Resilient State

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Deborah Cadman OBE, Professor Sir Ivor Crewe, Professor Ian Goldin, Andy Haldane, Suzanne Hall, Danny Kruger MBE MP, Rt Hon Baroness Nicky Morgan, Professor Nick Pearce, Charlotte Pickles, Dr Rod Thornton and Dr Marina Miron, Rt Hon Lord William Wallace

October 2020 #resilientstate About Resilient State

The COVID-19 pandemic has placed a huge strain on the State, and while the response has demonstrated some of the great strengths of our public services and machinery of government, it has also exposed some of the biggest flaws. As we move towards a ‘new normal’, we have a unique opportunity to explore fundamental questions about the shape of the State and how it operates. Reform’s ‘Resilient State’ programme seeks to learn the lessons from this crisis and identify the key building blocks that, if put in place, would enable us to better deal with future shocks and crises.

This collection of essays brings together leading thinkers to explore different aspects of a resilient state. The series aims to provide a platform for innovative ideas, to stimulate debate, and help shape a way forward. Each essay is the view of the author, and not necessarily that of Reform. About Reform

Reform is established as the leading Westminster think tank for public service reform. We are dedicated to achieving better and smarter public services. Our mission is to set out ideas that will improve public services for all and deliver value for money.

We are determinedly independent and strictly non-party in our approach. Reform is a registered charity, the Reform Research Trust, charity no.1103739.

This publication is the property of the Reform Research Trust.

Get in touch

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@reformthinktank 3 - Resilient State About the Authors

Deborah Cadman OBE Deborah Cadman has been Chief Executive of West Midlands Combined Authority since September 2017, having spent her career working in local government. Her previous roles include Chief Executive of St Edmundsbury Borough Council and Chief Executive of the East of England Development Agency. She is also a trustee of the Joseph Rowntree Trust and Joseph Rowntree Housing Foundation.

Professor Sir Ivor Crewe Sir Ivor Martin Crewe was until 2020 the Master of University College, Oxford and President of the Academy of Social Sciences. He was previously Vice-Chancellor of the University of Essex and also a Professor in the Department of Government at Essex. In 2013, he co-authored The Blunders of our Governments.

Professor Ian Goldin Professor Ian Goldin is a Professor of Globalisation and Development at Oxford University. He is a Senior Fellow at the Oxford Martin School, Director of the Oxford Martin Programme on Technological and Economic Change and a Professorial Fellow at the University’s Balliol College. Prior to this, he worked in global finance, as Vice President of the World Bank and Chief Executive and Managing Director of the Development Bank of Southern Africa. Andy Haldane Andrew Haldane is the Chief Economist at the Bank of England. He is a member of the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee and Chair of the Government’s Industrial Strategy Council. Among other positions, he is Honorary Professor at University of Nottingham, a Visiting Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences and a Governor of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research Suzanne Hall Suzanne is a Research Director in the Ipsos Mori Social Research Institute and heads its dedicated qualitative team. She has twenty years’ experience in designing and running mixed methods studies, with a focus on those which use qualitative and observational approaches. Suzanne has a BA in History and an MA in Politics and International relations both from the University of Nottingham .

Danny Kruger MBE MP Danny Kruger is the Member of Parliament for Devizes in Wiltshire. Prior to his election in 2019, he had a career in journalism and politics, latterly as Political Secretary to the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson. He is the founder of Only Connect, a community organisation working to reduce re-offending, and the West London Zone for Children and Young People. 4- Resilient State

Rt Hon Baroness Morgan of Cotes The Rt Hon Baroness Morgan of Cotes was member of parliament for Loughborough from 2010 to 2019. She held various positions in government, including Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, and Secretary of State for Education. She also served as Chair of the Treasury Select Committee, 2017-19.

Dr Marina Miron Marina Miron holds a BA in Politics and American Studies from the University of Nottingham, and an MA in War & Contemporary Conflict from the same institution. In February 2019, Marina successfully completed her PhD studies in the area of military strategy at the University of New South Wales Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy. Since 2012 she has been working as assistant editor at Infinity Journal and The Journal of Military Operations

Professor Nick Pearce Nick Pearce is a Professor of Public Policy at the University of Bath, where he is Director of The Institute for Policy Research. Previously he was Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research. Prior to this, he served as Head of the No10 Downing St. Policy Unit between 2008 and 2010, and as a special advisor in the Home Office, Cabinet Office and former Department for Education and Employment.

Charlotte Pickles Charlotte Pickles is director of Reform. She was previously Capitalism Editor and columnist, and then Managing Editor, of the media start up UnHerd.com. Charlotte started her public policy career at the Centre for Social Justice before heading into government as Expert Advisor to then Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP.

Dr Rod Thornton Dr Rod Thornton is a Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London. He is currently researching the role of civil defence, paramilitary and military organisations across Europe in mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Having spent nine years in the British Army, Dr Thornton’s career in academia began in 2002 and he has since held positions at the University of Nottingham and the University of Erbil in northern Iraq.

Rt Hon Lord Wallace of Saltaire Lord Wallace of Saltire has been a member of the House of Lords since 1995. Having held a range of roles, he is currently the Liberal Democrat Cabinet Office spokesperson. Lord Wallace was a Professor of International Relations at London School of Economics, 1999-2004. Prior to this he was a Senior Research Fellow at St Anthony’s College, Oxford and Deputy Director of Chatham House, the international relations think tank.

5 - Resilient State Contents

Contents

Introduction Towards a resilient state 07 Charlotte Pickles

Lessons for resilience Fragility to strength: lessons from around the world 10 Professor Ian Goldin

Points of failure, lessons for the future 13 Professor Sir Ivor Crewe

Securing public trust Public trust and compliance in a time of crisis 18 Suzanne Hall

Boosting domestic resilience A new settlement for social security 21 Professor Nick Pearce

Rethinking homeland resilience 24 Dr Rod Thornton and Dr Marina Miron

6 - Resilient State Contents

Going local A new relationship with Whitehall 28 Deborah Cadman OBE

Weak state, inadequate capacity 31

Rt Hon Lord Wallace of Saltaire

Building on success Resilience in the social sector 35 Andy Haldane

Community power and the investment state 39 Danny Kruger MBE MP

Future-proofing our digital infrastructure 42 RT Hon Baroness Nicky Morgan of Cotes 7 - Resilient State Introduction Introduction: Towards a resilient state

Charlotte Pickles Director Reform @ce_pickles

Routine surgery stopped, cancer There were also notable examples As Professor Ivor Crewe writes in care delayed, classrooms emptied, of creativity – the Coronavirus Job his essay, the “continuing lack of a courts paused, the military Retention Scheme was developed clear and coherent strategy” led to mobilised – as COVID-19 hit, many in weeks and saw over nine million errors, delays and poor of our public services found jobs furloughed; Nightingale decision-making. themselves ill-prepared to cope. hospitals were built in days The scale of the challenge, and the (although went largely unused); Professor Goldin notes that novel nature of the virus, meant and councils across the country resilient states learn not just from serious disruption to found innovative ways of using their own past experience, but that business-as-usual services was tech to deliver services and support of other countries. This was a inevitable, but, as our authors the vulnerable. And the UK has led failing in the UK: detailed plans highlight, structural weaknesses the world in treatment and vaccine were in place for dealing with an meant this disruption was more development – in part because of epidemic of influenza, but little severe and longer-lasting than it the flexibility of regulators in thought had been given to a should have been. streamlining processes. coronavirus-based pandemic despite the experience of SARS, The State, it seems, was not as largely in the Far East, in the early resilient as we might have hoped. Funding was by no 2000s. means the only, or That is not, of course, to say that At the same time, Professor Crewe we have not witnessed impressive even biggest, reminds us: “Do not plan future examples of resilience – between issue wars with the battleplans of the mid-March and the end of May, the last”. Both are right, and Department for Work and Pensions government would do well to processed almost three million Yet there is an overriding sense that follow such advice in the future. Universal Credit claims;¹ hundreds the State was unprepared when of thousands of public servants the pandemic hit, slow to mobilise when the threat became clear, and The narrow focus on influenza transitioned overnight from office demonstrates a degree of to home working; and GP surgeries in too many areas has failed to deliver. groupthink, another risk to shifted to remote consultations resilience – recent calls for greater (though the latter is not without its cognitive diversity in government problems).

¹ House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, DWP’s Response to the Coronavirus Outbreak: First Report of Session 2019 - 21, HC 178 (London: The Stationery Office, 2020).  NHS Confederation, Getting the NHS Back on Track: Planning for the next Phase of COVID-19, 2020. 8 - Resilient State Introduction

are well placed (though that must While extra investment is clearly Instead, promises were made but apply across the board – to needed in some areas – not least not met, creating a perception of officials, politicians, and expert social care as several authors point incompetence and undermining advisers). out – the prolonged and highly public trust in the Government, as damaging cessation of core public Suzanne Hall makes clear. The lack of planning may not have services is symptomatic of deeper issues. hit so hard had public services been As Danny Kruger puts it, in more robust health – a point “Centralised bureaucracies are Lord Wallace makes in his essay. Poor collection and use of data, entirely unfitted for the nimble, Even before COVID-19 hit, the insufficient pre-pandemic adoption digital, diverse 21st century.” Or to waiting list for NHS treatment of tech, gaps in civil service put it another way, as Deborah stood at over 4 million, and both capability, a seeming lack of Cadman writes, “the centre cannot the health and social care scenario-testing and decisive hold”. A more resilient State is one workforces were struggling with action, and a mixture of over that trusts, supports and high vacancies. Local government centralisation and excessive empowers its regions – as well as was similarly under pressure, with fragmentation in the machinery of holding them to account. rising social care costs squeezing government and service delivery. In addition to the fragilities that already falling spend on other All of these meant the State was have been exposed in our services less resilient than it could have machinery of government, our been when crisis hit. authors also highlight specific In much of the public sector there areas that may need redress. Dr was no, as Lord Wallace puts it, Rod Thornton and Dr Marina Miron “redundancy”. This tension Government cite the Government’s heavy between efficiency and resilience – departments have reliance on the “serendipitous” which requires some degree of availability of military personnel excess capacity for times of crisis – retreated to their where capacity and skills were will have to be addressed if we are lacking. From sourcing PPE, to to better weather future shocks. command-and- running test sites, to building Nightingale hospitals, the armed control comfort forces played an essential role in But funding was by no means the building our homeland resilience – only, or even biggest, issue; a point zones might it be time for a civil defence proven by the fact that billions of body? pounds have been spent over the One of greatest weaknesses past six months yet huge exposed by the pandemic is central challenges still remain. Professor Nick Pearce notes that government’s controlling instinct. the pandemic has exposed the Rather than recognising the value “holes in the [social security] safety A lack of funding was not the of local insight and infrastructure, net”, and asks whether it is time to reason that so many state school and devolving power and resources rethink our welfare system. The pupils received little to no formal accordingly, ministers and Treasury’s rapid design and delivery teaching during lockdown, or that government departments have of the furlough scheme is a key the exams algorithm proved such a retreated to their crisis success, but the fact that it fiasco. It was not the reason that command-and-control comfort had to be created in the first place justice was paused when jury trials zones. From identifying and also reveals a key weakness is the were pulled. And it was not – given supporting shielding households, State’s infrastructure – in many the Chancellor’s pledge that through delivering test, track and European countries their social “whatever it costs, we stand behind trace, to designing the employment insurance models could be flexed our NHS” – the reason that cancer and skills programmes to support to accommodate the jobs crisis. care and elective operations were the millions left unemployed, local postponed (much of the extra partnerships were needed. capacity sourced was left empty).

 HM Treasury and The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP, The Budget Speech as Delivered by Chancellor Rishi Sunak, 2020.  HM Treasury and The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP, The Budget Speech as Delivered by Chancellor Rishi Sunak, 2020.

9 - Resilient State Introduction

And many Britons who have lost the new types of warfare that Rod resourcing and protecting. their jobs will have been shocked at Thornton discusses will be how bare bones the benefit system cyber-enabled. Winston Churchill is credited with is. A welfare system that does not having said “never let a good crisis support household resilience in Most encouraging of all was the go to waste”. While the phrase may times of need also has serious upsurge in community solidarity as seem insensitive, particularly when implications for state resilience. neighbourhoods rallied together to we are still in the midst of the support those in need. As Andy COVID-19 crisis, it is nonetheless Yet among the gaps and holes that Haldane puts it, “as other sources true. Indeed a resilient state has the COVID-19 has exposed there have of capital (financial, physical, ability to learn and apply lessons in also been positives. Reserves of human) crumbled, social capital… real time. In the aftermath of a strengths and capabilities that can grew”. World War that wrought such be built upon as we move to devastation and challenged so recovery and beyond. many social ‘norms’, Britain A resilient state demanded more of its State. We Our basic digital infrastructure is has the ability to must do the same today. one of those, as Nicky Morgan highlights. Millions of Britons learn and apply shifted overnight to working and socialising virtually, many public lessons in real sector processes and transactions time went digital at a speed few would have anticipated pre-pandemic, and businesses shifted sales and An “investment state”, Danny services online. Improvements to Kruger argues, that gives power connectivity and skills are needed, back to communities, is a more but this critical infrastructure resilient state. But as with our proved resilient. Yet the largely digital infrastructure, our social successful shift to digital also infrastructure cannot be taken for presents a major risk to the State – granted, it needs nurturing,  HM Treasury and The Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP, The Budget Speech as Delivered by Chancellor Rishi Sunak, 2020.

10 - Resilient State Lessons for resilience Fragility to strength: lessons from around the world

Professor Ian Goldin Professor of Globalisation and Development University of Oxford @ian_goldin

It is a mark of the times that foster resilience and exposed their One-off policy initiatives are ‘resilience’, a term particularly absence. Resilient states (i) learn insufficient: true resilience associated with fragile and from the past, (ii) train, trust and emerges from practicing these low-income states, has become a retain the best people, (iii) invest in behaviours repeatedly, so that relevant lens for examining wealthy preparedness while the sun shines, knowledge, expertise and trust Western nations. At root, the (iv) distribute domestic power compound over time. concept concerns the way a state effectively, and (v) build responds to shocks. What I have mutually-supportive coalitions The first, simplest, and most described as “the butterfly defect” internationally. important characteristic of resilient characterises the modern economy states is that they learn from the with endemic instability. We live in past. Taiwan, Singapore, South times of “radical uncertainty”, such A truly resilient Korea and Vietnam have been top that no state can be perfectly performers in the fight against prepared for every eventuality. state emerges COVID-19, despite their proximity to the source of the outbreak, and A fragile state is one that breaks from the crisis very different political systems, due under a negative shock. A stronger than in part to their previous competent state can withstand the experiences with MERS and SARS. shock and recover to its previous before. It learns After struggling to deal with the level. A truly resilient state does 2015 MERS outbreak, the South more: it is “anti-fragile”, emerging and grows, with Korean government changed the from the crisis stronger than each trial survived law to provide more resources to before. It learns and grows, with epidemic intelligence officers, each trial survived leaving it better leaving it better including access to CCTV footage prepared for the next. prepared for the for contact tracing. The COVID-19 pandemic has both next Learning and implementing such highlighted key behaviours which lessons is difficult if inquiries take a

 Ian Goldin and Mike Mariathasan, The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic Risks, and What to Do about It (Princeton: Princeton Universi- ty Press, 2014).  John Kay and Mervyn King, Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making for an Unknowable Future (London: The Bridge Street Press, 2020)  Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (London: Random House Publishing Group, 2012)  ‘Contact Transmission of COVID-19 in South Korea: Novel Investigation Techniques for Tracing Contacts’, Osong Public Health Res Perspect 11, no. 1 (Febru- ary 2020). 11 - Resilient State Lessons for resilience long time to report and are overly Vice President. The Australian repeated failure to scale up politicised – as with the UK’s Government has surprised many tracking, tracing and testing have Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq War, with its deference to experts and similarly dented trust that the ideas which did not publish its findings collaborative decision-making, of experts and promises of until 2016 (seven years after UK with 93 per cent of Australians politicians can be translated into combat operations ended). There approving of its handling of the effective actions. are already fears that a similar fate pandemic. awaits an inquiry into COVID-19 in The extent to which trust and the UK. In the UK the Government had “had compliance make the difference is enough of experts” during the evident in the relative successes of Resilient states also learn from Brexit debate, but subsequently in governments from Canada to others’ pasts, not just their own. its response to the COVID-19 China, and also relatively poor While less directly affected by pandemic experts have played a countries such as Vietnam, previous pandemics, Germany central part: government action has Mongolia and in Europe Greece, went into the crisis with a detailed been based on the advice of the which in their management of pandemic response plan that was SAGE committee, and the Chief COVID-19 have outperformed richer quickly updated – with the South Scientific Adviser and the Chief countries. Countries who credibly Korean model of widespread Medical Officer were given leading can claim to lead in science, such testing at its centre. This roles in media briefings. In the US as the US and UK, have had far preparation enabled testing to by comparison, the system has worse outcomes than those with scale up rapidly, with little time become highly polarised, with far lower levels of national wasted on disputes over many talented officials locked out expertise. Those that have done governance, accounting or costs. of office by party affiliation, and well have been aided by high levels high turnover among those who of public support and prompt and remained. widespread compliance, not least Resilient states with WHO guidelines. ‘Rally round Beyond personnel, physical and the flag’ effects can provide a also learn from financial resources are required to temporary boost to individual others’ pasts, not deal with crises – and these are leaders, but effective responses best saved up during the good require deeper support for a wide just their own times. Singapore has been able to range of government actors and a spend almost 20 per cent of GDP commitment to international on stimulus measures by drawing protocols and coordination. Adopting international best on reserves accrued precisely to practice is intimately connected to prepare for financial shocks. Going Resources alone, however, are not the second key behaviour of into the pandemic Germnany had enough – they must also be resilient states: the ability to 35.3 intensive care beds per managed effectively. This requires empower and retain good people. 100,000 compared to 7 in the UK. finding the optimum trade-off Scientific advisors have received a between the coordination value of nightly news profile equivalent to Trust in government is a vital centralised control and the military generals in times of war (or experimentation value of national team coaches during intangible asset. In the UK there was a sharp fall in already fragile decentralisation. A national public international sporting events). health body like the Robert Koch Social distancing measures require public trust following the revelation that the Prime Minister’s close Institute in Germany can publish public compliance. Taiwan’s guidelines and set standards, then response has been helped by advisor Dominic Cummings had broken rules without any apparent state and county authorities can having a popular party- tailor them to their locality. independent epidemiologist as consequences for his position. The

 Constantin Eckner, ‘How Germany Has Managed to Perform so Many COVID-19 Tests’, The Spectator, 6 April 2020. ⁶ Natasha Kassam, ‘Covidpoll: Lowy Institute Polling on Australian Attitudes to the Coronavirus Pandemic’, Web Page, Lowy Institute, 14 May 2020.  Henry Mance, ‘Britain Has Had Enough of Experts, Says Gove’, The Financial Times, 3 June 2016.  Jan Bauer et al., ‘Access to Intensive Care in 14 European Countries: A Spatial Analysis of Intensive Care Need and Capacity in the Light of COVID-19’, Intensive Care Med, September 2020  2020 Edelman Trust Barometer Spring Update: Trust and the Coronavirus (Edelman, 2020). 12 - Resilient State Lessons for resilience

The subsidiarity principle – that Finally, true resilience is not has exposed fragilities in broader issues should be dealt with at the achieved in a vacuum. COVID-19, public health and central lowest possible level consistent like financial panic or a computer government. with their resolution – is a useful virus, is not constrained by human guide but implementing it in borders. In our globalised Major changes to civil service practice is difficult in unknown and economies it is not practical to cut personnel are in the works, but it changing circumstances. Resilient off trade, and tourist demand is remains to be seen how those states have established rebounding fast from Bulgaria to answering the call compare to mechanisms for handling the Tanzania to Wyoming. A key those who make way. The budget constant adjustments required, finding from studies of developing deficit was falling prior to the whether through formal channels and embattled states is that peace pandemic, but the consequent like the European Court of Justice, and prosperity are closely related cutting of investments in health or through complex political to the condition of neighbours. and education are having a haggling, such as is the case with Given this deep integration, profound toll and increasing negotiations over Northern Ireland resilient states invest in inequality, the impact of the and devolution in the UK, or mutually-supportive coalitions pandemic and are likely to slow negotiations in the EU to raise internationally. productivity and growth. common taxes.

China’s delay in reporting the virus Domestic and international Resources alone may have had severe relationships are more uncertain consequences, as have President than they have been for are not enough – Trump’s moves to undermine the generations, with both Scottish WHO precisely when it is needed devolution and Irish re-unification they must also be most. Multi-lateral alliances have in play, and a growing risk of a managed been a key part of British security ‘no-deal’ Brexit. Yet the British state and economic stability since 1945; has a long history of incremental effectively a successful Brexit will require new reform and muddling through, relationships to replace those that reflected in the Common Law have been weakened. system. Britain will survive – it may Resilience does not require that just look diminished and different these dynamics will ever be How resilient does Britain appear, unless greater attention if given to complete, finished for all time, but looking forward? COVID-19 has the long term and building simply that they occur in a way highlighted the country’s strength resilience. which does not undermine the in direct healthcare provision, ultimate unity and legitimacy of the vaccine research and territory being governed. macroeconomic policy, even as it

 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); John A. Vasquez, ‘Why Do Neighbours Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality’ 32, no. 3 (1 August 2020). 13 - Resilient State Lessons for resilience Points of failure, lessons for the future

Professor Sir Ivor Crewe Former Master University College, University of Oxford @IMCrewe

Thomas Hobbes published The UK State has had a creditable The COVID-19 pandemic is the Leviathan in 1651 in the aftermath record since World War II. It gravest threat to the health and of the chaos of the English Civil repulsed a German invasion, livelihoods of the British people War. A revised edition appeared in maintained a liberal democratic since 1945. It poses the most 1668, shortly after the Great Plague order, rebuilt the economy and demanding test of the State’s of 1665-66 had killed 100,000 in constructed the welfare state. The resilience and good governance in London alone, and the Great Fire pre-war scourges of destitution, our lifetime. Any judgement of its had devasted the Medieval city. mass unemployment and performance should be tempered Leviathan was the precursor of the epidemics did not return, although by recognition of the speed with theory of the modern state as a occasionally it was a close-run which the pandemic spread, social contract: the establishment thing. unavoidable uncertainty about the of a single, unified sovereign, with character and trajectory of this absolute power over its subjects, novel virus, and the exceptionally was necessary to transcend the The handling of high-stakes trade-off between “state of nature” in which a “war of protecting public health and all against all” would render the pandemic sustaining businesses and people’s lives “solitary, poor, nasty, represents the employment. brutish, and short”. most egregious Moreover, a full and detailed The foremost purpose of the failure of British account of the Government’s major modern, democratic state is the decisions is not available and what security and welfare of its governance in currently appear to be errors and population, notably protection from deficiencies may be vindicated in the ravages of civil disorder, living memory retrospect. external threat, natural disasters, and epidemics. In return the Governments have dealt effectively Despite these caveats, the handling population pays taxes, obeys the with the lesser-scale emergencies of the pandemic represents the law, complies with regulations and of floods, mad cow disease and most egregious failure of British (in the past) accepted military terrorism, which appears to be governance in living memory. The conscription and rationing among contained. The jury is out on major failures include: other impositions. climate change, which is work in progress. 14 - Resilient State Lessons for resilience

• The continuing lack of a clear as a whole, well above that for the The delay to the lockdown: this and coherent strategy, G20 (4.1 per cent) and the was a policy failure of the core understood by decision-makers Eurozone (7.9 per cent). executive of ministers and their and public alike. most senior advisers. The ‘Failures of governance’ fall into Government imposed the • The delay of the lockdown until lockdown two weeks or more after mid-March. different categories, with accordingly different implications much of Continental Europe, for the reform of the country’s despite well-publicised reports • The inadequate supply of from Lombardy in February of personal protective equipment governing arrangements. Some are (PPE) to medical staff and other strategic, others operational; some exponential increases in infections, key workers. are structural, the product of design overwhelmed hospitals and faults in our decision-making mounting deaths. • The offloading of untested institutions; others are human, the elderly hospital patients to care product of deficiencies in the The Government had only half an homes. country’s political leadership. eye on the ball (“we shall adopt the right measures at the right time”); • The failure, after six months, to establish an efficient national Boris Johnson, distracted by system of testing, tracing and The Government delivering Brexit, and reluctant to isolation (TTI). grapple with the details of bad procrastinated news, was absent from COBRA • The squandering of public trust meetings. in government measures of over strategy protection, particularly social restrictions, and the growth of when decisiveness The inadequate supply of PPE: this non-compliance. was imperative was an operational failure arising from bureaucratic inertia and amateurism. Despite warnings to Appearing before the the Department of Health and Parliamentary Health Committee, The persisting absence of a clear Social Care (DHSC) in June 2019 of the Government’s Chief Scientific and coherent strategy: the low stocks, UK hospitals and care Officer, Sir Patrick Vallance said government procrastinated over homes were beset with PPE that keeping the pandemic toll to strategy when decisiveness was shortages throughout March and under 20,000 deaths would be “a imperative in the face of conflicting April, resulting in higher than good outcome” (17 March). But models and advice from the necessary absentee, infection and these and other failures have epidemiologists. Initially the fatality rates of key medical and contributed to cumulative deaths Government adopted a ‘mitigation’ caring staff. numbering 42,000 and rising strategy of ‘flattening’ the curve of (October 2020), including 20,000 rising infections by a programme of The DHSC had been slow to in care homes left to fend for testing and isolating those with construct, pilot and test supply themselves, one of the highest symptoms and shielding the chains, and to recognise that excess death rates due to vulnerable. But the limited gowns designed for influenza were coronavirus pro rata to population available testing capacity was soon inadequate for COVID-19. By the in the world, behind only Ecuador, overwhelmed, which forced the time desperate NHS trusts looked Peru and (just) Italy. Government to abandon abroad, global supply chains had community testing and switch to a dried up. The delayed Government lockdown ‘suppression’ strategy, requiring a of 16 March led in the following national lockdown. quarter to the sharpest contraction Frontline staff were promised PPE that didn’t materialise and issued of the economy of any of the 37 The hesitation over strategy led to with frequently changing OECD countries, and the forecast of four other major failures. a 10.1 per cent contraction for 2020

 FT Visual & Data Journalism team, ‘Coronavirus Tracked: The Latest Figures as Countries Fight Covid-19 Resurgence’, The Financial Times, 1 October 2020  Building Confidence amid an Uncertain Recovery: OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report September 2020 (OECD Economic Outlook, 2020)  Camilla Hodgson, ‘UK Had No Stocks of Protective Gowns When Coronavirus Struck’, Financial Times, 28 May 2020 15 - Resilient State Lessons for resilience guidelines. Number 10 scrambled testing, testing.” South Korea, PHE over-relied on a small number through personal contacts to Taiwan and Singapore had of central laboratories for secure supplies with what turned adopted a mass TTI programme processing, and on a home-grown out to be flawed contracts. and already appeared to have the mobile phone app for contact virus under control. But four days tracing (of which the first prototype The offloading of untested elderly earlier the Government abandoned had to be abandoned). In hospital patients to care homes: general testing. retrospect, PHE should have taken this appalling error was a product advantage of the substantial of long-term policy neglect in the Public Health England was slow to unused processing capacity in form of chronic underfunding of get a national effort off the ground: university and private laboratories social care since at least 2010, and a mass capacity TTI system, and should have mobilised local of structural weakness in the available locally on demand, with authorities, each of which has its central responsibility for social care rapid processing times and reliable own department of public health, provision, which is divided between tracing of contacts needed to with knowledge of the local the DHSC, local government, ensure timely isolation, proved a community, for tracing contacts of charitable and private providers. No huge logistical challenge beyond those testing positive. Over eight agency considered it had overriding PHE’s capability. A succession of months after infections began, responsibility for the protection of capacity targets were set and Britain still lacks a national TTI the sector. usually missed. On 20 May Boris system fit for the purpose of Johnson announced in Parliament containing their spread. The NHS declared the highest level that the UK would have a “world of emergency on 30 January, but beating system” up and running by The erosion of public trust and there was no action plan for care 1 June, but it did not materialise. compliance: a test of good homes until 15 April, by which time governance is its capacity to rely on 25,000 elderly untested patients the public’s compliance with had been discharged by hospitals Capacity is emergency directives that disrupt desperate to find beds for the irrelevant without their everyday lives and take away swelling inflow of COVID-19 their normal freedoms. The patients. PPE was in even shorter efficient Government began well: the supply for the staff of unexpected lockdown, a drastic under-resourced care homes, implementation deprivation of people’s liberty and leading to high rates of on the ground means of livelihood, was very self-isolation and absence from widely supported and observed. work. A parliamentary report concluded that care homes “were A palpable national solidarity, thrown to the wolves”. Moreover, capacity was irrelevant crystallised in support of the NHS, without efficient implementation lasted until late May. It was on the ground. By September The failure to set up a national TTI sustained by the Government’s one capacity had very significantly system: this was – and remains – a undoubted success in the early increased, but delivery was a public service delivery fiasco, stage of the pandemic – the rapid shambles. People seeking rooted in initial government and efficient roll-out of bold appointments online were directed ambivalence about the role of TTI schemes for furloughing workers to testing stations hundreds of in its overall strategy, a skills deficit who could not work from home, miles away; some testing stations in Whitehall and loans to businesses and adaptions were largely idle; tracers over-centralisation of to Universal Credit. complained of being given no implementation. On 16 March the contacts to follow up; and the Director General of the World Solidarity then slowly frayed as processing of test results was too Health Organisation declared that lockdown measures were gradually slow – up to 48 hours – which his central message was: “testing, eased. By late summer there were defeated its purpose.

 WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 - 16 March 2020’, Web Page, World Health Organisation, 16 March 2020.  WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 - 16 March 2020’, Web Page, World Health Organisation, 16 March 2020.

16 - Resilient State Lessons for resilience

widespread breaches of their journey (an automatic COVID-19 crisis was also compliance with the Government’s quarantine policy was introduced undermined by a catalogue of guidelines on social distancing, later by which point COVID-19 policy reversals. Of these the most household mixing and masks. levels in most countries abroad significant was the Education were much lower.) Apparent Minister’s reluctant reversal of his There is no reliable measure of illogicality and inconsistency in the insistence that, in the absence of A how compliance levels in the UK rules eroded the public’s level exams, teacher-assessed have compared with those abroad confidence in them. grades be adjusted by an OFQUAL and nothing but impressions to algorithm despite warnings that it suggest that public discipline has This was compounded by the would produce bizarre and unjust been stronger elsewhere. But by Government’s carelessness with results. September self-reported levels of the public’s trust in both its compliance were low. For example, competence and integrity. But the list includes: agreeing to a Kings College London survey of Government ministers and officials the right of leave to remain for over 31,000 people living in the UK breached the social distancing in families of non-UK key workers from March to August found that plain sight, and the Prime Minister’s who had died of COVID-19; the only 11 per cent of those in contact Chief Adviser, Dominic Cummings, abandonment of the immigration with someone who had tested who broke the self-isolation rule, in health surcharge on immigrant positive went into quarantine and spirit if not technically, escaped the doctors; the mid-June switch from just 18 per cent of those who sack, unlike other delinquent resisting to insisting on the wearing developed symptoms isolated officials before him. of face masks on public transport, themselves. By common followed by a similar reversal in observation enforcement in pubs, August for schools and shops; the shops and public transport was A test of good abandonment of the commitment patchy. in June to give all primary school governance is its children four weeks of schooling; Acquiescence with social capacity to rely on the switch from refusal to restrictions would very probably agreement to extend Free School have drifted down irrespective of the public’s Meals over the summer holidays; official exhortation and compliance with the cancelling of the home-grown regulations, but numerous NHSX tracing app for a new app Government mistakes accelerated emergency involving Apple and Google; the the drift. The critical failure was the launch in May of an ambitious absence of a clear and convincing directives antibody-testing programme strategy for balancing the (trailed by the prime minister as a protection of public health with potential “total game changer”), followed by its suspension in sustaining the economy. The The message was that one could outcome was a set of regulations mid-July; and in late September the decide for oneself to be exempt Prime Minister’s plea to people to and appeals which taken together from the rules. The blizzard of defied common sense: for work from home wherever changes to the rules over the possible, having appealed for the example, the Government summer, compounded by different encouraged people to go out to exact opposite three months but varying restrictions for local earlier. pubs and restaurants, but avoid lockdowns, left people both family get togethers; and confused and sceptical that the throughout the lockdown, non-UK rules in every detail were A few of these U-turns could be travellers from countries with high necessary. justified as reasonable infection rates were free to adjustments to a changing disembark at airports without situation; but most were testing or restrictions and continue Faith in the Government’s concessions following intense competence to manage the  WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 - 16 March 2020’, Web Page, World Health Organisation, 16 March 2020.

17 - Resilient State Lessons for resilience

public and media pressure. The (epidemiologists) and a much larger and deeper constant drip of policy shifts and biomedicals (virologists). All scale, or at least the skills of an reversals wore away public should be on tap, not on top. intelligent client if outsourcing confidence in the Government’s Elected politicians must always complex projects. grip, and the foundations for choose between conflicting compliance with restrictions scientific advice. 7. Another old lesson, not yet designed to manage the pandemic. cracked: improve both horizontal and vertical The COVID-19 pandemic has tested Do not plan future coordination of responsibility in the British State’s capabilities and wars with the policy sectors that cut across the Government’s competence. departments, e.g. social care. Both get relatively low marks. What battleplans of the are the lessons to be learned for last 8. Nurture public trust, which next time? A brief list follows: will be needed for compliance. Adopt a communications . Do not plan future wars 4. Develop, at speed, a clear strategy that levels with the with the battleplans of the last. and coherent strategy, apply it public. Under-promise and PHE was geared up for an across all policy sectors, and over-deliver, not the other way influenza epidemic similar to sell it to decision makers and round. SARS in 2003 and MERS in public alike. This is the ultimate test of good government. 2015 but Covid-19 proved far Public policy failures rarely have a more infectious, unpredictable single or common cause, as this and lethal. 5. Recognise the limits to the eclectic list reveals. There are centre’s capacity to design and lessons for the strengthening of the 2. Do not delay the action deliver public services. country’s administrative apparatus plans of risk assessments. Incorporate from the start local and decision-making structures. government and other local But the quality of governance agencies in delivery of services ultimately rests with the quality of 3. Understand the limits of on the ground. scientific advice. There is governors, which cannot be always some uncertainty and legislated for. therefore rarely full consensus. 6. An old lesson, still not Social scientists (e.g. of public learned: develop Whitehall’s health) should be heard project programme skills, alongside modellers especially in IT and logistics, on 18 - Resilient State Securing public trust Public trust and compliance in a time of crisis

Suzanne Hall Research Director Ipsos MORI @suzanne_khall

In 1970, political scientist John appeared to be in evidence. Prime right direction than the wrong one Mueller published a paper entitled Minister Boris Johnson’s (40 per cent versus 35 per cent). Presidential Popularity from favourability ratings increased Truman to Johnson in which he sharply while the image of the However, Mueller also stressed that described the “rally round the flag” Conservative Party also improved. any rallying round the flag does not effect – a concept used to explain last indefinitely – what goes up short-term popular support of a must, inevitably, come down. And country’s government or political What matters now since April, public opinion towards leaders during times of crisis or the Government has shifted. By the war. is competency – end of August, just three in ten people were favourable towards Mueller outlined three conditions identified by the the Prime Minister and just under required for this effect to occur. It OECD as a core half unfavourable. Further, a had to be: international; involve the majority were dissatisfied with the country and its leader; and be driver of political way that Boris Johnson was doing “specific, dramatic and sharply his job as Prime Minister (54 per focussed”. Mueller was referring to trust cent dissatisfied versus 40 per cent events related to the Cold War, but satisfied). the definition could also be applied With an 80-seat majority in the to the COVID-19 pandemic: a global House of Commons secured in Some of this dissatisfaction may public health crisis with far December, by April the stem from how, in times of crisis, reaching social and economic Government’s position looked still what we want from our leaders implications and which has stronger as a majority of British changes. What matters now is involved country leaders directly in people (51 per cent) had a competency – identified by the terms of their response to it, their favourable opinion of the Prime OECD as a core driver of political own health and vulnerability to the Minister (up 17 points from early trust. virus, or both. March), and three in ten (31 per cent) had an unfavourable opinion of him (down 16 points). And, for Whereas Boris Johnson is identified In the early days of the pandemic, the first time in 2020, more as being patriotic and has lots of the rally round the flag effect believed Britain was moving in the personality compared to the

 Ipsos MORI, Ipsos MORI Political Pulse April 2020, 2020.  Ipsos MORI, Ipsos MORI Political Pulse: 21 - 24th August 2020, 2020.  Ipsos MORI, Ipsos MORI Political Monitor - September 2020, 2020.  OECD, Trust and Public Policy: How Better Governance Can Help Rebuild Public Trust, OECD Public Governance Reviews (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017). 19 - Resilient State Securing public trust About Resilient State

Leader of the Opposition, he is do public perceptions about how normal workplace, compared with behind on having sound competent a government is mean over four in five employees in judgement, being a capable leader for people’s behaviour as the France, and three quarters in and being a good representative pandemic plays out? And what Germany, Spain and Italy. for Great Britain on the world might it mean for the future stage. relationship between the citizen There are pull reasons at play here and the State? – working at home means And it’s not just in the UK where minimising both commuting time competency is increasingly valued: and costs, while technology another study highlights how Three in five also enables people to do their jobs across the UK, the US, Australia and remotely in a way that was Italy, citizens tend to look more agree that the previously impossible. The role of positively on those politicians who employers and their own guidance are perceived to listen to outside Government’s also needs to be taken into experts in formulating their response has account. However, an response to the pandemic. Rather unwillingness to do as the than people having had enough of been confused government wishes could also be experts it seems they are, for now, an indication that the public back in favour. Similarly, the leaders and inconsistent perceive the threat posed by that have been perceived to have COVID-19 differently to our leaders. used expert advice, been open and transparent, and capable of There are already signs that the The latest trend data finds seven in working with others are generally British public are not acting as the ten people remain concerned seen to have handled the outbreak Government would like them to. about the risk of COVID-19 to them most effectively. Prior to the guidance changes on personally – just one percentage 22 September, when the public point lower than it was at the end Perceptions of a lack of were once again urged to work at of June. Concern for the country competence are likely to be further home if they could, there was little as a whole also remains stable – damaged by a poor sign of British workers returning to and high – down just three communications strategy: a the office. Even with the percentage points from 90 per cent majority have found the Government’s carrot and stick to 87 per cent since the end of June. Government’s communications messaging approach – at once Additionally, on balance more feel about what to do in response to stressing both the benefits of being that lockdown measures have been COVID-19 to be unclear. Three in back in the office with colleagues eased too quickly than feel the five also agree that the for both productivity and mental Government has moved at the right Government’s response has been wellbeing and implying that pace or too slowly. Further, when confused and inconsistent. And, people’s jobs could be vulnerable if asked to rate on a seven-point as a result of all this, half say they they did not start going into the scale how worried they are about do not trust the Government’s office more – British workers restrictions being lifted, just over a advice on when it’s safe to start to seemed reluctant to go back to quarter give the top two scores return to work, school or leisure their desks. compared to 17 per cent who give activities (compared to 45 per cent the two lowest. who do). Research conducted by Morgan Stanley found that, in mid-July, just Given the public’s continued high There may be broader implications half of all British workers surveyed level of concern about the virus and of this shift in public opinion. What (52 per cent) had returned to their the pace of change to this point,

 Ipsos MORI, Ipsos MORI Political Monitor - September 2020.  Ipsos - TrustGov Survey, Political Trust and the COVID-19 Crisis: Summary Charts, 2020.  Ipsos MORI, Ipsos MORI Coronavirus Polling, Fieldwork: 18 - 20 September 2020, 2020.  The Policy Institute and Ipsos MORI, Coronavirus: Growing Divisions over the UK Government’s Response, 2020.  Joanna Partridge, ‘UK Office Workers Slower to Return to Their Desk after Covid’, The Guardian, 5 August 2020.  Ipsos MORI, Ipsos MORI Coronavirus Polling: Concern about the Virus 10 - 14 September 2020, 2020.  The Policy Institute and Ipsos MORI, Becoming ‘Covid-Secure’: How the UK Is Getting Used to Wearing Face Masks and Other Precautionary Behav- iours, 2020. 20 - Resilient State Securing public trust

combined with their doubts as to generation – those in the pre-war the Government’s competency, it is group, who of course have perhaps not surprising that they are Perceptions of first-hand experience of rebuilding taking matters into their own the world anew, are the keenest hands. incompetence proponents of this sentiment (76 foster mistrust, per cent), while younger Their reluctance to return to work is generations, who stand to be hit just one indication of this – but meaning people hardest by the financial fallout are other data suggests that people may be less likely a bit more cynical (just 60 per cent will be prepared to go to lengths of millennials support this view). previously unthinkable if a vaccine to follow the The latest wave of deliberative or treatment is not found. democracy – as illustrated by the rules UK’s Climate Assembly – offers more opportunities than ever for

Under such circumstances, half political leaders to consult widely think it would be acceptable for Further, when it comes to who is to and ensure that their decisions most children to be blame for the mismanagement this have legitimacy. home-schooled over the very long is also split along party lines; term (37 per cent do not) and three Labour voters are much more likely in five think it would be acceptable than Conservative voters to blame In times of crisis, public trust in for parents to decide whether their the Prime Minister (78 per cent vs government is key to ensuring children go to school or not. 35 per cent), the UK government as compliance with any measures a whole (73 per cent vs 58 per cent) citizens are asked to take. and the Conservative party (57 per Perceptions of incompetence foster It is important to note that this does cent vs 16 per cent). By contrast, mistrust, meaning people may be not necessarily represent a new Conservative voters are much more less likely to follow the rules – crisis of trust; our veracity index likely to blame the scientific which in turn makes the State less shows that a lack of trust in advisors to the Government (32 per resilient in the face of adversity. politicians is something of a cent vs 12 per cent), global health The UK experience of the COVID-19 chronic condition. But organisations like the WHO (29 per pandemic to date suggests that competency – as a component and cent vs 8 per cent) and Public whichever political leader is able to driver of political trust – is under Health England (23 per cent vs 5 best demonstrate to the public that more scrutiny, and also perceived per cent). they have the skills, expert advisors to be in short supply at a time when and sound judgement needed to it is most needed. navigate the crisis and lead the Amid all this there are, however, recovery will gain the most. That grounds for optimism for a more What’s more, the partisanship and also means harnessing new ways radical reshaping of our division that has characterised our of engaging meaningfully with a relationship with government. Two politics prior to this crisis has not public that is concerned and thirds say they think that the gone away: 2019 Labour voters are confused. coronavirus crisis gives us the three times more likely than 2019 chance to change how we’ve done Conservative voters to say that the things and build a better UK in the pandemic has been mismanaged future. Support for this varies by (60 per cent versus 21 per cent).

 The Policy Institute and Ipsos MORI, The Future under Coronavirus: Long-Term Changes and Immediate Expectations, 2020  Ipsos MORI, Ipsos MORI Veracity Index 2019: Trust in Professions Survey, 2019.  Gideon Skinner, ‘A Contract Under Strain - Trust in Government and Politics’, Web Page, Ipsos MORI Thinks, n.d., accessed 1 October 2020.  Ipsos MORI and The Policy Institute, Coronavirus Fallout: Blame, Trust and the Future of the UK, 2020.  Ipsos MORI and The Policy Institute, Coronavirus Fallout: Blame, Trust and the Future of the UK. 21 - Resilient State Building domestic resilience A new settlement for social security

Professor Nick Pearce

Institute for Policy Research University of Bath @IPR_NickP

It is staple of public commentary in Social security in the UK is Despite incremental expansion in times of national crisis that ‘there commonly considered archetypal the scope and generosity of the can be no going back’ to the status of a liberal welfare state. Benefits welfare state, this institutional quo. But how far is a critical are relatively parsimonious, structure has endured for over a juncture like the coronavirus flat-rate and extensively century. Important reforms were pandemic transformative of our means-tested. The role of both made to expand the ‘social economic and social life? What universal and contributory or investment state’ in the New changes will endure and what will earnings-related benefits is limited. Labour era: to create tax credits for Covid-19 leave behind in the Private savings and insurance play families and those in low paid 2020s? an extensive role, and household work, a patchwork of childcare incomes depend critically on provision, a more robust pensions employment. system, and wider opportunities for When we consider the long-term education and skills training. impact of the pandemic on the welfare state and the institutions of social security, there are at least As the pandemic After 2010, retrenchment in public three factors to consider. First, arrived in the UK, spending saw extensive cuts to there are the antecedents to the social security benefits, particularly crisis and, in particular, both the gaps and for young people and families with developments in the welfare state children, and intensified sanctions in the years preceding the inequities in this for those of working age. In pandemic. Second, there is the structure of social contrast, the Basic State Pension immediate impact of the crisis and additional benefits for older itself, and how national security were people were reformed and government has responded to it. enhanced in value. Third, there are the steps taken by exposed political actors and organised As the pandemic arrived in the UK, interests to use the instability There is no tripartite governance of both the gaps and inequities in this created by the crisis either to social security between unions, structure of social security were reshape the institutional employers and the State as there is exposed. Older people – leaving landscape, or to close down in Continental Europe, nor universal aside the vulnerability of those in opportunities for reform. We know institutions for the provision of care homes – were relatively a lot about the first two and much childcare and social care, as you less about the third. find in the Nordic countries. 22 - Resilient State Building domestic resilience

protected, if not generously. But the policies in coordinated capitalist generous or well designed. The new Universal Credit – a single economies than those of a liberal Government will extend the SEISS payment integrating six benefits – market economy like the UK, and until April 2021 but has not could not replace lost earnings for stands in stark contrast to the committed to maintaining the level millions of employees, nor those of scattergun subsidies to companies of increased payments in Universal self-employed workers. introduced in the USA (which, not Credit. And the Treasury will be being tied to the retention of eyeing up options for fiscal employees, have failed to prevent consolidation in the 2020s – an Statutory Sick Pay is payable at a mass unemployment). JRS ageing society recovering from a rate of £95 per week and excludes therefore represents a genuine pandemic, with significant the lowest paid, making quarantine innovation in the UK’s political pressures on health and social care and self-isolation unaffordable for economy. spending, and a large post-Covid thousands still well enough to carry deficit, is unlikely be a receptive on going into work. Vast swathes environment for increased of the British population – notably Similarly, the SEISS has provided spending on social security. those in the low paid sectors of significant protection against economy – faced unemployment income loss for those and dramatic income losses. self-employed workers entitled to Yet, significant increases in it. It has particularly benefited unemployment are looming this workers in sectors like construction winter and the UK’s welfare state In response, the Government that rely heavily on self-employed and employment support policies introduced three key measures of labour. Meanwhile, although delays are not ready to meet the employment support and social in accessing payments and challenge. The flaws that the protection: the Coronavirus Job restrictions to entitlements militate pandemic has exposed in the UK’s Retention Scheme (JRS or against the Universal Credit’s role social security system need to be ‘furlough’), the Self-Employed as a safety net, it too has addressed. This is the time to Income Support Scheme (SEISS), buttressed social protection. seriously consider institutional and a £20-per-week increase in Increased weekly payments and innovation and reform in the the main rates of Universal Credit the suspension of sanctions for welfare state. and tax credits, coupled with claimants have been particularly increased housing allowances. important. A new £500 payment for low income workers forced to The exposure of millions of British people to insecurity and the vital More than 9 million jobs, or around self-isolate will also plug some of the gaps in sick pay coverage. role played by key workers during a third of the workforce, were the pandemic may lead to a shift in furloughed by the summer of attitudes to collective risk-pooling. 2020, while 2.4 million It is far harder to maintain a self-employed workers had This is the time to discourse of a ‘deserving’ and claimed SEISS and 3.2 million seriously consider ‘undeserving poor’ and ignore people had claimed Universal labour market precarity when Credit. In total, these interventions institutional pandemic conditions create will cost over £70 billion this year, widespread reliance on social and that is before accounting for innovation and security. With appropriate political the new winter job support reform in the leadership, the public’s normative measures the Chancellor of the sensibilities about welfare Exchequer has announced. welfare state entitlements may therefore change. The flowering of mutual aid and community support groups These were important The signs are not promising that interventions to shore up the in recent months is testament to a these innovations will endure, bedrock of social solidarity. labour market and provide social however. The JRS is being wound security. The JRS is more typical of down and its replacement is not as 23 - Resilient State Building domestic resilience

The holes in the safety net exposed care for children or relatives. Older These core components of the by the crisis, and the depredations voters constitute a critical electoral social investment state paradigm and dysfunctions of sanctions and bloc in British politics and they are remain critical to both the welfare conditionality, have led to likely to be able to defend their rekindling of productivity growth intensified calls for the introduction entitlements to the state pension and a return to full employment in of a Universal Basic Income (UBI). and public services like the NHS. In the UK, without which fiscal Supporters of UBI argue that a these areas the prospects for the pressures on the welfare state will structure of universal payments welfare state look good. be intense. But demographic would have obviated the need for ageing will squeeze the space for creating a myriad of new welfare upfront spending on these social policies in the pandemic, while But Covid-19 has also exposed the investments unless widespread helping to sustain demand in the failings of social care in England support across the generations can economy. A number of countries – and Wales, and the damaging split be marshalled behind them. Care from the USA to Spain and Hong between the funding and provision services, which directly support Kong – have pioneered direct of the NHS and care services families at both ends of the life payments to households or commissioned by local course and enable working parents minimum income guarantees government. A fair system will have and carers to balance employment during the crisis, pointing to the to confront the electoral power of and care, are lead candidates for possible institutionalisation of the grey vote, not least as care this kind of political coalition. UBI-style policies. services that are integrated with Access to such services should not the NHS and free at the point of use be contingent on employment can only be financed by tapping status. Across Europe, older voters and into the accumulated wealth of the labour market insiders remain baby boomers. The abject failure to largely wedded to redistribution protect so many care home Equipping societies for an age of and social insurance policies, while residents and their carers from the zoonotic diseases is likely to have the middle classes are wary of coronavirus may prove the spur to universalising impulses. Robust paying the taxes needed to fund a reform. public health policies and UBI (short perhaps of using infrastructures are, by definition, monetary financing). In such population-wide; partial or circumstances, the biggest Incremental steps privatised social protection cannot challenge to UBI is political: how to provide societal security. But marshal an electoral coalition and towards a UBI, whether COVID-19 leaves a trail of set of political-economic interests reform in its wake will depend on to support its introduction. such as a single political leadership and collective Incremental steps towards a UBI, allowance for action, as welfare state reform has such as a single allowance for always done. young people, probably offer the young people, most promise. probably offer the

In the UK, the Basic State Pension most promise has evolved towards something like a UBI for the retired population. A new kind of intergenerational It is now a single-tier state pension politics is also needed to underpin with extensive credited-in renewed investment in childcare, contributions for those spending lifelong learning and active labour time outside the labour market to market policies. 24 - Resilient State Building domestic resilience Rethinking homeland resilience

Dr Rod Thornton Associate Professor / Senior Lecturer King’s College London

Dr Marina Miron Post Doctoral Researcher King’s College London

A few weeks into the national The military was also made ready floated that it might be necessary lockdown ordered in March in (although not used) to take over for Army personnel to deliver response to the spread of the certain duties from the police. The “millions” of meals to people COVID-19 virus, the Deputy Chief UK Government came to rely shielding across the country. Medical Officer said the UK was an heavily on its military. There was no Another 1,000 were to be on “international exemplar in other state agency that could have standby to support the prison preparedness ”. By July, it had brought to bear the resources that service and a further 1,550 drivers turned out to be the European it did. available for general supply country hardest hit as measured by deliveries. Moreover, to support the the death rate. Indeed within the It was serendipitous that in early police 10,000 troops were held in same month, the UK’s Chief 2020 the Government had the wings for, presumably, dealing Scientific Adviser had to admit that, considerable military capacity to with any pandemic-induced social “It’s clear the outcome has not turn to. At this time, at least 96 per disorder. As Heappy darkly put it, been good in the UK”. Clearly the cent of regular forces personnel “crisis brings economic instability UK was not in fact ‘prepared’ for were based in the UK. Never and economic instability brings the pandemic: its ‘homeland before in the history of the UK’s insecurity. At times of insecurity resilience’ capacity was revealed to armed forces has this figure been Defence is at its busiest”. be weak. so high. Military personnel were thus on hand in numbers – at a Even though such numbers were One area of strength, however, was push they could have provided the not, in the end, needed, the military the UK’s armed forces. These had, sort of mass that the Government, proved essential in other areas. in early 2020, a ready availability of at the start of the UK’s lockdown, This was not only in designing and personnel, equipment, capacity was looking for. building (and partially staffing) the and transferable skills that proved series of Nightingale hospitals invaluable in mitigating these According to Armed Forces Minister around the country, but also in weaknesses at scale and at pace. James Heappy, it was initially setting up and delivering mobile

 Jasmine Cameron-Chileshe and Georgina Hayes, ‘“It’s Clear the Outcome Has Not Been Good in the UK”, Sir Patrick Vallance Tells MPs’, The Telegraph, 16 July 2020.  Ibid.  Noel Dempsey, UK Defence Personnel Statistics (House of Commons Library, 2020).  James Heappy MP and Ministry of Defence, Minister for the Armed Forces James Heappey MP: The Ministry of Defence Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, 2020. 25 - Resilient State Building domestic resilience testing facilities: at one point 95 It is true that there is the Civil in the pandemic, could look for per cent of the mobile testing Contingencies Secretariat in assistance from their substantial centres around the country were Whitehall, but this has only 75 civil defence organisations. While run by the military. employees. Compare this to the they both used their armed forces, Federal Emergency Management there was no sense of reliance on Its personnel also helped deal with Agency (FEMA) in the United States their input. These organisations the dire shortage of PPE. This with 11,000 staff, and Russia (with a played a substantial part in assistance was not just a matter of population only just over twice that generating swift action and in military officers using their own of the UK), whose Emergency keeping the death rate in these two contacts abroad to source PPE, but Situations Ministry (Emercom) has countries below that of the UK, also essentially putting individual over 300,000 personnel. Russia despite their weaker health officers in charge of running the also has a body called services and initially being very National Health Service’s PPE Rospotrebnadzor (110,000), which badly affected. resupply system – including is concerned with everything from developing an online platform – consumer rights to epidemiological Yet robust mitigation practices in with an admiral in overall charge. surveillance in the country. This the most extreme of emergency latter organisation has come to the situations, such as in pandemics, fore of Russian mitigation efforts in require more than adequate civil But what if serendipity had not relation to COVID-19, including played a part – if the Army, in defence. To requote Heappy: “at setting up mobile testing centres times of insecurity Defence is at its particular, had been tied down on countrywide. operations abroad and not so busiest”. He was talking about readily on hand to help? The UK domestic insecurity – when troops government, where pandemics and The UK might be needed on UK streets to other possible future emergency deal with unrest after the police situations are concerned, should government, have lost the ability to provide not have to depend to such a control (as happened in Northern degree on its armed forces. where pandemics Ireland in 1969 and as was initially and other possible expected after a no-deal Brexit). Virtually every other European country has a dedicated civil future emergency This issue is particularly pertinent defence, civil protection or situations are to the UK given that a large police emergency situations body to force is not considered necessary: improve its homeland resilience concerned, should the UK population is used, more or capacity. There is a case for the UK less, to policing itself, based on the to follow suit, releasing the military not have to principle of policing ‘by consent’. from having to perform such depend to such a Hence, England has one of the emergency duties. There may also lowest ratios of police to be a case for creating a degree on its population in the world. This paramilitary force with the stance creates a vulnerability, necessary capacity, scale and pace armed forces however, if it ever does become to also provide mitigations in a necessary to keep public order after crisis. This new force could help Even smaller European countries consent is lost. And it has, in the provide the infrastructure needed, have dedicated civil current pandemic, come close to not only in dealing with nature’s defence/emergency situations being lost. As one Chief Constable pandemics, but also with expected bodies. Spain and Italy, for recently put it, “These are the future man-made contingencies. instance, the two countries that toughest times in the history of suffered almost as badly as the UK policing”.

 Ben Gummer, Civil Contigencies Secretariat: Question for Cabinet Office, UIN 57940, 2016.  Niall McCarthy, ‘The EU’s Most Heavily Policed Countries’, Web Page, Statista, 3 January 2019.  Dave Thompson, ‘Chief’s Blog: The Long Haul’, Web Page, Police Blog, 5 August 2020. 26 - Resilient State Building domestic resilience

Other countries do not have to rely case, the frequency and severity of objectives, have come to on troops to deal with incidences of emergency situations will be understand that what Clausewitz domestic ‘insecurity’. They have increasing in future years. called “the character of war” is their paramilitary forces to back up changing. The wars of the future the police. France has its While the incidence of pandemics are very unlikely to be fought Gendarmerie (100,000-strong); is, thankfully, rare they do appear to kinetically on traditional Spain the Guardia Civil (78,000); be becoming more frequent. battlefields. They are much more Italy the Carabinieri (110,000), and There will also be an increase in the likely to be non-kinetic, long term in Russia there are the 340,000 emergencies generated by climate in nature, and occur on the personnel in the Rosgvardia. The change: the likes of floods, major domestic terrain of adversaries. personnel of such bodies have, forest and grass fires, and drought. ‘Defeat’ will be induced from across all these countries, stepped But more than that, the current within, not imposed from without. in to provide extra levels of policing pandemic has exposed the UK’s in the current pandemic. They have general lack of homeland resilience Russian military writings, for set up roadblocks to prevent the to the activities of state example, are suffused with movement of people in lockdowns, adversaries. directions on how to create internal maintained a street presence that destabilisatsiya within the likes of encourages compliance with the UK and US. The aim being to restrictions and, when necessary, The current gradually weaken governmental dealt with pandemic-linked social and societal structures to the point disorder. The governments of these pandemic has where, ideally, khaos is created and countries have not had to rely on exposed the UK’s the state collapses. The Russians the delicate idea of public ‘consent’ refer to this as “new generation when it comes to imposing general lack of warfare” (NGW). restrictions and, indeed, order – nor resort to their militaries. homeland This is a type of warfare by now resilience to the well understood in the West. In the UK, with low police numbers Familiar headlines referring to and without a paramilitary body, activities of state Russian interference in elections the actual physical imposition of adversaries are just one, albeit limited, lockdowns and of social control in manifestation. Other examples extremis would be impossible include the planting of fake news, without calling in military Actors such as Russia and China, the work of cyber trolls and social personnel. Thus, overall, when it media manipulation. There are comes to providing mitigation, at acting as revisionist powers and seeing themselves involved in an also more ‘hands on’ techniques scale and at pace, in emergency such as ‘grooming’ Western situations in the UK – and when the existential struggle with the West, are already engaging in what UK political figures, the influencing of call is for both civil defence governments and the occasional measures and for extra policing – it military doctrinal statements euphemistically refer to as attempts to conduct actual coups is the military that is the first and, (such as in Montenegro in 2017). indeed only, option. “persistent competition” with core NATO countries. In terms of this All these Russian actions are the

“competition” both Russia and work of the Russian military or are This is a situation that does not China will have noted the UK’s coordinated through this military’s appear tenable. The UK homeland vulnerability. This is a National Defence Management government cannot rely on the luck significant issue given that Centre in Moscow. of having armed forces so freely homelands have become the new available in future emergency frontlines of ‘war’. Perhaps, though, the most situations. Fundamental changes profound means now available to are needed. This is especially so generate degrees of state given that, as appears to be the The militaries of both Russia and China, in pursuit of government

 Nita Madhav et al., ‘Pandemics: Risks, Impacts, and Mitigation’, in Disease Control Priorities: Improving Health and Reducing Poverty, ed. Jamison Dean T, Gelband Hellen, Horton Susan, Jha Prabhat, Laxminarayan Ramanan, Mock Charles N, and Nugent Rachel (Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2017).  Rod Thornton, ‘The Russian Military’s New “Main Emphasis”’, The RUSI Journal 2017, no. 4 (October 2017).  BBC News, ‘Montenegro Jails “Russian Coup Plot” Leaders’, Web Page, BBC News Online, 9 May 2019. 27 - Resilient State Building domestic resilience instability lie in the cyber-technical to firmly ‘double-hat’ the military. A further and more controversial realm. In particular, destructive That is, to add a series of specific step would be for the UK to cyber attacks enabled by Artificial homeland resilience tasks to its establish a paramilitary force. Intelligence represent a overall mission portfolio. The Pandemics aside, if the aim of the fundamental threat to any state’s Australian military already follows UK’s state adversaries is to homeland resilience capacity. The this model. As a force, it is generate internal instability and promise of such attacks is that they specifically designed to provide social disorder then better can be so targeted and so homeland resilience capacity, preparations need to be made to fast-acting (within hours) that they including to act alongside the deal with them. This new force can radically disrupt the functioning police and not just as a possible could provide support to the police of a state: the lights might go out, substitute for it. This was a fact in emergencies. It would not, of bank cards become unusable and highlighted by the recent course, be popular. It would likely there may be no food delivered to employment of joint police-military be viewed as a vehicle for state supermarket shelves. The patrols (with the military unarmed) control and would run counter to consequences could be to enforce lockdowns in Australian the whole idea of policing by devastating. cities. consent. But, in the coming years with the changing nature of the threats facing the UK, control may NGW in fact seeks to use all the Inevitably, though, such a change be more important than consent. methods of destabilisation to would lead to a dilution of core UK engineer social agitation within the military skill sets and degrade targeted state – to work on what operational deployability. Given Russian military doctrine refers to this, and the fact that the armed A further and as the “protest potential of a forces would have to spread population”. The ultimate aim of themselves more thinly, such a more controversial NGW is thus to make adversary change would be resisted by the step would be for states ungovernable because, in military itself; a point already made the end, the population, put under by Armed Forces Minister Heappy. the UK to establish intolerable pressure from various vectors, no longer accept being There appears to be a need to set a paramilitary governed. Control, let alone up a substantial civil defence consent, is completely lost. organisation whose sole mission it force would be to provide immediate and This turn in the character of war to dedicated emergency situation Whatever the avenues explored, emphasise targeting homelands mitigation – but to act at scale and the UK must ensure that it is not as adds further weight to the at pace, such a body would need a unprepared as it was prior to argument that the UK needs to be high degree of standing mass. This COVID-19. Relying on luck is not a fundamentally better prepared for would be expensive to maintain. long-term option where future future emergency situations. And And what would be the tasks of threats are concerned. There are these may come far more suddenly such a UK body in the periods profound arguments for setting up than COVID-19. Preparation is vital. between emergencies? The actual both a civil defence organisation The UK government cannot organisational set-up of any new and a paramilitary force in the UK. continue to rely on the fortuitous UK civil defence body requires If they are, then the country may, ready availability of armed forces substantial thought – Emercom, for indeed, become an ‘exemplar’ of personnel to provide both example, has proved itself to be emergency situation preparation. immediate mitigation and to act as weighed down by Soviet-era a pool of personnel to call into clumsiness and many of Russia’s further action if necessary. COVID-19 mitigation tasks have This piece uses research funded by a British been better handled by Academy COVID-19 Small Grant. Rospotrebnadzor alongside the There are several actions that may military. be contemplated. The first could be

 ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Press Release, The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 25 December 2014.  Foreign Staff, ‘Australian State of Victoria to Deploy Military as Police Face Resistance to Covid-19 Orders’, The Telegraph, 4 August 2020. 28 - Resilient State Going local A new relationship with Whitehall

Deborah Cadman OBE Chief Executive West Midlands Combined Authority @deborah1cadman

In a crisis we revert to type. The The West Midlands saw councils many issues, this was right – the chatty among us get on the phone and the combined authority work allocation of resources across the to friends or family to talk things with community groups to get country, and the mapping of the through late into the night, while resources to shielded populations, spread of the virus, requires the introverted retreat into coordinate with faith leaders to get coordination at the centre informed themselves. Self-restraint fails us public health messages to diverse by experts. as we reach for a cigarette, a groups, and integrate procurement biscuit, or another glass of wine. processes to tackle PPE shortages On some issues coordination was Unshakeable optimists tell us and weed out disingenuous seamless, including the everything will be fine, whilst cynics approaches. Local institutions were construction of the NHS shoot them down from the nimble and scrappy out of Nightingale Hospital at the NEC in sidelines. necessity and remained resilient Birmingham. Yet too often under pressure. processes were designed and As with individuals, so with delivered centrally where local institutions. As the leader of a knowledge was key - particularly regional public body in one of the Too often on shielding, where central worst hit areas of the country, I saw processes were government had neither the data two contrasting reversions to type nor the logisticals capacity to during the response to Covid-19. designed and deliver food and resources to all delivered centrally necessary homes. The first was a set of local institutions doing things differently where local On too many issues the under pressure. After a decade of knowledge was mechanism of collaboration the funding constraint, local proforma, with local leaders government has had to develop key providing information to the centre ways of delivering without and waiting for the necessary significant resource. While Local resources to be distributed Authorities sometimes have a The second reversion to type was down.National institutions reputation for being sluggish and an instinct to centralise within attempted to hold control over bureaucratic, in a crisis they are the Whitehall. Public servants and enormously complex systems, opposite – dropping ‘tanks on politicians faced an unprecedented where the key was rapid response lawn’ organisational competition, task in responding to this crisis. and local insight. This inevitably bringing in expertise from the From the beginning, it was clear meant that resilience and patience private and charitable sector, and that Whitehall intended to deliver was strained. reaching out to members of the much of their response from within community. government departments. On 29 - Resilient State Going local

The centralising instinct is still the machinery of government, I service reform. Here, the key is to apparent as we move to recovery. offer four initial thoughts for how experiment and take risks – In some areas of response, there we might begin to operate more piloting new approaches, gathering have recently been deliberate steps effectively as a system, and ensure data in real time, learning and to work more closely with local and increased resilience in the face of adjusting where there is failure, regional bodies. Postcode-level future crises. and scaling success. public health data is shared more openly with local authorities and Capacity – investing in the skills combined authorities, and our role Devolution must and leadership abilities of public in Test, Trace, and Isolate is better finally unleash the servants in local areas. Both the established. Yet in other areas delivery of large infrastructure Whitehall is still reverting to type – potential for public projects and agile economic including the recently launched development are enormously Kickstart scheme. Despite service reform challenging, straining governments evaluation of the Future Jobs Fund at all levels around the world. The indicating that local coordination Responsibility – giving genuine key to success is building the was key to success in finding powers and flexibilities to local and collective capability of public suitable roles, the decision has regional institutions. Devolution to servants. This is partly about been taken to deliver this scheme date has often felt more like discrete skills in statistics and data from Whitehall, with minimal delegation. At the West Midlands analytics, to understand and act on engagement with local institutions. Combined Authority we have been real-time information – a core Mayoral Combined Authorities, able to deliver with the powers capability when responding to a who have a key role in skills and provided to us – exceeding our crisis, as well as taking day-to-day apprenticeships, have been housing targets, rapidly expanding decisions and about priorities and overlooked as an ideal delivery our bus, metro, cycling, and rail delivery. body for Kickstart or for “similar networks, and delivering skills programmes to reboot the programmes to tackle youth Yet it is also about leadership, economy. unemployment. Yet genuine ensuring that we move away from responsibility means going further command and control forms of The new Cabinet Secretary and – providing both local authorities management and towards other leaders in Whitehall need to and combined authorities with the adaptive and collaborative forms of learn the key lesson of this crisis – funding and powers to deliver leadership. Both require new forms that the centre cannot hold. We long-term plans focused on of public-private delivery models need a new shared vision for the outcomes, not on individual for training, and a more porous national system of public projects. It is through holding this relationship between academia, institutions – based on responsibility that bodies outside industry, and the public sector. responsibility, capacity, Whitehall can earn trust and ensure Critically, there must be far greater accountability, and control. I that projects are suited to local incentives for our brightest and recently joined the Commission for economies and responsive to local best public servants to make their needs. Smart Government¹ in order to way in local and regional shape this debate and ensure that government rather than being the role of local and regional In constructing 21st century sucked into Whitehall or the private bodies in the system is recognised. infrastructure, we need to develop sector. 10-25 year regional plans, with aligned pooled and devolved Announcing the Commission, Accountability – more robust funding, to give developers and Michael Gove said “we must listen accountability for directly elected investors the certainty they need to to ideas on transforming how we officials, both to Parliament and shape successful places. And this deliver … because we all know the the public. More responsible and applies to our social infrastructure machinery of government is no capable public institutions need too. Devolution must finally longer equal to the challenges of new accountability mechanisms. today.” In prompting the debate on unleash the potential for public

¹ ‘About Us’ , Web Page, The Commission for Smart Government, n.d., accessed 21 September 2020. 30- Resilient State Going local

As long as permanent secretaries outcomes. Action against climate together to achieve shared goals, are put in front of select change is a key example – every we will fall short of our shared committees to account for funds part of the system has a role to potential and lag behind our provided to local and regional play, and all our interventions are international neighbours. bodies, there will be a reluctance to interdependent. Our ‘WM2041’ devolve responsibility. New zero-carbon plan for the West When a crisis subsides, we can arrangements need to be Midlands involves numerous enter a period of reflection on what introduced at a national and local changes to how we live, work, play, it revealed about us. We then work level – including reform of the and travel – just one example is our to harness our best elements and select committee system, changes plan for a battery production address those that hold us back. to the NAO’s scope and powers, ‘Gigafactory’ to boost domestic Many individuals and families are and the introduction of new local electric vehicle production. making changes to how they spend and regional accountability their money and their time functions. post-COVID-19, spending more There must be far time outdoors or revaluating New responsibilities should also be greater incentives long-held plans. Whitehall must placed on local institutions to remain in a similarly reflective engage with and involve for our brightest mood. By addressing the State’s communities in the exercise of current challenges through increased powers, not least and best public boosting responsibility, capacity, through more deliberative forums servants to make accountability, and control, we will like the recent West Midlands be in a much stronger position Citizens’ Panel on Recovery. This their way in local when the next crisis hits. way accountability reflects the true complexity of the system – it is and regional made stronger through clear government relationships with the public, local institutions, government, and Yet this one intervention requires parliament. support from across government – trade promotion to secure an Control – recognising that control international anchor firm, energy must be shared. Ultimately, we infrastructure to support the facility, need to recognise that making planning to make a location viable progress on the key challenges we and eco-friendly, new financial face is a shared endeavour instruments to secure long-term between Whitehall and other funding, and more. Until we move bodies. We are all on the same from a model of Whitehall’s control team, and we all want the same over the system, to one of control

 West Midlands Combined Authority, ‘Citizens’ Panel to Help Guide Covid-19 Recovery’, Press Release, 4 June 2020. 31 - Resilient State Going local Weak state, inadequate capacity

Rt Hon Lord William Wallace

of Saltaire Lib Dem Spokesperson for the Cabinet

A resilient state needs a strong contrast with Germany, where response to the Salisbury central government, but also strong well-funded local government led poisonings had been jointly local government and an active civil the response to the outbreak, with managed by local officials, the local society. And it needs institutions locally-run testing and tracing in NHS Trust, and a team from which encourage challenges to the support, has been stark. London. But in the early months of conventional wisdom, allowing for 2020, ministers in London turned a balance between expert advice instead to private companies and and political leadership at different Resilience in a consultancies to manage the levels. The quality of the staff – response across the country, public servants at all levels – is an crisis requires a bypassing existing local institutions important factor; but successful and public servants. management both of daily degree of business and of extraordinary redundancy: Resilience in a crisis requires a crises requires first a strong degree of redundancy: stockpiling institutional framework and stockpiling of of supplies, planning for staff effective political leadership. supplies, planning deployments and – for health emergencies – laboratories in In all of these aspects, the response for staff reserve for emergency use. The of British state institutions so far to deployments and British public sector has been the COVID-19 epidemic, has constrained by government efforts displayed underlying weaknesses. laboratories in to reduce the numbers employed, The most evident has been the and by determination to hold down weakness of local government, and reserve for public spending below the level of the apparent reluctance of central emergency use any other European democracy government to use local except Switzerland, Ireland and the authorities’ resources and small Baltic states. expertise. Successive cuts in central Nevertheless, English public health financial support for local officers and local authorities A Cabinet Office exercise on government, compounding the retained a degree of familiarity responding to a potential epidemic narrow base of their own sources with local geography, and social had concluded without a of funding, had left local authorities and economic conditions that commitment to ensure that there with very little capacity to respond should not have been neglected. were adequate reserve stocks of to a major health emergency. The Two years before, the effective equipment. 32 - Resilient State Going local

Laboratories within the health of personnel and responsibilities preparedness for such an system had been consolidated and among ministerial special advisers. emergency. A more consensual partly privatised since 2010, political climate, within which primarily in order to contain rising ministers briefed the spokesmen of costs. Hospitals were running with Sustained and informed political opposition parties on the dilemmas a tighter margin of bed occupancy direction is not possible under such that government faced, might have than in comparable countries, and conditions. It takes time for new led to more coherence in the with fewer staff. This left the British ministers and their advisers to presentation of government state without the spare capacity to learn about their responsibilities, responses to the wider public. particularly if their previous respond to or manage the major health emergency that it faced in experience has not been in that early 2020. field. The Prime Minister’s senior Yet the entrenched framework of adviser, Dominic Cummings, has Westminster is of institutional criticised the practice in Whitehall confrontation, rather than of Information on the Cabinet Office of moving ‘generalist’ officials dialogue. The Government’s scenario exercise conducted in every two to four years, as approach to managing the crisis – 2018 shows that the centre of disruptive for policy and damaging from the Prime Minister government had the capacity to for expertise. His criticisms apply at downwards – has been anticipate such events. To have least as strongly for ministers and over-confidence in promising what invested in the contingency their political advisers, often it could provide, leading to loss of planning and stocks that the moving on after less than a year. public trust when targets have not exercise suggested would be wise, been met and results from tests would, however, have gone against not delivered. the political and financial All governments assumptions of the then Government. Officials may have make mistakes in One of the government’s first advised differently, but ministers responses to the COVID-19 threat were in charge. responding to was to outsource testing, and later tracing, to large British and unanticipated American companies, without The governance of the UK invests emergencies. Not extensive prior experience in this authority in a strong central field or local knowledge. The executive, with Parliament as the all governments network of ‘Lighthouse’ legislature having limited powers laboratories was set up by a private to examine, and where necessary learn from those consultancy firm, separate from to challenge, policy as it evolves. mistakes, to carry the existing NHS network, creating The five years from 2015 to 2020 problems for the exchange of data saw remarkable turbulence within through reforms as well as the sharing of workloads the political leadership of that when under pressure. executive – in spite of the to improve their continuity of the party in power. resilience Central direction has meant on There have been two changes of many occasions that local political Prime Minister, three changes of leaders have been left uninformed Chancellor of the Exchequer and of Multi-party government might Secretary of State for Local have promoted more active of the intensity of infection within Government, four changes of discussion among ministers before their communities, and not warned Secretary of State for Business, and decisions were taken, or left to one in advance about the imposition of five of Secretary of State for Work side. Stronger parliamentary stricter conditions for local and Pensions. Turnover among committees, within an institutional lockdowns. This has not helped in junior ministers has also been as framework where information carrying the public along with high, and each of these changes flowed more freely from executive changing instructions on social has been accompanied by changes to legislature, might have led to behaviour. challenges to the low level of 33 - Resilient State Going local

High initial levels of public trust in All governments make mistakes in local authorities. Unlike in previous government required for responding to unanticipated political generations, few ministers observance of social restrictions emergencies. Not all governments responsible for local government have declined. learn from those mistakes, to carry have previous experience in local through reforms to improve their government. Political recruitment resilience before the next to Parliament comes much more Local authority leaders have unexpected emergency arrives. So often through work as a special struggled to respond to central far, ministers and advisers have adviser or in party headquarters instructions which impose blamed civil servants and than as a local councillor or council additional responsibilities without government agencies for mistakes leader. offering additional funding, as on made. But the issues that the crisis the ministerial announcement that The distant image of a political has illuminated are far wider than elite, recruited primarily from ‘COVID marshals’ would be that: they show systemic appointed. experience in London, playing weaknesses in the United rhetorical games in Westminster Kingdom’s framework of which do little to prepare What should have been a government, political recruitment themselves for government, has partnership between central and and leadership, and political fed popular cynicism. There are local government, to manage culture. lessons to be learned about the diverse local outbreaks while style of government, the taking into account specific local presentation of policy, the role of circumstances, has been marred by The epidemic has parliament and the engagement of ministerial mistrust of local other parties and groups in government and the public services highlighted an understanding and helping to it provides. underlying crisis communicate the problems that government faces which are too broad to pursue further here. The failure of successive of British governments to tackle the funding governance and management of the social care The UK’s experience in the first nine sector, or to move towards linking months of 2020 confirms the the NHS and social care more The greatest weakness is the message of John Micklethwait and closely, exacerbated the problems absence of any effective Adrian Wooldridge’s the emergency exposed. But partnership between central and newly-published study of different reform has proved too contentious local government. The devolved national responses to the in the UK’s confrontational political administrations in Scotland, Wales epidemic: weak and underfunded system. Reform has been and Northern Ireland have the states lack the resilience to attempted on several occasions, authority, and to some extent the respond effectively to crises like most recently in the Dilnot financial authority, to make their this. They may also find it more proposals which the Conservative voices heard on national policy and difficult to generate the collective government adopted before the to tailor its implementation to public engagement, the 2017 election campaign. Labour conditions on the ground. English community solidarity, when and several newspapers attacked local authorities have no similar commissioning private providers the proposals as a ‘dementia tax’, standing in Westminster and under centrally-negotiated and Theresa May retreated from Whitehall. contracts rather than investing in these necessary changes. Neglect public services led by locally-based of the protection of care homes officials and their staff in the response to a The abolition of regional offices of health emergency significantly government in 2010 reduced This raises large and long-term contributed to the high death rate Whitehall’s ability to inform the questions about the future in the first wave of the COVID-19 centre about regional and local orientation of the British state. The epidemic. concerns. There is little interchange between officials in Whitehall and

 John Micklethwait and Adiran Wooldridge, The Wake-Up Call: Why the Pandemichas Exposed the Weakness of the West - and How to Fix It (London UK: Hachette Books, 2020) 34 - Resilient State Going local

surge of public sympathy for NHS closer to the 40 per cent that can be addressed in a discussion of and other essential workers as the Canada raises, or the 43-46 per the State’s response to the current epidemic developed was cent of the Netherlands and emergency. But the lessons for the impressive. Germany. Public consent for higher UK’s public services are relatively levels of taxation, with a clear. The state is underfunded for significantly higher proportion of the tasks it faces, critically But it’s not evident that sympathy taxation raised and spent at short-funded at local level. would extend easily to acceptance regional and local levels, will not be Depending on the private sector to of higher taxation in order to pay easy for any party contending for create and provide public services NHS staff, care workers and others government to gain. when needed is less effective, or higher wages, let alone to support efficient. the larger public sector that this analysis implies is needed to increase the State’s resilience – The state is Reform of Britain’s central and local from better-funded local underfunded for public services should always be on government and spare capacity in the government’s agenda, carried hospitals and laboratories, to the tasks it faces, forward without losing the better-trained and confidence of the workforce and generously-staffed central critically with the approval of those who planning staffs. short-funded at may form the next government. But it is not the highest priority in local level reshaping the state, nor should The United Kingdom has held its reform or reorganisation be level of taxation under 40 per cent undertaken as a substitute for of GDP, even as its population has tackling the more fundamental aged and demands on public The epidemic has highlighted an underlying crisis of British weaknesses that the COVID-19 services have steadily risen. A more pandemic has uncovered. resilient state would require its governance. The constitutional citizens – and its corporations – to crisis which the UK now faces has contribute a higher proportion, wider causes and implications than 35- Resilient State Building on success

Resilience and the social sector

Andy Haldane Chief Economist Bank of England

The global financial crisis (GFC) of which had come under threat as resilience lessons are being transformed the way society the banking ship hit the rocks. As re-learned. International supply valued the activities of the financial Mervyn King memorably said, we chains before COVID-19, like sector. Pre-crisis, attention focused rediscovered that banks were international credit chains pre-GFC, on the highly innovative, and international in life but national in lengthened and broadened. As the lucrative, activities and products death. crisis struck, they fractured. This being manufactured by banks – laid bare the lack of national ABSs, CDOs, CLOs and the like. This lesson has since been acted resilience in the provision of many These activities were often on. Banking regulation was reset of the everyday essentials of international in nature and, as they with a much greater emphasis on citizens – from pasta to grew, so too did the length and resilience in general, and resilience paracetamol, masks to medicines. breadth of international credit of domestic payment and lending In response, a debate is just chains. There was comparatively activities in particular. The commencing about how best to little focus on the domestic centrepiece of the so-called Basel achieve greater resilience in the activities that had been the bread III banking agreements was much provision of these goods and and butter of banking since the 15th higher levels of banking resilience, services, while retaining the century – making payments and assessed periodically through benefits of internationally- granting loans to households and stress tests. In the UK, these integrated trade. companies. internationally-agreed rules were supplemented with domestic There are many dimensions of this Post-crisis, all of this was turned on measures to “ring fence” the debate. Should industrial policies its head. Many of the innovative domestic payments and lending be re-oriented in ways which put and lucrative products turned toxic activities of UK banks, helping greater weight on domestic supply and risked sinking the banking ship. insulate them from future toxic chains, to serve as an insurance International credit chains broke contamination. policy against future failures in almost overnight. And policy international supply chains? What attention refocused sharply on Twelve years on, the global role should the State play in the keeping afloat those banking economy is facing a very different provision of these goods and activities essential to the everyday crisis – the COVID-19 crisis. services, including through its lives of everyday citizens – making Nonetheless, some of the same procurement policies? payments and granting loans both

House of Commons Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision Fourteenth Report of Session 2008 - 2009, HC 767 (London: The Stationary Office, 2009).  Department for Business Innovation & Skills and HM Treasury, Independent Commission on Banking: Final Report, 2011.  Maurice Glasman, ‘As Globalisation Fractures, the West Must Champion Internationalism in the Face of China’, New Statesman, 3 July 2020. 36 - Resilient State Building on success

These are not new questions. They economic and social history is that vulnerability, a lack of resilience, have periodically been the civil society played as big a role as during these times of stress. That centrepiece of policy debate for as the public and private sectors in has been most clearly true long as we have had recognisably securing the huge economic and financially, where a wide and private and public sectors, societal gains of the past several widening gap has opened up particularly at times of economic centuries.  between the rising demand for and societal stress. They are charitable and community services nonetheless difficult ones. As the invisible hand of the market on the one hand and the brings innovation and creativity diminished supply of finance to I wish to focus my comments on a and the body of the state brings support these activities on the different part of the economy and security and stability, the heart of other. It has been estimated that society, much less focused on in civil society provides the networks, this financing gap for the UK social the past but, I would argue, as communities and social glue that sector is at present running at important as the public and private binds the first two together – what around £10 billion.  sectors in securing economic and Raghu Rajan, in his most recent societal resilience and success: the book, calls the “Third Pillar”. This lack of resilience can be seen, social sector. By this I mean the too, in a lack of ‘infrastructure’ to network of charities, community support the social sector. There is a and faith organisations, Once more, the long-standing issue across many not-for-profit enterprises and countries, that infrastructure does social movements that comprise social sector has not exist to match the skills of what is sometimes called civil served as society’s volunteers to the needs of the society – and at others times is organisations that seek them. It is a called, in a term I dislike, the Third institutional problem that applies across many Sector. charities and communities and immune many potential volunteers. The The term ‘Third Sector’ has echoes system result is an all too frequent set of of the ‘Third World’, a term earlier missed opportunities. For example, only a small fraction of those used to describe developing and 750,000 NHS volunteers were emerging countries. We dropped The importance of the Third Pillar ultimately put to work. this expression years back as it has been amply demonstrated, implicitly appeared to rank these once again, during the COVID-19 countries below the ‘First World’ in crisis. As other sources of capital The same lack of infrastructure is policy debate and importance. (financial, physical, human) apparent when it comes to Back then, that regrettably was crumbled, social capital and the measuring the social sector’s often the case. Today, the same is social sector grew in importance. contribution. At the level of true of the Third Sector. Civil As in the past, the sector has individual charities, too few have society gets nothing like the same provided the stitching necessary to the time and resources available to policy focus and attention as the mend tears in the social fabric: evaluate the social contribution public and private sectors. Often it from the 4,000 community mutual they are making. Indeed, it was this is treated as an invisible residual – aid groups across the UK to the that first prompted me to set up the the amorphous part of society, 750,000 NHS volunteers. Once charity Pro Bono Economics (PBE) neither market nor state, that more, the social sector has served over a decade ago. This matches largely goes unnoticed. as society’s institutional immune skilled economist volunteers into system during the COVID-19 crisis. charities, typically to evaluate their I think this hugely underplays the social impact. So far, PBE has helped hundreds of charities to do social sector’s role and Yet despite its importance, so. significance, historically and historically and presently, the social prospectively. My reading of sector has also demonstrated a

 Andy Haldane, The Health, Wealth And Happiness of Nations: Lecture for Centre for Policy Studies, 2020  Raghuram Rajan, The Third Pillar: How Markets and the State Leave the Community Behind (India: HarperCollins, 2019)  Pro Bono Economics, Pro Bono Economics/ Civil Society Media Results: 02 & 03 June 2020, 2020. 37- Resilient State Building on success

That same problem exists at a sometimes lack the dynamism of amounts of voluntary and national level. Our standard means the private sector. philanthropic activity benefitting of keeping score economically, greater numbers of vulnerable such as GDP, are not well-equipped The social sector has a structure charities, communities and people. to capture the social value created that combines elements of both It means strengthening the by activities in the social sector. For market and state. Like the state, it foundations of the Third Pillar to example, the volunteering regularly provides public goods, largely give it both greater resilience and undertaken by around 19 million unguided by market forces and greater dynamism. people across the UK does not prices. Like the market, it does so register in measures of GDP. In the on a decentralised, and sometimes Unleashing this potential will UK, charitable activities make a competitive, basis. The risks of require a rather fundamental measured contribution to GDP of a such a structure are only too clear. rethink and not just of the social little over 1 per cent.  I have Decentralisation with no market sector. As history attests, it is the estimated that their true social discipline runs the risks of combined efforts of the public, contribution may be around ten under-providing some public private and social sectors, acting in times that amount. This is another goods (and over-providing others). partnership, that is needed to example of the social sector being It also risks that provision taking unleash the potential of each the invisible residual. place in a way that lacks the private individually and their best collective sector’s dynamism. benefits. In rethinking the These resilience problems in the appropriate boundaries and social sector are not structures for civil society, then, we straightforward to solve. They go to It is the combined need to consider the appropriate the very heart of its structure and boundaries and structures of the design. The private sector operates efforts of the market and the State too and their in a largely decentralised fashion, public, private and complementarities. allowing market forces and market prices to serve as a social sectors, Later this year, PBE is launching a resource-allocation device towards acting in Commission on Civil Society, those activities that are most chaired by Gus O’Donnell and innovative and competitive. The partnership, that is funded by the Law Family result is dynamic efficiency. But this Foundation. It will combine comes at a cost. Those same needed to unleash high-level representatives from forces also mean that the private the potential of across all three sectors. Its aim will sector tends to under-provide be to try and address these public goods of various types, from each individually questions about the appropriate lamp posts to lighthouses, due to boundaries and market structures free-riding. and their best of the three pillars. Based on collective rigorous analysis, I hope the The public sector largely operates Commission can give the social on a unitary, centralised basis. It is benefits sector the policy prominence its largely unguided by market forces role deserves and which our and prices. That enables the state societies need. This is not intended to be a to side-step problems of individual criticism of the social sector; it free-riding and supply public goods serves many people very well and on a scale and at a price that better There are no shortage of ways in has done so for so many years. It satisfies public needs, from which effective change might take simply means that the potential of healthcare to education. But that place. Let me end by speculating the social sector may, at present, too comes at some cost. Precisely on one or two of them. On not be being fulfilled. It also means because it is structured in a measurement, progress has been that, with change, more of this non-competitive way, unguided by made over recent years. At the level potential could be unleashed for market forces, the public sector can of the economy, the UK’s Office for the public good: even greater

 Andy Haldane, The Third Sector and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Pro Bono Economics Annual Lecture, 2019.  Chris Giles, ‘Voluntary Work Comes under Spotlight in UK’s Virus Recovery’, The Financial Times, 30 August 2020. 38 - Resilient State Building on success

National Statistics publishes But civic service should be a measures of social capital, based lifelong and inclusive pursuit, on indicators covering personal What better time covering young and old, rich and relationships, social network to broaden our poor. A national system of support, civic engagement, and volunteering, locally-implemented, trust and cooperation. At the level measurement could provide that foundation for of companies, so-called ‘integrated lifelong civic service, mobilising reporting’ provides a means of horizons , putting many more volunteers and offering companies reporting their well-being and those volunteers in return contribution across a broader set of fulfilment and training.  capitals, importantly including broader concepts natural and social capital. of capital at the Finally, to support that lifelong model of civic service, we need Despite this progress, reporting of centre of how improved means of recording and economic performance through rewarding those that do volunteer. the National Accounts or company we measure A digital civic passport would be performance through company one way to achieve that, as is accounts continues largely to success already available for young people ignore social capital and in Scotland. And with that passport, significantly understates the the door is then opened to thinking In providing a better-developed contribution of volunteering and imaginatively about ways in which infrastructure for the social sector, the social sector to the value of volunteer activity might be not just one idea gathering ground is a businesses and societies. What recorded but encouraged – for formal system of National Civic better time than now to broaden example, by extending ‘digital Service. The National Citizen our measurement horizons, putting credits’ for time spent Service has since 2009 offered an wellbeing and broader concepts of volunteering. excellent three to four week capital at the centre of how we programme for 16-17 year olds. measure success, as companies, economies or societies.

 Roger Simnett and Anna Huggins, ‘Integrated Reporting and Assurance: Where Can Research Add Value?’, Sustainability Accounting, Managment and Policy Journal 6, no. 1 (28 June 2015).  Andy Haldane, The Third Sector and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Pro Bono Economics Annual Lecture, 2019. Ibid. 39 - Resilient State Building on success Community power and the investment state

Danny Kruger MP Member of Parliament for Devizes @danny_kruger

What existed before big individual freedom. This better Leaning in to this truth will align the government? It wasn’t personal idea, this something more, is desires and inclinations of freedom – it was ‘big society’, and community power. individuals with their family, not all in a good way. In the high community, and ultimately the Victorian period John Stuart Mill nation as a whole, improving trust, wrote of the suffocating pressure tackling the democratic deficit and of social conformity, of the power Centralised building the resilience of the state. of public moral expectation. This bureaucracies are power was worse than state The doctrine of community power coercion, he thought, because it entirely unfitted is a modernised conservatism. “enslaved the mind”, not just the for the nimble, Power properly belongs not just to body. the rich men who led communities digital, diverse in the old days, but to the Big government has had its day. communities themselves. Here is Centralised bureaucracies are 21st century where liberalism is co-opted to entirely unfitted for the nimble, shore up the conservative idea. We digital, diverse 21st century. But can avoid the social suffocation Mill Community power is closer to what will replace them? Some, the objected to (more likely these days nostalgic conservatism than to modern Millites, yearn for freedom to be the new intolerances of modern liberalism because it from both state and society – a critical theory than a resurgent recognises our fundamental need new progressive utopia of personal religiosity) when ordinary people – more fundamental than our need liberty, sans rules or religions or can assert their values through for freedom – for belonging. nations or manners. Others local decision making. Indeed, freedom proceeds from nostalgically evoke a revived belonging: only with the secure Victorian morality in which base of home, only with the Community power is the secret to everyone conforms to the identity learned from others, can levelling up, the magic yeast that bourgeois standard on pain of you safely and effectively venture will make depressed places rise. As social ostracism. Neither will do, into discovery and self-discovery. Professor Sir Paul Collier puts it, though I think the second, nostalgic This unfashionable truth, that ‘we’ there is a “radical uncertainty” vision is closer to the future than precedes ‘I’ in the sequence of life, about what drives local growth. the liberal one. As we dismantle the is the basis of conservatism and bureaucracies of the 20th century the cardinal distinction between it Fittingly, there is no central recipe state we need a better idea than and liberalism. we can apply to every community. liberalism, something more than 40 - Resilient State Building on success

All we know for sure is that, as money. Bang for buck is by Rather than just thinking of ways to Robert Putnam demonstrated 30 definition larger in areas of existing deliver acute remedial services years ago in his study of the growth: adding a housing estate or with greater efficiency and value regions of Italy, prosperity depends a business park to an affluent town for money, government should on “norms of reciprocity and yields bigger and quicker returns think of ways to generate networks of civic engagement”. than putting these things (let alone community capital. We need an the social infrastructure places ‘investment state’ that helps create Places with high levels of social really need) into a depressed or the civic conditions for prosperity. infrastructure and associative life – ‘left-behind’ area. The system also How do we organise government with churches and clubs and applies a discount rate of 3.5 per to do this work? We are, in the charities, with volunteering and cent per year for capital investment words of John Fonte of the Hudson mutual support – do better – a depreciation forecast that Institute, in the era of “post economically than those without encourages short-term projects democracy”, when elites run the these things. “Civic conditions”, rather than the long-term show with little reference to voters says Putnam, act like “a powerful investments that drive sustained and their representatives. The Blair magnetic field”, pulling social and growth. years saw a transfer of power from economic conditions forward in democratic control to quangos, their wake. Or to put it another way, Our social model similarly inhibits including the European “civics helps to explain economics, the associative life that places and Commission; many were helpfully rather than the reverse.” Strong people need. We have a ‘just in abolished under David Cameron families and communities, in other time’ system of social support, though others were created (like words, reduce economic which essentially means the Public Health England, and indeed dependence and make for a government steps in when things NHS England as a chartered, stronger, more resilient state. have gone wrong, and tries, autonomous body of its own). expensively and often ineptly, to put them right again. Hence the Boris Johnson has rectified the Community power favouring of acute healthcare European mistake, and restored spending over preventative democratic control of our borders is the secret to treatment (the famous ambulances and our laws. He might yet rein in levelling up, the at the bottom of the cliff rather the independence of the health than fences at the top), the vast quangos. But this is not enough. magic yeast that expenditure on prisons compared Indeed, democracy in its formal to youth services, or the cost of sense – the ultimate power of willl make looking after children in care rather Parliament over the bureaucracy of depressed places than investment in families and the state – is not enough, though family support. we do need this very urgently. To rise properly enfranchise the people we These late, reactive, acute need a more distributed model of

interventions are necessary power: more varied, more local, This is the way to level up – but our because of the absence of more informal. current fiscal model hinders it. In a community capital, the assets that nutshell, we send revenue places need to prosper and to spending to poor areas – largely via In the report I recently completed withstand economic shocks. transfers in the welfare system, for the government, Levelling up Community capital could be said to investing in individual people rather our communities: proposals for a consist of human capital (skills and than in civic conditions – while new social covenant, I set out a good mental health); social capital investing capital in the areas that range of policy areas where (the trusting networks that form are already wealthy. community power should replace around institutions and the dominance of large public and associations); and financial capital This is because of the way the (wealth, whether liquid or physical, Treasury calculates value for held by and for communities).

¹ Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).  Danny Kruger MP, Levelling up Our Communities: Proposals for a New Social Covenant, 2020. 41 - Resilient State Building on success private sector bureaucracies. These Here, then, is one of the essential are the proper business of central include housing, health and socia functions of the investment state government. care, aspects of criminal justice, after power has been given to Radical devolution will free up the early years, employment, and communities: to police their use of capacity of central government to refugee support. In all these areas it, inspecting and reporting on the attend to these grand challenges, we should enable local people, exercise of responsibility by the while securing the long-term front-line professionals and expert myriad organisations now resilience of our towns and villages non-government organisations to entrusted with it. for future generations by allowing take more responsibility - to build local systems to develop and systems based on trust and mature according to local needs. reciprocity rather than simply on The centre should Putnam’s work shows that strong command, control, and communities do not erode trust in quasi-markets. be much smaller, the central state, but enhance it. but it should be Community power is not an There is a danger here, as Nigel Ball anarchist or anti-state doctrine. of the Government Outcomes Lab much more long Indeed this is the way to restore at the Blavatnik School of sighted faith in politics, and in the good Government points out: “Relying that government can do. too heavily on relationships and The investment state should be trust demands an idealised vision More is needed, as Putnam more than a neutral inspector, of human behaviour, and risks a discovered in Italy, than formal however. Indeed the government resurgence of many of the vices democracy and liberal we need is far from neutral. The that the reform of the past was individualism. We need an older centre should be much smaller, but intended to combat: inefficient idea, the inheritance of civic it should be much more services meaning wasted money; humanism and the ‘virtue’ long-sighted. The ‘grand weakened accountability structures philosophy of the Renaissance, challenges’ identified by Theresa allowing patronage and corruption; which stressed your contribution to May’s Government, the threats and variations in local funding leading society rather than your opportunities presented by to ‘postcode lotteries’; independence from it. Then demographic and technological institutionalised prejudice; (leapfrogging the Enlightenment, change, was the right approach, systematic abuse of the vulnerable. that over-promoted era) we need and we should add the ethics of AI, Many residents of less mature the Victorian ethos of social pandemic preparedness, the rise of democracies or less dynamic solidarity and collective action, China, and no doubt others to the economies are still attempting to albeit (as Mill wished) a little less list. These, not the mechanics of exorcise these demons.”³ patriarchal. Disraeli had it right: local healthcare or the ‘trust the people’. management of local jobs markets,

³ Nigel Ball, ‘Reset of Refine: How Should Boris Johnson’s New Government Set about Reforming UK Public Services’, Government Outcomes Lab, 13 December 2019. 42 - Resilient State Building on success Future-proofing our digital infrastructure

Rt Hon Baroness Nicky Morgan of Cotes @NickyMorgan01

As so many aspects of our lives massively important parts of our one area before they start on moved dramatically and national infrastructure. In some another. We need a nationwide unexpectedly online in March ways, given the shift to working step change in our digital 2020, I suspect I wasn’t the only from home and working on the connectivity now. And we must be former Digital Secretary or Minister move they are becoming more realistic that Government support nervously wondering if our important than some of our more will be needed particularly for parts broadband and telecoms networks traditional infrastructure such as of the country which are too would meet the likely demand. To transport. And they will definitely remote for operators to upgrade their credit, overall, they did. play a role in helping us to achieve without it. our low carbon ambitions. But the switch to virtual meetings, Our digital infrastructure needs to online school lessons and Zoom be explicitly stated to be as drinks was still, for many people, a To achieve a truly important as projects such as HS2 slower and more frustrating resilient state we or the third runway at Heathrow. experience that it should be in the And it needs to be non-negotiable 21st century. To achieve a truly need better now in areas such as new housing resilient state we need better developments. Offering a new connectivity both geographically connectivity both property for occupation that but also demographically. geogrphaically but doesn’t have fibre should be as unacceptable as offering one also without a connection to mains When I became Digital Secretary in water or the national grid. July 2020 the Prime Minister was demographically clear that ensuring communications providers worked Our supply chains need to be towards gigabit-level connectivity There can be no let up in focusing diverse. The recent arguments over faster than they might otherwise on our digital infrastructure and which companies should be do was to be a key focus for me pushing for upgrades as quickly as allowed to upgrade our 5G network and the Department for Digital, possible. The operators want to get is a different conversation for our Culture, Media and Sport. stuck in, which is a good thing. But infrastructure planners than who Broadband and telecoms are we can’t wait for them to upgrade builds our roads or railways. 43 - Resilient State Building on success

We will need to be clear about what of the future that the UK is the Other applications of technology is in our national interest when it place to locate based on our talent can be found in sectors as diverse comes to our digital infrastructure pipeline, regulatory environment as farming, the creative industries, for the simple reason that as it and explicit support for innovation. and the payments industry. becomes a key part of our lives we are more vulnerable to the risks, along with the opportunities, it can That also means encouraging all of In accepting that more of our lives bring. But the UK is also in a unique us to learn new digital skills, adopt are going to be lived online we also position, particularly as we leave new tech and encourage the next have to accept that we all have to the EU, that we can bridge the generation to look to the digital become more cyber savvy. Banks different digital attitudes shown in horizon for their careers. This is and other financial institutions and Europe, America and Asia. We about more than coding – it is their customers have learnt this the should plough our own digital about creativity and innovation, hard way – by losing millions of furrow and not be compelled to taking existing things we do and pounds and being knocked offline make a choice between other re-casting them for a digital age. by attacks and sometimes just a nations’ self-interests. lack of operational resilience. Banks are continually looking for Our digital ways to bolster online security and The other encouragement needed remind customers of the threats to is for customers to take up those infrastructure their finances and the steps they faster speeds. That means making should take to prevent such risks. it easier for customers to needs to be There can be no substitute for understand what is available, or explicitly stated to continual and widespread soon will be, in their area, what that nationwide cyber security means for them and how they take be as important as campaigns. advantage of it. Any anti-competitive practices or projects such as hurdles which make it harder for HS2 And the lesson from the WannaCry people to switch contracts must be ransomware attack on the NHS tackled. And in the same way as (amongst many thousands of other moves have been made to HealthTech is one of those areas organisations) is that IT software encourage loyal (often older and where the UK is developing has to be kept up to date and there long-standing) customers who pay world-beating capabilities – such are many bad actors trying to over the odds to move energy as the Centre for Responsive disrupt our online activities and supplier, we need to do the same HealthTech Innovation I visited as even extort money from us. with their broadband and/or Digital Secretary. The Centre is a telephone suppliers too. It’s not collaboration between Leeds The UK has world-beating cyber acceptable for older or less digitally University and Leeds Teaching capabilities in GCHQ and the confident customers to be paying Hospitals NHS Trust. National Cyber Security Centre and too much simply because they feel we need to deploy them not as tied into a service such as an email And if this all sounds slightly agents of doom, but as agencies address. overblown then just think of one which give confidence to those very simple application which using digital services and those The UK is a digital nation – we lead might help all of us with elderly creating them that the UK’s cyber the world in areas such as quantum relatives living on their own – defences are robust. computing, deployment of 5G and thanks to health tech we (and their the Internet of Things. Better digital medical team) will be able to check Encouraging people to take up connectivity is not just about more if they are mobile and if they’ve faster services and to think about stable video conferencing calls or taken their medication without future careers in digital and tech faster download of content – it is having to interrupt their day. But won’t, however, get very far if our about dramatic improvements in that does need reliable digital our productivity and giving infrastructure to work. confidence to the tech businesses 44 - Resilient State Building on success young people don’t have access to the bottle it can’t be put back in, infrastructure, a responsive and computers or any kind of ensuring teachers and students are realistic digital regulatory connection other than, perhaps, a comfortable with online learning environment, effective cyber parent’s or carer’s mobile phone. has to be part of a longer term security capability, a strong digital move for education in the 21st skillset across the nation and a century. EdTech is another sector focus on digital equality for all. We The move to online learning in where the UK plays a leading role must not miss this chance. schools across England, because it but what the pandemic has shown happened so fast this year, is that online learning is not just for inevitably highlighted the divide some subjects and some schools – We need to give between those able to access it has to be for everyone. virtual lessons and those who confidence to couldn’t. Many schools did a heroic job of helping their students cope Inevitably 2020 has been the year those using digital with online lessons or found ways of the pandemic. But, because of to provide alternative lessons. And the virus, many individuals, services and those many thousands of laptops were organisations, and businesses have creating them that provided, but it was still patchy. made digital leaps in days or weeks that would otherwise have taken the UK’s cyber years or decades. The UK can Given the ongoing uncertainties of create a world leading digital defences are the virus and, in any event, the fact eco-system - modern digital that once the digital genie is out of robust REFORM Get in touch

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