POLITICS ABROAD

The Four Wars of Israel/Palestine

Michael Walzer four wars at the same time, side by side, though the overall emphasis falls differently at differ- ent times. Our moral and political judgments have to reflect this complexity. Taken sepa- he great simplifiers are hard at work, rately, two of the wars are just and two are un- but Israel/Palestine has never been a just. But they don’t appear separately in the T friendly environment for them, and it is “real world.” For analytic purposes, we can be- especially unfriendly today. They are bound to gin by looking at them one by one, but we won’t get it wrong, morally and politically, and that be able to stop there. is a very bad thing to do, for the stakes are high. 1. The war against Israel: this is the war There isn’t one war going on in the Middle that is “declared” every time a terrorist attacks East, and there isn’t a single opposition of right Israeli civilians. I believe that terrorism always and wrong, just and unjust. Four Israeli-Pales- announces a radical devaluation of the people tinian wars are now in progress. who are targeted for random murder: Irish • The first is a Palestinian war to destroy the Protestants in the heyday of the IRA, Europe- state of Israel. ans in Algeria during the National Liberation • The second is a Palestinian war to create an Front’s (FLN) campaign for independence, independent state alongside Israel, ending the Americans on September 11. Whatever indi- occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. vidual terrorists say about their activities, the • The third is an Israeli war for the security of intention that they signal to the world, and Israel within the 1967 borders. above all to their victims, is radical and fright- • The fourth is an Israeli war for Greater Is- ening: a politics of massacre or removal or of rael, for the settlements and the occupied ter- overthrow and subjugation. Terrorism isn’t best ritories. understood as a negotiating strategy; it aims It isn’t easy to say which war is being fought instead at total victory, unconditional surren- at any given moment; in a sense, the four are der. The flight of a million and a half Europe- simultaneous. They are also continuous; the ans from Algeria was exactly the sort of victory wars go on even when the fighting stops, as if that terrorists seek (the FLN was helped in its in confirmation of Thomas Hobbes’s definition: project, it should be remembered, by terror- “For war consisteth not in battle only, or the ists on the European side). act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein Israel’s Jewish citizens have to assume that the will to contend by battle is sufficiently something similar is what Palestinian terrorists known . . . ” Throughout the course of the Oslo are seeking today: the end of the Jewish state, peace process, some Palestinians and some Is- the removal of the Jews. The language of in- raelis were fighting the first and fourth of these citement—the sermons in Palestinian wars—or, at least, were committed to fighting mosques, the funerals where the “martyrdom” them (and their will to contend was sufficiently of suicide bombers is commemorated, the slo- known so that it could have been dealt with). gans shouted at political demonstrations, the The actual decision to restart the battles was celebration of terrorists as heroes in schools taken by the Palestinians in September 2000; run by the Palestine Authority (PA)—makes since then, all four wars have been actively in this intention clear, and it is the explicit goal progress. of the leading terrorist organizations, Hamas Different people are fighting each of the and Islamic Jihad. But can it be called the goal

26 ■ DISSENT / Fall 2002 POLITICS ABROAD of the Palestinian liberation movement taken panded, the more land was expropriated and as a whole? Is this what Yasir Arafat is really water rights seized, the stronger that movement after? It isn’t easy to read him; he may think grew. It is worth recalling how peaceful the that he is using the terrorists; he may even hope occupation was in its early days, how few sol- one day to kill or exile them as the Algerian diers it required when it was believed, on both government did to its terrorists in the aftermath sides, to be temporary (and when war number of independence. But clearly, whatever his ul- one had been decisively defeated). A decade timate intentions, he is right now a supporter later, Prime Minister Menachem Begin denied or at least an accomplice of terrorism. (A note that there was any such thing as “occupied ter- to European critics of Ariel Sharon: on any ac- ritory”; the whole land was the Land of Israel; count, including that of Palestinian opposition- the government adopted the ideology of con- ists, Arafat is more involved in the terrorist quest and settlement. And the occupation was campaign than Sharon was in the Sabra and far more onerous, far more oppressive when Shatilla massacre.) His distancing gestures, the its reality was denied than when it was called occasional arrests, and the perfunctory con- by its true name. demnations after each attack long ago ceased So it is certainly a legitimate goal of Pales- to be convincing; he cannot be surprised if or- tinian militants to establish a state of their own, dinary Israelis feel radically threatened. This free of Israel—and of Egypt and Jordan too. first war is a real war, even if it looks right now The first intifada (1987), with its stone-throw- like a losing war with terrible consequences for ing children, looked like a struggle for a state the Palestinian people and even if some (or of this kind, limited to the West Bank and many) Palestinians believe themselves to be Gaza, where the children lived. It was not ex- fighting a different war. actly a nonviolent struggle (though it was some- 2. The war for an independent state: this times described that way by people who weren’t is the war that leftist sympathizers in Europe watching), but it did show discipline and high and America commonly claim that the Pales- morale, and its protagonists seemed to ac- tinians are fighting, because they think that this knowledge limits to their struggle: it wasn’t in- is the war the Palestinians should be fighting. tended to threaten Israelis on their side of the And some (or many) of them are. The Pales- green line, where most Israelis lived. And that tinians need a state. Before 1967, they needed is why it was successful in advancing the peace a state to protect them against Egypt (in Gaza) process—though Palestinian leaders subse- and Jordan (on the West Bank); since 1967, quently declined, so it seems to me, to gather they need a state to protect them against Is- the fruits of their success. rael. I have no doubt about this, nor about the The renewed intifada that began in the fall Palestinian right to the state they need, even of 2000 is a violent struggle, and it is not con- though I believe that the original seizure of the fined to the Occupied Territories. Still, the in- West Bank and Gaza was justified. In 1967, terviews that journalists have conducted with the Arabs were fighting a war of the first kind many of the fighters suggest that they (or some on my list, against the very existence of Israel. of them) consider themselves to be fighting to There was no occupation in those days; Egyp- end the occupation and force the settlers to tian publicists talked openly of driving the Jews leave; their aim is an independent state along- “into the sea.” But the territories that Israel side Israel. So this second war is a real war too, controlled at the end of its victorious defense though again it isn’t clear that Arafat is com- were supposed to be used (this is what its lead- mitted to it. Does he want what some, at least, ers said at the time) as bargaining chips toward of his people certainly want: a small state a future peace. When, instead, the government alongside a small (but not as small) Israeli sponsored and supported settlements beyond state? Does he want to trade in the aura of he- the old border (the green line), it conferred le- roic struggle for the routine drudgery of state- gitimacy on a resistance movement aimed at building? Does he want to worry about the liberation. And the longer the occupation went water supply in Jericho and the development on, the more settlements proliferated and ex- of an industrial zone in Nablus? If the answer

DISSENT / Fall 2002 ■ 27 POLITICS ABROAD to these questions is yes, then we should all only that Palestinian terrorism is a political di- hope that Arafat gets what he wants. The prob- saster for the Israeli left. In the face of terror, lem is that many Israelis, who would share this the left cannot mobilize opposition to the hope if they were hopeful about anything, don’t settlements; it finds itself marginalized; its po- believe, and don’t have much reason to believe, tential supporters are more and more skepti- that the answer is yes. cal about its central claim: that withdrawal 3. The war for Israeli security: it is un- from the territories would bring a real peace. clear how many Israeli soldiers think that this And that skepticism opens the way for right- is the war they are fighting, but the number is wing politicians to defend the settlements— certainly high. The reserve call-up that pre- which are no different, they argue, from cities ceded the March-April 2002 Israeli “incur- and towns on the Israeli side of the green line: sions” into West Bank cities and towns pro- if we don’t fight for Ariel and Kiryat Arbah (Jew- duced a startling result. Usually the army calls ish towns on the West Bank), we will have to up about twice the number of soldiers that it fight for Tel Aviv and Haifa. needs; the routine pressures of civilian life— But the fight for Ariel and Kiryat Arbah sick children, infirm parents, school exams, guarantees that there won’t be a real peace. For trouble at the office—are accepted as excuses; the settler movement is the functional equiva- lots of reservists don’t show up. In March 2002, lent of the terrorist organizations. I hasten to more than 95 percent of them did show up. add that it is not the moral equivalent. The set- These people did not believe that they were tlers are not murderers, even if there are a small fighting for the occupied territories and the number of terrorists among them. But the mes- settlements; all the opinion polls show a mas- sage of settler activity to the Palestinians is very sive unwillingness to do that. They believed much like the message of terrorism to the Is- that they were fighting for their country or, raelis: we want you to leave (some groups on perhaps better, for their safety and survival in the Israeli right, including groups represented their country. The 95 percent response was the in Sharon’s government, openly support a direct product of the terrorist attacks. It is pos- policy of “transfer”), or we want you to accept sible, of course, that Sharon exploited the fear a radically subordinate position in your own of terrorism in order to fight a different war country. The settlers’ aim is Greater Israel, and than the one his soldiers thought they were the achievement of that aim would mean that fighting. Still, whatever the war in Sharon’s there could not be a Palestinian state. It is in mind, a substantial part of the Israeli army was this sense only that they are like the terrorists: defending the country against the terrorist they want the whole thing. They are prepared threat. The third war is a real war and, mor- to fight for the whole thing, and some Israelis ally, a very important war: a defense of home presumably believe that that is what they are and family in the most immediate sense. But doing right now. The fourth war is a real war. some Israeli homes and families are located on The vote of the Likud in May 2002 to bar any the wrong side of the green line, where their future Israeli government from accepting a Pal- defense is morally problematic. estinian state suggests a strong commitment 4. The war for the Occupied Territories: to continue the occupation and enlarge the the Israeli right is definitely committed to this settlements. Still, I suspect that most of the war, but the support they have in the country reservists called up in March, or those who are is (again) uncertain. Prime Minister Ehud now (August) patrolling Palestinian cities, Barak at Camp David in 2000 believed that would not be prepared to fight for those goals he would win a referendum for an almost total if they thought that this was the only war in withdrawal, if this were part of a negotiated which they were engaged. settlement of the conflict as a whole. With- It was the great mistake of the two center- drawal under pressure of terrorist attacks prob- left prime ministers, Yitzhak Rabin and Barak, ably does not have similar support, but that not to set themselves against the settler move- tells us nothing about the extent of support for ment from the beginning. They thought that the occupation and the settlements; it tells us they would most easily defeat the right-wing

28 ■ DISSENT / Fall 2002 POLITICS ABROAD supporters of Greater Israel if they waited un- for the importance of the symbolism and seem til the very end of the peace process. Mean- eager to postpone any discussion of numbers. while they compromised with the right and al- At Taba in January 2001 both sides did talk lowed a steady growth in the number of set- about numbers and, apparently, the figures tlers. If, instead, they had frozen settlement suggested by the two were very far apart. activity and chosen a few isolated settlements Among Palestinians, only Sari Nuseibeh, to dismantle, they would have provoked a po- the PA’s representative in Jerusalem, has been litical battle that I am sure they would have ready to argue that giving up the right of re- won; and that victory would have been defini- turn is the necessary price of statehood. That tive; a gradual out-migration of settler families seems to me the right position, since the claim from the territories would have begun. Failing to return effectively reopens the 1947-1948 that, Palestinian radicals were able to convince conflict, which is not a helpful thing to do more many of their people that compromise was than half a century later. All the other refu- impossible; the conflict could have only one gees from the years immediately after World ending: either the Palestinians or the Israelis War Two, from Central Europe to Southeast would have to go. Asia, have been successfully resettled. Pales- The right responds by claiming that this tinians are still in camps because a decision was always the view of Palestinian radicals, was made, by their own leaders and by the ad- even before there were any settlements beyond jacent Arab states, to keep them there: this was the old border. And that is certainly true: the a way of insisting that Israel’s independence radicals object to Jewish sovereignty on any part war was not yet over. Today, however, if the of “Arab” territory; they have no interest in the Palestinians are to win their own independence green line. But the supporters of the settlers, war, they must acknowledge that Israel’s is al- especially the religious supporters, are radical ready won. Perhaps some number of refugees in exactly the same way. They also have no in- will return to Israel, some greater number to terest in the green line; they oppose Arab sov- Palestine (how many will depend on the pace ereignty on any part of the land that histori- of investment and economic development). cally or by divine gift “belongs” to the Jewish The rest must finally be resettled. It is time to people. The aim of the fourth war is to enforce address their actual misery rather than their this conception of belonging. symbolic claims. There will continue to be a I need to say something about the “right of Palestinian diaspora, just as there continues to return,” even though the refugees who claim be a Jewish diaspora. A clear statement by this right, since they mostly live beyond the Arafat acknowledging this simple truth would borders of old Palestine, are not directly in- represent a big step toward undeclaring the volved in any of the four wars. Still, they may first war. well be the crucial constituency for war num- ber one. Arafat’s insistence that return is a ow can we adjudicate among the four make-or-break issue must be directed in part wars? What kind of judgments can we at them; he has always drawn support from the Hmake about whom to support or op- Palestinian diaspora. “Return” was probably a pose, and when? A lot depends on the ques- crucial factor in the failure of the Camp David tions I have not answered: how many Israelis, negotiations in the late summer of 2000. Here, how many Palestinians, endorse each of the however, there is disagreement among the par- wars? Or, perhaps better, we might ask: what ticipants: was Arafat insisting on a symbolic would happen if each side won its own just acceptance of the right or on an actual return? war? If the Palestinians were able to create a Most Israelis choose to be literal-minded about state on their side of the green line, would they this, arguing that acceptance of the right would (or a sufficient majority of them) regard that open the way to the return of hundreds of thou- as the fulfillment of their national aspirations? sands of Palestinians, overwhelming the cur- Would they accept that kind of statehood as rent Jewish majority. Return, they claim, means the end of the conflict, or would the new state two Palestinian states. Most Palestinians argue sponsor an irredentist politics and secretly

DISSENT / Fall 2002 ■ 29 POLITICS ABROAD collude in an ongoing terrorist war? Arafat’s struction of the state of Israel, ahead of war behavior at Camp David and after doesn’t sug- number two, for statehood in the territories, gest a hopeful answer to these questions. Simi- because it appears that statehood could have larly, does the Israeli defense of statehood stop been achieved without any war at all. And I at the green line, or does the current put the war for Greater Israel after the defen- government’s conception of state security (or sive war for Israeli security because the previ- historical destiny) require territories beyond ous Israeli government was prepared to re- that, even far beyond that? Sharon’s behavior nounce territorial “greatness” entirely. But if the since coming to power doesn’t suggest a hope- Palestinians make a serious effort to repress ful answer to this question. the terrorist organizations, and if that effort What happened at Camp David is obvi- does not move the Sharon government to re- ously important in shaping our moral judg- think its position on the territories, then these ments of the two sides and the four wars, for orderings would have to be revised. In any case, it was Barak’s inability to conclude an agree- all four wars are now in progress: what can we ment there that sealed his fate and brought say about them? Sharon to power. Arafat refused to make peace and survived; Barak failed to make peace and he first war has to be defeated or de- was defeated (we can learn something about finitively renounced. Critics of Israel in the constituencies of the two men from this T Europe and at the United Nations have contrast). It is true that the state of the nego- made a terrible mistake, a moral as well as a tiations and the proposals on the table at Camp political mistake, in failing to acknowledge the David and Taba are still in dispute. The people necessity of this defeat. They have condemned who were at the table disagree among them- each successive terrorist attack on Israeli ci- selves; I have no private information to bring vilians, often in stronger language than Arafat to this argument. But it seems reasonably clear has used, but they have not recognized, let that each successive move in the negotiating alone condemned, the succession itself, the process brought the Palestinians nearer to attacks taken together, as an unjust war against statehood and sovereign control over something the very existence of Israel. There have been close to (and with each move closer to) the too many excuses for terrorism, too many ef- whole of the territories. The claim that the forts to “understand” terror as a response (ter- Palestinians were offered nothing more than a rible, of course) to the oppressiveness of the disconnected set of “Bantustans” seems to be occupation. It is likely, indeed, that some ter- false; an almost fully connected Palestine (the rorists are motivated by personal encounters West Bank and Gaza would still have been with the occupying forces or by a more gen- separate territories) was at least a possible and eral sense of the humiliation of being occupied. even a likely outcome of the ongoing negotia- But many other people have responded differ- tions, whatever was actually offered at this or ently to the same experience: there is an on- that moment. So the decision to walk away going argument among Palestinians (as there from the process and to begin, and then to was in the IRA and the Algerian FLN) about militarize, the second intifada is very hard to the usefulness and moral legitimacy of terror. understand—especially hard because we have Palestinian sympathizers on the European left to assume that Arafat knew that Palestinian and elsewhere should be very careful not to violence guaranteed the defeat of Barak’s cen- join this argument on the side of the terror- ter-left government. It isn’t a crazy conclusion ists. that he simply wasn’t interested in or, when Winning the second war, for the establish- the critical moment came, wasn’t prepared for ment of a Palestinian state, depends on losing a historic compromise and an end to the con- or renouncing the first. That dependence, it flict—even if the compromise brought with it seems to me, is morally clear; it hasn’t always a sovereign state on the West Bank and Gaza. been politically clear. If there ever is a foreign Hence the order of the four wars in my pre- intervention in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, sentation. I put war number one, for the de- one of its goals should be to clarify the rela-

30 ■ DISSENT / Fall 2002 POLITICS ABROAD tionship of the first and second wars (and also cupation of Palestinian cities and the practice of the third and fourth). The Palestinians can of collective punishment impose unjustifiable have a state only when they make it clear to hardships on the civilian population. In battle, the Israelis that the state they want is one that however, the Israeli army regularly accepted stands alongside Israel. At some point, a Pal- risks to its own men in order to reduce the risks estinian leader (it is unlikely to be Arafat) will that it imposed on the civilian population. The have to do what Anwar Sadat did in 1977: wel- contrast with the way the Russians fought in come Israel as a Middle Eastern neighbor. Grozny, to take the most recent example of Since Israel already exists, and Palestine large-scale urban warfare, is striking, and the doesn’t, one might expect the welcome to come crucial mark of that contrast is the very small from the other direction. Perhaps it should; at number of civilian casualties in the Palestin- some point, certainly, the welcome must be ian cities despite the fierceness of the fight- mutual. But the extent of the terror attacks now ing. But the legitimacy of Israeli self-defense requires the Palestinians to find some convinc- will finally be determined by the size of the ing way to repudiate the slogan that still ech- “self”—the extent of the territory—that is be- oes at their demonstrations: “Kill the Jews!” ing defended. The relation of the third and fourth wars is symmetrical to that of the first and second: war lmost everybody has a peace plan: one number four, for Greater Israel, must be lost peace for the four wars. And or definitively renounced if war number three, A everybody’s plan (leaving aside those for Israel itself, is to be won. The March-April Palestinians and Israelis who are fighting for 2002 attacks on West Bank cities, and the re- the whole thing) is more or less the same. turn of Israeli soldiers to those same cities in There have to be two states, divided by a bor- June-July, would be much easier to defend if der close to the green line, with changes mu- it was clear that the aim was not to maintain tually agreed upon. How to get there, and how the occupation but only to end or reduce the to make sure that both sides stay there once terrorist threat. In the absence of a Palestin- they get there—on these questions the dis- ian war on terror, an Israeli war is certainly jus- agreements are profound, between Palestinians tifiable. No state can fail to defend the lives and Israelis and also within both groups. Ex- of its citizens (that’s what states are for). But cept in the most general terms, I cannot ad- it was a morally necessary prelude to that war dress these questions. The general terms are that the Sharon government declare its politi- clear enough: Palestinians must renounce ter- cal commitment to end the occupation and rorism; Israelis must renounce occupation. In bring the settlers home (many of them, at least: fact, neither renunciation seems likely given the actual number will depend on a negotiated the existing leadership of the two sides. But agreement on final borders for the two states). there is a significant peace movement in Is- Perhaps UN officials would have condemned rael, and several political parties committed to the Israeli war anyway, whatever the renunciation, and among the Palestinians, government’s declared commitments, but the though no comparable movement exists, there condemnations could then have been seen as are at least small signs of opposition to the ter- acts of hostility—not to be confused with se- ror attacks. Perhaps whatever forward move- rious moral judgments. As it was, the fierce ment is possible must come independently argument about the massacre-that-never-hap- from the two sides and, first of all, from out- pened in Jenin obscured the real moral issue, side what we used to call the “ruling circles.” which was not the conduct of the battles but What follows is a hard argument, and I the political vision of the government that or- don’t make it with any confidence. I shall sim- dered them. The conduct of the battles seems ply repeat what some of my friends in the Is- to have conformed to the standards of just war raeli peace movement are now saying (I can’t theory, though the use of air power (for ex- speak for Palestinian oppositionists). They ar- ample, against the Gaza apartment house in gue that there is a way to defend Israeli citi- July) has not always done so. The current oc- zens and to signal, at the same time, a readi-

DISSENT / Fall 2002 ■ 31 POLITICS ABROAD ness to return to some modified version of the feated before any such force came in, because 1967 border. A unilateral withdrawal from iso- the border along which it was deployed would lated settlements in Gaza and the West Bank certainly exclude many of the existing settle- would instantly improve Israel’s defensive po- ments. But the Palestinian terrorists would not sition, shortening the lines that the army has have to be defeated, because they sit comfort- to patrol, and it would provoke the political ably on one side of the line. It is easy to pre- battle with the settlers that (as I have already dict what would happen next: terrorists will slip argued) should have been fought years ago. In through the UN’s multinational patrols and kill the near future, this withdrawal is more likely Israeli civilians. Then Israel will demand that to take shape as a leftist program than as a gov- UN soldiers go after the terrorist organizations, ernment policy, but it would still begin the nec- which, since that would involve a major mili- essary battle inside Israel, and it might encour- tary campaign, they would refuse to do. And age Palestinian oppositionists to begin a battle what then? An international force prepared to of their own: a serious effort to rein in the ter- use force (and accept casualties) might well rorist organizations so that the Israeli with- bring peace to the Middle East, but I cannot drawal, when it finally comes, does not gener- think of any country that is seriously prepared ate a wave of enthusiasm among the militants to commit its soldiers to actual battles. The and then a series of new attacks. That pros- UN’s record in Bosnia, Rwanda, and East pect is the obvious danger of any unilateralism, Timor is appalling. So, the only force likely to and it is a real danger, as the withdrawal from be deployed is one organized for peacekeep- Lebanon demonstrates. But the risk might still ing, not peace-making, and then its effective- be worth taking. ness will depend on the previous victory of Is- raeli and Palestinian moderates. Internation- ltimately, the partisans of wars two alization is no substitute for that victory, and it and three must defeat the partisans of is certainly doomed to failure if it follows upon Uwars one and four. The way to peace the victory of Israeli moderates only. begins with these two internal (but not neces- There is a form of international engage- sarily uncoordinated) battles. An American or ment, more ideological and political than mili- American/European-sponsored truce would tary, that could be genuinely helpful. It is criti- help the moderates on both sides, but, at the cally important to delegitimize the terrorists same time, the success of the truce depends and the settlers. But this has to be done si- on the strength of the moderates. Right now, multaneously and with some modicum of moral it is hard to judge whether the “reform” of the intelligence. The current boycott campaign Palestinian Authority would increase that against Israel, modeled on the 1980s campaign strength. All good things don’t come together against South Africa, aims at a very one-sided in political life: some of the most moderate delegitimation. And because the other side isn’t Palestinians are among the most corrupt, while led by an organization remotely like the Afri- the suicide bombers are no doubt idealists. can National Congress, or by a man remotely Democratic elections in Palestine may well like Nelson Mandela, the success of this cam- play into the hands of nationalist and religious paign would be disastrous. It would strengthen demagogues; this is a real possibility in Israel the forces fighting the first war. Only when too. Still, a more open politics among the Pal- European critics of Israel are prepared to tell estinians would allow public expressions of the Palestinians that there will be no help for support for a compromise peace, and that a PA complicit in terrorism, can they ask would be a major advance. American critics of the Palestinians to deliver Would it help to bring in an international a parallel message to the Israeli government. force, under UN auspices, to police the (tem- Intellectuals committed to internationalism porary or permanent) lines between Israel and can best serve their cause by explaining and Palestine? This is an increasingly popular idea, defending the two messages together. but it raises difficult questions about reciproc- I have tried to reflect the complexity of the ity. The Israeli settlers would have to be de- Israeli/Palestinian conflict. I cannot pretend to

32 ■ DISSENT / Fall 2002 POLITICS ABROAD perfect objectivity. The Israeli nationalist right, States, have failed to do that, producing instead even the religious right, is a familiar enemy for ideological caricatures of the conflict. The cari- me, whereas the ideology of death and martyr- catures would be easy to ridicule, if they did dom endorsed by so many Palestinians today not have such deadly effects. For they encour- is alien; I don’t understand it. So perhaps some- age Palestinians and Israelis to fight the first one else could provide a more adequate ac- and fourth wars. Those of us who watch and count of the four wars. What is crucial is to worry about the Middle East have at least an acknowledge the four. Most commentators, obligation not to do that. • especially on the European left, but also on the Jewish and Christian right here in the United Michael Walzer is co-editor of Dissent. In Search of Europe’s Borders The Politics of Migration in the European Union

Seyla Benhabib Revolution. Recent developments within the European Union—the adoption of a common currency by twelve of the fifteen member coun- tries and the launching in February 2002 of a n March 11, 1882, the great French year-long European constitutional conven- scholar Ernest Renan gave a lecture tion—have given “Euro-federalists” new hope Owith the provocative title, “What is a and energy. Starting from a coal and steel con- Nation?”* Still recovering from the shock of sortium among Germany, France, the Benelux the defeat of France by Prussia in the Franco- countries, and Italy in 1951, the EU currently Prussian War of 1871, Renan, like many lib- encompasses 370 million residents in fifteen eral nationalists before and after him, walked member countries. Despite occasional setbacks a thin line between the affirmation of the in- (Denmark’s veto of the Maastricht Treaty, for dividual nation, which he described as “a soul, example) and despite the more serious discord a spiritual principle,” and the celebration of the caused by the election of right-wing govern- peaceful plurality of nations. For Renan, na- ments in Austria, Italy, Denmark, and the tions were not eternal: they emerged through Netherlands, most Euroskeptics have to admit suffering and struggle in the past; they were that the EU is moving inexorably forward. The sustained by the will to live together in the fu- question no longer is “whether the EU?” but ture. Nations had their beginning and their “whither the EU?” end. One day, he prophesied, “A European con- By 2003, the EU intends to expand its cur- federation will probably replace them. But such rent membership to twenty-one countries, in- is not the law of the century in which we are cluding the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Poland, living.” Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia. An ambitious Twice in the twentieth century nationalist second expansion by 2007 is intended to bring wars convulsed Europe and led to worldwide in Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, the carnage; the dream of a European confedera- Slovak Republic, and Malta. Since the tion that would end such wars has inspired Eu- Copenhagen accords of 1993, conditions for ropean intellectuals at least since the Napole- admission to full membership have been de- onic conquests in the aftermath of the French fined very broadly to include (1) a demonstra- tion of a country’s commitment to functioning *Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Nation and Narra- democratic institutions, human rights, the rule tion, ed. by Homi Bhabha (Routledge, 1990), pp. 8-23. of law, and respect for and protection of mi-

DISSENT / Fall 2002 ■ 33