DRAFT FMFM 1-3A A TACTICAL HANDBOOK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY AND POLICE OPERATIONS IMPERIAL AND ROYAL AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MARINE CORPS DRAFT FMFM 1-3A, Draft 1.0 12 August 2008 PREFACE Why another hip-pocket guide for counterinsurgency? What makes this different? This handbook is an offering from a group of Marine officers who feel that current doctrine is rapidly diverging from the intent of maneuver doctrine. Where other manuals aim to put current conflicts into the Maoist/Nationalist mold of the Twentieth century and aim to identify successful techniques, this book seeks to bring about a change in approach and thinking which is timeless. In an age where war is no longer monopolized by armies but is waged by non- governmental entities, ethnic groups, tribes, federal agencies and militias, we find it necessary to look to parallels and successful thought processes in the inter-agency arena. This we may apply to the current and future conflicts of a 4GW nature. Our hope is to compliment the FMFM-1A and provide a useful springboard of thoughts and practices. Monteccucoli, Hofkriegsrath Pola, July, 2008 2 FMFM 1-3A, Draft 1.0 12 August 2008 Chapter 1 THE GANGBANGER AND THE INSURGENT “For me the building block of policing in any democracy is that of an individual police officer acting as an individual, exercising his or her individual discretion. For almost 30 years because of the threat posed, not only to the society at large in Northern Ireland, but posed very specifically to my officers, we have been forced to operate from fortified buildings. We have been forced to travel in armoured vehicles and officers when patrolling on foot have been forced to wear body-armour, have been forced to carry fire-arms, have been forced in many circumstances to be accompanied by their military colleagues…Those who are clamouring most loudly for de- escalation or demilitarization are the very people who have forced us into those military defense stances. Let them now shine and stop gusting and they will very quickly see change in the way we go about our business, and very quickly thereafter, significant change in the way we are structured.” -Ronnie Flanagan, Chief Constable Royal Ulster Constabulary Into the Fourth Generation of War In the post-Cold War era, the world has seen a dramatic shift in who makes war, why it is made and upon whom it is made. The trend in the last half century has been toward conflict of a more fragmented nature, Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). War is less the pastime of the state, but rather a tool for the disenfranchised, disaffected and dissatisfied. As the United States enters the seventh year of warfare with various non-state entities it continues to search for a box in which to classify counter-insurgency operations (COIN). Since patterns of violence and structure in organized crime and gangs share characteristics with twenty-first century insurgencies, tactical successes of law enforcement provide insight into useful thought processes for COIN. In order to succeed in COIN environments, the Marine Corps must move beyond force protection, capitalize on similarities between insurgents and transnational gangs and adopt lessons learned by domestic law enforcement. Force Protection in COIN Deaf to the urgings of doctrinal publications, the Marine Corps appears to be focused more on force protection than counterinsurgency. Soldiers and Marines patrol the streets of Baghdad and the mountain passes of the Panshir mounted in the mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle,1 field counter radio controlled improvised explosive devices (CREW),2 and 1 DoD has increased MRAP production to over 20,000 armored cars of which 3,400 will be received by the Marine Corps. The intent of this plan is to eliminate the HMMWV from use in theatre for patrolling purposes. “MRAP,” Defense Update Online, 2007, <http://www.defense-update.com/products/m/mrap.html> (15 December 2007). 2 Bob Brewin, “Counter-IED Systems Jam Tactical Comms in Iraq,” Federal Computer Week Online, 5 January 2007, <http://www.fcw.com/online/news/97264-1.html> (15 December 2007). 3 FMFM 1-3A, Draft 1.0 12 August 2008 wear over 30 lbs of body armor.3 This up-armoring of man and machine has saved countless troops in the current conflicts. The MRAP is a hard target, and consequently undesirable to attack from the standpoint of the insurgent (a light infantryman operating without the support of heavier formations).4 Nevertheless, the mission at hand is not force protection. The U.S. military has emerged as culturally risk averse, inwardly focused, and clinging to the conventional philosophy that superior firepower and technology will defeat its adversaries. In the eyes of Chief Constable Flanagan of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, this default attitude is detrimental to policing operations: Armored cars and ballistic vests “all represent barriers between us and the people we exist to serve; barriers much unwanted by us, barriers forced upon us by others.”5 Flanagan brings us to a pivotal point that the DoD may find foreign. Whereas maneuver warfare focuses on the enemy, the center of gravity (COG) in COIN lies not with the enemy, but with the people6. Consider the five objectives of policing as set forth by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, founded in 1822: “the protection of life, protection of property, the preservation of the peace, the prevention and the detection of crime.”7 Kinetic combat operations are but a small piece of the puzzle. Insurgents and Transnational Gangs Current DoD publications suggest the cause of insurgency is economic. While some, if not many within Al Qaeda and its affiliates have taken up arms “…seeking a better life or relief of suffering by overthrowing an oppressive regime…”,8 insurgency in the twenty-first century no longer follows the Maoist model of the Cold War era. The evolving conflict and patterns of terrorist activity are far more complex, attracting supporters for broad and varied reasons. In fact, the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan more closely resemble what Haussler refers to as the “third generation gang” (3G2)model: an evolved and perhaps networked organization, no longer focused on local dominance, but expanding into mercenary activities and financial 3 Program Executive Office Soldier, Interceptor Body Armor, January 2006, http://www.peosoldier.army.mil(15 December 2007) 4 Insurgents in the current conflict meet Steven Canby’s description of light infantry: “…decentralized, small unit warfare, dependant upon small unit initiative...a force of illusive irregulars…fighting the small war, disrupting lines of communication, denying intelligence, ambushing detachments and foraging parties.” Steven L. Canby, “Classic Light Infantry and New Technology” (Report, C&L Assoc. Defense Consultants, 1983), iii-5. 5 Ronnie Flanagan, “Maintaining Law and Order in Northern Ireland,” RUSI Journal 143, no. 4 (1998): 3, ProQuest (19 October 2007). 6 In 4th Generation Warfare (4GW), COG is focused on “…collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture.” William S. Lind, et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation” Marine Corps Gazette (Oct 1989): 23. 7 Flanagan, 2. 8 United States Marine Corps, Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach, 2006 (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 2006), 6. 4 FMFM 1-3A, Draft 1.0 12 August 2008 acquisition, mobilization, and warfare all via the net.9 Like Al Qaeda and similar terrorist client sub-organizations, 3G2 actors seek to create a shadow government or influence targeted states that are unable to provide security within their borders and whose officials are susceptible to recruitment.10 To be sure, transnational groups such as M-18, MS-13, and the Maras are criminal in nature and owe their origins to local control of racketeering and narcotics.11 Unlike 3G2 models, insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan seek to undermine the al-Maliki and Karzai governments through 4GW militant groups having political and theological origins. Despite this difference, the insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 3G2 share many similarities: the fragmentation of these states, the urbanized nature of the current conflict, networking, mobilization, 12 and patterns of violence.13 Claude Arnold, in a Congressional research report, further characterizes the transnational gang threat as “very mobile, highly adaptable to new geographic areas, and [maintaining] connectors to their native countries.”14 Arnold might as easily have been be referring to Al Qaeda. 9 Nicholas I. Haussler, “Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency” (Grad.diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 19. 10 Max G. Manwaring, “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency,” (Carlisle, PA: SSI March 2005), 13-14 11 These increasingly networked gangs have been classified as a significant threat to Honduran, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan national security. As such, their actions have garnered an international judicial and military cooperative response between these Central American nations. Federico Breve, Minister of Defense, Honduras, “The Maras: A Menace to the Americas,” Military Review (2007): 91-92. 12 Maire-Joelle Zahar, “Proteges, Clientes, Cannon Fodder: Civilians in the Calculus of Militias”, (Managing Armed Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century, Special Review of International Peacekeeping, 2001), 7 quoted in Nicholas I. Haussler, “Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency” (Grad.diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 23. 13 In 2003 a rash of gang related murders included the decapitation of a female informant found along the Shenandoah River, and the severing of a rival gang member’s fingers by machete wielding gang members. In 2005 a member of MS-13 was arrested in Texas for orchestrating a bus bombing in Honduras that killed 28 people. Arian Campo-Flores et al, “The Most Dangerous Gang in America”, Newsweek, 28 March 2005, EBSCOhost (21 November 2007).