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'Equality, Women and Animals' Reading 3 ‘Equality, Women and Animals’ Mary Midgley In Animals and Why They Matter, Midgley sets the topic of our moral relations with animals in the wider context of some central themes in the history of political and general philosophy, and biological and evolutionary considerations. In the chapters from which these extracts are taken,* she explores the ways in which speciesism is like racism and sexism in failing to extend the principle of equality ‘across the species-barrier’. She surveys some of the history of our thoughts about equality, illustrating the ways in which, in the past, our forebears have always overlooked the justifiable claims of some under-privileged group and claims that we are now making the same mistake regarding animals. 1 Equality and outer darkness 1.1 Can animals be equal? It is not till the last decade that philosophers have seriously and persistently extended the concept of equality, and that of basic natural rights, to animals. But they have done it now. ‘All animals are equal... No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering – in so far as rough comparisonscanbemade– of anyother being’ (Peter Singer). And on rights, ‘Within an absolute context it is difficult to see how anyof us, men or beasts, have any rights at all; and we certainly therefore have no rights upon them. In less absolute terms, any principle, or prince, that accords rights to the weak of our own species must also accord them to animals’ (Stephen Clark). Again – ‘The right not to be tortured, then, is shared by all animals that suffer pain; it is not a distinctively human right at all,’and‘Whatever rationale is providedfor granting humans a right to liberty, it seems that a relevantly similar one is available in the case of at least some other species of animals’ (James Rachels). Of course not all 233 HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS philosophers agree, but the disagreement has so far focused mainly on the proper use of words like rights and equality rather than on defending traditional dismissive habits of thought and practice as a whole. Moreover the interesting term speciesism has been coined to describe discrimination against non-humans, thereby branding it as an offence against equality, parallel to racism, sexism, ageism and the like. Isolated writers had said these things before, but this is the first large-scale attempt to extend liberal concepts to the borders of sentience. Historically, this movement was made possible by the other liberation movements of the sixties, converging with the increasing interest in animals... an interest which has for the first time begun to publicize the relevant facts widely. Books and films about wild life have told people something about the complexities of animal existence and its likenesses to human existence, and also about the widespread threats of extinction, which are themselves a new feature of our age, never considered in traditional thought. At the same time, books and films about such things as factory farming have been able, though with much more difficulty, to spread some information about how animals are actually treated within our civilization. And again, many of the practices revealed are themselves new; tradition is dumb on how to regard them. The discrepancy revealed between ideals and practice is bound to bring into play concepts like equality and natural rights. This move, however, is not just a historical accident. Logically, these concepts demand this use as soon as it is opento them, because they haveno built-in limit. Theyare essentially tools for widening concern, and concern, though it may attenuate with distance, is certainly possible in principle towards anything which we suppose to feel. Normally prejudice restricts it, but these concepts exist to break down prejudice, as they have repeatedly done. They are essentially destructive. Along with notions like liberty and fraternity, they work to dissolve the screens of callous habit and reveal hidden injustice. All these concepts are vague. All must be supplemented, once their work of revelation is done, by other, moredetailed and discriminating ideas.But vague though they are, they are very powerful. They melt away the confused excuses given by custom, appealing from local laws and usage to the deeper standards required for change. Everybody who wants reform must sometimes use such concepts, but perhaps all those who do so are sometimes appalled at what they reveal, and find themselves retreating in alarm behind some ill-chosen bush. We must shortlyglanceattherecordoftheseevasionsinthecaseofthe clusterof liberal, French-revolutionary concepts which are our present business. Repeatedly, evenpeoplewhohaveusedthemwellhavesetupcrudebarriers to halt them at various frontiers, notably those of race and sex – barriers which have 234 READING 3 ‘EQUALITY, WOMEN AND ANIMALS’ crumbled scandalously as soon as they were examined. The dialectical road- block so far thrown up at the species-barrier is not less crude than these were, but far more so, because it has received even less attention. Anyone hoping to reinforce it will have to do the job over again from scratch. This does not mean that there is nothing wrong with the liberal concepts themselves. They are notoriouslyobscure. It may well be sensible to halt them for interpretation and replacement long before they reach the species-barrier. But if one does not do this – if one puts complete confidence in notions like equality and natural rights – one lies open to Peter Singer’s challenge. His opening chapter, indeed, is directed specially to egalitarians; it has the fighting title ‘All Animals are Equal, or Why Supporters of Liberation for Blacks and Women Should Support Animal Liberation Too’. This does not mean, however, that conservatives on these matters can ignore the whole business. In our civilization, everyone who thinks at all has an egalitarian element in his thinking. We all need to clear up these concepts. 1.2 The problem of extent What, firstly, about equality? This is a rather abstract ideal, distinguished from most others by needing a great deal of background before it can be applied. Who is to be made equal to whom, and inwhat respect? Historically, the answers given have mostlyconcerned rather narrowgroups. The ordinary citizens of a particular state – often a small one, such as Athens or Rome – demand to share certain powers of a still smaller group, such as their nobility, on the ground that they are all already equally citizens. The formula needed is something like ‘let those who are already equal in respect x be, as is fitting, equal also in respect y’. Outsiders, such as slaves, foreigners and women, who are currently not equal in respect x, cannot benefit from this kind of argument. It requires a limited public. Thenotionofequalityisatoolfor rectifying injusticeswithin a given group, not for widening that group or deciding how it ought to treat those outside it. Asisoftennecessaryfor reform,itworksonalimitedscale. Those working for equality take a certain group (such as that of Athenian citizens) for granted, andaskinwhatwaysthenatureofthatgroupdictatesthatits members should be equal.This question iswellexpressedbysocial-contract language: what are itsmembersherefor?whydidtheyformit?what,merelybybelonging to it, do theyagree to do? Aswe shall see, answers to this vary. But this variation does notaffectthemainpoint–namely,thatthebindingprinciple of the group tends to emerge as the basis of political obligation, and is easily extended to account for all obligation. This is no accident, for it is a central purpose of social- contract thinking to demolish a certain set of non-contractual moral principles 235 HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS – namely, those which tell citizens to obey their betters regardless of their own choice and interest. It demolishes these by applying a strong reducing agent – egoism. It asks, ‘Why should I obey the government?’ and accepts only answers delivered in terms of self-interest. There is much to be said for this. But when the same process is applied to other sorts of moral principle, results are much less satisfactory. Problems concerning the relations of the group to those outside it, and possibilities of widening the group, as well as relations within the group itself which are not considered as part of its egoistic binding principle, become insoluble. The notion of moral agents as equal, standard units within a contractual circle which constitutes the whole of morality is a blind and limited one. Contract has its place in morality, not vice versa. It may seem strange and paradoxical to suggest that the notion of equality has these self-defeating properties. We will look in a moment at instances which show the paradox in action. It is true, of course, that the snags are not part of the concept itself. They belong to its supporting apparatus. But since some apparatus of this kind seems needed to bring it into operation, it is very hard to avoid them. The concept itself, as I just remarked, is very abstract, and can in principle be extended to anylimit. In theory, when slaves or the like are noticed, the ‘equal’ group can always be extended to include them. But in practice two things make this very hard. One is simply the well-known difficulty about realistic political objectives. It is hard enough already to persuadethenobilitytotreatallcitizensas,insomeparticular respect, equal. If wetryatthesametimetoincludeslavesinthe argument,wemay well destroy our chances. Reforming movements which won’t set limited objectives simply fail; they are not serious. So the ‘equal’ group comes to be defined as, for instance, that offree citizens, and habit perpetuates this restriction even when itisnolonger needed.Theother trouble,whichgoesdeeperand will occupy us longer, comes from invoking egoism as the bond which is to keep the equal units together. The private self-interest of group members is often best served by keeping the group small.
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