WHO DECIDES A STATE’S ENERGY MIX THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2020 3 PM ET / 2 PM CT / 1 PM MT / NOON PT 2020 SPRING WEBINAR SERIES

Hosted by NCSL’s Natural Resources and Infrastructure Committee

 Who Decides a State’s Energy Mix?  New WOTUS Rule & States Response to Jurisdictional Changes  Solar on Agricultural Lands – Preserving Pollinator Habitat and Soil Health  State Legislative Trends: Traffic Safety  What’s Exceptional? State Efforts to Meet Clean Air Standards For more information on the webinars and how to register, visit NCSL’s NRI webpage SPEAKERS

Romany Webb Jeff Dennis Chairman Jason Sabin Center, Advanced Energy Stanek Columbia Law Economy Maryland Public School Service Commission Who Decides a State’s Energy Mix?

NCSL Natural Resources and Infrastructure Committee Webinar – April 2020

Romany Webb Associate Research Scholar, Columbia Law School Senior Fellow, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Federal Regulation of Electricity

Section 201, Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. § 824)

FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over: • “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and • “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce” – wholesale sales = sales for resale – sales in interstate commerce = sales where electricity is transmitted via an interstate grid RTOs and ISOs

Source: FERC PJM Interconnection, LLC • Profit-neutral corp., regulated by FERC • Manages a regional grid, comprising >1,300 generators and > 84,000 miles of transmission, and serving 65 million customers • Operates wholesale power markets, including energy markets and a capacity market

(Source: PJM) Wholesale Power Markets

Source: ISO New England (2020) Limits on Federal Authority

FERC “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or [intrastate] transmission” - Section 201, Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. § 824)

States are authorized to “regulate local distribution plus the facilities used to generate power.” States may exercise that authority “even when their laws incidentally affect areas within FERC's domain” - EPSA v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) State Policies Affecting Generation

Source: S&P Global (Mar. 2020) Response to State Policies

March April June October December 2016 2018 2018 2018 2019 • Calpine • PJM • FERC finds • PJM • FERC Corp. files proposes PJM’s submits directs PJM complaint market existing revised to apply with FERC reforms to tariff unjust proposal, MOPR to re: price address & unreas- involving all new & suppressive impact onable, expansion existing impact of state rejects of the state- state subsidies proposed MOPR, subsidized subsidies reforms coupled resources with a (with Resource limited Carve-Out exceptions) FERC’s View of State Policies The integrity of PJM’s capacity market is “untenably threatened out-of-market payments provided or required by certain states for the purpose of supporting the entry or continued operation of preferred generation resources that may not otherwise be able to succeed in a competitive market. . . An expanded MOPR with few or no exceptions, should protect PJM’s capacity market from the price- suppressive effects of” state policies - FERC Order (June 2018) The Minimum Offer Price Rule

Source: Sierra Club (Aug. 2019) Covered Resources

• All new and existing resources that receive, or are eligible to receive, state subsidies • State subsidies include out-of-market payments provided or required by states that “could have the effect of allowing a resource to clear in any PJM capacity auction” • No showing that subsidy “actually allows a resource to uneconomically enter or remain in market” • No materiality thresholds, e.g., for size of resource or state subsidy Exemptions • Existing resource exemptions – existing renewable resources that receive payments through state RPS programs – existing demand response, energy efficiency, and capacity storage resources – existing self-supply resources • Competitive exemption – certain new and existing resources that agree to forego state subsidies • Unit-Specific exemption – new and existing resources that can justify below- MOPR prices Contact Information: [email protected] (415) 702-7902 Important Links: www.climate.law.columbia.edu www.climatecasechart.com blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/ twitter.com/columbiaclimate www.facebook.com/ColumbiaClimateLaw WHO DECIDES A STATE’S ENERGY MIX? The Impact of FERC’s “Broad MOPR” Rule

Jeff Dennis Managing Director and General Counsel Advanced Energy Economy @EnergyLawJeff 17 About Advanced Energy Economy

• AEE represents more than 100 companies and organizations that span the advanced energy industry and its value chains. • Technologies represented include energy efficiency, demand response, solar photovoltaics, solar thermal electric, wind, energy storage, electric vehicles, advanced metering infrastructure, transmission and distribution efficiency, fuel cells, hydro power, advanced nuclear power, combined heat and power, and enabling software.

• Used together, these technologies and services will create and maintain a higher- performing energy system—one that is reliable and resilient, diverse, cost- effective, and clean—while also improving the availability and quality of customer- facing services.

18 18 Key Takeaways

• How FERC’s Broad MOPR, as PJM proposes to implement it, will impact advanced energy resources supported by state policies

• The impact of MOPR on the energy mix, customers, and clean energy policies in the PJM region

• Considering the MOPR in context

19 19 The Impact of Broad MOPR on Advanced Energy Resources in PJM

20 Over 89 GW of advanced energy resources could be impacted by the Broad MOPR ruling

MW of Capacity • Over 89 GW of solar and wind generation Exposed to MOPR Solar under development in the PJM Wind interconnection queue are potentially exposed to ruling MI 635 • This is comprised of over 60.6 GW of solar and 28.6 GW of wind interconnection requests PA 7,726 OH NJ 913 8,699 • Many of these projects have invested significant capital IL IN 635 4,785 6,097 11,717 into development and may have executed or be negotiating 6,471 2,124 2,361 MD 1,358 commercial arrangements that rely on capacity revenues WV 674 VA DE 367 431 KY 270 14,124 • New demand response, energy efficiency, 3,135 5,220 energy storage, and other impacted advanced NC energy resources add to this amount 3,811 Note: Many areas of MI, KY, IN, and NC are not within PJM • Every state could be impacted 21 Compiled by Apex Clean Energy in Feb. 2020 21 How do offer floors impact the ability of a resource to “clear” a centralized capacity market?

Hypothetical MOPR Floor Price: $400 / MW-day

Uneconomic Offer Historical Clearing Price: $80 to

$140 / MW-day $/MW

Resource Offers

– New resources: price floor based on the “Net Cost of New Entry” (muct higher than recent clearing prices for most new clean technologies, sometimes 2-5 times higher) – Existing resources: price floor based on “Net Avoidable Cost Rate” (much lower going forward cost), unless exempted 22 Advanced energy resources provide valuable capacity to the power system

• Wind and solar perform well in meeting peak loads – solar generates on peak during the summer, wind generates consistently in the evenings and early mornings in the winter • Demand response and energy efficiency help meet capacity needs by providing reliable demand reductions at peak times • Capacity revenues are an important part of the equation when building a new wind or solar project, and help encourage more demand response and energy efficiency, whether or not they are supported by state policies; without those revenues, prices to consumers can go up – Developers pass on capacity revenues to their customers – Without capacity revenues, power purchase agreement prices may increase from 9% to 25% – These price increases are in addition to the costs of other, redundant capacity resources procured in

23 their place 23 “Default” MOPR Floor Prices in PJM’s compliance filing

• PJM developed a set of standard floor prices for various technology types in compliance with FERC’s order – These floor prices apply to new resources – Supposed to reflect a “competitive offer” from a new resource – FERC required PJM to use a methodology based largely on typical economics of natural gas plants

• With historic capacity market clearing prices of $80 to $200/MW-day, most advanced energy resources at risk – Only Solar PV (Tracking) and Natural Gas CC in range Chart courtesy of Gabel Associates 24 www.gabelassociates.com 24 The importance of plant-specific MOPR Floor Prices

• FERC required PJM to allow individual resources to develop a “unit-specific” floor price

• Resource owner must provide evidence to PJM to validate its calculation – Evidence and inputs are subject to review by PJM and the Independent Market Monitor

• PJM’s compliance filing allows resource owners to use a methodology more appropriate to their technology type – In other words, the owner of a solar plant can use assumptions more appropriate to solar technology and its project, rather than be forced into a methodology developed for conventional resources

• This process helps to alleviate some of the near-term impacts of the Broad MOPR on state-supported resources – Concern that the process could become administratively burdensome 25 – Pending at FERC 25 How Could Broad MOPR Impact the Energy Mix, Consumer Costs, and State Policies in the PJM Region?

26 Impacts of Broad MOPR on the resource mix, consumer costs, and state policies

• If the Broad MOPR forces state-supported resources out of the capacity market, the capacity of those resources is not counted toward the region’s needs – Even if they are built, their capacity is effectively ignored

• The capacity market will procure other resources in their place, most likely natural gas plants or existing coal resources subject to low or no floor prices

• For states adopting policies to encourage clean advanced energy resources, Broad MOPR could add costs and limit effectiveness – Loss of capacity revenues results in higher power purchase agreement prices – Customers are forced to buy additional unneeded capacity in the centralized market, causing significant capacity oversupply – Higher-emitting, uneconomic aging resources that would otherwise retire will continue to operate, increasing costs and working against energy and environmental objectives 27 Cost estimates of Broad MOPR

• Commissioner Richard Glick (dissenting) – Estimated $2.4 billion per year increase in capacity payments in December 2019 dissenting opinion

• Grid Strategies LLC (consulting group) – Recently estimated $1.6 billion per year, citing figures from the PJM Independent Market Monitor – Earlier estimated up to $5.7 billion per year; exemptions in December 2019 moved that estimate downward

• PJM Independent Market Monitor – Concludes that Broad MOPR will have no impact on capacity market prices in the upcoming capacity auction

28 Potential state responses

• Opting out of the capacity market under an option known as a “Fixed Resource Requirement plan” (FRR) – Utilities submit plans to show PJM how they will meet their obligations; min. 5-year commitment • Carbon pricing/Emissions trading – FERC has confirmed that RGGI does not trigger MOPR • Moving more supported resources behind the customer meter • Considering MOPR impacts in demand side management program designs – Reduce the need for capacity rather than supplying capacity • Developing plant-specific methods with the Market Monitor in advance • Working inside the PJM stakeholder process to pro-actively push broader reforms that better integrate clean energy goals into the market Patchwork of state-by-state constructs could harm customers

and project development 29 Putting Broad MOPR in Context

30 MOPR isn’t a national policy, and it won’t apply everywhere

• PJM, ISO New England, and New York Independent System Operator are the only regions with centralized capacity markets and MOPR – FERC’s Broad MOPR in PJM is the most stringent

• Other RTOs/ISOs use different mechanisms to ensure resource adequacy that don’t require MOPR rules – They have their own advantages and disadvantages

• FERC has consistently declined to force PJM-like capacity market features, including MOPR, on other regions – Most recently, in late 2018 FERC rejected a formal complaint seeking the imposition of a PJM- style capacity market with a Broad MOPR

31 Advanced energy technologies are now the most cost- effective option for power generation

32 Broad regional wholesale power markets still provide significant benefits to consumers

• Well designed regional wholesale power markets are still an important tool in the transition to advanced energy – Coordinated dispatch of the most economic energy resources over a wide area – Greater competition between generating resources, reducing market power – Independent operation of the transmission system – Reduced transmission charges – Enhanced reliability and more efficient integration of variable renewable energy resources through sharing resources outside of individual utility control areas

• Regional wholesale power markets have been a platform for innovation – Reliability services can be provided by more technologies, with lower cost and higher quality

• These features bring consumers cost savings and enhanced reliability

33 THANK YOU!

Questions?

571-338-7547 [email protected]

Twitter: @EnergyLawJeff

www.aee.net / @aeenet / Washington DC San Francisco Boston / powersuite.aee.net 34 WHO DECIDES A STATE’S ENERGY MIX

Chairman Jason Stanek Maryland Public Service Commission Questions and Answers

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