DOCSLIB.ORG

Zarif Urges Europe to Grasp 'Last Chance' to Salvage

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Zarif Urges Europe to Grasp 'Last Chance' to Salvage 2 12 Gov’t spokesman: Two-time Oscar winner Non-accession to FATF Farhadi’s ‘A Hero’ negatively affected trade shooting done Number 6645 ● Wednesday December 23, 2020 ● Dey 3, 1399 ● Jamadi al-Awwal 8, 1442 ● Price 20,000 Rials ● 12 Pages ● www.irandailyonline.ir ● newspaper.irandaily.ir Iran resolved to stop Zarif urges Europe to grasp US destabilizing acts ‘last chance’ to salvage nuclear deal in West Asia Inclusive political solution best guarantee China, Russia FMs: US should rejoin JCPOA unconditionally for lasting peace in Afghanistan: Iran FM Political Desk They also expressed their readiness to “positively ad- from the JCPOA and its “maximum pressure” policy on the dress” the possible return of the United States to the accord Islamic Republic are the root causes of challenges pertain- oreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on Monday in a “joint effort”. ing to Iran’s nuclear program, Press TV wrote. called on the European signatories to the 2015 Iran Outgoing US President Donald Trump stepped out of the Wang added that the Iran nuclear situation has come to a Fnuclear deal not to miss the “last chance” for saving deal unilaterally in 2018 and reinstated tough sanctions on critical juncture as Biden has pledged to rejoin the JCPOA, the multilateral pact. Iran. But his successor President-elect Joe Biden has prom- but Washington has been at the same time mounting more “Last chance for E3/EU to save the JCPOA,” Zarif ised to rejoin the accord, which was negotiated while he pressure on Tehran. tweeted after a videoconference at which foreign ministers was vice president, and seek diplomacy with Iran. He also called on Iran to fully resume its nuclear commit- of Iran, France, Britain, Germany, Russia and China as well In his tweets, Zarif noted that “Iran-EU 2014-2019 trade ments as per the JCPOA and proposed that the deal’s signa- as the European Union’s foreign policy chief discussed the data proves E3/EU have gravely breached their JCPOA ob- tories hold consultations in this regard as soon as possible future of the nuclear agreement – known as the Joint Com- ligations”. so as to start the process of US returning to the agreement. prehensive Plan of Action. During the virtual meeting, the JCPOA parties “agreed to continue dialogue to ensure full JCPOA implementation by all sides”, a joint statement released by the EU said. IRNA Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani (L) holds talks with Afghan security official Hamdullah Mohib in Tehran on Iran welcomes Dec. 22, 2020. Secretary of Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani said on Tuesday Iran is resolved to stop the United States and its allies from Russian investors destabilizing the region and to eventually force a complete US military withdrawal. Speaking at a meeting with Afghan president’s National Security as Zanganeh ends Adviser Hamdullah Mohib in Tehran on Tuesday, Shamkhani said that the US acts of insecurity in the West Asia region reached their peak Moscow visit with the “cowardly” assassination of top Iranian and Iraqi anti-terror commanders, Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Iran’s Minister of Oil Bijan Namdar Zangeneh called “The Islamic Republic of Iran is resolved to prevent the continua- Russia a “strategic partner” during a visit to Moscow tion of the terrorist, tension-fueling and destabilizing acts of the United and invited Russian companies to invest in the Is- States and its stooges and make them leave the region by exacting a lamic Republic. severe revenge against those who ordered and perpetrated a crime that “We welcome the investment of Russian com- will go down in history,” he added, according to Press TV. panies in the required sectors of the oil industry” in US President Donald Trump ordered a fatal strike on General Solei- Iran, Zanganeh said after meeting Russia’s Deputy mani upon his arrival in Baghdad International Airport on January 3 at Prime Minister Alexander Novak and new Energy the invitation of the Iraqi government. Minister Nicolai Shulginov, Press TV reported. The attack also killed Muhandis, the second-in-command of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), as well as eight other Iranian and Iraqi people. AFP The two commanders were highly popular because of the key role German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (L), Britain’s Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab (C) and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves they played in eliminating the US-sponsored Daesh terrorist group in le Drian pose for a photograph in Kent County, Britain, on Sept. 10, 2020. the region, particularly in Iraq and Syria. Elsewhere in his remarks, Shamkhani referred to the threats facing “E3 share the blame with US for irreparable harm to Ira- The Chinese foreign minister said disputes related to the both Iran and Afghanistan and their common interests, especially the nians,” he pointed out, referring to the European members JCPOA fulfillment should be resolved fairly and objective- need to stop the spread of terrorism and to restore stability and security of the JCPOA. ly, adding that dialogue and cooperation are needed to sup- in the region. Iran’s top diplomat said they “collectively decided to ex- port the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its Warning of increased Daesh activity in Afghanistan and the dangers clude” issues related to the Middle East. verification of Iran’s nuclear activities and handle properly it posed to regional states, he called for collective vigilance and coop- “All must return to effective JCPOA compliance,” Zarif the UN Security Council’s concerns about the issue. eration to fully eliminate “the cancerous tumor.” SHANA said, stressing that renegotiation of the nuclear deal is “out Emphasizing that the JCPAO cannot solve all problems, Iran’s security chief also highlighted Tehran’s principal policy of Iran’s Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh (R) holds of question”. he warned that linking regional security issues directly to strengthening good neighborliness. talks with Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak The deal promises Iran economic incentives in exchange the accord is setting a self-imposed roadblock in the process “Afghanistan has a special place in Iran’s foreign policy due to nu- (2nd L) in Moscow, Russia, on Dec. 21, 2020. for curbs on its nuclear program, but with the reinstatement of restoring the deal’s implementation. merous commonalities that bond the two nations,” he said. of American sanctions, the other member nations failed to Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the US Shamkhani stressed Iran’s firm support for the legitimate govern- Novak said a broad range of trade and economic protect Iran. should not put forward any preconditions for its return ment of Afghanistan, underlining the need for enhanced Tehran-Kabul cooperation matters is “successfully explored be- A year after Trump’s “unlawful withdrawal and bla- to the JCPOA. cooperation and interaction in political, economic and security areas. tween our countries”. tant E3 breaches”, Iran took several steps away from the “We believe that the US return to the JCPOA should be He also expressed his satisfaction with the opening of the Khaf- “Although this year has become a tough challenge JCPOA in retaliation. without any preconditions. Our partners and we are ready Herat railroad and hoped that the project could play an effective role in for the whole global community, economic relations Zarif said Iran “will rapidly reverse remedial measures” for meaningful work in this area, and we are ready to help promoting bilateral relations and improving the welfare of the Afghan between Russia and Iran do not lose prior dynamics when “US/E3 perform their duties”. the Americans to step on the path of correction. This is in people. but become more active and meaningful instead,” he He said the Iranian people “MUST feel the effects of our shared interest,” Lavrov added. The historic joint railway project – which links eastern Iran to west- said. sanctions lifting”. Lavrov said Russia has taken note of Iran’s statements, ern Afghanistan – was inaugurated on December 10, with presidents When Novak visited Iran in June 2019 with a del- which assert that the country is ready to return to full adher- of the two neighboring countries delivering remarks through video- egation of 120 businesspeople, including representa- No preconditions ence to the JCPOA as soon as the US does the same. conference and expressing hope it would enhance trade links across the tives of private and public companies, the two sides “We hope that not only the current members of the region. said they had signed a dozen cooperation agreements Addressing the online meeting, the foreign ministers of JCPOA, but Washington as well, take note of this signal. Mohib voiced the readiness of the Afghan government and nation to covering energy, railway, agriculture, pharmaceuti- China and Russia said the US should return to the JCPOA Strict adherence to the UN Security Council Resolution boost cooperation with Iran, which he described as his second home. cals and tourism. “unconditionally” at an early date and lift sanctions against 2231 by the American side is not a matter of choice, it is He appreciated the unwavering support and hospitality Iran has of- Continued on Page 4 Iran as well as third-party entities and individuals. an obligation of any state stipulated in Article 25 of the UN fered to the Afghan people over the past 40 years. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said US withdrawal Charter,” the Russian foreign minister stated. Continued on Page 2 Britain, stuck in COVID-19 isolation, strives to lift France’s freight ban The United Kingdom was stuck in COVID-19 isolation on freight by Wednesday. and more than 67,000 in Britain.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
    The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • Country Report Iran March 2017
    _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Country Report Iran Generated on November 13th 2017 Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square London E14 4QW United Kingdom _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For 60 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square The Economist Group London 750 Third Avenue E14 4QW 5th Floor United Kingdom New York, NY 10017, US Tel: +44 (0) 20 7576 8181 Tel: +1 212 541 0500 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7576 8476 Fax: +1 212 586 0248 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Hong Kong Geneva The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 1301 Cityplaza Four Rue de l’Athénée 32 12 Taikoo Wan Road 1206 Geneva Taikoo Shing Switzerland Hong Kong Tel: +852 2585 3888 Tel: +41 22 566 24 70 Fax: +852 2802 7638 Fax: +41 22 346 93 47 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] This report can be accessed electronically as soon as it is published by visiting store.eiu.com or by contacting a local sales representative.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Case File (April 2021)
    IRAN CASE FILE April 2021 RASANAH International Institute for Iranian Studies, Al-Takhassusi St. Sahafah, Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 Contact us [email protected] +966112166696 Executive Summary .....................................................................................4 Internal Affairs ........................................................................................... 7 The Ideological File .............................................................................................8 1. Women and the “Political Man” ............................................................................... 8 2. Khatami and the Position of Women ......................................................................10 The Political File ............................................................................................... 12 1. The Most Notable Highlights of the Leaked Interview .............................................12 2. Consequences and Reactions .................................................................................13 3. The Position of the Iranian President and Foreign Ministry on the Interview ..........14 4. The Implications of Leaking the Interview at This Time..........................................15 The Economic File ............................................................................................. 16 1. Bitcoin’s Genesis Globally and the Start of Its Use in Iran ........................................16 2. The Importance of Bitcoin for Iran
    [Show full text]
  • Diplomatic Unease Casts Shadow on Jordan-Iran Ties
    16 April 23, 2017 News & Analysis Iran Diplomatic unease casts shadow on Jordan-Iran ties The Arab Weekly staff “It is advisable that the Jordanian king take a passing look first at the statistics released about the Jorda- London nian terrorists joining [the Islamic State] and other blood-spilling and iplomatic relations be- ignorant groups and then make tween Jordan and Iran an opinion on Iran which is on the are going through a pe- frontline of the fight against terror- riod of unease following ism and extremism and striving to the trading of insults be- strengthen security in the region,” Dtween Amman and Tehran. Ghasemi said. The Jordanian Foreign Ministry Jordan’s Foreign Ministry said said it summoned Iranian Ambas- Ghasemi’s “unacceptable” com- sador to Amman Mujtaba Fardousi ments were “a failed attempt to Bour to deliver a “strongly worded misrepresent the central role the protest.” kingdom plays in supporting re- The protest was against a state- gional security and stability and ment from Iranian Foreign Minis- fighting terrorism.” try spokesman Bahram Ghasemi branding comments Jordanian King King Abdullah said Abdullah II made to the Washington Iran was involved in Post as “silly and careless.” “strategic problems” King Abdullah told the American in the region. newspaper that Iran was involved in “strategic problems” in the re- gion. “There is an attempt to forge a Former Jordanian Ambassador to geographic link between Iran, Iraq, Tehran Bassam al-Amoush told the Syria and Hezbollah/Lebanon,” he website AlkhaleejOnline.net that said. the “Iranian transgression against He added that Iran’s Islamic Revo- Jordan needed a strong response, lutionary Guards Corps troops were especially since the proximity of within 70km of Jordan’s border and the Iranians from the Jordanian- Better days.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Under Khatami
    IRAN UNDER KHATAMI A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment Patrick Clawson Michael Eisenstadt Eliyahu Kanovsky David Menashri A Washington Institute Monograph THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, re- cording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 1998 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 1998 in the United States of America by the Washing- ton Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Iran under Khatami: a political, economic, and military assess- ment / Patrick L. Clawson ... [et al.]. p. cm. ISBN 0-944029-27-2 (pbk.) 1. Iran—Politics and government—1997- 2. Khatami, Muhammad. 3. Iran—Economic conditions—1997- 4. Iran—Foreign relations—1997- 5. Iran—Military policy. I. Clawson, Patrick, 1951- . DS318.9.I73 1998 955.05'43—dc21 98-39718 CIP Cover design by Monica Neal Hertzman. Cover image AFP Photo/ Jamshid Bairami/Corbis. CONTENTS Contributors v Preface vii 1 The Khatami Paradox Patrick Clawson 1 2 Whither Iranian Politics? The Khatami Factor David Menashri 13 3 Iran's Sick Economy Prospects for Change under Khatami Eliyahu Kanovsky 53 4 The Military Dimension Michael Eisenstadt 71 5 Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Policy Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt 99 CONTRIBUTORS Patrick Clawson is director for research at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Nuclear Ambitions From
    IDENTITY AND LEGITIMACY: IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS FROM NON- TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES Pupak Mohebali Doctor of Philosophy University of York Politics June 2017 Abstract This thesis examines the impact of Iranian elites’ conceptions of national identity on decisions affecting Iran's nuclear programme and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations. “Why has the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle been portrayed as a unifying symbol of national identity in Iran, especially since 2002 following the revelation of clandestine nuclear activities”? This is the key research question that explores the Iranian political elites’ perspectives on nuclear policy actions. My main empirical data is elite interviews. Another valuable source of empirical data is a discourse analysis of Iranian leaders’ statements on various aspects of the nuclear programme. The major focus of the thesis is how the discourses of Iranian national identity have been influential in nuclear decision-making among the national elites. In this thesis, I examine Iranian national identity components, including Persian nationalism, Shia Islamic identity, Islamic Revolutionary ideology, and modernity and technological advancement. Traditional rationalist IR approaches, such as realism fail to explain how effective national identity is in the context of foreign policy decision-making. I thus discuss the connection between national identity, prestige and bargaining leverage using a social constructivist approach. According to constructivism, states’ cultures and identities are not established realities, but the outcomes of historical and social processes. The Iranian nuclear programme has a symbolic nature that mingles with socially constructed values. There is the need to look at Iran’s nuclear intentions not necessarily through the lens of a nuclear weapons programme, but rather through the regime’s overall nuclear aspirations.
    [Show full text]
  • Menas Associates Ltd Cannot Ensure Against Orbeheld Disclaimer Publisher
    Menas Iran Strategic Focus 02 /14 >>> Politically independent monthly news and analysis of strategic developments in Iran 02 Slow, slow, quick quick slow: The path to a · Volume 10 · Number· Volume 10 comprehensive deal 014 2 On 18 February the negotiating teams of Iran implementation of the interim deal began on 20 the future of the Arak heavy water reactor, the (AEOI) director Ali Akbar Salehi has already and the P5+1 (the United States, United King- January and has proceeded smoothly. Western enrichment site in Fordo, and the degree of Inter- stated that Tehran is willing to make adjust- February dom, Russia, France, and China plus Germany) governments have introduced some sanctions national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervi- ments to reduce concerns about its utilisation. started a new round of talks in Vienna to final- relief, and Iran is reconfiguring some of the com- sion over the programme. Evidently, compromises ise the agenda for negotiations towards a com- ponents of its nuclear programme, in particular are possible in all these areas. As Foreign Minister The Fordo site was originally designed to enrich prehensive nuclear deal. reducing the level of uranium enrichment to Mohammad Javad Zarif remarked, making sure uranium to 20 per cent and has been reconfig- below 5 per cent. that the nuclear programme remains peaceful is ured to reduce that to below 5 per cent. West- This round of negotiations is expected to take also an Iranian objective. ern governments insist that the site should be 6 to 12 months. Its objective is clear: based on Although the Iranian delegation believes that a shut down, however, and that scenario is unac- the interim deal signed on 24 November 2013, comprehensive agreement is achievable within Iran currently has 19,000 centrifuges, 9,000 of ceptable to Iran.
    [Show full text]
  • Tightening the Reins How Khamenei Makes Decisions
    MEHDI KHALAJI TIGHTENING THE REINS HOW KHAMENEI MAKES DECISIONS MEHDI KHALAJI TIGHTENING THE REINS HOW KHAMENEI MAKES DECISIONS POLICY FOCUS 126 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 126 | March 2014 The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including pho- tocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2014 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei holds a weapon as he speaks at the University of Tehran. (Reuters/Raheb Homavandi). Design: 1000 Colors CONTENTS Executive Summary | V 1. Introduction | 1 2. Life and Thought of the Leader | 7 3. Khamenei’s Values | 15 4. Khamenei’s Advisors | 20 5. Khamenei vs the Clergy | 27 6. Khamenei vs the President | 34 7. Khamenei vs Political Institutions | 44 8. Khamenei’s Relationship with the IRGC | 52 9. Conclusion | 61 Appendix: Profile of Hassan Rouhani | 65 About the Author | 72 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EVEN UNDER ITS MOST DESPOTIC REGIMES , modern Iran has long been governed with some degree of consensus among elite factions. Leaders have conceded to or co-opted rivals when necessary to maintain their grip on power, and the current regime is no excep- tion.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Presidential Elections: Results and Implications
    Position Paper Iran’s Presidential Elections: Results and Implications 24 June. 2021 Contents Introduction ......................................................... 3 I- Iran’s Presidential Election and Crisis Dimensions .......................................................... 3 II- Iran’s Authoritarian “Engineered” Presidential Election and Priorities of Electoral Participation ........................................................ 5 III- The Results and Implications of the Election ............................................................... 7 IV- The Consequences of Electing Raisi ......... 10 Introduction: Under internal and external pressures, Iran’s political system held its presidential elections on June 18, 2021. The seemingly already determined result showed that “hardline” cleric Ebra- him Raisi won the election. This election was of particular im- portance due to the developments taking place inside and outside Iran. Therefore, its result will have an important impact on the overall situation whether on Iranians at home or on Iran’s foreign relations. This report will highlight the most important develop- ments regarding the election, its results and its implications inside and outside Iran. I- Iran’s Presidential Election and Crisis Dimensions The presidential election took place under critical internal condi- tions as the country continues to suffer from isolation and siege in the aftermath of US sanctions and the Rouhani government’s failure to fulfill its promises. These critical conditions have led to competition
    [Show full text]
  • Viral Tragedy in the Islamic Republic of Iran By-Apurbaa Sengupta, Research Intern, AIDIA 1 August 2020
    Viral tragedy in the Islamic Republic of Iran By-Apurbaa Sengupta, Research Intern, AIDIA 1 August 2020 Introduction: The spread of a virus, as fatal as the Coronavirus, constitutes an enormous threat to mankind anywhere in the world. The beginning of the new decade observed the entire world plunge into an extraordinary global public health crisis, the first of its kind in centuries. A respiratory disease, popularised worldwide as the Coronavirus broke out from the Huanan Seafood Market in the Chinese province of Wuhan and eventually trickled into every corner of the world1. The politically instable and disturbed region, such as the Middle East was not an exception. Within two months of the viral outbreak, the Islamic Republic of Iran acquired the second position after China, in terms of the worst affected countries and emerged as an epicentre of the epidemic2. The country which had for so long been debilitated by international sanctions and economic fallouts now wrestled to cope with a health emergency. What further exacerbated the plight of Iranians was a belated, haphazard government response to counter the looming threat and politicisation of the invisible enemy by leaders to gain political dividends. The initial outbreak of the global infection: The location of Iran is several thousand kilometres away from the original epicentre of the global infection. How then did the invisible global enemy reach the Islamic Republic? Iran reported its first confirmed case of Coronavirus on February 19, 20203. Reports from the authorities suggest that the widening outbreak began in the holy city of Qom and the authorities acknowledged the presence of the virus only after the city reported two COVID deaths.
    [Show full text]
  • Leadership Divided? Nima Gerami
    The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate LEADERSHIP DIVIDED? NIMA GERAMI LEADERSHIP DIVIDED? The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate NIMA GERAMI The Washington Institute for Near East Policy www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 134 | February 2014 The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2014 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Tehran newspaper headlines following signing of the Joint Plan of Action in Geneva. Design: 1000 Colors Contents Acknowledgments | v Executive Summary | vii 1. Introduction | 1 2. Limits on Iran’s Nuclear Debate: Secrecy and Self-Censorship | 3 3. Contextualizing Nuclear Decisionmaking: The Key Stakeholders | 9 4. The Political Landscape: Elite Factionalism and the Nuclear Debate | 19 5. Critical Junctures: Internal Divisions and Nuclear Policy Shifts | 31 6. Conclusion: Lessons Learned | 40 About the Author | 42 Figures Fig 1. Overview of Nuclear Decisionmaking in Iran | 11 Table 1. Formal Members of the Supreme National Security Council | 12 Acknowledgments I would like to express my gratitude to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, particularly Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt, and Mehdi Khalaji, for their encouragement, insights, and support during the preparation of this study.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy
    Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs August 14, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048 Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran’s ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve some of the region’s several conflicts. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran’s nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely peaceful purposes. The international pressure contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran’s international isolation.
    [Show full text]