The Philippine-US Relations: Living or Leaving the Bandung Spirit?

The Philippine-US Relations: Living or Leaving the Bandung Spirit?

Anna Rhodora Solar & John Matthew Poblete De La Salle–College of Saint Benilde

Abstract The had its own share of colonial past. Just as other Asian and African countries which were under the Western colonizers, the Philippines partook of the momentous event that proposed an alternative to the world order dominated by superpowers—the Bandung Conference. The principles collectively known as Bandung Spirit were embraced by the Philippines and had a clear understanding of its symbolic significance. Yet such understanding of these principles was coupled with compromises on the Philippines relations with the . Over the decades, the Philippines had to do a balancing act between its being sovereign, independent state and its recognition of the relevance of its past colonial master—the US. Hence, this raises the question of whether the Philippines is living or leaving the Bandung Spirit. Specifically, this paper assesses whether the Philippines still upholds the same Bandung Spirit in its traditional form or has it given a contemporary understanding of it. The paper argues that the Philippine-US relations remain to be an evident display of US presence in albeit redefined to blend with the Bandung Spirit.

Keywords: Bandung Conference, Bandung spirit, Philippine foreign policy, the Philippines-US relations, bilateralism, anti-Colonialism, political independence, economic development

Abstrak Filipina memiliki bagiannya tersendiri pada masa colonial. Sama seperti negara-negara Asia dan Afrika lainnya yang berada di bawah koloni Barat, Filipina mengambil bagian dalam peristiwa sangat penting yang memberikan alternatif pada tatanan dunia yang didominasi oleh kekuatan super—Konferensi Bandung. Prinsip-prinsip kolektif yang dikenal sebagai Semangat Bandung dianut oleh Filipina dan dipahami signifikansi simboliknya. Namun pemahaman prinsip-prinsip ini juga dibarengi dengan kompromi hubungan Filipina dengan Amerika Serikat. Selama beberapa dekade, Filipina harus melakukan aksi penyeimbang antara dirinya yang merdeka, negara independen dan dirinya yang mengakui relevansi penjajah masa lalunya—AS. Oleh karenanya, hal ini memunculkan pertanyaan apakah Filipina sedang hidup dengan cara Semangat Bandung atau meninggalkan Semangat Bandung. Secara spesifik, tulisan ini mengaji apakah Filipina masih menjunjung Semangat Bandung yang sama dengan bentuk tradisionalnya ataukah ia telah memberikan pemahaman kontemporer atas Semangat Bandung ini. Tulisan ini memiliki argumen bahwa hubungan Filipina-AS masih menjadi bukti kuat keberadaan AS di Asia Tenggara meski telah didefinisikan ulang untuk bercampur dengan Semangat Bandung.

Kata Kunci: Konferensi Bandung, semangat Bandung, kebijakan luar negeri Filipina, hubungan Filipina- AS, bilateralisme, anti-kolonialisme, kemerdekaan politik, pembangunan ekonomi.

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Introduction address its national interests while keeping its The Bandung Spirit takes its name from the commitment to the ideals of the Bandung Bandung Conference, formally known as the Conference. Asian-African Conference, which was held in the town of Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. The The Bandung Spirit: Redefining the conference reflected the dissatisfaction of Colonizer-Colony Relations governments such as Indonesia, Burma The Bandung Spirit embodies core principles (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India and which include anti-colonialism, political Pakistan on the slow pace of in freedom and state-guided economic the early 1950s. It was an opportunity for development. Externally, it safeguards state countries to express their opposition to from possible interference of hegemonic colonialism (Berger, 2004, p. 48). country. Internally, it allows state to steer its The final communique of the development free from external pressure. conference condemned all manifestations of Hence, it reflects both external and internal colonialism. The proceeding ended with a call environment by which state defines its national for increased technical and cultural individuality. cooperation among governments in The creation of foreign policy is an attendance; the establishment of an economic assertion of national individuality. It provides development fund to be operated by the United former colony full control of its internal affairs Nations; increased support for human rights while providing safeguard from possible and the self-determination of people and interference of former colonial master. In nations; and negotiations to reduce the effect, it redefines the relationship between the building and stockpiling of nuclear weapons former colonizer and its colony resulting to (Abdulgani, 1964, p. 98-101). equal partnership instead of predomination. To this day, the spirit of Asian-African This section assesses the extent to which solidarity remains. Although there is no Philippine foreign policy is consistent with the common cultural heritage among Asia and Bandung Spirit. It argues that Philippine African nations, they have certain attitude in foreign policy remains broadly infused with the common, that is abhorrence to colonialism and Bandung Spirit while remains to be engaged imperialism; and determination to keep at all with its former colonizer–the US. times mutual respect, mutual understanding, and mutual benefit among themselves Conceptual Framework: The Dual Actor (Abdulgani, 1963). This single force that binds Model them is known as the Bandung Spirit. Each nation, however, had its own Figure 1 The Dual Actor Model interpretation and its own reading of the implication of the Bandung Spirit. This paper therefore, analyses the Bandung Spirit in light of the Philippines’ definition of its national individuality through the formulation of its foreign policy over time. Specifically, the paper answers the question of whether the Philippines is living or leaving the Bandung Spirit. To address this, the paper is divided in two major parts. The first part assesses the foreign policy formulation of the Philippines since the Bandung Conference and argues that such process has involved balancing act between national interest and the relevance the The Dual Actor Model asserts that the state has United States as former colonizer. The second a tendency to play both an assertive and a part argues that the Bandung Spirit was cooperative role as these are inherent features adapted by the Philippines in its attempt to of a state. This becomes reflective on the

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decision pursued by the state. Such decision, would in effect nullify its independence. The however, is conditioned by both domestic and US having understood the Philippine international security environment which sentiments, revised and offered another treaty necessitates the state to perform a balancing called the “1934 Tydings-Mcduffie Act”, more act. The Philippines as a dual actor has a or less identical to the earlier independence act tendency to assert its national interest and except that it stated that the United States cooperate with its former colonial master—the would have no military bases in the Philippines US. Although this may send an impression on after independence (Shalom n.d., p. 2-4). the ambiguity of the Philippines commitment However, the naval reservations held by the US to the Bandung Spirit—anti-colonialism, would be retained until negotiations between political freedom, and state-guided economic Washington and within two years of development—it should be perceived that such independence settled all questions related to balancing act is a means by which the state such facilities. The Tydings-McDuffie Act did adjusts or adapts to the evolving environment not offer the Philippines the "real and while preserving its national individuality. complete" independence that Quezon claimed for, given that the failure of post-independence The Balancing Act: Philippine National negotiations to reach agreement on naval bases Interest and American Influence would leave the United States in possession of The Philippine-US relations highlight a shared any naval reservations previously retained. history based on the latter’s colonization of the Nevertheless, the archipelago from 1889-1946. Today, the two accepted the act, and a Philippine countries continue to be linked by their commonwealth was soon inaugurated, with security concerns, democratic principles, and Quezon as its President and independence economic ties. Yet the road to their ever- scheduled to follow a decade (Shalom, 2012). growing cordial relations is beset with As the 10-year period reached its end challenges particularly in the attempt of the in 1944, negotiations began to start with Philippines to define its national individuality regards to U.S naval bases. Although the through the creation of its independent foreign Philippines was previously against the policy. This necessitated the Philippines to retention of military bases, President Quezon perform a balancing act in the international and Vice President Osmeña became open to the stage. In light of this, the paper centers on two idea. They realized that the Philippines— major points of discussion which explain the although soon to be independent—remained balancing act. The first focuses on the politico- susceptible to any foreign attacks, and that a security concerns while the other on economic US presence of military bases would, to a issues. certain extent, give them a boosted confidence with regards to their national security. Politico-Security Concerns Eventually, the Philippines gained its The Philippine-US relations in the 1930s to independence through “The Treaty of Manila 1950s can be best described as the era of the in 1946” under the Philippine Presidency of “achievement of Philippine Independence”. It (1946-1948). Under this was during this decade that Philippine was agreement, it involved the assurance of further advancing to its independence. Yet before it maintained U.S Military bases, hence, the reached that point, the US offered a number of Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1946.The treaties albeit with certain conditions. One series of events that led to the Philippine such case is the passage of the 1933 Hare- independence is a notable response of the US Hawes Cutting Act in the US Congress which to the concerns of the Philippines and its was eventually turned down by the Philippine willingness to give its independence. On the Legislature under Senate President Manuel other hand, it also indicated the Philippines Quezon, primarily because it gave the US assertion of its own independence (Communist President a two-year unilateral authority of Party of the Philippines, 2011). retaining military bases in the Philippines. The After gaining its independence, the reservation of military bases in the Philippines Philippines signed under the presidency of

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Elpidio Quirino (1948-53) another agreement only during the reign of President Ferdinand with the US. The signing of the “Mutual Marcos (1965-1986), that this issue was Defense Pact of 1951” was aimed to further resolved through the formation of a “Joint strengthen the relations of the Philippines and Jurisdictional Implementation Committee” (a the US (Malaya, 2011, p. 1). The agreement result of the 1965 talks) and a mutual became the overall framework for the US- agreement, on both sides, to give sympathetic Philippine mutual defense in the event of consideration to waive jurisdiction in those foreign attacks on metropolitan territories, cases of a “particular national interest” armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft of (Cooley, 2008, p. 69). either country. It was a vital link in the US line The above-mentioned events reflected of defense in the Western Pacific. The the attempt of the Philippines to address its contracting countries agreed to maintain and national interest by retaining the US develop their individual and collective capacity involvement to a certain degree but not to the to resist attacks. This was put to the test during extent of sacrificing its own sovereignty. The the administration of President Ramon Philippines strategically made use of its strong Magsaysay (1953-1957) as he turned to the U.S relations with the US in order to resolve a to resolve the insurgency groups—known as problem of its own. The domestic insurgency “Hukbalahap” or “huks”—spreading in the was key determinant to the decisions made by Philippines. The US gladly helped in warding the Philippines. However, it was not the sole off the Huks and was successfully finished in determinant. The Philippines, being a newly- 1954. Such was a display of good Philippine-US independent sovereign nation-state, was also relations. However, the discussion on the sensitive to any breach towards its renewal of military bases in the Philippines Constitution. This showed an evidence of the failed in 1956. This was mainly because of the Philippines assertion of its sovereignty as it did American soldiers accused of violating not easily succumb to the idea of discussing Philippine laws. The US had generally refused new bases agreement simply because the US to turn such individuals over to the Philippine did help them fend off the Huks. Instead, the justice system, which infuriated many Philippines displayed its strong national Filipinos. Thus, the talks were unsuccessful individuality. In response, the US, although (Stephens, 1990, p. 26). rejected the idea of bringing its soldiers before Over the years, the Philippines and the the Philippine court, did not insist nor US underwent several negotiations with regard persuade the Philippines but rather accepted to the US military presence in the Philippines. the failure of an agreement and acknowledge For instance, in the 1959 Bohlen-Serrano the sour relationship that existed at that time. Agreement which was signed under President Having taken into consideration that Carlos P. Garcia (1957-1961), the Philippine the internal crisis requires a collaborative asserted to shorten the length of US military response, the Philippines turned to the US, but bases from 99 years to 25 years (UN Treaty because of some unsettled grievances with the Series n.d., p. 306). On the other hand, the U.S. US, it later asserted a negative reception to the agreed not to station nuclear missiles, to turn discussion of a new bases agreement. over unused bases, to consult before launching Nevertheless, these decisions made by the combat operations, and to turn over to the Philippines should not be initially seen as a Philippine administration the Subic Bay town submissive action on the part of the of Olongapo which at that time was under US Philippines, but rather, a result of a keen jurisdiction. In return, the Philippines allowed observation and matured perspective of the the US to enlarge the Subic Bay and Sangley Philippines on its security environment. Point Naval Stations. However, during The Philippine-US relations, before President Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965), and after its independence, had its own share the issue of jurisdiction (legal control) over of bumps on the road. Bumps that instigated a American soldiers in the Philippines, which sensitive-adaptive method that took into had not been fully settled after the 1959 consideration of the close assessment of the discussions, continued to be a problem. It was current relations. However, the rollercoaster

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ride seemed to have reached its end in 1991, and the “2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation that is, during the revolutionary government of Agreement” (Baviera 2014: 1). The common President Cory Aquino (1986-1992). Due to the point of these mechanisms/agreements is a transitioning of the Philippines from clear structure and increased number of authoritarian to democratic government, there rotational US Armed Forces in the Philippines. was a call to create a new constitution. One of Again, there is a need to understand that the the provisions that was passed was the ban of periods between 2001 and 2010—up to the US bases in the Philippines.1 This was by far, present—is characterized with existing the most crucial decision made by the external threats—both regional and global. The Philippines with regard to its relations with the global war on terror marked by the 9/11 attack US. However, it must be understood that such instigated a reassessment of both the decision was against the backdrop of a Philippines’ and the US’ foreign policies. heightened national patriotism amongst the Moreover, the growing dominance and Filipinos–due to the People Power–and the aggressiveness of China with regard to its claim end of the Cold war. A heightened patriotism of South China Sea posed a security threat and among the Filipinos shed light to the existence a direct breach of the territorial sovereignty of of US military presence in the Philippines and the Philippines. the end of the Cold War has made these bases The constant interplay of factors— lose its strategic focus and relevance to the both internal and external—plays a crucial role security environment. to the decisions made by the state. As for this The termination of the bases, however, case, there is sufficient evidence to support that was not aimed to cut Philippine-US security there were a number of factors that affected the relations entirely but rather, it called for a fresh course of Philippine foreign policy toward the security alliance that would be relative to the US. And so, it would not be fair to say that, the current security conditions present in both current Philippine-US Security relations is a regional and global environments. Hence, in show of a growing reliance and dependence of 1999, under President Joseph Estrada (1998- the Philippines to the US over its security 2001), the government restored American concerns, primarily because such assumption military presence in the country through a new shows no regard to the underlying intricacies form known as the Balikatan exercises or the of the Philippine-US relations. Hence, instead, RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) this should be seen as a display of a strategic ratified by the Senate on May 27, 1999 (Lim, consideration of national interest at work and 1987, p. 15). The agreement aimed to establish a point of maturity in the Philippines’ the guidelines and provisions that covered the independence. U.S. military personnel sent to the Philippines to conduct military exercises. Economic Concerns In the following years, the In 1956, during the tenure of President Ramon administration of President Gloria Macapagal Magsaysay (1953-1957), the 1955 Laurel- Arroyo (2001-2010) and President Benigno Langley Agreement—a revised United States- Simeon Aquino III (2010-present) have been Philippine Trade Agreement (or the Bell Trade closely acquainted with a series of efforts that Act), was negotiated (Rafaelita n.d., p. 5-9). would further strengthen Philippine-US This treaty had some advantages for the relations. Notable of these, were the “2001 Philippines. It ended the US authority to bilateral defense consultative mechanism”2 control the exchange rate of the Peso. The bill

1 This is a statement written by the Spokesperson of 2 See “Joint Statement between President George W. NDFP Mindanao Chapter, Ka Oris, “28 years hence, bush and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of the The EDSA promise is ever more elusive” on 25 Philippines on the 50th Anniversary of the U.S- February 2014. Philippine Alliance.” Washington: Authenticated U.S. Government Information. 2001. 1699.

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also extended the sugar quota and the time would need support from the American period during which Philippine goods could be Government to win again. exported to the US without tariffs. These Upon winning the 1961 elections, measures were concessions to the Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965)— elite, in recognition of their commitment to the under pressure from the US Government and American cause. The agreement also contained international financial institutions—reversed provisions encouraging foreign investment in Garcia-era economic policies with economic the Philippines, allowing increased American liberalization policies. First, under Garcia’s economic control. In particular, it granted government, the Peso had a fixed exchange foreign individuals and corporations the legal rate, to keep low prices for domestically- right to own land, which was opposed by many produced goods and food. However, nationalists. Macapagal allowed the Peso to “float” on It was however, during President currency exchange markets, causing a nearly - Carlos P. Garcia (1957-1961) that a radical shift 100% devaluation of the Peso, leading to in economic policy inadvertently happened. increased consumer prices, hurting Filipino Seeing that the Philippine economy in the post- consumers. Second, under Garcia’s regime, war period was dominated by American foreign imports were limited in order to businesses, he wanted to steer the country encourage domestic production by Philippine away from a colonial dependence on export of businesses. However, Macapagal lifted these raw materials and import of finished goods, limits, with the result that foreign imports and towards development of a modern flooded in, hurting domestic industries and industrial economy. In 1960, he asserted the agriculture, thus making the environment in need for Philippine economic freedom and the advantage of U.S businesses (Pelorina, promised to shake off “the yoke of alien 2013, p. 24). domination in business, trade, commerce and The above mentioned is an attempt of industry.” He pursued what became known as the Philippines to deviate from the “Pilipino Muna” (“Filipino First”). The goal of development path that the US envisioned. To a this policy was to provide increased certain extent, the Philippines showed a sense government support for the development of of responsibility to finally decide on its own. domestic industry (Pelorina, 2013, p. 25-26). The sudden shift was an attempt of the This was well received by some sectors of the Philippines to prioritize its national interest Filipino business community, but drew loud over the dictate of the US as a manifestation of protests from American business circle. The its independence from the US. However, the US Government was not pleased because the sudden spur of nationalism was not sustained policy hindered American business activity in as the Philippines still lacked institutional the Philippines. mechanisms to strengthen its own economy In response, the American-controlled hence creating the imperative to consider the World Bank and International Monetary Fund US assistance. pressured Garcia to end import and currency The rise of economic nationalism restrictions. The US claimed that he tolerated continued until the time of President graft and corruption in dollar allocations. Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1979). Responding to There were rumors of a possible CIA- the global changes from bi-polar to multi-polar sponsored coup against the government but system, President Marcos devised an many Filipinos were proud because President innovative approach to Philippine diplomacy Garcia was the first Philippine President since which was called “New Development independence in 1946 who stood up against the Diplomacy”. It was designed to cater to the Americans. However under pressure, in needs of economic and social development and December 1960 Garcia finally adopted partial reduce the excessive reliance of the Philippines fiscal decontrol; in other words, foreign to the US. The declaration of martial law in businesses would be allowed to take their 1972 provided President Marcos the profits out of the country again. National opportunity to direct Philippine foreign policy elections were coming in 1961 and he knew he away from the Cold War orientation to his

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vision of Development Diplomacy. It is focused Philippines was starting to recognize other on the development of a national self-reliance development partners apart from the US. Such which is based on economic progress and economic development efforts were taken political stability. However, in 1980s the further during the time of President Gloria Philippines was greatly affected by the oil price Macapagal Arroyo through bilateral and increases and the global recession. This led to multilateral cooperation, between and among trade deficit which was even exacerbated by the countries inside and outside the region. regime’s growing internal weakness. As a Moreover, the Philippines continued to pursue result, Marcos found it necessary to maintain active regional strategy of participation in the his diplomatic thrust toward the US. This was ASEAN and the APEC, while steadily building necessary because the US was the main up its bilateral alliance with the US (Abadilla, supporter of the regime through its sale and 2004, p. 36). grant of military hardware, its dominant role in In the area of bilateral trade, relations the World Bank and International Monetary have not only been growing, they also have Fund, and by actions of US-based been diversifying. Traditional Philippine multinational corporations. As a consequence exports to the US used to be dominated by of his dependence to the US, President Marcos sugar, coconut oil, and abaca. Today, the found himself vulnerable to American Philippines also exports higher-value goods diplomatic pressures (Castro, 1989). such as electronics, computer chips, and Series of events ultimately led to the garments. Moreover, the Philippines is already downfall of Marcos and came the ascendancy a major focus for overseas business processing into power by Corazon Aquino. The operations (BPO) and call centers for growing Philippines’ debt strategy entails repayment of list of US firms. Prospects are even brighter in loans made during the Marcos period. This the deepening integration of East Asian resulted to huge cash outflow that negated economies. Talks have progressed in future economic growth much less recovery. promoting closer economic integration The government’s desperate need for new between the ASEAN region and the money to service the debt and finance powerhouse economies of Northeast Asia economic recovery program forced the (Abadilla 2004, p. 41). In short, the Philippines Philippine to compromise its independent is gaining an economic foothold within its posture. It compelled the Philippine to seek regional neighborhood, while at the same time assistance from the US. Moreover the internal maintaining its economic partnership with the problem of the Philippine like insurgency, US. Muslim rebellion, the rightist threat and problems of economic development affected The Philippines and the Bandung Spirit the country’s ability to pursue an independent Although peoples of Asia and do not foreign policy since the government was far have common cultural heritage and do not more concerned with its domestic problems; it arise out of common civilization, there is depended on the US for economic assistance. however a single force that binds them The succeeding regimes after the together—the Bandung Spirit. It is a force that installation of democracy in the Philippines is characterized by collective abhorrence to through Corazon Aquino’s administration colonialism, common desire for national became more focused on propelling the political freedom, and shared vision of peaceful country toward global competitiveness. This economic growth. It is the force which led the was initially evident during the time of colonized countries to struggle for President Fidel Ramos as there were intense independence and emancipation. diplomatic efforts exerted to encourage foreign Each nation, however, has its own investors to the Philippines. The country’s interpretation and its own reading of the economic growth became heavily dependent implications of the Bandung Spirit. The on foreign investments. Investors, however, Philippines for that matter also had its own were not solely coming from the US but from understanding of the symbolic significance of other countries. This showed that the the Bandung Spirit. This section of the paper,

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therefore, discusses the Philippine did not disregard the fact that the Philippines understanding of the symbolic Bandung had also directly experienced the basic good Conference. It argues that externally, the faith of the US in the relationship. He further Bandung Conference exemplified a unified stressed, Let it be stated in fairness however effort to quell colonialism and imperialism; that uniquely among the colonial powers the internally, however, there seemed to be US in our case made a formal pledge of divergence among the participating countries independence, fixed a date for it 10 years in on the implication of the Bandung Spirit. In advance and fully and honorably redeemed light of this, the case of the Philippines as one that pledge”. Finally, he asserted, “We of Asia of the participating countries in the Bandung and Africa are emerging into this world as a Conference and a former colony of the US will new nation-states in an epoch when be examined. This paper further argues that nationalism, as such, can solve only the least of although the Philippines shared the common our problems and leaves us powerless to meet abhorrence to imperialism and exerted efforts the more serious one” (Romulo, 1956, p. 113). to create its independent foreign policy, it was, This implied that the Philippines perception of to a certain extent, put under pressure by both the Bandung Spirit was not a total absence or domestic and international concerns that complete disregard of the importance of its compelled it to engage with its former former colonizer. Although it is one with the colonizer–the US. Such engagement, however, colonized countries in belief of their right to is not an irreverence of the Bandung Spirit but self-determination and full national an adaptation of it. individuality, the Philippines did not discount Although this may send an impression the fact that independence of the smaller or on the ambiguity of the Philippines weak nation is at best a precarious and fragile commitment to the Bandung Spirit—anti- thing. colonialism, political freedom and state-guided Given the stand of the Philippines in economic development—it should be perceived the Bandung Conference, it was inevitable that that such balancing act is a means by which the Indian and the Philippine delegations found state adjusts or adapts to the evolving themselves on opposite sides of the fence: environment while preserving its national India was the leader of the neutralist states individuality. while the Philippines was among those in the forefront of the democratic alignment. This The Philippines in the Bandung Conference provided an impression that there was an In unity with the rest on the participating internal divergence on some issues in the countries in the Bandung Conference, the Bandung Conference. First is the issue of Philippines shared the same sentiment against democratic alignment. The Philippines colonialism and imperialism and the quest for asserted that being democratic should not be full national individuality. Carlos Romulo as equated to being pro-Western. The Philippines the head of Philippine delegation in the aligned itself to democratic ideals only because Bandung Conference stated, “The US at times the ideals of freedom are universal. appeared to us lacking in consistency and vigor Another divergence that manifested in in upholding the right of non-self-governing the Bandung Conference was on the issue of peoples to independence. It has on some issues peaceful coexistence within the region leaned heavily in favor of colonial power and specifically on the issue of the Manila Pact. The has sometimes disheartened us in the Manila Pact, was signed on 8 September 1954 Philippines because of its failure to make its in Manila, as part of the American Truman actions dovetail with its ideals of equality and Doctrine of creating anti-communist bilateral freedom.”3 However, Romulo in his speech also and collective defense treaties. These treaties

3 This is taken from Carlos Romulo’s speech delivered during the Opening Session of the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia.

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and agreements were intended to create exogenous conditions change (Johnston, 1995, alliances that would contain communist p. 35). powers. According to Nehru of India the Looking at the history of Philippine Manila Pact is contrary to the spirit of foreign policy, it can be argued the balancing agreements and understanding on non- acts performed by the Philippines in the course aggression and non-interference. Moreover, it of formulating its independent foreign policy diminishes the “climate of peace”4 in the region was a recalculation of the most effective means (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1956, to achieve its goal to improve its relative p. 65). However, Romulo asserted that he capabilities. For instance, on the issue of cannot see why the Manila Pact can be said to retaining the military influence of the US in the be inconsistent with non-interference and non- Philippines, the latter needed to maintain its aggression. He argued that India, had it been a cordial relationship with the US even after the member of the Alliance, could expect no help decision of removing the US bases because it under the alliance if it proposes to attack China knew for a fact that it was inadequate to or Pakistan or indeed any other state anywhere address domestic threats such as insurgency else in the world because the Manila Pact is a and international threats such as terrorism. treaty of collective defense5 and no aggressive Addressing such threats by recalculating its purpose is written into it (Indonesian Ministry move against US enables the Philippines to of Foreign Affairs, 1956, p. 70). The above strengthen its national security through discussion shows that externally, the Bandung burden-sharing but without over reliance to Conference exemplified a unified effort to quell the US. In effect, what seemed to be a move colonialism and imperialism; internally, away from the ideals of national individuality however, there seemed to be divergence among which is the very essence of the Bandung Spirit the participating countries on the implication is actually a recalculation of the most effective of the Bandung Spirit. means to improve its relative capabilities and ultimately attain national individuality. The Bandung Spirit and the Philippine The relationship between the Foreign Policy Philippines and the US is no longer defined as At the core of the Bandung Spirit is the colonizer-colony but instead a partnership abhorrence to colonialism and imperialism between two equally sovereign states. Hence, it and the right of colonized states to national shows that the Philippines has the upper hand individuality. However, in the course of the in determining its own development as a Philippines’ formulation of its foreign policy it nation-state and no longer at the mercy of the raises the question of whether the Philippines US. The relationship that exists between the is living or leaving the Bandung Spirit as it still Philippines and the US is characterized by continues to have strong bilateral ties with its partnership of two equally sovereign states. former colonial master–the US. This paper The bilateral relations of the Philippine with argues that the Philippines still lives in the the US side by side its active multilateral spirit of the Bandung Conference. First, the cooperation within the Southeast Asian region balancing acts performed by the Philippines in indicates that the Philippine is free to choose crafting its foreign policies over the years were its economic strategy as a sign of full national tactical in nature. The change in behavior of a individuality. In fact, the US and the state reflects recalculation of the most effective Philippines are both key players of Asia-Pacific means to achieve its goals and to preserve and Economic Cooperation (APEC), which aims to improve its relative capabilities. Interests do achieve a Pacific Community of “free and open not change; only the means of pursuing trade and investment” by 2020 (Abadilla, interests change and strategies change because 2004, p. 39). Additionally, the Philippines has

4 Reply of General Romulo to Prime Minister Nehru 5 Statement of Carlos Romulo, Chairman of the of India before the Political Committee on 23 April Philippine Delegation to the Asian African 1955. Conference on 23 April 1955.

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put emphasis on regionalism to lessen appropriate international legal institutions dependence on the US. Ever since the (Lun, 2014, p. 19). formation of ASEAN, the Philippines has Given Philippine constitutional perceived regionalism as a hedge against prohibition and nationalistic sensitivities, overdependence to the US. The Philippines has there was no US bases or large scale troop viewed regionalism as an instrument of alignment that have been proposed. The pooling the region’s technical and material Philippine’s need to increase its security in the resources so as to develop its economy which face of China’s aggression does not necessitate would strengthen its bargaining position and military dependence on the US. Instead, the lessen its need for the US assistance and Philippine opted to exhaust diplomatic means. investments or any other special relations with The Philippine is the first to take China to the the US (De Castro, 2010, p. 716-717). Hence, court. It decided to resort to compulsory the relationship that exists between the arbitration despite China’s vehement Philippines and the US is no longer based on opposition. (Heydarian, 2015, p. 1). On the dominance but on partnership. As the other hand, the US does not show desire to Philippines defined its national individuality, intervene in the domestic affairs of the the US, on the other hand, has also redefined Philippine. The US-Philippine Mutual Defense its role relative to the national identity of Treaty (MDT) of 1951, which forms the Philippine in particular and in the regional foundation of the bilateral security alliance, identity of ASEAN in general. does not explicitly obligate the US to come to the defense of maritime areas that are disputed Philippine-US Security Cooperation and by the Philippine. During his April 2014 visit to China’s Aggression in South China Sea the Philippine, President Obama asserted that Although the US military bases have ceased to the Treaty requires the US to help defend the operate in the Philippines since 1992, two Philippine against external armed attack, countries have maintained security adding that “our commitment to defend the cooperation. With China’s growing Philippine is iron-clad”. However, he stopped assertiveness in the South China Sea, the US short of saying that the MDT would apply to and the Philippine have discussed bolstering Philippine claimed islets in the South China the US military presence in the Philippine, Sea (Hachero, 2014, p. 1). including allowing greater US ship and aircraft Amidst concern over the aggressive access to Philippine military facilities; behavior of China over the disputed territory in increasing US military forces on a non- South China Sea, the Philippine remains to permanent basis; and raising the number and display assertiveness of its territorial integrity frequency of joint military exercises, ship visits through international legal institutions while and related activities through the Enhanced maintaining security cooperation with the US. Defense Cooperation Agreement (Lun, 2014, p. Hence, the Philippine maintains a delicate 20). balance between assertiveness of its foreign Since 2012, the Philippine has played a policy and its security cooperation with the US. key role in the Obama Administration’s “rebalancing” of foreign policy priorities to Conclusion Asia, particularly as maritime territorial The Bandung Conference was symbolic as it disputes between China and other claimants in was the first major international conference the South China Sea intensified. However, the that sought to bring together the governments US does not take a position on the territorial of the newly independent nation of Asia and dispute between the Philippine and China. The Africa. It was the first blueprint for solidarity US is not a party to United Nations Convention between the colonized countries. The on the Law of the Sea. It has no formal role in Philippines shared the common abhorrence to the case but the US officials have supported the imperialism and exerted efforts to create its Philippine’s right to use available international independent foreign policy. However, the arbitration mechanisms and argued that all Philippines, to a certain extent, was put under parties should abide by the rulings of pressure by both domestic and international

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The Philippine-US Relations: Living or Leaving the Bandung Spirit?

concerns that compelled it to engage with its Jayman, J. (2001) Towards Consensus after former colonizer–the US. This necessitated the Bandung: Global Public Goods and Philippines to perform a balancing act between Mitigating Uneven Development. its national interests and the US influence. New York: St. Lawrence University. The creation of the Philippines Mercado-Aldaba, R. A. (1994) Foreign Direct independent foreign policy was a process Investment in the Philippines: A characterized by the delicate balance between Reassessment. Philippine: Institute the Philippines national individuality and the for Development Studies. US dominance. What seemed to be a move Overholt, W. H. (1986) The Rise and Fall of away from the ideals of national individuality Ferdinand Marcos. Los Angeles: is actually a recalculation of the most effective University of California Press. means to improve the Philippines relative Romulo, C. P. (1956) The Meaning of capabilities and ultimately attain national Bandung. North Carolina: University individuality. The Philippines’ engagement of North Carolina Press. with the US, therefore, is not an irreverence of Stephens, W. D. (1990) The Roots of Social the Bandung Spirit but an adaptation of it. Protest in the Philippines and Their The Philippines remains to live up to Effects on U.S.-R.P. Relations. the ideals of the Bandung Conference as it California: Naval Post-Graduate displays the abhorrence to imperialism, School. commitment to political freedom and peaceful Tan, S. S. and Amitav A. (2008) Bandung economic growth within its neighborhood–all Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 of which are at the core of the Bandung Spirit. Asian-African Conference for The Bandung Spirit, therefore, still lives albeit International Order. Singapore: NUS redefined to fit in to the evolving security Press. environment. Journals Abadilla, A. (2004) RP-US Patternship for Bibliography Peace and Development. Philippine Books Diplomacy in the 21st Century. Makati Abdulgani, H. R. (1964) Bandung Spirit. City: Hanns Seidel Foundation. Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Prapantja. Baviera, A. S. P. (2014) Implications of the U.S- Acharya, A. (2008) The Evolution of Norms: Philippines Enhanced Defense The Social Construction of Non- Cooperation Agreement. Asia Pacific Interference in Asian Regionalism. Bulletin. Washington D.C.: East-West Paper for the Provincializing Center. Westphalia Conference. Oxford De Castro, R. C. (2010) Weakness and Gambits University. in Philippine Foreign Policy in the Baker, C. (2005) Philippines and the United Twenty-first Century. Pacific Affairs States 2004-2005: Defining 83.4, p. 697-717. Maturity. Hawaii: Asia Pacific Center Castro, R. de. (2002) Historical Review of the for Security Studies. Concept, issues and Proposals on an Berger, M. T. (2008) The Battle for Asia: From Independent Foreign Policy for the Decolonization to Globalization. New Philippines: 1955-1988. Asian Studies York: Routledge Curzon. 27, p. 7-34. Cooley, A. (2008) Base Politics: Democratic Chin, L. (2002) The United States in the Change and the U.S. Military Philippines: Post 9/11 Imperatives. Overseas. New York: Cornell Center for Research on Globalization- University Press. Online Journal. Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Asia- Johnston, A. I. (1995) Thinking about Strategic Africa Speaks From Bandung. Culture. International Security, 19.4, Jakarta: The Ministry of Foreign p. 32-64. Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, (n.d.).

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Pelorina, R. N. (n.d.). (2013) Decontrol and Its Lum, T. and Ben D. (2014) The Republic of Effects on Philippine Economy (1962- the Philippines and the US Interests – 1966). Journal of Arts, Science, and 2014. [Online]. Congressional Commerce 4.1, p. 23-35. Research Service. Available from: Technology Integration Division. (2011) . Orientation Date. Defense Language Malaya, J. E. (2011) Constitutional Processes Institute Foreign Language Center. Requirement in the PH-US Mutual Ross, R. (2013) US Grand Strategy, The Rise Defense Treaty. [Online]. Philippine of China, and US National Security Law Journal Online. Available from: Strategy for East Asia. Strategic . Hachero, A. (2014) DFA Insists US Resos, A. B. (2013) International Realities and Will Help PH If Attacked. Malaya. Philippine Foreign Policy under Ferdinand Marcos. [Online]. Foreign Online Articles Policy Journal. Available from: Communist Party of the Philippines. (2011)

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