GAO-05-851 Passenger Rail Security
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United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters GAO September 2005 PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts GAO-05-851 September 2005 PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY Accountability Integrity Reliability Highlights Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Highlights of GAO-05-851, a report to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The U.S. passenger rail system is a Within DHS, the Office for Domestic Preparedness has completed 7 risk vital component of the nation’s assessments of passenger rail systems around the country, with 12 more transportation infrastructure, under way. TSA has begun to conduct risk assessments and to establish a carrying more than 11 million methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize risks that passengers each weekday. The have been identified but has not yet completed either effort or set timelines Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of for doing so. TSA will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets and help Transportation (DOT) share guide security investment decisions until these efforts are completed. At the responsibility for ensuring the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has not yet completed, a safety and security of rail systems. framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other In this report, GAO addressed sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it (1) DHS actions to assess the risks may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize to the U.S. passenger rail system in them, and allocate resources accordingly. the context of prevailing risk management principles, (2) federal The Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration actions taken to enhance the within DOT have ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security. In security of the U.S. passenger rail system, and (3) security practices addition, in 2004, TSA issued emergency security directives to domestic rail that domestic and selected foreign operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid, Spain, and passenger rail operators have piloted a test of explosive detection technology for use in passenger rail implemented. systems. However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with the directives, citing What GAO Recommends limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a GAO is recommending, among memorandum of understanding to improve coordination between the two other things, that the Secretary of agencies, and they are developing agreements to address specific rail DHS direct the Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security security issues. Administration (TSA) to develop a plan with timelines for completing Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a its methodology for conducting risk range of actions to help secure their systems. We also observed security assessments and develop rail practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their governments security standards that can be that are not currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or measured and enforced. The by the U.S. government, and which could be considered for use in the United Secretary also should consider the States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen feasibility of implementing certain passengers, and some foreign governments maintain centralized security practices used by foreign clearinghouses on rail security technologies and best practices. operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with the report’s recommendations. DHS’s detailed comments and GAO’s response are contained in the report. Example of high visibility canine sweep www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-851. at mass transit station To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-8777 or JayEtta Hecker Source: Developed by GAO with photo provided by Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. at (202) 512-2834 United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Results in Brief 4 Background 8 DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Additional Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments 20 Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security 32 U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security Actions May Exist 45 Conclusions 68 Recommendations for Executive Action 71 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 72 Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 79 Appendix II Elements of a Typical Homeland Security Risk Assessment 84 Appendix III FTA and ODP Passenger Rail Risk Assessments Conducted or In Progress 85 FTA Risk Assessments Conducted 85 ODP Risk Assessments 86 Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 88 Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 94 Tables Table 1: Selected Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies Related to Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection 18 Page i GAO-05-851 Passenger Rail Security Table 2: Selected Steps in ODP’s Risk Assessment Process 22 Table 3: Examples of Measures Required by TSA Security Directives Issued to Passenger Rail Operators and Amtrak 36 Table 4: Domestic Passenger Rail Agencies We Visited or Interviewed for the Purposes of this Review 80 Table 5: Foreign Passenger Rail and Government Agencies We Visited or Interviewed for the Purposes of This Review 82 Figures Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Amtrak and Rail Transit Systems 9 Figure 2: Risk Management Cycle 14 Figure 3: Sample ODP Relative Risk Diagram 23 Figure 4: Status of TSA’s Passenger Rail Risk Assessment Efforts, as of July 2005 30 Figure 5: Summary Information on TSA’s Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot Program Phases 41 Figure 6: Example of Passenger Rail Customer Awareness Poster 49 Figure 7: Wallet-size Cards Distributed to BART Employees Containing Anti-terrorism Information 52 Figure 8: Selected Security Design Elements Incorporated into London’s Underground 58 Figure 9: Security Design Elements Incorporated into London’s Underground 59 Figure 10: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Passenger Rail Environment 61 Page ii GAO-05-851 Passenger Rail Security Abbreviations AAR American Association of Railroads APTA American Public Transportation Association ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act BART San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit CCTV closed-circuit television DHS Department of Homeland Security DOT Department of Transportation FRA Federal Railroad Administration FTA Federal Transit Administration HSPD-7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection MBTA Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority MOU memorandum of understanding NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan ODP Office for Domestic Preparedness PANYNJ Port Authority of New York and New Jersey PATH Port Authority Trans-Hudson PDA personal digital assistant RATP Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens SLGCP Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness TRIP Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot TSA Transportation Security Administration TSSP transportation sector-specific plan UASI Urban Area Security Initiative WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page iii GAO-05-851 Passenger Rail Security United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548 September 9, 2005 The Honorable Steven LaTourette Chairman Subcommittee on Railroads Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives The Honorable Olympia Snowe United States Senate The Honorable Barbara Boxer United States Senate The Honorable Michael Castle House of Representatives The July 7 and July 21, 2005, bomb attacks on London’s subway system, which resulted in over 50 fatalities and more than 700 injuries, dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks and the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. The U.S. passenger rail system is a vital component of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, encompassing rail transit (heavy rail, commuter rail, and light rail) and intercity rail systems.1 Together, these systems carry more than 11 million passengers each weekday. One of the critical challenges facing rail system operators—and the federal agencies that regulate and oversee them—is finding ways to protect rail systems from potential terrorist attacks without compromising the accessibility and efficiency of rail travel. 1The U.S. passenger rail system consists of heavy, commuter, light, and intercity rail systems. Heavy rail is an