UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Why Parties Vote Together in Montreal City Council:
Rethinking Assumptions about Legislative Party Cohesion in Parliamentary Systems
by
Mateusz Trybowski
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
CALGARY, ALBERTA
APRIL, 2011
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Abstract:
This thesis applies statistical techniques and elite interviews to measure party cohesion on important votes in Montreal City Council and reconcile its presence with parties‟ reported ideological heterogeneity and decentralized candidate nomination, campaign financing and appointment processes. It finds that party leaders‟ influence over these processes extends beyond formal descriptions of their authority and is exploited to cultivate political loyalty.
Negative incentives for legislative party cohesion are nonetheless more often transmitted through informal cues than explicit threats. These cues interact with socialization processes in a manner that supports normative institutional explanations for legislative party cohesion – and could not be captured through comparative quantitative analysis. This thesis makes a secondary contribution to literature on Canadian municipal politics by bridging a twenty-year gap in research on Montreal‟s party system and testing claims made on behalf of party competition in other municipalities.
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Acknowledgments:
I must first and foremost thank my supervisor, Dr. Lisa Young, for her invaluable insight, frequent advice, and willingness to accommodate my travels throughout this thesis project.
I consider myself fortunate to have had the opportunity to learn directly from Dr. Young who exceeded the call of duty in terms of her availability, attention, and enthusiasm for the unexpected directions in which this thesis evolved. Additional thanks go out to Dr. David
Stewart and Dr. Byron Miller for serving on my committee and offering helpful comments, and to Judi Powell, Ella Wensel, and Bonnie Walter for their constant encouragement and administrative assistance. I am also indebted to Paul Fairie, who spent hours training me in the statistical techniques that are applied in this thesis; Dr. William Cross, who supervised my undergraduate thesis at Carleton University and whose research and teaching have made lasting impressions on my academic career; and Alex Munter who exposed me to the study and importance of municipal politics.
I am equally grateful to this study‟s participants for fitting this project into their busy schedules and approaching interviews with candour and enthusiasm. This appreciation is also extended to staff at Montreal‟s City Archives and Clerk‟s Office for their cooperation in providing roll-call voting records and other information.
This thesis project was funded through generous support from the Fonds Québécois de la
Recherche sur la Société et la Culture (FQRSC), as well as the Alberta Government and
Political Science Department at the University of Calgary.
The unsung heroes of this project are my family (their support for me at all times has been generous and loving) and Rachelle Anctil who kept me driven and focused on what matters iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract……………………………………………………………………… ii
Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………… iii
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………. iv
List of Tables………………………………………………………………… viii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION……………………………………….. 1
CHAPTER TWO: CASE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN……... 5
Case Selection: Why Montreal?...... 5
Montreal City Council‟s Quasi-Parliamentary Attributes…... 6
Contributions to Literature on Canadian Municipal Politics... 10
Analytical Scope…………………………………………………….. 12
Methodology………………………………………………………… 12
Quantitative Analysis………………………………………... 13
Qualitative Analysis…………………………………………. 14
CHAPTER THREE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS………………………. 18
City Council‟s Legislative Processes and Patterns of Disagreement... 18
Cluster Bloc Analysis of Council Voting Records…………………... 23
CHAPTER FOUR: LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………. 28
Theoretical Developments in Research on Legislative Party Cohesion 28
Legislative Voting as a Collective vs. Individual Phenomenon 29
Institutional vs. Sociological Theories for Leg. Party Cohesion 30
System-Level Analyses of Legislative Party Cohesion……………….. 34
v
Executive-Legislative Relations……………………………….. 34
Electoral Systems………………………………………………. 35
Party-Level Analyses of Legislative Party Cohesion…………………... 36
Candidate Nomination and Removal Processes………………... 36
Election Campaign Financing and Expenditures……………….. 38
Quantitative Evidence for Career Incentives vs. Qualitative Evidence for Sociological Ones………………………………… 39
CHAPTER FIVE: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INSTIT. THEORIES…… 47
1. Candidate Nomination and Removal Processes………………………. 47
Perceptions of Parties‟ Importance to Candidates‟ Electoral Competitiveness…………………………………………………. 48
Do Party Leaders or Members Control Candidate Selection Processes?...... 49
Do Party Leaders or Members Oversee Caucus Removal and Admittance Decisions?...... 52
Do Party Leaders Use their Authority over Caucus Evictions to Maintain Party Cohesion?...... 53
2. Candidate Financing and Campaign Spending Practices……………… 56
Campaign Expenditures‟ Perceived Importance to Electoral Competitiveness………………………………………………….. 57
Party Affiliation‟s Importance to Campaign Financing………….. 57
Parties‟ Management of Candidate Campaign Expenditures…….. 60
3. Legislative Appointments and Policy Influence………………………. 62
3.1 Opportunities for Policy Influence and Career Advancement……….. 63
Council-Level Opportunities for Policy Influence and Career- Advancement……………………………………………………... 64 vi
Council-Level Opportunities‟ Perceived Influence and Appeal...... 64
Party-Level Opportunities for Policy Influence and Career- Advancement……………………………………………………… 69
Party-Level Opportunities‟ Perceived Influence and Appeal……... 70
3.2 Party Leaders‟ Appointment Power and its Influence over Legislative Behaviour………………………………………………………………….. 74
Party Leaders‟ Appointment Powers………………………………. 74
Perceptions of Municipal Party Leaders‟ Appointment Criteria…. 76
3.3 Party Leaders‟ Methods for Disciplining Dissent……………………… 78
Do Party Leaders Sanction Dissent by Withdrawing Appointments? 78
Do Councillors Expect to be Sanctioned for Dissent with Demotion? 78
Do Councillors‟ Expectations of Being Disciplined for Dissent Arise From Informal Cues that Reinforce Institutional Norms?...... 82
CHAPTER SIX QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES 88
Support for Hypotheses that Attribute Party Cohesion to Ideology…...... 88
Support for Hypotheses that Attribute Party Cohesion to Socialization…….. 91
Comparing City and Borough Level Opportunities for Socialization.. 92
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION……………………………………………….. 97
Theoretical Contributions to Research on Legislative Party Cohesion……… 97
Substantive Contributions to Research on Canadian Municipal Politics and Montreal‟s Party System……………………………………………………... 100
Shortcomings and Openings on New Research Avenues……………………. 101
Appendix 1: Rules Governing Montreal‟s Electoral District Boundaries……………. 103
Appendix 2: Summary of Results for the 2001, 2005 and 2009 Montreal Elections… 105
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Appendix 3: Script of Framing Interview Questions…………………………………. 109
Appendix 4: Index of Agreement Scores and Voting Blocs in Montreal City Council‟s 2002-2005 Session………………………………………………………… 112
Appendix 5: Index of Agreement Scores and Voting Blocs in Montreal City Council‟s 2005-2009 Session………………………………………………………… 113
Appendix 6: Verifying Clusters‟ Consistency and Composition with Willetts‟ Modifications to the Rice-Beyle Technique………………………………………….. 114
Appendix 7: Timeline and Direction of Floor Crossing in City Council (2001-2009) 119
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………... 120
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1: Salary Distribution and Supplements in City and Borough Councils…….. 9
Table 2.1: Four Categories of Motions that Elicited Legislative Disagreement during Montreal City Council's 2001-2005 and 2005-2009 Sessions………...... 22
Table 2.2: Partial Matrix of Indexes of Agreement in 2001-2005 Session of Montreal City Council…………………………………………………………………………… 24
Table 2.3: Probability of Obtaining a Particular Number of Agreements in Four Roll- Call Votes……………...... 115
Table 2.4: Index of Agreement Thresholds Generated Through Willetts‟ Technique in Four Important Categories of Votes…………………………………………………… 118 1
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Political scientists have long considered parties essential to the operation of democratic governance (Bryce 1921; Schattschneider 1942; Epstein 1980; Sartori 2005;
Przeworski 2006). Amongst other functions, parties organize electoral competition, mobilize political participation, articulate and aggregate interests, recruit political elites and impart order to legislative processes. Cohesion – or coordinated behaviour between caucus members to advance collective goals – is a necessary condition to these functions‟ fulfilment, and thus an equally essential component of democratic governance (Giannetti and Laver 2005). Unfortunately, research on party cohesion is less developed than that on parties‟ other functional attributes. Recurring statistical patterns have prompted most scholars to accept without comprehensively understanding why parties exhibit greater legislative cohesion in parliamentary systems (Epstein 1980; Shugart 1988; Sartori 1994;
Perrson and Tabellini 2003) and when they centralize control over candidate selection and campaign financing processes or distribute appointments in a manner that rewards deference and sanctions dissent (Sieberer 2006; Carey 2007; Depauw and Martin 2008).
Few scholars have likewise attempted to reconcile these correlations with qualitative research that attributes legislative party cohesion to shared ideological convictions and norms of caucus solidarity transmitted through socialization (Searing 1986; Docherty
1997; Kam 2001; Cowley 2002).
Montreal‟s parties are an interesting case for this research because they exhibit strong legislative party cohesion without operating under conditions that are hypothesized to favour its maintenance (Aubin 2002a; Cardinal 2003a; Mennie 2006). While it boasts 2
many parliamentary attributes, Montreal City Council is not governed by principles of responsible government. Fixed election cycles shield the mayor‟s administration from confidence votes but also prevent it from deterring dissent with threats of council‟s dissolution (Boyer 1986). Unlike their federal and provincial party counterparts,
Montreal‟s party leaders can furthermore not distribute or revoke appointments without council approval. According to party statutes, they do not exercise any authority over candidate selection or renewal processes either. These conditions purportedly limit the extent to which parties‟ legislative cohesion can be attributed to disciplinary mechanisms.
Explanations involving normative or ideological variables are equally improbable in the context of Montreal‟s parties‟ alleged heterogeneity and vulnerability to caucus defections
(Vengroff and Whelan 2004: 13; Tindal and Tindal 2007: 350). How can their experience be reconciled with comparative studies on legislative party cohesion in parliamentary systems? Might it draw attention to alternative explanations for this phenomenon?
This thesis has two goals - to confirm the presence of caucus cohesion on important votes in Montreal City Council and test whether hypotheses that explain variance in this phenomenon in comparative literature, and more specifically, Canadian parliamentary parties, are transferable to Montreal‟s municipal parties. These goals involve different but interrelated research questions. In the first case, we ask and evaluate whether Montreal‟s city council contains recurring voting blocs, how these blocs are composed, and whether these blocs‟ members are brought together by shared partisan, geographic or demographic attributes. We confirm that councillors either vote unanimously or along party lines that emerge on budget and other important votes. This finding, in turn, raises questions about 3
councillors‟ reasons for complying with parties‟ legislative directives. Are councillors rational actors directed by utility-maximizing calculations and the pursuit of electoral security, policy influence and career advancement as institutional theorists posit? Or might their voting behaviour also reflect the influence of shared ideological principles and norms of caucus solidarity, as sociological theorists posit? We find that both theoretical perspectives carry explanatory weight. Some variables nonetheless exert less influence than reported in comparative literature or research on Canadian parliamentary parties.
Our analysis confirms that at least some councillors vote along party lines to strengthen their chances of being appointed to committees or maintain existing appointments. It also reveals that party leaders‟ practical influence extends beyond formal descriptions of their authority in party statutes and provincial legislation. Explicit threats are rarely issued on the basis of that influence, however, and seldom deter dissent or prevent defections once disputes are publicized. Negative incentives for legislative party cohesion are instead transmitted through informal cues. These furthermore appeal to norms of deference or solidarity before exploiting councillors‟ electoral vulnerabilities and pursuit of appointments that confer policy influence, prestige, and additional revenue.
To what extent does informal persuasion strategies‟ efficiency rest on disciplinary threats‟ occasional enforcement? Might councillors, for example, simply refrain from rebelling because they agree with their party‟s ideological principles or have been socialized to norms of caucus solidarity? Neither scenario can be invalidated through this analysis although its evidence for each is limited. The frequency and consistency with which councillors defect for appointments suggest that utility-maximizing calculations 4
govern political behaviour more than ideological considerations or norms of caucus solidarity. To be fair, our analysis also distinguishes a group of councillors who helped establish the city‟s governing party to campaign for administrative decentralization. Their commitment to this principle came to function as a source of legislative cleavage instead of cohesion, however, resulting in their eventual defections. This principle has furthermore since ceased to inform political debates and was never pertinent to a broad scope of council business. Our analysis otherwise generates evidence that socialization to norms of caucus solidarity occurs at the local rather than city level. This distinction is not irrelevant in light of inconsistent opportunities for local mentorship. These inconsistencies limit the degree to which socialization can be credited for parties‟ legislative cohesion.
This study attributes legislative party cohesion in Montreal City Council to a combination of institutional incentives and sociological norms that parties strategically manipulate, and which interact with councillors‟ varying goals, ideological principles and political experiences. Some of its findings are consistent with patterns observed in comparative literature on legislative party cohesion. Others deviate in ways that draw attention to alternative research avenues or challenge literature that frames legislative party cohesion as an inevitable outgrowth of parliamentary institutions. In this regard, our thesis primarily contributes to research on political parties and their organizational dynamics. It makes a secondary but equally valuable contribution to Canadian research on urban politics by filling gaps in literature on Montreal‟s party system and testing claims made on behalf of parties‟ establishment in municipalities outside Quebec.
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CHAPTER TWO: CASE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
There are practical and analytical advantages to situating research on legislative decision-making at the municipal level. First, it reduces research problems relating to scale. City council deliberations tend to focus on mundane administrative issues like road repairs and snow removal that attract little controversy. Councillors might occasionally encounter corporate lobbying or grassroots resistance. These cases tend to involve easily identifiable and relatively small groups of stakeholders, however, that mobilize in issue- specific and reactive manners (Lightbody 2006: 42). Municipal councillors are often also more accessible for interviews or surveys than ones at other levels of government as a result of council deliberations‟ lower profile. Second, structural and procedural differences between municipal governance systems permit comparative analyses that cannot be conducted, but might help explain phenomena, at other governmental levels.
Case Selection: Why Montreal?
A similar combination of practical and analytical considerations prompted
Montreal City Council‟s selection as a case study for this thesis. First, this council‟s structure and procedures exhibit quasi-parliamentary attributes. A number of institutional variables can consequently be held constant when comparing its parties with ones in other parliamentary assemblies. Second, this thesis bridges a twenty-year gap in research on
Montreal‟s party system by advancing original data through interviews with key informants. Third, this data can also be used to test claims made on behalf of party competition in other Canadian cities. Most of these claims rest on an assumption that 6
municipal parties would exhibit the same legislative cohesion as federal and provincial ones. Their credibility would be diluted if we discovered otherwise in Montreal since its party system is perceived as a paradigm in the country.
Montreal City Council‟s Quasi-Parliamentary Attributes
Provincial legislation in the form of a municipal charter confers Montreal‟s city council with quasi-parliamentary attributes that are relatively unique for a city government
(Gravel 1987: 12). Most notably, it establishes an executive committee that performs similar functions to Canada‟s federal and provincial cabinets.1 This committee is composed of councillors who are appointed and assigned policy portfolios by the mayor. It controls council‟s order paper and tables most of the motions that it considers. These include the city‟s budget, requests for loans and credits, and matters that relate to zoning or public property transactions (Boyer 1986). Council performs procedural and oversight functions that are, in turn, similar to those exercised by federal and provincial legislatures
(Herland 1992: 40).
A number of institutional variables can be held constant when researching legislative party cohesion at these different levels. They nonetheless also differ in three crucial respects. First, Montreal‟s municipal charter requires party leaders to secure council approval on standing committee and most other appointments.2 Their capacity to reward legislative compliance is thus restricted in comparison to their federal and provincial
1 In fairness, executive committees also operate in Quebec City, Laval, Hull, and Toronto. However, an absence of opposition parties in the first two cases and partisan links between members in the second two cases reduces their comparability with Canada‟s federal and provincial cabinets. 2 Executive committee appointments are exempted from this requirement and conferred at the mayor‟s discretion. 7
counterparts. Second, as an administrative corporation under Quebec‟s provincial government, Montreal City Council cannot manipulate the process through which or, timing at which its, office-holders are elected (Tindal and Tindal 2009: 2). This deprives it of responsible government in the sense that its executive committee does not need to maintain councillors‟ confidence to govern. More significant to this research, an absence of responsible government prevents the city‟s governing party from intimidating caucus dissidents with threats of council‟s dissolution; caucus members can rebel without fearing that they may trigger an election (Boyer 1986: 116). These disparities involve variables that feature prominently in explanations for legislative party cohesion in parliamentary systems. Montreal City Council thus serves as an ideal setting for exploratory research on alternative explanations for this phenomenon.
Unlike other parliamentary assemblies, Montreal City Council shares office-holders with a lower tier of borough councils. We were initially concerned that this additional disparity might undermine our case study‟s comparative utility. More specifically, we had reason to suspect that it creates unique incentives for intra-party competition at the expense of socialization processes. Contrary to our expectations, we found that norms of caucus solidarity are as likely to be strengthened as strained by councillors‟ participation in borough council activities. This suggests that borough level variables neither inhibit nor strengthen legislative party cohesion enough to jeopardize this study‟s comparative utility.
Borough councils were created to appease suburban municipalities that were forcibly amalgamated into Montreal. They oversee the administration of local services like snow removal and road maintenance. City council, by contrast, remains responsible for 8
municipality-wide services like public transportation. The convoluted rules that govern this system‟s elections need not be fully unpacked to appreciate that it creates a career ladder and incentives for competition between councillors. In brief: Montreal‟s vote aggregation formula is identical to that used at the federal and provincial levels. Candidates only require a plurality of votes in their district to be elected. Districts are furthermore geographically constituted and limited to a single representative. District boundaries nonetheless often converge and increase in tandem with the prestige of their corresponding office (see Appendix 1 for an illustration). Montreal‟s mayor is elected from a single city- wide district. This district is divided into nineteen boroughs that are represented by separate borough mayors. These boroughs are then divided into further districts that elect city councillors or borough councillors. Each voter consequently elects three or four representatives. Borough mayors and city councillors serve on city council in addition to their respective borough‟s council. Borough councillors nonetheless only serve on borough councils.
Salaries increase with advancements in this hierarchy, as illustrated in Table 1.1.
We consequently expected to find that it encourages intra-caucus competition. For example, we thought that city councillors would work to strengthen their profiles in neighbouring districts in anticipation of an eventual campaign for their borough‟s mayoralty. We also expected that they would compete with caucus colleagues from geographically converging districts for electoral financing and volunteer resources. We instead found that councillors‟ experience varies with the managerial skills of their borough‟s mayor and number of borough-level caucus colleagues. While some councillors 9
felt that they needed to compete with caucus colleagues, others openly shared resources.
Such inconsistencies undermine the extent to which parties‟ legislative cohesion can be attributed to borough-level variables – and the extent to which borough councils undermine our case study‟s comparability.
Table 1.1: Salary Distribution and Supplements in City and Borough Councils (2010)
Position Held Base Salary City Mayor $141,973 Official Opposition Leader $87,914 Borough Mayor $60,065 - $88,501 City Councilor $49,144 Borough Councilor $28,394 - $39,315 Appointment Salary Supplement Executive Committee Chair $63,343 Executive Committee Vice-Chair $54,606 Executive Committee Member $38,770 Associate Councilor $16,381 Standing Committee Chair $16,381 Standing Committee Vice-Chair $10,921 Standing Committee Member $5,460 Speaker $38,770 Majority House Leader $27,302 Opposition House Leader $16,381 CASTM Co-Chair $26,244 CASTM Member $20,996 STM Committee Chair $3,000 - $6,000 STM Committee Member $1,750 - $3,000 CCU Committee Member $3,726 Legend: STM: Société de transport de Montréal / Montreal Transit Society CASTM : Conseil d‟administration de la STM / STM Administrative Council CCU : Comité consultatif d‟urbanisme / Consultative Committee on Urban Planning
Source: City of Montreal (2010a) “Rémunération des élus de la Ville de Montréal,” (http://www.ville. montreal.qc.ca/ pls/portal/docs/page/prt_vdm_fr/media/documents/remuneration-elus-2010.pdf.)
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Contributions to Literature on Montreal‟s Party System and Canadian Municipal Politics
By generating original data on Montreal‟s current party system, this thesis also bridges a twenty-year research gap and permits testing of claims made on behalf of party competition in other Canadian cities. Political scientists devoted considerable scholarly attention to Montreal‟s party system in the 1970s and 1980s. That period saw business interests‟ traditional dominance of Montreal‟s governance confronted by civic advocacy movements. Less has been written about the city‟s parties since those movements splintered. Most accounts of this outcome also adopt a regretful tone and feature anecdotes that expose researchers‟ involvement in their object of study. These cues suggest that research efforts were motivated by reformist impulses and abandoned as scholars became personally disillusioned.
Parties‟ involvement in municipal governance has not abated with researchers‟ interest however. Quebec‟s most recent municipal elections, for example, saw one hundred and ninety-one parties register in sixty percent of municipalities with more than five thousand residents (Directeur Général des Élections du Québec 2009). Astonishingly, next to nothing is known about these parties‟ organizational structures or decision-making processes. To have allowed their activities to go unmonitored has been imprudent given the importance of local decision-making to our everyday lives.
With some cities overseeing larger budgets than provincial governments, it has become difficult to deny the political significance of local decision-making (Tindal and
Tindal 2008: 3). Through its dominance of regional coordinating committees, Montreal 11
City Council is responsible for an area of 3.7 million inhabitants, representing twelve percent of Canada‟s population and more than half of Quebec‟s population (Lightbody
2006: 26). It also makes decisions regarding water and waste management, police and fire services, social programs, and other matters that affect citizens more directly than ones administered by federal or provincial governments. An argument could thus be made about the inherent value of researching the bases on which, and processes through which, its councillors make legislative decisions.
This thesis also contributes to scholarly debates over the benefits of local party systems. Some political scientists contend that party competition would benefit municipalities outside of Quebec by strengthening councils‟ electoral accountability and voters‟ sense of efficacy. Party advocates describe non-partisan elections as personality contests that lack substantive policy discussions as a result of inconsistent platforms
(Stewart and Smith 2007: 270). They argue that it is not possible to predict how any particular candidate‟s election will impact governance if every councillor receives an independent mandate (Fowler and Goldrick 1972: 55). Even mayors only control a single vote. They can consequently evade accountability for council decisions (Kaplan 1972:
182). These problems are alleged to be averted under party systems because they bind candidates to shared electoral commitments. Party platforms also provide voters with bases on which to assess incumbents‟ performance (Silcox 1972: 154). These inferences are plausible but assume that councillors‟ legislative voting behaviour is guided by party directives. Their claims would be severely undermined if our thesis found otherwise in
Montreal, since its party system holds paradigmatic status in their research. 12
Analytical Scope:
This study‟s scope is limited to the analysis of voting behaviour in Montreal City
Council between 2002 and 2009. This restriction was primarily guided by practical considerations. It most notably, reflects data access constraints. Roll call voting records for
Montreal‟s past two council sessions are available on the city‟s website. They can otherwise only be consulted at the city‟s archives however. Transcribing archival records would have required considerable time and costs that exceeded this study‟s budget. This also partly explains why our scope does not incorporate borough council decision-making.
Given their small size and recent creation, we furthermore anticipated that borough councils‟ experiences with legislative party cohesion would be idiomatic. High degrees of turnover in the 2002 election (as shown in Appendix 2) would also render it difficult to track down councillors from earlier council sessions for interviews. Few borough council offices maintained forwarding addresses for defeated or retired councillors. Finally, the contemporary relevance of researching pre-amalgamation council sessions with fairly different sets of parties could legitimately be challenged. We opted to focus on Montreal‟s current party system in the aim of informing current rather than historical debates.
Methodology:
This thesis employs a two-pronged research design to confirm and then account for the legislative cohesion of Montreal‟s municipal parties. Its first part applies cluster bloc techniques and logistic regression to roll-call voting records in order to distinguish voting blocs and whether their members share partisan, geographic or demographic attributes. Its 13
second part evaluates whether institutional and sociological hypotheses from comparative research on legislative party cohesion help explain these voting blocs. It relies on qualitative data acquired through interviews with key informants and archival research of council sessions‟ media coverage.
Quantitative Analysis:
This thesis combines several statistical methods to discern voting blocs in Montreal
City Council and evaluate their composition. It begins with an application of the Rice-
Beyle cluster-bloc technique which measures the frequency with which pairs of individual office-holders vote together. This exercise exposes voting blocs on four important categories of motions: budgetary motions, amendments to the city‟s Master Plan, motions to transfer authority to borough councils and motions tabled by independent or opposition party councillors.
Logistic regression is then used to determine whether these voting blocs‟ members share other geographic, demographic or partisan attributes. We advance evidence of a statistically significant relationship between party and voting bloc membership and find that other cleavages‟ influence disappears when party affiliation is used as a control variable. Montreal‟s municipal councillors are, in other words, found to vote with caucus colleagues. This behaviour‟s causes cannot be explained without insight into councillors‟ institutional environment and interaction with socializing agents however. The second portion of our two pronged research design is, by consequence, informed by interviews with councillors and records of their past statements on the nature of council work. 14
Qualitative Analysis:
Reliability and validity remain the principal standards by which social scientists appraise research. Golafshani (2002) defines reliability as “the extent to which results are consistent over time and can be reproduced.” Qualitative studies are reliable if their methods and interpretations are clearly explained, justified and verified by observations recorded in field notes and secondary sources (Richards 2004: 205). Validity is defined as the extent to which techniques and findings actually address the phenomenon that one sets out to measure (Maxwell 2002). The validity of this thesis‟ qualitative analysis hinges on the appropriateness of its interview participants and the questions that they were asked, as well as the precision with which we recorded their responses. Each of these points is addressed in the following review of our qualitative research techniques.
Interviews with fourteen councillors from Montreal‟s 2002-2005 and 2005-2009 council sessions inform this study‟s qualitative analysis.3 Participants were evenly distributed between these council sessions, suburban and urban constituencies, and gender groups.4 A considerable number also held frontbench positions. This permitted councillors‟ experience to be examined from varying perspectives. Councillors from Vision Montreal, which was then the city‟s only opposition party, participated at considerably lower rates than independent councillors and ones from its governing party Union Montreal. This
3 They represent 13% of the these sessions‟ councillors and 24% of those who could be contacted (borough council offices did not keep forwarding addresses for defeated or retired councillors). Forty-four out of one hundred five city councillors who served between 2002 and 2009 could not be tracked down, rendering survey research inappropriate for this study. 4 Specific figures are not reported as a result of concerns raised by one anonymous participant. 15
undermines the validity of our analysis into the causes of Vision Montreal‟s legislative cohesion and explains why greater focus is sometimes placed on Union Montreal.
Interviews are reactive situations of social interaction. The manner in which questions are posed can have as much influence over response validity as their ordering and content. Several measures were consequently taken to build trust with this study‟s participants. First, a consent form was sent to every solicited councillor that described the thesis‟ objectives and interview process. It also gave councillors the option of remaining anonymous and guaranteed them an opportunity to review citations from their interviews before the study‟s submission – confirming the validity of interview responses‟ interpretation.
Measures were also taken to ensure that the ordering and content of interview questions elicited responses that directly and accurately addressed our research subject. A script of twenty-six questions inspired by comparative and Canadian research on legislative party cohesion was prepared and posed to each participant. Interviews were nonetheless semi-structured and question ordering was often changed to accommodate the flow of participants‟ responses and time constraints. Follow-up questions were also asked to obtain additional information on referenced events or to ensure that responses were being accurately interpreted. Greater emphasis was placed on allowing participants to describe their own decision making processes than on getting through questionnaires.
Indeed, participants were encouraged to emphasize whichever variables they felt were most important in relation to themes set out in framing questions. At the end of each interview, participants were also asked if there was any other information that might be 16
pertinent to this thesis that they would like to volunteer. Our framing script of questions can be consulted in Appendix 3.
The reliability of this analysis‟ data and interpretations, on the other hand, is enhanced by field notes that were collected to prepare for, and immediately following, each interview. Notes were collected on the environments in which councillors work when interviews were conducted in their offices. A regular meeting of Montreal‟s city council was also observed. Information on each participant was equally collected from party websites and media coverage. This was done to contextualize responses and avoid a need for clarification during interviews. Media sources were revisited whenever interviews referenced unfamiliar persons or events. Notes were also collected about the manner in which interviews occurred. These document participants‟ body language and other signs of enthusiasm or reservation as well as remarks that were not tape recorded.
Triangulation further enhances our thesis‟ validity and reliability. This involves applying multiple techniques to a consistent research question. Its effectiveness rests on the premise that each particular technique‟s weaknesses will be counterbalanced by other techniques‟ strengths. Research findings are deemed credible if these techniques are congruent and yield comparable findings. Our thesis achieves triangulation by combining quantitative and qualitative strategies. Its roll-call vote analysis‟ results, for example, prompted us to focus interviews on councillors‟ interaction with party variables. Data collected through these interviews, in turn, helped explain why parties are more important in guiding councillors‟ legislative behaviour than other sources of cleavage. Findings from both of these exercises are also supported by data drawn from media coverage of 17
Montreal‟s 2002-2005 and 2005-2009 council sessions. Focused searches were performed for articles describing parties‟ candidate nomination and policy-making processes as well as occasions of caucus dissent and defection. Interview references to party procedures were also verified against the contents of parties‟ statutes. Union Montreal provided its constitution on request. Vision Montreal refused to release it publicly but an archived version was retrieved from a cached version of its website (Vision Montreal 2007a).
Summary:
This chapter outlines and accounts for our study‟s case selection, scope and methodology. It recapitulates our central research question by framing Montreal City
Council as a parliamentary system in all aspects but those that comparative research credits for maintaining legislative party cohesion. Montreal‟s municipal parties direct voting behaviour even though they require council consent to distribute or withdraw appointments and cannot force, or deter dissent with threats of, council‟s dissolution. This renders them ideal case studies for testing prevailing hypotheses, and identifying alternative explanations, for legislative party cohesion. This chapter also argues that, as one of
Canada‟s largest governments, Montreal City Council is worth researching on its own merits. Finally, it demonstrates how data generated through interviews update a twenty- year gap in research on Montreal‟s party system and helps verify claims made on behalf of party competition in other Canadian municipalities. This chapter otherwise explains how data access limitations guided this study‟s scope and reviews precautions that were taken while conducting and organizing research to ensure findings‟ reliability and validity. 18
CHAPTER THREE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
This thesis attributes greater analytical significance to the conditions under which, than the frequency with which, councillors form recurring voting blocs. Its quantitative analysis begins by distinguishing four important categories of motions that elicit disproportionately high rates of legislative disagreement. Using cluster-bloc techniques, it then identifies two voting blocs whose compositions remain constant when verified across these four categories of motions. The analysis concludes with logistic regression tests that reveal a statistically significant relationship between councillors‟ voting bloc and party membership, and discount geographic and demographic bases for their emergence.
Disagreements between councillors are, in other words, confirmed to reflect disagreements between parties.
Montreal City Council’s Legislative Processes and Patterns of Disagreement
Montreal City Council unanimously ratified nearly ninety-five percent of the motions that it considered between 2002 and 2009. This seems difficult to reconcile with popular assumptions about the importance of party affiliation to councillors‟ legislative behaviour until one considers the disincentives that they encounter for registering votes and particular motions over which they disagree.
Councillors‟ high rates of unanimous consent reflect incentives for expediency more than other considerations. Council convenes once a month for meetings that do not 19
typically exceed a business day (Rules of Procedure for Council Meetings 2006).5 More than one thousand motions are adopted in these meetings annually, requiring councillors to depend on bureaucratic briefings for voting cues (Bernier-Genest). Social and institutional disincentives also inhibit councillors from organizing legislative opposition. To improve council meetings‟ efficiency, votes are not cast or recorded unless requested by a councillor. A hundred dollars is nonetheless deducted from councillors‟ salary every time that they miss a vote to ensure that this process does not undercut council meeting attendance. The frequency with which councillors rush into council meetings when bells are rung to signal votes or subsequently request to have votes recorded in debate transcripts suggest that this sanction is rigorous enough to modify behaviour and, more significantly, to expose councillors who request votes to social reprobation.
Having discounted the analytical significance of votes that elicit unanimous consent, our analysis now considers the conditions under which, and specific motions on which, councillors disagree. It distinguishes four categories of motions that provoke disproportionately high rates of legislative disagreement and also happen to be particularly important to Montreal‟s development and governance. This combination of attributes cautions against confusing infrequent disagreement with random disagreement; it implies that councillors are strategic in selecting the motions that they contest.
Our first category of contested motions is made up of comprehensive budgets. It includes the city‟s annual budgets, triennial capital spending budgets and surplus spending
5 Council meetings are usually scheduled from 7:00 PM to 11:00 PM on a Monday evening and resumed the following morning from 9:30 AM to 12:30 PM and 2:00 PM to 5:00 PM as required until council has dealt with all items on its agenda. 20
plans, as well as motions to transfer funds between boroughs for equalization purposes and, what might best be translated as, unavoidable financial needs.6 This category of motions excludes funding requests for particular programs or services, or expenditures that are exclusive to a particular borough. It also excludes piecemeal attempts to alter expenditure admissibility requirements under triennial capital spending or other budgets.
Budgets accounted for a tenth of council‟s contested motions between 2002 and
2009. More significantly, more than half of all budgets that councillors considered during this period were contested. This disagreement rate is considerably higher than the period‟s average rate of 5%. That budgets only represented 1% of council‟s total number of motions reinforce the notion that voting disagreements do not occur randomly but rather reflect motions‟ policy significance.
Two further analytical categories of motions that elicited legislative disagreement during between 2002 and 2009 involve reforms to Montreal‟s Master Plan and transfers of authority to the borough level. The Master Plan is council‟s most important planning reference document. It sets out a long-term vision for Montreal‟s development and progressive targets in every area of council‟s jurisdiction. These targets are reviewed and adjusted annually. Motions to amend the Master Plan were contested at a rate of 13%
6 These motions were generally described with the following titles: Adoption du budget de la Ville de Montréal; Adoption du programme triennal d‟immobilisations (PTI); Autorisation d‟un budget supplémentaire; Affectations des surplus et politique d‟utilisation; Report des dépenses non réalisés; Contribution de un arrondissement a l‟équilibre budgétaire; Demandes incontournables des arrondissements. 21
between 2002 and 2005 and 17% between 2005 and 2009.7 These figures are considerably lower than ones for budgetary motions but still triple those of council‟s average disagreement rate.
Motions to transfer decision-making authority from city to borough councils were only tabled during the 2002 to 2005 council session. As noted earlier, borough councils were created as a concession to municipalities that were forcibly merged into Montreal.
Disagreements over 44% of motions that defined the breadth and limits of borough councils‟ authority are unsurprising, given amalgamated municipalities‟ opposition to administrative centralization. They nonetheless draw attention to geographic variables‟ potential influence over legislative voting behaviour.
Our last category combines motions that were tabled by opposition party or independent councillors instead of the executive committee. These motions represented 6% of contested votes in council‟s 2002 to 2005 session and 7.5% of contested votes in its
2006 to 2009 session, even though they accounted for less than 1% of these sessions‟ total number of tabled motions. More than half of all motions initiated by opposition or independent councillors during these sessions also elicited legislative disagreement. These rates surpass those recorded for motions to transfer authority to borough councils and nearly match those for budget votes. Disagreements on these motions are not easily attributed to policy or geographic considerations because they differ considerably in content. They are more likely a product of party discipline or conventions that permit
7 Calculations for the 2005 to 2009 council session omit dissenting votes by Richard Bergeron, the leader and then-lone representative of the city‟s second opposition party Projet Montreal because they artificially inflate the rate at which motions were contested. 22
councillors to vote freely on private member‟s motions as is customary in Canada‟s federal and provincial assemblies.
Table 2.1: Four Categories of Motions that Elicited Legislative Disagreement during Montreal City Council's 2001-2005 and 2005-2009 Sessions
Motions in category that Percent of motions in elicited disagreement as Motions in category as category that elicited percentage of all motions a percentage of all disagreement that elicited disagreement motions considered
2001-2005
Budgetary motions 61.0% 11.4% 1.0%
Amendments to Master Plan 13.2% 9.6% 3.9%
Power transfers to borough councils 43.8% 6.4% 0.8%
Motions Tabled by Independent or Opposition Party Councillors 35.1% 5.9% 0.9%
2005-2009
Budgetary motions 56.8% 10.0% 0.9%
Amendments to Master Plan 16.9% 5.2% 1.6%
Motions Tabled by Independent or Opposition Party Councillors 57.1% 7.5% 0.7% 23
Cluster Bloc Analysis of Council Voting Records
Having demonstrated their analytical significance, the next section of our analysis applies the Rice-Beyle cluster bloc technique to evaluate whether voting blocs emerge around contested motions. Its first step is to measure the frequency with which every possible pair of members in an assembly vote together over a specified period of time. The
Rice-Beyle technique divides the number of times that members of a pair voted in the same manner by the total number of times that they voted on the same motion to calculate an index of agreement. Abstentions and absences are treated as missing data. Votes eliciting unanimous consent are also ignored because they do not provide information on voting blocs.
The second step in the Rice-Beyle technique involves selecting a threshold by which to define voting bloc membership. Some strategies have been developed to reduce this decision‟s arbitrariness. However, most still involve guesswork based on observation of index of agreement scores‟ distribution across a table or matrix (Anderson, Watts, and
Wilcox 1966: 65-67). Ljiphart (1963) and Truman (1969), for example, examined these scores in phases, using a successively lower cut-off point to identify the level at which blocs emerge. Their procedure is best explained through an example. Table 2.2 features a partial matrix exhibiting the distribution of index of agreement scores for a sample of councillors from Montreal‟s 2002 to 2005 council session. The complete matrix from which these scores are extracted can be consulted in Appendix 4. Our sample includes every fourth councillor in that matrix. It reveals two or three clusters, depending on the cut- 24
off point that one applies. For purposes of illustration, we limit membership in clusters to councillors who voted in the same manner on three out of four votes. We then consider how they would change if they included councillors that voted in the same manner on one out of two votes.
Clusters formed above our upper-level (75%) index of agreement threshold are outlined in bold. Their membership generally coincides with that of Montreal‟s parties. The first cluster in the matrix‟s upper-left corner contains councillors who remained loyal to
Union Montreal during the 2002 to 2005 council session. A second smaller cluster containing councillors who left that party to lobby for borough demergers intersects its lower corner. Their overlapping area features two councillors who left the party under 25
relatively unique circumstances. Robert Libman had to resign when his borough voted to demerge from the megacity (Robitaille 2004a). Rene Dussault, on the other hand, was forced out of the party after being accused of accepting bribes (Hanes 2005). Neither catered to demerger sentiments but would have been freed from party discipline. A third cluster in the matrix‟s lower-right corner contains councillors from Vision Montreal.
Colette Paul resigned shortly after being elected under the party‟s banner to sit as an independent but seems to have continued voting with her former caucus. Saulie Zajdel also appears to firmly belong in this cluster despite subsequently crossing the floor to Union
Montreal. Neither was elected from an amalgamated municipality, however, which might help explain why they do not join councillors in the matrix‟s second cluster. These results thus generate grounds for suspecting that voting disagreements are explained by a combination of party and geographic variables.
No alternative explanation for cluster bloc membership arises when we broaden our index of agreement threshold to include councillors who voted together on at least 50% of all motions that elicited disagreement. This change only strengthens party affiliation‟s explanatory power by adding two Union Montreal defectors to the Union Montreal cluster and an additional Vision Montreal defector to the Vision Montreal cluster.
An additional cluster emerges when we apply a 75% index of agreement threshold to our complete matrix for the 2002 to 2005 council session (as shown in Appendix 4). It contains five opposition party councillors who crossed the floor to Union Montreal. The exercise otherwise replicates clusters outlined in our sample matrix. The first and second of 26
these clusters contain councillors that were elected with Union Montreal. Defectors and demerger advocates mostly converge in the second cluster. A third cluster composed of
Vision Montreal defectors similarly arises next to a fourth cluster of councillors who remained loyal to that party. Reducing our index of agreement threshold to 50% draws councillors into two broad party clusters.
Party affiliation seems to govern cluster membership in the 2005 to 2009 council session as well. Three clusters arise when we apply a 75% index of agreement threshold to this session‟s roll-call votes: two large ones that separate Union Montreal from Vision
Montreal councillors, and a smaller cluster of independent and Union Montreal councillors
(as shown in Appendix 5). This third cluster‟s source of cohesion is not immediately apparent. It does not seem to reflect geographic variables since none of its members represent municipalities that amalgamated into Montreal. It is also more entrenched than its corresponding cluster in the 2002 to 2005 council session, since its parameters hardly change when our index of agreement threshold is reduced to 50%.
We verified these matrices‟ clusters by applying a more sophisticated version of the
Rice-Beyle cluster-bloc technique to the four categories of important motions that we distinguished at the beginning of this chapter. Willetts‟ (1971) modifications to the Rice-
Beyle technique involve measuring the probability with which a pair of legislators will vote in the same manner across a specified number of motions, and then deriving index of agreement thresholds from the tails of these equations‟ sampling distributions. Appendix 6 breaks down Willett‟s technique and reviews its statistical benefits. For all its complexity, 27
the exercise simply ended up reproducing the same clusters as our application of the traditional Rice-Beyle technique.
Logistic regression tests were also used to verify whether clusters‟ composition coincides with councillors‟ caucus membership and experience with amalgamation. We controlled these variables‟ influence against those of councillors‟ years in office, executive committee experience and prior occupations, as well as census data on borough density and average per capita income. The tests confirmed that our matrices‟ leftmost and rightmost clusters are formed exclusively of Union Montreal councillors and Vision Montreal councillors. Representing an amalgamated constituency also makes councillors more likely to emerge in our matrices‟ second cluster by a margin of 1.4 in 2002 to 2005 and 5.9 in
2005 to 2009. This variable‟s influence otherwise disappears when party affiliation is used as a control variable. Montreal‟s city councillors are, in other words, primarily found to vote with their party on contested motions. This finding, in turn, focuses our qualitative analysis on the causes of parties‟ prioritization in councillors‟ voting decisions.
Summary:
This chapter uses statistical techniques to discern the strength and composition of voting blocs on contested motions in Montreal City Council. It confirms that legislative disagreements between councillors actually reflect disagreements between parties. These disagreements occur infrequently but on motions that are considerably more important to
Montreal‟s development and governance than ones that elicit unanimous consent.
28
CHAPTER FOUR: LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on legislative party cohesion is not theoretically or methodologically unified. Legislative cohesion is varyingly approached as an individual and collective property, evaluated through quantitative and qualitative techniques, and interpreted by reference to conflicting institutional and sociological assumptions about political behaviour. The following chapter situates our thesis in the context of comparative and
Canadian literature on legislative party cohesion. It also reviews leading institutional and sociological explanations for legislative party cohesion as an individual behavioural phenomenon in the aim of identifying hypotheses for our analysis of its operation in
Montreal City Council.
Theoretical Developments in Research on Legislative Party Cohesion
Research on political parties as a source of cleavage in legislative voting dates back for over a century (Lowell 1902; Rice 1925). However, party cohesion was not framed as a formal concept or differentiated from party discipline until Ozbudun‟s exploratory study into its causes. This analysis defined party cohesion as “the extent to which group members can be observed to work together for the group‟s goal.” By contrast, it defined party discipline as a “type of cohesion achieved by enforcing obedience” (1970: 360).8
Researchers have generally been content to work within this conceptual framework.9 It
8 Ozbudun approached party cohesion and party discipline as continuous rather than dichotomous concepts. They have accordingly since been measured along an interval scale. 9 For recent examples, see: Kaare Strom and Wolfang Muller (2009) “Parliamentary Democracy, Agency Problems and Party Politics,” in Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments, eds. Daniella Gianetti and Kenneth Benoit (Routledge, New York); Heidar Knut (2006) “Parliamentary Party Group Unity: Does the Electoral System Matter?”Acta Politica 41 (3): 249-266; and Scott Morgenstern (2005) Patterns of 29
undeniably requires further theoretical development however. Ozbudun implies that cohesion can be produced through other forces than discipline. He does not categorize these other forces, however, or specify the extent to which they interact. Moreover, his analysis does not clarify whether research on party cohesion should concentrate on individual or collective legislative behaviour. These ambiguities have resulted in a theoretically fragmented body of literature.
Legislative Voting as a Collective vs. Individual Behavioural Phenomenon
American political scientists have traditionally approached legislative voting as a collective behavioural phenomenon. Their research compares parties to demographic and geographic sources of legislative voting blocs. Non-American research, by contrast, has tended to focus on the conditions under which individual office-holders comply with parties‟ legislative preferences. Unlike American research, it takes parties‟ primacy over other cleavages in structuring legislative voting for granted. These discrepancies are important because they result in different research designs. Analyses that approach legislative voting as a collective behavioural phenomenon tend to be comparative and quantitative. On the other had, studies that approach legislative voting from an individual perspective tend to be case-specific and qualitative and to focus specifically on office- holders‟ interaction with central party officers.
These schools of research are becoming less geographically-specific. Their findings and techniques are also starting to be combined. Political scientists outside of the United
Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States (New York: Cambridge University). 30
States, for example, are increasingly sensitive to the possibility that office-holders‟ deliberations involve non-party variables. Studies on party cohesion in American legislatures are also being broadened to include analyses of the determinants of individual voting decisions (Collie 1985). This cross-fertilization has extended the scope of data on which hypotheses about party cohesion can be constructed and tested. Our study‟s qualitative analysis draws on findings from both schools of research but is mainly concerned with explaining legislative party cohesion from an individual behavioural perspective. This reflects the overwhelming evidence that our quantitative analysis generates for parties‟ importance over other cleavages in structuring Montreal City
Council‟s legislative voting blocs.
Institutional vs. Sociological Theories for Legislative Party Cohesion as an Individual Behavioural Phenomenon Research on legislative party cohesion as an individual behavioural phenomenon has traditionally pitted institutional against sociological theories. Institutional analyses emphasize incentives and constraints that emerge from the political environments in which office-holders operate. They also assume that legislators are purposively motivated, strategic, and sufficiently intelligent to calculate the utility of complying with, or rebelling from, institutional pressures. Sociological analyses, by contrast, confer primacy to norms of deference and caucus solidarity that are transmitted through social interaction and internalized over the course of office-holders‟ careers. They also dismiss the notion that office-holders‟ behaviour is invariably strategic or self-serving (Hazan 2003: 4).
These approaches are not easily reconciled. For example, they hold differing perspectives on the comparability of legislative behaviour. Institutional theorists reduce 31
legislative behaviour entirely to the pursuit of re-election, policy influence and career advancement (Strom and Mulller 1999). These goals are assumed to be fixed and thus allow for the development of comparative and predictive models (Hall and Taylor 1996).
Sociological theorists, by contrast, contend that office-holders‟ motives evolve as they interact with their legislative environments and caucus colleagues. This process is considered to be gradual and dynamic. As a result, it does not readily lend itself to comparative analysis. Though strategic benefits may be accrued from conformance to group norms, office-holders‟ behaviour is likewise not assumed to invariably reflect utility maximizing calculations. This behaviour is also deemed to be inhibited but not determined by norms (Kam 2009: 13). These inconsistencies have resulted in a relatively fragmented body of literature.
Recent studies by Searing (1994), Norton (2003), and Kam (2009) have confronted this fragmentation by advancing models in which sociological and institutional variables interact but account for different aspects of legislative party cohesion. These studies are conducted from a normative institutional approach. Like traditional schools of institutionalism, this approach maintains that individuals are purposively motivated and strategic in their behaviour. It nevertheless proposes that cost-benefit calculations are constrained by social expectations of appropriate behaviour. It also interprets motives and conceptions of utility as socially constituted (Hall and Taylor 1996: 23). In these manners, it creates opportunities for dialogue between traditional institutional and sociological hypotheses for legislative party cohesion. 32
While this development is encouraging, normative institutionalism is vulnerable to many of the same critiques that traditional institutional theorists make against sociological approaches. For example, it continues to associate behavioural norms with concepts like
“symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates.” Scholars disagree on how or even if these concepts can be measured (Hall and Taylor 1996: 14). Normative institutional studies also rely on descriptive analytical techniques that frame socialization as a dynamic process with inconsistent outcomes. These techniques are critiqued for being labour- intensive but difficult to replicate and useless for making predictions (Russell 2008).
Kam (2009) confronts these critiques by using survey data to proxy sociological variables and quantitative techniques to test for correlation between these proxy variables and fluctuations in party dissent rates. Opinion survey data on controversial policies are, by way of illustration, thus used as proxies for ideological values. Rookie candidates‟ years of prior party activism are similarly used as proxies for pre-legislative socialization.
This thesis‟ qualitative analysis is conducted in the absence of survey data on
Montreal‟s city councillors, which prevents it from developing proxy measures for their motives, ideological convictions, loyalty to party leaders, or exposure to socialization.10 A broad scope of questions and limited time with participants also prevented this study‟s interviews from attaining enough depth to descriptively trace socialization processes or their effect over motives, values and loyalty. For these reasons, our analysis could not
10 This is also the first study to generate statistics on Montreal city councillors’ roll call voting records. Comparing fluctuations in proxy variables’ correlation with party cohesion over just two council sessions would have hardly been sufficient to verify causal relationships even if we could produce them. It would have likewise not been reasonable to conduct an original survey because contact information could not be found for half of the councillors who served in examined council sessions. 33
generate a unified theory for legislative party cohesion in Montreal City Council. Indeed, its evaluation of sociological hypotheses is limited to exploratory findings. It nonetheless devotes as much attention to formal descriptions as caucus perceptions of party leaders‟ disciplinary authority and practices when evaluating institutional hypotheses. In this sense, it is open to the possibility that institutional incentives for legislative party cohesion are socially constituted as normative institutional theorists posit.
Having broadly situated our research in the context of theoretical debates on legislative party cohesion, this chapter‟s literature review now proceeds to outline leading explanations for this phenomenon and considers their applicability to Montreal‟s municipal parties. Attempts to verify these hypotheses at Canada‟s federal and provincial party levels are also reviewed on the premise that Montreal‟s municipal parties are conditioned by similar parliamentary processes and norms of behaviour.11 In the absence of aggregate roll- call voting data from other Canadian municipal party systems, our analysis cannot statistically verify whether system-level variables like electoral rules or divisions of authority between executive and legislative branches directly cause voting blocs to emerge around parties. These variables are theorized to condition party leaders‟ disciplinary leverage, however, and thus merit brief consideration. Our literature review otherwise focuses on institutional and sociological hypotheses involving party-level variables.
11 This notion is reinforced by councillors’ seeming transferability. Municipal councils serve as common recruitment bases for federal and provincial parties (Studlar et al. 2000). Mayoral candidates likewise frequently emerge from provincial or federal parties, or depend on those parties’ networks for financing and volunteers (Tindal and Tindal 2009: 315; Graham, Phillips and Maslove 1998: 105). It is reasonable to assume that they have been socialized to the same political norms. 34
System-Level Analyses of Legislative Party Cohesion:
Executive-Legislative Relations
Legislative party cohesion is commonly found to be stronger in parliamentary than presidential systems (Epstein 1980; Shugart 1998; Persson and Tabellini 2003).
Institutional theorists who approach party cohesion from an individual behavioural perspective attribute this relationship to rational choice calculations. Responsible government fuses caucus solidarity with job security and access to influence, for governing party members by requiring their parties to maintain legislative confidence. Rebelling in these circumstances carries risks of triggering new elections (Schwarz 1980; Norton 1985;
Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). Even opposition party members face electoral incentives to exhibit legislative cohesion under parliamentary systems. Strategic dissent can strengthen an office-holder‟s appeal to constituents. This benefit is nevertheless accrued at the direct expense of his or her party‟s credibility and competitiveness as a government-in- waiting (Sartori 1994: 191-193). Office-holders in presidential systems, on the other hand, are regularly subjected to competing requests by their parties‟ legislative and executive branches since neither depends on the other to exercise power. This dilutes the credibility of disciplinary threats and fosters norms that encourage favour-trading instead of caucus solidarity (Linz 1994; Carey 2007).
Some recent literature challenges descriptions of responsible government as a necessary and sufficient condition for legislative party cohesion in parliamentary systems.
It points out that majority governments frame relatively few votes as matters of confidence.
It also draws attention to precedents on which parties were permitted to continue governing 35
after being defeated on a confidence vote (Franks 1987; Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1993;
Huber 1996; Kam 2009). This literature has bearing on our research since Montreal City
Council functions as a quasi-parliamentary assembly without confidence conventions.
No parliamentary scholar contests that confidence conventions, at least indirectly, deter dissent in governing parties. Even Kam accepts this premise after discovering that
Canadian and British governing parties‟ dissent rates increase in accordance with the margin of seats that they hold over other parties. He interprets this to demonstrate that governing party members discipline themselves when faced with credible prospects of defeat (2001: 21). This relationship could also be attributed to career ambitions. Larger caucuses presumably reduce backbenchers‟ chances of being appointed to frontbench positions and thus incentives for party loyalty (2009: 54). Neither scenario helps explain how legislative cohesion is maintained in Montreal‟s parties though, when councillors, and not party leaders, control appointment decisions.
Electoral Systems
Some institutional theorists argue that electoral systems also shape parties‟ vulnerability to caucus rebellions. Electoral arrangements that require co-partisans to compete for preference votes are assumed to encourage strategic dissidence and campaigning on personal rather than party reputations (Crisp et al. 2004; Tavits 2009).
Multi-member plurality systems fit this profile, as do ones that permit voters to choose from candidates on party lists. Central party control of candidate nominations and party list rankings, by contrast, are assumed to encourage deferential behaviour (Carey and Shugrat
1995). Theorists are divided on how the single-member plurality system should be 36
categorized. On one hand, it does not allow for intra-party competition. On the other hand, it restricts districts to a single representative and might thus encourage candidates to personalize their campaigns at their party‟s expense (Wallack et al 2003).
Our thesis considers the manner in which electoral rules can influence parties‟ candidate nomination and campaign financing procedures. In the absence of roll-call voting data from other Canadian municipal party systems, it is nonetheless unable to test whether
Montreal‟s electoral rules strengthen, weaken, or have any statistical effect on parties‟ legislative cohesion. Comparative research suggests that this exercise would, in any case, be fruitless. A recent study comparing twenty-three democracies found no statistically significant relationship between electoral systems and caucus dissent rates (Morgenstern and Swindle 2005).
Party-Level Analyses of Legislative Party Cohesion:
Candidate Nomination and Removal Processes Comparative studies advance evidence of a small but statistically significant relationship between centralized candidate selection processes and legislative party cohesion (Sieberer 2006; Carey 2007; Depauw and Martin 2008). Some scholars attribute this relationship to screening criteria that weed out potential dissidents (Gallagher and
Marsh 1988; Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1993). Others assume that central party control over candidate nominations also extends to those nominations‟ renewal between elections and/or caucus evictions. Candidates elected by virtue of their party‟s popularity will presumably comply with the legislative preferences of whichever authority allows them to maintain their nomination (Carey and Shugart 1995; Crisp et al. 2004; Shomer 2009). 37
Comparative research findings associating legislative party cohesion with central party control over candidate selection processes are not replicated in Canada‟s federal parties. These parties are remarkably cohesive but use decentralized candidate selection processes. Scholars interpret this deviation to reflect an organizational trade-off that requires constituency members to defer to party leaders on the enforcement of parliamentary discipline (Carty, Cross and Young 2000: 155). It might also be explained by scholars‟ observation that central interference in nomination processes increases in tandem with constituencies‟ electoral competitiveness (Sayers 1999: 27-49). Electoral rules that require candidates to have nomination papers signed by party leaders, for example, are being increasingly exploited to prevent challenges to incumbent candidates (Cross 2002:
375). Under these circumstances, candidates‟ loyalty could be expected to revert to party leaders even if they were originally nominated by constituency associations.
Provincial legislation requires Montreal‟s municipal parties to have at least fifty members but does not dictate their rights or functions in, what are effectively, private organizations (Act Representing Elections and Referendums in Municipalities 2009: S.
397). Information on candidate selection processes is furthermore not posted on parties‟ websites. There is some historical evidence, however, that centralized candidate selection processes have contributed to Montreal parties‟ legislative cohesion. For example, Mayor
Jean Drapeau is reputed to have deliberately handpicked amateurs as candidates to safeguard against being challenged (Sancton 1983: 72). The dissolution of his immediate 38
successor‟s party, furthermore, can at least partially be attributed to its decentralized nomination processes.12 It is thus reasonable to hypothesize that:
H1: Montreal‟s municipal parties exhibit legislative cohesion because their leaders control candidate nominations and/or can remove caucus members.
Election Campaign Financing and Expenditures
Institutional theorists contend that legislative party cohesion is strengthened when party leaders control candidate campaign financing and expenditures. On the other hand, independent campaign financing is interpreted to buffer candidates from disciplinary pressures. Candidate control over campaign expenditures is also significant in this regard.
Candidates can hardly be expected to distinguish themselves on the basis of their personal reputation or records of service, if parties control the way in which, and extent to which their campaigns are promoted (Samuels 1999).
Information on candidate campaign financing and expenditures is not readily available in many countries, which has frustrated efforts to comparatively test these hypotheses (Morgenstern and Swindle 2005). Independent fundraising and candidate control over campaign expenditures in Canadian, British and Australian parliamentary parties nonetheless co-exist with low dissent rates in contradiction of these hypotheses.
12 Many of the resignations that fuelled the Montreal Citizens Movement‟s collapse were admittedly instigated by attempts to centralize decision-making. Caucus defectors would have caused less electoral damage to the party if they had not brought along their constituency associations‟ members however. A strong personal vote, supported by nomination and re-confirmation processes that rendered candidates accountable to local activists, instead permitted these councillors to mount credible challenges under alternate party banners. These, in turn, caused the city‟s left-wing vote to split and permitted Pierre Bourque‟s election in 1993. For further analysis on the causes of the Montreal Citizens‟ Movement dissolution, see: Tim Thomas (1997) A City with a Difference: The Rise and Fall of the Montreal Citizens‟ Movement (Montreal: Vehicule Press); and Jean Panet Raymond (1990) “Decentralization: Discourse and Reality,” in Montreal: A Citizen‟s Guide to Politics, eds. Jean- Hughes Roy and Brendan Weston (Montreal: Black Rose Books). 39
Kam attributes this deviation to appointment practices that integrate successful fundraisers into parties‟ power structures. He suggests that party leaders prefer to keep well-financed caucus members in cabinet than on the backbenches where they could organize leadership challenges. Experienced fundraisers are also strategically valuable if their skills could be applied to parties‟ broader fundraising efforts (2009: 165).
Recent allegations of fundraising improprieties by municipal parties across Quebec raise the alternative possibility that parliamentary scholars underestimate the importance of party networks to candidate campaign fundraising. These allegations charge municipal parties with circumventing prohibitions on corporate campaign contributions by
“collect[ing] cash and giv[ing] it to front men who write a [legal] cheque” (Patriquin 2009).
If accurate, these practices would offer parties additional leverage over candidates.
Quebec‟s election subsidy regime could also be expected to facilitate central party control over candidate campaign expenditures since it distributes campaign spending reimbursements to parties‟ official agents and do not require them to return anything to candidates (Act Representing Elections and Referendums in Municipalities 2009: S.475).
These circumstances justify examining whether:
H2: Montreal‟s parties exhibit legislative cohesion because their leaders help finance candidates‟ campaigns and control those campaigns‟ expenditures.
Quantitative Evidence for Career Incentives vs. Qualitative Evidence for Sociological Ones
Institutional theorists posit that central party involvement in candidate selection processes and campaign fundraising strengthen legislative party cohesion by rendering 40
political aspirants dependent on party leaders for electoral success. This effect is diminished after candidates are elected, requiring party leaders to use patronage and sanctions (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2007).
Control over appointments‟ distribution and withdrawal is broadly considered to be the most important instrument in party leaders‟ disciplinary arsenal (Bowler, Farell and
Katz 1993: 10). Governing parliamentary party leaders are particularly powerful in this regard because they oversee executive and legislative appointments. These positions are furthermore only available for as long as governing parties win legislative votes. Under these circumstances, caucus rebels do not only risk cutting themselves off from future appointments by offending party leaders but also jeopardizing those leaders‟ capacity to distribute appointments (Palmer 1995: 168-170; Kam 2009: 29).
How much influence do patronage and sanctions exert over legislative voting behaviour? This is an area in which quantitative and qualitative literature frequently conflicts. On one hand, there is aggregate-level evidence of a statistically significant relationship between parliamentary parties‟ legislative cohesion and proportion of caucus members with frontbench positions. Over the past fifty years, parties in Canada, Britain,
Australia, and New Zealand have experienced an average 1.7% reduction in dissent for every 10% increase in their proportion of caucus members with frontbench positions (Kam
2009: 66). Research has also found that MPs are more likely to rebel after being demoted
(Kam 2009: 152). When asked to account for their party‟s legislative cohesion or explain their reasons for rebelling, legislators tend to reference other concerns than career advancement or influence however. Surveys find that MPs in Canada and New Zealand are 41
guided by pride in past legislative accomplishments and ideological agreement with party policies (Epstein 1964; Kornberg 1966; Hobby 1987). These surveys‟ reliability could be challenged. Participating MPs might, for example, conclude that their interests are better served by leaving electoral and career goals unreported (Searing 1994). At face value, their responses nonetheless appear to support sociological rather than institutional explanations for legislative party cohesion.
Qualitative analyses of party whips‟ disciplinary strategies provide further evidence for normative variables‟ precedence over utility-maximizing calculations in maintaining legislative party cohesion. Searing‟s research on socialization in British parliamentary parties, for example, outlines a process whereby whips first appeal to norms of caucus solidarity before threatening dissidents with sanctions (1994: 250-257).
Qualitative research also finds that parliamentary legislators become more deferential through interaction with caucus colleagues. For example, surveys find that most
Canadian and British MPs are elected as avowed constituency representatives but then abandon constituents in favour of party preferences in their legislative decisions. This shift is counterbalanced by increases in MPs‟ respect for caucus solidarity and the „rules of the game‟ (Searing 1986; Docherty 1997). Quantitative research on the relationship between incumbency and caucus solidarity has again refuted these findings however. Its tests target the premise that dissent levels should increase with those of legislative turnover if sociological theories are accurate. Multivariate analyses of caucus dissent in Britain,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, do not find any evidence of a statistically significant relationship between these variables in governing parties. Their correlation amongst 42
opposition parties also challenges sociological interpretations since dissent is found to decline with rookie candidates‟ election (Cowley 2002; Garner and Letki 2005; Kam 2009).
How does one account for these inconsistent findings? Quantitative models might be critiqued for under-estimating the effects of pre-legislative socialization (Kornberg
1966; Clarke and Price 1977; Hazan 2003). One could, for example, attribute evidence of party loyalty amongst newly elected Canadian MPs to earlier interaction with political norms and elites. This argument is difficult to reconcile with these MPs‟ political amateurism however; surveys find that Canadian federal party candidates have comparatively low rates of prior party activism and legislative experience (Carty and
Erickson 1991: 347; Docherty 1997: 69).
Alternatively, one might focus on ideological variables. Legislative party cohesion often correlates with measures of ideological coherence in comparative quantitative research (Owens 2003: 26). Findings of party loyalty amongst rookie office-holders might therefore be a function of ideological solidarity. Numerous Canadian and British studies have found that MPs who perceive themselves to be ideologically distant from their parties are more likely to dissent (Searing 1986: 370; Kam 2001: 103; Cowley 2002: 105). Neither individual MPs‟ ideological values, nor parties‟ overall ideological diversity are, in themselves, strong predictors of legislative party cohesion however (Kam 2009: 80).
Relying on interview data, our analysis cannot systemically discern councillors‟ motives or trace whether, and the direction in which, they change. It must consequently consider findings that support and challenge the importance of rewards and sanctions to legislative party cohesion. Montreal‟s municipal charter requires party leaders to secure 43
council approval for appointment decisions. Their ability to reward legislative compliance or sanction dissent is thus presumably limited in comparison to their federal and provincial party counterparts. Recent amendments to Montreal‟s municipal charter, in fairness, confer governing party leaders exclusive jurisdiction over executive committee appointments. It is reasonable to assume that membership on this committee appeals to councillors driven by pursuits of policy influence and career advancement. Moreover, party leaders probably control caucus members‟ office locations, research and administrative staff resources, and council seating positions. These perks are significant to the extent that they provide certain caucus members greater opportunities for exposure and influence or, in the case of governing party members, more resources with which to compete for executive committee appointments. If institutional theorists are correct in attributing office-holders‟ actions to utility-maximizing calculations and distinguishing electoral security, policy influence, and career advancement, as their chief motives, then it is reasonable to hypothesize that:
H3) Montreal‟s municipal parties exhibit legislative cohesion because their leaders distribute appointments and other opportunities for policy influence in a manner that rewards legislative compliance and sanctions dissent.
In the absence of existing survey data, this analysis could not develop proxy measures for councillors‟ legislative socialization. Its broad scope of examined hypotheses and participants‟ limited availability also prevented it from systematically tracing socialization processes through interviews. Greater evidence of socialization to norms of deference and solidarity was likewise generated in response to questions on disciplinary sanctions than ones that explicitly addressed interaction between caucus colleagues. For 44
example, most first-term councillors criticized their party when asked to describe their experience with mentorship. Many nevertheless admitted to receiving frontbench advice on fundraising or the conditions under which it is most efficient to rebel as interviews progressed. Such mentorship could strengthen bonds of caucus solidarity. The manner in which it transmits norms nevertheless aligns more closely with normative institutional explanations for legislative behaviour than traditional sociological ones. Recall that normative institutional theorists attribute explanatory power to socialization processes but argue that they are governed by, and mostly serve to buttress, existing institutional arrangements. In Montreal‟s case, mentorship reinforces institutional arrangements by encouraging councillors to profit from their manipulation. To avoid repetition, these findings are integrated into our analysis of institutional hypotheses for legislative party cohesion instead of being presented separately.
An absence of survey data also prevented this analysis from developing proxy measures for councillors‟ pre-legislative socialization. Prior research on this variable also suggests that its influence cannot be isolated unless opinion data are collected before and after rookie candidates are first elected (Eulau et al 1962; Clarke and Price 1977; Docherty
1997). This thesis evaluates voting behaviour in past council sessions. Its interview participants have accordingly served at least one term in office and could be expected to have lost touch with their initial expectations. For this reason, we do not evaluate hypotheses that attribute legislative party cohesion to pre-legislative socialization.
Without opinion survey data, we cannot establish proxy measures for councillors‟ ideological convictions either. These are not easily discerned from parties‟ statements of 45
principles. Both make commitments to sustainable development, participatory governance, responsible financial management, cultural integration, bolstering Montreal‟s international competitiveness, and improving citizens‟ social and economic wellbeing (Union Montreal
2007; Vision Montreal 2007). The only area in which they substantively differ relates to administrative centralization. Union Montreal was created to prevent Vision Montreal from imposing a centralized administrative structure onto the Montreal megacity. Its statement of principles also pledges to promote diversity amongst boroughs whereas Vision Montreal persists in regretting the “cacophony of administrative structures and absence of direction” that have resulted from attempts to preserve borough autonomy (Vision Montreal 2009).
This cleavage could reasonably be expected to exert as much influence over councillors‟ legislative decisions as left-right cleavages did when Montreal was governed by civic parties in the 1980s. For these reasons, efforts are undertaken to evaluate whether:
H4: Montreal‟s municipal parties exhibit legislative cohesion because they bring together councillors with common ideological convictions.
46
Summary:
This study‟s qualitative analysis is conducted in a near absence of existing information on Montreal‟s city councillors or their interaction with party institutions and socializing agents. Our selection of hypotheses for councillors‟ compliance with party preferences in legislative voting is consequently guided by the assumption that they encounter similar institutional incentives and behavioural norms to office-holders in other parliamentary parties and, particularly Canadian federal and provincial parties. This chapter canvasses comparative and Canadian literature on legislative party cohesion to identify potential explanations for its emergence in Montreal City Council. It settles on institutional hypotheses that attribute legislative party cohesion to central party manipulation of councillors‟ electoral security (through access to party nominations and campaign financing) and desire for policy influence or career advancement (through access to appointments). It also emphasizes sociological hypotheses that frame legislative party cohesion as a product of shared ideological values and socialization to norms of caucus solidarity.
47
CHAPTER FIVE: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES
The following chapter considers whether legislative party cohesion in Montreal can be explained by central party control over candidate nomination and caucus eviction procedures, candidate campaign financing and expenditures, and councillors‟ access to appointments and policy influence. Interviews with former and current council members reveal that party leaders‟ practical influence over these mechanisms extends beyond formal descriptions of their authority. A review of media coverage also identifies occasions on which Union Montreal‟s leader issued threats of caucus eviction. Their efficiency at deterring dissent has nonetheless been inconsistent. No evidence is furthermore found to suggest that party leaders ever withhold campaign financing from rebellious candidates.
More persuasive evidence is found in support of hypotheses that attribute legislative party cohesion to party leaders‟ strategic distribution of appointments and other opportunities for policy influence. Interviews reveal that at least some councillors comply with parties‟ voting directives to increase their chances of being appointed to committees or to preserve existing appointments. Informal cues are nonetheless found to cultivate these expectations to a greater degree than experience with rewards and sanctions. This suggests that councillors‟ concepts of utility are socially constituted as normative institutional theorists posit.
1. Candidate Nomination and Removal Processes
Our first institutional hypothesis contends that central party control and manipulation of candidate selection and caucus eviction processes strengthen party 48
cohesion. It rests on several assumptions. Institutional theorists assume that political aspirants will seek a party candidacy if they believe that it enhances their electoral prospects. These theorists also assume that candidates will conform to the directives of whichever authority is responsible for their nomination and its renewal. Our analysis is accordingly divided into four sections addressing: a) party affiliation‟s perceived electoral value to councillors; b) party leaders‟ influence over candidate selection processes; c) party leaders‟ influence over caucus eviction processes; and d) party leaders‟ willingness to exploit leverage over these processes to maintain legislative party cohesion.
Participants perceive party affiliation as critical to electoral victory and dismiss borough associations‟ usefulness as a buffer to disciplinary sanctions. Party leaders also exercise greater influence over candidate selection and caucus eviction processes than reported in party statutes. More significantly, Union Montreal‟s leader occasionally whips votes by threatening dissidents with caucus eviction. These threats appear to be enforced reluctantly and have been inconsistent at deterring dissent however.
Perceptions of Parties‟ Importance to Candidates‟ Electoral Competitiveness
Montreal‟s municipal parties actively seek out candidates with established electoral profiles. Newspapers report that they increasingly prioritize candidacies by retired federal or provincial office-holders (Aubin 2005a; Lessard 2009; Duchaine 2009). These parties also made considerable efforts to recruit candidates from forcibly merged municipalities‟ existing political ranks during Montreal‟s first elections as a megacity (Milner and Joncas
2002; Auger 2003a). Moreover, it is not unusual for defeated councillors to be advertised as star candidates when recruited by third parties (Projet Montreal 2009; Parti Montréal Ville- 49
Marie 2009). These practices suggest that name recognition retains electoral value and can be acquired independently of party ties.
Participants did not dismiss the value of name recognition to electoral competitiveness. None felt that it could compensate for the advantages of being affiliated with a party however. “Personne ne se fait élire comme indépendant à Montréal,” reflected former Union Montreal councillor Carle Bernier Genest. “Moi, l‟objectif c‟était d‟être élu.
Si l‟objectif avait été de participer au processus démocratique, j‟aurais pu être indépendant.”13 Parties were regarded to provide fundraising and volunteer networks and preferential media treatment (Libman; Cowell-Poitras; Confidential Interview).
Do Party Leaders or Members Control Candidate Selection Processes?
Institutional theorists claim that parties are more cohesive when their leaders personally select candidates and can evict caucus members. Candidates face incentives to pursue personal votes and rebel against their parties, on the other hand, if nominated or required to periodically confirm their nomination through local activists. Interviews and media coverage reveal that Montreal party leaders‟ practical influence over candidate nomination and caucus eviction processes extends beyond formal descriptions of their authority. They also reveal that borough associations are too inactive and fluid in membership to serve as credible buffers against threats of caucus eviction.
Party leaders exert considerable influence over candidate nomination processes.
Vision Montreal statutes are fairly transparent in this regard. They instruct the party‟s
13 Translation: No one gets elected as an independent in Montreal. For me, the objective was to get elected. Had my objective been to participate in the democratic process, I could have been an independent. 50
leader to consult with a candidate nomination committee but permit him or her to ignore its advice and handpick candidates (Vision Montreal 2007: Art. 1.29-1.35). Union Montreal‟s constitution, on the other hand, assigns candidacy decisions to borough associations.
However, their options are limited to candidates who meet fundraising thresholds set by the party‟s central office (Union Montreal 2009: Art. 44-45). Union Montreal‟s leader can also veto undesirable candidates by refusing to sign their nomination papers (Quebec Election
Act 2010: S.172; Searle; O‟Sullivan).
Interviews generated additional evidence that Union Montreal‟s leader exercises broader influence on candidacy decisions than the party‟s statutes describe. Participants from that party generally dismissed the notion that borough associations could supersede leadership preferences on these decisions.14 Some even suggested that the party‟s central office handpicks and grooms candidates before opening nominations. One participant claimed that party officials collected signatures for his/her candidacy before advertising a nomination that was only opened for three days. This participant could still technically have been challenged but benefited from an early start (Confidential Interview).
Union Montreal participants reacted in fairly consistent manners when asked to describe the effects of these practices on nomination meeting outcomes. Those who requested to remain anonymous recognized that they winnow competition and limit party members‟ scope of choice. Most others evaded the question and advised against exaggerating the extent to which municipal party candidacies are contested. Some
14 This study‟s references to Union Montreal or Vision Montreal participants encompass retired and defeated caucus members. Responses from participants who defected from one of these parties to sit as independents before being interviewed were also included if they were asked to specifically comment on their experiences as caucus members. 51
explained that it is more efficient to centrally recruit candidates and distribute them amongst constituencies than have them focus resources on dividing grassroots loyalties in areas of existing party strength. Newspaper coverage contradicts claims that parties had trouble assembling full slates of candidates, however, reporting cases in which qualified political aspirants were discouraged or blocked from seeking party candidacies (Beauvais
2005; Aubin 2005a).
Further evidence of central party dominance over candidate selection processes was generated through descriptions of participants‟ own electoral recruitment experiences. None was required to formally compete for his/her nomination or could remember an occasion on which a candidate was not acclaimed. Most had furthermore been personally recruited. The remainder approached party leaders, borough mayors or outgoing councillors to express interest in a candidacy.
Participants held differing views about borough associations‟ organizational consistency. These are worth evaluating since strong borough associations could presumably buffer dissidents from party discipline. Both of Montreal‟s leading municipal parties require candidates to recruit members before being nominated. Thresholds vary with constituencies‟ size but usually range from one to two hundred members. Most participants spoke favourably about this requirement because it provides evidence of candidates‟ organizational and campaigning skills and helps them generate local roots. They nonetheless admitted that it results in fluid memberships. One participant also critiqued parties for projecting false appearances of grassroots activism. George Bossé remarked that 52
he never faced local pressure for participation in party decision-making and had to actively mobilize supporters when Union Montreal institutionalized borough associations.
« Parlant ici [en Verdun] il n‟y a jamais eu un exécutif [locale]… on n‟a jamais tenu un assemblé... Ils on fait un exécutif parce que le maire en voulait qu‟il en aille dans tous les arrondissements. Mais moi je n‟y crois pas à ca… Quand on se fait élire, c‟est pour prendre des décisions. Si on a besoin de consulter localement on va le faire. Mais d‟organiser des congrès ou, honnêtement, on faire venir des amis qu‟on connait, a qui on a vendu une carte [de membre] puis qui vont penser comme nous parce que ce sont des amis, moi je n‟estime pas que ce sont des congrès vraies.»15
Do Party Leaders or Members Oversee Caucus Removal and Admittance Decisions?
Union Montreal‟s constitution does not specify whether incumbents need to confirm their nominations between elections or clearly delineate responsibility over caucus eviction and floor-crosser admittance decisions.16 Participants were equally uninformed about these matters. Most were under the impression that incumbents could be challenged but seemed unwilling or unable to describe the party‟s procedure for renewing nominations. None could likewise break down the party‟s rules for evicting caucus members or admitting floor-crossers. Most simply assumed that they were controlled by its leader.17 As former
15 Translation: “Speaking here [in Verdun] there never was a [local] executive… we never held an assembly… They created an executive because the mayor wanted for there to be one in every borough. But I don‟t believe in that… When you get elected, it‟s to take decisions. If we need to consult locally, we‟ll do so. But to organize congresses in which, honestly speaking, we bring out friends that we know, to whom we sold [membership] cards, and who think like us because they‟re our friends – I don‟t think that these are real congresses.” 16 Caucus eviction decisions might be governed by the same rules and processes as membership evictions. If so, they would require a two-thirds vote of the party‟s executive committee which brings the party‟s leader and table officers together with three caucus representatives and three borough association representatives. 17 Vision Montreal experienced a regular exodus of caucus members to Union Montreal between 2002 and 2009, and its efforts were consequently focused on retaining, not removing, caucus members. Its current leader blocked incumbent caucus member Line Hamel from seeking re-election under the party‟s banner in 2009 after her father – and immediate political predecessor– was arrested on charges of fraud. This event did not occur during our study‟s examined council sessions, however, and involved some fairly exceptional circumstances. For further information on that particular incident, see: Éric Clément and Sébastien Rodrigue 53
executive committee member Louise O‟Sullivan summarized, “if the leader likes you, he‟s going to make sure that you stay.”
Evidence acquired through media sources supports this premise while helping to explain participants‟ confusion. They suggest that rules are either regularly neglected in the interests of expediency or reinvented to suit evolving circumstances. Gerald Tremblay did not consult with borough associations in 2003, for example, when he lured six independent and opposition party councillors to Union Montreal to ratify a budget (Corriveau 2003a).
He also acted independently in 2005 when he declined to renew two of these councillors‟ candidacies (Corriveau 2005).18 His actions in both cases contradicted earlier precedents
(Rodrigue 2003a).19
Do Party Leaders Use their Authority over Caucus Evictions to Maintain Party Cohesion?
Our analysis confirms that parties‟ candidate nomination and caucus eviction practices equip party leaders with leverage that could be exploited to maintain legislative party cohesion. Media coverage suggests that Gerald Tremblay only threatens dissidents with caucus eviction in exceptional circumstances however. It also leaves that impression that Montreal‟s 2002 to 2005 council session was relatively unique in terms of contextual variables that might be expected to instigate caucus rebellions.
(2007) “Line Hamel Longuement Interrogée,” La Presse, September 15; André Desroches (2009) “Line Hamel et Ronald Bossy ne Font Plus Partie des Plans de Vision Montréal,” La Voix Pop, August 18. 18 Tremblay did not even try to create an impression that he was responding to local preferences when he announced the candidates that he chose to replace these councillors. He simply explained that he had to make a political choice. 19 Former opposition councillor Luc Larivée, for example, was required to wait several weeks before being admitted to the party so that its executive committee could consult with the borough association that he would represent. He is also accused of having contravened party rules when he appointed replacements for Marius Minier and Ivon LeDuc instead of allowing them to defend their nominations before borough associations through formal and open contests. 54
Media coverage of Montreal‟s 2002 to 2005 council session portrays Gerald
Tremblay as a reluctant disciplinarian who was gradually hardened through experience with party defections and their causing contextual variables. Union Montreal was formed to prevent Vision Montreal from imposing a centralized administrative structure onto the
Montreal megacity. It brought the former administrations of amalgamated municipalities together with left-wing parties and some popular independents from the former City of
Montreal (Milner and Joncas 2002). Despite agreeing on broad principles, this mismatched group was not elected with a clear plan for reforming the city‟s administrative structure
(Auger 2003a). This eventually caused it to splinter along urban and suburban lines and exposed its leadership to a string of caucus rebellions.
Two of these rebellions were particularly notable for eliciting alternating threats of caucus defection and eviction. The first arose from Gerald Tremblay‟s decision to restrict borough councils‟ taxation power to levies for additional services. This decision provoked immediate criticism from Union Montreal‟s suburban caucus members. Their dissent had gone unpunished on earlier motions that appeared to benefit urban over suburban boroughs
(Duddin 2002; Cardinal 2003b). These councillors now attempted to wring concessions from the mayor by threatening to defect and, by extension, jeopardizing Union Montreal‟s slim council majority. Tremblay reasoned with these councillors before issuing an ultimatum: “ceux qui ne [défendent pas la motion] devront prendre une décision et s‟ils ne se décident pas, je les aiderai dans leur réflexion”20 (Perrault 2003). Borough Mayor Luis
Miranda subsequently resigned from the party but placed Tremblay‟s firmness in question,
20 Translation: “Those who do not [defend the motion] will have to make a decision and if they don‟t decide, I will help them in their reflection” 55
remarking: “he didn‟t have the guts to fire me” (Gyulai 2003a). Miranda‟s colleagues were less explicit but seemed equally unthreatened. They opted to remain in caucus while continuing to criticize the mayor‟s position. These councillors eventually conformed but stressed that they were treating the mayor‟s plan as a temporary arrangement until the provincial government held demerger referendums (Gyulai 2003b; Corriveau 2003b).
Given his subsequent demands for solidarity on the issue, it is surprising that Tremblay allowed them to make these and other statements. It eventually prompted reporters to join
Miranda in questioning Tremblay‟s resolve to implement disciplinary sanctions (Morisette
2003; Corriveau 2003c).
Tremblay‟s decision to campaign against borough demergers incited a similar sequence of alternating threats in the months that followed these incidents. This dispute involved even higher stakes for Tremblay, however, since he was now governing with a council minority and stood to lose half of his caucus to demerger referendums. It nevertheless still took Tremblay three months to intervene publicly. Moreover, he did not threaten to remove demerger advocates from Union Montreal‟s caucus until they threatened him with defection. One could thus interpret his ultimatum as an attempt to save face
(Cardinal 2003c). On the other hand, Tremblay reacted swiftly when three councillors called his bluff: “it just came to a point where the three of us said – listen we‟re not going to leave but we‟re certainly not going to change our mind. So we got the old heave ho,” explained one evicted caucus member (Branswell 2003). These examples confirm that dissidents are occasionally threatened and punished with caucus eviction in Union
Montreal. They do not clarify whether these sanctions‟ inconsistent record at deterring 56
dissent follows from or causes their infrequent exploitation. These sanctions do not, in any case, appear to serve more than a backup role in maintaining legislative party cohesion.
2. Candidate Financing and Campaign Spending Practices
Our second institutional hypothesis attributes legislative party cohesion to central party financing of candidate campaigns and oversight of those campaigns‟ expenditures. Its analysis is divided into three sections evaluating whether: a) councillors believe that competitive campaign financing confers electoral benefits; b) parties facilitate campaign financing by directly subsidizing candidates or assisting them with fundraising; and c) parties oversee candidate campaign expenditures.
Participants associated electoral success with competitive campaign financing and framed party affiliation as a necessary condition for its achievement. One confirmed while others strongly denied using party channels to solicit campaign contributions from corporations. This practice has been documented in the media, however, which provides the deviant interview credibility and raises suspicions about other participants‟ candour.
Candidates are otherwise found to depend on caucus colleagues more than party leaders for fundraising assistance. Our analysis finds no evidence that central party oversight of candidate campaign expenditures has ever been manipulated to encourage cohesive voting behaviour.
57
Campaign Expenditures‟ Perceived Importance to Electoral Competitiveness
Participants broadly agreed on the electoral benefits of competitive campaign financing.21 Louise O‟Sullivan attributed the poor results of her recent mayoral campaign, for example, to the misguided notion that she could compete with parties without matching their expenditures:
“If I want to have a viable party and viable candidates in four years – whether I find them now or not is not that important. The onus is on raising money. Money makes the world go round. You have to have money for banners…publications… up-keeping the Internet site. So I learned a lesson: it‟s money.”
Party Affiliation‟s Importance to Competitive Campaign Financing
Montreal‟s municipal parties were not found to directly finance candidate campaigns. On the contrary, they depend on caucus members to finance central campaign activities. Both assign fundraising targets that vary in relation to the size of councillors‟ constituencies.22 Contributions flow directly to parties‟ central office and a proportion is then returned to borough associations for local expenditures. This arrangement is intended to facilitate bookkeeping and to ensure that councillors comply with campaign financing laws (Tassé; Trudel). Any disciplinary leverage that parties derive from this arrangement is tenuous; it can only be exercised as long as candidates continue to transfer fundraising revenues to party coffers.
21 These beliefs are supported by findings in other Canadian municipalities. Variations in campaign spending seldom influence electoral outcomes in municipalities with fewer than 100 000 residents. Significant disparities arise in the expenditures of elected and defeated candidates, however, in cities that pass that population threshold. It is possible but improbable that these trends would change if research were extended to include cities with parties. For more on this research see: Kushner et al. 1997; Austin 2006. 22 Targets frequently changed but ranged between $1000 and $15,000 annually. 58
Some participants claimed to rely on party assistance to meet fundraising targets but few of their examples actually involved party practices. Most described informal arrangements at the borough-level through which rookie councillors share fundraising burdens with seasoned caucus colleagues. Further questioning revealed that these arrangements are initiated and maintained by borough mayors and differ broadly across the city. Verdun Mayor Claude Trudel attributed this variance to differences in the breadth and flexibility of borough mayors‟ fundraising networks. Union Montreal councillor Jane
Cowell-Poitras, on the other hand, attributed it to differences in political culture, implying that councillors from formerly independent municipalities get more support from constituents and are more supportive of caucus colleagues than ones in the former City of
Montreal. Either explanation confirms that these arrangements operate independently of formal party practices. They might still serve to deter dissent as a result of being perceived to fall under party control but are not technically vulnerable to manipulation by party leaders.
How else might parties facilitate fundraising? Only participants with past experience as independent candidates mentioned electoral subsidies that disproportionately benefit candidates running under party banners.23 None discussed the benefits of appearing
23 Montreal‟s electoral financing laws disproportionably limit independent candidates‟ access to two public subsidies. The first offsets parties‟ secretarial expenses. It provides $0.35 per registered voter and is distributed in proportion to parties‟ share of the popular vote. In spite of their intended administrative function, these funds can reasonably be expected to help parties prepare for elections. For example, they can be used to mail pamphlets or to rent a party headquarters. A portion of these subsidies is distributed to parties‟ caucus members. No subsidy of this kind is made available to independent councillors however. Unlike party candidates, independent candidates are also required to loan their campaigns money in order to access reimbursements for campaign expenditures. Quebec‟s electoral finance regime reimburses half of the expenditures of any candidate who receives more than 15% of votes cast in his or her district. However, independent candidates‟ reimbursement “cannot exceed… debts arising from [their] election expenses or 59
on campaign materials with a familiar party leader.24 Despite being well documented in the media, only one participant furthermore admitted to engaging in fundraising practices that circumvent legal prohibitions on corporate campaign contributions (Patriquin 2009). This participant asked to remain anonymous before explaining how party affiliation opens doors to corporate donors who stand to profit from public contracts. According to this informant, corporate donors do not discriminate between parties. They are also easier to approach and more predictable sources of financing than grassroots activists:
“La manière que ça fonctionne c‟est que chaque année on fait une levée de fonds. On a une liste de personnes et ça ne me gêne pas de dire que c‟est des compagnies… Ils savent quoi faire… tu n‟as même pas besoin de t‟expliquer… Pour ceux qui on des contrats, ils ne veulent pas les perdre – ils pensent qu‟ils vont les perdre. Ça m‟étonnerait mais bon,… pour répondre à nos obligations [financières], tu es un peu obligé de faire cela.”25 If more broadly verified, these arrangements would easily explain perceptions of parties‟ importance to competitive campaign fundraising. They would also equip parties‟ central offices with powerful disciplinary mechanisms. Legislative party cohesion could be maintained through the strategic distribution of access to corporate campaign donors.
Caucus eviction threats would also carry broader electoral repercussions. Allegations of collusion with corporate campaign donors were nonetheless vehemently denied by other interview participants who identified grassroots activists as their principal source of personal contribution” (Elections Act 2010. c.457). This restriction aims to ensure that subsidies do not serve as a source of additional income for defeated councillors. They nonetheless require those councillors to indebt themselves to access the same funds as their party counterparts. 24 Some of these benefits have been documented in the media. Vision Montreal councillors experienced a tenfold decline in fundraising revenues, for example, when Pierre Bourque left the party‟s leadership. See: Linda Gyulai (2007) “Tremblay‟s Party Sitting Pretty with Donors,” Montreal Gazette, April 6; Sara Champagne (2007) “Le Départ de Pierre Bourque coûte cher à Vision Montréal,” La Presse. May 5. 25 Translation: “The manner in which it works is that, we raise funds every year… We have a list of people, and I‟m not ashamed to say that its companies… They know what to do… you don‟t even have to explain yourself…. For those that have contracts, they don‟t want to lose them – they think they‟re going to lose them. I‟d be surprised but … to respond to our [financing] obligations, you‟re a bit required to do that. 60
campaign financing. These allegations also continue to be denied by party leaders (Gyulai
2005a; Aubin 2005b; Gyulai 2008; Cliche 2009). Our conclusions in this area are therefore necessarily tentative. We do not find explicit evidence that candidates rely on parties for campaign funds or that leverage conferred through this relationship is exploited to maintain legislative party cohesion. We have reason to suspect that both scenarios remain plausible however.
Municipal Parties‟ Management of Candidate Campaign Expenditures:
Neither of Montreal‟s municipal parties advertises its involvement in the management of candidate campaign expenditures. Interviews suggest that it confers a levelled playing field and guarantees campaign activities‟ consistency. It might therefore prevent candidates from pursuing personal votes with party resources but is not manipulated to reward loyalty or sanction dissent.
Interviews confirmed that both parties require candidates to direct campaign expenditures to centrally approved lists of items. Most also felt that these parameters restricted their margin of manoeuvre. “[Les campagnes sont] très encadrés et très strictes,” explained Union Montreal councillor Jane Cowell-Poitras. “C‟est tant que vous alliez avoir pour la publicité, pour le locale, le téléphone.”26 Vision Montreal House Leader Anie
Samson agreed. Neither participant‟s tone was aggrieved however. On the contrary, both defended their parties‟ management of candidate campaign spending on the grounds that it
26 Translation: “It’s very structured and very strict. You’ll have this much for… publicity, the campaign office, the telephone.” 61
ensures campaign activities‟ consistency and provides a levelled playing field to candidates with different backgrounds and fundraising networks.
Other participants felt that legal campaign spending limits are too low to warrant analysis of parties‟ spending guidelines. “Ca passe vite un budget de campagne,” explained former Union Montreal councillor Carle Bernier-Genest. “Un coup que t‟as payé le loyer, le téléphone, les différents dépliants… ta capacité d‟inventivité n‟est pas très mise à contribution.”27 An anonymous participant shared this sentiment, arguing that spending limits are so low that candidates often need to pay for materials out of their pockets:
“Quand tu reçois des gens qui viennent travailler pour vous – faut qu‟il en aille du café. Mais là, si tu mets soixante tasses de café par jour… pendant cinq ou sept semaines, c‟est trop! Le nombre de beignes, le nombre des biscuits… tu dépenseras facilement ton budget. Donc, il y a certaines choses que tu vas prendre de ta poche et que tu vas mettre en dessous [de la table]. Tu ne va pas mettre [cela] dans tes dépenses électorales parce que sinon ça serait ridicule.” 28 A third group of participants acknowledged these limitations but argued that candidates who pool resources can still derive enough utility from campaign expenditures to exercise autonomy within parties‟ spending guidelines. Some Union Montreal participants described sharing offices and volunteers with other party candidates in their borough. Some also split production costs for, and consulted one another on, the content and distribution of campaign materials. These arrangements strengthened expenditures‟ efficiency by reducing production costs and preventing efforts from being replicated
27 Translation: “Campaign budgets are passed through quickly. Once you‟ve paid for the rent, the telephone, the different posters… your capacity to be creative cannot really be put into force.” 28 Translation: “When you have people who come work for you – it is required that they have coffee. But if you put out sixty cups of coffee per day… for five or seven weeks, it’s too much. The number of donuts, the number of cookies… You’d easily spend your budget. So there are certain things that you need to put under [the table]. You are not going to put them in your electoral expenses because if you did, it would be ridiculous.” 62
(Bernier-Genest; Tassé). Like those involving fundraising, these arrangements were nonetheless described to differ across the city and to hinge on borough mayors‟ willingness to share resources (Bittar). Their emergence might be encouraged by parties‟ distribution of campaign funds to borough associations instead of individual candidates. These arrangements are not vulnerable to central party manipulation, however, or contingent on councillors‟ compliance with parties‟ legislative directives. If anything, they are more likely to contribute to legislative party cohesion by fostering bonds of caucus solidarity – and thus serving as instruments of socialization. None of the scenarios that participants described therefore imply that parties use their regulatory authority over candidate campaign expenditures to reward loyalty or punish dissent.
3. Legislative Appointments and Policy Influence
Institutional theorists frame legislative party cohesion in transactional terms; they assume that it varies with central party control over caucus members‟ electoral security, policy influence and career advancement. Our analysis of this phenomenon in Montreal
City Council has thus far been limited to party leaders‟ manipulation of councillors‟ electoral vulnerabilities. Its attention now shifts to disciplinary strategies that exploit councillors‟ aspirations for career advancement and policy influence.29
Our analysis is divided into three sections. The first reviews opportunities for promotion and policy influence in council and party structures. Despite denying its appeal,
29 Councillors‟ pursuit of policy influence is approached from a strictly institutional perspective. Their behaviour, in other words, is still reduced to utility maximizing calculations and self-serving motives. Councillors are assumed to treat parties as conduits for advancing policies that they personally value. Sociological theorists, by contrast, would explore the possibility that councillors are socialized to identify with their party‟s policies and to behave in a manner that puts its interests above their own. 63
participants set executive committee membership apart from other opportunities to influence policy agendas. They otherwise either dismissed the value of participating in policy development exercises or stressed the importance of seizing every formal and informal opportunity to advance a policy. The second section of our analysis reviews party leaders‟ influence on appointments. It exposes another gulf between council‟s formal rules and practical operation and dispels our original premise that Montreal‟s party leaders exercise less control over appointments than their federal and provincial counterparts. It also verifies that at least some councillors comply with parties‟ legislative directives to strengthen their chances of being appointed to standing committees. The third section of our analysis evaluates the extent to which negative incentives help forge parties‟ legislative cohesion. It finds that councillors take precautions to preserve existing appointments in the absence of evidence for, or personal experience with, their withdrawal. Their expectations of being disciplined for dissidence are cultivated through informal cues, and not explicit threats or sanctions.
3.1 Opportunities for Policy Influence and Career Advancement
This analysis begins by providing an inventory of opportunities for career advancement and policy influence in council and party structures, and then winnows the list down to opportunities that held greatest appeal to participants. Most distinguished the executive committee from other council forums because it controls council meeting agendas. Participants who participate in party policy development exercises were also satisfied with their efficacy, even though these exercises were not regarded to rival executive committee work in terms of prestige or policy influence. Standing committee 64
work was dismissed on both of these standards but recognized to offer income supplements that appeal to certain councillors.
Council-Level Opportunities for Policy Influence and Career-Advancement
Montreal’s executive committee is structured like a parliamentary cabinet and performs similar functions. It schedules council meetings, prepares their agendas, and introduces most of the motions that they consider (Boyer 1986). Beyond its ratifying functions, city council makes appointments and forms standing committees that consult with public stakeholders and advise the executive committee. Standing committees are only supposed to conduct research in their respective policy areas. They can initiate consultations on any matter that they consider to fall in those parameters however (Guide d’Information sur les Commissions Permanentes du Conseil Municipal 2009). City council meetings also permit councillors to question executive committee members and table their own motions (Rules of Procedure for Council Meetings 2009: s. 32).
Council-Level Opportunities‟ Perceived Influence and Appeal to Councillors
Participants generally agreed that the executive committee directs council decisions while other forums only attempt to influence its members. Being appointed to this committee, in other words, confers policy influence in addition to career advancement.
Participants denied interest in joining its ranks, however, which is difficult to reconcile with institutional assumptions about legislators‟ motives. Our analysis cannot verify motives and consequently accepts participants‟ claims at face value. It nonetheless notes that they acknowledged and admonished other councillors who use their office to advance personal 65
business interests or as a stepping stone to provincial or federal political careers.
Participants did not use follow-up questions on these councillors‟ behaviour to attack opposition party counterparts. This suggests that each party contains a similar distribution of career-oriented councillors who presumably also aspire for executive committee membership.
Further evidence for councillors‟ career motives and pursuit of executive committee posts arose through interview questions on legislative dissent and caucus defections. Vision
Montreal House Leader Anie Samson, for example, argued that every councillor considers him or herself worthy of a frontbench position. Passing over councillors for promotions thus inevitably exposes party leaders to potential dissidence. A similar rationale was advanced to explain defections. It is supported by the frequency and consistent direction in which councillors cross the floor. Twenty-five councillors defected from their parties over our study‟s council sessions. This figure nearly matches that of federal party defections during the same period, in a chamber that is more than four times the size of Montreal City
Council.30 Despite the hurried circumstances under which it was formed, Union Montreal also experienced half as many defections as Vision Montreal from 2002 to 2009. Thirteen out of seventeen Vision Montreal defectors eventually joined Union Montreal as illustrated in Appendix 7. The vast majority of Union Montreal‟s defectors, on the other hand, were demerger advocates who preferred to sit as independents.
30 Both legislatures experienced electoral boundary changes during our study‟s time period. This prevents us from advancing a specific figure. Montreal city council was enlarged from 52 to 74 seats following the city‟s amalgamation with surrounding municipalities in 2002. It was then again reduced to 65 seats after eleven of its boroughs fully or partially demerged in 2006. The House of Commons was enlarged in 2003, on the other hand, from 301 to 308 seats. In terms of proportional difference, this represents a 1:4 ratio at the beginning and 1:5 ratio at the conclusion of our study‟s examined legislative period. 66
Having established that at least some councillors aspire for appointments to the executive committee, this analysis now considers why other council forums are not perceived to match its influence or prestige. Participants appreciated the opportunity to acquire deeper understandings of specific policy areas by serving on standing committees.
Standing committee positions were also observed to confer supplementary income which is valuable to backbenchers who rely on council salaries for their livelihood. We did not anticipate that financial considerations may direct councillors‟ pursuit of appointments when formulating interview questions but consider this motive to conform with institutional assumptions about political behaviour since it serves personal rather than collective interests. Participants nevertheless dismissed the notion that standing committee work is worth pursuing to influence policy. Some even suggested that these forums were deliberately established to distract attention from the city‟s real power arena.
Participants noted that executive committee members are required to neither comply nor even respond to standing committee advice. As Union Montreal councillor Jane
Cowell-Poitras explained, “ils ne sont aucunement tenu par la charte de faire un suivi. Ils peuvent carrément dire: on va étudier, on va étudier.”31 This was confirmed by former executive committee member Robert Libman. “You‟ll listen to what they say but you‟ll still do what you want… [Standing committees] discuss, they debate and occasionally things are incorporated but [motions] are packaged in advance.” These arrangements naturally frustrated some participants. They even prompted Vision Montreal House Leader
Anie Samson to challenge the standing committee system‟s integrity:
31 Translation: “They are not required to follow-up in any manner by the Charter. They could pretty much just say: we‟ll review, we‟ll review.” 67
Actuellement, les commissions – honnêtement – n‟ont pas donné des résultats concrets. C‟est comme un dévidoir du comité exécutif pour dire « tel dossier est pas mal „hot‟ – on va l‟envoyer aux commissions, puis regarder ça, puis remet nous des documents, puis faites nous des conclusions – et je te dirais que ça prend des années […] d‟arrivé à une conclusion. C‟est vraiment une perte de temps.32 Participants were equally dismissive of opportunities for policy influence through council meetings. Union Montreal participants were particularly cynical, grasping to an ideal notion of how council should proceed and suggesting that it has been corrupted by parliamentary norms that prioritize partisanship over policy improvement. Most attributed these norms‟ intensification to provincial and federal legislators‟ recruitment to municipal parties.33 “Ces gens là ont apporté ce qu‟ils vivaient au provincial et au fédéral – ça veut dire: une guerre de partis politiques et non pas une guerre de projets,” argued former executive committee member Georges Bossé.34 Others directly blamed party leaders for council meetings‟ increasing partisanship. “La partisannerie est plus lié aux individus… que d‟autres choses,” argued Carle Bernier-Genest. “Mettons que le chef de l‟opposition avait le même type de leadership que Gerald Tremblay – plus consensuel et toute ça – ça apaiserait la partisannerie.”35 Vision Montréal councillors concurred but held executive committee members responsible for council meetings‟ partisanship. House Leader Anie
32 Translation: “As they presently stand, commissions – honestly – have not given concrete results. It’s a detractive instrument used by the executive committee to say “this file is pretty hot – we’re going to send it to a commission and look it over, and produce some documents, and give us some conclusions – and I’d say that it allows for it to take years before we arrive to conclusions. It’s really a waste of time.” 33 This phenomenon is well documented in the media. See, for example: Henry Aubin (2005a) “Backroom Boys Pick Candidates for Tremblay,” Montreal Gazette, August 25; Denis Lessard (2009) “Des Coups de Pouce Arrivent de Québec Juste à Temps,” La Presse, September 24; Gabrielle Duchaine (2009) “Les Vedettes ont Brillés de Tous Leurs Feux,” Rue Frontenac, November 2, http://ruefrontenac.com/nouvelles- generales/electionsmunicipales/13095-candidats-vedettes, (accessed August 26 2010). 34 Translation: “Those people brought along what they lived with provincially and federally – that is, a war between political parties and not initiatives.” 35 Translation: Partisanship is more linked to individuals… than other things. Say that the Leader of the Opposition had the same leadership style as Gerald Tremblay – more consensual and all that – it would reduce partisanship. 68
Samson, for example, argued that confrontational tactics were rendered necessary by executive committee members‟ indifference to opposition motions and unwillingness to engage in constructive debate:
Je dirais que depuis l‟administration Tremblay est la, je trouve qu‟il y a un non respect de l‟opposition… à l‟époque on était avec M. Bourque, on respectait l‟opposition puis on les écoutés… Eux fonctionnent depuis 2002 en disant: « On est au pouvoir… Dites ce que vous voulez. De toute façon on est 40, on passer au vote et ca va passer… » On sent que toutes les fois qu‟on ouvre la bouche on conseil, on les fait perdre leur temps » 36 An executive committee member who asked to remain anonymous confirmed these critiques but, in turn, reproached Vision Montreal for wasting council‟s time:
Quand je suis dans le conseil, je ne suis pas en train de travailler des dossiers... [mais plutôt à] répondre à des questions d‟ordre politique où on cherche à nous mettre dans l‟embarras… Y a une façon de faire la politique a Montréal, ou on pense que parce qu‟on débat pour huit heures de temps on a bien servi la démocratie. Je ne suis pas de cet avis… Y a des débats qui sont légitimes à faire mais ce n‟est pas vraie que tous les points de jour doivent être débattu 37
For all its shortcomings, Vision Montreal‟s confrontational approach to council meetings appears to pay dividends in terms of policy influence. Samson explained that
Union Montreal saves itself embarrassment by co-opting Vision‟s Montreal motions before they reach council; the executive committee grants itself an opportunity to preview those motions by imposing a fifteen-day notice period for their tabling. No Union Montreal
36 Translation: “I would say that since Tremblay’s administration got there, I find that there’s no respect for the opposition… when we were there with Mr. Bourque, we respected the opposition and we listened to them… Since 2002, they’ve been operating by saying “we are in power. Say what you’d like. In any case, we’re 40, we’re going to vote and its going to pass… We feel that every time we open our mouths in council, we’re wasting their time..” 37 Translation: When I’m in council, I’m not working on my files… [but rather] responding to political questions through which they’re looking to embarrass us… There’s a way of doing politics in Montreal where we think that we’ve served democracy because we debated for eight hours. I’m not of that opinion… There are legitimate debates that should be had but not every point of the day has to be debated. 69
councillor confirmed this allegation although Carle-Bernier Genest admitted that his party occasionally withdraws or changes motions in anticipation of opposition party initiatives.
These policy achievements did not encourage councillors to independently table motions. Some participants claimed to lack familiarity with the rules that govern this mechanism, while others simply felt that it was too cumbersome. Whatever the cause, none felt that independent motions approached ones initiated by parties in terms of prospects for success.
Party-Level Opportunities for Policy Influence and Career-Advancement
Party policy development processes offer an alternate route to policy influence that might appeal to governing party members who are not interested in jockeying for council appointments. These processes offer opposition party councillors even greater potential influence since shadow cabinets cannot rely on bureaucrats for research like their executive committee counterparts.
Union Montreal‟s and Vision Montreal‟s constitutions outline similar policy development processes. Both parties permit borough associations to send policy resolutions and delegates to biannual conventions. Both also describe conventions as their highest decision-making authority and require that they confirm election platforms. Vision
Montreal‟s statutes specify that one in every two of its conventions must be held during an election year (2007: 1.26). This particular convention must also allow delegates to revise the party‟s platform (2007: 1.41). It is unclear whether this means that delegates can actually modify platforms‟ contents. Union Montreal‟s statutes are equally ambiguous on 70
these matters. Caucus meetings provide councillors a further opportunity to influence party policy though little is known about their proceedings through party statutes.
Perceived Influence and Appeal of Party-Level Opportunities for Policy Influence
Participants were split over the utility of participating in party-level policy development exercises. Those who dismissed these exercises usually did so outright, whereas those who found them useful stressed the importance of seizing every possible opportunity to lobby for a policy.
Cynics claimed that policy development exercises are more centralized than party statutes describe. One participant even charged Union Montreal with orchestrating convention outcomes by preventing controversial resolutions from being tabled
(Confidential Interview). These claims echo media coverage of the party‟s early conventions. It reports that borough associations used to regularly complain about the party‟s refusal to bring important policies to vote in convention. This occurred until the party enacted a gag rule that authorizes its executive committee to expel any member that does not “respect decisions taken by [party] authorities” (Aubin 2004). Former Vision
Montreal councillor Christine Poulin was equally sceptical about conventions‟ influence on her party‟s platforms. She suggested that only members of the party leader‟s inner circle have genuine input on platforms. Other participants disagreed, insisting that their parties‟ platforms capture the spirit, if not content, of convention resolutions. They attributed colleagues‟ frustration to decisions made in light of budgetary constraints and existing commitments. “Ce n‟est pas parce que les conseillers et les gens dans le parti veulent 71
absolument tel affaire que ca va se réaliser… parce que parfois il y a des obligations," argued executive committee member Claude Trudel.38
Participants who focused their lobbying efforts on caucus meetings were equally cynical about their influence over policies. Former Union Montreal councillor Patricia
Bittar described caucus meetings as exercises in group therapy. Executive committee members generally agreed with this assessment. Caucus meetings are designed “to pacify the underdogs,” explained Louise O‟Sullivan. “They feel important… because you have to listen to them… but the decision has already [been made].” Unfortunately, many participants also regarded these meetings as the only party forum in which they are solicited for input. These councillors complained that caucus meetings were too short and infrequently scheduled. Former executive committee member George Bossé agreed. “Je trouve qu‟on donne peu de temps dans les caucus pour que les gens puissent [intervenir].39
His colleague Claude Trudel nonetheless countered that the councillors who intervene in these meetings are the same ones that seize other opportunities for influence:
C‟est la critique… du caucus souvent de dire – écoute, vous arrivez, la décision a été prise par l‟exécutif et vous nous informer. Vous nous ne consulter pas. [Tandis qu‟] il y a une dizaine qui interviennent régulièrement [et] qui défendent des idées… Pour faire réagir le comité exécutif, il y‟on deux solutions, ou il gueule au caucus… ou ils vont voir le membre du comité, puis peut-être leurs collègues pour essayer de les convaincre.40
38 Translation: “Its not because councillors or people from the party absolutely want something, that its going to be accomplished… because sometimes there are obligations.” 39 Translation: “I find that people are given too little time to [intervene] in caucuses. 40 Translation: “It’s a critique that’s often raised by people from the caucus to say – listen, you arrive, the decision has already been taken by the executive, and you inform us, you don’t consult us… [Whereas there] are… ten... that regularly intervene… that defend their ideas. To get a reaction from the executive committee, there are two solutions: either they speak up in caucus or they go see the executive committee member and maybe their colleagues to try and convince them.” 72
A similar dispute arose among Vision Montreal participants. House Leader Anie
Samson insisted that the party‟s voting positions are not set until debated in caucus meetings. Her former colleague Christine Poulin rejected this assertion however. “Le caucus pour préparer les conseils ça ne donnait absolument rien. On avait discuté… l‟horaire du conseil… ce n‟est pas là que [tu peux avoir une] influence.”41
Participants who pushed a small number of policies through every stage of their party‟s policy development process were considerably more confident about their ability to influence council‟s agenda than ones that only intervened in caucus meetings. Former
Union Montreal councillor Carle Bernier-Genest was particularly articulate when contrasting these approaches:
“Si t‟as une position à faire valoir, faut que tu interviennes à toutes les étapes… Moi, j‟étais responsable des dossiers [de la] jeunesse… donc, j‟ai intervenu auprès de la commission jeunesse avant que [le parti] commence un débat. Puis, j‟ai intervenu auprès des groupes jeunesses, mes collègues, des fonctionnaires. Je n‟ai pas gagné toutes mes luttes mais j‟en ai quand même gagné. [Tandis qu‟il] y a certains élus qui s‟éparpillaient dans trop de dossiers, donc, leur efficacité est moindre” 42
Participants with executive committee experience shared his perspective. “Starting from the origins is probably the best way that [backbench] input can be found on something,” claimed Robert Libman.
41 Translation: The caucus to prepare for council did not serve for absolutely anything. We discussed… the council’s schedule… its not there that you influence. 42 Translation: If you have a position to promote, it’s necessary that you intervene at every stage… I was responsible for youth files… so I intervened in front of the youth committee before [the party] began a debate. And I intervened in front of youth groups… colleagues… bureaucrats. I didn’t win all of my battles but I did still win… [However] there were some office-holders who mixed themselves up in too many files so they had less efficacy. 73
Bernier-Genest‟s remarks were also notable for drawing attention to the value of informal lobbying: “le meilleur c‟est d‟aller parler avec les élus responsables… avant qu‟ils commencent à travailler sur leurs dossiers.”43 Executive committee members agreed. They also claimed not to discriminate against opposition party or independent councillors who approached them (Trudel, Confidential Interview). This was confirmed by former Vision
Montreal councillor Christine Poulin. She described an occasion on which an executive committee member intervened on her behalf in a borough dispute by pushing through a motion centrally that she wanted to implement locally. She received this assistance even though her borough council was dominated by Union Montreal councillors. These findings are interesting because they reinforce perceptions about the executive committee‟s overriding influence and further demonstrate how easily council and party procedures can be informally circumvented.
This overview confirms that at least some councillors‟ behaviour is guided by aspirations for career advancement and policy influence. Moreover, no forum is found to rival the executive committee for pursuing those aspirations. Some councillors believed that they could exert genuine influence over council‟s agenda if they seized every formal and informal opportunity to advocate for a policy. Nonetheless, even they admitted to mainly target the executive committee. Only standing committee positions were otherwise found to appeal to certain councillors because they provide additional income. We prioritize executive and standing committee positions in the remainder of our analysis on the basis of these findings.
43 Translation: “The best is to go chat with the office-holders in charge before they begin working on their files” 74
3.2 Party Leaders’ Appointment Power and its Influence over Legislative Behaviour
The next section of our analysis examines party leaders‟ influence over appointments. It also examines the criteria by which party leaders are perceived to make appointment decisions and the extent to which those decisions actually reward councillors for voting along party lines. We find that party leaders‟ influence over appointments extends beyond formal descriptions of their authority and that at least some councillors vote with their parties to improve their odds of being appointed to standing committees. Our analysis cannot confirm appointments‟ distribution as rewards for loyalty but finds strong evidence for their employment as bargaining instruments.
Party Leaders‟ Appointment Powers:
Montreal‟s municipal charter requires mayors to secure council approval on appointment decisions. Council has historically tended to heed mayoral advice as a result of being dominated by governing party members. This convention was nevertheless regularly challenged during Pierre Bourque‟s mayoral tenure between 1993 and 2001. Bourque‟s refusal to consult with council or his party on appointments drew regular protest from opposition parties and the media, as well as dissent and defections from his caucus and party administration (Myles 1996a; Noel 1996; 1997; Levesque 1997; Leduc 1998). These campaigns resulted in the removal of an executive committee chairman in 1996 and prevented Bourque from evicting executive committee members who defected from his party in 1998 (Myles 1996b). The latter dispute provoked court challenges and legislative reforms that eventually transferred exclusive authority over executive committee appointments to the mayor‟s office while confirming city council‟s jurisdiction over 75
standing committee appointments (Lévesque 1999). These reforms did not accord any influence over appointments to opposition party leaders.
Some media commentators have accused Gerald Tremblay of adopting the same heavy-handed approach to appointments as his predecessor (Aubin 2002b). If so, it has not provoked caucus resistance since his first year in office (Cardinal 2002; Beauvais 2002).
Union Montreal participants claimed to be satisfied with consultations on appointment decisions and controlled enough votes between 2002 and 2009 to guarantee their ratification. Reporters have similarly come to take council approval of Tremblay‟s appointments for granted, shifting attention to their underlying causes (Corriveau 2004;
Cardinal 2004; Gyulai 2009). Their coverage suggests that Tremblay is confident enough about his influence to use appointments as bargaining instruments with those who actually control their distribution.
Opposition party leaders‟ influence over appointments was also found to extend beyond formal descriptions of their authority. Interviews revealed that a number of standing committee positions are reserved for opposition party councillors. These positions are distributed on the basis of opposition parties‟ number of council seats in consultation with their leaders. A similar arrangement governs opposition party councillors‟ participation in travel delegations. Opposition party leaders must nevertheless negotiate with the mayor‟s office for committee chairmanships. By virtue of controlling a majority of council votes,
Tremblay also exercises discretion over the specific number of positions that opposition party councillors occupy in each standing committee and can shuffle those councillors
(Corriveau 2004). He thus exerts leverage that is not available to opposition party leaders – 76
or governing party leaders at Canada‟s federal and provincial levels. These findings challenge our initial assumption about the gulf that separates Montreal‟s party leaders – and particularly its mayor – from federal and provincial party leaders with regard to appointment powers.
Perceptions of Municipal Parties Leaders‟ Appointment Criteria:
Participants held differing impressions about the mayor‟s criteria for standing committee appointments.44 Some claimed that Tremblay bases these appointments on councillors‟ policy interests and qualifications. Others framed them as rewards for loyalty.
These participants also suggested that dissidents risked forfeiting existing committee positions. “Beaucoup de gens ne contestent pas parce qu‟ils occupent une poste et veulent
[la] maintenir… parce que ça donne un revenu additionnel,” explained former executive committee member George Bossé.45 Former independent councillors Karin Marks and
Jeremy Searle agreed. They stressed that standing committee positions are particularly valuable to backbenchers that rely on council salaries for their livelihood.
Participants held more consistent notions of the mayor‟s criteria for executive committee appointments. The first standard that they proposed was demographic. Tremblay was thought to consider councillors‟ representativeness vis-à-vis the population in terms of language, ethnicity and gender. Participants‟ second set of standards were more technical.
They expected Tremblay to address gaps in expertise and skills amongst existing committee members. Participants‟ third set of standards emphasized competence, reliability
44 Vision Montreal participants were not interviewed on this subject. 45 Translation: “A lot of people do not dissent because they occupy a post and they want to keep [it]… because it provides additional revenue. 77
and character. Executive committee member Claude Trudel explained that Tremblay was initially prone to surrounding himself with lifelong political colleagues but now uses executive committee appointments to reward performance. This is important because it means that a credible career ladder operates in Union Montreal and that it is rational for caucus members to base their behaviour on promotion-oriented, utility-maximizing calculations. These presumably involve toeing the party line even though it was not distinguished as a necessary condition for being promoted to the executive committee as in the case of standing committees.
Media reports tend to interpret executive and standing committee shuffles as disciplinary exercises. They quote anonymous informants and advance persuasive narratives involving many of our study‟s participants (Corriveau 2004; Cardinal 2004;
Gyulai 2009). Some denied while others confirmed bargains struck around appointments.
For example, Jeremy Searle conceded that he joined Union Montreal after being promised the chairmanship of a transportation standing committee that he petitioned to establish.
Another councillor drew attention to a standing committee shuffle in which six independent councillors were replaced by ones who crossed the floor to help Union Montreal enact a budget (Confidential Interview). Some unsuccessfully solicited opposition party councillors eventually confirmed that these floor-crossers were promised appointments (Beauvais
2003). These examples corroborate that Gerald Tremblay exerts enough influence over council voting to use appointments as bargaining instruments, and strongly suggest that he exploits this leverage for partisan purposes.
78
3.3 Governing and Opposition Party Leaders’ Methods for Disciplining Dissent
Our analysis concludes by evaluating whether party leaders withdraw appointments to punish dissent and whether anticipation of this discipline influences voting behaviour. It finds greater evidence of party efforts to deter dissent through informal cues than explicit threats or sanctions. Councillors have been persuaded to anticipate without ever having observed disciplinary consequences for dissent on budget votes. Some councillors even believe that rebelling on non-budgetary votes would jeopardize their chances of being promoted or result in the withdrawal of their existing appointments, despite public affirmations by party leaders to the contrary.
Do Party Leaders Sanction Dissent by Withdrawing Appointments?
Our analysis relies on media coverage to evaluate whether party leaders ever withdraw appointments to punish or deter dissent. Its evidence is consequently incomplete; while media reports provides credible records of public statements and events, they cannot capture what occurs behind closed caucus doors where disciplinary threats are most likely to be issued. Our analysis falls back on media interpretations of committee shuffles that feature quotes by anonymous sources and persuasive but unverifiable narratives.
Participants who confirmed being solicited with appointments, however, did not confirm allegations of being punished by their withdrawal.
Do Councillors Expect to be Sanctioned for Dissent with Demotions?
Councillors are more likely to publicly criticize than vote against their parties.
Fifty-one out of seventy-one councillors rebelled on at least one occasion during the 2002 79
to 2005 council session by either refusing to approve a unanimous voting decision or voting with other parties. Only six councillors rebelled on five or more occasions however. These relatively low rates of dissent are surprising in light of the frequency with which councillors otherwise criticized their party‟s policies in the media.46
To what extent might councillors‟ low rates of legislative dissent be attributed to disciplinary threats involving committee positions? Most of our study‟s participants admitted to voting against their party on at least one occasion. None recalled encountering disciplinary threats or sanctions as a result of this behaviour however. More significantly, none could recall an occasion on which a caucus colleague was ever disciplined for rebelling, beyond cases involving caucus evictions. Interviews revealed that many councillors nonetheless still expect to be sanctioned for dissent.
Despite lacking personal experience with its enforcement, most participants assumed that discipline was inevitable for dissidence on budget votes. One participant
46 See for example: Jean-Maurice Duddin (2002) “Luis Miranda S‟Oppose au Projet de son Maire,” Journal de Montréal, January 25; André Beauvais (2002) “Marvin Rotrand Tient a sa Liberté de Vote,” Journal de Montréal, March 5; Linda Gyulai (2002) “D-Word a Tough Sell in Council, Rotrand Discovers,” Montreal Gazette, March 28; Karim Bennesaieh (2003a) “Vente de l‟Ile Notre-Dame: Des Conseillers de l‟UCIM s‟y Opposaient,” La Presse, January 23; Karim Benessaieh (2003b) “Vision Montréal a la Recherche d‟un Sauveur?” La Presse, January 29; Francois Cardinal (2003d) “Des Conseillers Pourraient s‟Opposer au Contrat de Ville,” La Presse, March 3; François Cardinal (2003e) “Trois Conseillers du Maire Tremblay Réclament Plus d‟Autonomie pour les Arrondissements,” La Presse, April 22; François Cardinal (2003b) “La Majorité du Maire Tremblay en Jeu,” La Presse, May 1; François Cardinal (2003f) “L‟UCIM est Toujours en Proie aux Dissensions,” La Presse, August 8; Jeanne Corriveau (2003c) “Tremblay Reste Muet Devant l‟Affront,” Le Devoir, October 25; François Cardinal (2003g) “Trois Autres Conseillers Songent a Quitter le Parti du Maire,” La Presse, December 2; Antoine Robitaille (2004b) “Pierre Bourque est Contesté au Sein Même de son Parti,” Le Devoir, March 3; Andre Beauvais (2004) “Un Membre du Comite Exécutif Contre la Nouvelle Taxe sur les Stationnements,” Journal de Montréal, September 1; William Marrisen (2004) “Rotrand Fears for Electoral System,” Montreal Gazette, September 27; Linda Gyulai (2006a) “Budget Starves Boroughs, Councilor Charges,” Montreal Gazette, January 22; Michelle Lalonde (2006) “Borough Mayors: We‟re Shortchanged,” Montreal Gazette, March 17; Claire Andrée Cauchy (2006) “Tremblay Maintient le Cap,” Le Devoir, November 2; Linda Gyulai (2006b) “Time To Abolish Mayor‟s Cabinet, Rotrand Says,” Montreal Gazette, November 14; 80
explained that parties tolerate criticism on budgets “parce qu‟il reconnaissent que c‟est ton circonscription. Tu dois faire semblant que tu luttes pour [tes électeurs].”47 That participant nonetheless added that party leaders have “henchmen… qui vont te dire que si tu veux… demeurer secrétaire parlementaire [ou…] président d‟un comité, tu ne peux pas voter publiquement contre ton parti sur un budget” (Confidential Interview).48 This occurrence‟s rarity renders councillors‟ expectations difficult to confirm. A review of voting records from the 2002 to 2005 council session only uncovered two examples. Both occurred in
Union Montreal.49 If they elicited any sanctions, it was not reported in the media. Both offending councillors also now serve in the executive committee (Champagne 2009). In fairness, their appointments to this committee could have reflected attempts to co-opt compliance. For example, Marvin Rotrand rebelled against his party on more occasions between 2002 and 2009 than any other councillor. He has nonetheless since been appointed to a position that involves whipping functions and requires him to serve as an example to caucus colleagues.
Participants were more divided on the extent to which dissent on non-budgetary votes is sanctioned. Some continued to maintain that rebelling on these votes would be punished through withdrawn appointments. “Si quelqu‟un sort trop des rangs, il va être pénalisé parce qu‟on ne le nommera pas quelque part… [ou] on ne le tiendra pas en compte,” explained former executive committee member George Bossé. “De dire qu‟ [un
47 Translation: “because they know that it’s your constituency – you have to look as though you’re fighting for [your constituents].” 48 Translation: “henchmen… who will tell you that if you want to keep… being a parliamentary secretary [or…] a chairman of a committee, you can’t publicly vote against your party on a budget.” 49 Helen Fotopoulos voted against the adoption of the budget of Montreal‟s transit corporation in 2002. Michael Applebaum voted against two budget transfer motions in 2004. 81
système de punition] n‟existe pas ça serait de la foutaise.”50 It is worth noting, however, that this impression was only held by Union Montreal participants who retired or were defeated before 2005.
Union Montreal participants with recent council experience, by contrast, were unanimous in rejecting the notion that their party‟s leader sanctions dissent on non- budgetary votes. Some even claimed that Gerald Tremblay encourages dissent if informed by moral convictions or constituency grievances. “Le maire a souvent répété que nous sommes libres de nos votes,” attested Alain Tassé. “Non, je dirais qu‟il n‟y a pas de discipline.”51 Carle Bernier-Genest agreed. “Dans les cas où les gens sentaient qu‟ils avaient de l‟information qui les permettait légitiment de voter contre l‟administration, ils l‟ont fait, et sans conséquences d‟ailleurs – ce qui m‟a toujours surpris.”52
Union Montreal participants‟ divergent expectations of being disciplined for dissent on non-budgetary votes are difficult to explain. We noted that their expectations split in accordance with the council sessions in which they were elected. It is possible that participants who still serve as councillors or harbour ambitions of being returned to office reasoned that their electoral interests were better served if they exaggerated their legislative autonomy. On the other hand, the party‟s central office might have genuinely become more tolerant of dissent over the course of this study‟s council sessions. Our limited sample of
50 Translation: “If someone gets too out of hand, he will be sanctioned because he won‟t get appointed somewhere… or kept in touch. To say that [a system of sanctions] does not exist would be nonsense.” 51 Translation: “The mayor often repeated that we were free with our votes. No – I would say that there isn’t any party discipline.” 52 Translation: “In the case where people felt that they had information that permitted them to legitimately vote against the administration, they did so, and without consequence – which is something that always surprised me” 82
participants prevents us from verifying the pattern‟s statistical significance and, consequently, either scenario.
Our study‟s Vision Montreal participants firmly denied that their party uses sanctions to punish or deter dissent. Even so, they were not ashamed to describe events that warranted their enforcement, which reduces the likelihood that their responses aimed to manage our impressions. When asked to explain why the party voted together in the absence of discipline, House Leader Anie Samson emphasized sociological bonds forged through mentorship, consensual deliberation and common values. Former councillor
Chrsitine Poulin, on the other hand, emphasized informal cues and social pressure. “Peut-
être une fois ou deux quand j‟ai dit trop ce que je pensais, on me l‟a dit mais d‟une façon délicat,” she recalled. "Il fallait que je comprenne entre les lignes.” 53
Do Councillors‟ Expectations of Being Disciplined for Dissent Arise From Informal Cues that Reinforce Institutional Norms? Participants‟ descriptions of party whips generated additional evidence for the notion that parties forge legislative cohesion through informal cues instead of explicit disciplinary threats. Both parties assign whipping functions to House Leaders. Many participants felt it inappropriate to associate these functions with those served by provincial or federal party whips however. If anything, they commended their party‟s House Leader for establishing an environment and lines of communication that render dissidence unnecessary. These individuals were described as being responsible for ensuring that caucus members are present for votes, aware of party positions and prepared to enact
53 Translation: “Maybe once or twice, when I said too much about what I thought, they let me know in a delicate fashion. It required reading between the lines. 83
policies that are central to a party‟s agenda (Samson; Rotrand). House Leaders do not control – and are not perceived to control – councillors‟ access to appointments or policy influence (Cowell-Poitras; Bossé). They meet regularly with party leaders and can thus plausibly influence such decisions. These meetings are nonetheless regarded to serve councillors‟ interests because they bring attention to caucus disputes and create pressure to delay or amend contentious motions. These meetings are even credited for smoothing relations between party leaders and dissenting councillors because they contextualize the latter‟s circumstances (Samson; Bossé). House Leaders are thus perceived to serve as mediators more than enforcers of party discipline.
House Leaders are not impartial to dissidence however. They tolerate and make efforts to accommodate councillors who disagree with a motion but convey expectations and conditions that are designed to prevent grievances from reaching the public sphere.
Marvin Rotrand and Claude Trudel who have both served as House Leaders in Union
Montreal explained that dissent is only legitimate if informed by moral convictions or boroughs interests and if it does not contradict the party‟s program or basic principles. Both were also adamant about the importance of raising conflicts in caucus before a motion reaches council. Trudel explained that persuasive arguments could prompt motions to be amended or withdrawn. Former Union Montreal councillor Carle Bernier Genest observed that this requirement also forces councillors to explain why they should be held to different standards than caucus colleagues in being allowed to dissent. A negative reaction eliminates false allusions that they represent broader caucus opposition. Fear of social reprobation can also dissuade councillors from moving forward with plans to rebel. If 84
equipped with enough notice, parties can likewise convince councillors to change their minds or use alternative means of registering disagreement. Councillors will frequently abstain from voting, for example, when they disagree with a motion but do not wish to embarrass their party (Bossé; Trudel; Cowell-Poitras).
Descriptions of House Leaders‟ persuasion tactics provided further examples of informal instead of punitive and transactional disciplinary strategies. These individuals were reported to begin by appeals to teamwork and solidarity. They also encourage councillors to consider the importance of legislative cohesion to past party achievements and underline those achievements‟ role in councillors‟ election (Poulin; Bernier-Genest).
Such arguments are often complimented by efforts to educate dissidents about the reasoning behind a motion. House Leaders will nonetheless exploit councillors‟ electoral insecurities and desire for career advancement if these tactics are insufficient. House
Leaders do not make explicit threats but turn discussion towards councillors‟ relations with caucus colleagues or progress on borough projects. “Tu pourrais aller voir quelqu‟un qui est récaltricant…” explained executive committee member Claude Trudel, “qui a deux projets dans son arrondissement [et] il faut qu‟il [les] passe par le comite exécutif; il peut avoir de la misère – ce genre de chose.”54 Trudel mentioned that dissidents are also asked if they remain comfortable in the party, which could be interpreted as another implicit threat.
To what extent do our findings support institutional hypotheses that attribute legislative party cohesion to rewards and sanctions that exploit councillors‟ pursuit of
54 Translation: “You can go see someone whose being uncooperative… and has two projects in his borough, and has to pass them by the executive committee; he could have some trouble. That kind of thing.” 85
policy influence and appointments? On one hand, they confirm that at least some councillors‟ legislative behaviour is guided by the expectation that dissent carries inevitable disciplinary consequences. Our findings also confirm that parties actively discourage dissent on certain categories of votes. On the other hand, they also suggest that parties rely more heavily on informal pressure tactics than explicit disciplinary threats or sanctions to discourage dissent. These strategies also exploit councillors‟ sense of caucus solidarity and loyalty to party leaders before aspirations for electoral security, policy influence and career advancement. Their efficiency in terms of averting parties‟ need to enforce sanctions suggests that sociological variables have at least some bearing on councillors‟ voting behaviour. These variables‟ exploitation by party officials to reinforce councillors‟ expectations of being disciplined for dissent, however, corresponds more closely to normative institutional than traditional sociological behavioural assumptions. For example, our findings still suggest that councillors are strategic in their behaviour and at least partly motivated by electoral security, policy influence or career advancement. They nonetheless also suggest that councillors‟ cost-benefit calculations and normative orientations have been manipulated to reinforce existing institutional arrangements and the leverage that they confer onto party leaders.
86
Summary:
From an institutional perspective, Montreal‟s municipal parties are structured and operate in a near-ideal manner for maintaining legislative caucus cohesion. These parties compensate for city council‟s insusceptibility to confidence tests by centralizing authority over caucus members‟ nominations, campaign financing, policy influence, and career advancement. Our analysis finds that party leaders‟ influence in these areas extends beyond formal descriptions of their authority. This discredits our original assumption that their disciplinary powers pale in comparison to those exercised by federal and provincial party leaders. Our analysis also verifies that some councillors aspire for, and vote along party lines to increase their chances of being promoted to, standing and executive committee positions. It cannot prove that appointments are distributed in a manner that rewards legislative conformity but finds that they have been used to solicit candidates and reward floor-crossers.
Councillors‟ expectations of being sanctioned for dissent with repealed appointments, on the other hand, seem to be fostered through informal cues, rather than personal experience. This conclusion rests on descriptions of House Leaders‟ whipping strategies and the regularity with which dissidents get promoted to frontbench positions.
Threats of caucus eviction are also issued sparingly and rarely effective at deterring dissent.
Moreover, no evidence is found that party leaders ever threaten to withhold campaign financing or fundraising assistance from dissidents. Party leaders are not found to treat deferential caucus members differently through their management of candidate campaign expenditures either. Our analysis consequently exposes a stronger role for positive than 87
negative institutional incentives in fostering Montreal parties‟ legislative cohesion. On one hand, it suggests that many councillors vote along party lines to strengthen their odds of being promoted to executive or standing committee positions as traditional institutional theorists anticipate. On the other hand, it attributes their reluctance to dissent to inflated expectations and norms of appropriate behaviour that are internalized through interaction with caucus colleagues and manipulated to reinforce institutional arrangements that confer leverage onto party leaders, as normative institutional theorists anticipate. Party leaders might occasionally demote or remove rebels from caucus to buttress implicit threats‟ credibility. These sanctions are nevertheless rarely enforced and inconsistent at deterring dissent.
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CHAPTER SIX: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
The following chapter reports interview and other research data that could be interpreted to support sociological hypotheses for legislative party cohesion. Its analysis is more exploratory than ones conducted on institutional hypotheses because of research design and data limitations. To briefly recap points made in our literature review, the most efficient way of testing sociological hypotheses for legislative party cohesion is to establish proxy measures for intangible variables like ideological convictions and norms of caucus solidarity. This cannot, however, be done in the absence of survey data covering representative samples of study populations. Neither was available to this thesis. We could not afford to engage in lengthy ethnographic research on socialization processes either. Our research nonetheless still generated data that could help focus or inspire future studies on voting behaviour in Montreal City Council. The following analysis, for example, discredits commitments to administrative decentralization and participatory democracy as possible ideological sources of legislative cohesion in Union Montreal. It also opens new research avenues by finding that borough council activities are more important to socialization than the city level ones on which this thesis primarily concentrates.
Support for Hypotheses that Attribute Party Cohesion to Ideological Variables
Sociological theorists argue that ideological convictions drive cohesive voting when shared amongst caucus members, but can also elicit dissidence in ideologically heterogeneous caucuses. Our analysis reveals that some Union Montreal councillors self- identify as decentralists and that decentralist convictions helped bring the party‟s original slate of candidates together. These ideals nonetheless functioned as a greater source of 89
cleavage than cohesion during its first term in office and have now arguably ceased to frame council debates. Our analysis also discredits Union Montreal‟s professed commitment to participatory democracy by demonstrating that it centrally manages opportunities for grassroots activism. Neither decentralist nor democratic convictions are consequently found to contribute to the party‟s legislative cohesion.
Two potential ideological sources of legislative cohesion were identified through interviews with Union Montreal participants. These can be traced back to the bases from which the party‟s first slate of candidates was recruited. Union Montreal was borne as a coalition of suburban mayors and urban civic parties that shared a common objective of depriving Pierre Bourque of Montreal‟s post-amalgamation mayoralty. Suburban mayors held Bourque responsible for dispossessing their communities of self-government. Given his controlling managerial approach, they also feared that he would impose a centralized administrative structure onto the megacity instead of maintaining some levers of local autonomy (Sancton 2006). After ceding two elections to Vision Montreal through vote splitting, civic-oriented opposition parties and independent councillors from the former
City of Montreal also faced incentives to coalesce. Combining forces with suburban mayors averted the need to recruit candidates from areas in which these parties and councillors lacked roots. Their commitment to strengthening civic participation in local governance also prompted them to see common cause with suburban mayors‟ decentralist priorities
(Latendresse 2005).
Interviews suggest that administrative decentralization has emerged as a stronger basis of ideological self-identification in Union Montreal than democratic ideals. When 90
asked to describe the party‟s distinguishing ideological feature, participants consistently referenced decentralizing tendencies before commitments to participatory democracy. To what extent might decentralist convictions thus guide Union Montreal councillors‟ legislative decisions? Participants did not mention them when outlining their criteria for evaluating motions. Debate over decentralization has also markedly declined in media coverage of council sessions since boroughs held referendums on demerging from the megacity. Until that time, it arguably also functioned as a greater source of cleavage than cohesion amongst Union Montreal‟s caucus members. As noted in our last chapter, Union
Montreal experienced frequent dissent and a steady line of defections over decisions to restrict borough councils‟ taxation power and to campaign against municipal demergers.
Even these revolts do not constitute clear-cut examples of ideological convictions‟ influence over legislative behaviour since they could just as easily have been guided by utility-maximizing calculations. Until provincial laws were enacted to permit demerger referendums, suburban councillors were caught between opposing party and constituency pressures. They risked eliciting electoral backlash if they betrayed demerger advocates but also risked forfeiting the electoral security of governing party membership if they defected prematurely or forced the mayor‟s hand on caucus eviction threats. In addition to not finding evidence for their current influence, our analysis consequently raises grounds to suspect whether ideological convictions ever directed Union Montreal councillors‟ legislative behaviour.
Another potential source of ideological cohesion in Union Montreal is a commitment to participatory democracy carried over from its largest predecessor party, the 91
Montreal Citizens‟ Movement. Union Montreal‟s statement of principles pledges to strengthen civic participation in municipal governance. Its statutes also charge borough associations with nominating candidates and describe conventions as the party‟s highest decision-making authority. Interviews reveal that both processes are actually orchestrated, however, to reinforce party leaders‟ preferences. Most Union Montreal candidates are centrally recruited and uncontested as a result of fundraising and membership recruitment requirements that are difficult to achieve without implicit party backing. Union Montreal also prohibits members from criticizing its administration‟s decisions on penalty of expulsion and allegedly blocks debate of controversial resolutions in conventions.
Platitudes on its commitment to participatory democracy ring hollow before these practices and render it an unlikely source of legislative cohesion.
Support for Hypotheses that Attribute Party Cohesion to Socialization
Socialization processes are highly complex and can only be accurately captured through ethnographic research conducted over an extensive period. To omit evidence for socialization as a result of limitations to this study‟s scope would have been unfair to its participants, however, given that they were as likely to credit norms of caucus solidarity as interaction with disciplinary mechanisms for colleagues‟ cohesive voting behaviour. The rest of this chapter accordingly reports data that could be interpreted to support hypotheses that attribute legislative party cohesion to socialization processes. It finds that borough- level opportunities for socialization are more significant than ones at the city level for transmitting norms of appropriate behaviour and forging bonds of caucus solidarity. These 92
opportunities are nonetheless also found to vary across boroughs and consequently limit the degree to which parties‟ legislative cohesion can be attributed to socialization.
Comparing City and Borough Level Opportunities for Socialization:
Participants were divided when asked to explain colleagues‟ cohesive voting behaviour. Many of those who referenced disciplinary sanctions nevertheless framed them as being of secondary importance to behavioural norms in deterring dissidence.55 This reinforces our earlier findings about party whips‟ persuasion strategies. Recall, for example, that party whips appeal to dissidents‟ norms of caucus solidarity before issuing disciplinary threats. These tactics reinforce but are applied too infrequently to reasonably account for norms‟ transmission. By what agents and processes does this therefore occur?
Many backbench councillors denied receiving mentorship from frontbench colleagues. Some even returned to this matter when asked if there was anything that they wanted to add at the end of interview sessions so as to emphasize their frustration. “C‟est quelque chose que je déplorais,” noted former Vision Montreal councillor Christine Poulin:
“Y avait aucun [mentorship]. Les gens se compétitionent entre eux plus que d‟autre chose. Puis, c‟est ça qui est triste parce que moi j‟étais néophyte… et là il fallait que je fasse l‟opposition carrément [seule] sur le Plateau.”56
55 Some efforts were made to test whether these observations support normative institutional predictions about the manner in which sociological and institutional incentives interact to generate legislative party cohesion. Most normative institutional studies posits that norms of caucus solidarity transmitted through socialization serve to de-radicalize office-holders by the time they come to terms with their limited potential for career advancement. Participants disagreed on the degree and direction in which councillors‟ career expectations and reasons for voting along party lines change however. While some agreed that socialization de-radicalizes councillors, others thought that watching others rebel emboldens councillors to follow suit. 56 Translation: “Its something that I deplored. There was no [mentorship]. People competed with one another more than anything else. That‟s what was sad because I was a neophyte… and essentially did opposition on the Plateau [alone]” 93
Frontbench councillors perceived things differently. They admitted that mentorship could be strengthened through formal pairing arrangements but still claimed to provide regular information and advice to backbenchers. How can these narratives be reconciled? Data collected through interviews raise two possibilities. First, mentorship practices seem to place burdens of initializing and maintaining contact on backbench councillors. This is inferred by the frequency with which frontbench councillors claim to “make themselves available to” backbench councillors or help those “who approach them.” It would also explain why councillors who informally lobby executive committee members report stronger feelings of political efficacy. Second, and as the remainder of this chapter demonstrates, mentorship seems to primarily occur, and varies in accordance to councillors‟ number of caucus colleagues, at the borough level. Both scenarios suggest that councillors‟ access to mentorship – and exposure to socialization – differs on a case by case basis. For example, as Vision Montreal‟s only representative on the Plateau borough council, Christine Poulin would not have benefited from the same opportunities for mentorship as her Union Montreal counterparts. This variance is significant because it limits the extent to which socialization processes can explain legislative party cohesion.
Descriptions of party policy development processes suggest that councillors have regular but restricted city-level opportunities to interact with caucus colleagues. Caucus meetings emerged above other forums in terms of being perceived to open direct lines of intra-caucus communication. Participants were near unanimous in applauding the consistency with which these meetings are attended by frontbench councillors. Most participants were also comfortable intervening in these meetings. It is thus reasonable to 94
infer that they function as an arena for socialization. On the other hand, many participants also criticized caucus meetings for being too short and infrequent. Our analysis suggests that borough-level caucus meetings are more important to norms‟ transmission as a result of these limitations.
Backbench councillors have more opportunities to observe, and interact with, frontbench councillors at the borough than city council level. First, borough caucus meetings occur more frequently than city level ones – as much as once per week. They also bring together smaller numbers of councillors and thus create conditions for more intimate dialogue. “À Montréal, ils vont se rencontrer une fois par mois," recalled former borough mayor George Bossé. “Au lieu d‟être cinq autour de la table, ils sont cinquante. Puis ils vont passer le même temps”.57 Former Union Montreal councillor Carle Bernier Genest even noted occasions on which opposition party councillors were invited to participate in borough caucus meetings. This nevertheless prompted him to warn that practices varied by borough and local caucus leaders.
Second, office-space is distributed to councillors at the borough level. Offices in
City Hall are, by contrast, reserved for party leaders, their House Leaders, and executive committee members. This arrangement physically separates backbenchers from most of their frontbench colleagues. It gives them ample opportunity to interact with other caucus members in their borough however. One should not underestimate the opportunities that close quarters create for social influence. These struck Claude Trudel when he temporarily
57 Translation: “In Montreal, they’ll meet once a month. Instead of being five around the table, they are fifty. And they’ll spend the same amount of time [debating]” 95
left City Hall for an office in another building. “Quand je suis revenu à mon bureau à l‟Hôtel de Ville, j‟ai réalisé jusqu'à quel point j‟étais „away‟ du pouvoir quotidien. Parce que tu sais, dans les corridors tu rencontres des membres du comité exécutif… Ils sortent d‟un bureau, ils rentrent dans d‟autres. C‟est comme ça que ça se joue.”58 Although Trudel spoke specifically about influencing executive committee members, these same principles presumably apply to behavioural norms‟ transmission through informal interaction in borough council office buildings.
Third, participants drew greater attention to informal borough-level campaigning and fundraising arrangements than formal party assistance when outlining the electoral benefits of party affiliation. Recall, for example, that many councillors described sharing campaign offices and volunteers with borough caucus colleagues or occasionally compensating for one another‟s fundraising shortfalls. These arrangements inevitably strengthen bonds between caucus members and allow them to share best practices and impressions of appropriate political behaviour. Being locally initiated and maintained, they nonetheless vary on a borough-by-borough basis. They are furthermore not accessible to councillors who were not elected with borough caucus colleagues. Inconsistent exposure to socialization limits the degree to which it can produce legislative party cohesion in the absence of disciplinary safeguards.
58 Translation: “When I returned to my office at City Hall, I realized the point at which I was away… from day-to-day power. Because you know, in the hallways, you meet members of the executive committee… they exit their office, enter into others – it works like that.
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Summary:
Our fourth chapter revealed that party whips appeal to norms of caucus solidarity before threatening dissidents with disciplinary sanctions. This raises questions about whether sanctions or expectations of their enforcement are necessary conditions for deterring dissent. For example, might councillors not simply refrain from rebelling because they share their party‟s ideological values or have been socialized to place caucus interests before individual ones? Our sociological analysis does not suggest that either scenario is credible. It advances considerable evidence that norms of caucus solidarity are primarily forged through caucus interaction at the borough rather than city level. This also means that councillors‟ exposure to socialization is highly inconsistent, which reduces the extent to which it accounts for parties‟ low rates of caucus dissent. Differing degrees of fervour for decentralization, on the other hand, are found to serve as a greater source of legislative cleavage than cohesion in Union Montreal. We do not find any evidence that ideals of participatory democracy function as a source of ideological cohesion in the party either. As such, our study reinforces assumptions about Union Montreal‟s ideological heterogeneity.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION:
This thesis attributes legislative party cohesion in Montreal City Council to a combination of institutional and sociological variables. Some of its findings coincide with patterns observed in comparative literature and Canadian federal parties. Others deviate in manners that challenge conventional assumptions and suggest alternative research avenues.
The theoretical contributions of this thesis therefore extend beyond its cases. They are matched by practical contributions to research on Canadian municipal politics and
Montreal‟s party system.
Theoretical Contributions to Research on Legislative Party Cohesion:
This research was conducted to evaluate and reconcile some seemingly incompatible assumptions about Montreal‟s municipal parties: that they exhibit legislative cohesion but are ideologically heterogeneous and run by leaders with limited disciplinary leverage. We found that these leaders actually resemble federal and provincial ones more closely than reported in formal descriptions of their authority. An absence of responsible government in the form of periodic confidence tests admittedly prevents Gerald Tremblay from deterring dissent in Union Montreal with threats of council‟s dissolution. This discrepancy does not undermine the party‟s legislative cohesion, however, suggesting that confidence conventions‟ influence on legislative behaviour in parliamentary systems is overstated. Montreal‟s party leaders are otherwise hardly constrained by formal limits on their authority. They do not legally control but are alleged to actively distribute appointments in a manner that rewards legislative compliance. Their influence over 98
candidate selection processes and candidate campaign expenditures also arguably exceeds that outlined in their parties‟ constitutions.
This thesis does not find any evidence of a causal relationship between central party dominance of candidate nomination or campaign spending, and legislative party cohesion in Montreal City Council. Its parties could thus be added to a growing list of cases that challenge these correlations‟ explanatory significance. Montreal‟s parties also experience strong legislative cohesion in spite of engaging in decentralized campaign financing practices. This likens them to federal parties though our findings differ considerably from ones at that level. For example, we do not find any evidence that skilled fundraisers exploit party reliance on their networks to bargain for appointments or that party leaders promote these individuals to prevent them from organizing leadership challenges. On the contrary, councillors either rely or believe that they rely on party networks for campaign fundraising.
Party affiliation‟s benefits, in this regard, remain unclear. It might permit involvement in corporate sponsorship arrangements that circumvent the spirit of Quebec‟s campaign financing regulations, as one participant suggested but many others denied. Alternatively, it might simply bolster electors‟ willingness to contribute to campaigns. Perceptions of financial reliance on party affiliation could equally arise from councillors‟ experience with fundraising assistance or cost-splitting practices at the borough level. There is no reason, in any case, to assume that these perceptions or arrangements are exclusive to parties in
Montreal. This thesis, in other words, draws attention to potential alternative explanations for correlation between legislative party cohesion and decentralized campaign fundraising practices. 99
In contrast to its analysis of candidate selection and campaign fundraising practices, this thesis finds some evidence that councillors‟ expectations of being rewarded with appointments for deference contributes to legislative party cohesion. It also finds that some councillors expect and take precautions to avert being sanctioned for dissent. However, these expectations are not held unanimously and do not necessarily reflect party practices.
Indeed, party leaders rarely issue or enforce disciplinary threats. Moreover, these threats are seldom successful at deterring dissent or preventing caucus defections. This leads us to conclude that councillors‟ expectations of being rewarded and sanctioned are mostly cultivated through informal cues.
One of this study‟s main findings is that perceptions are more important than actual party practices in guiding councillors‟ behaviour. Councillors perceive themselves to depend on parties for campaign financing even though that relationship is actually reversed.
Party leaders are also perceived to distribute appointments in a manner that rewards loyalty and punishes dissent even though rebels are frequently promoted to parties‟ frontbenches.
These perceptions are cultivated through interaction with caucus colleagues and reinforced by occasional cues from party whips. They prevent those whips from having to enforce sanctions to deter dissent, which echoes findings from parliamentary studies that question whips‟ reliance on sticks and carrots. More significantly, these perceptions normatively legitimize central party domination of procedures and decisions that are technically controlled by councillors. Councillors are, in other words, socialized to calculate utility in a manner that exaggerates party leaders‟ disciplinary leverage – and conforms to normative 100
institutional theories of political behaviour. In this regard, our findings add weight to calls for this approach‟s broader application in research on legislative party cohesion.
Substantive Contributions to Research on Canadian Municipal Politics and Montreal’s Party System
This analysis of legislative party cohesion in Montreal City Council holds practical in addition to theoretical significance. As the foremost example of its kind in Canadian municipal politics, Montreal‟s party system merits study in its own right. This thesis picks up on a twenty-year gap in research on its parties. It also generates original data by which to verify claims made on behalf of party competition in municipalities outside Quebec.
Interviews and archival research conducted for this thesis confirm that Montreal‟s municipal parties have all the necessary attributes to qualify under functional definitions of that concept. They are not interest coalitions that recruit slates of candidates who share few explicit goals and lose cohesion after elections, like past parties in Edmonton, Winnipeg and Vancouver (Lightbody 2006: 243-251). Rather they are sophisticated electoral machines governed by formal statutes and institutionalized, albeit inactive, membership structures. Their policies are developed and, at least superficially, vetted through consultations with grassroots and caucus stakeholders. They also differ on important issues like the scope of authority that borough councils should exercise, which disputes their description as interchangeable. More importantly, this combination of attributes establish
Montreal‟s parties as archetypes for arguments made on behalf of party competition in municipalities outside Quebec. For example, they show that municipal parties can facilitate informed voting by binding slates of candidates to common platforms that present clear cut 101
alternatives. They also bolster claims that associate municipal party systems with enhanced electoral accountability. These posit that party platforms function as helpful bases for evaluating legislative performance as long as caucus members vote cohesively.
Shortcomings and Openings on New Research Avenues
By bridging a twenty-year gap in research on Montreal‟s municipal parties and discerning their most probable causes of legislative cohesion, this thesis equips scholars with an empirical framework for constructing focused surveys. These could be used to verify its inferences and to develop proxy measures for sociological variables that it could not comprehensively evaluate.
In light of evidence for their importance to councillors‟ socialization to norms of caucus solidarity, this thesis also advances grounds for including borough activities in future research on councillors‟ legislative behaviour. As further roll-call voting datasets are added to ones compiled for this study‟s quantitative analysis, it will also be worth examining whether parties‟ legislative cohesion is influenced by caucus size or, more specifically, the breadth of governing parties‟ majority and opposition parties‟ proximity to power. Several participants mentioned that they expected whips to use more explicit disciplinary threats following Union Montreal‟s reduction from a majority of thirty to twelve councillors in the 2009 election. Although it falls beyond our study‟s scope, city council‟s current session has already seen a number of that party‟s motions defeated as a result of, what some participants framed as, deliberate absences by councillors who were passed over for promotions. These were the first defeats that the party has ever experienced and, by all accounts, took its leadership by surprise. Their description supports our finding 102
that parties primarily deter dissent through informal cues instead of explicit threats. They nonetheless also caution that disciplinary practices might be changing. 103
Appendix 1: Rules Governing Montreal’s Electoral District Boundaries:
Montreal‟s municipal charter stipulates that borough councils must contain at least five members. Some formerly independent municipalities that were transformed into boroughs have too few residents to justify this number of city councilors however. To permit proportionality while still guaranteeing that borough councils contain five members, small boroughs are divided into further subsections called borough districts. Borough districts‟ boundaries are carved out or coincide with those of city districts.
An illustration might help to make sense of this system. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 feature maps of two neighboring boroughs: Outremont and Parc Extension - Villeray - Saint
Michel. These maps are not drawn to scale. At 3.9 square kilometers the Outremont borough is roughly a quarter of the size of the Parc Extension - Villeray - Saint Michel borough. These boroughs‟ populations are even less proportional. At twenty-four thousand residents, the Outremont borough‟s total population is much smaller than that of Parc
Extension, which houses thirty-four thousand residents but only constitutes a city district in the Parc Extension - Villeray - Saint Michel borough (City of Montreal 2009a). As a result of these disparities, the Outremont borough‟s mayor serves as its only representative on city council and joins four borough councilors on Outremont‟s borough council. The Parc
Extension – Villeray – Saint Michel borough council, on the other hand, is sufficiently large in geography and population to justify being divided into city rather than borough districts. Its borough council members consequently also serve on City Council. 104
105
Appendix 2: Summary of Results for the 2001, 2005 and 2009 Montreal Elections
Borough District Position Elected (2001) Party Vote Elected (2005) Party Vote Elected (2009) Party Vote Mayor Gerald Tremblay UM 49.11% Gerald Tremblay UM 53.73% Gerald Tremblay UM 37.90% Oppos. Leader Pierre Bourque VM 44.20% Pierre Bourque VM 36.32% Louise Harel VM 32.73% Ahuntsic- Cartierville City Councilor Noushig Eloyan VM 52.90% Noushig Eloyan VM 49.44% Harout Chitilian UM 37.71% Cartierville Ahuntsic City Councilor Pierre Lapointe VM 63.10% Pierre Lapointe UM 44.38% Émilie Thuillier PM 34.17% Saint-Sulpice City Councilor P. Beauchamps VM 65.13% Jocelyn Campbell UM 44.19% Jocelyn Campbell UM 35.60% Sault-au- Recollet City Councilor Achille Polcaro VM 47.05% Jean St-Onge UM 46.50% Étienne Brunet VM 32.36% Acadie City Councilor Hasmig Beleli VM 57.90% ------Borough Mayor - - - Marie Beaudoin UM 49.59% Pierre Gagnier PM 35.09% Anjou City Councilor Luis Miranda UM 59.40% ------City Councilor Carol Beaupre UM 53.13% ------Borough Mayor - - - Luis Miranda IND 57.63% Luis Miranda UM 55.32% Anjou City Councilor - - - Andrée Hénault IND 54.46% Andrée Hénault UM 51.03% Beaconsfield------Baie-d'Urfe City Councilor Roy Kemp UM 55.46% Côte-des- Darlington City Councilor Saulie Zajdel VM 46.83% Saulie Zajdel UM 38.77% Lionel Perez UM 43.74% Neiges–Notre- Dame-de- Côte-des-Neiges City Councilor Francine Senecal UM 48.56% Francine Senecal UM 52.78% Helen Fotopoulos UM 41.75% Grâce Snowdon City Councilor Marvin Rotrand UM 67.42% Marvin Rotrand UM 61.85% Marvin Rotrand UM 59.82% Decarie City Councilor Marcel Tremblay UM 60.31% ------NDG City Councilor M. Applebaum UM 65.97% Marcel Tremblay UM 49.90% Peter McQueen PM 41.82% Loyola City Councilor Jeremy Searle UM 71.51% Warren Allmand UM 55.90% Susan Clarke UM 33.31% Borough Mayor - - - M. Applebaum UM 48.11% M. Applebaum UM 52.19% Cote-St-Luc- Hampstead- City Councilor Robert Libman UM 87.06% ------Montreal-Ouest City Councilor Dida Berku UM 71.67% ------Dollard-Des- Ormeaux City Councilor E. Janiszewski UM 75.49% ------Dorval City Councilor Peter Yeomans UM 91.36% ------Île-Bizard– City Councilor N. Marinnaci IND 38.10% ------Sainte- Borough Mayor - - - Richard Belanger UM 56.05% Richard Belanger UM 55.91% Genevieve City Councilor H. Zingboim UM 57.36% ------Kirkland City Councilor John Meaney UM 84.75% ------Lachine City Councilor Claude Dauphin UM 61.92% ------City Councilor J, Cowell-Poitras UM 51.04% ------106
Borough Mayor - - - Claude Dauphin UM 80.22% Claude Dauphin UM 63.37% City Councilor - - - J. Cowell-Poitras UM 76.46% J. Cowell-Poitras UM 58.86% Lasalle City Councilor Manon Barbe UM 47.80% ------City Councilor Alvaro Farinacci UM 46.34% ------City Councilor R. Deschamps UM 40.99% ------Borough Mayor - - - Manon Barbe UM 63.71% Manon Barbe UM 49.19% Cecil-Newman City Councilor - - - Alvaro Farinacci UM 60.65% Alvaro Farinacci UM 45.97% Sault-St-Louis City Councilor - - - R. Deschamps UM 60.19% R. Deschamps UM 47.55% Mercier- Laurent Hochelaga- Hochelaga City Councilor Luc Larivee VM 64.08% Blanchard VM 46.46% Laurent Blanchard VM 57.36% Maisonneuve Louis-Riel City Councilor Lyn Faust VM 67.35% Richer Dompierre VM 45.36% Lyn Faust VM 39.95% Tetraultville City Councilor Ivon Le Duc VM 68.31% Gaëtan Primeau VM 48.47% Gaëtan Primeau VM 45.95% Longue-Pointe City Councilor Claire St-Arnaud VM 57.54% ------Maisonneuve City Councilor R. Dompierre VM 68.84% ------Borough Mayor - - - Lyn Faust VM 48.07% Real Menard VM 52.53% Maisonneuve- - - - Longue-Pointe City Councilor Claire St-Arnaud VM 51.43% Monique Blanchet VM 53.60% Montreal- City Councilor Marcel Parent UM 50.81% ------Nord City Councilor J.M. Gibeau UM 47.40% ------City Councilor James Infantino UM 45.16% ------Borough Mayor - - - Marcel Parent UM 60.64% Gilles Deguire UM 40.50% Ovide-Clermont City Councilor - - - J.M. Gibeau UM 58.40% J.M. Gibeau UM 49.21% Marie-Clarac City Councilor - - - James Infantino UM 52.36% C. Teti-Tomassi UM 37.77%
Mont-Royal City Councilor Suzanne Caron UM 75.92% ------Outremont City Councilor S. Harbour UM 60.48% ------Pierrefonds- City Councilor Monique Worth UM 68.60% ------Senneville City Councilor Bernard Ward UM 65.27% ------Pierrefonds- Borough Mayor - - - Monique Worth UM 56.68% Monique Worth UM 53.22% Roxboro Ouest City Councilor - - - Bertrand Ward UM 57.89% Bertrand Ward UM 54.22% Est City Councilor - - - Christian Dubois UM 46.27% Christian Dubois UM 51.63% Pointe-Claire City Councilor Bill McMurchie UM 91.23% ------Plateau-Mont- Jeanne-Mance City Councilor Michel Prescott UM 49.64% Michel Prescott UM 45.34% Valérie Machouf PM 39.90% Royal Mile-End City Councilor Helen Fotopulos UM 52.36% Michel Labrecque UM 46.86% Alex Norris PM 47.51% Laurier City Councilor Christine Poulin VM 55.98% ------Plateau-Mont- Royal City Councilor Nicolas Tetrault VM 59.95% ------Borough Mayor - - - Helen Fotopulos UM 46.28% Luc Ferrandez PM 44.76% 107
De Lorimier City Councilor - - - Richard Bergeron PM 36.53% Josée Duplessis PM 49.51% Rivière-des- Rivière-des- Prairies– Prairies City Councilor Michell Plante VM 59.67% Joe Magri UM 65.69% Maria Calderone UM 59.82% Pointe-aux- Pointe-aux- Trembles Trembles City Councilor Marius Minier VM 46.18% André Bélisle VM 47.38% Suzanne Decarie VM 50.13% Bout-de-l'Ile City Councilor Paul Colette VM 62.57% ------Marc-Aurele- Fortin City Councilor Cosmo Maciocia UM 48.76% ------Borough Mayor - - - Cosmo Maciocia UM 50.30% Joe Magri UM 41.27% La Pointe-aux- - - - Prairies City Councilor N. Montmorency VM 46.53% C. Bourgeois VM 40.58% Rosemont- Saint-Edouard City Councilor Francois Purcell VM 62.61% Francois Purcell VM 38.15% Francois Limoge PM 46.52% Petite-Patrie Etienne- Desmarteau City Councilor Nicole Thibault VM 60.33% Carole Du Sault UM 41.21% Marc Gadoury PM 39.17% Rosemont City Councilor Denise Larouche VM 66.15% Gilles Grondin UM 46.22% Pierre Lampron VM 42.38% Marie-Victorin City Councilor K. Beauregard VM 62.23% Nicole Thibault VM 38.10% Élaine Ayotte VM 45.11% Jean-Francois Louis-Hebert City Councilor Plante VM 63.69% ------Borough Mayor - - - Andre Lavallee UM 42.57% Francois Croteau VM 35.51% Saint-Laurent City Councilor Alan DeSousa UM 67.65% ------City Councilor Rene Dussault UM 65.45% ------City Councilor Irving Grundman UM 62.55% ------Borough Mayor - - - Alan DeSousa UM 67.33% Alan DeSousa UM 72.89% Côte-de-Liesse City Councilor - - - Laval Demers UM 61.18% Laval Demers UM 64.33% Norman- - - - McLaren City Councilor Patricia Bittar UM 57.83% Aref Salem UM 57.32% Saint-Leonard City Councilor Frank Zampino UM 71.14% ------City Councilor Yvette Bissonnet UM 64.48% ------City Councilor Dominic Perri UM 59% ------Borough Mayor - - - Frank Zampino UM 78.20% Michel Bissonnet UM 69.72% Saint-Léonard- - - - East City Councilor Yvette Bissonnet UM 75.95% Robert Zampito UM 63.51% Saint-Léonard- - - - West City Councilor Dominic Perri UM 71.70% Dominic Perri UM 66.69% Sud-Ouest Emard City Councilor Robert Bousquet VM 48.60% ------Louis-Cyr City Councilor Line Hamel VM 65.12% ------Pointe-Saint- Charles City Councilor J. Montpetit VM 48.60% ------108
Borough Mayor - - - J. Montpetit UM 40.40% Benoit Dorais VM 28.35% Saint-Henri- Pointe-Saint- - - - Charles City Councilor Line Hamel VM 44.56% V. Fournier VM 30.19% Saint-Paul- - - - Émard City Councilor Jean Yves Carier VM 45.68% Daniel Belanger UM 38.14% Verdun City Councilor Georges Bosse UM 52.29% ------City Councilor Laurent Dugas UM 41.23% ------City Councilor Claude Trudel UM 39.12% ------Borough Mayor - - - Claude Trudel UM 63.62% Claude Trudel UM 39.92% Champlain- - - - L'Île-des-Soeurs City Councilor Ginette Marotte UM 55.69% Ginette Marotte UM 36.51% Desmarchais- - - - Crawford City Councilor Alain Tasse UM 56.18% Alain Tasse UM 38.69% Ville Marie Peter-McGill City Councilor L. O'Sullivan UM 53.95% C. Sevigny UM 57.81% Sammy Forcillo UM 38.33% Saint-Jacques City Councilor Robert Laramee VM 47.96% ------Sainte-Marie City Councilor Martin Lemay VM 69.83% ------Borough Mayor - - - Benoit Labonte UM 39.62% Sainte-Marie- - - - Saint-Jacques City Councilor Sammy Forcillo UM 41.76% François Robillard VM 41.21% Villeray- Saint-Michel City Councilor P. Tamburello VM 62.27% Soraya Martinez UM 45.21% Frantz Benjamin UM 43.41% Saint-Michel- Villeray City Councilor S. Lachance VM 63.44% S. Lachance UM 39.01% Elsie Lefebvre VM 54.29% Parc-Extension Parc-Extension City Councilor Mary Deros VM 46.99% Mary Deros VM 66.40% Mary Deros UM 50.69% Jarry City Councilor Anie Samson VM 58.91% ------Jean-Rivard City Councilor Frank Venneri VM 55.09% ------Borough Mayor - - - Anie Samson VM 45.24% Anie Samson VM 39.61% Francois- - - - Perrault City Councilor Frank Venneri UM 42.63% Frank Venneri UM 36.26% Westmount City Councilor Karin Marks IND 87.79% ------Source: City of Montreal (2010b) “Résultats Electoraux,” (http://www2.ville.montreal.qc.ca/archives/democratie/democratie_fr/expo/savoir-plus/index.shtm) 109
Appendix 3: Script of Framing Interview Questions
1. Were you active in your party at a grassroots level before seeking elected office? If so, did this experience help prepare you for work as a city councillor?
2. Why did you decide to run for public office?
3. By what process did you become your party‟s candidate in your constituency? Do you have to confirm your nomination between elections? Has an incumbent ever been challenged through this process? Has your party leader ever refused to sign a candidate‟s nomination papers?
4. Can councillors be removed from your party‟s caucus? If so, then how and who governs this procedure?
5. Why did you choose to run under your party‟s banner? Would you have considered running as an independent? Why/why not?
6. Are there significant ideological differences between your party and competing ones? If not ideological, on what bases are they distinguished by the average voter?
7. What motivates voters to support you? Is it mainly your party affiliation, or your own personal accomplishments? Can you estimate roughly what percentage for each?
8. Broadly speaking, what is your principal source of campaign financing? Does the party place conditions on how these funds are spent?
9. How do you monitor your constituents‟ policy preferences? When your party‟s policies and your constituents‟ preferences conflict, what do you do?
10. Could you describe the process by which your party develops its policies and voting positions? Do you prioritize any particular stage in this process when lobbying for a policy? How closely do your party‟s election platforms reflect resolutions adopted at its conventions?
11. Is there a process that permits councillors to independently table motions for council‟s consideration (akin to Private Members‟ Bills)? Do you consider this to be an efficient means of advancing policy? Why or why not?
12. Is the input of independent councillors and councillors from other parties invited at any stage in the current administration‟s decision-making process? If so, at which stage and how frequent is such collaboration?
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13. Could you describe a typical caucus meeting? How often do they occur? Do these meetings provide substantive opportunities to influence your party‟s policies or voting positions? Do they provide an opportunity to express disagreement?
14. Does your party either formally or informally encourage more experienced caucus members to mentor rookie councillors? Were you exposed to this type of mentorship when you were first elected?
15. Broadly speaking, would you describe your relations with councillors from other parties as collegial, professional, or adversarial?
16. How much influence does the mayor exert over standing committee appointments? By what criteria are they distributed? Are any positions reserved for opposition party members? How much influence do opposition party leaders exert over their distribution?
17. In your opinion, what accounts for the frequency with which councillors vote unanimously? Have these trends changed over time? Are certain kinds of votes more likely to elicit disagreement?
18. Has a councillor ever voted against their party on a budget? Did he/she face any disciplinary consequences?
19. Have you ever voted against your party on any issue? Why or why not? Were you disciplined as a result of this decision?
20. Are councillors more likely to dissent before or after gaining experience in office?
21. Does your party use formal or informal rewards and sanctions to encourage cohesive voting behaviour? If so, could you describe them and the manner in which they are distributed? If not, what accounts for their caucus members‟ cohesive voting behaviour?
22. Does your party have an officially appointed whip? If so, what type of relationship do caucus members have with that person? What types of sticks and carrots are made available to that person by the party‟s central office? Alternatively, what types of arguments does he/she make to discourage dissent?
23. Do councillors have the sufficient budgetary means to hire a research assistant? If not, are they sufficiently informed when making voting decisions?
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24. Do you approach standing committee work as an opportunity to promote policies or shape council‟s agenda? Are standing committees assigned tasks by the executive committee? Does their work relate directly to that of the executive committee? To what extent, in your experience, do their recommendations influence executive committee decisions?
25. In your opinion, what are councillors‟ principal motives when they are first elected? Do their motives change over the course of their mandates? Why and how?
26. Is there anything that you think I should have asked for the purposes of this research that you would like to share with me? 112
Appendix 4: Index of Agreement Scores and Voting Blocs in Montreal City Council’s 2002-2005 Session 113
Appendix 5: Index of Agreement Scores and Voting Blocs in Montreal City Council’s 2005-2009 Session 114
Appendix 6: Verifying Clusters’ Consistency and Composition with Willetts’ Modifications to the Rice-Beyle Technique
Willletts‟ technique for generating statistically significant index of agreement thresholds actually builds on a method that was proposed but not fully developed by Beyle.
It involves measuring the probability with which two legislators will vote in the same manner across a specified number of motions if voting randomly and then deriving thresholds from the tails of these equations‟ sampling distribution. Beyle used the following standard formula to calculate probability:
This translates into the probability (P) of getting a specified number of voting agreements
(r) between two legislators across a specified number of roll-call votes (N). Pf represents probability of agreement while Pr represents probability of disagreement. Beyle‟s method is based on an assumption of random voting, which means that Pf = 0.5 and Pr = 0.5. The
term is evaluated according to the following formula:
N!
r! (N – r)! Imagine that two legislators agreed on eight out of ten votes when voting randomly.
This agreement score‟s probability would be calculated as follows: =
= 45 x 0.003906 x 0.25 = 0.0439. Agreeing on eight out of ten votes would, in other words, have a 4.39% chance of occurring randomly. Table 2.3 delineates the probability of other combinations of binomial agreement across ten roll-call votes. These scores are verified by their sum of 1.0 and a normal distribution curve. 115
Table 2.3: Probability of Obtaining a Particular Number of Agreements in Four Roll Call Votes
Number of Values Probability Agreements 0 Pf Pd 0.000976563 1 0.5 0.5 1 Pf Pd 0.009765625 10 0.5 0.5
2 Pf Pd 0.043945313 45 0.5 0.5 3 Pf Pd 0.1171875 120 0.5 0.5 4 Pf Pd 0.205078125 210 0.5 0.5
5 Pf Pd 0.24609375 252 0.5 0.5
6 Pf Pd 0.205078125 210 0.5 0.5 7 Pf Pd 0.1171875 120 0.5 0.5
8 Pf Pd 0.043945313 45 0.5 0.5 9 Pf Pd 0.009765625 10 0.5 0.5 10 Pf Pd 0.000976563 1 0.5 0.5
Statistically significant index of agreement thresholds are found by examining the tails of probability scores‟ sampling distribution. No score is significant at the 0.001-level in our sample of ten votes. Agreement or disagreement on ten out of ten votes is 116
nonetheless statistically significant at the 0.01-level. This furthermore drops to agreement or disagreement on nine out of ten votes at the 0.05-level.
Willetts‟ modifications to Beyle‟s formula for calculating statistically significant index of agreement thresholds substitute probability of agreement (Pf) and disagreement
(Pr) values that assume random voting with ones that reflect legislators‟ actual voting habits. In this vein, it also instructs researchers to incorporate votes that elicited unanimous consent. Willetts assumes that analytically relevant variables must come into play if legislators regularly vote together.
Calculating average rates of probable agreement is relatively straightforward. One begins by calculating the ratio of office-holders who voted for and against each motion in a distributive sample. One then squares and sums these values to produce a relative probability of agreement score. These scores are multiplied by each other and doubled to produce a relative probability of disagreement score. To illustrate, Montreal City Council‟s first budget vote following municipal mergers was enacted by a 40 to 29 vote. It thus elicited a 0.58 ratio of agreement (representing 40 out of 69 voting councillors) and 0.42 ratio of disagreement (representing 29 out of 69 voting councillors). This vote‟s relative probability of agreement score would be calculated as follows:
Pf = 0.58 + 0.42 = 0.3364 + 0.1764 = 0.5128
Its relative probability of disagreement score would, in turn, be calculated as:
Pd = 2 x 0.58 x 0.42 = 0.4872 117
The final step in Willetts‟ technique involves averaging relative probability of agreement and disagreement scores and then inserting those values into Beyle‟s formula.
This creates a distribution curve that skews towards agreement to reflect the influence of variables that prevent office-holders from voting randomly.
Disagreement rates in the four categories of motions that we discerned at the beginning of this chapter were broad enough to generate statistically significant index of agreement thresholds through Willett‟s formula. Table 2.4 shows these thresholds. They distinguished similar clusters to the unmodified Rice-Beyle technique when applied to budgetary motions or motions initiated by independent or opposition councillors. Cluster bloc analyses could not be conducted on votes to modify Montreal‟s Master Plan or transfer powers to borough councils unfortunately because divisions on these motions were not recorded through formal roll-call votes.
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Table 2.4: Index of Agreement Thresholds Generated Through Willetts' Technique in Four Important Categories of Votes
Council 2001-2005 2005-2009 Session: Index of Index of Agreement Agreement Relative Relative Threshold for Relative Relative Threshold for Sample Probability of Probability of Voting Bloc Sample Probability of Probability of Voting Bloc of Votes Agreement Disagreement Membership of Votes Agreement Disagreement Membership Category (N) Score Score (p < 0.05) (N) Score Score (p < 0.05) Budget Votes 38 0.74 0.26 86.84% 36 0.84 0.16 0.97 Private Members 35 0.82 0.18 27 0.8 0.2 0.96 Master Plan 158 0.96 0.04 98.73% Power Transfer 31 0.81 0.19 93.55% * Partially recorded votes are omitted
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Appendix 7: Timeline and Direction of Floor-Crossing in City Council (2001-2009)
Year Date Councilor Elected in Ended Source term 2001 17-Nov Collette Paul Vision MTL Independent Girard 2001 2003 Mar Bill McMurchie Union MTL Independent Gyulai 2003c. 2003 20-Aug Luis Miranda Union MTL Independent Gyulai 2003a. 2003 22-Oct Suzanne Caron Union MTL Independent Gyulai 2003d. 2003 04-Dec John Meaney Union MTL Independent Rodrigue 2003b. 2003 13-Dec Pierre Lapointe Vision MTL Union MTL Lapointe 2003. 2003 13-Dec Frank Venneri Vision MTL Union MTL Rodrigue 2003c. 2003 13-Dec Sylvain Lachance Vision MTL Union MTL Rodrigue 2003c. 2003 13-Dec Marius Minier Vision MTL Union MTL Trottier 2002. 2003 13-Dec Ivon Le Duc Vision MTL Union MTL Rodrigue 2003c. 2003 13-Dec Luc Larivée Vision MTL Union MTL Rodrigue 2003c. 2003 31-Dec Jeremy Searle Union MTL Independent Solyom 2003. 2004 31-Dec Louise O'Sullivan Union MTL Independent Duschesne 2004. 2004 22-Oct Nicolas Tétrault Vision MTL Union MTL Hirez 2004. 2005 12-Feb Saulie Zajdel Vision MTL Union MTL Rodrigue 2005. 2005 03-Mar Michel Plante Vision MTL Union MTL Gyulai 2005b. 2006 04-Mar Paolo Tamburello Vision MTL Union MTL Gyulai 2005b. 2006 23-Nov N Montmorency Vision MTL Independent Rodrigue 2006. 2006 28-Nov Andre Belisle Vision MTL Independent Beauchemain 2006. 2007 18-Sep Benoit Labonté Union MTL Vision MTL Wllton 2007. 2007 18-Sep Soraya Martinez Union MTL Vision MTL Wllton 2007. 2007 13-Dec Mary Deros Vision MTL Union MTL Mennie 2007. 2008 17-Jun Richer Dompierre Vision MTL Union MTL Corriveau 2008. 2008 29-Nov Claire St. Arnaud Vision MTL Independent Clement 2008. 2009 25-Jun Francois Purcell Vision MTL Union MTL Lessard 2009b.
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