virtually every terrorist network in the country, constituting what the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) calls the “third wave” of Indonesian jihadism. “[T]he training camp in Aceh represented the coming together of mujahidin from a number of different groups in Java and Sumatra who believed that a more coherent strategy for jihad in Indonesia was needed,” states a recent ICG report entitled Indonesia: A Jihadi Surprise in Aceh. This third wave, according to the ICG, comprises jihadists who are critical of the country‟s foremost terror group, JI, for its recent tactic of abandoning jihad in favour of religious outreach and Al-Qaeda Serambi education, and also critical of JI‟s main pro-violent splinter faction that favors mass-casualty 1 Mekkah (al-Qaeda in suicide bombings and lacks a long-term vision. Instead, these jihadists prefer targeted Aceh), a 100 member assassinations and attacks that don‟t involve the loss of innocent Muslim lives and believe that Jihadist base jihad should be waged as a means to an end, as opposed to an end in itself. discovered in Aceh Uncovering this group led Indonesia‟s counter-terrorism forces to another significant for the first time success. As operations against „al Qaeda in Aceh‟ shifted to Jakarta in early March, Indonesia‟s elite counter-terrorism force, Detachment 88, closed in on one of Southeast Asia‟s most wanted terrorists, Dulmatin. Nicknamed „Genius,‟ Dulmatin was a car salesman before launching his career as a jahadist. He received training in Afghanistan in the early 1990s and went on to become a Membership is drawn senior member of JI. An expert in explosives, he was one of the key perpetrators of the 2002 2 from virtually every Bali bombings, which killed 202 people. He is believed to have assembled most of the bombs terrorist network in and suicide vests for the attack, as well as detonating one of the bombs with a mobile phone. the country Dulmatin fled to the Southern Philippines in 2003 where he joined with the Moro Islamic representing the ‘third Liberation Front (MILF) and later the Abu Sayaf group (ASG). It is believed he snuck back wave’ of Indonesian into Indonesia in late 2007. Back in his native country, he went on to set up and lead the new jihadism terror cell in Aceh. He had a 10 million-dollar reward on his head by the US Rewards for Justice Program. On 9 March 2010, commandos of Detachment 88 tailed Dulmatin and his wife riding a motorbike in Pamulang, west of Jakarta. He dropped his wife off at a beauty salon and then went to an Internet café. After five minutes online, he was shot dead by Detachment 88. Two The group prefer of his bodyguards were also shot and killed that day in a separate raid. Dulmatin‟s death was a 3 targeted huge blow to Indonesia‟s jihadist network, and a major victory in the country‟s fight against assassinations and terror. attacks on non- Indonesia‟s latest significant counter-terrorism success came in late June with the arrest of Muslims, rather than Abdullah Sunata, who became the country‟s most wanted terrorist after the killing of mass killings, as a Dulmatin. It wasn‟t the first time he was arrested. In June 2005, Sunata was arrested and later means to an achieve sentenced to seven years in prison for harboring the Malaysian-born terrorist Noordin Top, a predefined objectives key plotter of the 2002 Bali bombings (Top was killed by Detachment 88 commandos in September 2009). Sunata was released for good behavior in April 2009 as Indonesian authorities believed he had been de-radicalized. They were wrong. Immediately after his release he returned to the shadowy world of Indonesian jihadism and became a key member of Dulmatin‟s Aceh-based terror cell. Sunata was arrested on 24 June with two of his aides after Detachment 88 commandos raided their hideout in central Java. A third suspect, Yuli Karsono, was shot dead. Like Sunata, Karsono also spent time in prison. He was an officer in Indonesia‟s armed forces but dismissed and jailed for smuggling ammunition. It was during his time in prison that the former soldier became radicalized. Upon his release he went straight into an active terror cell. The cases of Abdullah Sunata and Yuli Karsono, brought to light by the success of Indonesia‟s counter-terrorism forces in reining them in, highlight one of the major shortfalls of the country‟s largely successful counter-terrorism program: the Indonesian penal system. “In prison [terrorists] can convene, sit and discuss freely, secured by the government,” the head of Detachment 88, Colonel Tito Karnavian, told reporters at a press conference following the arrest of Sunata and the killing of Karsono. The National Police spokesperson at the same press conference warned that Indonesia‟s prisons were at risk of becoming “schools” for terrorists. Of the more than 70 members of the Aceh-based terror cell who were captured or killed since the group‟s discovery by authorities in February, at least 14 were either once convicted or arrested, most on terrorism charges. Analysts note that inmates convicted on terrorism charges should be monitored more closely and a sound de-radicalization program needs to be put in place. The ICG, in its recent report mentioned above, notes that the coming together of jihadists from various groups to form the Aceh cell was made possible by “regular communication between prisoners and ex-prisoners, via mobile phone and direct visits.” “A de-radicalization program is highly needed in Indonesia‟s prisons,” says Noor Huda Ismail, executive director and founder of the Institute of International Peace Building, a Jakarta- based think tank. “There needs to be a systematic way to disengage these individuals from violence,” he says, adding that there is a dilemma in incarcerating convicted terrorists and extremists. “If we put these individuals together in the same prison, we risk strengthening their cause. If we separate them, we risk expanding their cause.” Significantly, although Indonesian authorities have arrested more than 450 suspected militants since 2002, the vast majority have been given lenient prison sentences, while many have been given early release. A second shortfall of Indonesia‟s counter-terrorism program highlighted by recent successes, in particular the elimination of Dulmatin in March and of Noordin Top six months earlier, is the killing of key terrorist suspects instead of capturing them alive. Indonesian counter-terrorism forces have a startling kill-to-capture ratio of about one to four (although this is improving this year). By killing key suspects, authorities lose the opportunity to gain valuable intelligence, as well as risk losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public, which in turn can play into the hands of the terrorists. “The police are not in the killing business. I know those guys in the killing business. If we do the same thing we are like them,” says Noor Huda, adding that valuable evidence and legal testimony is also lost by killing key suspects. Analysts note that other shortfalls in Indonesia‟s counter-terrorism program include weak legislation, corruption, and lax regulations that allow activities such as paramilitary training and the publishing of jahidist material. Despite such shortfalls, Indonesia has one of the most sound and sophisticated counter-terrorism programs in place today. This includes addressing terrorist threats through more police work than through military means, establishing village-level intelligence networks, allowing opportunities for Islamists to participate in above-ground organizations, and relatively quiet and behind-the-scenes cooperation and coordination with the United States, Australia and regional governments. Successful results, like those recorded in the first half of 2010, will likely continue to be a mainstay of Indonesia‟s counter-terrorism forces in the months and years to come. China and the North Korea-Iran Nuclear Axis Christina Y. Lin On May 20 South Korea (ROK) ended all ambiguity on the sinking of their Cheonan naval vessel by a torpedo attack from the North Korean DPRK.

Load more