The British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Home , Falls Curfew, Free Derry, Ian Freeland, Max Hastings, Operation Banner, Peter Leng

Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Brian Treanor

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Australian Defence Force Academy

University of New South Wales

2011

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

„I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.‟

Signed ……………………………………………......

Date ……………………………………………......

ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that confrontation between the nationalist community and British troops in Northern Ireland was virtually inevitable, despite the celebrated „honeymoon period‟ that followed the deployment of troops in August 1969. The thesis will show that the army‟s attitudes, experience and culture led it to move rapidly from a neutral, „peacekeeping‟ posture to counter-insurgency operations before an insurgency had begun. It will also show that the deployment itself was the culmination of a series of ill-conceived and usually counterproductive decisions by British governments torn between a deeply-ingrained fear of becoming involved in Irish conflicts and a belief that Irish problems could be solved by exporting British norms and institutions. Such poor decisions continued after the deployment and helped to create a vacuum that the army filled with a strategy derived from its own recent experiences of colonial policing operations.

The settlement of 1921-22 led British authorities to believe that the Irish question had been permanently removed from British politics. However Britain‟s abdication of its constitutional responsibilities for Northern Ireland allowed the Unionist government to institutionalise sectarian discrimination while limiting the Westminster government‟s options for future intervention. When the province erupted into violence in 1968 Britain continued to hope that the problem could be resolved without British intervention. But when the Stormont government coercion against nationalist protest led to endemic sectarian violence, the British government found it had no choice but to send in the army.

While this British army was experienced at using force to restore order in colonial conflicts it was utterly unsuited to aid the civil power within the United Kingdom. Moreover, key elements of the army nursed a latent hostility to any manifestation of Irish nationalism. The result was that early attempts at maintaining good relations with the nationalist community in Belfast did not last, and because of its confrontational approach the army quickly became associated with the despised Unionist government. This process culminated in July 1970 when the newly-elected Conservative government gave the army its head, allowing it to instigate a counter-insurgency campaign before any insurgency existed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

While I am alone responsible for this thesis, it was carried out over a number of years and could not have been completed without the invaluable help from a number of people. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all those who helped and supported me throughout this endeavour. In particular I am immensely grateful to the enduring support of my thesis supervisor Dr David Blaazer from the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of new South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra. Dr Blaazer was not only a constant source of advice and encouragement throughout this whole process but his unwavering enthusiasm and professionalism in the face of life‟s trials was the vital component I needed to complete such a demanding task. I also wish to thank my co- supervisor Dr John Connor for arranging access to the papers of General Sir Ian Freeland at the Imperial War Museum in London because without access to these unique records the thesis would be a much lesser work. I was very grateful that I was able to undertake this research at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Australian Defence Force Academy. The head of the School, Professor David Lovell, and his staff supported me above and beyond the call of duty during my extended stay and I thank them for their on-going support. The UNSE@ADFA is a very exceptional academic institution and supports its post- graduate students in ways that much larger institutions are unable to do. This is especially true with regard to the Academy Library with its unique collection and staff who were friendly, efficient and always willing to source even the most obscure request.

I also wish to thank my family both in Australia and Ireland for their sustained support and assistance during a project that many must have wondered would even be completed. Michael was always there for me with encouragement during the many times when my tribulations seemed insurmountable. Timothy may not have appreciated how important the research project he carried out for me in London was but without his diligence and hard work at the Imperial War Museum I would not have been able to access General Freeland‟s papers which have proved so essential to this thesis. My family in Ireland also need to understand how essential their input to this work was. Chris, Paul and Mairead I thank you for your on-going support and assistance over the last few years. Chris has survived more personal trials than anyone should have to confront but like most Irish women she has an indomitable spirit that saw her through and it is to her that I dedicate this thesis. However my overwhelming thanks must go to my wife Suzanne who was a pillar of strength and support to me through even the darkest of times. Without her I would never have completed this thesis. Sue I thank you for staying with me through an endeavour you must have thought had consumed me. You will be happy to know that this journey is now over and we can now start another and hopefully more enjoyable phase in our life together.

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CONTENTS

Page

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 A Place apart; Britain and Ireland before 1968. 30

Chapter 2 The Wilson Government and the Return of the Irish 65 Question.

Chapter 3 Ireland, Insurgency and the British army. 100

Chapter 4 The British army and the Northern Ireland Special 140 Powers Acts.

Chapter 5 The army in control. 178

Chapter 6 Belfast; a city at war. 206

Chapter 7 Nationalism and the army. 232

Conclusion 259

Bibliography 272

Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Introduction

This thesis will argue that when the British army was deployed to Northern Ireland in August

1969 it did not follow the direction of its political masters and operate as an impartial force to keep the peace. Even though the British government‟s requirements were clearly spelt out by the Home Secretary James Callaghan when he directed the army to act in an even-handed manner 1 it almost immediately identified the nationalist community as the source of the trouble and began confronting them as if they were colonial rebels. However impartial policing quickly evolved into a counter-insurgency operation well before any republican insurgency existed. The army‟s actions in the province‟s two major cities, in particular

Londonderry were not those of impartial peacekeepers but of a military force confronting rioters it judged were disloyal to the Crown. Frank Kitson comes closest to describing the army‟s real modus operandi in Northern Ireland when he stated in Low Intensity Operations that: “keeping the peace and duties in aid of the civil authority were polite terms to describe a mild form of countering subversion.”2

In Londonderry the army had immediately confronted the nationalist community with force and even though the army‟s actions in Belfast were initially less confrontational there was conflict between it and the nationalist community as early as September 1969. The army had actively confronted elements of the nationalist community even though it had not come under any direct attack from that community or from its traditional defenders the IRA, on the

1 J Callaghan, A House Divided, William Collins, London, 1973, p 43. 2 F Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency & Peacekeeping, Natraj, Dehra Dun (India), 1992, p. 25.

contrary the IRA in Belfast had worked with the army to help stabilise the situation.3 In spite of these clashes an amicable relationship had developed in Belfast, however this began to fracture very shortly after the initial deployment when the arrogant and aggressive actions of some troops began to be challenged by members of the nationalist community.4 In

Londonderry the army had immediately identified the nationalist community as the source of the problem but in Belfast there was a short hiatus before the nationalist community was judged in the same light and the same level of force began to be used against all of the nationalist community. However this is not the view usually taken of these events or of the army‟s role because the commonly accepted view is that the army acted in a neutral manner towards the nationalist community from its initial deployment until the emergence of the

Provisional IRA (PIRA) in January 1970. It is also generally accepted that the public emergence of the PIRA signalled the start of its insurgency against the British state that in turn forced the British army to adopt aggressive counter-insurgency tactics.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Dewar in The British Army in Northern Ireland promotes the generally accepted view that the army in Northern Ireland was an impartial force that approached a very difficult task in a professional manner. As he stated:

Though solely tried, though individual men may have made mistakes, although inevitably playing the role of „pig in the middle‟, the army has managed in a quite remarkable way to do its duty in the professional and humane way we have come to expect of the British soldier. It has remained impartial; it has with few exceptions, maintained the tradition of minimum force. It has, where no other modern army has demonstrated similar self-discipline in like conditions, maintained a remarkable degree of restraint often despite extreme provocation.5

3 T Geraghty, The Irish War, Harper Collins, London, 1998 p. 93, 1998: R Thornton, „Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army's deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972), The Journal of Strategic Studies, 30(No 1), 2007, pp. 73-107. 4 L Baston, Reggie: The Life of Reginald Maudling, Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill, UK, 2004, p. 360: M Meehan, Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007. 5 M Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1996, p. 10.

Dewar also supports the widely accepted belief that by the early 1970s the situation had dramatically changed with the emergence of the Provisional IRA. He argues that in 1970 the

Provisionals, while not yet strong enough to tackle the army directly was a terrorist organisation that had grown from less than one hundred active members to eight hundred by the end of the year. It was these angry and discontented urban working-class youths that the army had to confront.6 From the start of that year it was the combination of these highly motivated foot-soldiers and embittered leaders that Dewar says gave the PIRA such a horrific potential for violence.

Peter Neumann in Britain’s Long War claims that when the army was deployed to Northern

Ireland in 1969 the British government had ensured that it acted in restrained way so that it could withdraw it as quickly as possible. The army was to act in a manner that Harold Wilson described as being “firm and cool and fair”.7 It was directed to act as „peacekeepers‟ and limit its actions to merely „controlling civil disorder that had got out of control‟ and it was this limited response that allowed the army to be generally accepted by the nationalist community. However any appearance of impartiality changed dramatically with the emergence of the Provisional IRA in early 1970. According to Neumann the PIRA had an:

“obvious intention to start a military campaign ... against the British forces of occupation” 8 and it was the emergence of the PIRA that changed the dynamics between the army and the nationalist community. From that time the army‟s role was to confront and contain the nationalist community. This perspective is also supported by Caroline Kennedy-Pipe in The

Origins of the Present troubles in Northern Ireland.9 She states:

6 ibid, pp 47-49. 7 P Neumann, Britain’s Long War, Palgrave, Houndmills, 2003, pp. 51-53. 8 ibid, p. 52. 9 C Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, Addison Wesley Longman, London, 1997.

… in the first phase, British troops acted as a quasi police force, … actively involved in the protection of the minority Catholic community. However the conflict changed quite dramatically with the emergence of the … provisionals in 1970. [their actions] transformed the function of the British army; it was recast into the role as the opponent of the type of nationalism associated with Catholic Irish insurrection. … in the early 1970s the British army … abandoned its neutral role and engaged in a formidable counter-insurgency campaign against [the PIRA].10

There are a number of reasons why this viewpoint has been accepted, including the often repeated claims by the British government that the army was sent to Northern Ireland simply to restore order and it would do this by acting in a neutral manner. The British government and especially the Home Secretary James Callaghan repeated - publicly and privately - that the army would act impartially between the two parties to keep the peace and preserve the life and limb of all Northern Ireland citizens. As Callaghan stated in parliament shortly after the army was deployed:

The General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (GOC NI) has been instructed to take all necessary steps, acting impartially between citizen and citizen, to restore law and order. This is a limited operation and during it the troops will remain in direct control of the GOC, who will continue to be responsible to the United Kingdom Government.11

Callaghan had only reluctantly authorised the deployment of British troops onto the streets of

Londonderry and Belfast because the RUC had been unable to restore order. More importantly he stated that the army would act in an impartial manner to both protect the nationalists from attack by loyalists and by their presence alongside the RUC to calm the unionists.12

10 ibid, p. 170. 11 Quoted in Callaghan, 1973, pp. 43-44. 12 ibid.

Much has also been made of the so-called „honeymoon period‟ in 1969 when the nationalist population generally welcomed the British army and there is considerable evidence that at least in Belfast there were amicable relations between the army and that community.

However this had only occurred because the army had initially protected the Catholic minority and had actively engaged with that community. Troops in the Falls Road had received a very warm welcome from the local Catholics but conversely a hostile response from neighbouring Protestants.13 Also supporting this belief was the deadly gun battle between the army and loyalists in the Protestant Shankill Road in October 1969, described by

General Freeland as the largest gun-battle ever to have been fought in Northern Ireland at that time.14 This was not just a random attack by loyalist but a sustained gun-battle that resulted in the death of the first member of the security forces in the present conflict.15 However it is usually claimed what has been called the honeymoon period ended in January 1970 coinciding with the formation of the Provisional IRA and that this compelled the army to respond to the PIRA‟s stated intention of using force against it 16 yet Freeland stated that it had ended much earlier.17

There is little doubt that the underlying ideology of the PIRA was based upon a return to the

IRA‟s tradition of „physical force‟ and a united Ireland. Nevertheless there is little evidence that it either had the numbers or the ability to undertake such an overwhelming task in early

1970. Although the Provisional IRA had emerged at the start of 1970 with the fundamental aim of removing the British from Ireland it did not pose a threat to the British state until the end of 1970, rather its only real strategy during most of 1970 was the defence of the

13 K M Wharton, A Long Long War: Voices from the British Army in Northern Ireland 1969-98, Helidon & Company, Solihull, 2008, pp. 46-47. 14 Gen Sir I Freeland, Transcript-This week-Five Long years 1974, IWM 79/34/4. 15 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, London, 788: 47-164, 13 October 1969. 16 C Allen, The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers Voices, 1945-1989, Futura, London, 1991, p. 207: General Michael Grey, Sound Archive, Imperial War Memorial, London, 2007, IWM 11146. 17 Freeland, Study period, 5 Dec 1969, IWM 79/34/3.

nationalist community.18 The army‟s own official account of the „troubles‟ confirms that the

PIRA was not a viable force during 1970 and did not directly attack the army until the start of

1971.19

However, this thesis will show that the situation was much more complicated because there is also evidence that the army acted in a hostile manner towards the nationalist community almost immediately after its deployment. Army commanders had identified the nationalist community as „the problem‟ within weeks of the deployment and began to target that community. Senior officers on the ground at the time, including General Michael Grey considered that the insurgency started in January 1970 with the emergence of the PIRA.20

However it is generally accepted that the PIRA did not overtly attack the army for another year. Peter Neumann argues that the army believed that the PIRA had started its terrorist campaign in November 1970 and that it was about to start its armed conflict with British forces.21 Nevertheless as MLR Smith states in Fighting for Ireland that it was only at “the beginning of 1971 that the [PIRA] army council authorised attacks on the British army.”22

Conversely, the official army report into its operations in Northern Ireland, Operation

Banner, states that the PIRA was not in a position to attack the army in early 1970 and it was not until mid-1971 that an „insurgency‟ took place.23 The army‟s premature adoption of a counter-insurgency strategy strengthened the PIRA‟s hand in the insurgency that was still to come.

18 MLR Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 84-85. 19 Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, MoD, 2006. 20 General Michael Grey, IWM 11146, 2007. 21 Neumann, 2003, pp. 53-54. 22 Smith, 1995, p. 95. 23 Operation Banner, 2006.

Although this is not the most commonly expressed viewpoint, it has also been articulated by

Niall O Dochartaigh in From Civil Rights to Armalites 24 who argues that when the army was deployed in Londonderry it did not act as impartial peacekeepers but almost immediately began to confront the nationalist community. The same way it had confronted anti-British groups in Malaya, Cyprus and Aden. The army had been specifically deployed by the British government to protect nationalists from rampaging unionists, however in Londonderry those troops ignored both the reasons for the conflict and their explicit political directions. They simply identified the nationalist demonstrators as the troublemakers and immediately began using force to overwhelm them. O Dochartaigh focuses very strongly on Londonderry and while Londonderry is important to this thesis, Belfast is equally if not more important. It was as a result of the army‟s unwillingness to be truly impartial in Belfast that not only inflamed the overall security situation but firmly established the Provisional IRA as the sole defender of the nationalist community. It could be argued that in the predominantly nationalist city of

Londonderry a firm response by the army might have been justified, however in solidly unionist Belfast the nationalist minority had been saved from potential annihilation by the same British army and as a result nationalists owed it a debt of gratitude. This allowed many within the nationalist community to accept the army, especially if it was seen to behave impartially. This apparent impartiality was the primary reason for the so-called „honeymoon‟ yet even in Belfast there were early signs that the army was becoming antagonistic towards the nationalists. Here the army had an opportunity to continue operating as impartial peacekeepers even when it had to respond to nationalist unrest but instead it quickly resorted to using force when this was unnecessary.

In O Dochartaigh‟s examination of the events in Londonderry he describes in great detail how the events of 1969 and early 1970 unfolded in the narrow confines of central

24 N O Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish troubles, Palgrave, London, 2005.

Londonderry and the nationalist ghettos of the Bogside and the Creggan. He portrays, largely from a nationalist perspective the myriad and complex interactions between the army and the nationalist community and while these interactions are important for this thesis its main focus is on the army itself but primarily on its experiences and attitudes that led it to act in the way it did. However surprisingly little else has been written about the role of the army during this period and most of what has been written has repeated the conventional views outlined above. By examining the army‟s actions during such a momentous period in Irish history this work represents a significant contribution to our understanding of the Northern Ireland troubles.

Surprisingly Operation Banner, the longest major campaign in the history of the British army25 has not attracted the attention of many British military historians. This deficiency is extraordinary because, as Tony Geraghty states in The Irish War 26 this „Irish war‟ killed six hundred and fifty British soldiers yet most of the accounts were written by the Irish.

Conversely, the extremely short Falklands conflict generated shelves of memoirs. One of the few British accounts of the Irish conflict is Lieutenant Colonel Michael Dewar‟s The British army in Northern Ireland,27 which while claiming not to be „an apologia‟ for the army‟s actions in Northern Ireland it is in reality an undisguised attempt to counter critical accounts of the army‟s actions by journalists and other non-military writers, who Dewar claims did not have his experience on the streets of Belfast. Yet the journalists were there and did observe a lot of what happened. Unfortunately Dewar says little about the period between August 1969 and the end of 1970 other than to reiterate what has been generally accepted. Conversely he is at pains to portray British troops as bravely attempting to separate rampaging loyalists and nationalists. Although while accepting that it was the army‟s failures in early 1970, especially

25 Operation Banner, 2006. 26 Geraghty, 1998, p xvii. 27 Dewar, 1996.

in the Lower Falls that destroyed any chance of a peaceful settlement Dewar still attempts to excuse the army‟s actions by contending that it „was only doing its job‟.28

Dewar states that Desmond Hamill‟s Pig in the Middle 29 and David Barzilay‟s The British

Army in Ulster 30 are the only books he discovered that attempted to chart the main course of events between 1969 and 1975. However Dewar also states that Hamill is one of those journalists who could not claim to understand the army or its actions. Hamill moreover concentrates on events after 1970 and contributes little new about the period in question.

Nevertheless while not supporting Sinn Fein‟s claim in Freedom 31 that the army in Northern

Ireland were there to protect British colonial interests Hamill does assert that the army was a product of British colonialism that historically had depended upon an integrated civil-military approach for success.32 With respect to Barzilay‟s work there is little to add to Dewar‟s comment that: “it is a piecemeal diary of events put together … as events unfolded.”33

There are other accounts of the army‟s involvement in Northern Ireland including; Charles

Allen‟s The Savage Wars of Peace 34 and Michael Barthrop‟s Crater to the Creggan.35 Allen gives us an insight into British counter-insurgency campaigns after 1945 including Northern

Ireland but makes the comment that the first [English] standing army was set up in the 1680‟s to deal with the “present troubles in Ireland”.36 Nevertheless he does portray an army that while initially sympathetic to the nationalist minority was utterly bewildered by the irrationality of the locals they came into contact with. Notably Allen confirms that during

1970 the army changed its „rules of engagement‟ which dramatically eased the existing

28 ibid, pp. 39-40. 29 D Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1985, Methuen, London, 1985. 30 D Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster Vol 1-3, Century Services, Belfast, 1973-1978. 31 Freedom, Sinn Fein, 1991, http://www.sinnfein.org/documents/freedom.html 32 Hamill, 1985, pp. 21-25. 33 Dewar, 1996, p. 9. 34 Allen, 1991. 35 M Barthorp, Creater to Creggan: The History of the Royal Anglian Regiment, 1964-1974, Leo Cooper, London, 1976. 36 Allen, 1991, p. viii.

restrictions as to when troops could shoot to kill.37 I argue that this radically changed the army‟s tactics from peacekeeping to counter-insurgency. Barthorp gives us little more than a chronological account of the Royal Anglian Regiment‟s deployment from August 1970 to

1972, however he tells us that because the regiment served in both Belfast and Londonderry they understood the differences between these two cities even if, as one senior officer has claimed,38 their commanders were unable to do so. Barthorp also confirms that the army believed the IRA was an armed force and the army had begun firing on suspects as early as

July 1970.39

There are very few accounts by ex-military personnel describing the actions or the philosophy of the army during what I term the early phases of the „troubles‟ but what is available either largely ignores this period or simply reiterates the established historical accounts. On the whole they are little more than what Dewar called „an apologia‟ for the army‟s actions or an attempt - such as Curtis‟s Faith and Duty 40 to portray the army as the innocent party sent by an unwilling and ignorant government to undertake a very unpleasant task they were not prepared for. However it is the personal observations of a small number of retired soldiers that are crucial to gaining a better understanding of how the army itself perceived its role in Northern Ireland.

The testimonies of soldiers who served in Northern Ireland have been compiled by a few authors and these give some voice to their actions and why they operated in the way they did.

Some of the very few direct accounts of British soldiers who were deployed to Northern

Ireland between 1969 and 1970 are included in John Lindsay‟s Brits Speak Out,41 a compilation of British soldier‟s impressions of the Northern Ireland conflict; in Ken

37 ibid, p. 217. 38 Brig James Cowan, IWM 18802, 2007. 39 Barthorp, 1976, p. 100. 40 N Curtis, Faith and Duty - The True Story of a Soldier's War in Northern Ireland, Andre Deutsch, London, 1998. 41 J Lindsay, Brits Speak Out, Guildhall Press, Londonderry, 1998.

Wharton‟s A Long Long War 42 and Peter Taylor‟s Brits; The War Against the IRA. 43 Even the Imperial War Museum‟s oral history collection totalling some 56,000 hours of recordings contains only fourteen tapes with relevant material. 44 These accounts confirm that at least initially there was an amicable relationship between the army and the nationalist community,45 with soldiers stating that when they were first deployed they got on very well with the nationalists because they were protecting them from loyalist attack. This was part of what Lt Col (later General) Michael Grey 46 confirms was the official policy of establishing good relations with that community, at least in Belfast until the end of 1969 when the army determined that the IRA was a viable force. However these soldiers‟ accounts do conflict with Operation Banner’s contention that the IRA was not a threat until early 1971.47

None of this literature seriously tries to discover why the army adopted a hostile stance towards the nationalist community and why it took up a counter-insurgency strategy so early.

There are two major themes advanced in this thesis for the army‟s actions that will be examined in varying levels of detail. The first is that the army was instinctively a counter- insurgency force because as Tony Geraghty states in The Irish War that despite the fact that the army‟s primary role was to confront Warsaw Pact forces in Germany, it was a counter- insurgency force and that most of its recent experience was in Cyprus and Aden.48 It was also commanded by Lt General Sir Ian Freeland, a veteran officer typical of many army commanders of that era who had gained most of their experience in Britain‟s post-war colonial disengagements. Dr Rod Thornton describes General Sir Ian Freeland, GOC NI, as a typical „counter-insurgency‟ technician who was also a strong advocate of using massive searches, cordons, and roadblocks. Thornton further argues that the officers and senior NCO‟s

42 Wharton, 2008. 43 P Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA, Bloomsbury, London, 2001. 44 Imperial War Memorial, Sound Recordings, http://collections.iwm.org.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.6818. 45 Wharton, 2008, pp. 46-47. 46 General Michael Grey, IWM 11146, 2007. 47 Operation Banner, 2006. 48 Geraghty, 1998, pp. 24-25.

also came from a similar background; they were hardened and experienced soldiers who knew only one way to deal with major civil unrest and that was to use maximum force on the troublemakers.49 It was these troops that were deployed not to some distant colony but to aid the civil power in a part of the United Kingdom.

Secondly the army had an „instinctive‟ hostility towards Irish nationalists and to Irish

Catholics resulting from its historical experience of operations in Ireland. This was powerfully reinforced by a long-held sense of British national identity based on

Protestantism, in which Irish Catholics had always occupied an extremely problematic position. A comment in the army‟s official account of its operations in Northern Ireland,

Operation Banner goes some way towards understanding the army‟s attitude towards its role in Northern Ireland. As it stated in 2006:

“It was often said that the British did not understand Ireland. In part this may have reflected ignorance and an unwillingness to try to understand. … [but] In the absence of such deep understanding the British tended to underestimate the differences between the Irish and themselves. One commentator observed that Englishmen … tend to view the Irishman as a variant of a Briton rather than as a foreigner.”50

Maybe by 2006 the British army had finally come to the conclusion that the people of

Northern Ireland while part of the United Kingdom were not British but Irish. Yet this is a not new idea but a concept that had been well established for many decades if not centuries and should have been self-evident to those at Westminster and their military servants.

Questions of overlapping and conflicting identities in Ireland – and especially Northern

Ireland are, of course, enormously complex. A group of retired and very definitely Protestant

49 R Thornton, „Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army's deployment to Northern Ireland „August 1969 to March 1972‟, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 30(No 1), 2007. 50 Operation Banner, 2006, 820.

Ulster Defence Regiment members confirmed unanimously when asked if they saw themselves as British or Irish, they were Irish because they were born there, but felt British because of their allegiance to the crown.51 These men‟s view of their identity conforms to the argument advanced by Michael Ignatieff, in Blood and Belonging; journeys into the new nationalism.52 Ignatieff argues that Britishness should be understood as a concept of „civic nationalism‟ based upon a national creed that is focused on the rule of law and loyalty to the

British Protestant monarch. The Irish on the other hand should be seen as „ethnic nationalists‟ whose national identity is inherited and where the national community rather than loyalty to any individual or institution defines the individual. However generations of those Irish in

Northern Ireland who had grown up in a fervently Protestant and anti-Catholic society had adopted a particularly virulent version of British civic nationalism and equated Irish nationalism with disloyalty to the crown and therefore the state. In Great Britain the general acceptance of both the rule of law and loyalty to the monarch would normally have ensured a relatively peaceful resolution, but unionists‟ loyalty to the Protestant monarch sometimes obliged them to dispense with the acceptance of the rule of law which is the other central plank of British civic nationalism. This paradox was often difficult for non-Irish people - including the British army - to understand.

Linda Colley in her seminal work Britons pointed out that the 1707 Act of Union uniting

Scotland with England and Wales was based upon the principle that Great Britain was a

Protestant nation with a Protestant ruler.53 The reformation may have established England as a Protestant nation but the 1707 Act of Union not only institutionalised Protestantism as the state religion of Great Britain but also established an underlying anti-Catholic ideology among its united peoples. Colley argues that because the Irish were predominantly Catholic,

51 Meeting with Ex UDR members, Interview by B Treanor, Bangor, Co Down, Northern Ireland, 2007. 52 M Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: journeys into the new nationalism, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1994. 53 L Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992.

this anti-Catholic sentiment inevitably produced a strong anti-Irish sentiment within British culture. Colley goes on to argue that anti-Irish sentiment within Britain in the nineteenth century was not just based on Protestantism as a religious belief but rather it was a vital part of who the British were and how they viewed their past.54 The underlying cultural norm within British society instinctively connected Catholicism with Irishness and as a result directly linked being Irish with disloyalty to Protestant Britain.

It is accepted that the British army was the servant to a civilian government which had made its views on the matter clear and this thesis will not argue that the army consciously or deliberately opposed its political masters. Rather that the army‟s habits and predilections had a greater impact than they otherwise should have because of serious failures of political leadership as the Northern Ireland crisis developed and because of ambiguities about the political and legal frame work within which the army was operating. These failures will be examined at some length, however they were most obvious at the very end of the period discussed in the thesis, especially the Falls Road curfew and the impact that the newly appointed Home Secretary Reginald Maudling had on events.

When Reginald Maudling made his first visit to Northern Ireland on 30 June 1970 he was told very bluntly by unionists that the restoration of „law and order‟ was fundamental to the survival of their government and the army had to be seen to deal toughly with thugs and gunmen.55 According to Maudling‟s biographer, Lewis Baston, the Stormont Cabinet had

„given him an ear-bashing about the situation‟ but his only response was that he would discuss the situation with the police and General Freeland. However Freeland‟s immediate reaction was that the army had only two courses of action, either it could fire on rioters or it could use overwhelming force to keep order. Maudling was also told that the army was

54 ibid, p. 330. 55 G Warner, „The Falls Road Curfew Revisited‟, Irish Studies Review, 14(No 3), 2006: p. 330: P Evans, „Three MPs walk out of Maudling talks‟, The Times, London, 30 June 1969.

increasing searches for arms, restricting movement in affected areas, and that it also planned to use helicopters for observation and crowd control, what Baston described as a blueprint for the Falls curfew.56 Freeland may not have explicitly requested Maudling‟s approval for these tactics but he was certainly advising him that the army was going to respond to any future nationalist unrest with overwhelming force. Baston argues that Maudling had allowed himself to be manipulated in this manner by Freeland 57 whereas Callaghan had restrained Freeland from overreacting in October 1969.58 Nevertheless Maudling, because of his ignorance of the

Northern Ireland situation and his unwillingness to get involved, said and did nothing and therefore gave the army the imprimatur to get tougher with the nationalists. The now unrestrained General Freeland responded to the disturbance in the Lower Falls with an overwhelming show of force.59 The army went in hard in the Lower Falls because it was not going to allow the IRA to again demonstrate its ability to defend the nationalist community as it had done so successfully in the Short Strand, the army had to be seen to be in control.

James Callaghan, then in Opposition, was highly critical of the role that the new Home

Secretary Reginald Maudling played in the events of Northern Ireland after the election of the

Heath Conservative government even though there did not appear to be any fundamental change in policy direction. Maudling appeared to give very little attention to Northern Ireland and was content “to leave responsibility to the men on the spot”.60 He was also not interested in what Labour had been doing in Northern Ireland or giving the same level of oversight to the army.61 General Freeland may have been grateful that “there [were] not so many back seat drivers” 62 but so was the Unionist government which believed that the Conservative‟s would

56 Baston, 2004, p 366. 57 ibid. 58 Callaghan, 1973, p. 124. 59 H Evans, (eds), Ulster: The Sunday Times Insight Team, Penguin, London, 1972, p. 219: Freeland, Press Briefing 21 Sept 1970 Personal Papers, IWM 79-34-4. 60 Callaghan, 1973, p. 144. 61 ibid. 62 ibid.

let them have more control of events.63 Although Maudling was in Northern Ireland on 30

June and met both with a range of Unionist leaders and General Freeland there is no evidence that Maudling gave any explicit direction to Freeland that he could take the fight to the nationalists. But nor is there evidence that he made any attempt to veto Freeland‟s plans.

Callaghan and Maudling‟s incompetent response to the civil unrest in Northern Ireland reflects the actions of many other governments when confronted by what they identified as a failure in its fundamental duty, the maintenance of law and order. However instead of ascertaining the reasons for the disorder before acting, inevitably the first response was to demonstrate that they had the power to restore order. Usually this took the form of using military force against non-state actors and while successful, this military strategy rarely addressed the long-term political issues. Richard English and Louise Richardson are among those who argue that military solutions to what are in reality political problems rarely succeed, rather they are usually counterproductive.64 Northern Ireland is one of the most graphic examples of how a state should not respond to the political breakdown of part of its society.

The object of this thesis is to demonstrate that political failure ran far deeper than the negligence of one politician in 1970. Rather, it was the historical failure of successive British politicians‟ to take political control of the situation in Northern Ireland as protest descended into violent confrontation. Instead the British government chose to leave control of Northern

Ireland affairs in the hands of the Stormont even after British troops had been deployed onto

Northern Ireland‟s streets. The result was that the army now had to respond to two very different political masters with differing objectives. One of these, the Unionist government was in practical terms the more important and it was their intense pressure to take a firm line

63 ibid. 64 R English, Terrorism: how to respond, Oxford Uni Press, Oxford, 2009; L Richardson, What Terrorists Want, Hodder Headline, London, 2006.

with nationalist unrest that powerfully reinforced the army‟s tendency to view nationalists as the enemy. This contributed to a conviction among nationalists that the army was simply another agent of a repressive and partisan Northern Ireland state.

The thesis will review the history of Anglo-Irish relations since the early part of the twentieth century in order to show both the origins and the consequences of the British government‟s reluctance to intervene in Northern Ireland. The thesis will argue that the government‟s reluctance stemmed from a combination of fear and incomprehension of Irish affairs and particularly of Irish nationalism. Until 1920 Ireland was united and part of a United

Kingdom, however after a bitter Anglo-Irish war the island was partitioned into a republican

Irish Free State and a unionist Ulster. Benign indifference continued until the Second World

War when Eire‟s neutrality renewed dormant anti-Irish hostility, nevertheless it was Clement

Attlee‟s actions in 1949 when by rewarding Ulster for its support during the Second World

War he punished all Irish nationalists for their perceived disloyalty. However it was the futile

1956-62 IRA border campaign together with alarmist reports in 1966 that the IRA was about to attack Northern Ireland and Britain that kept the latent fear of a republican uprising alive among both governments. When the civil rights protests of the late 1960s began to evolve into outright violence, British politicians had been consistently ignoring Northern Ireland affairs for half a century. As a result they were ignorant of Northern Ireland politics and society and when forced to take action they had little option other than to try to impose inappropriate and unhelpful solutions based on British models. Conversely, the British government‟s one significant intervention in this period - the Ireland Act of 1949 - reinforced the position of Northern Ireland unionists and further absolved the British government of responsibility for its citizens in Northern Ireland. The thesis is basically a chronological narrative, however specific themes will be also be investigated.

The purpose of Chapter One is to examine some of the aspects of the complex relationship between the Britain and Ireland in an attempt to gain an understanding as to why various

British governments in the twentieth century, but in particular those after the Second World

War which continued to pursue non-interventionist policies on Northern Ireland when there was clear evidence that the nationalist minority was suffering institutionalised discrimination.

One of the issues I will be exploring is whether the differences between British and Irish identity have contributed to the failure of most political leaders to fully understand each other and therefore reach consensus. Using existing sources such as Linda Colley‟s Britons;

Forging the Nation 1707-1837 65 and Michael Ignatieff‟s Blood and Belonging; journeys into the new nationalism 66 I will demonstrate that there was an anti-Catholic sentiment within

British culture that inevitably produced a strong anti-Irish sentiment. And that this anti-Irish sentiment was not just based on Protestantism as a religious belief but rather it was a vital part of who the British were and how they viewed the past.67 Therefore the underlying cultural norm within British society unquestioningly connected Catholicism with being Irish and as a result directly linked being Irish with disloyalty to Protestant Britain. I will show that

Britain and Ireland had two distinct concepts of nationalism with one based upon a national creed that is focused on the rule of law and loyalty to a monarch and the other whose national identity is inherited and where the national community defines the individual and not loyalty to any individual or institution. Using established sources I will examine the prevailing theories of culture and identity in an attempt to discover what may have conditioned the decision-makers to act in the manner they did. This is especially important with regard to how the differing entities perceived each other‟s political and social objectives and how they responded to inherently selfish political agendas.

65 Colley, 1992. 66 Ignatieff, 1994. 67 ibid, p 330.

Chapter Two will examine the position of the Wilson Labour government towards Northern

Ireland prior to 1969, especially the actions, or inaction, of the Home Secretary James

Callaghan. Using mainly published literature including James Callaghan‟s A House Divided

68 and accounts of Labour politicians of the time including Harold Wilson‟s own biography A

Personal Record; The labour Government 1964-70 69 I will show that these crucially important British politicians with supposedly impeccable liberal-democratic credentials allowed an alien regime to continue to exist within the United Kingdom. Both Callaghan‟s and Wilson‟s accounts could be considered self-serving and while important to an overall understanding of the British political environment I will also be relying heavily upon Peter

Rose‟s How the Troubles came to Northern Ireland to gain another perspective on this government and its ministers.70 Rose, a one-time lobby correspondent at Westminster turned academic used his personal access to those directly involved and gained an insight unavailable to many others. He was also prepared to be critical of this government‟s actions when those directly involved preferred to either gloss over their failings or ignore them altogether.

These secondary sources will be compared to a range of primary sources including

Westminster debates on Northern Ireland, 71 official government documents 72 and newspaper reports 73 to gain a fuller understanding of both the events and the actions of the Labour government. Contained in the official files are the accounts of the RUCs attack on the civil rights marchers in Londonderry including the Eye-witnesses Report on Londonderry by the three Labour MPs who observed the march, however this account cast an unfavourable light

68 Callaghan, 1973. 69 H Wilson, A Personal Record: The labour Government 1964-70, Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1971. 70 Peter Rose, How the Troubles came to Northern Ireland, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000. 71 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, vol 770 cc15-6, 14 October: et al. 72 PREM 13 2841 (1968-69), London: et al. 73 „Right to be Cautious‟, Leader, The Times, London, 8 October 1968: et al.

on the official version of the same incident also contained in the same file.74 Overall the picture obtained from the primary and secondary evidence casts a cloud over the actions of the British government and its officials. However the evidence demonstrates that the British

Labour party ignored its underlying ideals of social democracy and the concerns raised by some of its own MPs but instinctively followed established British responses to the „Irish question‟. I will argue that this response was further complicated by the actions of James

Callaghan the one British politician in the late 1960s to grasp the Irish nettle, however his actions greatly contributed to the escalation of the crisis rather that its resolution.

The aim of Chapter Three is principally to examine the British army from an historical perspective and question whether it was suited for the role imposed upon it by a reluctant

British government. The army‟s actions in Londonderry were pivotal to its later actions in

Belfast and other parts of the province and have been extensively analysed by Niall O

Dochartaigh in From Civil Rights to Armalites; Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles.75

Niall O Dochartaigh brings an Irish perspective to the army‟s operations in Londonderry; however he supplies the most academically valuable account of the gradual escalation of the civil protests by the nationalist community in Londonderry. Rarely have local sources been used so effectively to demonstrate how the brutal suppression of a subjected minority can reach a stage that they have so little left to lose but to take on an armed opposition. O

Dochartaigh‟s work also demonstrates how radically different Londonderry and Belfast are in social and political makeup. However it is O Dochartaigh‟s vivid description of how the army responded to nationalist unrest that is especially important to this thesis. As an outsider

Russell Stetler‟s account of The Battle of the Bogside 76 written in 1970 gives a more dispassionate account of events of as they happened. These accounts will also be compared to

74 Three Eye-witnesses Report on Londonderry, PREM 13 2843, 8 October 1968. 75 O Dochartaigh, 2005. 76 R Stetler, The Battle of the Bogside: the Politics of Violence in Northern Ireland, Sheed & Ward, London, 1970.

Lord Cameron‟s very factual but legalistic official account of the events of 1969 77 to help gain a better understanding the events that led up to the army‟s deployment and its actions in

Londonderry.

Much of the existing literature on the history of the British army emphasises not its role as a standing army but its long experience in imperial policing and in counter-insurgency, and I intend to demonstrate that the army‟s extensive experience in asymmetric warfare contributed greatly to its actions in Northern Ireland. Among those quoted are authors who have written extensively on the British army including; Charles Townshend who has written at length on

Ireland and is a respected expert on insurgency and terrorism.78 Hew Strachan has written about the politics of the British army 79 and widely about its involvement in colonial counter- insurgency campaigns, however it is his opinion of the British military‟s so-called policy of

„hearts and minds‟ that highlights the army‟s attitude towards the nationalist community in

1969.80 Julian Paget writing in 1967 shortly before the army‟s deployment to Northern

Ireland helps us to understand how the British army differentiated between an „insurgency‟ which he defines as an armed rebellion against the government and „internal security‟ known as duties in „aid to the civil power‟.81 Thomas Mockaitis also contributes to our understanding of the British army‟s approach to counter-insurgency in the second half of the twentieth century but argues that they more closely resembled British pacification and policing campaigns of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.82 This was a time when the army could ignore its English common law restraints or the need to use minimum force but operate as it saw fit against civil populations.

77 Disturbances in Northern Ireland, Cameron Report, Cmd 532, HMSO, Belfast, 1969. 78 C Townshend, Ireland: the 20th century. Hodder, London, 1993, et al. 79 H Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997: „British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq‟, RUSI, 152(No 6), 2007, et al. 80 Strachan, 2007, pp. 8-11. 81 J Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, Faber, London, 1967. 82 T Mockatis, British Counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era, Manchester Uni Press, 1995.

In addition I will be introducing some of the personal documents of General Sir Ian Freeland who was General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (GOC NI) during the most crucial period in its recent history, 1969 to 1971.83 This is original material that has not been previously used and includes hand-written notes for a proposed biography, personal correspondence between him and the Chief of the Defence Staff, transcripts of television programs he appeared in, his notes for a presentation to the Lords Cross Benches and details of a 1970s Ministry of Defence account of the army in Northern Ireland. This material is highly significant in gaining an understanding of actions and beliefs of the commander of the

British army in Northern Ireland during this most crucial period.

In Chapter Four my aim is to examine the British army‟s role in „aiding the civil power‟ within Great Britain and compare it to its historical role in Ireland, but more importantly to examine its perceived role in Northern Ireland in 1969. While not wishing to enter into any extremely complex legal argument on the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts (SPA) it is essential to understand how all-encompassing this suite of laws was, who was empowered by the SPA and how it impacted the nationalist community. However the SPA has been extensively analysed by L K Donohue in Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the

United Kingdom, 1922-2000.84 Donohue is an authority on the Special Powers Acts and she explains in detail the draconian nature of this suite of Acts and its origins in the British

Restoration of Order in Ireland Act that was enacted by the British government to fight the

IRA during the Anglo-Irish war. I will also be using official files to examine in detail the extensive debate that ranged within Westminster and the British bureaucracy on both the publicly declared reason for the army‟s deployment, Military Aid to the Civil Authority

(MACA), and the Special Powers Acts. It is clear that as early as 1968 all parties understood

83 Freeland, Personal papers, IWM 79-34-3/4/6. 84 L K Donohue, Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom, 1922-2000, Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 2001.

the extensive powers contained within SPA and how this impacted the army.85 The various legal experts such as the Home Office Legal Advisor supplied a range of opinions to the

Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Home secretary even if these were not always consistent.86 This chapter will critically examine the reasons behind the army‟s determination to retain access to this highly controversial suite of laws when its political masters had tasked it to simply „aid the civil power‟ of Northern Ireland in the same manner as it did in Great Britain. The extensive official government documents obtained from the

British National Archives will be compared with the views of those politicians directly responsible, such as James Callaghan 87 and the opinion of academics such as Dr Rod

Thornton in Getting it Wrong; The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British

Army's deployment to Northern Ireland 88 to argue that the government, the bureaucracy and the army not only fully understood the powers incorporated within the Special Powers Acts but actively fought for the army to retain access to these when deployed to Northern Ireland.

Chapter Five will initially examine the army that was deployed in August 1969 to restore order in Northern Ireland through an analysis of its commander General Sir Ian Freeland.

Freeland was quite clearly the crucial figure in how the British army performed its duties in

Northern Ireland once the British government had ordered that troops be deployed onto the streets of Londonderry and Belfast. In this chapter I will again make extensive use of

Freeland‟s private papers sourced from the Imperial War Museum.89 These papers give a unique insight into the character of General Freeland and how he personally perceived his and the army‟s role and how the army should be allowed to operate. In addition authors such

85 DEFE 24 882 (1968-69), Ref O 19/1, 20 Nov 1968, et al. 86 Northern Ireland Political Situation 1969, Northern Ireland Office, Internal Home Office Minute from Legal Advisors Branch, CJ 3 1, 12 Dec 1969, et al. 87 Callaghan, 1973. 88 Thornton, 2007. 89 Freeland, Personal papers, IWM 79-34-3/4/6.

as Tony Geraghty whose Irish War 90 gives an informed ex-soldiers opinion of General

Freeland will be used to balance what could be a biased perspective. Thornton has also examined the army‟s actions in Northern Ireland and is very critical of General Freeland because of his counter-insurgency experience and attitudes towards those who did not willingly accept British benevolence.91 Secondly I will be examining the army‟s actions in

Londonderry again mainly through Niall O Dochartaigh‟s From Civil Rights to Armalites 92 to better understand how it approached its task in Northern Ireland‟s second city. At this very early stage the army‟s actions in Londonderry were very dissimilar to its operations in Belfast but gave an indication as to how it was going to operate in Belfast.

Chapter Six will continue the analysis of the operations of the British army, however on this occasion it will concentrate on its operations in Belfast. Further I will be questioning the army‟s retrospective judgement contained in Operation Banner 93 that the period between

August 1969 and mid-1971 was simply a single phase in the army‟s operations and identified mainly by violent civil unrest. I will argue that what Operation Banner perceived as a single phase of the „troubles‟ was in fact three phases in which the army increasingly applied counter-insurgency tactics to what should have been a policing action. This chapter will provide an understanding of the army‟s changing approach during the first phase of its deployment to Belfast. In an attempt to understand the army‟s actions in Belfast I will using published sources such as the Sunday Times Insight Team‟s Ulster 94 and Max Hastings

Ulster 95 who as journalists were able to give a more objective account of the events than official sources. One of the most significant events during 1969 was the Shankill Road gun battle and this will be critically examined to ascertain whether the army was truly impartial.

90 Geraghty, 1998, pp. 24-25. 91 Thornton, 2007, p. 85. 92 O Dochartaigh, 2005. 93Operation Banner, 2006. 94 Evans, 1972. 95 M Hastings, Ulster 1969, Gollancz, London, 1970.

To understand how the army responded to this incident I will be using a firsthand account written by the Officer Commanding the British troops that was included in General

Freeland‟s papers.96 This gives us a unique perspective on the methods used by the army when it confronted loyalist gunmen as compared to rioting nationalists some months later.

General Freeland described this event as the first major gun battle of the present troubles 97 but significantly it did not involve the supposedly disloyal nationalist community but those who had sworn allegiance to the same monarch as the troops they attacked.

Secondly I will examine the changes that occurred within the nationalist community to question whether the formation of the Provisional IRA in January 1970 was a significant enough events to allow the army to substantially escalate its use of force towards the nationalist community. It has been generally accepted that it was the emergence of the

Provisional IRA in January 1970 that gave the army the imprimatur to engage in a counter- insurgency war against the nationalist community. However the analysis of the republican movement by Richard English in Armed Struggle; The history of the IRA 98 and M L R Smith in Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement 99 substantially contradicts this established point of view. Their analysis confirms that although the PIRA might have wanted to attack the army at this stage in its evolution it neither had the intent or the means to do so. Equally for most of 1969 the troops in Belfast were on the whole supportive of the nationalist community and that this community was not seen as a threat.

This perspective is supported by the personal accounts of army personnel in Northern Ireland at that time. These include oral recordings in the Imperial War Museum 100 and written

96 Freeland, Personal papers, Report on operations in Shankill Rd, on night of 11/12 October 1969 By Lt Col J. Ballenden, OC 3 LI, IWM 79-34-3. 97 Freeland, Personal papers, IWM 79-34-3/4/6. 98 R English, Armed Struggle: The history of the IRA, Macmillan, London, 2003. 99 Smith, 1995, pp. 72-75. 100 Imperial War Memorial Sound Archive, et al.

accounts in books such as John Lindsay‟s, Brits Speak Out,101 and Ken Wharton‟s A Long

Long War; Voices from the British Army in Northern Ireland 1969-98.102 Although there were significant changes within the nationalist community and the army leading up to start of

1970 it is still questionable as to what was the trigger that allowed the army to change from policing to counter-insurgency.

In Chapter Seven I will be examining the events that occurred in Belfast between March and

July 1970 in an attempt to understand why the once amicable relationship between the army and the nationalist community finally erupted into all-out hostility. To do this I will be analysing the two most significant incidents in the first half of 1970, Ballymurphy and the

Lower Falls curfew. Ballymurphy is very important in the evolution of the army‟s strategy in early 1970 because it signified its determination to move from a facade of impartially towards the nationalist community to outright confrontation. Nevertheless 1970 had started relatively peacefully but on 31 March there was a sectarian dispute between nationalists and loyalists that quickly escalated into a conflict between the nationalist community and the army. I will be questioning why such a relatively minor sectarian incident escalated into such a major confrontation and what the underlying reasons that allowed this to occur were. I will mainly use published accounts of this incident, including reports in The Times, 103 the New York

Times 104 and later analysis in The Sunday Times Ulster 105 but I will compare these with the clearly biased reporting of the same events in the unionist newspaper the News Letter 106 to establish the sequence of the events and show differing perspectives.

I will also be demonstrating that counter to established belief some of the troops deployed to the Ballymurphy were fundamentally sectarian and that this was a major contributor to how

101 Lindsay, 1998. 102 Wharton, 2008. 103 J Chartres, The Times, London, 1 April 1970, et al. 104 New York Times, 1 April 1970, et al. 105 Evans, 1972. 106 R Managh, News letter, Belfast, 1 April 1070, et al.

this incident evolved. This issue has received little attention although Thornton has noted it in his critical analysis of the army‟s early deployment in Northern Ireland 107 but this is unusual.

John Lindsay‟s Brits Speak Out; British Soldiers' Impressions of the Northern Ireland

Conflict 108 also contains criticism of the army‟s decision to send a Scottish regiment to

Northern Ireland. However there are significant clues to the differing attitudes of the soldiers sent to Ballymurphy contained within the press reports described above. Whether the army hierarchy knew or cared that some of the troops they sent to Ballymurphy could by their presence and attitudes inflame an already volatile situation is uncertain but what is clear is that those troops who acted in a sectarian manner and the Belfast population they were dealing with were well aware and all reacted accordingly.

Ballymurphy may have been the first critical incident of 1970 but it was the Lower Falls curfew in July that was the most crucially important factor in determining how both the army and the nationalist community progressed towards what became an all-out insurgency. Using the few published accounts of the curfew, or a „restriction of movement‟ as General Freeland consistently called it 109 I will establish the pivotal events from both an academic and nationalist perspective. Geoffrey Warner‟s The Falls Road Curfew Revisited 110 is a very detailed if unsympathetic account of the curfew and according to the author is one of only three accounts of the curfew. He states that the only other detailed accounts are by Sean

O'Fearghail and jointly by Colm Campbell and Ita Connolly. O'Fearghail‟s Law (?) and

Order; The Belfast Curfew of 3-5 July 1970 111 while valuable because it was contemporary and based on the accounts of those affected by the curfew is clearly biased because the author was a nationalist. Campbell and Connolly‟s account A Model for the War Against Terrorism?

107 Thornton, 2007, p. 82. 108 Lindsay, 1998, p. 25. 109 Freeland, Transcript-Five Long Years. BBC 1974, IWM, 79-34-4. 110 Warner, 2006. 111 S O'Fearghail, Law (?) and Order: The Belfast Curfew of 3-5 July 1970, Central Citizens' Defence Committee, 1970, p. 45.

Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew 112 is also judged by

Warner as limited because it focuses principally on the legal aspects and does not make use of recently declassified documents. However all three accounts contribute towards a better understanding of those crucial events. I will again make extensive use of material included in the personal papers of General Freeland 113 to both flesh out what occurred but more importantly reveal the reasons behind Freeland‟s actions leading up to and during the curfew.

However, overriding General Freeland‟s actions were the actions, or lack thereof of his political masters and in addition I will be examining the extensive debate within the bureaucracy regarding Freeland‟s authority in the manner. Within the official records of that era, including those from the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence 114 we can begin to understand how the various British bureaucrats perceived what was clearly not a policing action in aid of a British civil authority but a military operation similar to those in Cyprus and other British colonial actions. The debate over Freeland‟s legal authority to impose the Falls

Road curfew may have ranged between the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts and the army‟s Common Law authority but his authority was eventually traced to a late nineteenth century English judicial ruling. This says much about how the army and its bureaucrats viewed the army‟s action in Northern Ireland at that time.

The essential question is why did the army apparently declare war on this particular nationalist community and employ what were clearly questionable military tactics? The answer may lie in the argument that the newly elected Conservative government had lost control of its own army and was now allowing it to set its own agenda. During the debate on this incident in parliament a few days later we gain the impression of a government that was

112 C Campbell & I Connolly, „A Model for the War Against Terrorism? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew‟, Journal of Law and Society, 30(No 3), 2003 113 Freeland, Personal papers, IWM 79-34-3/4/6. 114 DEFE 24 980: DEFE 13/730, et al.

uncertain what its army was doing and what authority it had acted under.115 However it was the appointment of Reginald Maudling as Home Secretary in the newly elected Conservative government that was to have the greatest impact, because it would appear that he was either ignorant of the issues or completely unwilling to become involved. Whatever the case he allowed Freeland complete freedom of action when firm political direction was needed.116

James Callaghan the consummate politician was able to use this confused situation to further his own political interests and compared his proactive approach to the ambivalent attitude of his successor, 117 however in this endeavour he had an unlikely ally in General Freeland.118

The army appears to have increasingly believed that the main threat to security in Northern

Ireland was from a resurgent IRA and that it must be tackled in the same manner as the rebels in Aden and Cyprus, however a re-examination of the same events by the army later acknowledged that an insurgency did not begin until mid-1971.119 This puts into question the entire leadership of the army in Northern Ireland and why its commander, General Freeland acted in the manner he did. It would appear that even though 1970 had begun relatively quietly that army was still determined to pursue what it deemed was the most appropriate strategy in spite of the wishes of its political masters and that the election of the Heath

Conservative government in June 1970 gave it the imprimatur to continue down a path of its own choosing. More importantly, the army‟s attitudes and actions did not defuse nationalist unrest, on the contrary they greatly contributed to the creation of radical republican sentiment and the emergence of the Provisional IRA as a powerful insurgent force.

115 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, London, vol 803 cc328-34, 06 July 1970. 116 Freeland, TV Interview. Five Long Years 1974, IWM 79-34-4. 117 Callaghan, 1973. 118 Freeland, Letter to James Callaghan, 7 Sep. 1973, IWM 79-34-4. 119Operation Banner, 2006.

Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Chapter 1

A Place Apart: Britain and Ireland before 1968

There is little doubt that the events of early 1968 and 1969 in Northern Ireland can be traced to the long troubled relationship between the English and the Irish. The conflict had started many generations earlier when an emerging England began to see Ireland as a strategic problem and attempted to dominate its inhabitants, a practice that they continued to employ into the twentieth century. However it was when Britain ceded control over most of the island in 1922 that the scene was finally set for the events of 1968 and 1969. When Westminster gave the inhabitants of Ireland self-government, albeit with strong ties to Britain, they based this on a compelling urge to avoid ever again becoming involved in Irish politics; the concept of „a place apart‟ had become established within the British polity. This is central to understanding why successive British governments blatantly ignored the overtly sectarian practices of the theoretically subordinate Northern Ireland government for almost fifty years.

Further, Westminster‟s deliberate disregard for what was occurring in the province created the conditions that led to the increasingly violent civil unrest, confrontation with the Unionist government and the eventual involvement of the British government.

This chapter will examine some of the fundamental aspects of the complex and contradictory relationship between the British and the Irish up to the time the civil rights protests erupted in the late 1960s, leading to decades of death and destruction. It will demonstrate that since partition all governments used this dysfunctional relationship to pursue their own political goals often to the detriment of the nationalist minority. Essentially this was a relationship

based upon mutual mistrust and opposing objectives, which led to alienation and an inability to understand each other‟s actions. However the violent civil unrest that erupted in Northern

Ireland in 1968 can be traced to 1922 when Britain gave Ireland its independence. Irish independence may have allowed Northern Ireland to develop its own unique political model, but it also enabled British politicians to believe increasingly that they no longer had any responsibility for the province. This was a perspective that had become institutionalised over the decades, and was based on a fervent wish to never again have to deal with the apparently intractable problems of Ireland. Northern Ireland, while part of the United Kingdom could now be considered as „a place apart‟ that could, and should be left to the entrenched Unionist government to manage. Westminster now felt able to ignore Northern Ireland even when

Stormont dealt with its nationalist minority in ways that were alien to British liberal- democratic traditions. However added to this already complex relationship were strategic concerns unique to Britain that were always central to its relationship with Ireland. Overall this contributes to an understanding of why British politicians were so unwilling to become involved in Northern Ireland affairs, and why their later interventions were often ill- considered and counter-productive.

However the uneasy relationship between Britain and Ireland is not simply a relationship between the British and the Irish, it is a very complex relationship between British, Irish

Catholic, and Ulster Unionist identities. Linda Colley and Michael Ignatieff have argued that because these identities are constructed in different ways they are to a large extent mutually incomprehensible and regularly end in conflict. However this is not just a complex relationship between societies with differing cultural and collective norms, it is further complicated by Britain‟s strategic considerations as a great power that traditionally overrode questions of identity. Nevertheless this concept has proved difficult for the people of Ireland, who view British actions very differently, to fully understand. Throughout the twentieth

century there were a number of key events that adversely impacted on this already troubled relationship, including the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, Irish neutrality during the Second

World War; and Britain‟s response to Ireland‟s unilateral declaration of a republic in 1949.

These events further reinforced within British and Irish society a sense of separation that was amplified within Northern Ireland and which contributed to the entrenchment of unionist power and the alienation of the nationalist community.

However it was how the Labour government of Harold Wilson viewed Northern Ireland and how it responded to the escalating unrest that was crucial to how the events of 1968 and 1969 evolved. Throughout most of its tenure this British government was content to act within the accepted Westminster conventions established by its predecessors, and while its tenuous grip on office may have given it reasons for not addressing Northern Ireland‟s entrenched problems when it was first elected in 1964 its strong majority from 1966 to 1970 gave it no such excuse. Throughout this period MPs at Westminster had increasingly exposed the underlying sectarian nature of Unionist government in Northern Ireland, but the Wilson government continued to ignore both the advice of its own members and its governmental responsibilities. Instead they preferred to rely upon Stormont and its security forces to deal with the increasing violence using known and accepted tactics. Both governments were content to follow existing protocols even though it was increasingly evident that the Unionist government was inherently incapable of resolving a situation that was escalating out of its control.

Irish nationalism and the British.

One of the major complications in the continuing relationship between the Irish and the

British is how very differently they perceive their national identities, with the fundamental

differences described by Linda Colley in Britons 1 and Michael Ignatieff, in Blood and

Belonging; journeys into the new nationalism.2 Ignatieff has defined the Irish as „ethnic nationalists‟ whose national identity is inherited and where the national community defines the individual. On the other hand he equates Britishness with a concept of „civic nationalism‟ based on a subscription to the national creed, especially to the rule of law and loyalty to the

British Protestant monarch. As Ignatieff has argued, the British nation-state that was established in the eighteenth century was united by a civic nationalism rather than an ethnic definition of belonging.3 As a result the unity of Great Britain was dependent upon an absolute acceptance of this version of civic nationalism and therefore any demonstration of

Irish nationalism was viewed as an act of disloyalty towards Britain. Moreover as Colley has shown Great Britain was most definitely a Protestant nation because as the 1707 Act of

Union linking Scotland to England and Wales stated: “from now on there would be one united kingdom … with one Protestant ruler.”4 The relationship between Britain and Ireland has also to be considered in the context of the underlying anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sentiment within British culture.5

Opposition to Catholicism has endured in Britain since the reformation and while it is not as intense now as it was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it has remained an underlying sentiment, arguably to the present day. In the early decades of the nineteenth century an underlying anti-Irish attitude was linked to the widely supported opposition movement against Catholic emancipation within Britain. As Colley argues:

… anti-Irish sentiment, whether founded on economic grievances or ethnic prejudice, scarcely explains the sheer scale of the agitation against Catholic emancipation. … The protestors acted as they did … not so much from what they knew, as from what

1 Colley, 1992. 2 Ignatieff, 1994. 3 ibid, pp. 5-8. 4 Colley, 1992, p. 11. 5 ibid, pp. 19-54. 33

they felt. For these men and women, Protestantism was not just a species of religious belief … [it] was a vital part of who they were now and the frame through which they looked at the past.6

Therefore within British society there was and is an underlying cultural norm that undoubtedly connects Catholicism with being Irish and as a result directly associates being

Irish with disloyalty to Protestant Britain.7 Even though British opposition to Catholic emancipation reflected a wish to protect Irish Protestants this movement also reflected the long-held belief that Catholicism equated with disloyalty to the crown.8 Great Britain had been founded upon a universal acceptance of the rule of law as represented by its Protestant monarch and the idea that Catholicism equated with disloyalty to the crown permeated throughout British political and social culture well into the twentieth century. This belief has to a great extent determined the way the British establishment has responded to any overt demonstration of Irish nationalism in the second half of the twentieth century.9

However the British practice of using short term and expedient policies to protect its strategic interests in Ireland exposed some fundamental weaknesses within the very concept of

Britishness. While the union with Scotland in 1707 had allowed the Scots to retain their institutions and cultural identity especially in law, education and religion, the union with

Ireland in 1801 gave that country little cultural or political independence.10 The union confirmed Ireland as a dependency of Britain rather than an equal member of the United

Kingdom; the union also exposed the essential differences between Protestant Britain and

Catholic Ireland as well as their very divergent cultural identities. More importantly the union

6 ibid, p. 330. 7 ibid, pp. 324-334. 8 Colley, 1992, p. 19: J D Brewer & G I Higgins, Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland, 1600-1998: the mote and the beam, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002, pp. 5-6. 9 A W B Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 10 J.G.A. Pocock, „The Union in British History‟, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, Vol. 10, (2000) pp. 181-196. 34

with Ireland also exposed Britain‟s own problem of Catholic emancipation that along with increased Irish migration to Britain produced an unexpected backlash from the entrenched

Protestantism of the British people.11 Catholic emancipation within Britain and the extension of civil rights to British and Irish Catholics challenged the very concept of a British identity based upon Protestantism.12

The Protestant masses of Britain had traditionally viewed Catholicism as an enemy of the state and it was this institutionalised cultural norm that had allowed the British elite to use a combination of military force and discriminatory laws to reinforce the Protestant status quo.

While opposition to Catholic emancipation had begun to wane within parts of the British establishment by the early nineteenth century, the underlying anti-Irish and anti-Catholic prejudices in the British polity were exposed by the mass of petitions signed by ordinary

Britons in 1828-29. This anti-Irish hostility demonstrated the survival of fundamental anti-

Catholicism that began with the reformation and continues to the present.13 Currently for example, there is little support within Britain for a change to the Act of Succession that prevents a Catholic from becoming or marrying the heir to the throne 14 and it is significant that Tony Blair did not feel able to convert to Catholicism until after his resignation as British

Prime Minister.15

Across the centuries successive British governments viewed Ireland mainly from a strategic perspective.16 How the island could be used to threaten or advance British strategic interests was at the core of British thinking, and as a result Ireland had always been treated very

11 Colley, 1992, p. 330. 12 J.H Hexter, „The Protestant Revival and the Catholic Question in England, 1778-1829‟, The Journal of Modern History, vol 8, No 3, 1936, pp. 297-319. 13 T Clayton & I. McBride, (eds), Protestantism and National Identity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 50-52, 1998. 14 Colley, 1992, p. 46. 15 Blair explains Catholicism move, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/uk_news/7780980.stm, viewed 2010. 16 Townshend, Ireland in the 20th Century, Hodder, London, 1999, p. xii. 35

differently to other parts of Great Britain.17 Ireland‟s forced integration into a union with

Britain in 1801 in response to a perceived threat from France reinforces the contention that

Britain principally viewed Ireland from its own strategic perspective.18 Britain was little concerned how the island was governed so long as its own strategic interests were protected.

Even after independence the Irish Free State was still treated favourably by Britain because it remained a loyal member of the Commonwealth and allowed the Royal Navy the use of strategically important ports. Northern Ireland, while constitutionally part of the United

Kingdom was also treated very differently to other parts of Britain, being on the whole left to its own devices. Despite Cunningham‟s claims that concerns were raised at Westminster about how the Unionist government ruled Northern Ireland none of these issues compelled the British government to take any action.19 It was the expedient application of the 1920

Government of Ireland Act and in particular the convention of not debating areas under the competence of the Northern Ireland government that allowed Westminster to avoid its responsibilities and clearly demonstrates that Britain was little concerned how the island was governed.

The perception that the British viewed Northern Ireland largely from their own strategic point of view was beyond the comprehension of the Ulster Unionists who retained an erroneous belief in their unique importance as loyal Protestant British subjects in a sea of disloyal

Catholic Irish.20 While the British had never lost their inherent distrust of disloyal Irish

Catholics they were content to ignore Irish issues so long as they were not directly affected by them. However Ulster unionists retained their visceral hatred for Catholicism and

17 D Freeman, „Winston Churchill & Eamon De Valera: A Thirty year relationship‟ in The 2008 International Churchill Conference, Boston. 18 Colley, 1992, p. 322: G I T Machin, The Catholic Question in English Politics: 1820-1830, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, p. 12. 19 M.J Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969-89, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, pp. 1-2. 20 Brewer & Higgins, 2002, p. 87. 36

consequent fear of Catholic mobilisation.21 Those feelings underpinned the unionists‟ inability to understand that the civil rights protests were essentially a political protest agitating for internal change in Northern Ireland and not a disguised fight for Irish unity, which was to be a major spur to the resurgence of violence in 1968.

The Ulster unionist concept of what it was to be British was based upon an eighteenth century concept of Protestantism with a strong fundamentalist ideal whereas the British concept of what it was to be a Protestant had continually evolved, and by the 1960s included little of the archaic concepts that contributed to unionist ideology. Unionist views of British identity tend to conform to the argument advanced by Linda Colley in Britons 22 and Michael Ignatieff, in

Blood and Belonging; journeys into the new nationalism.23 However generations of those

Irish in Northern Ireland who had grown up in a fervently Protestant and anti-Catholic society had adopted a particularly virulent version of British civic nationalism and equated Irish nationalism with disloyalty to the crown and therefore the state. In Great Britain the general acceptance of both the rule of law and loyalty to the monarch would normally have ensured a relatively peaceful resolution. But unionists‟ loyalty to the Protestant monarch sometimes obliged them to dispense with the acceptance of the rule of law which is the other central plank of British civic nationalism.24 This paradox was often difficult for non-Irish people - including the British army - to understand. This ideology was also based upon a siege mentality that had developed over the centuries in Ulster and was still evident in the 1960s.25

Unionists also firmly believed that their peculiar concept of what it was to be British had been solidified as a result both of Home Rule and also Northern Ireland‟s contribution to the

21 R Rose, Governing Without Consensus, Faber & Faber, London, 1971, p. 74. 22 Colley, 1992. 23 Ignatieff, 1994. 24 S Nelson, Ulster’s Uncertain Defenders, Appletree Press, Belfast, 1984, p. 9. 25 Brewer, & Higgins, p. 22. 37

Second World War.26 However it was the actions of the British Labour Prime Minister

Clement Attlee in 1949 that further strengthened the ideological basis of unionism, that unionists alone had the right to rule Ulster.

Attlee and the Ireland Act of 1949.

The institutionalised attitude of the British towards the nationalist Irish as a disloyal people was reinforced by Eire‟s neutrality during the war, and it was this that formed the underlying basis of the post-war Anglo-Irish relationship.27 Ireland was only militarily important while the island was threatened by an invasion that in turn might threaten Britain, and as in the past it was Ireland‟s geographical location in times of external danger that heightened British concerns about the loyalty of the Irish. On this occasion it was Britain‟s fear of a German invasion in the early stages of the Second World War that renewed demands for the Royal

Navy to regain access to the „treaty ports‟ and for unfettered military access in Eire.28

However Churchill‟s imperialist outlook meant that he could not understand or more importantly accept that Eire saw itself as an independent nation that was determined to remain neutral even in the face of immense British and American pressure.29

Secondly, those in positions of political power in post-war Britain had not only lived through a very recent world war, many had also lived through the Irish Home Rule crisis and its aftermath. Senior members of the Attlee government had served in the wartime cabinet and had firsthand experience of how very differently the two parts Ireland responded to the fight

26 R Fisk, In Time of War, Andre Deutsch, London, 1983, p. 476. 27 Peter Rose, 2000, p. 1. 28 Fisk, 1983, pp. 470-471: Freeman, 2008. 29 D E Boyce, (eds), The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868-1996, 1996: The British History Perspective. Macmillan, London, p 86. 38

against Nazi Germany and were very obviously affected by the experience.30 It is essential to remember that even though the post-war government was a Labour government with a strong anti-imperialist streak, its members and especially its leadership were profoundly committed to conventional British patriotism. Attlee himself had been born in 1883 and was a member of the Victorian professional class with fundamentally conservative British attitudes on questions of nationality, attitudes that were reflected and reinforced through his active service in the First World War.31 Attlee first became politically active in 1906 when his work in the

London slums served to transform his conservative political views by the realisation that only a socialist national agenda could alleviate institutionalised poverty.32 The divisive Home Rule crisis of 1912-14 and the Irish independence struggle of 1916-21 were thus crucial events at an early stage in his political development. He was elected to Westminster in 1920 and represented a constituency with a large Irish population and therefore was exposed to Irish culture and political opinion. On the other hand Attlee‟s responsibilities as Under-secretary of

State for War in the government of 1929-34; the British response to India‟s drive for self- government, and the 1930 Imperial Conference also reinforced his distinctly British beliefs.33

A deeply conventional man Attlee was a product of British nineteenth century imperialism.

When Eire‟s neutrality is compared to Ulster‟s proactive support for Britain during the war a further insight can be gained into why the British political leaders immediately after the war reacted differently to the separate parts of that troubled island. This was demonstrated in

1949 when Ireland declared itself a republic and opted out of the Commonwealth. Ernest

Bevin, Britain‟s Foreign Secretary, clearly enunciated the British government‟s attitude towards Irish nationalism when in May 1949 he said:

30 R Fanning, „The response of the London and Belfast Governments to the Declaration of the Republic of Ireland, 1948-49‟, International Affairs, vol 58, No 1, 1982, pp. 95-114. 31 L Bridges, „Clement Richard Attlee 1887-1967‟, The Royal Society, 14, 1968. 32 W Golant, „The early Political Thought of C R Attlee‟, The Political Quarterly, 40(3): 246-255, 2005. 33 Bridges, 1968. 39

…we could not ignore the history of the last forty years. Northern Ireland had stood in with us against Hitler when the South was neutral. Without the help of the North Hitler would probably have won the submarine war and the United Kingdom would have been defeated.34

Bevin‟s statement reflected both his long-term historical view of Anglo-Irish relations - some forty years - as well as resentment not only of Irish neutrality expressed by Churchill and other members of the war-time cabinet, but also of the entire Irish national struggle from the time of the 3rd Home Rule Bill.

Bevin‟s resentment for Eire‟s neutrality also reflected that of Attlee and his post-war cabinet colleagues.35 Herbert Morrison is another member of the Attlee cabinet who actively supported Ulster during this crisis. Morrison, who was originally anti-Unionist, was converted by his wartime experiences into an active defender of partition and the Unionist cause within the post-war Labour government.36 He was greatly impressed by the conspicuous loyalty of Ulster Protestants to Britain and at the same time angered by Irish neutrality and the reported disloyalty of the northern Catholics. His conversion to the unionist cause was so complete that in a 1943 public address with the Stormont Prime Minister as the guest of honour he suggested that the overall opinion of the British people towards Irish nationalism would be permanently changed because of the explicit loyalty of the Ulster

Protestants during the war. This view was clearly borne out by Bevin‟s statement.

Morrison remained a strong supporter of Unionist interests in the post-war Labour cabinet even to the point of ignoring the systemic discrimination against Catholics in Northern

34 Fanning, 1982, pp. 95-114. 35 G Bell, Troublesome Business: The Labour Party and the Irish Question, Pluto Press, London, 1982, pp. 72- 85. 36 Bell, 1982, pp 72-85: B Donoughue & G.W Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician, Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1973, pp 307-8. 40

Ireland.37 It is clear from the actions of senior members of the post-war Labour cabinet in

1949 that whatever underlying sympathy there might once have been for the Irish nationalist cause within the British Labour party, this was now undermined by the government‟s desire to protect what it saw as Britain‟s strategic interests, in the aftermath of a war of national survival in which Irish neutrality had profoundly offended the Labour Party‟s anti-fascist instincts, while Northern Unionists stood shoulder to shoulder with the coalition government.

The Irish government failed to understand this or to recognise that Eire‟s neutrality would be seen by Britain as a disloyal act in stark contrast to Northern Ireland‟s overt display of loyalty to the Crown.38 Loyalty to the Crown would always be rewarded and disloyalty punished.

The inward-looking decision by the Irish government and the reactionary British response was another significant breakdown in the long history of the flawed relationship between

Britain and Ireland.

While the decision of the Irish government in 1949 to break the last links to the British

Commonwealth was not entirely unexpected within British government circles, the reaction of the Attlee Labour government came both as a surprise to the Irish government and a relief to the Unionist government in Ulster.39 It has been suggested that the new Irish government‟s announcement of a declaration of independence at a press conference in Canada was ill- considered, spontaneous and out of step with prevailing policies. Conversely it was an emotive policy change primarily intended to appeal to the Irish Prime Minister John

Costello‟s own electoral base, whose possible repercussions from either Britain or Ulster had not been fully considered.40 However the Irish declaration of independence and the potential repercussions were extensively debated at Westminster with the continued relationship

37 Donoughue & Jones, 1973, pp. 307-8. 38 B Barton, „Relations between Westminster and Stormont during the Attlee premiership‟, Irish Political Studies, no 7, pp. 1-20, 1992. 39 Fanning, 1982, pp. 95-114. 40 ibid. pp. 95-114. 41

between Eire and Ulster and Eire‟s membership of the Commonwealth being of particular concern, as was the peculiar status of Irish citizens resident in Britain.41 The problems that developed reflected an evolving range of issues that had been percolating through the three governments since the end of the Second World War. Within Eire there was an increasing demand for the removal of the constitutional link to the British Crown even if this action complicated the parallel drive for an end to partition. Sean McBride, Eire‟s Minister for

External Affairs, was of the opinion that even if Eire left the Commonwealth the relationship between Eire and Britain was so robust that the issue of partition could still be resolved. As

McBride optimistically stated in July 1949:

… the view of the Irish government [is] that the repeal of the External Relations Act and the enactment of the Republic of Ireland Act would be a constructive step in the improvement of Anglo-Irish relations.42

On the other hand the election of a Labour government in London in 1945 caused considerable unease within Ulster Unionist circles.43 Primarily this was because Labour, as the heirs of historical Liberalism, was associated with Asquith‟s Home Rule proposals which from a Unionist perspective could imply the end of partition. The Unionist government‟s concerns were further increased by the rise of the „Friends of Ireland‟ within the parliamentary Labour party with their overt support for an end to partition and unwelcome exposure of the inherent discrimination in the province. While the Unionists were concerned that conflict with Labour might strain the very foundations of the Union with Britain it was

Labour‟s socialist policies as outlined in the King‟s speech that were their initial concern.44

Attlee‟s social reform agenda was based on raising the social standards of all the residents of

Great Britain through direct state action which was an anathema to the ultra conservative

41 Eire and the Commonwealth, House of Lords, Hansard, vol 159 cc1051-140, 15 Dec 1948. 42 H.E.S MacBride, „Anglo-Irish Relations‟, International Affairs, no 25, No 3, 1949, pp. 257-273. 43 Peter Rose, 2000, pp. 2-3. 44 ibid. 42

Unionists. The Unionist government was worried because they believed that any rise in the overall social standards in Northern Ireland would be especially advantageous to the nationalist community and as a result unionist domination could be challenged.45 So concerned was Unionist government by this strategy that it even considered a range of options including dominion status, however the realisation that this would mean an end to the massive subsidies paid by Westminster curtailed this notion.46

Attlee‟s response to Ireland‟s unilateral declaration of independence is particularly illustrative of British attitudes towards Ireland at this time. As a result of Britain‟s wartime experiences the Attlee government had little sympathy for Eire and it gave serious consideration to punishing the Irish Republic by removing its privileged position and threatening to treat it like any other foreign country outside the Commonwealth.47 Attlee also actively considered declaring Irish nationals in Britain aliens and imposing tariffs on Irish trade, and it was only when the practical implications of these proposed policies were explored that he finally relented.48 While the impossibility of controlling the flow of Irish people between Ireland and

Britain was seen as a major impediment, it was the opposition of senior Commonwealth leaders that tempered Attlee‟s approach towards Ireland.49 Attlee‟s decisions in this instance have also to be considered in the context of the 1947 Indian drive for independence and a need for Britain to protect its strategic interests in the escalating cold war. So strategically important did the government see Northern Ireland at the time that the government even stated that there was little chance of ending partition even if the people of Northern Ireland wanted it. To quote from a Cabinet Minute of 12 January 1949: “From the point of view of

45 Barton, 1992, pp. 1-20. 46 Peter Rose, 2000, pp. 2-3. 47 ibid. pp. 1-9. 48 Quoted in Fanning, 1982, pp. 95-114. 49 Bell, 1982, p. 78. 43

Great Britain, experience in the last war had amply proved that Northern Ireland‟s continued adhesion to the United Kingdom was essential for her defence.”50

Attlee had been forced to discuss the evolving situation with representatives of Canada,

Australia and New Zealand, countries with large populations of Irish descent, in an attempt to gain a united Commonwealth approach to Ireland. Nevertheless it was a lack of support from these important members of the Commonwealth that forced Attlee to allow Ireland to retain its privileged connections to Britain. Attlee may have reluctantly accepted the inevitability of

Ireland‟s departure from the Commonwealth, however the economic and political guarantees that he gave to the Northern Ireland government and especially his decision to give the

Northern Ireland parliament the right to determine whether the province stayed within the

United Kingdom, proved to be highly contentious within his own party.51 The decision not to directly give the right of determination to the people of Northern Ireland was seen by many in the Labour Party as a step too far and provoked strong dissent even though the decision was strongly supported by the Cabinet.52

Such was the dissent within the party that it provoked a rebellion by a small group of Labour backbenchers. The instigators of this rebellion were the „Friends of Ireland‟ a small group of some thirty Labour backbenchers predominantly from the north of England whose members had either a large percentage of Irish people in their electorate or who were affiliated to

Ireland personally through birth or family connection. These MPs were also concerned that

Northern Ireland‟s standards of democracy did not comply with their notions of British liberal democratic standards.53 However their attempts to raise specific Northern Ireland issues such as the Special Powers Acts at Westminster were continually thwarted by their

50 Quoted in Fanning, 1982, pp. 95-114. 51 Ireland Bill, Second reading, House of Commons, Hansard, vol 464 cc1854-904, 11 May 1949. 52 Peter Rose, 2000, pp. 5-8. 53 Ibid. 44

own government‟s adherence to the Westminster convention, which ruled out of order discussion of issues that were the responsibility of the Northern Ireland government. The final downfall of the „Friends of Ireland‟ came after the passing of the 1949 Ireland Act when despite the concerns of large numbers of Labour backbenchers, Attlee and his cabinet forced through the Bill in its existing form and would not allow any dissent. Herbert Morrison‟s wartime experiences again influenced the Labour government‟s decisions on Ireland and he personally led the charge against the sixty-five Labour rebels.54 Morrison not only attacked the labour MPs for their disloyalty to the government he also ensured the arbitrary removal of five Parliamentary Secretaries who had opposed the measure.55

Another issue of mutual distrust between Ireland and Britain that has to be included in the mix of issues confronting the two nations was Ireland‟s refusal to join the North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949. Again from a British perspective the defence of Britain had always been dependent on control of its western approaches and historically the strategic position had always been either to control Ireland or to ensure that no other power did. This strategy had been constant throughout the Second World War and now as a result of the threat from the USSR it was just as important. America supported Britain‟s strategic direction and had encouraged Ireland to join the new security treaty, however Ireland was now governed by the newly elected Costello coalition that included the ultra-republican Clann na

Poblachta led by Sean MacBride who was also Eire‟s External Affairs minister.

Republicanism was the core ideology of MacBride and his party which led them to vehemently oppose any military agreement that included the possibility of British troops being present in Ireland.56

54 Donoughue & Jones, 1973, p. 435: Bell, 1982, pp. 98-99. 55 Peter Rose, 2000, pp. 1-9. 56 B Whelan, „Ireland, the Marshal Plan and the US Cold war Concerns‟, Journal of Cold war Studies, 8.1, 2006, pp. 68-94. 45

The Attlee cabinet evidently believed that the Irish government‟s decision to leave the

Commonwealth and its refusal to join NATO demonstrate again that Ireland was disloyal to

Britain and the Crown when compared to Ulster. They therefore assumed that they had little option other than to strongly support the Northern Ireland government as it had supported

Britain during the war.57 It was Attlee who personally ensured that the 1949 Ireland Act gave the Northern Ireland government complete control over its own future, and as he made clear during the parliamentary debate of 11 May, it was as a direct consequence of the actions of the Eire government that his government had decided to give the Parliament of Northern

Ireland and not its people the veto on whether or not to stay within the United Kingdom.58 He was also highly disparaging of Eire‟s desire for unification and described this as irrelevant, it was no longer important and had been dealt with by Westminster in another era. Attlee assumed that if an independent India could retain its connection to the Commonwealth and therefore display its loyalty to Britain so then should the Irish government. If republican India felt able to stay in the Commonwealth then so could Eire. From Attlee‟s perspective Irish actions were a gratuitous and unacceptable demonstration of disloyalty to Britain and the

Crown.

It can also be argued that Ireland‟s dramatic break from the Crown and the British family of nations in 1949 had offended British sensitivities by again demonstrating how „disloyal‟ the

Irish were. The timing of Ireland‟s actions was especially important because it occurred during a period when Britain was being forced to confront the disintegration of its once vast empire, with its crowning glory India becoming independent in 1947. Ireland‟s perceived act of disloyalty added to the international perception that Britain was a declining world power, and could therefore not go unanswered.59 The British response to the actions of the Irish

57 K.O Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-51, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. 58 Ireland Bill, Second Reading, House of Commons, Hansard, vol 464 cc1854-904, 11 May 1949. 59 Morgan, 1984, pp. 330-358. 46

government in 1949 and especially Attlee‟s attempts to treat Irish citizens in Britain as aliens adds weight to the concept that the British polity viewed the Irish as treacherous.60

The deliberate refusal of the Attlee government to interfere in what was blatant discrimination against the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland is an obvious demonstration of how his government believed that Irish nationalist sentiment should be treated. This was an unmistakable and premeditated policy which helped to prolong the institutionalised discrimination within what was constitutionally a part of the United Kingdom but which in practice was always viewed as a place apart.61 The ongoing actions of the „Friends of Ireland‟ ensured that the Attlee government was fully aware that the Act would further institutionalise sectarian discrimination in unionist Northern Ireland yet they choose to deliberately ignore this.62 Whether they knew it or not, Attlee and his cabinet clearly were reinforcing discriminatory social and political standards on this minority, standards that would not have been accepted in any other part of Britain. However not only were these objections ignored but they forcefully pursued their policy in the face of the facts and reasoned argument by their own party members.

The most obvious casualties of Attlee‟s policy were the impotent nationalist minority in

Northern Ireland as a result of the cynical dilution of what was championed as British liberal democratic traditions. In the end all that Attlee achieved, like Lloyd George before him with partition, was to find a temporary solution to the problem first posed by the English policy of plantation generations earlier; how to get the culturally divergent Protestants and Catholics to live peacefully together. It was Attlee‟s Labour successor, Harold Wilson, who in 1968 was to be finally confronted with the culmination of decades if not centuries of incompetent

60 Fanning, 1982, pp. 95-114. 61 Peter Rose, 2000, pp. 5-8. 62 ibid, p. 7. 47

British policy on Ireland.63 However the fundamental question that has to be asked about the actions or inaction of Harold Wilson and his government when they were finally confronted by the breakdown of Northern Ireland society in the late 1960s was why their behaviour was so like that of the Attlee government some twenty years earlier.

The Wilson government and Northern Ireland.

In the period between the fall of the Attlee government in 1951 and the election of Harold

Wilson in 1964 none of the Conservative governments then in power were forced to confront the political and social issues eating at the fabric of Northern Ireland. Even the futile 1956 to

1962 IRA border campaign had little direct effect on Britain and as a result the Conservatives were content to leave dealing with the IRA to Stormont and Dublin. From a British perspective the province was unimportant and the British political and bureaucratic elite allowed the Unionist government to carry on without interference as they had done since

1921. The historically close relationship between the Conservative and Unionist parties led to an assumption that the management of the province could be left in the hands of like-minded friends in Ulster. From a Westminster perspective all appeared well, and so long as the

British treasury continued to underwrite the Northern Ireland government, the enduring

British policy of treating Ireland as „a place apart‟ appeared to work. It was not until Edward

Heath unexpectedly came to power in 1970 that the Conservatives were again forced to confront the „Irish question‟.64

63 B Purdie, The Friends of Ireland: British Labour and Irish Nationalism, 1945-49, Contemporary Irish Studies, Manchester Uni Press, Manchester, 1983, pp. 81-94. 64 J Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975, Longman, London, 1996. 48

However in 1964 the Labour government of Harold Wilson was elected and as the previous

Conservative governments had done they ignored Northern Ireland.65 Yet Harold Wilson came to power with the self-proclaimed reputation as a reformist Prime Minister with a vision of pulling Britain out of its post-war malaise and dire economic position, and to do this he had formed grandiose plans to modernise the nation‟s social, political and economic institutions.66 Even though Harold Wilson did put some pressure on the government of

Terence O‟Neill to implement political reforms this was at arms-length, and it was only when the civil unrest of 1968 turned to outright violence in 1969 that an unwilling and unprepared

Labour government was forced to directly confront a dysfunctional society whose problems the partition of Ireland fifty years earlier had not resolved. However there is little evidence that Wilson‟s early promises were at the forefront of his political agenda once he took power, and as with many politicians the realities that Wilson faced when he came to power bore little resemblance to the policies he had publicly espoused before his election.67

It could be argued that Harold Wilson was more aware than many in his party of the „Irish question‟. His electorate contained a very high percentage of voters from an Irish background; his knowledge of Northern Ireland‟s contribution to the war effort and his parliamentary experience during the Atlee era had given him firsthand knowledge of

Northern Ireland and of the issues the „Friends of Ireland‟ had raised in 1949.68 Wilson‟s public statements before the election also raised expectations that his incoming government would again take up the challenge of discrimination in Northern Ireland. A short time before the 1964 election he had written to the founders of the Campaign for Social Justice in

Northern Ireland promising that once in power he would ensure that discrimination against

65 K Jeffery, Northern Ireland since 1968, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, p. 21. 66 H Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A personal Record, Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1971, p. xvii: P Bew & H. Patterson, The British State and the Ulster Crisis: from Wilson to Thatcher, Verso, London, 1985, p. 7. 67 Peter Rose, 2000, p. 17. 68 R.F Foster, Luck and the Irish, Penguin, London, 2007, p. 102: Peter Rose, 2000, p. 8: Bew & Patterson, 1985, p. 11. 49

Catholics would be removed.69 Whether his promises were purely for local consumption in his Huyton constituency or he believed his own rhetoric is open to debate; significantly however they were not included in the Labour Party‟s election manifesto. More importantly for the incoming government Britain was facing the financial and political consequences of a diminishing empire and the reality that it was no longer a significant world power.

When Wilson was elected in 1964 he was not in a position to implement any potentially controversial policies because of his government‟s very slim majority, a position that was especially true with regard to Northern Ireland. During his first term he was at the mercy of the Ulster Unionist MPs who if they voted with their Conservative allies could bring down the Labour government. However this was certainly not the case after the 1966 election when he had a sizable majority and could, as he had promised earlier, tackle the discrimination within Northern Ireland. He chose not to do so.70 A broader reading of the events would suggest that the majority of British politicians and the British media were more preoccupied with the myriad of problems confronting Britain at that time.71 In addition both the political establishment and the majority of the media were unaware of what was happening in

Northern Ireland at that time. More importantly, they were not interested.

The government‟s primary focus was the dire financial situation that Britain found itself in and especially the key issues of a massive balance of trade deficit that the Wilson government had inherited and the ongoing defence of Sterling.72 It was Britain‟s desperate financial situation that was the focus of most of its decisions for the next six years. In addition the government had to contend with increasing industrial and social unrest within Britain and major foreign issues such as the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, the

69 Peter Rose, 2000, p. 13: Purdie, Politics in the Streets: The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland, Blackstaff Press, Belfast, 1990, p. 100. 70 Peter Rose, 2000, p. xi-xiii. 71 R Coopey & S Fielding, et al., (eds), The Wilson Governments, 1964-1970, Pinter, London, 1993, pp. 1-8. 72 D Blaazer, „Devalued and Dejected Britons: the Pound in Public Discourse in the Mid 1960s‟, History Workshop Journal, 47, 1999, pp. 121-140. 50

continuing insurgency in Malaya, and United States pressure to participate in the escalating war in Vietnam.73 It is clear that the political issues the Wilson government had to face during this period were much more important to Britain than anything the relatively insignificant province of Northern Ireland appeared likely to produce. It was not until 1966 that the „Irish question‟ again raised its head in the British consciousness and from then until Labour lost office in 1970 the unresolved issues of Northern Ireland increasingly came to the forefront of

British politics.

The Labour government of Harold Wilson has been researched by a growing number of academics and political observers, however in most of these studies Northern Ireland rates only a passing mention.74 The most comprehensive analysis of the Wilson government‟s struggle with Northern Ireland during the period 1964 to 1970 has been produced by Peter

Rose. Rose, a one-time lobby correspondent at Westminster turned academic, had access to the normal range of published material both official and non-official, however it is his personal access to those directly involved in the evolving crisis that is of particular interest.75

His interviews of prominent politicians, civil-servants and members of the media make his work a unique account of this most important part of British and Irish history and that is why it has been extensively relied upon here.

During the first months of the Wilson government it was as if Northern Ireland did not exist.

The General Section of the Home Office had kept a watching brief on Northern Ireland and the Treasury supplied the necessary funds for the province‟s continued existence. The Wilson government was at that time content to leave the governing of the province to the apparently

73 Wilson, 1971. 74 Coopey & Fielding, et al., 1993: R H S Crossman & J. P. Morgan, The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, 1981: B Donoughue, Dowing Street Diary: With Harold Wilson in No 10, Pimlico, London, 2006: C Hemming, The Wilson Years, Labour government 1964-70: A Bibliographical essay, http://www.labour-history.org.uk/Wilson%20Years%20Bibliography.htm. 75 Peter Rose, 2000. 51

moderate, and they hoped reforming, Unionist government of Terence O‟Neill.76 Labour‟s first Home Secretary, Frank Soskice, was so uninterested that he only paid one half-day visit to the province during his tenure and came away from the visit overly impressed by the

Northern Ireland premier Terence O‟Neill and the Unionist party.77 Peter Rose argues that

Soskice was by general consent a very ineffective minister 78 and was simply trying to continue the British policy of treating Ireland as „a place apart‟. If so he was successful at least insofar as his inaction insured that Westminster avoided any engagement with Ulster, its politicians or its problems.79 Soskice‟s successor, Roy Jenkins, a historian with a reputation for being liberal-minded, was similarly unconvincing in his dealings with Northern Ireland.80

Jenkins‟ biographer John Campbell has argued that he clearly admired Asquith and as a result was too close to his subject to deal impartially with Asquith‟s handling of the „Irish crises‟.81

Jenkins was also very strongly influenced by his relationship with Clement Attlee who had sponsored Jenkins into parliament and was godfather to Jenkins‟s first son.82 Whether his historical understanding of the corrosive influence of the „Irish question‟ in British politics had produced a personal resolve to stay out of the political graveyard of Northern Ireland as

Paul Rose has suggested, or that he simply had other more pressing issues to deal with is arguable. However like his predecessors Jenkins avoided getting involved in Northern Ireland and as a result its internal conflicts were allowed to gain more momentum until shortly afterwards they boiled over into violence.83

76 ibid, pp. 17-19. 77 Bew & Patterson, 1985, p. 13. 78 Peter Rose, 2000, p. 26. 79 ibid, pp. 25-27. 80 R Jenkins, Mr Balfour's Poodle: Peers v People, Chilmark Press, New York, 1954: Jenkins, Asquith, Collins, London, 1964. 81 J Campbell, Roy Jenkins: A Biography, Weidenfield & Nicolson, London, 1983, pp. 45-46. 82 A Howard, Roy Jenkins, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford Uni. Press, 2010. 83 Bew & Patterson, 1985, p. 13. 52

Avoiding the Irish Question.

British concern with the „Irish question‟ quickly evaporated after the establishment of the

Irish Free State and Northern Ireland in the 1920s and as we have seen, the manifest lack of interest by successive British governments had allowed Northern Ireland to become entrenched as a sectarian state, and even the activities of some concerned Labour MPs during

Attlee‟s reign could not displace the institutionalised ignorance at Westminster. While the increased sectarian violence in the late 1960s finally awakened British politicians to the severity of the problem and to their responsibilities for the province, the government should have been aware of the brewing trouble earlier than this through the activities of the

Campaign for Democracy in Ulster (CDU).84

The newly elected Labour MP Paul Rose (no relation to Peter Rose) was pivotal in the founding of the CDU in 1962. Rose had been awakened to the overt discrimination in

Northern Ireland by the actions of the Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland (CSJ) and its founders Dr and Mrs McCluskey.85 Like the „Friends of Ireland‟ before it, the CDU was a small group of Labour MPs who had either large numbers of Irish in their electorates or were themselves of Irish extraction and were keen to redress what they saw as decades of

British inaction and political failure in Ireland, failure that was in their opinion based primarily on ignorance and a lack of comprehension about Ireland. Paul Rose believed that taken together with the patronising attitude of most British politicians towards the Irish it was surprising that the sectarian bitterness in Northern Ireland had not caused major problems for

Britain earlier.86 From Paul Rose‟s perspective the issues arising in Northern Ireland were the

84 Callaghan, 1973 pp. 1-15. 85 Paul Rose, Backbenchers Dilemma, Frederick Muller, London, 1981. 86 Bell, 1982, .p. 109. 53

result of English and not Irish problems. It goes without saying that his views were not overwhelmingly supported at Westminster or within the bulk of the English polity.87

Like the „Friends of Ireland‟ two decades earlier, the CDU attempted to raise the numerous examples of social, economic and political discrimination against the Catholic minority in

Northern Ireland. However, as was the case with the „Friends of Ireland‟ the CDU had very little success. Since 1923 the Speaker of the House of Commons had consistently ruled that anything that was the responsibility of the Northern Ireland government could not be discussed at Westminster. The practice of the Wilson government was consistent with the practice of the Attlee government and in both periods Labour ministers enforced the ruling by refusing to debate these issues. Peter Rose writing some years later and from a journalistic and academic background suggests that British ministers had two fundamental reasons for regularly using the Speaker‟s convention to avoid having to confront issues concerning

Northern Ireland. For the most part they knew that anything Irish usually ended in grief; however the main reason was that they would not gain any political capital in Britain.88 Rose goes on to argue strongly that while the Speaker‟s convention was perceived as having the force of law it was not a law and could have been changed at will if the government of the day had wanted it changed. Senior British legal counsel confirmed that the Speaker‟s ruling could not be treated as a law even though it had been in use for fifty years.89

Westminster had refrained from involving itself in matters that affected Northern Ireland although it still retained the supreme legislative power over Stormont. As Birrell has shown

“it was Westminster‟s practice of refraining from legislating on matters that Stormont could deal with rather than any legal constraint that became an established convention”.90 Birrell

87 Paul Rose, 1981, pp. 178-179. 88 Peter Rose, 2000. 89 ibid, pp. 20-24. 90 W D Birrell, „The Stormont-Westminster Relationship‟, Parliamentary Affairs, no 26, 1973, pp. 471-491. 54

concludes that Stormont had been able to acquire and use a wide range of powers not available to the rest of the United Kingdom because Westminster politicians were both uninterested in and unwilling to get involved in Northern Ireland affairs, even though they had the legislative authority to do so.91 Even though Stormont was subordinate to

Westminster, and Westminster had the constitutional authority to override any Stormont legislation, it was the established convention enforced by successive British governments that

Attlee and all other British governments used to ignore Northern Ireland issues. As Lawrence has stated: “In 1922 and again in 1923 the Speaker of the House of Commons ruled that questions were out of order if they dealt with matters transferred to the Government of

Northern Ireland.”92 Therefore all matters devolved to the Northern Ireland parliament were prevented from being discussed at Westminster and it was the continuation of this established convention that allowed the Attlee government to ignore Northern Ireland issues even if they were raised by their own members.93 This „Speakers‟ ruling was both institutionalised and rigorously enforced by all parties from 1922 until the events of 1969 displayed its fallacy.94

The crutch that successive British governments and Unionist MPs at Westminster had used to avoid any British involvement in Northern Ireland was based on a false premise and could have been overturned at any time if the political desire had been there.

Paul Rose began agitating at Westminster for action on Northern Ireland even though it was opposed by the leadership of his own party. Rose continued to meet with other Labour MPs and some Liberals who were responsive to Northern Ireland‟s problems and with the new generation of Northern Ireland Civil Rights leaders such as John Hume and Austin Currie.95

They attempted to increase an awareness of Northern Ireland‟s discriminated minority at

91 ibid. 92 R.J Lawrence, „Northern Ireland at Westminster‟, Parliamentary Affairs, no 20, 1966, pp. 90-93. 93 B Purdie, „The Friends of Ireland: British Labour and Irish Nationalism, 1945-49‟, Contemporary Irish Studies, Manchester Uni. Press, 1983, pp. 81-94 94 M Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969-2000, Manchester Uni. Press, Manchester, 2001, p. 1. 95 Paul Rose, 1981, p. 180. 55

Westminster and also to counteract the activities of the Ulster Unionist MPs who were determined that no issue they judged the responsibility of the Northern Ireland government would be discussed in the British parliament. Nonetheless what Paul Rose and the CDU did achieve was to remove the well-worn excuse that British political establishment was ignorant of Northern Ireland issues. However by mid-1968 the CDU no longer believed that it was achieving anything significant for the minority in Northern Ireland and as a result membership of the CDU fell from more than eighty MPs to only Paul Rose and a few supporters.96 Unfortunately, as in the past, this British government refused to grasp the nettle of the Irish problem until it was too late.97

The only issue of any consequence relating to Northern Ireland that forced its way on to the

British government agenda in 1966 was the possibility of IRA activity during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the 1916 Easter Rebellion. This fleeting interest was awakened by a Metropolitan Police report of 1 March 1966 describing the increased build-up of what was described as a well-armed IRA capable of attacking military and civilian targets in Northern

Ireland and Great Britain. This report formed the basis of the Home Secretary‟s briefing to

Harold Wilson on 2 March.98 The report was also forwarded to the Ministry of Defence who began contingency planning on the basis that IRA activities constituted a „law and order‟ problem, a police responsibility, and that the army‟s primary responsibility was the protection of military establishments and possible „aid to the civil power‟.99 However it was not until 28

March that Harold Wilson replied to the Home Secretary and then he only wrote a cursory request for a note on the matter.100 As part of the army‟s contingency planning General Baker,

Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS), personally visited Northern Ireland on 30-31 March

96 Peter Rose, 2000, pp. 174-175. 97 Paul Rose, 1981, pp. 178-198. 98 Northern Ireland, DEFE 11 698-400/66/37, London. 99 ibid, COS/15/17 March/66. 100 ibid, Serial 13/66. 56

to bring himself up-to-date on the IRA threat. After meeting the Inspector General (IG) of the

Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs his assessment of the IRA threat included:

The IG RUC gave me a detailed assessment of the threat [which he had passed to the Security Service] from which it is clear that there is a very real likelihood of trouble, of two kinds:

a. IRA Terrorism on the EOKA model - e.g.: attacks on key individuals such as leading members of the administration, the Police and the Services…. b. Sectarian Conflict: most probably in Belfast which can lead to communal rioting of a particularly virulent sort.

General Baker went on to describe his assessment of the Inspector General and the RUCs report:

Throughout our discussion I was struck by the IG‟s sober, balanced and „down-to- earth‟ approach: his conclusions had obviously been formed on a basis of reliable information, cross-checked and carefully weighted against a background of wide experience of the IRA problem over a number of years.101

The outcome of this intelligence-gathering exercise was that the Metropolitan police, the

British security services and the army accepted without question the assessment of the RUC

Special Branch which in turn was accepted by the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins. However

Jenkins added to the strength of the threat by including in his report the remarkable claim that the IRA had three thousand well equipped and trained men and was in a position to challenge the Northern Ireland government and also strike within Britain. At the same time Jenkins assured Wilson that the RUC was in control of Northern Ireland, the Metropolitan Police

Special Branch was keeping an eye on Britain and the army was on standby in case they were required to support the Northern Ireland government.102 In the end there was no violence of

101 ibid, CGS/353. 102 ibid. 57

any consequence in either Northern Ireland or Britain and army support was not required.

However in April the army reported that the crisis had been prevented because of the proactive conduct of the Northern Ireland government, the actions of the RUC in denying the

IRA the ability to implement its plans, and the vital assistance of the army.103 The evidence thus demonstrates that the British security authorities and the army firmly believed that they had effectively dealt with a potentially serious threat. However it is questionable whether any real threat existed.

It is also highly unlikely that the membership of the IRA in 1966 was the three thousand well equipped and trained army claimed by the Unionist government, its security apparatus, and in turn by the British security authorities. Richard English argues that the IRA‟s total strength in

1966 was closer to one thousand men and it probably had less than four hundred active members in all of Ireland.104 This number is supported by Dixon,105 however other sources including Patterson and Quinn suggest that there were approximately 80 - 120 active members in Northern Ireland. Furthermore there is no evidence that they were well trained or well armed.106 The IRA had very few arms and what they had were generally obsolete.107 The

RUC Special Branch, instead of obtaining accurate intelligence, appears to have believed the verbose propaganda emanating from the IRA, and especially its Chief of Staff Cathal

Goulding, who in 1966 stated that the IRA was preparing for another military campaign. It is clear from the lack of anything resembling a military campaign that the IRA was not the well armed and well trained organisation claimed by the Northern Ireland government and the

RUC Special Branch. It can be acknowledged that the IRA may have wanted to use the fiftieth anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rebellion to reawaken interest in a united Ireland and

103 British Army and Northern Ireland, MOD. DEFE 11-698, 1964-66, London. 104 English, 2003, p. 84 & p. 399. 105 P Dixon, Northern Ireland - The Politics of War and Peace, Palgrave, Basingstoke, p. 75, 2001. 106 H Patterson, The Politics of Illusion: A Political History of the IRA, Serif, London, 1989, p. 108: R J Quinn, The Troubles. A Chronology of the Northern Ireland Conflict, Glenravel Publications, Belfast, No 9, 51, 2001. 107 English, 2003, p. 84. 58

as a result enhance its own cause,108 however there is little evidence that it had the capacity to do so.

What is important when considering the actions of the British government in this instance is that the reports they used to form their judgement did not originate from any British security organisation but could only have come from the Royal Ulster Constabulary‟s Special Branch.

This is confirmed by Merlyn Rees, a member of the Wilson Cabinet and later Northern

Ireland Secretary, who stated at an Institute of Contemporary British History Seminar on

Northern Ireland in 1992 that the security services were not operating in Northern Ireland until the troops were deployed in August 1969.109 This was the same organisation that only a few years later was found to be grossly incompetent when it supplied substantially inaccurate and out-of-date intelligence to the army before internment. The Special Branch reports were in fact greatly influenced by the irrational beliefs of the unionist elite and that their evaluation was contaminated by an ideology stuck in the 1920‟s. Britain‟s reliance on this flawed source of intelligence was to contribute significantly to the events of 1968 and 1969.

However it was the Unionist leader, the reformist premier Terence O‟Neill in which the

Wilson government most placed its trust. Even though O‟Neill had attempted to break down some of the more obvious barriers between unionists and nationalists and between Eire and

Northern Ireland he was still fundamentally a Unionist and a fervent supporter of Northern

Ireland‟s connection with Britain. Nevertheless O‟Neill was encouraged to pursue his reform agenda by Harold Wilson, and although confronted by serious opposition from the more radical loyalists, especially Ian Paisley, he was able to convince the British government that meaningful reforms were being implemented.110 However the belief that O‟Neill‟s reforms were producing a transition from the ideological politics of the past into the politics of

108 ibid, pp. 81-85. 109 Quoted in Peter Rose, 2000, p. 129. 110 K Bloomfield, Stormont in Crisis: A Memoir, Blackstaff Press, Belfast, 1994, pp. 76-84. 59

economic realism and social modernism was clearly only a British perception of the Northern

Ireland political landscape.111 Kenneth Bloomfield, the Northern Ireland Cabinet Secretary, has suggested that O‟Neill‟s strategy was more symbolic than real and that he never really attempted to change the culture or politics of Northern Ireland.112 O‟Neill‟s visits to Catholic schools and his discussions with Catholic leaders appear to have been designed to placate

Northern Ireland‟s minority and to soften his profile in Eire although even these superficial attempts at political change raised the ire of the unionist majority and inflamed communal unrest in the province.113 The British may have believed that Terence O‟Neill was implementing real political change in Northern Ireland, however all this demonstrates is a profound lack of understanding of Northern Ireland or its politics within the British polity.

The British media had even less understanding of Northern Ireland and its underlying political and social issues than British politicians. Peter Rose states that even though he was a

Lobby correspondent at Westminster during the 1960s he was unaware of Northern Ireland or its issues.114 The British media had rarely shown any interest in the province before Cal

McCrystal‟s „John Bull‟s Political Slum‟ in July 1966, one of a series of articles in the

Sunday Times written to coincide with the Queen‟s visit to the province, which were the only significant articles to raise the long-standing issue of discrimination in Northern Ireland.115

However we have to remember that the author of this exposé of Catholic discrimination in

Northern Ireland came from Belfast and that they were written under the auspices of William

Rees-Mogg, the Catholic Deputy Editor of the Sunday Times. From an Ulster Unionist perspective the author of any criticism of the political status quo in Ulster must be anti-

Unionist or even nationalist and therefore biased. Moreover from a British perspective the

111 Boyce, 1996, pp. 107-108: Bew & Patterson, 1985, pp. 14-15. 112 Boyce, 1996, p. 76. 113 Bloomfield, 1994, pp. 63-86. 114 Peter Rose, 2000. 115 C McCrystal, „John Bull's Political Slum‟, Sunday Times, London, 1966: Foster, 2007, p. 102. 60

editor‟s religion could only make his judgement suspect.116 Nonetheless while the press coverage was very limited it did help expose the blatant discrimination in Northern Ireland.

The Wilson government‟s response to the unravelling of Northern Ireland society was on many levels a typically British response which also reflected the policies of earlier British governments. However Wilson‟s support for Terence O‟Neill‟s supposed reform agenda did raise expectations and fears on both sides of the Northern Ireland political spectrum and by offering that support without any real understanding of the consequences of his actions

Wilson contributed to the increasing destabilisation of Northern Ireland‟s existing political institutions.117

Conclusions.

If Protestantism and loyalty to Great Britain were the fundamental ideologies of Ulster unionism the ideological basis of Irish nationalism was seen to be Catholicism and independence from Britain. In addition the determined neutrality of de Valera‟s Eire during the Second World War contrasted badly against Northern Ireland‟s explicit support for

Britain‟s war effort. To Churchill‟s wartime deputy and post-war Labour Prime Minister

Clement Attlee, the inherent disloyalty to Britain displayed during the Second World War was confirmed by Eire‟s decision in 1949 to split from the Commonwealth. However his reactionary decision to favour unionists at the expense of nationalists on both sides of the border not only punished the „disloyal‟ Irish but also entrenched the sectarian nature of the

Unionist government while blatantly ignoring British liberal-democratic traditions.

116 Peter Rose, 2000, p. 190 & pp. 58-77. 117 Foster, 2007, p. 102. 61

What Lloyd George had established in 1922 Attlee had confirmed in 1949, however it was the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson who was to reap what his predecessors had sown.

In 1968 Harold Wilson was finally confronted with the culmination of many years of inept

British policy on Ireland; the virtual disintegration of Northern Ireland society. In reality there was very little difference between the policies of Lloyd George in the 1920s and those of Harold Wilson in the 1960s because the fundamental basis of all British policies since the

First World War was principally to avoid at all costs any direct involvement in Irish affairs.

Yet both Attlee and Wilson had a better understanding of Irish affairs than many of their predecessors and should have been aware of the issues that could confront their governments.

Nevertheless because of their inability to fully understand the „Irish question‟ they continued to make the same mistakes, as exemplified by James Callaghan, the one senior minister who did attempt to address the sectarian practices of the Unionist government and who also failed spectacularly. Harold Wilson had overtly raised this thorny problem of sectarian discrimination prior to his election in 1966 and while promising to impose a solution on the unionists he pointedly ignored the issue once in office, however by doing so he both raised nationalist expectations and increased unionist fears. As we shall see in the next chapter it was the Labour government of Harold Wilson, but especially the Home Secretary James

Callaghan that had to confront the return of the „Irish question‟ in 1968.

While earlier generations of the Northern Ireland minority had acquiesced to institutionalised discrimination, a new generation of better educated and driven young people now strongly opposed the very concept of discrimination. Following the example of the American civil rights and international protest movements they now demanded equality of opportunity from a reactionary Unionist government and an unwilling British government. Added to the local pressure for change were the actions of a ginger group of newly elected Labour MPs at

Westminster who continued the fight their predecessors had started during the Attlee era.

Moreover elements of the British press had also begun to write about Northern Ireland and both helped to expose the institutionalised sectarianism of Northern Ireland. Now the façade of normality in Northern Ireland so long used by Westminster to avoid its ethical and political responsibilities was exposed and it was now only a matter of time before the reality of the situation compelled the British government into action.

By throwing its support behind Terence O‟Neill the Wilson government reverted to the erstwhile British policy of conciliation in Ireland and as in the past this policy was found wanting. It was only when the government was confronted with political and social breakdown in Northern Ireland that it decided that it had no alternative but to act coercively.

However by delaying any action until 1969 the Labour government lost any scope for initiative it may have had and allowed the volatile situation in Northern Ireland to escalate to a level beyond effective political control. While Labour‟s lack of action prior to 1966 can possibly be excused because its focus was elsewhere, its subsequent plodding inactivity, total lack of understanding of Northern Ireland and its compulsion to give an answer to the „Irish question‟ before it knew what the question was simply reflected a typically reactive British approach.

The Home Secretary James Callaghan instinctively followed the policies of his predecessors at the Home Office and initially ignored Northern Ireland, yet when he did begin to address the increasingly violent civil unrest he instinctively applied British solutions to Irish problems. Callaghan, because of his personal knowledge of British policing and inherent belief in the protection of British civil rights should have been aware that it was not just the way that the RUC controlled civil unrest but rather the discriminatory nature of the Northern

Ireland statelet that had allowed the RUC to act in such a violent manner. Callaghan while well intentioned failed because he did not understand that Northern Ireland was

fundamentally a dysfunctional society that needed major social and political reform before any attempt could be made to impose British solutions. However while the Labour government and in particular Callaghan continued to publicly perceive Northern Ireland as just another part of the United Kingdom, other members of the British elite were preparing to impose a military solution onto a political problem.

Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Chapter 2

The Wilson Government and the Return of the Irish Question

Any politician who wants to get involved with Ulster … ought to have his head examined. (Harold Wilson, 1964)1

This comment by Harold Wilson during the 1964 British election campaign clearly exposed the Labour leader‟s attitude towards Ireland and its politics. Wilson was provoked into vocalising his deep-seated attitudes towards Northern Ireland when prior to a televised election debate he saw the then leader of the British Conservative Party Sir Alec Douglas-

Home wearing a tie that symbolised his connection to the Ulster Unionists. Wilson viewed this opportunistic choice as an infringement of the established Westminster convention that had since 1922 been used to avoid any direct British involvement in Irish politics. It could be argued that this throw-away comment not only exposed Wilson‟s determination not to get involved in Northern Ireland but it also exposed an intrinsic anti-Irish sentiment. Wilson‟s comment also gives us an indication of Labour‟s policy direction on Northern Ireland during the turbulent years before his government lost power in 1970.2 Such was his determination to avoid any involvement in Irish politics that he adhered to the established policy during 1968 and well into 1969 even when events in Northern Ireland made it clear that urgent British government action was needed.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the initial responses of the Wilson government and in particular the actions of the British Home Secretary, James Callaghan to the escalating crisis

1 Evans, 1972, p. 80. 2 ibid, pp. 80-93.

in Northern Ireland. As discussed in Chapter One, successive British governments until late

1968 had systematically ignored Northern Ireland and knowingly allowed this semi- autonomous state to develop in ways alien to British liberal-democratic traditions.

Nevertheless it was a still-reluctant Labour government led by Harold Wilson that was finally compelled to respond to a crisis long in the making. However even after witnessing the excessively violent actions of the Northern Ireland police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary

(RUC), in Londonderry in late 1968 they continued to limit their involvement in the province and to maintain that Stormont was ultimately responsible. This British government, at least until James Callaghan became involved, was reluctant to confront a crisis that was escalating out of control. However instead of addressing the underlying causes of the violence they responded with a series of ill-considered, superficial and counterproductive reforms that were forced upon the Unionist government. The Wilson government‟s reluctance to address the crisis before late 1968 reflects the neglect of earlier governments but when were finally compelled to confront the crisis they reacted by imposing British solutions to Irish problems.

The Londonderry riots of 5 October 1968 are accepted as being a crucial phase in the transformation of what had been peaceful but robust civil unrest into violent confrontation with the almost exclusively Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary. The RUCs aggressively confrontational approach when compared to the tactics of the Metropolitan Police in the

Grosvenor Square anti-Vietnam protest a few weeks later display a stark contrast between these two police forces. The Metropolitan Police responded to a very large civil disturbance with considerable restraint compared to the violence of the RUC. The response of the

Metropolitan Police demonstrated both its inherent attitudes towards the British public and the philosophies of the British Home Secretary, James Callaghan, whereas the techniques used by the RUC towards civil unrest can be traced to their origins and positions in society.

However, even though the Londonderry riots marked a turning point in the Northern Ireland

crisis the British government‟s actions were limited to chastising the RUC and attempting to encourage the Unionist government to address some of the more obvious reasons for the unrest and it remained unwilling to get involved in Northern Ireland affairs.

However it is the actions, or more importantly the inaction of the British Home Secretary,

James Callaghan, that became crucial to how events evolved in Northern Ireland. Callaghan had initially accepted without question the established status-quo between Westminster and

Stormont, however when his ideological beliefs are considered the decisions he made regarding Northern Ireland are very difficult to comprehend. Callaghan claimed that he was a strong defender of the fundamental rights and civil liberties of British citizens yet he did not make the link between Britain and Northern Ireland. Callaghan‟s flawed decision-making on

Northern Ireland is even more exposed when his responsibilities for policing within the

United Kingdom are considered because he ignored the actions of the RUC during the early part of his tenure as Home Secretary. When the essential failure of the RUC to act appropriately in Londonderry left little doubt they were in urgent need for reform,

Callaghan‟s response was to transform the RUC into a replica of an English county police force. His belief that the para-military RUC could be transformed into an idealised version of an unarmed English police force at the stroke of a pen confirms the illogicality of Callaghan‟s decision-making with regard to Northern Ireland. This demonstrates Callaghan‟s profound ignorance of Northern Ireland‟s problems that had resulted from decades of disengagement by British politicians, but it also confirms the Wilson government‟s continuing desire to minimise British involvement in Northern Ireland. Callaghan may not have remained in power long enough to fully implement his reform agenda but (as will be shown in detail in

Chapter Five) he contributed little the situation; on the contrary his actions aggravated tensions and increased the likelihood that the army would soon be needed to re-establish order in Northern Ireland.

The Londonderry Riots and Westminster.

The origins of the current „troubles‟ in Northern Ireland can be traced to the civil rights

March in Londonderry on Saturday 5 October 1968, a non-violent march that if it had occurred in Britain would have normally been peacefully contained by British police.3

However the RUC used excessive violence to suppress the march and this event was personally witnessed by British Labour MPs and also by the world‟s media and television.4

The New York Times described the rioting as the worst violence seen since the 1930‟s and included in its report a photograph of RUC officer batoning a Catholic demonstrator.5

Nevertheless it was an editorial in The Times of London linking the actions of the RUC to those of the Chicago police beating civil rights demonstrators a month earlier that fully exposed the sectarianism of the RUC and the Unionist government and gained the attention of the British government. Importantly The Times emphasised that British police would not have lost control in the same manner the RUC had done.6 Added to the British and international press coverage was an enormous and emotional coverage of the events by the very parochial and sectarian Northern Ireland media.7 Before 5 October the actions of the

RUC would have received little criticism from a largely supportive local press, however the

RUCs excesses had now been exposed by the world‟s media who could not be pressured by the Unionist government to censor their reporting.

While insignificant in column-inches British press coverage considerably influenced both

British public opinion and more importantly the British government. The Times of 7 October had strongly condemned the aggressive actions of the RUC when they attacked innocent

3 R Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla, Cassell, London, 1973, p. 63. 4 Correspondence between UK PM & NI PM on the use of British troops in Northern Ireland, PREM 13 2843, 1969, London: Three Eye-witnesses Report on Londonderry, PREM 13 2843, 8 October 1968, London. 5 J.M Lee, „Rioting Reopens Old Wounds in Northern Ireland‟, New York Times, New York, 1968, p. 3. 6 „Questions for Ulster‟, Editorial, The Times, London, 7 Oct 1968, p. 9. 7 A Scott, „Calendar of Newspaper Articles dealing with Civil Rights issues‟, CAIN, No 5, 1968.

demonstrators, however the very next day its Leader titled „Right to be Cautious‟ dramatically changed its opinion and now demanded that the Wilson government do all in its power to „keep the internal affairs of Northern Ireland out of Westminster politics‟.8 This apparent paradox reflects both the British public‟s fickle and ambiguous attitude towards

Northern Ireland and the British establishment‟s reluctance to get involved in Irish issues.

When the actions of and statements by British politicians are examined we find little more than a sense of mild panic based upon a forlorn hope that the policy of „leave it to Terence‟ would eventually work.9 Other than continuing to pressure the Northern Ireland premier

Terence O‟Neill to continue his reforms the government clearly did not have a considered policy for dealing with the violence.

The behaviour of the RUC in Londonderry on 5 October was one of the key factors that led to the escalation of violence and to the breakdown of Northern Ireland society.10 However the widespread reaction to the RUCs violence throughout the world and especially in Britain would not have occurred if the whole dramatic event had not been played out before television cameras and covered by the international press. The Northern Ireland MP Gerry

Fitt has claimed credit for ensuring that television cameras were on hand to record the whole episode and exposing what had up to this point been persistently ignored by the British parliament. He also ensured that a television crew from outside Northern Ireland covered the event because he believed that the Northern Ireland government would pressure local television stations to censor their coverage of the event.11

Predictably the Unionist government forcefully defended the RUCs actions, rejected the worldwide criticism of the police violence and in turn blamed the negative publicity on the

8 „Right to be Cautious‟, Leader, The Times, London, 8 October 1968, p. 13. 9 Callaghan, 1973 pp. 5-7: Evans, 1972, pp. 83-84. 10 R Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, Allen Lane, London, 1988, p. 588. 11 Quoted in Peter Rose, 2000, p. 108.

unsympathetic television coverage, pointing out that it was a television crew from Eire that had recorded the event. In meetings between Westminster and Stormont, unionists continued to robustly defend their constitutional rights, which gave the British government the excuse to delay any overt action in the province.12 By failing to accept any responsibility for the breakdown of „law-and-order‟ in Northern Ireland the Wilson government allowed fear and hostility to build up on both sides of the Northern Ireland community which in turn contributed to the inevitable breakdown of civil society.

The Londonderry disturbances were eventually discussed at Westminster on 7 October, however not in the Commons but in the House of Lords. In replying to Lord Brockway‟s request for an enquiry into the violence the Lord Chancellor continued to follow the

Westminster convention and refused to allow debate on any issues that were the responsibility of the Northern Ireland government. Such was the government‟s unwillingness to directly intervene in the province that even when Lord Mitchison attempted to demonstrate that under the European Commission for Human Rights Britain had responsibility for all of the United Kingdom including Northern Ireland, the government representative followed

Wilson‟s earlier response to Paul Rose and would not change ground.13 When the Commons did eventually debate Northern Ireland on 14 October it did not discuss the Londonderry violence but employment at the aircraft factory of Short Brothers. The stalling tactics of

Unionist MPs at Westminster had ensured that the RUCs actions were not discussed and the

Home Secretary also avoided his responsibility by only answering a question on Northern

Ireland electoral boundaries.14

Finally when the Labour MP and CDU supporter Kevin McNamara attempted to discuss the disturbances on 21 October the Speaker continued to rule such questions „out of order‟. The

12 B Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, Weidenfield & Nicolson, London, 1978, pp. 48-49. 13 Londonderry Disturbances, House of Lords. London, Hansard. 296: 811-815, 7 October 1968. 14 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, vol 770 cc15-6, 14 October 1968.

Wilson Government could have easily condemned the violence on this occasion, but it was still reluctant to involve itself in the Northern Ireland crisis.15 The government‟s rearguard action finally ended on 22 October when the Prime Minister was forced to confront the

Londonderry violence of some three weeks earlier. However Wilson was again reluctant to become involved in Northern Ireland affairs and dismissed Paul Rose‟s attempts to have the

British government remove control of the RUC from the Northern Ireland government.

Instead Wilson actively defended O‟Neill‟s supposed liberalisation in the province and therefore limited his actions to commenting on recent discussions between them.

The British Home Secretary James Callaghan was one of many people in mainland Britain who had viewed whole episode on television and were appalled by the sight of the RUCs brutality. He described what he saw on the streets of Londonderry as being unacceptable in a liberal democratic society such as Britain.16 Crucially it was because people such as

Callaghan and Wilson had seen the evidence of the RUCs brutality directly on their television screens that the British government could no longer hide behind the existing protocols.

Harold Wilson even felt able, at least temporarily, to ignore the Westminster convention and rebuked the Unionist MP Captain Orr in the House of Commons on 22 October. Wilson was apparently so infuriated by what he had seen on television that he was moved to state that he now no longer had confidence in what the Unionist MPs at Westminster had been saying about Northern Ireland, however his revulsion was not matched by any immediate political action as distinct from rhetoric.17 Even when the television pictures clearly demonstrated that the RUC had used unprovoked violence the Wilson government still did not act against the

Northern Ireland administration. Wilson may have been upset at what he had seen on

15 Northern Ireland (Questions), House of Commons, Hansard, 770: 882-5, London, 1968. 16 Callaghan, Quoted in Peter Rose, 2000, p. 109: R Hattersley, Fifty Years On: A Prejudiced History of Britain Since the War, Little, Brown & Co, London, 1997, pp. 197-8. 17 Government of Ireland Act, Debate, House of Commons, Hansard, 770: 1087-1088, London, 1968.

television, however neither he nor his government was prepared to act against Stormont at this stage, such was his determination to avoid any involvement in Irish politics.

As late as 30 October Wilson again tried to hide behind the provisions of the Government of

Ireland Act (1949) and to claim this as the basis of the relationship between Britain and

Northern Ireland.18 During the extensive „Debate on the Address‟, Wilson‟s only comment on

Northern Ireland was to answer a question from Edward Heath confirming that he would adhere to Attlee‟s pledge not to change the constitutional position of Northern Ireland.19

These were clear signals that the Wilson government, with the support of the Conservative opposition, was intent on continuing the Westminster convention of not interfering in

Stormont affairs. The British government would still not countenance direct action in the province even in the face of the overwhelming need for Britain to intervene.

Although Wilson did contact the Northern Ireland premier Terence O‟Neill immediately after the 5 October riot they did not meet to discuss the Londonderry violence until almost a month later.20 Beyond pressuring the Northern Ireland government to hold an inquiry into the event

Wilson did not address the core problems of the RUCs excessive violence, or more importantly demand that Stormont ensure that its police use less violent tactics to suppress civil dissent. Even though it was the RUCs violence - so publicly exposed on British television - that had forced the Wilson government to face up to the breakdown of the social order in Northern Ireland it still clearly had little taste for direct involvement in the province.21

18 Government of Ireland Act, Debate, House of Commons, Hansard 770, London, 1968. 19 Debate on the address, House of Commons, Hansard, 772: 11-153, London, 1968. 20 Disturbances in Northern Ireland & Eyewitnesses accounts of disturbances in Londonderry, PREM 13 2841 (1968-69), London, 1969. 21 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 10-11: Cabinet Office documents on Northern Ireland, Ref 5m, Note of meeting between Callaghan and NI PM, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970), 8 Aug 69, London.

Kenneth Bloomfield, the Northern Ireland Cabinet Secretary, who was with O‟Neill at the meeting says that Wilson did impress on the Northern Ireland delegation that Westminster expected real change, nevertheless it was also made clear that it was the Stormont government that was responsible for the problem and that they were expected to implement any changes.22 Wilson‟s actions at this time therefore cannot be considered as a serious attempt by the British government to address the underlying problems exposed by the RUCs violence. Although Wilson did hint that the current generous financial support from

Westminster might be at risk he still did not act on Britain‟s responsibilities for its citizens in

Northern Ireland.23 At no time did Wilson openly threaten Northern Ireland with sanctions, instead he merely suggested that he could not continue to defend the current Northern Ireland government if the present state of affairs continued. James Callaghan has also suggested that

Harold Wilson did briefly consider removing Northern Ireland‟s political representation at

Westminster yet this was not discussed at the meeting or publicly acknowledged and therefore it cannot be considered other than a passing thought on Wilson‟s part.24

Throughout October 1968 Wilson assiduously refused to accept any responsibility for the escalating violence, but instead continued to support the „leave it to Terrence‟ policy. By taking this action Terence O‟Neill the British government was both able to avoid any direct responsibility and to lay the blame for any failure at the feet of the Northern Ireland government. Wilson publicly maintained this position even in the face of strong evidence from Labour MPs, and extensive press and television reporting. The official records afford some insight into how the senior echelons of the British civil service perceived Northern

Ireland and its problems and demonstrate that the British Prime Minister was

22 Bloomfield, 1994, p. 99. 23 PREM 13 2841 (1968-69), Ref 5. 24 Callaghan, 1973, p. 11.

comprehensively briefed very shortly after the events of 5 October.25 A „Confidential‟ brief was written on 7 October outlining discussions between Wilson and Callaghan on the

Londonderry disturbances and the following day the government received an official account of the „Disturbances in Northern Ireland‟. They also received a report from the three Labour

MPs who had personally witnessed the RUCs violence, however the file contained no other entries until 8 November and these only document the later meeting between Wilson and

O‟Neill. The official report dated 8 October 1968, while being matter-of-fact, began by distancing the British government from any responsibility for law-and-order in Northern

Ireland. As the report stated:

Under the constitution of Northern Ireland, as led down in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, maintenance of law and order in the province is a matter for which the Parliament of Northern Ireland are solely responsible: no responsibility in this respect devolved upon Her majesty‟s Government.26

Notably there are significant discrepancies between the official report and the eye-witness accounts with the official report claiming that it was the demonstrators who provoked police reaction. The report states: “Some [of the marchers] ... were intent on breaking through the police cordon and were led forward, with Mr Gerry Fitt MP in the van. Attempts were made to break through cordon by force in the course of which Mr Fitt suffered injury and was removed to hospital.”27 This official account blames the marchers led by Gerry Fitt for instigating the violence, however the account of the three British MPs who directly observed the march is at odds with the official story. As their eye-witness report states:

The marchers approached the police and when they were about a yard from the police ranks and obviously slowing up, the police opened up a passage into which were pulled in Mr Fitt and Mr Devlin. Mr Fitt was struck twice with a baton and Mr Devlin

25 PREM 13 2841 (1968-69). 26 ibid, Disturbances in Northern Ireland, 8 October 1968. 27 ibid.

was struck as well. They were taken away, Mr Fitt to have stiches inserted into a head wound.28

These Labour MPs were present during the entire course of events and wrote a nine page first-hand account of the events, on the other hand the official report is very brief and most probably designed to reinforce the British „leave it to Terrence‟ policy and Wilson‟s ongoing attempts to distance his government from the Northern Ireland crisis.

Although Harold Wilson and James Callaghan met with the Northern Ireland ministers on 4

November 1968 primarily to discuss what was termed the „Londonderry disturbances‟, “a subject that was of great concern to all sides in Great Britain” 29 he used this meeting to belatedly confront the Northern Ireland ministers with some of the issues underlying the civil rights protests. While it was important to discuss proposed changes to the local electoral franchise, the allocation of housing, the appointment of a parliamentary commissioner and the Special Powers Acts the fundamental reason for these inter-government discussions, the

Londonderry riots was the last topic listed for discussion.30 However the British government was still not prepared to take direct action on any of these issues because as the report declared: “they were matters [that] were within the competence of ... the Government of

Northern Ireland.”31 Even in the face of considerable local and international pressure Harold

Wilson was still attempting to limit British involvement and instead deflect its responsibility onto the Northern Ireland government. Directly supporting him in this endeavour was his

Home Secretary James Callaghan, and from this point on it was Callaghan‟s actions rather than those of his Prime Minister that arguably determined the course of events in Northern

Ireland for better or worse.

28 ibid. 29 ibid, The Londonderry Disturbances. 30 ibid. 31 ibid.

James Callaghan and the Northern Ireland crisis.

It was James Callaghan, Jenkins successor in November 1967, who was the responsible minister when the Wilson government finally confronted the escalating violence in 1968.

Callaghan‟s actions on Northern Ireland are at best ambiguous, because while strongly defending and extending liberal-democratic principles in Britain he failed to defend these rights vigorously in Northern Ireland. While he did at least confront the Unionist government about the more obvious examples of discrimination in the province, such as the electoral gerrymandering in Londonderry and the province-wide discrimination in the allocation of public housing, he made no headway on the problem of the electoral franchise, and failed to tackle Northern Ireland‟s fundamental sectarianism.32

Callaghan always staunchly defended his policies and argued that if he had been given enough time he could have resolved Northern Ireland‟s problems. He specifically blamed the election of the Heath Conservative government in 1970 with its hands-off approach for the escalation of violence 33- an argument that will find some support later in this thesis.34

However Rose argues that Callaghan only tackled these lower order issues for his personal political benefit as he attempted to recover from his hapless tenure as Chancellor.35 Some commentators have also suggested that his actions during this period did more to inflame the situation than to resolve the underlying issues.36 In the last analysis it appears that the Wilson government, while socialist in nature and having some sympathy for the Northern Ireland minority, appeared to possess little understanding of Ireland and demonstrated the same reluctance as most of its predecessors to become involved in its affairs.37 Furthermore it can

32 Callaghan, 1973, p. 11. 33 ibid, p. 142. 34 See Ch 7 below. 35 Peter Rose, 2000, p. 91. 36 Bell, 1982, p. 113. 37 Peter Rose, 2000, p. 106.

be argued that the defence of Britain‟s strategic interests together with Wilson‟s own erroneous understanding of the Irish question overwhelmed any inherent sympathy the

Labour Party may have had for the underprivileged in Northern Ireland and devalued the party‟s social conscience.38

There can be little argument that the appointment of James Callaghan as Home Secretary in

December 1967 fundamentally affected how the events in Northern Ireland evolved during

1968 and until the fall of the Labour government in mid-1970. However it was Callaghan‟s almost total lack of action prior to the outbreak of violence in Londonderry on that fateful

Saturday that is particularly significant. During this crucial period he was the key decision maker within the British government and as such bears much of the responsibility for the events that occurred during his watch. It can be further argued that his actions, or more importantly his inaction, laid the ground for the further crisis that enveloped the province during the next thirty years.

Callaghan by his own admission paid little attention to Northern Ireland until the violence erupted in October 1968. In A House Divided he is at pains to point out that on taking office

Northern Ireland did not rate a mention in any of the briefings he was given by his department. He puts the blame for this omission on the Westminster convention, the wishes of the Northern Ireland government, and the established practices of the Home Office.39

While apparently surprised at the situation, he blames his lack of action on pressure to progress British legislation then in train and the fact that the day-to-day responsibility for

Northern Ireland affairs was in the hands of his Minister of State, Lord Stonham.40

Nonetheless it is a casual remark about a discussion he had with the Northern Ireland Premier

38 Wilson, 1971, p. xvii: Bew & Patterson, 1985, p. 7. 39 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 1-2. 40 ibid, p. 2.

Terence O‟Neill that is illustrative of his and the Labour government‟s attitude towards

Northern Ireland. Reflecting on a meeting between the two in early 1968 he states:

Terence O‟Neill, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1963-69, was very experienced and showed no particular enthusiasm for visits to the Province by Home Secretaries. In my early days he came to pay a courtesy call on me in 1968, but he was plainly not very excited by the proposal and I let it drop.41

Callaghan was clearly not willing to engage in Northern Ireland and was quite happy to leave the running of the province to the Northern Ireland government and its oversight to his

Under-Secretary Lord Stonham. Moreover by ignoring the overt discrimination within the province Callaghan had willingly followed the accepted policy on Northern Ireland of earlier

British Home Secretaries and the parliamentary convention of not discussing anything deemed the responsibility of the Northern Ireland government. As discussed earlier this convention had been in place since 1922 and Callaghan could have ended it at any time if he had accepted his ultimate responsibility for the province under Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act (1922).42 It would appear that by blindly following accepted precedent designed to insulate Britain from Irish politics Callaghan was following what Merlyn Rees called the „play-it-cool‟ approach; a practice not based upon what was happening but what the policy makers wanted to believe was the nature of the problem, an approach that was fatally flawed.43

Callaghan described his colleague and friend Lord Stonham as passionate about Northern

Ireland and on good personal terms with Northern Ireland MPs and civil service.44 It can therefore be assumed that he placed much credence on Stonham‟s opinion of the political

41 ibid. 42 C O'Leary, „The Northern Ireland Crisis and its Observers‟, The Political Quarterly, 42, No 3, 1971, pp. 255- 268. 43 M Rees, „Jim Callaghan and the Irish Problem‟, Contemporary Review, 223, October 1973, pp. 217-220. 44 Callaghan, 1973, p. 2.

situation in the Province. Nevertheless Stonham‟s own political judgement has to be questioned when after a three day visit to the province in June 1968 he reported that O‟Neill‟s progressive changes had improved community relations to such an extent that he could feel no unease. Conversely Peter Rose argues that Stonham had been deliberately kept ignorant of the true situation by the Ulster Unionist government, just as his predecessor had been.45

Stonham‟s assessment makes it clear that the Wilson government had little understanding of what was actually happening. Callaghan did not involve himself with Northern Ireland affairs and Stonham was apparently a captive of the Northern Ireland Government and its civil servants and although Wilson later reported that he felt much unease about Northern Ireland in the summer of 1968 there is little evidence to support this claim.46 Richard Crossman comments in his diaries that the only cabinet discussion of Northern Ireland before the

October riots (in September 1968) concerned the extensive financial subsidy paid by Britain to Northern Ireland.47 Neither Wilson nor Callaghan makes any other reference to cabinet discussion on Northern Ireland prior to October 1968 48 so it therefore can be assumed that the Wilson government deemed Northern Ireland and its civil unrest as a very low priority and treated it accordingly.

By 1967 the administration of the Home Office‟s responsibilities for Northern Ireland had fallen into a settled routine. Northern Ireland was crammed into the General Department along with such pressing issues such British Summer Time and the Channel Isles. More importantly the General Department only had a staff of seven relatively junior civil servants and Callaghan claims that overall responsibility for Northern Ireland fell into the hands of himself and Lord Stonham.49 The result of this settled routine was that there was little if any

45 Peter Rose, 2000, p. 101. 46 Wilson, 1971, p. 671. 47 R Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol 3, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1977, p. 197. 48 Wilson, 1971, pp. 489-577: Callaghan, 1973, pp. 1-30. 49 ibid, p. 2.

oversight of Northern Ireland by civil servants in the Home Office or by the responsible ministers.50 Therefore it can be assumed that as a result of historical precedent and intent,

Northern Ireland was treated as politically inconsequential and generally ignored by the mandarins of the Home Office and their political masters.

Matters were slightly different when it came to Northern Ireland‟s precarious economic situation, where the British Treasury kept a more careful eye on the province, even if its responsibility was also tempered by historical precedent. The Ireland Act of 1920 may have given Northern Ireland a considerable level of political autonomy, however it did not give the province economic independence, which meant that it was dependent upon large supplementary grants from the British Treasury.51 Northern Ireland‟s financial dependence could have been a potential lever for Westminster but it was not acted upon.

When he became Home Secretary James Callaghan emphasised that he was determined to protect the fundamental rights and civil liberties of British citizens and therefore gave it his personal attention on a daily basis. He believed that any attempt to weaken these hard fought for rights would arouse intense concern among the British public and the press.52 Given the importance he placed on the protection of these rights in Britain, his indifference to the fundamental lack of civil rights in Northern Ireland is surprising. It is especially paradoxical when Paul Rose and his fellow members of the CDU regularly exposed the blatant discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland.53 Callaghan‟s excuse is that that he had little time to look at the problems of Northern Ireland and anyhow the British public were little interested in the province.54 Callaghan‟s approach to Northern Ireland appears hypocritical when his defence of British civil rights is considered, nonetheless it was the

50 ibid, p. 3. 51 A Jackson, Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800-2000, Weidenfield & Nicolson, London, 2003, pp. 206-7. 52 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 3-4. 53 Paul Rose, 1981. 54 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 1-6.

typical response of most British politicians of that era. Yet Callaghan‟s justification for not acting on the very obvious social and political problems in Northern Ireland was a singularly

British excuse, he had learnt one lesson from history and that was that British politicians should avoid any direct involvement in Irish political issues. Unfortunately his later attempts to impose British policing methods in Northern Ireland suggests that he had not learnt the equally important lesson that British practices do not necessarily translate to Ireland.

Callaghan and Policing.

Considering Callaghan‟s extensive personal experience within the British Police Federation and his direct involvement in London‟s Grosvenor Square riots of October 1968, it is very surprising that he apparently failed to appreciate the fundamental differences between the

British police and the RUC and especially their approach to major civil unrest. From 1955 and until becoming a minister in the Wilson government in 1964 Callaghan had been the principal industrial relations negotiator for the British Police Federation, a position that he states give him an extensive understanding of British policing and an unprecedented advantage when he became Home Secretary in 1967.55 It was his understanding of the British police system and its values and his personal relationship with Sir John Waldron that helped influence his handling of the anti-Vietnam march in October 1968. The contrast between this event and the Londonderry march could not have been greater.

A massive anti-Vietnam War and anti-American demonstration was planned for 27 October

1968 and it was predicted that the march would target the American Embassy in London‟s

Grosvenor Square - only a few weeks after the 5 October civil rights march in Londonderry that had ended so disastrously. The Metropolitan Police expected the London march to

55 Callaghan, Time and Chance, Collins, London, 1987, pp. 250-253: K.O Morgan, Callaghan: A Life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 290-293.

contain upwards of 50,000 protestors and believed that it could easily degenerate into violence as had occurred at the anti-Vietnam War disturbance earlier that year.56 Significantly it was a combination of Callaghan‟s philosophical opposition to confrontational policing in a civil environment, his confidence in the police as a whole, and his close relationship with the

Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police that enabled him to resist calls for explicitly restrictive measures including banning the march and calling in the army. By operating in this manner Callaghan was upholding what he termed „freedom under the law‟, a philosophy based on the right to protest which he believed was an essential component of all democracies.57 Even though there was some violence by a small hard core of demonstrators, the march passed off without the total breakdown of law-and-order predicted by the radical press and the right wing of British politics.58 Callaghan was applauded on all sides of the political spectrum and gained considerable international acclaim for his handling of the situation.59 How much of the success in containing the demonstration was due to Callaghan‟s own beliefs, the work of the police or a range of other circumstances is open to debate, however it is clear that in late 1968 Callaghan fully supported the concept of non- confrontational policing of mass protest in Britain. What is not clear is why he did not immediately insist on the same philosophy being used in Northern Ireland, including the use of British police to supplement the RUC as was the practice in England where individual police forces could be supplemented by other forces as necessary. Whatever his reasons he left Northern Ireland to deteriorate until it was too late for such measures.

While Callaghan strongly supported the concept of police primacy and that the British army did not have a role in controlling civil disturbances in Britain, his failure to apply the same

56 Grosvenor Square (Demonstrations), House of Commons, Hansard, 762: 34-40, 18 March 1968. 57 Demonstrations, Central London (27th October), House of Commons, Hansard, 770: 1597-1605, 1968: Callaghan, 1987, p. 258. 58 Callaghan, 1987, pp. 260-261. 59 K.E Meyer, „Tolerance: Britain's lesson to the world‟, The Washington Post, Washington, 1968.

standards to Northern Ireland is noteworthy.60 Callaghan did not independently investigate the actions of the RUC until after the army was deployed to Londonderry and Belfast in

August 1969,61 and his decision to send Robert Mark, Deputy Commissioner of the

Metropolitan Police and Douglas Osmond, Chief Constable of Hampshire to Northern Ireland was his first positive action to address the RUCs demonstrable failures.62 It could be argued that he should have acted immediately after the riots of 5 October 1968 if not earlier.

Mark and Osmond confirmed that the RUC was an incompetently led organisation with poor morale and little political oversight. It had ceased to operate in many parts of the province because it no longer had the support of a large proportion of the population and therefore it could not be compared with the British model of cooperative civil policing.63 Their reports also confirmed that the RUC was a „force apart‟ and at the first signs of trouble it reverted to a paramilitary force where any opposition to the status quo was dealt with by force.64 Mark and Osmond had arrived on 14 August 1969, the day troops were deployed onto the streets of

Northern Ireland and Osmond personally reported to Harold Wilson on 19 August just prior to the crucial meeting between the British Cabinet committee on Northern Ireland and the

Northern Ireland Premier Chichester-Clark and his leadership group.65 What they concluded from their very short visit to Northern Ireland was that the RUC was a sectarian agency whose role as an arm of the ruling Unionist party precluded it from performing the duties of an impartial police force. The British government could have obtained this information much earlier and insisted on radical change but this delay meant that the RUC lost what little acceptance it had within the nationalist community.

60 Morgan, 1997, p. 316. 61 Callaghan, 1973, p. 49: Cabinet Office (1969-1970), -CAB-164-577, Ref 10, 15 Aug 69. 62 R Mark, In the Office of Constable, Collins, London, 1978, pp. 104-5. 63 Callaghan, 1973, p. 59. 64 ibid, pp. 54-58. 65 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 57-58: Bloomfield, 1994, p. 116.

However this report gave Callaghan the political ammunition he needed to force the Northern

Ireland government to at last hold an external review into the RUC - the Hunt inquiry.66

Callaghan‟s strategy appears to have been to build up a political case to pressure the Northern

Ireland government to reform the RUC while keeping Britain out of Irish politics.67 In this

Callaghan further confirmed his misreading of the Northern Ireland situation because the role he envisaged for the RUC - while consistent with the traditions of British policing - was in conflict with the RUCs established internal security role in Northern Ireland and was doomed to failure.

In Britain the principle of the unarmed „English bobby‟ had emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in place of the armed gendarmes of Europe and was firmly established in the political and social mindset of mid-twentieth century England. Ian Oliver has described the underlying ethos of twentieth century British policing as a system where the police work for the community in a non-coercive manner but are not an arm of the state.68 However as with many

English contributions to Irish social fabric the execution of „law and order‟ in Ireland was not left to the tender mercies of an unarmed police, the Dublin Metropolitan Police excepted, but rather to an armed paramilitary police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). It was Sir

Robert Peel 69 the originator of the „English bobby‟ who was responsible for raising the

RIC‟s forerunner, the Peace Preservation Force, in the mid-nineteenth century. Significantly neither of these Irish paramilitary style police forces reflected Peel‟s perception of what was suitable for England or more importantly acceptable to the British public; however they were deemed appropriate for use in Ireland.70

66 J.A Brewer, & A. Guelke, et al., eds, The Police, Public Order and the State, St Martin's Press, New York, 1988, p. 51. 67 Callaghan, 1973, p. 67. 68 I Oliver, Police, Government and Accountability, Macmillan, London, 1987, p. 5. 69 Colley, 1992, p. 328. 70 C Townshend, Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Policy in Modern Britain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 17.

The crucial difference between the „English bobby‟ and the RIC was that the RIC was not just an armed police force upholding the law, on the contrary, it was an arm of the British government and used by it to implement its coercive policies in Ireland. So successful was the RIC model in containing violent civil unrest that its structure and operational concepts were exported by Britain and used in many of its colonies.71 Significantly, after partition the fledgling statelet of Northern Ireland adopted the RIC model in the guise of the Royal Ulster

Constabulary (RUC), while the Irish Republic despite the intense pressure of countering IRA hostility, followed the British model by founding the unarmed Garda Siohana. The decision by the Unionist government with the support of the British government to use a paramilitary model of policing was to have fundamental consequences for Northern Ireland some fifty years later.

The newly formed Unionist government did not envisage the RUC as a civilian police force, but rather an armed force defending the Protestant state from disloyal Irish nationalists both south of the newly formed border and within the province. The RUC were entrenched as the defenders of the unionist state by the bigoted and long serving Minister of Home Affairs

Richard Dawson Bates. Bates was uncompromising in his distrust for all Catholics whom he perceived to be Irish republicans and as such enemies of the Northern Ireland state.72 As the defenders of unionism the RUCs primary duty was to keep the innately subversive nationalists under control and by force if necessary.73 By placing so much emphasis on its paramilitary responsibilities the RUC produced within its ranks a „siege mentality‟ where everyone with a nationalist inclination was seen as a potential enemy. It was because of their

71 C Townshend, Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, pp. 51-74: R Doherty, The Thin Green Line: The History of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Pen & Sword Military Books, Barnsley, 2004, p. 8. 72 C Ryder, The Fateful Split: Catholics and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Methuen, London, 2004, p. xviii. 73 J. Brewer et al, The Police, Public Order and the State, St Martin‟s Press, New York, 1988, p. 47.

demonstrably partisan approach that the Catholic minority viewed the RUC as an occupying military force rather than impartial enforcers of law-and-order.74

It was the RUCs inherent unionist convictions and militarist culture that caused it to respond to the upsurge of civil unrest during 1967 and 1968 in such a violent manner.75 As a blatantly sectarian force it viewed the civil rights demonstrations as an attack by anti-unionists on the state rather than civil protest by a political opposition. The RUC had become progressively civilianised since its early years, but its culture was implicit in its origins and mind-set, which meant that while its only response was to violently confront the peaceful if ill-considered march in Londonderry on 5 October 1968, it lacked the military training and tactics to do so effectively.76 While the London Metropolitan Police successfully used standard British police tactics to contain a much larger demonstration a few weeks later, however these tactics were not available to the RUC, ideologically, culturally or operationally. Nevertheless Callaghan believed that all that was required to remedy this situation was to remodel the RUC into a version of an idealised English police force and to this end he employed the redoubtable Lord

Hunt to come up with the answer.

The Hunt Report.

It was at the 19 August 1969 meeting between the British government led by Harold Wilson and James Callaghan and the Northern Ireland Unionist leadership led by James Chichester-

Clark that the decision was made to establish what became known as the Hunt Committee to inquire into the future of the RUC and its auxiliary the B-Specials. While technically reporting to the Northern Ireland government it was established under the auspices of the

74 Oliver, 1987, p. 126. 75 Public Order - Northern Ireland, (Sir A. Young), Northern Ireland. Office, CJ 3 126 (1969-1971). 76 Bloomfield, 1994, p. 123.

British government and under the direction of Callaghan. While Callaghan was clearly the driving force behind the Hunt inquiry he had the full support of Harold Wilson who had suggested that Lord Hunt should be its Chairman.77 Hunt was an ex-army officer having retired in 1952 as a Brigadier 78 but significantly his only personal experience of policing was during his army service in India when in 1933 he was seconded to the Bengal police as a

Superintendent in the District Intelligence Branch working directly with Indian Army

Intelligence. There the British were fighting a counter-insurgency war and commonly used the regular army in the restoration of law-and-order. Writing in 1978 Hunt stated that there were clear parallels between the Bengali separatist organisations and the IRA in Northern

Ireland and that the army should be used as and when required to deal with direct threats to the state. Hunt was an appropriate choice to examine a para-military force that would have to work with the army in a counter-terrorist environment.

Callaghan justified his selection of Lord Hunt on the basis of his great public spirit, his leadership of the Everest expedition and Chairmanship of the Parole Board.79 To assist Hunt in his task Callaghan appointed two experienced senior police officers, Sir Robert Mark,

Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and Sir James Robertson, Chief Constable of Glasgow.80 Callaghan had already used Robert Mark for the initial inquiry into the RUC and Robertson was appointed to give reassurance to the Northern Ireland Protestants.81

Nevertheless it does not appear that this group fully understood the extremely complex history and ethnic disposition of Northern Ireland or the RUCs role in ensuring the continuance of unionist hegemony. Hunt was a British hero with no apparent knowledge of

Northern Ireland; Robertson was recommended to Callaghan by the Northern Ireland

77 Bloomfield, 1994, pp. 66-67: Cabinet Office Minute, 22 August 1969, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970). 78 Hunt, 1978, pp. 20-23. 79 Operation Banner, 2006, p. 2-4. 80 Callaghan, 1973, p. 49. 81 ibid, p. 67.

Minister of Home Affairs; and Mark‟s understanding was based on a very short visit earlier that month.82 All told, their collective understanding of the Irish question was extremely limited.

The Hunt committee‟s terms of reference were fairly narrow. Its „mission‟ was:

… to examine the recruitment, organisation, structure and composition of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Special Constabulary and their respective functions and to recommend as necessary what changes are required to provide for the efficient enforcement of law and order in Northern Ireland.83

Callaghan allowed the committee only a very short timeframe to carry out this task. The committee was appointed on 29 August and its report was published on 10 October. In these circumstances Hunt and his colleagues had little choice but to interpret this mission literally and narrowly, avoiding any examination of the broader political context within which the

RUC operated, and refraining from making any recommendations about political reforms.

In the „General Considerations‟ of the enquiry Hunt states that the police in Northern Ireland, as in all democratic societies must have the support and cooperation of a large majority of that society. The RUC must be accepted as the impartial enforcers of law and order by any significant minority because no society could be kept under control in the long-term by an armed force.84 This was the same classic British liberal democratic tradition favoured by

Callaghan and therefore Hunt‟s concept of policing was limited to the British model of consensual policing. However while the RUC did have the support of the loyalist majority it never had the full support of the nationalist minority and therefore the British model was

82 Note of meeting chaired by Callaghan on Northern Ireland, Cabinet Office, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970, 21 Aug 69. 83 Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland (Hunt Report), Government of Northern Ireland, Cmd 535, (1969), HMSO Belfast, (CAIN). 84 ibid, Para 81.

inappropriate. Nevertheless Hunt pursued this ideal and recommended that a reformed RUC should lose all of its paramilitary functions; this simple operational change would allow it to become an unarmed police force working within the community, as he put it: “not only in enforcing law and order, but in helping to create a new climate of respect for the law, a new attitude of friendship between its members and the public, and a sense of obligation among all men of goodwill to co-operate with the police in fulfilling their civic duties in the

Province.”85 It was from this somewhat naïve and unrealistic perspective that Lord Hunt produced his report, which Callaghan grasped as an essential strategy for resolving Northern

Ireland‟s problems.

Hunt obtained confidential written submissions from selected individuals and groups in

Northern Ireland including the head of the army (GOC NI), Judges, lawyers, church leaders, other community leaders and business groups. Other than gaining the views of this very limited section of the Northern Ireland community he did not attempt to obtain the opinions of the wider population.86 Hunt and his colleagues appear to have accepted the constraints imposed by their political master, and their report duly reflected Callaghan‟s belief that the imposition of a traditional British model of policing was all that was required in Northern

Ireland.87 The committee therefore limited its recommendations to removing the RUCs armed paramilitary functions and disbanding the B-Specials. Hunt appears to have believed that this alone would transform the RUC into a local version of the English „bobby‟, which would then enable it to gain the support of the nationalist minority.88

Hunt‟s recommendations also reflected Home Office policy. D.R.E. Hopkins, J2 Division, a member of the Home Office committee responsible for policing in Northern Ireland reported

85 ibid, Para‟s 8-11. 86 ibid, Para‟s 1-6. 87 T Jones & T. Newburn, et al. „Policing and the Idea of Democracy‟, British Journal of Criminology, 36, No 2, 1996, pp. 182-198. 88 Oliver, 1987, p. 129.

on a 31 October 1969 meeting between the Home Office and the British Police Federation. In writing to H. W. Stotesbury the Committee Chairman stated:

I mentioned after the meeting [with the Police Federation-on mutual aid between the RUC & British police] that the whole object of the Hunt Committee and of this division was to ensure that the RUC became as British a police force as any other in the United Kingdom.89

While Hunt recommended transforming the RUC into an English style unarmed police force he also appears to have understood that the RUC could not be a duplicate of an English county police force and acknowledged that the RUC would still have a counterinsurgency role working with the British army. Both Hunt and Mark had been directly involved in imperial policing, understanding and accepting the concept of joint police/army operations in internal security. They therefore understood that the ideal of the „English bobby‟ they were recommending for the RUC was incompatible with the internal security situation in Northern

Ireland. Nevertheless even in the midst of violent civil unrest Callaghan and the British government went ahead with their illogical and contradictory plans to disarm the RUC and disband the B-Specials.

Lord Hunt also recommended that the RUC should have a Chief Constable instead of an

Inspector General which is consistent with the thoughts and wishes of his political master

James Callaghan.90 This suggests that Callaghan was orchestrating the course of events in

Northern Ireland and personally used Hunt‟s recommendations to pressure Chichester-Clark to appoint Sir Arthur Young, Commissioner of the City of London Police as the Inspector

General.91 Brian Faulkner, who was then a member of the Northern Ireland Cabinet, is derisive of Callaghan‟s actions, and although Faulkner‟s perspective was clearly biased he

89 Police Bill Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Office, CJ 3 3, London, 1969. 90 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 111-113. 91 ibid, pp. 111-113.

was part of the Northern Ireland government and was more aware than most of the cabinet‟s thinking at this time. Faulkner strongly believed that the decisions to reform the RUC and abolish the B-Specials were grave mistakes because not only were they were made as a result of strong political pressure from Britain, but more importantly because they were made without the consultation of the Northern Ireland Cabinet. Faulkner also believed that

Callaghan had browbeaten Chichester-Clark into making the outgoing Inspector General J.A.

Peacock the scapegoat for the RUCs failings and appointing Young as his replacement.

Faulkner also believed that Young was selected for the position because he was Callaghan‟s man and that he would report directly to London.92 Callaghan confirms that he was determined to have Sir Arthur Young replace Peacock as head of the RUC. However what appears to have convinced Callaghan that Young was the right man for the job was not his

British police experience, on the contrary it was his colonial policing experience.93 Young had previously been sent by the British government to the Gold Coast, Kenya and Malaya to work as a trouble-shooter with their colonial police services during their fights for independence.

Callaghan went further in his public admiration of Young when in the House of Commons he stated that Young was the best person to undertake such a difficult task.94 Callaghan‟s plan to transform the RUC into a replica of English county police force and appoint Sir Arthur

Young as its Chief Constable might have represented a policing model appropriate for

England but not Northern Ireland. Clearly Callaghan and the British government were at this late stage attempting to apply an inappropriate British solution to an Irish problem because of their earlier unwillingness to accept its responsibility for Northern Ireland. On one hand the

British public could see Young‟s appointment as a decisive action by the British government,

92 Faulkner, 1978, pp. 69-71. 93 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 111-112. 94 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, London, 788: 47-164, 13 October 1969.

while from a political perspective this policy also ensured they had their man in charge of the

RUC.

Ken Bloomfield, the Northern Ireland Cabinet Secretary, who was described by Callaghan as the brains of the Northern Ireland government, 95 was scathing of Hunt‟s recommendations and the appointment of an English Chief Constable to head the RUC. As he states:

The imposition of an English police chief coupled with the dismantling of the RUCs distinctive rank structure … represented a dramatic and deliberate change of course. It was as if the RUC by an act of political will, be made into an English police force at a stroke. At that time the English bobby, whether reality of myth, still had such public appeal that few people outside Northern Ireland asked themselves whether the conditions there were actually English conditions, likely to respond to English remedies.96

Bloomfield confirms that the British government had decided to appoint Sir Arthur Young without consulting the Northern Ireland government. More importantly Bloomfield was convinced that these were the wrong decision for Northern Ireland because they did not consider Northern Ireland‟s unique social and political environment. From a unionist perspective the RUCs main role was not a police force on the British model but a force to keep the nationalists in their place, yet Callaghan did not appear to understand this distinction and was continuing to determine Northern Ireland‟s fate on the basis of his English perspective. He appeared blind to the local situation and ploughed on regardless, defending his actions at every occasion. Speaking in the Commons on 13 October Callaghan stated that the Hunt Report was expertly written by men who were the best policemen in Britain and who fully understood policing in Northern Ireland. Callaghan also stated that he believed the

RUC was simply an English-style police force that not only had to deal with ordinary policing such as traffic but that also had additional responsibility for armed border protection.

95 Callaghan, 1973, p. 59. 96 Bloomfield, 1994, p. 123.

The RUC simply had too many roles and that if it no longer had a paramilitary responsibility it could operate in the same way as an English police force.97 Callaghan also envisaged that the reformed RUC would be able to operate cooperatively with other English or Scottish police forces in the same way British police forces cooperated with each other. However this was something that he could also have tackled much earlier but failed to do so.

Following the Hunt committee‟s recommendations Callaghan set in motion the parliamentary processes to establish the necessary legal framework to allow the RUC to become a civilian police force similar to other British police forces. In September 1969 the Home Office began drafting what was to be known as the 1970 Police Bill. This Bill was designed to establish a governing police authority for Northern Ireland in line with English and Scottish police forces and to give these forces the legal authority to reinforce the RUC, something that they had been prevented from doing earlier.98 The Minister of Defence, Denis Healey was also creating parallel legislation to set up the Ulster Defence Regiment to replace the B-Specials.

However Callaghan‟s plan to send a contingent of between five hundred and one thousand

British police to Northern Ireland was opposed by both the Police Federation and the British bureaucracy.

Discussions within the British civil service make it clear that the Police Federation were primarily concerned about the legal and operational status of British police officers seconded to Northern Ireland, especially regarding the operation of the Northern Ireland Special

Powers Acts. The Police Federation did not want its members operating within the Special

Powers Acts because they considered its draconian laws alien to the consensual concept of

British policing. Strangely they also were officially opposed to sending a large number of

British police in support of the RUC because they believed that this would undermine the

97 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, 788: 47-164, London, 13 October 1969. 98 Police in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Office, CJ 3 73, Refs 1-3, Sept-Oct 1969.

RUCs already poor morale.99 However in August 1970 the Chairman of the Police Federation of England and Wales, Inspector Reg Gale, confirmed the underlying reasons behind its opposition to using British police in Northern Ireland. He stated that the federation was opposed to its members being sent to Northern Ireland because in his opinion this was a military problem and not one for British police.100

The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and other very senior British police officers were even less supportive of Callaghan‟s plan. In particular they were very much opposed to their men working under RUC control and had even more reservations about their officers working in an environment where they had little local knowledge. They were also opposed to sending British police to areas where both the RUC and the army were unwelcome and only supported sending a much smaller party of specialist British police officers to Northern

Ireland to help train the RUC in British policing tactics and specialist functions.101 However this was opposed by General Freeland, GOC NI, who, speaking from his experience in

Cyprus, stated that he did not believe that anything less than five hundred British police reinforcements would be effective.102 Overall there was little support for Callaghan‟s plans and it would appear that the civil servants saw problems where Callaghan saw opportunities because while Callaghan was supervising the Bill‟s passage through parliament his civil servants appeared to be stalling.

Callaghan did eventually table his „Police Bill 1970‟ on 6 November 1969 103 and made it clear that this Bill was one of the major outcomes of the Hunt Report. He also enthused about the progress that the RUC had already made towards becoming more like its British counterparts. Very few MPs supported the Bill and there were serious reservations about

99 ibid, Ref 5. 100 Freeland, Transcript of interview on Ulster TV, 5 August 1970, IWM 79 34 4, London. 101 Police in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Office, CJ 3 73 (1969 - Sept-Oct), Ref. 5. 102 ibid, Ref 11. 103 Presentation of Police Bill, House of Commons, Hansard, 790 1193, London, 1969.

British officers working under the Special Powers Acts. Paul Rose was vocal in his opposition to the draconian Special Powers Acts and its implications for British police who could be expected to work under the same conditions. However, most MPs appeared to be more concerned to protect their under-strength local British police forces from erosion than with supporting the RUC. While some MPs did support the Bill and especially the principle of mutual aid between police forces, they had difficulty in accepting the extensive differences between the standards, training and culture of the British forces when compared to the RUC.

More importantly they were concerned that British officers could be exposed to the paramilitary aspects of Northern Ireland policing.104 Despite these reservations the Second

Reading was passed on 17 November 1969 and the Bill was allowed to proceed into law, however the Home Secretary never did decide when the time was right for British police to be deployed to Northern Ireland.

This may have occurred because Callaghan was changing his opinion on what legal powers were required for the internal security of Northern Ireland. In a Minute to Cabinet shortly after the second reading of the Bill he described why the „Civil Authorities (Special Powers)

Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922‟ had been such a difficult issue to resolve for the British government. He claimed that the Special Powers Acts gave RUC officers overwhelming powers when compared to the laws British police officer worked with, and that he could not countenance British officers being used in the province until this issue was resolved. Yet

Callaghan was clearly supportive of the Act‟s powers, stating that some of the provisions had proved to be very useful in controlling civil unrest and it would be a great loss to the police if they did not have these options. Callaghan was again being contradictory on Northern Ireland because he justified his actions by saying that Northern Ireland was very different from the rest of Britain. Callaghan obviously believed that the Special Powers Acts were essential for

104 Police Bill - 2nd reading, Hansard, House of Commons, Hansard, 791: 989-1074, London, 1969.

security in Northern Ireland and makes it clear how the British government differentiated between Northern Ireland and the remainder of the United Kingdom. In this Minute he states:

… putting down an amendment in response to pressure may lead to pressure directed to ensuring that the Ulster Defence Regiment also makes no use of the Special Powers. This pressure might be difficult to resist although the regiment could not carry out its tasks properly without using the power.105

Crucially Callaghan believed that the newly established Ulster Defence Regiment and by extension the British army could not operate effectively in Northern Ireland without the all- encompassing powers incorporated within the Special Powers Acts. Callaghan‟s contradictory approach to the Special Powers Acts reflected the British government‟s contradictory policies on Northern Ireland. Callaghan‟s only concerns were how British police officers would be affected and that they alone should not be exposed to legal repercussions from applying the Acts draconian measures. Overall Callaghan‟s ambition to convert the RUC into a replica of an English County Constabulary was a contradictory and ill-considered exercise that reflected poorly on many of his actions on the province.

Conclusions

Harold Wilson came to power in 1964 as the head of a Labour party with a reforming agenda and with the protection and extension of the British people‟s civil rights as one of his party‟s core values. However while he had initially given public support to the Campaign for Social

Justice in Northern Ireland his total failure after the election to fulfil a written promise confirms his underlying negative attitude towards Irish politics. Fundamentally he was a

British politician with an institutionalised British attitude that compelled him to avoid any involvement in Irish affairs. While the Wilson government may have had some political

105 ibid, Ref. 12.

excuse for delaying any action on the endemic sectarianism of Northern Ireland during its first term it had no such excuse from 1966 onwards. Instead it fell back on the old claim that

Westminster did not have the authority for issues that had been delegated to Stormont some fifty years earlier.

When James Callaghan became Home Secretary his initial approach towards Northern

Ireland, like his predecessors, was to ignore that part of the United Kingdom. Although his political ideals may have been based on a strong defence of British civil rights this did not extend to protecting the civil rights of those citizens living in Northern Ireland. Even when confronted by the increasing sectarian violence regularly exposed by Paul Rose and other

Westminster MPs Callaghan and Wilson continued to expediently use the Speaker‟s convention to avoid their moral and political responsibility for all citizens of the United

Kingdom. Callaghan‟s excuse was that because the Home Office had slipped into a settled routine on Northern Ireland he saw little need to disrupt his civil servants. Westminster was also content to continue funding the province while publicly encouraging the Unionist government to improve some of the more contentious political and social problems, but the

British government would not directly confront Stormont.

In the wake of the riots Callaghan did attempt to address one significant issue; the structure and operations of the local police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It had been obvious from its inception that this para-military force had been operating as the coercive enforcer of unionist rule and that it could not be confused with any English police force. Nevertheless the

British government had always been content to ignore the RUCs demonstrably violent suppression of peaceful protests and even after the unprovoked attack on the Londonderry march of October 1968 Westminster did not take any direct action. However the resultant world-wide publicity did stir Wilson and Callaghan to meet with the Unionist government

and express their unhappiness with the events. Still they continued to allow Stormont to control the internal security of the Province and it was not until August 1969 when the British government was on the brink of deploying the army that Callaghan began to assert his authority and sent British police officers to Northern Ireland to investigate the operations of the RUC. While Robert Mark and Douglas Osmond‟s very superficial examination of the

RUC in early August 1969 confirmed the force‟s structural and operational weaknesses it was the investigation by Lord Hunt begun later that month - when the army was on the streets - that was to have the greatest repercussions. Hunt recommended that the RUC be transformed into a reflection of an unarmed English county police force with a Chief Constable instead of an Inspector General. The evidence suggests that Hunt‟s conclusions reflected the wishes of his political master James Callaghan who it would appear believed that simply removing the

RUCs para-military functions would give him the opportunity to resolve the political mess that Northern Ireland had become. While Hunt may have appreciated that the internal security of Northern Ireland would continue to have a military component Callaghan appears to have ignored the available evidence and pursued a policy that was inappropriate for the local circumstances.

Overriding all internal security concerns was the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts, and

Callaghan‟s plan to replace the paramilitary RUC with an unarmed English style police force seems incongruous when the then secret British cabinet discussions are considered. British police had stated that they could not work within the draconian Special Powers Acts they described as alien to their concept of consensual policing and it was their objections that had put paid to Callaghan‟s plan to reinforce the RUC with British police. However the British government, and in particular the British army believed that the internal security of Northern

Ireland could not be maintained without its access to the Special Powers Acts and its

inclusive powers. As we shall see the army also did not believe that it could aid the Northern

Ireland government to restore civil order without using the Special Powers Acts.

The type of „peacekeeping‟ operation the army was envisaging even at this early stage was a counter-insurgency operation, much like that of Cyprus and other military operations in

Britain‟s colonial past. Elements of the British government appear to have already determined that Ireland was indeed „a place apart‟ and that the internal security of Northern

Ireland could not be ensured by using the accepted British model of consensual policing.

Callaghan‟s attempt at remodelling the RUC into a version of an idealised English county police force was at best extremely naïve and reflected his fundamental ignorance of that society. Northern Ireland was simply not just another part of Great Britain but was a dysfunctional society with a dysfunctional approach to the maintenance of law and order and while restructuring was essential it was not only far too late it was the wrong policy at the wrong time. Northern Ireland society was so fractured that it would require a return to the well established policy of coercion before some order was restored. The often troubled relationship between England and Irish nationalism and the historical British policy of military coercion in Ireland was about to repeat itself.

Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Chapter 3

Ireland, Insurgency and the British army.

In any other part of the United Kingdom the events that took place in Londonderry in August

1969 simply would not have occurred, because even if civil protest had escalated into a major disturbance this could have been controlled by firm police action. However Northern

Ireland‟s extreme politics and divided society meant it was almost inevitable that nationalist protest would end in violence that in turn would be suppressed by the paramilitary Royal

Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and its exclusively unionist auxiliary the B-Specials. The Battle of the Bogside may have started as a civil-rights protest on 12 August but it turned into a revolt against the state with the besieged residents repelling the paramilitary RUC and their unionist supporters. More than two years of agitation for improved civil and political rights had only resulted in a façade of reform that failed to satisfy the increasing aspirations of the nationalist minority. However increased minority demands resulted in a corresponding increase in unionist opposition to any dilution of their domination of Northern Ireland. It was the culmination of decades of institutionalised discrimination that had caused the nationalist minority to erupt so violently but the consequences were so severe that it forced an impotent

Unionist government to plead for help from the British government who unwillingly deployed three hundred armed British troops into Londonderry on 14 August to restore a semblance of order.

The aim of this chapter is to explain important elements of the context of the army‟s deployment in Northern Ireland in August 1969 by examining some of the key events that

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occurred in Londonderry prior to the deployment; including the underlying conditions that led to the „battle of the Bogside‟ and reasons why the RUCs customary tactics for dealing with nationalist unrest failed on this occasion. The chapter will also analyse the historical role of the British army overseas and its singular role in Ireland, before and after partition. Even though the events prior to the army‟s deployment are well known they will be briefly reviewed but on this occasion the emphasis will be on the escalation of the conflict between nationalist protestors and the unionist majority in the province‟s two major cities. During this time Britain was still attempting to distance itself from Irish affairs but the potential failure of

Stormont placed the British government in a quandary and left it with little option other than to deploy the army to replace the now exhausted police. However, the British army was little used to policing civil communities within the United Kingdom.

The history of the British army during the twentieth century is an account of a military force that was trained to fight comparable forces but spent most of its time fighting irregular forces.

Even though the British army reverted to the role it was trained for during the two world wars its principal role throughout the twentieth century was combating indigenous enemies in

Britain‟s far-flung empire. Many analysts have claimed that the British army has been one of the best counter-insurgency forces throughout the twentieth century, however its operational tactics and underlying philosophies have not been without criticism. Yet during the second half of the twentieth century the British army was almost constantly deployed throughout

Britain‟s fading empire combating irregular forces fighting for their countries‟ independence.

Notably it was during these asymmetrical conflicts that many of the senior commanders and other key army personnel sent to Northern Ireland gained most of their military experiences, and crucially it was this army that was sent to Northern Ireland to replace an exhausted RUC and restore order out of chaos. However this was not the only time that the army had been deployed to Ireland for so-called peace-keeping duties. The British army has also had a long

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connection to Ireland where its traditional role was to confront Irish nationalism, particularly during the IRA‟s guerrilla campaign prior to partition, but regularly throughout the twentieth century. It was this almost constant exposure to anti-British sentiment in Ireland that helped condition the army‟s attitude towards any display of Irish nationalist sentiment. The British army after 1945 may have been trained to fight Warsaw Pact forces in Europe but during most of its operational deployments it was combating anti-British guerrilla forces in its colonies and eventually in Northern Ireland.

On the whole the British army that was deployed in Northern Ireland in August 1969 was not simply an impartial military force sent to restore order in a remote corner of the United

Kingdom but one conditioned by its past. The army had a long history of counter-insurgency campaigning that had allowed it to identify any opposition to British rule as the actions of disloyal subjects who could and should be confronted by force. In addition the army‟s unhappy relationship with Ireland had further conditioned it to view any overt display of Irish nationalism as a military threat rather than an expression of political opposition. Overall it was the army‟s tendency to routinely embark on counter-insurgency operations and its equally strong disposition to identify Irish nationalism as its logical target that helped condition its behaviour in Northern Ireland and made its actions there almost inevitable.

Londonderry in revolt.

Throughout 1968 and 1969 Londonderry continued to be the focus of anti-government activity that threatened unionist domination, however working class unionists viewed the reforms demanded by the civil-rights protestors‟ not as political protest but as a direct threat to their own security. As a result they began to lose faith in the unionist elite who had been

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their traditional leaders.1 In March 1969 the premier Terence O‟Neill, attempting to preserve unionist authority in the province, passed a new Public Order Act designed to reduce the effectiveness of the civil rights demonstrations. By prohibiting one of the protestors‟ favourite tactics, the sit-down protest, the Unionist government hoped that this would also help reduce the fears of the rank-and-file unionists.2 However in Londonderry the local Derry

Citizen Action Committee (DCAC) demonstrated its contempt for the new laws by organising a series of sit-down protests and planned a second protest march to commemorate the infamous „Long March‟ of January that year. The RUC responded by deploying five hundred officers to control the expected five thousand participants, however the protestors viewed this as a deliberate provocation and the march ended in violence. Although the organisers attempted to restrain the marchers, the increasingly activist nationalist youths held their own impromptu sit-down protest which was forcefully ended by the RUC. This led to increased clashes between nationalist protestors and hard-line unionists that developed into a full scale riot, with the RUC responding by baton charging the protestors and driving them back into the Bogside. It was during this initial charge that the RUC broke down the front door of Sammy Devenney‟s house and savagely beat him and his family. While there is some uncertainty as to what exactly happened, the official inquest recorded that the RUC violently attacked the entirely innocent family with batons and boots, injuring not only Samuel

Devenney but also his children, one of whom had just come out of hospital.3 Devenney‟s death in July of that year made him both a „nationalist martyr‟ and a focal point of anti-RUC feeling within the nationalist community. What is evident is that the RUC did not act as a disciplined police force operating within the law, but rather it became, in effect, a part of an

1 O Dochartaigh, 2005, pp. 62-63. 2 Patterson, Ireland Since 1939, Penguin, Dublin, 2006, p. 209. 3 Evans, 1972, p. 75: P Routledge, John Hume-A Biography, Harper Collins, London, 1998, p. 81: Dixon, Northern Ireland-The Politics of war and Peace, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 86.

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illegal sectarian mob that savagely attacked the nationalist community of the Bogside.4 By functioning in this manner the RUC exposed its sectarian bias and conclusively established that its primary role was to coercively contain the nationalist minority in the defence of

Protestant Ulster, rather than to serve the entire community as an impartial police.

Undoubtedly the nationalist protests in Londonderry were a direct confrontation to the

Unionist state; however it was how the Unionist government responded that was pivotal to shaping how the sectarian unrest would evolve. While the Northern Ireland state had a clear legal right and duty to restore order, it was how its authority was projected that was crucial.

The RUC was the only full-time security force available to the Unionist government, but this was a prejudiced and at times ill-disciplined force, whose demonstrably illegal actions identified it in nationalist eyes as little more than a group of armed vigilantes who greatly contributed to the breakdown of Northern Ireland society. The RUC was also not an independent and accountable police force; rather it was an arm of the unionist state and directly responsible to the Minister of Home Affairs who was invariably a member of the

Unionist Party. The Unionist government, because of its prejudiced standpoint and gross mismanagement of the disturbances must accept the ultimate responsibility for the way the

RUC acted. Ultimately by mid-August 1969 the inept and partial handling of the situation by the Unionist government and the RUC further escalated an already volatile situation that developed into all-out conflict between the police and large sections of the nationalist minority.

The annual Apprentice Boys march through Londonderry on Tuesday 12 August 1969 was the spark that finally inflamed sectarian tensions past the point of no return. Unionists had always viewed the Apprentice Boys march as both a right and as a customary annual ritual

4 Disturbances in Northern Ireland, (Lord Cameron), Cameron Report, Cmd 532, HMSO, Belfast, 1969.

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designed to demonstrate their superior status in Northern Ireland.5 The tens of thousands of unionists who came for the celebrations that year behaved as they had always done and imposed their presence on the local nationalists. In the past the latter had had little choice but to tolerate the marches, however that year was unusual because the nationalists in

Londonderry were no longer subservient and in addition there was a large contingent of

British and Irish journalists who were expecting trouble. They were not to be disappointed because the nationalist youths, primed by the earlier confrontations with the RUC, were ready for a fight. As the march passed close to the Bogside stones were thrown, and although this intimidation was ignored by most of the marchers the more radical Paisleyites retaliated and the scene was set for the „Battle of the Bogside‟, a furious fight between the people of the

Bogside and the representatives of unionism.6

There is disagreement over exactly what happened and who was responsible, however what is accepted by most parties is that the RUC and nationalist youths confronted each other on the edge of the Bogside close to the parade route. Even then there was no actual violence against the police until most of the marchers had left the area 7 and according to O Dochartaigh the confrontation only became serious when the RUC charged down William Street after nationalist youths followed by Protestants. Other RUC officers accompanied by a large crowd of loyalists also moved down Little James Street until they were confronted by the first barricade.8 The RUC claimed that they were merely trying to control a potentially dangerous enemy who they believed would pour into the commercial centre and cause destruction; yet independent observers including journalists who were in the Bogside at the time did not support the RUCs version of events. As O Dochartaigh states: “At approximately 7 p.m. some one hundred RUC men with batons and riot shields, supported by Land Rovers and

5 Cameron, 1969: O Dochartaigh, 2005, pp. 101- 114 6 Stetler, 1970, pp. 70-77. 7 O Dochartaigh, 2005, pp. 104-108. 8 ibid, p. 105.

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accompanied by a large number of loyalists, charged down Rossville Street and breached the barricade. It was then that the RUC wantonly stoned and batoned anyone they came into contact with while the loyalists randomly smashed windows.”9 The residents of the Bogside saw this as an invasion of their territory by the RUC and their unionist allies‟ intent on their destruction, and stoically defended their ghetto.

This was the beginning of the real „Battle of the Bogside‟ that continued with sporadic attacks by the RUC and the first and arguably excessive use of CS gas. The RUC used more than one thousand gas canisters during these two days, and while CS gas had been developed as a form of crowd control the RUC had not been trained in its use and subsequently used it indiscriminately and as a weapon of attack. It was even reported that the RUC had used the gas canisters as „bullets‟ that they fired directly at the rioters.10 The gas permeated almost every house in the Bogside and affected all the residents whether they were involved or not.

As a result CS gas became a symbol of unionist repression instead of being an instrument of crowd control.11

The residents of Bogside had always feared being attacked by the RUC and unionists and now saw no alternative but to repel any further incursions. They prepared by breaking up paving stones and organising a large stock of petrol bombs behind a layered defence of barricades.12 That night after the media had left the RUC again attempted to regain control of the Bogside, however they were once more repulsed following a sustained barrage of petrol bombs, mainly from the roof of the multi-story block of flats in Rossville Street. In the end there was a total stalemate with neither side able to gain the upper hand. The RUC did not have the numbers to overcome the barricades without resorting to firearms and the people of

9 ibid, p. 106. 10 ibid, p. 107. 11 ibid, pp. 105-107. 12 Evans, 1972, pp. 117-120.

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the Bogside continued to defend their positions. Stetler has described this action as a medieval type of warfare where little is gained but a lot of pain is inflicted.13 The next morning the RUC continued its attack on the Bogside using an increasing amount of CS gas, and the people of the Bogside retaliated with a growing barrage of firebombs and the reinforcement of the barricades. The roof of the multi-story Rossville Flats was described as a virtual fortress where youths were armed with an apparently endless supply of petrol bombs which they rained down on the RUC.14

From a nationalist perspective it was the sight of the RUC actively cooperating with crowds of extreme loyalists attacking the Bogside that demonstrated the overtly sectarian nature of the unionist state. What had started as a sectarian disturbance had evolved into an all-out conflict between the police and nationalists. The situation was now so serious that even moderates who had long tried to stop the rioting now accepted that there was little option but to defend the Bogside.15 Nationalists also began appealing for help from other parts of

Northern Ireland and from the Irish Republic. The Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch was so concerned that he directly appealed to the British government to stop the violence and also ordered the Irish army to set up field hospitals close to the border.16 However by positioning the Irish army on the border Lynch had created an irrational belief within the Bogside that the

Irish army was coming to save them while also creating fear within the unionist majority of a republican invasion.17

By the third day the RUCs strength was down to less than fifty percent with those available exhausted and unable to control the situation, the Northern Ireland government then mobilised the B-Specials. However this exclusively Protestant militia force immediately

13 Stetler, 1970, pp. 78-80. 14 E O'Ballance, Terror in Ireland: The Heritage of Hate, California, Novato, USA, 1981, pp. 118-119. 15 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 11: Evans, 1972, pp. 117-120. 16 Evans, 1972, p. 108. 17 Evans, 1972, pp. 108-109: O'Ballance, 1981, p. 109.

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allied themselves with the local unionists.18 There is evidence that the B-Specials together with unionist civilians attacked nationalists, nevertheless it was their appearance on the city walls overlooking the Bogside that really terrified the nationalists because it looked like they were preparing for another attack.19 Nationalists did not simply fear the B-Specials, they hated them because of their overtly anti-Catholic attitudes and history of using indiscriminate force against the nationalist minority.20 This force had been originally established as an armed militia to support the RUC; however as in the past they were now being used by the

Northern Ireland government to directly attack nationalists. They were not auxiliary police on the English model but a para-military reserve force with its own chain of command and armed with rifles and automatic weapons that they retained off duty.

The events of 1969 were examined at the request of the Northern Ireland government by Mr

Justice Scarman and his report Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969 was published in February 1972.21 Overall he concluded that while the IRA had influenced the unrest there was no evidence that they started or planned the riots. However Scarman also reported that the B-Specials had not carried weapons in Londonderry on 14 August, conversely there is photographic evidence that confirms they were armed when they marched towards the Bogside.22 Limpkin, a British press photographer, was covering the battle of the

Bogside photographed the armed B-Specials and witnessed at first hand the overtly sectarian attitude of the RUC and the B-Specials and their animosity towards the Catholics. He explains how the RUC acted during the „battle of the Bogside‟:

It wasn‟t the RUCs stoning or rare petrol-bombing that shocked: it was their hate that really stunned, matching that of the Catholics. The obscenities, the threats, the

18 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 113. 19 Stetler, 1970, p. xx. 20 M Hastings, Ulster 1969, Gollancz, London, 1970, pp. 29-30. 21 Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969, The Scarman Enquiry, Vol 1 & 2, SBN 337 10566 9, Cmnd. 566, Belfast, 1972. 22 C Limpkin, The Battle of the Bogside, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972.

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religious tauntings - and all coming from a peace-keeping force. To the outsider it seemed so unbelievable.23

Even though the RUC was an armed force it was small in comparison to most British police forces, moreover the RUCs tactics were primarily military in nature and therefore unsuitable for managing any form of major civil unrest without resorting to arms.24 It was now up to the forces of a very reluctant British state to attempt to resolve what was in reality a total breakdown in civil order and it was in an attempt to end the sustained violence that the

British government finally ordered the deployment of the British army into Londonderry.

However so fearful were the residents of the Bogside of another RUC and unionist attack that before this occurred they emotionally requested help from other nationalist communities, especially in Belfast.

In a symbolic display of support for the people of the beleaguered Bogside, the Belfast branch of the Civil Rights Association organised a small protest meeting at the Catholic Divis

Flats, however what had been a peaceful protest erupted into violence. Local teenagers who had attached themselves to the protesting group stoned and threw petrol bombs at the local

Hastings Street RUC station where the District Inspector, fearing that this was the start of an

IRA attack and frightened by the stories of the violence in Londonderry, overreacted and ordered Shorland armoured cars into action. These armoured cars were equipped with

Browning machine guns and had originally been obtained by the RUC to defend the border with Eire during the IRAs abortive 1956-62 campaign. Why they were used in an urban area such as Belfast has been debated at length, 25 however there is no doubt that their indiscriminate use on the night of 13 and 14 August resulted in the death of four Catholics, including the nine year old Patrick Rooney and the off-duty British soldier Trooper

23 ibid. 24 Stetler, 1970, p. xx. 25 Evans, 1972, pp. 129-133: Callaghan, 1973, p. 48: Geraghty, 1998: Scarman, 1972, Section 11.

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McCabe.26 What had started as a relatively peaceful protest developed into an all-out battle that engulfed many Catholic areas of Belfast, leaving at least six dead and one hundred and fifty Catholic houses destroyed by fire.27

The afternoon of Thursday 14 August 1969 saw the first operational deployment of British forces in Northern Ireland since the end of the Second World War other than as static guards.

Their deployment ended the stalemate between the RUC and the people of the Bogside and signalled the beginning of the army‟s new role in Northern Ireland. The RUC had demonstrably failed as the agent of state security for the Unionist government who then had been compelled to formally ask for help from a reluctant British government. However the

British army in coming to the aid of the Northern Ireland government did not operate in an impartial manner to restore order as ordered by their political masters at Westminster, rather they quickly assumed the role of the RUC and as a result were perceived by the nationalists as the representatives of the despised Northern Ireland state. Whether the army consciously understood and accepted its role as the enforcer of Unionist authority or was unwillingly drawn into the abyss is crucial to understanding how the army acted in Northern Ireland and will be discussed in greater detail later. Nevertheless the decision to deploy British troops in

Northern Ireland was formally announced by the Home Secretary James Callaghan at

Westminster in terms that suggest a different role, as he stated:

26 Evans, 1972, p. 136: Scarman, 1972, Sections 9 & 10. 27 Evans, 1972, pp, 127-136: Scarman, 1972: M Mulholland, The Longest war - Northern Ireland's Troubled History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 72-74. 28 Hamill, 1985, p. 7.

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Callaghan had authorised the deployment of British troops onto the streets of Londonderry as a last resort because the RUC had been unable to restore order. More importantly he stated that the army would act in an impartial manner both to protect the nationalists from attack by unionists and, by their presence alongside the RUC, to calm the unionists.29 Callaghan also believed that British troops would „aid the civil authority‟, the Northern Ireland government, in the manner they occasionally did in Great Britain by assisting the local police to restore order. However Callaghan appears not to have appreciated that the political and legal situation in Northern Ireland was far from the established norms of Great Britain and this basic lack of understanding of Northern Ireland‟s complex socio-political structure led the

British government to again try and implement ill-conceived and poorly timed policies that had little chance of success.

It was at approximately 5 p.m. on 14 August 1969 that three hundred soldiers of the Prince of

Wales Own Regiment finally arrived in the Bogside directly from Royal Navy‟s Sea Eagle base where they had been stationed in reserve. A short time earlier the Inspector-General of the RUC had formally requested the deployment of troops in aid of the civil power and after consulting the Northern Ireland and British governments this request was agreed to by

General Freeland, GOC NI. The immediate effect was that the RUC and B-Specials were removed from duty from the Bogside, 30 and as a weary peace descended the residents reluctantly began to accept that the presence of the British army was a better alternative than the hated RUC and the even more despised B-Specials.31 In this early phase of the deployment there was a general acceptance of the army‟s role in what had almost been a war zone. Even though some of the more radical nationalists in the Bogside did not welcome the army‟s presence, the great majority saw the army as the only practical way of restoring some

29 Callaghan, 1973, p. 43. 30 Stetler, 1970. 31 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 113.

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semblance of order.32 The result was an unreal hiatus where there was no legally constituted body controlling the Bogside, only the unofficial Derry Citizens Defence Association

(DCDA) operating with the tacit agreement of the army. The army quickly recognized that the DCDA was the only functioning authority within the Bogside and it was informal discussions between the two parties that had helped end the rioting. It was also during these early negotiations that the army agreed that if the rioting stopped they would not enter the

Bogside. By negotiating directly with the DCDA the army gave that organisation a level of semi-official authority, 33 but by doing so it made an already complex political situation even more complex.

As we have seen earlier there was an entrenched if unwritten policy at Westminster designed to ensure that British governments avoided any direct involvement in Northern Ireland affairs, a policy the Wilson government had willingly continued to pursue. In August 1969 the British government was still attempting to minimise its involvement in Northern Ireland and had delayed authorising the deployment of troops until it had absolutely no alternative.

But this delay had created a political vacuum in the province and as a result the army, while being tasked with restoring order in Londonderry was unsure how it was to perform this role.

Militarily it knew its duty but it had no clear political direction. This uncertainty may help explain the army‟s initial unwillingness to enter the Bogside and instead allow the residents to manage their own affairs.34 This state of affairs was further complicated when the British officer in charge of Londonderry entered into direct negotiations with the DCAC since by doing so he gave his imprimatur for this unofficial regime to continue.35 Whether the army was acting with or without political direction is unclear, however its actions did result in an end to what had been an extremely violent episode and this may have been the army‟s only

32 Geraghty, 1998, p. 27. 33 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 115. 34 ibid, p. 114. 35 B White, John Hume, Statesman of the Troubles, Blackstaff Press, Belfast, 1984, p. 89.

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objective. The situation continued to remain cordial even after the Prince of Wales Own

Regiment was replaced a few days later by the Queens Own regiment who continued the policy of non-intervention in the Bogside.36

This situation was further legitimised in the eyes of the nationalist community when on 27

August the British Home Secretary James Callaghan visited the Bogside and received a rapturous welcome from the residents who saw him as their saviour from an oppressive unionist regime. Unfortunately this proved to be politically naïve and the tenuous self-rule was soon under threat when the army began to enforce its authority. As the army steadily increased its presence the fragile influence of the DCDA began to be undermined, which in turn weakened the more moderate leadership within the Bogside and strengthened that of the radicals. The residents of the Bogside quickly understood that their fragile self-rule was at an end and Stormont‟s authority was being re-established, however now it was by the army and not the RUC. The deployment of British troops to replace the RUC had dramatically changed the political situation and now the army was making it clear that they were in control and would deal with any opposition.37 More importantly the overall political picture in Northern

Ireland began to change, especially when troops were deployed in the capital city of Belfast.

Belfast has had a long history of communal disturbances, with regular sectarian violence at the interfaces between the Protestant and Catholic working class districts. The 1969 unionist marching season had inevitably raised tensions and there was violent confrontation between the two communities in Ardoyne, Falls Road and Shankill Road areas of the city.38 Although the rioting was mainly instigated by out-of-control nationalist youths who attacked the RUC and unionists in a spontaneous reaction to the situation in Londonderry, it was not the start of

36 O Dochartaigh, 2005, pp. 113-117. 37 ibid, p. 124. 38 D M McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, New Amsterdam Books, Chicago, 2002, p. 54.

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an IRA insurgency as the RUC had irrationally believed.39 The Belfast rioting and the RUCs response set in motion a series of events that escalated the situation even further.40 The army was now operationally deployed in both of Northern Ireland‟s two major cities and although their political masters had done everything in their power to avoid any direct involvement in the province the die had now been cast and the British army was about to begin the longest operational deployment in its history.

The British Army that confronted the Northern Ireland civil unrest.

In August 1969 the army that was deployed onto the streets of Londonderry and Belfast was to a large extent the product of its recent, extensive colonial experiences where it fought insurgencies against British rule.41 Paget, reflecting the British army‟s perspective in the

1960s, differentiates between an „insurgency‟, which he defines as an armed rebellion against the government, and „internal security‟ known as duties in „aid of the civil power‟ where the army is used to help control civil disturbances. In an „insurgency‟ the security forces, army and police, confront the rebellion forcefully using „counter-insurgency‟ techniques whereas during „internal security‟ operations they use minimum force.42 Benest goes further and argues that while the British army did use overwhelming force in the nineteenth century this did not occur during the twentieth century because it adhered to what he describes as the

„British way‟. He argues that British soldiers always operated within British law because they were always accountable to British law.43 As the British Army Field Manual states:

39 Hamill, 1985, p. 14. 40 Geraghty, 1998, pp. 25-27. 41 Benest in Strachan, (eds), Big Wars and Small Wars, Cass Series: Military History and Policy, Routledge, Oxford, p. 116, 2006: Thornton, „Historical Origins of the British Army's Counter-Insurgency and Counter- Terrorist Techniques‟, 7th Annual Conference of the PfP Consortium, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 1-17. 42 Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, Faber & Faber, London, 1967, pp. 14-15. 43 Benest in Strachan, 2006, p. 115.

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“Throughout its history … the British army has gained a vast amount of experience in the control of internal conflict and internal affairs … in all types of operations … [including] urban counter-insurgency action.” 44 The manual goes on to assert that the army had absorbed the lessons of its historical past and applied them to later operations. The army also understood that it needed to apply different tactics when confronting a civil unrest and an insurgency because how these very different types of operations are tackled can greatly influence their outcome. Less force needs to be used when aiding the police because if overwhelming force is used to confront civil unrest this could easily evolve into a full-scale counter-insurgency.

Other commentators reject the notion that the British army differentiated between internal security and insurrection. Mockaitis argues that the British army viewed internal-security operations and counter-insurgency campaigns as the same because they used the same methods in both situations.45 Benest also contends that all asymmetrical conflicts are fundamentally the same because force is used to challenge state authority and as a result the army can also respond with force.46 Nevertheless with the exception of the two world wars when the British army reverted to being a regular field army its experience since the first phase of the Boer War ended in 1900 had been limited to what was termed „small wars‟ or

„imperial policing‟ where it fought mainly non-European forces. The army had gained its extensive counter-insurgency experiences during Britain‟s imperial expansion and continued in this mode throughout its colonial and end-of-empire age. However since 1945 the British

44 Army Field Manual, Vol 1, Pt 9, 2001, p. 78. Quoted in A Jackson, „British Counter-insurgency in History: A Useful Precedent?‟, The British Army Review, 139, Spring 2006. 45 T.R Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60, St Martin's Press, New York, 1990, pp. 10-11. 46 Benest in Strachan, 2006, p. 115.

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army has been almost continuously involved in counter-insurgency campaigns including

Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and in many other parts of the world.47

It was the army‟s post-war internal security experiences in Malaya and Cyprus that were the most relevant to its later exploits in Northern Ireland, and these were clearly counter- insurgency campaigns. The army‟s initial exposure to what is now termed an „insurgency‟ was not in a distant colony but in Ireland during the 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish war. During this violent confrontation some three thousand members of the IRA confronted a British army that eventually numbered fifty thousand.48 The IRA‟s campaign was strategically successful in that it rendered significant parts of Ireland practically ungovernable, and it was because of the IRA‟s success that this first truly modern insurgency became not only a model for later insurgents but also a precedent for later British counter-insurgency strategy.

Mockaitis has also claimed that the British army did not use any formal doctrine for the conduct of its counter-insurgency operations such as that in Ireland. On the contrary it used a set of broad principles based on English common law, the use of minimum force, a unified civilian-military authority and the application of a decentralised small-unit approach.49

Thornton goes further and suggests that the use of „minimum force‟ forms the basis of all

British counter-insurgency operations and has done so since the early nineteenth century. In his view, this concept emerged from what he calls „Victorian values‟ based upon religious sentiment and Liberal values.50 Benest also argues that the British approach to counter- insurgency was codified in books by Callwell, Gwynn, Thompson, Paget and later Kitson.

However the British army did not appear to have learnt much from these publications instead

47 Paget, 1967, pp. 13-15. 48 Mockaitis, 1990, pp. 10-12. 49 ibid, p. 13. 50 Thornton, 2004, p 3.

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preferring to relearn the necessary skills through trial and error in each new campaign.51 This was the case in Ireland at the start of the 1919-1921 emergency where the British security forces initially tackled what was an internal security operation by using the same military tactics they had employed in the First World War. Yet in Ireland they did not operate within

English common law or use minimum force, and there was no effective co-operation between any of the security forces or the civil authority prior to 1921. Excessive force was used by the security forces and this inevitably contributed to the alienation of the majority of the Irish civilian population.52

Townshend argues that while the army was deployed to Ireland to restore „law-and-order‟ its actions had the opposite effect and that the coercive imposition of „British law‟ had in fact provoked the disorder.53 The increasingly draconian special powers imposed by the British culminating with the 1920 „Restoration of Order in Ireland Act‟ (ROIA) signalled a break from an internal security operation and into a full counter-insurgency operation. The ROIA allowed the army to operate with almost total impunity and while these powers fell short of full „martial law‟ the army was able to search and arrest at will and try those it arrested in military courts. Field Marshal French even argued for the authorities to be given the right to use full warlike measures against the IRA. If in the later stages of this campaign the army had been gaining the upper hand the actions of its allies, the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries, fatally weakened British political and public support. Their ill-disciplined and excessively violent actions not only completely alienated the local population but also led to a weakening of political will which in turn forced the British government into a political settlement.54

51 Benest in Strachan, 2006, p. 117. 52 Paget, 1967, p. 13. 53 C Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars, Faber and Faber, London, 1986, pp. 55-67. 54 ibid.

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While the Boer War was the British army's first true insurgency campaign of the modern era - with no pretence to using minimum force - the lessons it learnt in South Africa were quickly implemented in Ireland, where Mockaitis's principles were no more in evidence. In Ireland the British army could not claim to have operated within Mockatis‟s principles. The army did not operate within the constraints of English common law, use minimum force or work in close cooperation with all branches of the civil authority until very late in the campaign - principles that Mockatis claims were so deeply ingrained in the thinking of British soldiers that they became automatic.55 Rather it could be argued that the British soldiers deployed in

Ireland during that war operated from a more basic soldier‟s instinct of utilising all the force available to them in order to defeat an enemy. The army was fighting a rebellion against the

Crown and not aiding the civil authorities in the restoration of law and order.

It is claimed that the British army gained its reputation as one of the most effective counter- insurgency forces in the post-war era because it adhered to what has been defined as a suite of operational principles.56 Mockatis and other counter-insurgency analysts have claimed that the British Malayan campaign of 1948-60 is the best model of modern counter-insurgency warfare and has been acknowledged by some American military commentators as arguably superior to the failure of the US army in Vietnam.57 These analysts assert that the Malayan campaign is a classic example of how to fight a guerrilla war because it was the only major insurgency campaign in the second half of the twentieth century that ended with a modern army claiming victory over an insurgent force. Yet Strachan argues that the British army did

55 Mockaitis, 1990, p. 13. 56 A Jackson, 2006, pp. 12-22. 57 Dixon, „Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq‟, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32, No 3, 353-381: Mockaitis, 1990, p. 8.

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not learn the lessons of Malaya until after the campaign and that the army failed to apply those lessons when it was deployed to Aden in 1968 and to Northern Ireland in 1969.58

Lt General Sir John Kiszely argues that the army initially failed because the tactics used by its commander, General Boucher, were those of the Second World War and that counter- insurgency tactics should have been used much earlier in the campaign.59 Success only occurred when General Sir Gerald Templer took command. Templer understood that this was not a simple military campaign with a military solution but a counter-insurgency campaign that required an integrated civil-military strategy including what he termed „winning the hearts and minds‟ of the civil population. Templer‟s overall strategy assumed that an insurgency is primarily an asymmetric conflict between a government and non-state actors 60 and therefore this conflict could only be won when the political and social issues were identified and resolved with the army „holding the line‟ until these issues could be neutralised. The military‟s primary role was to establish a situation secure enough to enable the non-military actors to achieve the necessary changes to the political and social environment.61

Yet the army‟s role in Malaya was not the simple counter-insurgency model claimed by

Mockaitis, rather its operations more closely resembled British pacification and policing campaigns of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. There it did not operate within

English common law or use minimum force but used overwhelming force and collective punishment against the civil population, whether they actively supported the insurgents or not. However these operations occurred when the British public had an ambiguous attitude to non-whites and where there was little press coverage or opposition to these tactics within

58 Strachan, 2006, p. 9. 59 J Kiszely, „Learning about Counterinsurgency‟, Military Review, March-April 2007, pp. 5-11: Mockaitis, 1990, p 115: Paget, 1967, p. 51. 60 Dixon, 2009, pp. 353-381. 61 The Military Contributions to Peace Support Operations, Ministry of Defence. Quoted in A Jackson, 2006.

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Britain.62 The army in Malaya did not operate within its celebrated legal framework, or minimum force rather, it used a highly coercive strategy to gain the ascendancy over the insurgents.

The British army in Malaya also did not work alone; it worked as part of an overall civil- military structure in concert with a range of other security agencies including British-led but locally recruited military units and police forces.63 This combined civil-military apparatus rarely worked within a British legal framework or use minimum force to achieve its aims.

During the campaign for example some 400,000 Malaysians were detained and compulsorily resettled into secure villages were the army was directly involved in the detention and screening process.

This was also the practice in Kenya between 1952 and 1956 when over one million natives were resettled and hundreds of thousands held in detention camps. In Kenya the British army also did not operate within the principle of minimum force but was directly involved in the forced relocation of suspects and in their execution.64 The British campaigns in Malaya and

Kenya were in fact very coercive campaigns that did not comply with British legal principles or liberal values. Rather British forces regularly used high levels of violence and therefore cannot claim that they operated within the English Common Law.65

Templer believed that if the British used a less coercive approach then it would win over the

„hearts and minds‟ of the local people, and that they would then be less likely to support the insurgents. This would also reduce the need for overwhelming force and resultant civilian casualties. However there are questions as to what Templer meant by the term „winning the hearts and minds‟ when he stated “the answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring more troops

62 Mockaitis, 1990, p. 17. 63 Mockaitis, 1990, pp. 10-14: Paget, 1967, p. 52. 64 Strachan, 2006, p. 11. 65 Dixon, 2009, pp. 353-381.

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into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.”66 However Templer also stated that before a „hearts and minds‟ policy can be implemented a secure political environment had to be established that would allow the population to have confidence in the rule of the legitimate authority and reject that of the insurgents. Crucially he believed that the security forces had to use minimum force otherwise they could alienate the local population.67

Nevertheless there are contradictory interpretations as to exactly what a „hearts and minds‟ campaign is, because security forces can either attempt to win the emotional support and self- interest of the population through non-coercive and voluntary means or they can use coercion and fear to control the population. Thomas Mockaitis believes that a „hearts and minds‟ campaign will only work when minimum force is used and the reasons for the insurrection are fully understood and strategies are formulated to address these failings.68 Thornton also argues that the army always kept the overall consent of the indigenous population because it was seen to be operating within the law.69 Hew Strachan on the other hand has a much more hard-headed, or maybe a more realistic, assessment of how the British security forces applied the „hearts and minds‟ policy. He states:

When we speak about „hearts and minds‟, we are not talking about being nice to the natives, but about giving them the firm smack of government. „Hearts and minds‟ denoted authority, not appeasement. Of course, political and social reform might accompany firm government.70

Strachan‟s assessment of this more coercive approach is supported by Colonel I. A. Rigden who argues that the British army‟s approach to „hearts and minds‟ did not mean taking a soft approach with civilians but rather using hard measures such as overt riot control and

66 Quoted in Dixon, 2009, p 354: Paget, p. 65. 67 Dixon, 2009, p. 359. 68 ibid, p. 363. 69 Thornton, 2004, p. 9. 70 Strachan, 2007.

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curfews.71 Ashley Jackson argues that the British approach to a „hearts and minds‟ campaign is fundamentally coercive and that the British have regularly used overwhelming military force not only to attack insurgents but also to inflict fear on the wider population.72 As Dixon states, “the British did fight a highly coercive campaign in Malaya where high levels of force were used by the army who did not fight within the law and committed abuses of human rights”.73 The British army in Malaya was therefore a willing agent of the British state; fighting and intimidating non-state actors. Sir Robert Thompson, who served in Malaya and who later went on to advise American forces in Vietnam, confirms that the British did use draconian measures during the Malayan campaign and they did so with the full consent of the

British government.74 The army was clearly content to use overwhelming force and to operate in an overt coercive manner when directed to do so and again when British rule was being challenged in Cyprus the army was again deployed to defend its government‟s political interests.

Although Cyprus had been annexed by Britain in 1878, its predominately Greek-Cypriot population retained a long-held wish to be united with Greece. In 1955 EOKA, an anti- colonial nationalist organisation led by George Grivas began a renewed campaign for Enosis, union with Greece.75 The EOKA campaign not only challenged Britain‟s authority in Cyprus but also threatened its strategically important military base on the island. Furthermore Britain had to consider relations between Greece and Turkey who were both members of NATO, and the effect that Cypriot independence would have on the political balance of the area.76 There was also a long history of conflict between Greece and Turkey and the resultant segregation

71 Quoted in Dixon, 2009, p. 365. 72 A Jackson, 2006, pp. 12-22: T R Mockaitis, „The Phoenix of Counterinsurgency‟, The Journal of Conflict Studies, 2009, 1-8. 73 Dixon, 2009, p. 355. 74 Quoted in J Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland, Palgrave, New York, 2002, pp. 40-47. 75 Paget, 1967, p. 117. 76 C Foley & W.I Scobie, The Struggle for Cyprus, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 1975, p. ix.

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of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus.77 The social and political situation in Cyprus was therefore very similar in many ways to Northern Ireland and in both countries the British were equally blind to the obvious grievances and unwilling to deal with them.

From a British perspective Cyprus was simply a strategically important base where the views of its inhabitants were treated with disdain, 78 and it was the coercive British reaction to local support for Enosis that escalated anti-British sentiment in Cyprus. When Britain was confronted with internal opposition to its authority on the island it viewed it as simply disloyalty and instinctively enacted dormant anti-sedition laws.79 Even though the administration initially attempted to negotiate with the leaders of Enosis, when this strategy failed they reverted to coercion as they had done in Malaya.

The newly appointed British supremo, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, declared a state of emergency and imposed some seventy-six new regulations to enable the security forces to address the deteriorating situation. These included the death plenty for the use of firearms, life imprisonment for the possession of arms or explosives, collective punishment, banishment and corporal punishment. Harding‟s imposition of collective punishment included detaining those deemed responsible, imposing curfews and restricting access to the homes of those the British determined disloyal.80 Whether these coercive policies should have been applied during the Cyprus insurgency is arguable, however they had a negative effect on the Greek-Cypriot population and instead of reducing the status of the insurgents they increased it. The British had never understood the emotional attachment for Enosis nor did they find an acceptable alternative to support for EOKA.81

77 Mockaitis, 1990, p. 132: Paget, 1967, p. 117. 78 Newsinger, 2002, p. 84. 79 Paget, 1967, p. 119. 80 Newsinger, 2002, pp. 94-95. 81 Paget, 1967, p. 145.

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Harding, learning from Malaya and Kenya, concentrated on establishing an effective civil, police and military organisation and by 1957 British intelligence was producing enough valuable information to allow the military to begin gaining the security initiative. Then again when the British could not obtain intelligence on EOKA through normal measures they began to use other means including joint interrogation teams who used what has been described as excessively cruel interrogation techniques. According to Charles Foley the British brought into Cyprus interrogation teams that had been trained in Kenya and Malaya and who used overt violence to obtain information. Although Cypriot lawyers claimed their clients were being tortured, even after questions were raised in the British press and at Westminster they were always rejected by the local administration.82 Newsinger contends that the British used relays of interrogators to continuously question suspects for extended periods. They also physically assaulted the prisoners and subjected them to what is now termed „water- boarding‟.83 However these techniques supplied significant intelligence to enable troops to use new techniques including „snatch squads‟, raiding suspected EOKA hideouts, and to operate Special Forces at night. As a result British security forces began to gain the upper hand and were able to eliminate large segments of the terrorist network which in turn weakened EOKA as a viable force and forced it to announce a final ceasefire.84.

Paget judged that the overall campaign in Cyprus was a draw because while the security forces contained the insurgents the British were unable to stop terrorist attacks in the towns.85

Overall it was the methods that the British authorities used to gather intelligence that stigmatised the whole operation because the techniques that were used were far removed from the norms of English common law and the use of minimum force. The army was clearly operating as a counter-insurgency force outside English common law and were not using

82 Foley & Scobie, 1975, pp. 73-4 & 123-4. 83 Newsinger, 2002, p. 102. 84 ibid, p. 102. 85 Paget, 1967, p. 140.

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minimum force to give aid the civil authority as described by Mockaitis in his defence of the

British approach to counter-insurgency. This was the same British army that was already stationed in Northern Ireland and would be confronted by similar rioting crowds in August

1969.

The army and Northern Ireland before 1969.

During the 1950s and early 1960s the British army found Northern Ireland a very pleasant posting compared to the dangerous counter-insurgency operations in Malaya, Cyprus and

Aden. When Lt General Sir Ian Freeland was appointed to the position of General Officer

Commanding Northern Ireland (GOC NI) on 9 July 1969 he considered, as many other members of the British army had in the past, that this would be a pleasant pre-retirement posting.86 Later he described his posting to Northern Ireland as “a rather pleasant final job for the last two years of my service … [Northern Ireland was] a very pleasant province … where

I could indulge my passion for shooting and golf.”87 The position of GOC NI, at least until

General Freeland‟s appointment, was seen as a secure posting where senior officers could be sent to enjoy their last few years of duty before retirement. However as Lt. Gen. Sir R.

Denning (GOC NI) commented in 1950, Northern Ireland is very different to Great Britain; as he stated a letter to a brother officer, “Outwardly the situation remains quiet … notwithstanding two bomb incidents in Belfast.”88 These were not a regular occurrence in

Britain; however in Northern Ireland troops were regularly on stand-by in case they were required for „internal security‟ duties or to combat IRA activity.

86 Army Department, The London Gazette, London: 1969, pp 2-8. 87 Freeland, transcript of a Thames Television interview (Five Long Years), 1974, IWM, 79-34-4. 88 Quoted in K Jeffery, & T. Bartlett, (eds), A Military History of Ireland, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 448.

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Throughout the nineteenth century the army‟s primary role in Ireland was to aid the Royal

Irish Constabulary (RIC) to enforce British coercive policies, with the army eventually assuming most internal security duties during the 1919 to 1921 Anglo-Irish war.89 In 1922 and after partition several hundred soldiers supported by artillery were used to repulse an attempt by republican forces to take over the Ulster enclave of Beleek.90 While this action clearly signalled the British government‟s commitment to defend its remaining sovereign territory; much to the dismay of the Unionist government in Belfast, Westminster explicitly restricted the army to limiting its operations to defending the border against incursion and ensured that local politicians could not exert control over the army.91

Belfast‟s answer to this slight was the creation of its own paramilitary police force, the Royal

Ulster Constabulary, (RUC) supported by a wholly Protestant reserve, both armed with military weapons.92 However as the British government‟s political complexion changed in the decades after partition the restrictions on how the Northern Ireland garrison was used were relaxed and it began to regain a stronger role in internal security. While the army in Northern

Ireland did not take an active part in controlling unrest during the 1926 British general strike,

93 nor during the Belfast poor relief riots of 1932, the entire garrisons of the Hollywood and

Victoria barracks were put on standby to assist the RUC and B-Specials if required.94

However during the 1935 Belfast sectarian riots the army was actively involved in the suppression of serious civil unrest. The sectarian violence during 1922 when extreme loyalists attacked isolated nationalist communities erupted again in 1935 when sustained rioting escalated into all-out sectarian bloodshed and led to the British army being deployed again onto the streets of Belfast.

89 Jeffery & Bartlett, 1996, pp. 434-437. 90 ibid, pp. 434-437. 91 ibid, p. 436. 92 Ryder, 2004, p. xviii. 93 Jeffery & Bartlett, 1996, pp. 434-437. 94 „Rioting in Belfast‟, The Times, London, 1932, p 11.

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While the 1932 riots were violent they were abnormally non-sectarian, on the contrary they were part of a unified Protestant-Catholic working class protest against the extremely meagre poor relief paid to both communities and had been socialist inspired.95 However in 1935 the underlying sectarian divide of Northern Ireland resurfaced and the ensuing violence resulted in many deaths and a large number of Catholics being evicted from their homes in Belfast.

The fleeting Catholic-Protestant working-class unity of 1932 had weakened Protestant working-class solidarity and the political power of the Unionist party which led to Sir Basil

Brooke and other unionist leaders intentionally using the spectre of republicanism to re- establish Protestant working class supremacy. This stirred up sectarian hostility and inevitably led to a recurrence of violent confrontation between Catholics and Protestants.96 In a precursor to 1969 Catholics erected barricades to defend their threatened neighbourhoods against not only their Protestant neighbours but also the RUC and B-Specials. However in

1935 the Unionist government retained total control of the security situation even though this included armed British troops as well as their own heavily armed police. This was in direct contradiction to the British policies of the 1920s when control of the army was specifically restricted to Westminster.97 The Unionist government considered that these disturbances were a direct threat by Irish nationalists to its sovereignty and that unless it could clearly demonstrate its control of the province there was a risk that Westminster would intervene.98

As had been its practice since partition the Unionist government used the overwhelming force of the RUC, the B-Specials and the army to regain control over the nationalist minority.

Nevertheless it was not until four civilians had been killed and only when the police were under considerable pressure that the army was eventually called in and peace finally

95 R Munck, „Class and Religion in Belfast - A Historical perspective‟, Journal of Contemporary History, 20, no 2, 1985, pp. 241-259. 96 ibid. 97 Jeffery & Bartlett, 1996, p. 436. 98 A.C Hepburn, „The Belfast Riots of 1935‟, Social History, 15, No 1, 1990, pp. 75-96.

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restored.99 In the afternoon of 14 July 1935 the Inspector general of the RUC, Lt Col. Sir

Charles Wickham, consulted with the army Chief in Northern Ireland, Major-General

Girdwood who in turn ordered men of The Border Regiment to move to Belfast to „aid the civil power‟. Arriving in armoured cars the soldiers toured the affected area in full fighting kit, including fixed bayonets, after which they were deployed to strategic positions in the city.

The combined security forces had to use increasing force including firing at and over the heads of civilians to regain control. Between 14 and 24 July the army operated in a coordinated manner with the RUC and the B-Specials 100 and was constantly in action throughout Belfast during which there was at least one recorded episode where British soldiers fired over the heads of rioters.101 In the end the security forces were able to contain the violence to a relatively small part of the city, however at least ten civilians were killed and many hundreds were seriously wounded before the violence ended.

In 1935 the RUC had armoured cars mounted with machine-guns and used these military weapons as a means of crowd-control. The New York Times reported that on at least one occasion the RUC instinctively opened fire on a crowd and that two women died as a result102 and on another occasion the police used a Lewis machine-gun mounted on an armoured-car to fire over the heads of rioters.103 The Catholic minority had long complained that the RUC and the B-Specials had fired upon them but their complaints had never been taken seriously.

However during the 1935 riots there was compelling evidence that the Unionist government sanctioned their police to use live ammunition as a normal method of crowd control, at least against the Catholic minority. It could also be argued that because British troops also used

99 ibid. 100 ‘Fighting Spreads in Ulster Capital‟, New York Times, New York, 18 July 1935, p. 6. 101 „More Rioting in Belfast‟, The Times, London, 15 July 1935. 102 „Belfast Riots‟, New York Times, New York. 13 July 1935, pp. 1-6. 103 Hepburn, 1990.

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live ammunition as a method of crowd control the Westminster government fully supported the practice of firing on civilians in Northern Ireland.

Although the British government reported that its soldiers were under the control of their officers there is no evidence that they were directly controlled by London. Some British MPs expressed their concern that the army appeared to be operating under the command of the

Northern Ireland government; however their concerns were brushed aside by Prime Minister

Baldwin.104 Baldwin may have had such a relaxed attitude because the Inspector General of the RUC, Lt. Col. Sir Charles Wickham was a distinguished British soldier and it could be claimed that they had an English officer indirectly in control of their troops.105 However it was the institutional memory of this precedent that stayed with the unionists and resurfaced when the Unionist government requested that British troops assist the RUC in similar circumstances thirty-four years later. The Northern Ireland Minister of Home affairs, Robert

Porter, was quite clearly equating the army‟s actions in 1935 as part of the Unionist government‟s effort to beat the nationalists into submission and was expecting the army to play a similar role in 1969.106 On the other hand the nationalists memory of the 1935 riots was very different, even though both Catholics and Protestants had participated in the riots and members of both communities had been killed and injured, it was the RUC aided by the

B-Specials and more importantly the British army that was used to subdue the nationalist minority. There was strong evidence that in the 1935 riots the security forces had consistently sided with the Loyalists and against the nationalists.107 As was to happen again in 1969 it was

Catholics that were evicted from their homes and forced them to live in even more concentrated ethnic ghettos. To the Catholic minority this was confirmation of Stormont‟s

104 Northern Ireland Disturbances, House of Commons, Hansard. 304 1225-1836, London, 1935. 105 The Royal Ulster Constabulary: Lt Col Sir Charles Wickham, Police Inspector General, 1922-1945, Police Federation. N. Ireland, 2009. 106 Note of meeting between Callaghan and Northern Ireland PM, CAB 164 577, Cabinet Office documents on Northern Ireland. Ref 5m, 8 August 1969. 107 Hepburn, 1990.

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policy of sectarian discrimination, and reinforced the general nationalist perception that they were a suppressed minority. This perception was continually reinforced by Stormont through the 1940s and 1950s until nationalist frustration exploded as a result of the civil rights movement in the late 1960s. However the nationalist cause was not helped by the IRA‟s reversion to their physical-force tradition when in the late nineteen-thirties they began another campaign against their traditional enemy the British and their representatives in

Northern Ireland.

The outbreak of the Second World War forced a beleaguered United Kingdom to again focus on Ireland, however this was not because of Irish nationalist activity but rather for its own strategic defence. The British army‟s defeat at Dunkirk in 1940 meant it was now directly threatened by Germany and its very survival was dependent upon its ability to defend its

Atlantic supply routes. Routes that in the past had been defended from bases in Ireland were now no longer available to Britain because of a neutral Eire and the actions of its determinedly neutral leader Eamon de Valera.108 Britain had always seen Ireland from a strategic perspective, a vulnerable back door from where its enemies could attack Britain.109

However Ireland‟s neutrality and perceived disloyalty to the Allied cause greatly increased this apprehension. Adding to this fear was the fact that both countries were almost unprepared to repel any German invasion of Eire which could threaten Britain. The British army in Northern Ireland consisted of little more than ten thousand soldiers, poorly equipped, with little heavy equipment and no air cover. The Irish army was in even worse shape with only nine thousand troops who were even more poorly equipped and trained.110 However with the arrival of more than one hundred thousand American troops in Northern Ireland in

108 W Churchill, The Second World War. Vol 2, Penguin, London, 2005, pp. 145- 153. 109 Townshend, 1999, p. xii. 110 Fisk, 1983, pp. 130-156.

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preparation for the Normandy invasion the German threat receded permanently and also to a large extent did Britain‟s concern about a possible threat from Irish nationalism.

On the other hand the IRA was not entirely inactive during the Second World War and in

1939 began a bombing campaign in England.111 As the British Home Secretary stated in parliament Britain did take this IRA threat very seriously, declaring that the IRA had been very active and that there had been 127 incidents in Britain since January 1939 including a number of explosions in London and Coventry that killed and injured scores of civilians.112

The attacks on Britain were militarily inconsequential and had little impact on the British war effort; however they did enrage the British public and reinforce the long-held British perception that the Irish were fundamentally treacherous.113 In the end what defeated the

IRA‟s English campaign were the determined actions of both the Irish and British governments.114

Nevertheless the IRA then began a campaign in Northern Ireland that was equally unsuccessful. However the IRA‟s actions were so mediocre that they were contained entirely by the RUC and had little impact on the many thousands of British and American troops stationed in the province for the duration of the war.115 Other than an occasional gun battle between it and the RUC, the IRA‟s actions were ineffective and many members of the IRA were arrested and a large quantity of its weapons and explosives sized. The Second World

War ended with the IRA an impotent organisation, the bulk of its leadership jailed and its reputation substantially reduced because of its association with Nazi Germany. It would be a

111 „Bomb blasts shake cities in Britain: Irish are blamed‟, New York Times, New York, 17 January 1939. 112 English, 2003, pp. 60-61: „Vast Bomb Plots are laid to IRA‟, New York Time, New York, p. 11, 24 July 1939. 113 „4 Blasts in London Terrorize Crowds‟, New York Times, New York, p. 1. 25 June 1939: D Benest in Strachan, 2006, p. 126. 114 C Townshend, Political violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1848, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 381. 115 English, 2003, pp. 67-69.

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number of years before the IRA was strong enough to continue its campaign against the

British in Ireland.

Between 1945 and 1956 there were sporadic IRA attacks in Northern Ireland with occasional bombs going off in the 1950s much to the annoyance of the British army commander of the time.116 Nevertheless before the IRA could start another campaign it needed to obtain the necessary arms and to do this it raided a number of British military bases in Northern Ireland and England.117 The Times reported on 14 June 1954 that a group of IRA men dressed as

British soldiers raided the Gough Barracks in Armagh and stole rifles and machine-guns 118 with the Northern Ireland government responding by reactivating regulations under the

Special Powers Acts.119 The Labour MP Denis Healey raised the theft of British military weapons at Westminster and also suggested that the British government should consider withdrawing the army from Northern Ireland and letting the Irish people settle their own differences.120 This is an interesting viewpoint considering that Healey became Defence

Secretary during the first Wilson government and was responsible for the army‟s operations in Northern Ireland until June 1970.

The IRA also raided the British army barracks at Arborfield in Berkshire on 13 August 1955, when a dozen armed men held up army guards and stole a large number of military weapons and ammunition. However the same night the heavily-laden van used by the IRA was stopped by a local police constable who arrested its occupants after he found that it contained military weapons. Scotland Yard‟s Special Branch found more of the weapons shortly after during a raid in London‟s Caledonian Road, and subsequently members of the IRA were charged with

116 Jeffery & Bartlett, 1996, p. 448. 117 English, 2003, pp. 72-3: Smith, 1997, p. 67. 118 „IRA Raid on Armoury‟, The Times. London, p. 6. 14 June 1954. 119 „Powers Restored to Northern Ireland Police‟, The Times, London, p. 3, 18 June 1954. 120 Gough Barracks Armagh (Theft of Arms), House of Commons, London, Hansard, 592: 211-2, 1954.

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the theft and jailed.121 Even though the IRA was so inept it was able to acquire enough arms to begin its campaign against Northern Ireland. More importantly the raids also reawakened the on-going threat from Irish nationalism within the British and Northern Ireland security forces. Nevertheless it was not until December 1956 that the IRA began its border campaign against the British in Northern Ireland.122

The bombing of a BBC transmitter signalled the start of the IRA‟s guerrilla campaign against

British targets in Northern Ireland, a campaign that the IRA leadership hoped would paralyse the government and force the British out of Ireland. What was planned as an all-out attack involved some one hundred IRA volunteers and included another attack on the Gough

Barracks and on a number of RUC barracks near the border. The campaign continued until

February 1962 when the IRA was forced to call it off because of a failure to gain support from the nationalist community on either side of the border.123 The IRA‟s final communiqué dated 26 February 1962 blamed the unwillingness of the Irish people to support its fight to free Ireland from the British forces of occupation.124 However the campaign allowed the

Unionist government to mobilise the B-Specials and reintroduce internment without trial.

This campaign not only marked the complete failure of the IRA, but also widened the divide between nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland.

There was another somewhat farcical episode in the apparently never-ending drama of

Anglo-Irish history that occurred in early 1966 when, as we have seen, the RUC Special

Branch reported that the IRA was about to launch a campaign against both Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The army took the threat seriously and advised its commands that the situation in Northern Ireland could be „ominous‟ and „serious‟ for the remainder of the UK.

121 Arms Theft, Arborfield, House of Commons, London, Hansard. 545: 6-8 1955: „Alleged Arms Raid Conspiracy: Three men for Trial‟, The Times, London, p 4, 1955. 122 „Explosions in Northern Ireland, The Times, London, p. 10, 12 December 1965. 123 English, 2003, pp. 71-83. 124 Smith, 1997, p 72.

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Just how gravely the army took the RUCs reported threat can be confirmed by the decision of

General Baker, Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS), to personally visit Northern Ireland to be briefed on the IRA threat.125 There he met with the Inspector General of the RUC and the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs and as a result became convinced that there was a real threat from a well equipped and well trained IRA. With the exception of General

Baker‟s visit to Northern Ireland there is no evidence that the British government or any of its agencies attempted to verify the RUC Special Branch report. On the contrary they appeared to have accepted without question its substance and conclusions. In fact as Merlyn Rees, a member of the Wilson Cabinet and later Northern Ireland Secretary confirmed in 1992 the security services were not operating in Northern Ireland until the troops went in August 1969 and Britain relied completely upon the Northern Ireland government for its information.126

Irish republicanism‟s fight with the British state throughout the Second World War and into the early 1960s was a sporadic and futile series of military campaigns. In 1939 the IRA started a spectacular but ineffectual bombing campaign on the British mainland and when that failed they turned their attention to Northern Ireland and again failed. However in 1956 they again attacked Northern Ireland and again failed miserably, being forced to end this campaign ignominiously in 1962. While these campaigns were militarily irrelevant their one success was that they continued to feed unionist paranoia and allow the retention of a belief within the British military and security establishments that the threat from Irish republicanism was always present. Even in 1966 the army hierarchy still believed that the IRA was strong enough to pose a threat against Great Britain and planned accordingly.

125 DEFE 11 698 CGS/353. 126 Quoted in Peter Rose, 2000, p. 129.

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Conclusions

The period after the confrontational People‟s Democracy march in January 1969 was crucial to the evolution of this early phase of the conflict that consumed Northern Ireland during the last decades of the twentieth century. However it was the very different approaches by the

Unionist and British governments to the growing nationalist unrest that was to determine how events would unfold. The conservative and relatively peaceful protest movement that had begun in 1968 was now being taken over by extremists who favoured confrontational tactics.

The events that unfolded in Londonderry in late 1968 and 1969 signalled the dramatic shift from passive demonstrations to violent confrontation and were pivotal to the long-term evolution of the protest movement. In particular it was the defence of the Bogside against the combined forces of the RUC, the B-Specials and their unionist supporters that had produced the conditions for a resurgent IRA. Nationalist defiance within the Bogside had led to a recovery of republican sentiment in Londonderry that in turn allowed the IRA and its physical force traditions to gain an acceptance within the nationalist community. The upsurge in nationalist violence also led to an increased paranoia within the unionist majority and a belief that the IRA was again preparing for an armed attack.

The Unionist government and its supporters had become increasingly confused and frightened by the confrontational tactics of the civil-rights protesters, and because of its ideology and politically inept leadership the Unionist party instinctively reverted to the reactionary strategies of their predecessors. In a last ditch effort Terence O‟Neill had attempted to retain what was left of his authority over a disintegrating Unionist party by increasing the already draconian powers available to the RUC but this had not stabilised the situation, only further inflamed it. However while it is accepted that the nationalists were clearly challenging the authority of the state, it was the violent and confrontational approach

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of the RUC towards the protesters in Londonderry that tipped the balance from civil unrest to outright defiance. Even though the RUC was an ill-disciplined and sectarian force it still represented the authority of the Unionist state and had the right to take reasonable action to restore order. Yet in its haste to restore the authority of the Unionist government the RUC and their unionist followers greatly exceeded their powers, and not only used excessive violence, but attacked and injured innocent bystanders. It was as a result of the RUCs increasing use of excessive force that the seeds of the battle of the Bogside were sown.

Even using sustained force the RUC were unable to break down the improvised defences of the Bogside and regain control of the nationalist area, so all that was available was to contain the residents in their ghetto. An unwilling British government now had little option other than to come to the aid of the Unionist government and deploy the army to restore order. However if the Wilson government thought that a minimalist approach would be sufficient they were soon disabused when the very next day they were forced to deploy even more troops into the capital city Belfast. Even if it could be argued that unionist attacks on Catholic homes were simply in response to the actions of nationalist rioters this was soon perceived by Catholics as a pogrom against them. This violence resulted in many deaths and the forced migration of numerous Catholics from the interface areas and into more secure Catholic neighbourhoods and to Eire.

It is clear from the historical evidence that Northern Ireland in the 1960s was not only an overtly sectarian and anti-Catholic state, it was led by a reactionary Unionist government that was still fighting a religious war that had started some three hundred years earlier. Northern

Ireland itself was an anachronism; a statelet that lacked both the capacity to be economically self-sufficient and the moral legitimacy of a truly inclusive polity. It was into this quagmire that the British army was now being deployed in aid of a civil power whose legitimacy was

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not recognised by a large minority within the province. One of the central questions we will consider in later chapters is whether the army went into Northern Ireland as the impartial peacekeepers their political masters had directed them to be, or simply viewed these protests as a rebellion against a legitimate government to be crushed by military force. However the most enduring legacy of 1969 was the identification of the British army as the explicit enemy of the nationalist minority. The hostility that had always existed between Protestants and

Catholics had been transferred to the Protestant-dominated RUC; nevertheless it was because of the analogous actions of the army in Londonderry during August and September of 1969 and later in Belfast that this hostility came to be directed against the British army. More importantly it was the way the army undertook its duty that changed the „troubles‟ from a series of violent demonstrations into an extremely violent insurrection. Whether the army willingly went down this road or was led down it by external factors is the fundamental question that the remainder of this thesis will attempt to answer.

The deployment of the British army onto the streets of the two major cities of Northern

Ireland in mid-August 1969 cannot be examined as an isolated event; it has to be considered as part of a much larger picture. We have already seen the roots of these events in the politically expedient decision by Lloyd George in 1920 to grant the unionists of Northern

Ireland their own statelet even in the knowledge that by doing so he was allowing the creation of an oligarchy that would subjugate the Catholic minority. We have also seen that Lloyd

George‟s expediency was powerfully reinforced by Attlee‟s Ireland Act of 1949 which institutionalised the sectarian policies of the Ulster Unionist government. Closer to our period it was the determined strategy of successive British governments to maintain the distance between it and Northern Ireland that greatly contributed to the developments that inevitably put the soldiers on the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969. The question that we now have to investigate is whether the army that was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969 in an

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attempt to restore order in that dysfunctional province was either the most appropriate body or was adequately prepared for the duty imposed upon it.

The violence that the British army faced when it was first deployed to Londonderry and

Belfast in August 1969 was on one hand completely alien to these troops while on the other hand they had very recently been on active duty in Aden and Cyprus fighting an insurgency against British rule. Although on occasions there had been significant civil unrest in England,

Scotland and Wales these had been generally tackled using non-confrontational policing, even when the army had been called in to assist the local authorities. However the province‟s sectarian ideology inevitably meant that civil unrest degenerated into extreme violence that in turn was confronted by an armed police in a much more belligerent manner than would have been accepted in Britain. The Unionist government had historically employed force to keep the nationalist minority in a state of constant submission using both heavily armed police and a Protestant reserve force. In addition elements of the British army stationed in the province also had a history of containing the nationalist minority. As a result the perception within the nationalist minority was that they were being oppressed not only by the Unionist government but also by the British state. This situation continued throughout the Second World War and into the post-war period due to the almost constant threat, real or imagined, from an IRA that continued in its own ideologically-driven fight for a united Ireland. While the threat may have been largely in the minds of unionists, the IRAs activity was a major contributor to the continuation of civil instability in Northern Ireland. IRA action also reinforced within the

British establishment a continued sense that the Irish would always be disloyal to Britain and that Irish nationalism inevitably threatened British interests.

This perception within the British army was highlighted in 1966 when its hierarchy accepted without question the Unionist government‟s claim that the IRA was preparing to attack both

Northern Ireland and Britain. It is not all that surprising that the British army was prepared to

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accept without question there was a threat from the IRA because it identified the IRA in a similar vein to insurgents in Malayan or EOKA in Cyprus. The army had been waging a series of wars against insurgency forces throughout Britain‟s far flung empire for many decades and had operated mainly as a counter-insurgency force. In addition the bulk of its officers and senior NCOs had been blooded in Malaya, Cyprus and Aden, experience that was to prove very relevant once they were being deployed to Northern Ireland. However while it was often argued that these deployments were simply internal security operations employing minimum force the army largely used classic counter-insurgency tactics. The army did not aid the civil authority and use only minimum force while working within British common law; rather it regularly used military force in an overtly coercive manner as it had done throughout the British imperial era. It was this British army that was deployed to

Northern Ireland in August 1969.

The British government clearly considered that if its army was to be deployed to Northern

Ireland in aid of the civil authority then it could not be expected to operate under the same constraints as it was expected to do in the remainder of the United Kingdom. While the army had well defined legal constraints when called upon to aid the civil authority in Britain, based on Queen‟s regulations and English common law, it was apparently not prepared to be deployed to Northern Ireland under this restrictive legal authority. As we shall see in the next chapter the army and its bureaucratic establishment had for some time been arguing that if its troops were to be deployed to Northern Ireland then they would require more robust legal protection. What the army wanted was a structure that would give its soldiers the legal protection and similar powers to those it had during in its end-of-empire deployments. The army and Ministry of Defence had determined that it was the Northern Ireland Special

Powers Acts they wanted and went about ensuring that it did not lose such a powerful asset in their fight against Irish nationalism.

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Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968- 1970

Chapter 4

The British army and the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts

In August 1969 when the British army was finally deployed onto the streets of

Londonderry and Belfast its task was to aid the Northern Ireland government regain its control of the province from the rampaging Protestant and Catholic mobs. With the paramilitary Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and its reserves unable to contain the situation the Unionist government urgently needed military assistance from the British government. This was a situation which one historian has declared was “a classic example of troops being used to quell public disorder and come to the aid to the civil power.”1 As we have seen the army‟s political masters had also publicly declared that the army‟s primary role was to assist the civil authority and not to replace it, with the

British Home Secretary, James Callaghan, stating that the troops being deployed would act as „impartial and fair policemen‟ who would use minimum force when attempting to restore law and order and would to return to barracks as soon as possible.2 However the army‟s hierarchy appears to have had a different perspective on its proposed duties in Northern Ireland.

The fundamental aim of this chapter is to carefully examine the available evidence to determine how the army understood its role in Northern Ireland; as impartial

1 S Deakin, „Security Policy and the use of the Military: Military Aid to the Civil Power, Northern Ireland 1969‟, Small Wars & Insurgency , 4, No 2, 1993, p 213. 2 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 42-43. 140

peacekeepers or as the agent of the Northern Ireland state in its fight against Irish nationalism. The army fully understood its legal authority in Northern Ireland under the „military aid to the civil authority‟ regulations and the direction that its political masters had determined for it. However while the army conceded that it had a secondary role when aiding the local police forces in Great Britain its hierarchy continued to see the problems of Ireland very differently.3 This chapter will show that the army had determined that the situation in Northern Ireland was so dissimilar to the other parts of the United Kingdom that it fought for the retention of the Northern

Ireland Special Powers Acts even before the sectarian violence had become uncontrollable. To this end I will be attempting to discover whether the army‟s hierarchy and/or the British Labour government had any consistent and agreed policies for the deployment of troops to Northern Ireland and if so what these where.

Further I will be attempting to discover whether the army saw its role in Northern

Ireland in the same light as its political masters.4 For while the British government appeared to have viewed Northern Ireland from a British political perspective, the military concluded that its role was to help the Unionist government regain its legitimate control over Northern Ireland from a perceived nationalist attack. This was a concept of internal security consistent with the role the army had continued to perform in Britain‟s colonies and dependencies, but also in Ireland even after partition.

The army had a well defined set of rules for giving „Military Aid to the Civil

Authority‟ (MACA) within Great Britain that had evolved over many decades and were contained in the „Manual of Military Law‟ and „Queens Regulations‟.5 These

3 British army and Northern Ireland, MoD, DEFE 11 698 (1964-69), Ref E53. 4 Operation Banner, 2006, 4-1. 5 British army and Northern Ireland, DEFE 11 698 (1964-69), Ref VCGS/353.

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laws were not simply for internal military use but also described how the military should operate within British society and were based upon English Common Law.6

As early as November 1968 the army had obtained advice on what its legal position would be if it were to be deployed to Northern Ireland. It was informed that as in

Great Britain it was obliged to assist that civil authority if the need arose, however in

Northern Ireland its role was less constrained. Nevertheless at least some within the

British bureaucracy believed that the army‟s role in Northern Ireland was not as clear cut as some in the military might think, there were serious political issues that also had to be considered. History suggested that when the army gave aid to the civil authority in Northern Ireland it was not merely assisting a civil authority to restore order, it was helping the Unionist government retain its control over the nationalist minority.

Historically the British army‟s role in Ireland has been that of the ultimate provider of

„internal security‟ and not a home garrison occasionally giving aid to the civil power as in Great Britain. For many decades before partition the army in Ireland operated under the auspices of a series of draconian coercive laws that culminated in the

„Restoration of Order in Ireland Act‟ (ROIA) enacted during the Anglo-Irish war of

1919-1922. Therefore the British army in Ireland had become accustomed to working within a coercive legal framework, a state of affairs that continued for that part of the army that was stationed in Northern Ireland after partition. In 1922 the fledgling loyalist state in Northern Ireland enacted its own version of ROIA, the Civil

Authorities (Special Powers) Northern Ireland Acts, 1922-1943.7 This was a series of equally draconian laws that granted extensive powers to the Northern Ireland government and its agents, primarily the RUC but in addition His Majesty‟s forces.

6 ibid, Ref E60. 7 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922, CAIN, 2009.

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While the Unionist government continued to depend on these draconian powers to defend Northern Ireland from a perceived nationalist threat it would seem that the

British army also believed that it needed these powers if it was to be operationally deployed to Ireland.8 The army appears to have considered Ireland, north or south, as

„a place apart‟ from Great Britain and as a result its internal security role there was also quite different. If the army was to be responsible for the „internal security‟ of

Northern Ireland then it would require a more sweeping legal framework than it was willing to accept in Great Britain.

Then again the violence that was then taking place in Northern Ireland was not a state of affairs the army garrison in the United Kingdom was ever likely to confront. In

England, Scotland and Wales, troops had on occasions been deployed to assist the civil authorities, however they had not been required to confront armed rioters since early in the previous century. On the contrary the army‟s operations in Ireland had rarely been so benign.9 In Great Britain the army had largely been able to operate in a secondary role of assisting the civil authority because the British public had generally accepted both the authority of the Crown and the enforcement of this authority by the civil police and not the army.10 On the other hand the population of Ireland have frequently resisted British rule and the imposition of British law, and as a result the enforcement of law and order was in many cases imposed by the civil authority rather than accepted voluntarily. As a result the army‟s primary role in Ireland was to assist the armed police in the coercive enforcement of Northern Ireland law; it was not there primarily to defend the island against external threats as in Great Britain.11

8 Northern Ireland legislation - Special Powers Act, Northern Ireland Office, (1968-1971), CJ 3 76. 9 Note of Home Office meeting, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970), 8 Aug 69. 10 Oliver, 1987, p. 5. 11 Jeffery & Bartlett, 1996, p. 436.

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If in the early 1960s the army was content to have a very limited role in the internal security of Northern Ireland and allow the RUC to take the fight to the IRA, in 1969 the situation had dramatically changed and it was now intent on retaining access to the full provisions of the Special Powers Acts. The very definition of internal security in

Northern Ireland and the role of the army had been transformed into something more akin to its role as an external counter-insurgency force. Its rules for „aiding the civil authority‟ within Great Britain were clearly defined in the Manual of Military Law and Queen‟s Regulations and should have automatically been used when it was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969, however over the preceding years the army hierarchy had determined that if it had to be deployed to Northern Ireland it should have access to a legal framework similar to that it had worked under in Malaya and Cyprus. The army was beginning to travel along a path of its own choosing but very different from that envisaged by its political masters and one which would have immense repercussions.

Military Aid to the Civil Authority in the United Kingdom.

As early as November 1968 the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, became concerned that the army could be asked to render military assistance to the Northern

Ireland government. However Wilson was awakened to the possibility that British forces could be involved in sectarian disturbances in Northern Ireland not as a result of a request from the Unionist government, but rather after the leader of the Northern

Ireland Nationalist party asked why RUC officers were being quartered at a naval

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base in Londonderry.12 Wilson was alarmed that the military‟s cooperation with the

RUC would demonstrate that British forces were involved in the Northern Ireland government‟s conflict with the nationalist minority. His primary concern at that time was that the British government should not seen to be taking sides in the Northern

Ireland disturbances; on the contrary he was determined that Britain would keep its distance.13

Wilson‟s concerns prompted officials within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to clarify what the military‟s position in Northern Ireland would be if and when it was required to assist that civil power.14 In December the MoD began the process of establishing the legal basis for troops deployed there. As part of this process the MoD requested from the Treasury Solicitor his considered legal opinion of the position that British troops would find themselves in if deployed to assist the Northern Ireland government.15 His opinion was that troops could be deployed under British Common

Law. He stated:

Under common law it is the duty of every person to come to the assistance of the civil authorities to maintain law and order if called upon to do so. Military personnel are under no higher or lower obligation than any other citizens in this respect. In a situation of extreme necessity, the civil authorities are entitled to request military assistance, but they should not do so unless the situation is, or is about to become, beyond civil control. The law enables reasonable force to be used according to the circumstances, but not more. … the obligation [to assist the civil powers] derives from common law. … All the above law is basically the same throughout the United Kingdom.16

12 British army and Northern Ireland, MoD, DEFE 11 698 (1964-69), Refs 51/52, 19/20 Nov 1968: Minute Home Office to PM‟s Office, PREM 13 2841 (1968-69), 25 Nov. 68. 13 Northern Ireland Political Situation 1969, Northern Ireland Office, CJ-3-1 (1969), Ref 2a. 14 Military Assistance to the NI Government, DEFE 24 882 (1968-69). Ref O 19/1. 20 Nov. 68. 15 British army and Northern Ireland, MoD, DEFE 11 698 (1964-69), Ref 48/c/39. 16 ibid, Ref E60.

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The official legal opinion obtained by the MoD thus confirmed that if the civil power, in this case the Northern Ireland government, found itself in a position where its own forces were unable to contain or restore order then they could request assistance from the army, and that the army was obliged to render that assistance. The army‟s position in law was unambiguous, because under its „common law‟ obligations it was required not only to come to the aid of the civil power, but to use applicable force to restore order.

The army‟s duty to come to the assistance of the civil authorities with the United

Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, was detailed by the Chief of the Defence Staff in a Minute to the Secretary of State dated 9 December 1968. In this he confirmed that the GOC NI had a duty to come to the aid to the civil authority in Northern Ireland.

Both the Manual of Military Law and Queen‟s Regulations (1961) paragraph 1165 were the army‟s standing instructions and had been in place since the early 1960s.17

This advice was also formalised by the Attorney General who wrote to the Prime

Minister on 13 December 1968 confirming that the GOC NI was bound to assist the civil authority in the enforcement of law and order if requested and that the law applied to Northern Ireland in the same manner as it did in Britain.18 Consistent with this last point, Callaghan had earlier set out that if troops were deployed to aid the civil power, control of the army would remain in British hands. As he told Chichester-

Clark: “Even if the local magistrates in England were to find themselves in a situation

17 Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland, MoD, DEFE 24 882, Minute from CDF to Secretary of State, 12 Dec 1968. 18 Minute from Attorney General to PM, Northern Ireland Office, CJ 3 1 (1969), 13 Dec 1968.

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in which they called in troops, they would quickly find that the central government stepped in to control the situation.”19

In November 1968 the British government overrode the army‟s common law obligation to respond directly to a request for assistance by a legitimate civil authority by directing the GOC NI to firstly obtain permission from his superiors. He was reminded that the Manual of Military Law stated that the local commander should be under the control of Government and that he should consult London before acceding to any request. The GOC NI was also directed: “That [the] use of troops must only be only be considered in a situation when all [Northern Ireland] police reserves including both regular and special reserves have been committed.”20 Therefore before the GOC

NI acceded to the Northern Ireland government‟s request for military aid, that government must use all its police resources and he must gain authorisation from

Whitehall.21 The Wilson government‟s contradictory policy on Northern Ireland meant that the Unionist government was forced to utilise the exclusively Protestant B-

Specials against the nationalist minority before British troops would be deployed to restore order.22 Clearly Westminster was not prepared to apply the same policies when aiding the civil power in Northern Ireland as they would almost certainly have undertaken in Great Britain. On the contrary, Westminster attempted to both continue the British government‟s policy of attempting to distance itself from the „Irish question‟ while simultaneously demanding that the Northern Ireland government implement reforms dictated from Westminster. This approach was not only

19 Northern Ireland Political Situation 1969, Cabinet Office documents on Northern Ireland, Notes of a meeting between Callaghan and NI Government, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970), 8 August 1968. 20 Signal from VCGS to GOC NI, MoD, DEFE 24 882, 24 Nov 1968: H Black, Discussions on possible use of troops in aid of the civil power, PRONI, CAB/4/1458/13, 7 Aug 1969. 21 S Greer, „Military Intervention in Civil Disturbances: The legal Basis Reconsidered‟, Public Law, 573(Winter 1983), p 587. 22 Evans, 1972, pp. 108-109: DEFE 11 698 (1964-69). Ref VCGS/353.

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contradictory; it was inconsistent, and demonstrates Westminster‟s continuing ignorance of Irish politics and society and how differently it perceived Northern

Ireland even though it was a part of the United Kingdom.

The military had an established policy for responding to official requests for aiding the civil power, and in May 1968 the Chief of Staff had written to the Secretary of

State detailing its current policy for giving „Aid to the Civil Power‟ in the United

Kingdom. Plans for using military forces to assist in the maintenance of law and order fell into three main categories: “the protection of specific installations, support for the civil police in the Metropolitan area and the maintenance of essential services in the event of strikes” 23 such as the 1966 British seamen‟s strike.24 Therefore in May 1966 it was not envisaged that British military forces would be required to assist the civil authorities outside London other than in the event of major industrial disputes, and even this could only occur when emergency legislation was evoked. Nevertheless the

MoD began to examine what it described as the “whole problem of assistance to the civil power”.25 As late as September 1968 the Chiefs of Staff confirmed that there was no change in the established policy and that “the only occasions when the Services had been required to cooperate with the civil authorities in connection with civil disturbances [was] when the demonstrations involved a threat of damage or trespass to Service property”, as had occurred during the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

(CND) demonstrations earlier in the decade.26

23 Military aid to the civil power in Northern Ireland, MoD, DEFE 24 882 (1968-69), Ref. COS 1373/23/5/68. 24 K Thorpe, „The Juggernaut Method: The State of Emergency and the Wilson Government's Response to the Seamen's Strike‟. Twentieth Century British History, 12, No 4, 2001, pp. 461-485. 25 DEFE-24-882 (1968-69). 26 ibid, Minute to Secretary of State, Re Demonstrations, 18 Sept 1968.

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It was during the Grosvenor Square demonstration in October 1968 that the government considered that troops might be needed to assist the police in controlling civil disorder in the metropolitan area. On this occasion the Metropolitan Police and the Home office determined that troops would not be required, however the army was not so relaxed and began drawing up its own plan of action in case it was required.

The Chief of Staff, in a Minute to the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, outlined the situation as he saw it, and voiced his disagreement with the Home Office on how troops should be utilised. In a sign of the army‟s desire for a more active role in civil disturbances he argued that troops should be used early in a disturbance and, not as the Home Office believed, only used when the situation was completely out of hand. The Chief of Staff pursued this line of argument even though he accepted that his troops were not trained in this type of duty and would require guidance from the police.27 On 14 October 1968 Healey wrote to James Callaghan and stated that he did not believe that troops should be used in any form of riot control, basically because they were not trained for riot control in Britain. 28 On the other hand the army hierarchy appeared to believe that it had a superior understanding of how to control civil disturbances than either the Metropolitan Police or the Home Office, presumably on the basis of its internal-security experiences throughout the Empire, a role that it had also performed in Ireland.

The British government‟s continued wish to avoid any involvement with the Irish question would allow the violence to escalate and ultimately make the situation even worse for the British government and its army.29 Eventually the violence of July and

August 1969 overwhelmed the local police and forced the beleaguered Unionist

27 ibid, Minute from COS to Secretary of State, Re Demonstrations, 7 Oct. 1968. 28 ibid, Letter from Secretary of State for Defence to Home Secretary, 14 Oct.1968. 29 Callaghan, 1973, p. 67.

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government to formally request military assistance from the British government. On

14 August 1969 British troops already stationed in Northern Ireland were deployed to

Londonderry to relieve the embattled police on the streets of that divided city. The following day troops were also deployed to Belfast, not merely to assist the RUC in restoring order, but to replace them altogether in many nationalist areas. These deployments initiated what was to become the British army‟s longest continuous deployment, Operation Banner, an operation that did not end until 2007.30 The army‟s deployment was formalised by the British Home Secretary, James Callaghan, who in a public statement issued in London on 15 August declared that he had authorised the use of troops to restore law and order in ways that would [ensure] no further loss of life.31 The army was officially deployed to Northern Ireland in „aid of the civil authority‟ and in line with its standing instructions for aiding the civil authority in the

United Kingdom. However this political decision was to challenge the very role of the military in Northern Ireland as well as force the government of Harold Wilson - very much against its will - to again confront the Irish question.

We have seen that on 13 December 1968 the Attorney-General wrote to the Prime

Minister on the topic of military assistance to the civil power in Northern Ireland. On the same day he also wrote to the same effect directly to Denis Healey, Secretary of

State for Defence. He confirmed that it was the duty of soldiers to come to the aid of the civil authorities in the suppression of a riot or unlawful assembly. However the

Attorney-General also pointed out the complex constitutional arrangements that existed between Westminster and Stormont and the unusual position of the British army operating in aid of the civil power in Northern Ireland. Constitutionally the

British army could only be directed by the United Kingdom government, being

30 Operation Banner, 2006. 31 Northern Ireland Statements, Cabinet Office, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970), Ref 10, 14/15 Aug 69.

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responsible to the Secretary of State for Defence, and through him to Westminster. On the other hand law and order in Northern Ireland was the indirect responsibility of the

British Home Secretary. Cutting across both of these considerations was the fact that it was the Northern Ireland government that had the legal authority to control law and order in the province.32 The Attorney-General also advised the Secretary of State for

Defence that the United Kingdom government still had the supreme authority over

Northern Ireland, contained in Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The

Attorney-General‟s advice to Healey, and through him to the cabinet, was that although the army had a clear-cut duty to aid the government of Northern Ireland if requested; the ambiguous relationship between Westminster and Stormont made the army‟s role in Ulster far from straightforward.33 While the military was obliged to take such action as it deemed necessary, the political imbroglio meant that its chain of command and the legal status of troops operating in Northern Ireland were very uncertain.

The unease that some within the civil service felt about troops being used in Northern

Ireland is outlined in a draft minute prepared by the Home Office and dated 4

December 1968 - nine days before the Attorney-General‟s advice. This Minute was prepared in response to Prime Minister Harold Wilson‟s earlier request for clarification of the status of the military in Northern Ireland. Under the title

„Arrangements in Northern Ireland‟ the author, who was probably a reasonably senior officer within the Home Office, outlines the arrangements then in place for the army in Northern Ireland. He stated that if bases were attacked by the IRA the military was only responsible for the security of its own installations and the RUC was expected to handle everything outside the bases; this was regarded as a law and order problem and

32 ibid, Attorney General to S of State Defence, 13 Dec. 1968. 33 ibid.

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the responsibility of the local authorities. The author pointed out that there was no connection between the present arrangements and the obligation for the military to give aid to the civil authority. Under the heading of „political considerations‟ he argued perceptively that if the military did act to support the civil power in Northern

Ireland this would be viewed as the military acting “as agents of a repressive civil authority over whose activities the United Kingdom government had no control”.34

The author went on to state that if there was a situation that did require the assistance of the military to restore law and order “this might have been brought about by some provocative act on the part of the [Ulster] authorities. … Indeed the … very use of the military to maintain law and order … could be represented as a symbol of repression at all times and in all places.”35

This Home Office official appears to have been one of the few British officials to have any real understanding of the complex political situation that was Northern

Ireland, or the army‟s troubled history in Ireland. But however well grounded his analysis of the situation might have been, his advice does not appear to have influenced any of the subsequent deliberations within the Ministry of Defence because there is no further reference to any of the issues he had so clearly enunciated.

Instead, the MoD appears to have taken its own counsel on the situation on Northern

Ireland. In a response to this Minute two days later, the MoD rejected the Home

Office‟s core assertions: it stated “In [an attempt] to make the [Home Office] Note more accurate where it concerns our side of the house [we suggest] removing

34 ibid, Draft Home Office Minute, 4 Dec 1968. 35 ibid.

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unsuitable references to „armed force suppressing a riot‟ and any suchlike phrases that would give a misleading mailed fist impression of the role of the military.”36

Whatever the MoD‟s intentions in 1968, by the middle of 1970 most members of

Northern Ireland‟s Roman Catholic community would come to regard a „mailed fist impression‟ of the army‟s role as essentially accurate. By then, however, the army was not relying on the common law provisions of aid to the civil power, but on the far more coercive powers available to it under the Unionist regime‟s Special Powers.

Before examining those powers and the army‟s attitude to them, however, it is necessary to consider the struggle between the British and Northern Ireland governments over the terms of the army‟s deployment to Northern Ireland.

Westminster and Stormont; a difference of perspective.

As we have seen, until August 1969 the British government was still attempting to persuade Stormont to implement social and political reforms aimed at alleviating the more obvious discriminatory practices of the Unionist state. Britain had adopted this position because the government hoped that if it followed this path it could avoid any direct involvement in the province. Britain simply accepted that the Unionist government was democratically elected, and even though it might not have had the support of the Northern Ireland minority and did not conform to British liberal- democratic traditions it was still the legal government with majority support and

Westminster had a constitutional obligation to support it.37 As a result the British government continued to use established governmental channels, leaving

36 Ibid, MoD Minute. Ref. 48/c/39. 37 Thornton, 2007, pp. 73-107.

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responsibility for Northern Ireland affairs with the Home Office.38 These channels continued to be used until the violence began to escalate in July and August 1969 when Callaghan was forced to meet directly with the Northern Ireland government of

Prime Minister Chichester-Clark. However it was only when the RUC began to lose control of large parts of the province that the Northern Ireland government reluctantly conceded that it needed British military assistance to regain control.

As we have seen previously, even at this late stage Callaghan considered that the most appropriate assistance for Northern Ireland was British police reinforcements, however concerted opposition from within Britain stymied this plan and there remained only one alternative, the army.39 However it was the form of military assistance that was the stumbling point, because Stormont expected that as in the past the army would be used as part of its security forces to restore order.40 Callaghan, on the other hand, did not support the Unionist government‟s position that it alone was responsible for all aspects of the province‟s internal security. During Callaghan‟s earlier discussion with Terence O‟Neill it was accepted that if the British army had to be deployed then Westminster would be obliged to take control of law and order.

Conversely Chichester-Clark reported that he was first informed of what he described as the „penal consequences‟ of a troop deployment by the Home Office official

(North) after a Northern Ireland Cabinet meeting on 3 August 1969.41 Callaghan states that he informed him during a Home Office meeting on 5 August 1969. At this meeting Harold Black, the Secretary to the Northern Ireland Cabinet was told that if the army was required for „law and order‟ duties in Northern Ireland this would imply

38 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 16-21. 39 ibid, p 19. 40 British army and Northern Ireland, Draft Home Office Minute, DEFE 11 698 (1964-69), MoD, 4 Dec 1968. 41 H Black, Discussions on possible use of troops in aid of the civil power, PRONI, CAB/4/1458/13, 7 Aug 1969.

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that Stormont‟s status as the civil power had failed and that Westminster would be forced to take control of „law and order‟ in the province.42 Westminster and Stormont clearly had a crucially different perception of the role that British troops would perform in Northern Ireland. While the Chichester-Clark government believed that the

British army would act as it had done in 1935 and assist the RUC in containing nationalist dissenters, Callaghan considered that if troops were needed then this would indicate that the Northern Ireland government had lost its legitimacy and that

Westminster had to step into the void.

On 8 August 1969 there was a crucial meeting between the British and Northern

Ireland governments to discuss the expected use of British troops in Northern Ireland.

It was at this meeting that the British Home Secretary James Callaghan formalised

Westminster‟s constitutional and political position if the Northern Ireland government made a formal request for troops to assist in restoring order to the streets of

Londonderry and Belfast.43 Harold Black clearly enunciated the Northern Ireland government‟s erroneous belief when he stated during the meeting that he had assumed that the army would play a similar role to the role British troops played in 1935 when they patrolled the streets and searched houses.44 Callaghan was at pains to disabuse him and confirmed that the British Cabinet‟s position was that troops were not there to be used by the Northern Ireland government as and when they determined. He stated that “the Northern Ireland Government seemed to contemplate the use of troops in a rather matter-of-fact way, with troops being called in “from time to time” to deal

42 Callaghan, 1973, pp 24-25. 43 Note of meeting at Home Office between Home Sect. and NI PM, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970), 11 Aug 69. 44 ibid.

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with „day to day‟ riots.” 45 On the other hand Westminster‟s view was that British troops would only be used “as a last resort” and not as Stormont wished.

Callaghan believed that the circumstances of 1935 and 1969 were completely different politically and socially. Whereas in 1935 the Unionist government was clearly the civil power and the nationalists the obvious minority, in 1969 the Unionists were not the single unified voice of the Protestant majority and the nationalists had not only greater numbers they also had much higher aspirations.46 Callaghan went on to tell Chichester-Clark, and his Minister of Home Affairs, Robert Porter, that it was not the usual practice within Great Britain to use troops for the normal maintenance of law and order. “In practice troops had never been used in Great Britain in recent times

[and] he went on to say that on the occasions when troops were used in overseas dependent territories [for internal security] they were deployed under the Police

(Overseas Services) Act whereas the troops deployed in Northern Ireland were there as part of the defence of the United Kingdom and not primarily to be used to assist the

Northern Ireland government in internal security.”47 This was completely in contrast to Chichester-Clark‟s belief that British troops in Northern Ireland were there to assist

Stormont restore the „internal security‟ of the province, as they had done in the past.

Callaghan‟s belief was that if troops were to be deployed to Northern Ireland then it would not be for a quick operation as the Unionist government expected. On the contrary it would be for an extended deployment because the RUC was unable to cope with the situation.48 Callaghan‟s position, and by extension that of the British

45 ibid. 46 Callaghan, 1973, p. 21. 47 CAB 164 577 (1969-1970). 48 ibid.

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cabinet,49 was that the Unionist government could not expect to have access to British troops as and when they saw fit. Troops would only be made available if it was clear that the Northern Ireland government was unable to ordinarily maintain law and order, a state of affairs that would also constitute a situation that was outside the

„common law‟ obligation of the army to assist the civil authority. Such a state of affairs would also signal to the British government that the Northern Ireland government had lost control of the province, which in turn would substantially change the established constitutional and political position of Northern Ireland within the

United Kingdom.

The meeting of 8 August was the culmination of a series of highly-charged phone calls between Callaghan and Chichester-Clark on 5 and 6 August 1969 and a formal letter from Chichester-Clark to Callaghan on 6 August. Chichester-Clark was surprised and angry when Callaghan pointed out that if British troops were to be used in Northern Ireland this would necessarily have constitutional consequences.50

During earlier discussions between Callaghan and O‟Neill it was understood that if

British troops were deployed on an extended scale this “would lead almost inevitably to a de facto takeover” by the British government.51 However Chichester-Clark seemed unaware of this agreement. Nevertheless it was this very confrontational letter from Chichester-Clark to Callaghan on 6 August that brought the situation to a head.52 Chichester-Clark refers to the British army as also Northern Ireland‟s army and while going some way to acknowledging that the British government was the army‟s controlling agency, he appears to have had considerable difficulty accepting that in Northern Ireland the army could not be directed by his government. However

49 Ibid, Minute from PMs Office confirming that the PM approved of Callaghan‟s tactics, 8 Aug. 1969. 50 ibid, Home Office Minute, 6 August 1969. 51 Callaghan, 1973, p. 25. 52 Letter from Chichester-Clark to Callaghan, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970), 6 August 1969.

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Chichester-Clark‟s arguments were also contradictory when he stated that the recent disturbances were not political but the work of hooligans, while also claiming that the disorders were the work of those who wished to overthrow the Northern Ireland government. The sting in the tail of Chichester-Clark‟s letter was his threat that

Ulster loyalists would not accept a British government takeover of Stormont.

Callaghan concluded from Chichester-Clark‟s letter: “that the suspension of

Stormont might lead to the same sort of rebellion that the British government had to deal with in 1919-1921, only this time it would be the Ulster Volunteer Force who would be doing the shooting rather than the IRA.”53

The meeting between Callaghan and the leaders of the Stormont government exposed the political and social fracture that had grown between Great Britain and

Northern Ireland and signalled the direction that future interaction between these governments would follow. Callaghan continued to view the Northern Ireland crisis as a political problem while the Unionists continued to see the unrest only from an

„internal security‟ perspective.54 Callaghan‟s approach was based upon his long held

British liberal-democratic beliefs and it was this philosophy that was also reflected in

Westminster‟s „official‟ policy towards this dysfunctional and distant part of the

United Kingdom. On the other hand the Unionist government remained politically and socially isolated from the remainder of the United Kingdom and continued to fight the same sectarian, ideological battles that it had been fighting since 1920.

While Northern Ireland had remained stuck in its past, Great Britain had moved on politically and socially. Unfortunately, during the preceding five decades

Westminster had allowed Stormont to acquire a considerable arsenal of legal powers

53 Callaghan, 1973, p. 27. 54 ibid, p. 28.

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to defend its entrenched political position; powers that the unionists believed were essential for the defence of their state against what they perceived was the never- ending threat from Irish nationalism.55 It was mainly the Northern Ireland Special

Powers Acts that the unionists had used as the cornerstone of the defence of

Northern Ireland. However it appears that the British army also viewed the coercive powers allocated to them in this suite of Acts as an essential legal basis for any future deployment to Northern Ireland.

The Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts.

The Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts (SPA) or as they are correctly called „The

Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922-1943‟ were a series of laws passed by the Northern Ireland parliament that entitled the Northern Ireland

Minister of Home Affairs, or his delegates, to search any person, car or building and arrest any person he or his delegates determined were or could be a threat to the

Northern Ireland state. In practice this suite of laws was so inclusive that it essentially empowered the delegated authorities to „issue all orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace‟.56 These Acts were in fact an overtly coercive set of laws intended to give the authorities all the powers they judged necessary to ensure the continuation of the Unionist state in Northern Ireland. The Special Powers

Acts had been first enacted in 1922 by the fledgling Unionist government who used

55 Donohue, 2001, pp. 16-18. 56 CAIN, Special Powers acts, 2009.

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the British „Restoration of Order in Ireland Act‟ (ROIA) of 1920 as the legal basis for its defence against the threat from Irish nationalism.57

Although the ROIA powers had been granted to the British military authorities in

Ireland before partition, similar powers were now given to the Northern Ireland

Minister of Home Affairs acting in the name of the Northern Ireland government. As

Dawson Bates, the Minister of Home Affairs, stated in a letter to the Mayor of

Belfast in 1921 “the [Special Powers Acts] proposes to confer certain additional powers with the object of increasing the penalty for certain offences, and increasing the power of certain courts to inflict sentences; … it is proposed to transfer to the

Civil Authorities (the government of the day) the various powers which were vested

… in the Military Authorities under the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act.”58 The

Act‟s 35 regulations gave the Minister of Home Affairs and the security forces acting under his authority a wide range of search, arrest and confiscation powers, however the minister could also authorise a „curfew‟ in a prescribed area and „intern without trial‟ a specified list of persons deemed to threaten the Northern Ireland state. The Special Powers Acts, while originally intended to be renewed annually, were made permanent by the Unionist government in 1933 specifically to ensure that the opponents of Unionist rule would know that their actions would be forcefully opposed.59

The principal reason given by the newly formed Unionist government for enacting such draconian legal measures in 1922 was the threat to its existence from both the

IRA and the Irish Free State. Within Northern Ireland there had also been resistance from nationalist-dominated councils who swore allegiance to the Free State and it

57 Donohue, 2001, pp. 16-18. 58 ibid, p. 18. 59 ibid, pp. 31-34.

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was because of this internal and external opposition that the Northern Ireland government first used emergency legislation to consolidate its power. The 1921

Local Government (Emergency Powers) Act enacted by the Northern Ireland government was used to transfer control of any recalcitrant local council to the

Ministry of Home Affairs.60 Not only did this Act enable the Unionist government to override these democratically elected councils, it also signalled the beginning of

Unionist domination of Northern Ireland politics based on the overt gerrymandering of local government and the disenfranchising of the Catholic community.

The Unionist government was also determined to have control of its own internal security, and absorbed the local members of the paramilitary Royal Irish

Constabulary, renamed the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Stormont also established reserve forces of which the B-Specials remained in being until 1969, and which despite British government efforts was exclusively Protestant almost from its foundation.61 However it was in response to the extensive communal disturbances in

Belfast between December 1921 and May 1922 when over two hundred people were killed and many more injured that the Northern Ireland government enacted the

Special Powers Acts (SPA). As Laura Donohue states “This legislation, drawn from statutes previously employed by the British government, quickly became the cornerstone of Unionist security policy.”62 What had been a series of regulations exclusively used by the British military to fight against an IRA insurgency in Ireland was now granted to the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs and his agents.

The Special Powers Acts not only incorporated the powers of arrest and search, it also included the creation of special courts that could impose a range of penalties

60 ibid, pp. 8-9. 61 ibid, p. 12. 62 ibid, p. 16.

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including flogging and the death penalty. The all-encompassing nature of the Special

Powers is demonstrated by what the authors of the Acts saw as the fundamental reason for the legislation. As they stated it was designed to: “empower the government to take [whatever] steps for preserving the peace and maintaining order in Northern Ireland.” 63 Also what has been described by Donohue as a catch-all phrase taken from the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act states: “If any person does any act of such nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern Ireland … he shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against the regulations.”64 This confirms that the Unionist government was not just intent on giving its police the powers to maintain law and order but was determined to give the state the most all-encompassing legal authority it needed to maintain its control over Northern Ireland.

Furthermore the SPA included specific provisions to restrict any inquiry into the killing of civilians by the security forces and to give indemnification to the police or military forces involved in these killings. Section 10 of the 1922 SPA enabled the

Minister of Home Affairs to control or prohibit inquests into any deaths. He could if he wished -without reference to any legal statute and without regard to public opinion - prohibit the holding of an inquest if he believed that the coroner was not favourably disposed to the government.65 Such powers were deemed necessary because, as the local Unionist MP Richard Best stated at the time: “We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there are some areas where the coroners are not in sympathy to us … and where the Minister of Home Affairs wishes … to be able to prohibit

63 Quoted in Donohue, 2001, pp. 21-23: CAIN, Special Powers Acts, 2009. 64 ibid. 65 CAIN, Special Powers Acts, 2009.

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inquests to be held.”66 The Unionist government‟s intent in this issue was summed up by another Unionist MP, who wrote to Best: “The Prime Minister [of NI] is particularly anxious to secure that any member of the police or military forces, who in what he believes to be the execution of his duty, either wounds or kills an individual, should be indemnified so as to render him immune from any form of legal action.”67 The culmination of the Special Powers Acts was that they enabled the Northern Ireland government or its agents to take such action as they saw fit to preserve the Unionist state in Northern Ireland free of judicial oversight and immune from the possibility of prosecution.

The Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts, while initially enacted as a short-term measure to control a dissident nationalist minority, continued to be used by the

Northern Ireland government for the same purpose for the next five decades.

However it was not only the Unionist government that viewed these laws as the pinnacle of internal security legislation; this opinion was also held by the British army that was deployed to aid it as the „civil authority‟ in Northern Ireland.

The Ministry of Defence; the Home Office, and the Special Powers Acts.

As stated earlier the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had in December 1968 begun a process of establishing the legal position of British troops if and when they were deployed to Northern Ireland to „aid the civil authority‟. However during this process the MoD also asked for clarification as to what legal authority the Northern Ireland

66 Donohue, 2001, pp. 30-31. 67 ibid, p. 30.

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Special Powers Acts would give British troops deployed to the province. The

Treasury Solicitor gave the following opinion:

[This law] is applicable only in Northern Ireland [and] gives additional powers of arrest and search to troops when acting in aid of the civil authorities and if specifically authorised by the GOC. The powers allow a member of HM forces when authorised to enter a house or building without a warrant; stop any vehicle on the public road and search it, and if necessary seize it; stop a person suspected of carrying firearms or documents and search him; stop a person and make him show that his presence in Northern Ireland is not to the detriment of peace and preservation of order in Northern Ireland; stop a person and order him to produce any information, article, or document in his possession or control.68

The Treasury Solicitor‟s advice was based upon his reading of the Special Powers

Acts 1922, where Section 7 gives British troops the same powers as the local security forces. It states: “Any person authorised by the civil authority, or any police constable, or any member of His Majesty‟s forces on duty may … affect an arrest. …

Members of His Majesty‟s forces [are authorised] to search any house, car or building.”69 However in Great Britain members of the armed forces did not have automatic access to powers equivalent to the SPA, even the powers included in

British emergency legislation and those covered by Section 2 of the Criminal Law

Act 1967 were extremely limited by comparison. In fact the legal opinion in

Whitehall was that there were no powers equivalent to the SPA in Britain.70

Emergency legislation in Britain was only designed to be used during severe industrial disputes when the supply of essential services could be disrupted, however an emergency had to be proclaimed on an individual basis before these powers could

68 DEFE 24 882 (1968-69), Ref O 19/1, 20 Nov. 68. 69 CAIN, Special Powers Acts, 2009. 70 Northern Ireland Political Situation 1969, Northern Ireland Office, Internal Home Office Minute from Legal Advisors Branch, CJ 3 1 (1969), 12 Dec 1969.

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be used.71 The 1967 Criminal Law Act simply conferred on all citizens the right to arrest anyone considered to have committed an arrestable offence, although in practice it was only used by the military to assist the police in apprehending escaped criminals. Yet army policy directed service personnel not to arrest any civilian but to ensure that they had police present to make the actual arrest.72

Nevertheless, as can be seen from the Treasury Solicitor‟s advice, the Northern

Ireland Special Powers Acts delegated to any member of His Majesty‟s Forces on duty the same powers available to the RUC. These were the powers that were vested in the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs as the designated „civil authority‟.

The Treasury Solicitor also makes it clear that as early as December 1968 the

Ministry of Defence and the army hierarchy were not only aware of the Special

Powers Acts (SPA) but more importantly the MoD were fully aware of the additional powers that the SPA conferred on British troops operating in an internal security role in Northern Ireland as compared to the common law provisions of „aid to the civil power‟. Naturally the MoD wanted to give their troops the best legal protection available to them, however by going along this path they were clearly signalling that they believed that Northern Ireland was very different to the remainder of the United

Kingdom and that troops deployed there should not be required to operate within the same legal constraints.

However the Home Office had a somewhat different perspective on the Special

Powers Acts. As the British ministry with constitutional responsibilities for law and order in Northern Ireland, it was obliged to deal with the problem that the Special

71 Northern Ireland political situation - Manual of Military law, Pt 11, CJ 3 12 (1969), S 8-10, 1951: CJ 3 1 (1969), 12 Dec. 1969. 72 Military aid to the civil power in Northern Ireland, MoD, DEFE 24 882 (1968-69), Ref. DS 15, 24 July 68.

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Powers Acts were at odds with Britain‟s obligations under the Council of Europe

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, and other international Human

Rights Agreements. Here the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) had to defend the United Kingdom against accusations that the SPA offended against

Britain‟s obligations to these conventions. It was pressure from the FCO that forced the Home Office into action, resulting in the British government having to defend the

Northern Ireland government‟s insistence on retaining its Special Powers Acts to combat terrorism. In 1967 the Home Office requested the Northern Ireland Ministry of Home Affairs to produce a report on the Acts and details of the powers of arrest and detention contained within it.73 Unsurprisingly, the main thrust of the Northern

Ireland report was an attempt to establish that the Special Powers Acts were necessary to defend the Unionist state from internal threats and that they were only used against

IRA terrorists. The report did however set out in great detail the draconian provisions of the SPA including the powers of arrest, detention, trial, inquests and the powers given to the police (RUC) and members of His Majesty‟s forces. The Home Office used this report to analyse the SPA for non-compliance with Britain‟s international obligations and determined that nineteen out of the thirty-five regulations contained in the SPA offended against the European covenant. These included the powers of arrest and detention, access to land and buildings, internment and curfew.74 The Home

Office was not so much concerned with the SPA‟s draconian powers and the effect that these had on the nationalist minority rather it was attempting to protect British interests. Nonetheless the Home Office began a process of attempting to persuade the

Northern Ireland government to repeal the Acts or at least revoke their more contentious parts.

73 ibid, Report on SPA from NI Ministry of Home Affairs to Home Office, 1967. 74 ibid, Minute from Foreign Office to Home Office, 28 November 1968.

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As late as October 1969 the Home Office was still attempting to persuade the

Northern Ireland government to dismantle at least some of the more offensive components of the Special Powers Acts. However the briefing paper they produced was not an independent British assessment but a recapitulation of the argument put by the Northern Ireland Ministry of Home Affairs when it had earlier attempted to justify the on-going use of the SPA due to the continued IRA threat.75 Yet while preparing its briefing paper the Home Office involved representatives from the Ministry of

Defence and it was most likely it was at the MoD‟s insistence that details on those powers conferred on the military were included. The paper concluded that even though there had been a possibility of revoking most of the offensive provisions of the

Special Powers this had not happened because of the recent “terrorist” activity and because “they [the powers] were necessitated by a public emergency threatening the life of the state”.76 Callaghan continued his ongoing but futile attempt to have the

Northern Ireland government repeal major components of the SPA and had discussions with the Northern Ireland government in October, November and

December 1969. However Callaghan was thwarted by Chichester-Clark‟s continuing strategy of prevarication, promising action but only when the time was right.77

Part of Chichester-Clark‟s strategy included ensuring that the Northern Ireland government‟s Security Committee undertake its own review of the Special Powers

Acts but chaired by the Home Office Police Advisor John McKay. According to the official Home Office records this review was undertaken to consider what powers contained within the SPA were required for national security, and it was convened to

75 ibid, Home Office Briefing paper on the Special Powers Acts (SPA), 3 Oct. 1969. 76 ibid. 77 ibid, Official Home Office records of meetings between Callaghan and Chichester-Clark, 10 Oct & 19 Nov 1969: Internal Home Office Minute, 6 Jan. 1969.

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advise to the GOC NI on what provisions if any could be revoked.78 In his report to

General Freeland, McKay stated that only sections of the SPA were reviewed because these were the only ones relevant to the present circumstances. Section 2;

The General Provisions of the Act covering the wide range of activities that were covered by the Act, Section 6; Crimes that incurred the death penalty, and Section 7;

The section that authorised both the RUC and the army to arrest anyone authorised by the civil authority. The Committee concluded, “It was felt that, from a national security point of view, there was [not] any need to suggest alterations to the Act itself.”79 This report proved to be the final act in the Home Office‟s attempt to have the Special Powers Acts repealed or at least have its more contentious provisions revoked, because by that time the violence within the province was escalating out of control and there was a perceived threat from a resurgent IRA within the security forces. The security forces could now argue that this was not the time to weaken their powers to fight the IRA because its special powers were now even more essential. However the more important question was why the major civil unrest was allowed to escalate to such a level that the situation was now being viewed as a breakdown of „internal security‟ and where normal policing methods had to be replaced with counter-insurgency tactics with the support of both governments.

Military Aid to the Civil Authority or Internal Security?

It is important to be able to gain an understanding of how the military differentiate between „aid to the civil authority‟ and „internal security‟ because how those terms

78 ibid, Home Office record of meeting between Callaghan and Chichester-Clark, 10 Oct 1969 79 ibid, Report of deliberations into the SPA by a committee chaired by J. McKay, Home Office Police Advisor, 13 Oct. 1969.

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are interpreted determines how the military operates in any given context. Within the

United Kingdom the military is obliged to give aid to the civil authority in the case of severe crisis and when the civil authority, normally the police, is unable to control events. On these occasions in Great Britain the military normally takes a secondary and supporting role and while it is officially independent it works in conjunction with the police. However in an internal security role where there is armed resistance the army operates in a „military mode‟ and is in full control of all operations. In

Great Britain this is the exception rather than the rule and as Callaghan stated to

Chichester-Clark this had not been the accepted role for the military within England,

Scotland or Wales for many years.80

The Manual of Military Law is the military‟s legal bible and sets out how and when troops can be deployed to aid the civil power. It described three criteria that are in addition to its duties during national emergencies when the military can supply aid to the civil power. The first is an “Unlawful Assembly” when three or more persons are intent on committing a crime by use of force: the second is a “Riot” described as a

„tumultuous disturbance‟ by a mob; while the third is an „Insurrection‟ which differs from a riot in that the intention of an armed mob is to threaten the state.81 On all occasions when troops are used in „aid of the power‟ their use is based upon the military‟s „common law‟ duty to come to the aid of a civil power when that power requires assistance to enforce law and order. However the military use these different criteria to determine the level of force they can use in each occasion. If troops are used to assist the civil power during an unlawful assembly or riot then the military are constrained in the amount of force they can use, neither to little nor too much. On

80 Note of a meeting between Callaghan and NI government, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970). 81 Manual of Military Law: Employment of Troops in the Aid of the Civil Power, Part 11, Section V, War Office, HMSO (1955), London.

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the other hand if it is apparent that an armed insurrection is taking place then troops can use lethal force. The Manual of Military Law states: “… the use of arms may be resorted to as soon as the intention of the insurgents to carry their purpose by force of arms is shown…”82

Primarily, „military aid to the civil authority‟ in Great Britain is a policing action and is seen in the context of restoring law and order in an unusual emergency and then handing back authority to the police as quickly as possible. Whereas in Northern

Ireland the concept of „internal security‟ is perceived not so much as restoring the civil authority of the state but as maintaining the power of the Unionist state to contain the nationalist minority. The RUC had always operated from the perspective that their primary role was to defend the Unionist state against its nationalist enemies. In this context the army‟s traditional role in Northern Ireland has been to assist the RUC against a perceived threat from the IRA, however the extent of this role was dependent upon the level of threat determined by the Unionist government.

In some circumstances the army limited its actions to defending its own bases, while on other occasions it has been prepared to join the RUC in directly confronting elements of the nationalist community.

In 1966 the army‟s internal security role in Northern Ireland was unambiguous, its obligations were limited to the defence of military bases from IRA attack. The military thus deemed that the RUC had responsibility for any IRA activity outside its bases, this was a law and order problem. This is confirmed in the Chief of Staff‟s directive of 30 March 1966 in which he directed the senior army officer in Northern

Ireland to take responsibility for internal security matters only when military bases

82 ibid, Pt 22.

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were under threat from the IRA.83 At that time IRA activity was minimal and it was not seen as a threat to the internal security of Northern Ireland.84 In fact the Home

Office was of the opinion that in these situations “it was the military‟s practice to call upon the aid of the police rather than the other way round.”85 In December 1968 the Director of Military Operations (DMO) visited the Northern Ireland

Headquarters to gain a firsthand account of the situation, during which he was briefed by Lt General Sir Ian Harris, GOC NI and Antony Peacock, the Inspector

General of the RUC. On his return he reported to the Chief of the General Staff that the situation was indeed volatile and that troops may be needed for a normal

„internal security‟ role as in England, Scotland and Wales. However he made it clear that the GOC NI was well aware of the military‟s responsibilities with regard to aiding the civil power and the additional powers granted to the military under the

Special Powers Acts. Under the title of „Legal Aspects‟ the Director of Military

Operations set down the legal position as the GOC NI and Headquarters NI understood it:

Headquarters NI confirmed that their interpretation of the law relating to the use of troops in aid to the civil power in Northern Ireland is the same as ours in London, i.e. as was set out in the note from CDS to Secretary of State. With regard to the special powers which the GOC NI may authorise for troops as a result of the regulations made under the authority of the Civil Authorities (Northern Ireland) Special Powers Acts 1922-1945. ... At present time these Regulations are, I understand, in force but their primary purpose is of course related to anti-IRA operations. The GOC made it quite clear that he would not exercise his authority with regard to them in connection with aid to the civil power in the maintenance of law and order unless troops indeed had been called out and were engaged in internal security operations.86

83 The British army and Northern Ireland, MoD, DEFE 11 698 (1964-69), Ref. COS 35/66. 25 March 66. 84 ibid, Ref COS 1378/25/3/66, 25 March 66. 85 ibid, Home Office Note, 4 Dec 1968. 86 British army and Northern Ireland, MoD, Note by DMO to CGS, DEFE 11 698 (1964-69), 16 Dec 1968.

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What is important to note here is that the then GOC NI and the army hierarchy differentiated between their „internal security‟ role in aiding the civil power, and in anti-IRA operations. When aiding the civil power the military in Northern Ireland understood and accepted that the legal basis of this „internal security‟ role was limited to the rules governing „aid to the civil authority‟. Conversely while undertaking anti-

IRA operations the military would be able to operate under a different level of

„internal security‟ and could employ the full weight of the Special Powers legislation.

However as the violence escalated throughout 1969 the MoD began to reassess the internal security role of the army in Northern Ireland and quickly came to the conclusion that being restricted to securing military bases was too limited. It therefore recommended that the GOC NI should now be responsible for „aid to the civil power‟ and „internal security‟ operations in Northern Ireland…”87 This increased emphasis on internal security was confirmed on 11 February 1969 when the MoD announced that the GOC NI was now the operational commander for all military forces in Northern Ireland and responsible for all aspects of „internal security‟.88 Within a few short months the internal security role of the military in

Northern Ireland had hardened from a very limited role in defending its own bases to the overall internal security of the province. At the start of 1969, some eight months before troops were deployed to „aid the civil authority‟ the MoD and the army were clearly differentiating between how it was prepared to operate in Great Britain and how it believed its role might develop in Northern Ireland. This was also occurring during a period when Callaghan and the British government were determined to

87 Military aid to the civil power in Northern Ireland, MoD, DEFE 24 882 (1968-69). 88 Military aid to the civil power in Northern Ireland, MoD, Ref A/79/HD/2454/MO3, DEFE 24 882 (1968-69), 11 Feb 69.

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ensure that the British army did not have a role in controlling civil disturbances in

Britain.89 However in this newly strengthened and redefined role the military determined that it required the umbrella of the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts if it was to fulfil its true internal security role. It was how internal security in

Northern Ireland was defined that determined how the security forces reacted to a civil disturbance. By August 1969 the violence had become so intense that all pretences to simply „aiding the civil power‟ had been removed and the military had regained its traditional militarised internal security role in Ireland.

On 26August 1969 the Ministry of Defence in London informed General Freeland,

GOC NI, of the legal status of British troops deployed in Ulster at that time. This advice had been cleared by the Solicitor General before being circulated to the Prime

Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Foreign Secretary and the Home

Secretary. At its core the instructions stated that any military personnel deployed to the province were governed by three sets of laws; The Common Law, The Army Act

1955 and the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts. British troops had been officially deployed to Northern Ireland under the Common Law obligation to aid the civil authority when the Northern Ireland government was unable to enforce order; however the Special Powers Acts also gave troops additional powers in Northern

Ireland. The Minute goes on to advise the GOC NI that under Common Law troops must only use a minimum of force while carrying out these duties and that the Army

Act and Queen‟s Regulations make it clear that they are still subject to the civil courts if they commit offences including murder. The Minute does protest that these arrangements were much less comprehensive when compared to similar „internal security‟ duties overseas and that troops in Northern Ireland would be in a less

89 Morgan, 1997, p. 316.

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favourable position. On the other hand jurisdictional arrangements in the colonies had enabled the military authorities themselves to try all offences committed on duty and the Northern Ireland Command was encouraged to enter into arrangements with the local authorities to achieve complementary arrangements.90 Northern Ireland was therefore deemed to be different from the remainder of the United Kingdom.

The scene was now set for the British military in Northern Ireland purportedly deployed „in aid of the civil power‟ to operate as if there was an armed insurrection where armed force could be used to suppress a threat to the security of the state. The army could now operate in Northern Ireland in ways similar to how it had operated in colonial territories; it was a place apart, where the rules of engagement were far different to those of Great Britain. However the assumption that the level of violence had increased to the level of an „armed insurrection‟ was not in any way supported by

Mr Justice Scarman‟s inquiry onto the disturbances of 1969. In commenting on what he termed „the conspiracy theory‟ he stated quite categorically that:

In our judgment there was no plot to overthrow the Government or to mount an armed insurrection. But, although there was no conspiracy in the sense in which that term is normally used (for it is not possible to identify any group or groups of persons deliberately planning the riots of 1969), yet it would be the height of naivety to deny that the teenage hooligans, who almost invariably threw the first stones, were manipulated and encouraged by persons seeking to discredit the Government.91

90 Cabinet Office documents on Northern Ireland - Status of Troops, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970), Ref 14m, 26 Aug 1969. 91 Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969: Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry, (Scarman Report), Government of Northern Ireland, Cmnd. 566. 2.2. HMSO, Belfast, 1972.

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Conclusions.

The British army that was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969 was officially or at least publicly sent there to aid the civil power, the Northern Ireland government, who had lost control of law and order on the streets of the province.

The troops were deployed under this established legal provision after the MoD received advice from the country‟s most eminent legal authority, the Attorney

General that as was the case in all of the United Kingdom they had no other option than to come to the aid of the Unionist government if officially requested. However the British Prime Minister and his Cabinet were increasingly concerned that if troops were deployed then this would lead to their government becoming directly involved in the internal affairs of that troublesome province.

While the Unionist government had long held on to the position that it needed its

Special Powers Acts to defend itself against what it perceived was an on-going threat from Irish nationalism, the Ministry of Defence had also come to the view that these powers were essential if the army was to be deployed to Northern Ireland. The

Ministry of Defence had obtained its own legal advice confirming that this suite of

Acts gave its forces extensive powers while officially acknowledging that the legal basis for aiding the civil power in Northern Ireland was founded upon its well- established rules of engagement as set out in the Manual of Military Law and

Queen‟s Regulations. On the other hand it was increasingly attracted to the overwhelming powers available to its troops under the Special Powers Acts - powers that it had come to see as normal in both its imperial policing roles and in Ireland.

The Northern Ireland government had long seen the Special Powers Acts as an

Internal Security Act and it was to this ideal that the military was attracted. The legal

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authority given to the military when aiding the civil power limited it to acting in a secondary role to the civil authority, whereas under the Special Powers Acts it could take the lead in restoring the internal security of Northern Ireland. The increasing violence in Ulster during 1969 and the continuing belief within the Unionist government that the violence was motivated by a resurgent IRA fuelled this fear and put paid to any suggestion that the Special Powers Acts could be repealed, or even relaxed.

The long-held Unionist belief that the Special Powers Acts would give the security forces the powers necessary to take the fight to the IRA was increasingly accepted by the British establishment, who had little understanding of, or interest in, the history or politics of Northern Ireland or its social failings. What appears to have occurred during this crucial period, 1968-1969, was series of contradictory political and military policy directions where politicians attempted to tackle the Irish problem from a British political perspective while attempting to avoid any direct responsibility. At the same time the army independently anticipated a need to take a militarised internal security role in Northern Ireland reflecting its recent operations in Cyprus and other colonial deployments. In Northern Ireland the RUC became incapable of restoring order using normal police methods and before long there was no alternative but to deploy the British army purportedly „to aid the civil authority‟.

However it would appear that at Westminster there was an increasing acceptance that Northern Ireland could not be treated as part of the United Kingdom but rather as an external dependency. Northern Ireland was therefore a place apart, where the army‟s rules of engagement could be less constraining than those demanded in

England, Scotland or Wales.

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Despite the latitude offered by the Special Powers Acts, the British army that was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969 initially operated in a laudable manner, at least in Belfast. They tackled an extremely unpleasant situation with admirable restraint and attempted to separate the warring loyalist and nationalists. When the army first arrived in Northern Ireland they were famously seen as the saviours of the beleaguered Catholics who were being savagely attacked by their Protestant neighbours. However there is strong evidence that by very early 1970 the army‟s attitude towards the nationalist minority had changed considerably and that the task of keeping the peace between the Protestants and Catholics had given way to identifying the nationalist as disloyal subjects in the same way the Unionist government had viewed them over the past five decades; as an enemy that must be defeated. The question I will be examining in the remaining chapters is how the military changed its role in early 1970 and what brought about such a change. In the next chapter I will examine how the army‟s own recent internal security experiences in places such as Cyprus and Aden affected its approach to the situation it found in

Northern Ireland.

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Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Chapter 5

The army in control

The army in Northern Ireland was commanded by Lt General Sir Ian Freeland, a veteran officer with extensive experience commanding troops in a range of overseas deployments. He was also typical of many army commanders of that era who while having seen active duty during the Second World War had gained most of their experience in imperial policing in pre-war India and Britain‟s post-war colonial disengagements. Thornton has described

Freeland as a typical „counter-insurgency‟ technician whose concept of winning „hearts and minds‟ was based upon being hard on those who did not accept British „beneficence‟.1

Thornton also argues that Freeland was a strong advocate of using massive searches, cordons, roadblocks and checkpoints during counter-insurgency campaigns. The officers and senior

NCO‟s who were deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969 were also hardened and experienced soldiers who knew only one way to deal with major civil unrest and that was to use maximum force on the troublemakers. These were the troops that General Freeland sent on to the streets of Londonderry to replace the defeated Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in restoring order and containing the riotous mobs.

However Freeland‟s soldiers were being deployed not as a counter-insurgency force in a far- off colony such as Malaya or Cyprus but to aid the civil power in a part of the United

Kingdom. As we have seen the army also had to work within a complex and contradictory legal framework that did not recognise anything other than peace or war, but in Northern

1 Thornton, 2007, p. 85.

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Ireland the army could operate within a legal framework the gave it almost unlimited authority. Even though the army had a long tradition of what has been called „imperial policing‟, fighting irregular forces in a series of small colonial wars, it was still an army and not an armed police force. In these operations the British army did not operate in a „policing‟ mode; on the contrary, it fought these wars using conventional military techniques modified to suit the local political and social environment. Yet it was this army that the British government deployed onto the streets of Londonderry in the late afternoon of 14 August 1969 officially to „aid the civil power‟ an army made up of and commanded by soldiers whose primary experience was in counter-insurgency and not in civilian policing.

This chapter will begin by examining the attitudes and actions of Lt General Sir Ian Freeland, who as the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (GOC NI), played the pivotal role in deciding how the British army in Northern Ireland went about its business. Freeland has been portrayed as an honest soldier who attempted to do his duty as best he could when ordered to do an unpleasant job.2 However he and the army he commanded made some grave errors of judgement during the early phases of its deployment and this chapter will demonstrate that these errors greatly contributed to the escalation of the violence.3 In addition

I will be looking closely at the army‟s operations in Londonderry and questioning why its operational tactics were so different to those employed in Belfast. Logically the army should have used the same tactics in both cities but this was not the case and it is important to gain an understanding as to why the troops deployed to Londonderry almost immediately identified the nationalist community as the „troublemakers‟ and why the „hearts and minds‟ campaign so successfully employed in Belfast was not used to any great extent in

Londonderry.

2 Freeland, Transcript BBC Radio-Brig. Thompson, Personal Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 79-34-6, 20 Aug. 1969. 3 Thornton, 2007.

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Lt General Sir Ian Freeland.

The appointment of Lt General Sir Ian Freeland as the General Officer Commanding

Northern Ireland (GOC NI) on 9 July 1969 4 was not the result of any sophisticated and considered selection process for what was to be the most crucial appointment in the British army, rather he was appointed to this position because it was the only suitable post available to a general of his rank. Commenting on his appointment as GOC NI a few years later

Freeland philosophically suggested that if the Minister of Defence, Denis Healey had not eliminated his previous post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff he would have remained at the Ministry of Defence and some other general would have been forced to confront the latest iteration of the Irish problem.5 Yet as we have seen when Freeland was informed of his impending appointment in April 1969 he considered the Northern Ireland command as a quiet posting normally given to generals shortly before they retire. The Northern Ireland command was not given to a „three star general‟ because of its military significance; rather it was given to such a senior officer because of the peculiar political sensitivities of Northern Ireland.

Nevertheless by 1969 the once peaceful posting had turned into a poisoned chalice because of the continued sectarian violence and the replacement of the somewhat liberal Prime Minister

Terence O‟Neill with the more uncompromising James Chichester-Clark. On taking up his appointment in July Freeland described his surprise at being confronted with the images of

„King Billy‟ and all the paraphernalia of the twelfth of July celebrations that decorated the

Protestant streets of Belfast. He states that the scene did not fill him with confidence, in fact he wondered whether his last two years in the army would be as peaceful as he had earlier thought.6 Freeland related that on his first visit to the Inspector General of the RUC, Antony

4 Freeland, Letter of appointment, MoD Ref P/53691/MS1 (a), 79-34-6, 2 April 1969. 5 ibid, Draft of Memoirs, 79 34 4, pp. 1-3. 6 ibid, p 5.

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Peacock, and the Northern Ireland Prime Minister he found both men supremely confident that the celebrations on the twelfth of July would pass off quietly, as long as the Catholics did not cause trouble. However in his draft memoirs Freeland does not sound so confident because here he states that the political situation was much more volatile, and that the July celebrations could result in major civil unrest with his troops being needed to help the

Unionist government keep order.7 It would appear that after only a few weeks in the province

Freeland had assessed the overall security situation, judged that the RUC was inadequate for its task and that British troops would need to be deployed to aid the Northern Ireland government.

Freeland not only believed that the RUC was a fundamentally a weak and exhausted force detached from modern British policing, but also that, because its leadership was so poor, the force in its present form would never be able to regain law and order in the province.8

Freeland was disparaging of the Inspector General and suggested that he had obtained his position not as a result of his aptitude but simply because of his seniority. He further describes Peacock as having a purely reactionary management style, and as making „off-the- cuff‟ decisions without taking advice.9 Freeland‟s Chief of Staff, Brigadier Tony Dyball, was visiting the RUC Headquarters at Knock regularly during this period to assess the state of the

RUC. His reports to Freeland confirmed the inherent weaknesses in both the RUCs command mechanisms and staff control, but more importantly he also confirmed that there was a lack of basic intelligence being produced by the RUC Special Branch.10

It was this lack of intelligence that had earlier concerned the British government so much that in April they sent a member of their security services to Northern Ireland to liaise with and

7 ibid. 8 ibid, Transcript - Five Long Years 1974, 79-34-4, 1968-71. 9 ibid, Draft of Memoirs, 1968-71, IWM 79-34-4, p. 8. 10 ibid, p. 9.

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report on the RUC Special Branch.11 This officer was met with suspicion and a lack of cooperation but reported that the Special Branch was chaotic and was not producing any worthwhile intelligence. In particular he was concerned that the Special Branch had ignored

Protestant extremists because they judged that these groups did pose any threat; they also had no worthwhile intelligence on the IRA and subsequently what information they had was out of date and therefore worthless. Freeland was convinced that this lack of relevant intelligence was especially important because he personally believed that the early military failures in

Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden were mainly the result of poor intelligence and recognised that good intelligence would be essential for success in Northern Ireland.12

Experience of colonial conflict had taught the army that if their internal security operations were to be successful then it needed both good intelligence and an effective local police force, however the situation in Northern Ireland lacked both these essential ingredients.

Freeland, consciously or otherwise, was linking the army‟s impending operations in Northern

Ireland to past internal security operations in the colonies. As a result he was undoubtedly viewing the internal security operations in Northern Ireland from the same perspective as military operations in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden and was preparing his forces to operate in a similar manner. At the same time his political masters in London were publicly stating that the army would only be deployed to Northern Ireland to operate in an impartial manner aiding the civil power.13

Nevertheless the overall picture that Freeland was obtaining in July and August 1969 was that the increasing level of civil unrest was being tackled by an overwhelmed, poorly equipped and incompetently led police force. As a result Freeland judged that the RUC had no chance of regaining control of the province, as he stated: “once one is [sic] able to assess the strength

11 Ibid, p. 11. 12 ibid, pp. 10-11. 13 Callaghan, 1973, p. 43.

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and weaknesses of the RUC one realised that the British army was going to have to do the work. Because the RUC was so weak in numbers, that they simply couldn‟t deal with this sort of situation and that the army were going to have to be there for ages. I always used to say five to ten years at the minimum.”14 Furthermore the overall security policy was being determined by the same government that was the root cause of the problem. Freeland also believed that a total breakdown of civil order was inevitable and it was this crucial point he continued to pass on to his superiors at the Ministry of Defence in London.15 He specifically advised the Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS) that there was an imminent breakdown of civil order and that the RUC was incapable of regaining control and as a result he would be soon getting an urgent request for military assistance from the Northern Ireland Minister of

Home Affairs, Robert Porter. However in August 1969, and in spite of Freeland‟s warnings,

Whitehall appeared unprepared to deal with the violence in Northern Ireland because the majority of the senior decision-makers were absent on holiday. The only senior minister on duty at the time was the Home Secretary James Callaghan and it was he who would eventually have to make the decision to deploy the troops in aid of the civil power.

However Freeland‟s perception of his duties in aiding the civil power in Northern Ireland appears to have been at odds with that of his political masters. Speaking to the House of

Lords Cross Benches in February 1972 Freeland explained that there was a direct link between the use of the army in Northern Ireland and earlier British colonial internal security operations.16 During six years of pre-war internal security operations in India and later in

Cyprus Freeland had seen at first hand the army‟s impact in breaking up riots after the police had been unable to contain the situation. He stated: “The army was the final solution after the police had lost control and the normal method of breaking up a riot was to shoot one or two

14 Freeland, ibid, Transcript TV Interview. Five Long Years 1974, 79-34-4. 15 ibid, Draft of Memoirs, p. 10. 16 ibid, Talk to Lords Cross benches, 3 Feb 1972, 79-34-4.

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ringleaders and then the rioters would run away. The situation was then handed back to the police and the soldiers would leave the scene”.17 He went on to argue that the effectiveness of the army during serious civil disturbances was seriously weakened when it was forced to adopt police tactics and use police equipment such as riot shields and batons. Freeland held that when the army had been forced to act in a policing role during colonial troubles its deterrent effect was greatly reduced because that changed role signalled to the rioters that the army was then no longer prepared to shoot to kill.18 Freeland‟s concern was that the army was primarily a military force and should not have a policing role, and when it was forced to act out of character it was bound to be less effective.

Freeland further linked his colonial experiences with what had happened in Londonderry in

August 1969, when the police had been defeated by the rioters and the army had been forced to restore order. Freeland considered that the defeat of the armed Royal Ulster Constabulary was not only a defeat for the police but also a defeat for the very concept of British law and order.19 From Freeland‟s perspective the defeat of the RUC also signalled to the rioters that the soldiers who had replaced them and who subsequently stayed out of the Bogside had also been defeated. It was because the army had been prevented from using its overwhelming force to restore order that this weak response had allowed the residents of the Bogside to view the army as an impotent force. Freeland considered that the army‟s sole role during the initial breakdown of internal security should have been to use whatever force it considered necessary to restore order. Freeland was not alone in this view. Colonel Robin Evelegh, an army officer deployed to Northern Ireland during the early 1970s has also argued that if the

17 ibid, p. 8. 18 Ibid. 19 ibid, p. 9.

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army had been allowed to operate in this manner then order might have been restored before the „terrorists‟ were able to gain the upper hand.20

Freeland clearly believed that what was happening in Northern Ireland was not simply a political protest movement but a rebellion against British rule, and that the army had not been allowed to do its job properly to suppress it. This violent breakdown in „law and order‟ could only be seen as a „rebellion‟ against the Queen‟s law, and as he stated to the Lords: “A breakdown in law and order resulting from a „rebellion‟ by part of the Catholic community, either through terrorism or „civil disobedience‟, has produced some extremely difficult problems for the government and the security forces.”21 Freeland also distinguished between

England and Ireland stating that in a democratic society such as England citizens did not rebel because the civil population was law abiding and accepted the rule of law whereas the

Irish people had a history of opposing the rule of English law.22

Freeland was also aware of how differently the law was interpreted in Northern Ireland by what he described as „hard line‟ Protestants and Catholics. “To the Protestant loyalist it [the law] means keeping the Catholics in their place, but breaking the law [is OK] if it suits their cause … it is [also] OK to riot and shoot at the security forces … if you are an Orangeman.

… The Republican outlook is quite different, as they don‟t accept Stormont; they don‟t accept the law as fair and impartial. They are prepared to live outside the law if they can get away with it … if they are particularly bolshy about something they barricade themselves into their ghetto areas and defy the law by keeping out the … soldiers if they are able to.”23

Freeland also stated that the entire Catholic population of Northern Ireland were Irish

20 R Evelegh, Peace-keeping in a Democratic Society: The lessons of Northern Ireland, C. Hurst & Co, London, 1978, p.2. 21 Freeland, Draft of Memoirs, p. 2, 79-34-4. 22 ibid. 23 Freeland, Talk to Lords Cross benches, 3 Feb 1972, 79-34-4, p. 5.

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nationalists whom he perceived were rebelling against the British state.24 Freeland held that the building of barricades by the Catholic community constituted a refusal on their part to live within the laws of the land and by extension a refusal to be governed by the democratically elected government of Northern Ireland, even though they built the barricades to protect themselves from Protestant attacks. Therefore from Freeland‟s perspective the primary cause of the unrest in Northern Ireland was the Catholic community‟s refusal to unquestioningly obey the lawful rule of the Unionist state, and it was as a result of their unlawful actions that the army had been deployed to restore order out of chaos.

Freeland‟s fundamental attitude towards his task in Northern Ireland was based upon a belief that this very divided community should simply accept the rule of law in the same way that

English society willingly did, even if they had to function within a legal framework that would not have been tolerated in England. However if they were unwilling to do so then the army would need extensive legal powers to control them. As Freeland stated in 1972: “The present laws in the United Kingdom do not enable the authorities to deal quickly with a

„rebellion‟. The laws of Northern Ireland however do enable the authorities … through the contentious Special Powers Acts to intern subjects without trial … The army and police are also able to act more freely in the security field than they could in England without special legislation.”25 Freeland was reflecting the military‟s longstanding frustration with its lack of a suitable legal framework when it had to tackle any major civil unrest within Great Britain.

However, as we saw earlier British forces in Northern Ireland had legal protection under the

Special Powers Acts that gave it similar powers to those used in colonial internal security operations. In Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden the military had an appropriate legal framework and it was able to operate within a unified political and operational structure.

Conversely the overall control of internal security in Northern Ireland was critically divided

24 ibid. 25 ibid, p. 6.

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between Westminster and Stormont and it was this flawed structure that was to cause

Freeland major problems in the early stages of the army‟s deployment.

As we have seen, one outcome of the meeting between the British and Northern Ireland governments on 19 August 1969 was that Freeland was appointed Director of Operations in

Northern Ireland and given overall responsibility for all security forces used for the internal security of Northern Ireland and given overall responsibility for security operations.26

Included were all British military forces in the province, direct responsibility for the B-

Specials and the internal security role of the RUC.27 The Communiqué issued at the end of the meeting stated that the GOC NI would have full control of the deployment of the RUC, however for its normal policing duties the RUC would continue to be responsible to the

Inspector-General and through him to the Northern Ireland government.28 Freeland understood this to mean that he could direct the RUC in what he determined were internal security duties, yet it is how internal security and normal police duties were defined that was at the heart of Freeland‟s problems. Freeland, as a British counter-insurgency expert, believed that when a military commander was made responsible for internal security it was essential that he have overall control of all security forces including the police.29 Accordingly Freeland believed that as the military commander of the province he could use both the army and the

RUC to confront the sectarian violence. As in past colonial internal security operations the military would hand control of the province back to the civil police once order had been restored and then the RUC could regain its authority and apply civilian law.

However Freeland‟s understanding of his role was not universally shared. On the one hand his belief was confirmed by the directive he received from the Acting Chief of the Defence

26 Cabinet Office documents on Northern Ireland, CAB 164 577, 1969-1970. 27 Brief for debate on Northern Ireland, Home Office, Northern Ireland Communiqué, Cmnd 4154, CJ 4 5, 19 Aug 1969. 28 Communiqué, 20 Aug 1969, CAB/4/1445/B, PRONI. 29 Thornton, 2007, p. 85.

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Staff (A-CDS), which instructed him to take charge of all security operations in Northern

Ireland, and to take whatever action was required against those who were attempting to subvert the security of the state.30 The Home Secretary James Callaghan also assumed that

Freeland had been give total control of all security forces in Northern Ireland as did the

British Cabinet, with the official records stating that: “the GOC has taken over the responsibilities for security and public order previously exercised by the RUC and the Ulster

Special Constabulary.”31 However after pressure from the newly appointed English Inspector-

General of the RUC, Sir Arthur Young, Freeland lost direct control of the RUC and as a result his authority was undermined. Freeland confirms that it was because of pressure from

Sir Arthur Young that Denis Healey, the Minister of Defence changed the original directive.32

Healey‟s decision to give direct control of the RUC back to the Northern Ireland government was a political decision and reflects a major division within the Cabinet. Healey had always been reluctant to become directly involved in the „Irish question‟ whereas Callaghan - despite his earlier reluctance - on this occasion was proactive, which strongly reinforces the argument that the British cabinet was not unified when dealing with the Northern Ireland crisis. From that point on General Freeland‟s title was changed to that of Director of Security Operations, and his police responsibilities limited to coordinating the actions of the RUC with the

Inspector-General. Freeland was convinced that if this internal security operation was to be successful then the military commander must have total control, but now political interference had forced him to liaise with Sir Arthur Young on all security matters involving the RUC and this had severely weakened both his authority and the army‟s ability to do its job. Unfortunately the relationship between Freeland and Young was far from cordial and

30 Signal from A/CDF to GOC NI, Cabinet Office documents on Northern Ireland, CAB 164 577 (1969-1970). 31 ibid, Cabinet Office Minute, 22 Aug 1969. 32 Freeland, Interview with MoD May 1972, 79-34-4.

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what should have been a unified command became fractured.33 In addition Freeland was forced to work within a very complex and divided command structure that included the normal Westminster chains of command as well as the perpetually difficult Stormont government, which the British government had allowed to retain responsibility for security within the province. As Freeland put it: “The Stormont government is responsible for security in Northern Ireland and the police are under their command. But the army who are now the main security force are under Westminster and the Stormont government cannot give the army orders.”34 Constitutionally this was correct, however on a day-to-day basis Stormont could and did wield extraordinary influence on Freeland and the army‟s actions.

Freeland was now in the invidious position of being responsible for the internal security of

Northern Ireland while having to report to two different political masters at Westminster,

Denis Healey and James Callaghan. He also simultaneously had to answer to the Unionist government at Stormont with their insatiable demands for action against the rebellious nationalist community. This is what Freeland termed a situation of „divided control‟ where he had all the responsibility but did not control all the security assets of the province. Nostalgic for previous colonial conflicts, Freeland later lamented: “Poor old GOC! A whipping boy if ever there was one. He certainly has to serve several masters. In our past colonial troubles the arrangements for command and control were clearly defined, because the Governor was also

Commander-in-Chief and commanded all forces committed to the internal security of the colony.”35 However in Northern Ireland the Governor has no such powers and plays no official part in the security of the province which is controlled by the Northern Ireland government officially through its Security Committee.36 Yet this Security Committee was not simply an advisory committee but a powerful working group that was normally chaired by

33 ibid, BBC Panorama interview Nov 1971. 34 Ibid, Talk to Lords Cross benches. 3 Feb 1972, pp. 6-7. 35 ibid, p. 7. 36 Operation Banner, 2006.

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the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs or the Northern Ireland Prime Minister when he attended. In addition it also included the Inspector General of the RUC and the Head of the

RUCs Special Branch.37 At one meeting of the Joint Security Committee held on 19 August

1969 those attending included; the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs and three other

Northern Ireland ministers, the Inspector general of the RUC, the head of the Special Branch and the RUC Liaison Officer at army headquarters as well as the GOC NI.38 Although the

British government officials attached to the Northern Ireland government attended the security coordinating committee they were not members of the committee, only observers;

Freeland was the lone official British voice.

In a British television interview recorded in 1974 Freeland described the constant pressures he was under in this committee from the Unionist government. Stormont Ministers always wanted the army to act tougher on the Catholics while at the same time ensuring that the army was not tough on the Protestants. Unionists were also constantly claiming that the army wasn‟t doing enough to arrest the rioters or take the barricades down. Freeland called himself the „Aunt Sally in the middle‟ and because he was the only official British representative he was forced to take all the kicks from the Stormont Ministers who really wanted to attack the

British government.39 It has to be remembered that while the British army was the major security force throughout 1969 and 1970 it was the Northern Ireland government that still had the overall responsibility for security in the province. While the Joint Security Committee was in name a coordinating committee that met weekly to report on what had happened and to decide strategies for the future, in reality its members determined the overall security policy. Freeland describes the committee as a forum: “[where he was] a minority voice and

37 Freeland, Record of meeting on the NI Cabinet Security Committee. 21 August 1969, 79-34-3. 38 Conclusions of a meeting of the Joint Security Committee held at Stormont Castle, 19 August 1969, 1969/Joint Sec/4, PRONI, HA/32/3/2. 39 Freeland, Interview on Thames TV, Five Long Years - 1974, 79-34-4.

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sometimes … [where he] had to fit in with the majority and then try and make things work.”40

It is evident that neither General Freeland nor the British government was directing the security policies during this crucial period; rather the British government was allowing the

Unionist government to continue dictating security policy. The British army‟s official report into „Operation Banner‟ pointedly states that there was no single authority in overall charge of the direction of the campaign, “but rather three agencies, often poorly co-ordinated;

Stormont … the Ministry of Defence and the RUC”: a situation that the report claims contributed greatly to the inefficiency and longevity of the campaign.41

This unwieldy and politically untenable situation might help explain why the army applied very different tactics to the nationalist communities in Londonderry and Belfast, but even if it operated differently in each city the army was predisposed to act as a counter-insurgency force in Northern Ireland. Their actions may have been different because of the circumstances they found in each city but in the end they arrived at the same position. In particular it was because there was so little political oversight from Westminster - as opposed to political pressure from Stormont - that the army was allowed to determine independently the tactics used to confront the rioting mobs in the predominantly nationalist city of Londonderry, provided only that its tactics were broadly in harmony with Unionist desire for a hard line.

The upshot was that instead of acting in support of the civilian police in Londonderry the army assumed total control and reverted to its well-proven colonial internal security tactics.

Its actions to a great extent determined the course of events in Northern Ireland over the next few years.

40 ibid, Record of meeting on the NI Cabinet Security Committee. 21 August 1969, 79-34-3. 41 Operation Banner, 2006.

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Londonderry - the army and Irish nationalism.

Although the deployment of troops to Londonderry and Belfast was separated only by one day, the army appears to have employed significantly different tactics in each city. It has been suggested that the very different ethnic and geographic composition of the two cities required the army to take the different approaches. Londonderry had a Catholic majority who were physically concentrated into the ghettos of the Bogside and Creggan; 42 conversely Belfast was a city with a Protestant majority where Catholics lived in less well defined enclaves but in close proximity to their Unionist neighbours.43 However while the demographics of the cities were different the pattern of sectarian rioting during this period was basically the same, with Unionist triumphalism being confronted by increasingly emboldened Nationalists.

General Freeland described the initial deployment in Londonderry: “as initially a very small operation in the Bogside to really keep the gangs from the Bogside in there and separate them from the RUC [that] was in a completely exhausted state [after] having to fight with the

Bogside mobs for a period of three days. [We] had to assert ourselves between the police and let them disengage and go and lick their wounds and keep the Bogsiders inside the Bogside

… then we had other various things to do in Londonderry but it started as relatively local.”44

Freeland is clearly stating that he, as the person responsible for the internal security of

Northern Ireland, blamed the nationalist community of the Bogside for the rioting because it was they alone who were fighting the RUC when his troops were deployed. From a simple military perspective Freeland‟s troops had only to confront one rioting mob made up of nationalists from the Bogside, whereas loyalists were ignored because they caused the army no trouble. The army also did not concern itself with what had gone on before, with Freeland

42 Freeland, Draft Memoirs, Personal Papers, 79-34-4. 43 Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969, Vol 1, 18.1, Mr. Justice Scarman, HMSO, Belfast, 1972. 44 Freeland, Interview on Thames TV, Five Long Years - 1974, 79-34-4.

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ignoring the fact that the confrontation between the nationalists and the RUC was the final phase of a sectarian conflict that had seen the RUC and its loyalist supporters invade the

Bogside. Then again Freeland could not plead ignorance to what had happened in

Londonderry because one of his senior officers, Colonel Todd, CO of the Prince of Wales

Own regiment and three other officers had been closely watching the unfolding events.45

Nevertheless Freeland and his local commanders viewed these disturbances simply as a breakdown in internal security and accordingly deployed troops to contain the rioting mobs.

However the only mobs that were rioting when they arrived were nationalists from the

Bogside and therefore from an army perspective they became the enemy.

Niall O Dochartaigh‟s From Civil Rights to Armalites; Derry and the Birth of the Irish

Troubles 46 supplies the most academically valuable account of the gradual escalation of the civil protests by the nationalist community in Londonderry and has been used extensively in this chapter. He describes that what the army confronted in Londonderry on 14 August was the concluding phase of a disturbance between loyalists and nationalists that had started two days earlier; however what had begun as a conventional ethnic conflict had evolved into a confrontation between the RUC and the residents of the Bogside.47 Then again this was not a straightforward confrontation between rioters and police as could have occurred in Great

Britain; it was a sectarian confrontation between unionists and nationalists distinctive to

Northern Ireland, in which the unionists happened to have the apparatus of state coercion in their hands. As we have seen, the police in Great Britain could be expected to act impartially, however the RUC acted in their traditional capacity as agents of the Unionist state and saw the nationalists as the enemy. On this occasion the situation was exacerbated because the

RUC were accompanied into the Bogside by loyalist radicals, and as a result the RUCs

45 Bogside accepts army, The Times, London, 16 Aug 1969. 46 O Dochartaigh, 2005. 47 ibid, pp. 113-114.

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actions were perceived as a loyalist invasion of the nationalist Bogside rather than as a simple policing action. The nationalist community believed this was an attack on their very existence by the whole loyalist community and ferociously defended the Bogside even after repeated attempts by the RUC to enter the area.48 The fighting eventually ended in a stalemate, and on the afternoon of 14 August when the RUC finally conceded that they were unable to restore order they requested assistance from the army. British troops were subsequently deployed as a buffer between the police and the residents of the Bogside and the rioting ceased.49

Nevertheless while the army in Londonderry were deployed as impartial peacekeepers to end the immediate violence there were signs even at this early stage that the army‟s intentions towards the nationalist community were not benign. There is evidence that the army‟s behaviour became increasingly partial and they were quickly seen as only defending the

Stormont regime.50 While within the nationalist community there was initial relief that the army had replaced the hated RUC and B-Specials, problems soon developed, and before long both sides reverted to their historical antagonism. Freeland has stated that he had always viewed Catholics as rebellious citizens and that he always expected that they would inevitably come into conflict with the army as a result of the latter‟s historical relationship with Irish nationalism. 51 This assessment may well have been correct, however before conflict arose the army allowed the situation to take a very unusual course, which requires close examination.

Shortly after the arrival of troops on 14 August the army appeared to give the Derry Citizens

Defence Association (DCDA) official recognition by allowing it to control the Bogside. The army stayed out of the area and sanctioned the DCDA‟s operations without interference, and

48 Scarman Report, 1972, Vol 1, 11.4-11.26. 49 ibid, 12-30. 50 O Dochartaigh, 2005, pp. 113-114. 51 Freeland, Interview on Thames TV, Five Long Years 1974, 79-34-4.

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even negotiated with the DCDA rather than enforce its own authority. Colonel Todd had initially negotiated directly with the DCDA leadership and gave them permission to maintain the peace within the Bogside.52 The nationalist community saw this as a form of „self- determination‟ and as one RUC County Inspector is reported to have angrily said at the time:

“the DCDA were the de facto government of the area.”53 The army reinforced this belief by limiting its actions to building sandbagged military posts around the edge of the Bogside to separate it from the city centre. Otherwise it kept a low profile and appeared to act as politicians rather than soldiers.54 It has been argued that the army did not impose its military willpower in Londonderry because of political pressure from London, yet it continued its policy of non-confrontation even though the Unionist government continually pressured

Freeland to use force to regain physical control of the nationalist areas.55 As a result troops were ordered to remain in the background until the hoped-for political solution would take effect, especially the restructure of the RUC and other parts of Callaghan‟s futile attempt to keep the British government out of direct involvement in Irish affairs.56 The end result was a political and legal vacuum in the Bogside and Creggan where the law did not exist.

The army found this situation untenable and began to steadily assert its authority by a series of actions including reducing its willingness to work with the DCDA, increasing military activity, and imposing changes to the policing of the Bogside. Both sides had earlier agreed that only military police could patrol the area, however the army reneged and soon after began to use regular troops.57 This was part of the army‟s long-term plan and as Brigadier

Leng confirmed, the army always had an underlying determination to regain control of Free

52 400 troops bring peace to the devastated Bogside, The Times, London, 15 Aug 69. 53 O Dochartaigh, 2005, pp, 114-125. 54 ibid, p. 116. 55 Ibid, p. 115. 56 Peter Rose, 2000, p xx. 57 Military police take over in Bogside, The Times, London, 13 Oct 1969.

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Derry from the “vigilantes”.58 David Benest has further argued that the army‟s early actions in Londonderry may also have been part of a „cooling off‟ period to allow it time to work out what its strategy was to be, a method that the army had successfully employed in Aden and other colonial operations.59 Whatever the case, from the start the army had determined who was causing the trouble and began evolving a strategy to strengthen its grip on the nationalist

Bogside and Creggan.

The gradual but ever-increasing containment of these areas in September 1969 exposed the army‟s true strategy.60 The imposition of what was described as a „peace ring‟ was not just a physical construction of barriers and checkpoints designed to separate the nationalist community from the city centre and Protestant areas of Londonderry, rather it was a containment policy designed to encircle and manage the nationalist community. This containment signalled to the nationalist community that the army had identified them as the enemy. In a further demonstration of its growing control the army imposed a classic colonial era tactic of restricting the free movement of the people of the Bogside and Creggan.61 The army restricted the movement of vehicles between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. including emergency vehicles such as ambulances. They also controlled individual movement by making those wishing to enter the Bogside and Creggan give their personal details to the soldiers.62 As

Evelegh has stated, the British army did not deal with single internal security events, rather their traditional method was to view these as part of a larger operation. The army regularly tackled civil unrest in its colonies by using a classic „cordon and search‟ technique to both control and monitor civilian populations they judged as suspect.63 What had been used as a

58 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 123. 59 Benest in Strachan, (eds), Big Wars and Small Wars, Cass Series: Military History and Policy, Routledge, Oxford, p. 122, 2006. 60 O Dochartaigh, 2005, pp. 136-7. 61 Evelegh, 1978, pp. 128-9. 62 O Dochartaigh, 2005, pp. 136-7. 63 Evelegh, 1978, pp. 128-9.

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control and intelligence-gathering tactic during the era of imperial policing was now being imposed on a selected group of citizens of the United Kingdom.

The very first troops deployed on 14 August, the Prince of Wales Own Regiment of

Yorkshire, had been, as John Charters of The Times reported: “[directly involved in the]

Aden, Malay and the Greek [Cypriot] insurrections.”64 The army commander in Londonderry,

Brigadier Peter Leng, was also an experienced counter-insurgency expert, having commanded troops of the Royal Anglian Regiment in Aden during 1964 and 1966.65

Therefore the predominant and very recent experience of the army that was deployed to

Londonderry was of internal security operations in British colonies or dependencies. The military commanders were also sending a clear signal to the nationalist community even at this very early phase of its deployment in „aid to the civil power‟ that the army had not only replaced the local police but now that it would confront any further civil disturbances.

Freeland‟s statements and actions confirm that he viewed the nationalist community as the troublemakers and it was they who would have to be contained.66 By removing the RUC from any major involvement in future civil disturbances Freeland had - at least in Londonderry - established the army‟s dominance and to all intents and purposes imposed military rule.67 As we have already seen the army was now imposing its historical interpretation of „internal security‟ and its initial tactic was to contain the trouble-makers within a controlled area.

By placing a cordon around the Bogside the army had not only created a physical barrier between what was called „Free Derry‟ and the rest of the city, it had also ended the nationalist community‟s limited political independence from Stormont. What the army saw as a simple military tactic was in actuality the continued subjugation of the nationalist community in

64 Bogside accepts army, The Times, London, 16 Aug 1969. 65 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 136. 66 Freeland, Interview on Thames TV, Five Long Years - 1974, 79-34-4. 67 O'Ballance, 1981, p 143.

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Northern Ireland and the emasculation of their long fight for political and social equality.

More importantly when the army initially arrived on 14 August to give „aid to the civil power‟ this community had believed the army was there to protect them from their traditional oppressors; now it appeared that the army had simply replaced the RUC and was no longer a neutral force that could be trusted.68 Unsurprisingly the army did not understand or consider the nationalist community‟s concerns but only saw its actions as the application of a rational military strategy that had worked in the past. From all available evidence the army contained the nationalist community within the Bogside and Creggan because this was a strategy that had proven effective in other insurrections such as Malaya, Cyprus and Aden. Unfortunately, rather than containing the growing unrest, the army‟s tactics further exacerbated an already volatile situation. Predictably, this was a situation that the residents and especially the young men of the Bogside and Creggan would soon find unacceptable and would inevitably lead to an escalation of violence.

It was because an effective police force was missing in Londonderry that the army had subsumed the RUCs policing role, and, whether it undertook this role willingly or through necessity, it was now operating in a manner that defined it as the de facto defenders of the

Unionist state in that city. By their very existence armed soldiers are much more confrontational than civilian police, and the actions of the young English soldiers prohibiting equally young residents of the Bogside from entering their own territory after curfew were bound to escalate tensions. The local Derry Journal reported on early confrontations between soldiers and civilians. In late September and early October 1969 young men had been detained by soldiers and were later convicted for disorderly behaviour after objecting to being denied access to their homes in the Bogside. The newspaper reported that “None had used violence and [the worst] they were accused of was „using fairly strong language‟ or „speaking

68 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 136.

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in an aggressive manner‟.”69 The stage was now set for a further deterioration in the relationship between the army and the nationalist community of Londonderry and this occurred in late October 1969 when the army directly confronted nationalist youths.70

However it was how the army responded to this unrest that confirmed to the residents of the

Bogside that it had replaced the distrusted RUC as the key defender of Unionist power.

As had occurred in other parts of Northern Ireland Lord Hunt‟s recommendation to radically restructure the RUC had aroused anger among local loyalists who in October 1969 staged sit- down protests in the centre of Londonderry. The loyalists were pointedly ignored by a partisan RUC, but when a small group of nationalist youths began their own protest nearby the RUC attempted to move them on. Not unexpectedly a clash broke out, and what had begun as a relatively innocuous protest quickly escalated into an all-out riot, which in turn led to the deployment of the army. The result was the army drew their batons and charged the nationalists in what O Dochartaigh claims was the first direct confrontation between the army and nationalist youths as opposed to the army separating loyalists from nationalists.71 This confrontation was to have a profound effect on the relationship between the army and the nationalist community. Only two months after being deployed to aid the civil power the army was now in direct conflict with the group it had specifically come to help. In an attempt to defuse some of the tensions that had built up between the young British troops and the nationalist youths the army began what was called a „hearts and minds‟ program.

Reminiscent of earlier colonial campaigns the broad aim of this policy was to more closely integrate the army into the local community, although on this occasion it was designed to give the young people something better to do than riot.

69 ibid, pp. 137-138. 70 Ibid, p. 140. 71 ibid.

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As we have seen, a hearts and minds campaign was not just about soldiers attempting to get on well with the locals, but as Templer in Malaya understood, should form part of an integrated civil-military strategy.72 Templer believed that if the British used a less coercive approach then it would win over the „hearts and minds‟ of the local people, and that this would result in the local people being less inclined to support the trouble-makers. However this strategy only works if there is a coordinated set of policies designed to also redress local grievances.73 On the other hand, as Strachan has argued, hearts and minds is not always about being nice to the locals but is part of a robust enforcement of control where political and social reform might accompany firm government once the locals had accepted British authority.74 It would seem that the military in Londonderry were applying Strachan‟s version of a hearts and minds campaign simply to gain military control of that city.

Freeland‟s approach to a hearts and minds policy was clearly part of an overall strategy to gain army supremacy. As Thornton has stated: “Freeland [aimed] to make life easier for those who supported the army … but [was] a hardliner when dealing with those who did not accept the „beneficence‟ of the British approach.”75 If the strategy of the army hierarchy was to win the support of the local population by working with them, then they ignored one of Templer‟s main tenets; that major civil unrest could only be contained through non-confrontational measures associated with political initiatives. In Londonderry what political initiatives were implemented were piecemeal, and from the nationalist perspective insignificant. As a result the army‟s hearts and minds policy simply gave the locals a taste of British rule, which, if

72 Dixon, „Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq‟, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(No 3), 2009, pp. 353-381. 73 Quoted in Dixon, 2009, p. 354: Paget, p. 65. 74 Strachan, „British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq‟, RUSI, 152(No 6), 2007, pp. 8-11. 75 Thornton, 2007, p. 85.

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unconditionally accepted, might result in them being rewarded. As Freeland stated: “I warned them about this [conflict] and I said; we shall be as nice and pleasant as you allow us to be.”76

The army did set up two boys‟ clubs; one in the Protestant area and another that straddled the nationalist Bogside and the Creggan. Yet these clubs did not have the positive effect some had hoped for, because while a good numbers of boys were attracted to the Protestant club located in an army barracks the other club did not attract the older Catholic youths who were the major troublemakers.77 O Dochartaigh has suggested that the lack of success in attracting

Catholic youths was in great part because of the inherent distrust of the army that was felt within the overall nationalist community.78 He goes on to suggest that by giving the children of the Bogside „keep-fit‟ classes while at the same time it was giving weapons training to the loyalist youths the army was being somewhat cynical. It could be argued that this overtly discriminatory program was designed more to improve the army‟s relationship with the

Protestant community than to placate the Catholic youths, and rather than attempting to win over the nationalist community the army merely signalled that it was not neutral but favoured the loyalists.

The „hearts and minds‟ program had been instigated by one of the first regiments deployed into Londonderry - the Queen‟s Own Regiment -, who on the whole had been given a warm response by the local population and had responded in like manner.79 Even though the

Queen‟s Own had subsequently become involved in clashes with the nationalist community there was still some residual friendliness between the two groups. The same cannot be said about the Gloucestershire Regiment (Glosters) who replaced them in December 1969 after a four-month deployment. A short rotation was part of the army‟s policy of supporting garrison

76 Freeland, Interview on Thames TV, Five Long Years - 1974, 79-34-4. 77 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 144. 78 ibid, p. 145. 79 ibid.

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regiments in Northern Ireland with troops on short-term deployments.80 Whether this was simply an expedient policy to source troops from throughout the British army or - as was believed by some nationalists - a deliberate policy to ensure that troops did not develop too much sympathy for Catholic grievances is debatable.81 Nevertheless the Glosters were never able to achieve the same relationship with the nationalist community as the Queen‟s Own had enjoyed, and were soon confronting nationalist youths in the same way that the RUC had done a few short months earlier. In early January 1970 there was a serious conflict between these two groups that continued until 5 a.m. the next morning, and while there were no arrests there were claims of army brutality.82 In a further escalation of its containment of the nationalist community the army announced that it was banning late night movie showings for at least three months.83 While this might have been an unsophisticated attempt to reduce the possibility of late night disturbances, nationalist youths simply viewed it as a further attempt by the army to contain the residents of the Bogside and Creggan. The army, in a crude and draconian manner, had now almost completely restricted the movement of the nationalist community between their homes and the city during the hours of darkness.

By February 1970 it was becoming clear to the Londonderry nationalists that little headway was being made towards remedying what Freeland later called: “the fundamental sectarianism of the Unionist state.”84 Stormont was still in control and the army was increasingly being used to maintain Unionism as the dominant political system. The violent actions of the Glosters outside the Guildhall in February 1970 finally removed any lingering impression of army neutrality and while it is accepted that there was considerable provocation from the nationalist youths, three soldiers were reported to have gone berserk

80 Freeland, Staff College Lecture - 1970, 79-34-3. 81 O Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 146. 82 ibid. 83 ibid. 84 Freeland, Personal notes on MoD list of questions, 79-34-4, 1972.

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and attacked some of the demonstrators for no apparent reason.85 Following this riot the army used baton charges to drive the youths back into the Bogside and also employed „snatch squads‟ to arrest anyone they could catch, whether they were involved in the disturbance or just happened to be in the vicinity.

The army had clearly escalated the situation by changing its tactics from a passive to an aggressive form of riot control, which was in line with Freeland‟s overall strategy for tackling the disturbances. As Freeland stated in his talk at the Chief of the General Staff Conference in

October 1969: “There are four stages of escalation beginning with „Passive‟ when the army provides a presence and keeps the peace by „threat‟ (This stage lasted six weeks from 12

August to the end Sept 1969). In the next [aggressive] stage CS gas is used, in the third stage snatch squads with batons are used to arrest ringleaders and finally ringleaders are shot.”86

The army‟s actions in Londonderry during the first months of its deployment evolved in ways that reflect how its commander believed major civil unrest should be confronted. Even though the army was supposedly deployed to restore order within the United Kingdom it acted in the same manner that it had done recently in Cyprus, Aden and other colonial operations. It was the reaction to these aggressive military tactics by the more radical nationalists that ruined any chance of an end to the violence at this early stage.

Conclusions

Between August and December 1969 there was both an escalation in the level and a change to the nature of the violence in Northern Ireland that was to a great extent caused by the actions of the army and its commander General Sir Ian Freeland. Freeland was an imperial soldier of the „old school‟ and his service in pre-war India and post-war Africa and Cyprus

85 Ibid. 86 Freeland, Talk at CGS’s Conference, Oct. 1969, 79-34-3, p. 3.

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had conditioned his approach to the Northern Ireland problem. It is clear that he viewed the violence in Northern Ireland not from a policing but from an internal security perspective.

Based upon his past experiences Freeland logically assumed that he needed to become the security „supremo‟ for Northern Ireland. However the confused and contradictory politics emanating from London had allowed the Unionist government to retain control over the RUC with which the army had to work, and Freeland found himself answering to a multitude of political and military authorities. Freeland‟s actions may have resulted from the ineptitude of his political masters nevertheless he allowed himself to be pressured by the Unionist government to undertake actions that further increased unrest in the province. Even though he later complained about the pressure from the Joint Security Committee to take action against nationalists he appears to have mostly acceded to unionist wishes. It could be argued that he followed this path not only because of unionist pressure but because his instincts and training told him that it was the correct course to follow in these circumstances. As a result he treated

Northern Ireland as if it were another colony rather than a part of the United Kingdom.

Freeland has suggested that the army‟s neutral peacekeeping operations in Londonderry only lasted a few weeks after the 1st Battalion of the Prince of Wales Own Regiment marched into the city to separate the rioting mobs. Even for a volatile country like Ireland this was a comparatively short time period for the situation to deteriorate so quickly. Containing the nationalist community in their own ghetto was not the action of a police force, rather it was the action of a British army who had regularly used this tactic to control disruptive natives in distant colonies. This classic „cordon and search‟ technique had been successful in Malaya,

Cyprus and Aden and the army similarly used a so-called „peace-ring‟ to impose its will on the nationalist residents of the Bogside and Creggan.

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The British army that was deployed to Londonderry on 14 August 1969 clearly had to confront a very serious civil disorder in which the nationalist community was the major protagonist. However the army only arrived onto the scene after the RUC and its loyalist supporters had violently attacked the residents of the Bogside and Creggan; not in an isolated incident but the final act in a long conflict. Nevertheless the army ignored the reasons behind these riots and quickly began to assert its authority on the disturbances. But instead of acting as impartial peacekeepers as directed by their political masters in London they targeted nationalist youths and used increasingly violent tactics to contain them in the Bogside.

Although it is accepted that these youths did instigate many of these disturbances it can equally be argued that they were increasingly provoked by the army‟s aggressive actions while the army ignored the equally guilty loyalist youths.

The disturbances in Londonderry were indeed violent yet it is important to note that there was no overt action by the IRA or firearms used. This level of violence in Great Britain would have been controlled by civil police using accepted crowd control tactics and not the army using internal security tactics based upon imperial policing strategies. The army quite clearly was not only the wrong agency to tackle the civil unrest in Londonderry it also used the wrong tactics against civilians who it has to be remembered were citizens of the United

Kingdom. On the contrary their actions demonstrated to the nationalist community that the

British army was not their protector but their enemy. By establishing itself as the dominant security agency in Londonderry and relegating the RUC to a secondary role the army was repeating the same mistake that its predecessors had earlier made in Ireland. They were very soon to repeat the mistake in Belfast. In Londonderry Freeland‟s approach had been demonstrated and although it took longer to implement in Belfast his principles were fully in place by the middle of 1970.

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Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Chapter 6

Belfast: a city at war

On 15 August 1969 a very reluctant British government sent the army into Belfast to act as impartial peacekeepers and to protect the Catholic minority from rioting Protestants.1 The traumatised Catholics in Belfast initially welcomed the troops, however this was very short- lived and was the only time when the relationship between the army and the nationalist community it came to protect was truly amicable. As early as September 1969 there was conflict between the army and the nationalist community in Belfast, even though the army had not come under any direct attack from that community or its traditional defenders the

IRA. On the contrary the IRA in Belfast had worked with the army to help stabilise the situation.2 However very shortly after the initial deployment this amicable relationship began to fracture when the arrogant and aggressive actions of some troops began to be challenged by members of the nationalist community.3 Within weeks of its deployment to Belfast the army had identified the nationalist community as the cause of the disorder and had begun to use increasing force when interacting with that community.

This chapter will demonstrate that even though traditional republicans distrusted the army‟s intentions and had begun to foment unrest, the majority of Belfast nationalists were still content to allow the army to maintain order in their areas.4 Conversely the loyalist majority did not understand why their British army was protecting what they perceived as disloyal

1 Operation Banner, 2006, p. 8-2: C Allen, 1991, p. 207. 2 Geraghty, p. 93, 1998: Thornton, 2007, pp. 73-107: Operation Banner, 2006, p. 3-1. 3 Baston, 2004, p. 360: M Meehan, Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007. 4 M Meehan, Interview by B Treanor. 10 Oct 2007: Billy Kelly, Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007.

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nationalists, and became increasingly angered by what they viewed as an abnormal state of affairs.

Historically the army‟s role in Ireland since partition had been to assist the Unionist government contain nationalist unrest, and this is what the loyalists had expected the army to do when it was deployed to Belfast in 1969. But in August 1969 the main threat was from an enraged loyalist community and not from the traumatised Catholics.5 On Friday 11 October

1969 an incensed loyalist mob from the Shankill Road attempted to storm the nearby Catholic

Unity Flats but were stopped by the RUC and the army.6 Loyalist frustration at being denied their inalienable right to attack Irish nationalists was so great that they turned their attack onto the security forces, not only with stones and petrol bombs but with sustained gunfire.

What is significant about this encounter is that it was the so-called „loyalist‟ majority - not the allegedly „disloyal‟ nationalists - that instigated the first major armed conflict with the British army.7 However it was the manner of the army‟s response to this sustained attack that was to be a major determinant in the relationship between the army and the loyalist majority, and it was that relationship which in turn determined how the army responded to conflict with the nationalist community. When James Callaghan restrained General Freeland from systematically punishing the loyalist community he may have been politically pragmatic but the army showed no such restraint when it confronted nationalists in Londonderry or Belfast.

The Shankill Road gun battle in October 1969 was an anomaly because the army had been forced to confront armed loyalists and not just unruly nationalists.

Even though the army had not been directly attacked by nationalist gunmen its tactics changed from protection to confrontation. Peacekeeping gave way to a military concept of internal security that in turn evolved into counterinsurgency, even though there was no

5 Freeland, Talk to Commanders, 9 Sept 69, 79-34-6. 6 Freeland, Transcript, Interview on This week, 1974. 7 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, London, 788: 47-164, 13 October 1969. 207

recognised insurgency until mid-1971; only widespread public disorder. Operation Banner describes the period between August 1969 and the summer of 1971 simply as a time of widespread public disorder characterised by marches, protests and rioting, and states that a

„classic insurgency‟ did not start until mid-1971 when both wings of the IRA fought the security forces.8 Yet the army had identified the IRA and the nationalist community as the source of the unrest almost immediately after its deployment.9

What Operation Banner perceived as a single phase of the „troubles‟ - the period between

August 1969 and mid-1971 - was in fact three phases in which the army increasingly applied counterinsurgency tactics when they should have operated in the manner of an armed police force preserving order. This chapter will provide an understanding of the army‟s changing approach during the first phase of its deployment to Belfast, between 14 August and

December 1969 when it acted mainly in an impartial manner. The remaining chapter will examine the second phase of the army‟s operations, from January to June 1970 and the beginning of the third in July 1970. In the present chapter I will examine the first phase of the army‟s deployment in Northern Ireland in order to evaluate claims that the army acted as a neutral peacekeeping force during this period. I will also explore the events that allowed the army to stop aiding the civil power in restoring order and begin to engage in something akin to the imperial policing that was to characterise the second phase. The army seems to have applied contradictory tactics during this period by increasingly targeting the nationalist community 10 while still appearing to implement the official policy of winning the „hearts and minds‟ of the same community.11 However before we can explore the increasingly volatile relationship between the army and the nationalist community the relationship between the army and the loyalist majority has to be considered. To this end I will be examining what

8 Operation Banner, 2006, 106, p. 1-3. 9 Freeland, Talk to Commanders. 2 Sept 1969, 79/34/3. 10 M Meehan, Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007: Billy Kelly Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007. 11 Dixon, 2009, pp. 353-381. 208

Freeland termed the first armed conflict of the troubles in an attempt to understand the army‟s contradictory approaches to both communities.

Loyalism and the army.

The Scarman enquiry linked the events of August 1969 to the on-going civil rights campaign that was on one hand emboldening the Catholic minority in its drive for greater political and social equality, while on the other hand creating within the Protestant majority a mounting sense of insecurity that resulted in growing unease throughout the province. However contributing to this sense of unease was a feeling within the nationalist community that the reforms already secured were inadequate and that they should continue their fight for greater equality while extreme loyalists progressively responded to civil rights protests with even more violent counter-protests in a demonstration of their hostility to any dilution of Unionist power.12

Coinciding with the annual loyalist celebrations the level of violence in Belfast increased steadily during 1969 but at the same time extreme loyalist organisations became more active within the Shankill Road. One of these organisations, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) had been founded in 1966 in response to groundless loyalist fears of an IRA uprising, and with the notorious Gusty Spence as one of its leaders it had already been responsible for a number of unprovoked sectarian killings.13 Loyalists had always feared a nationalist uprising and automatically associated the activities of the Catholic-dominated civil rights movement with the IRA. This fear within the loyalist community escalated into anger because of a belief that the security forces were not tackling what loyalists perceived to be the source of the unrest,

12 Scarman Report, 1972, Vol 1, pp. 5-7. 13 English, 2003, pp. 99-100. 209

the IRA within the nationalist community.14 On 2 August 1969 a Protestant mob marched down the Shankill Road and attempted to invade the Catholic Unity Flats, however they were prevented from doing so by the RUC. The very fact that the RUC had stopped them from attacking the Catholic flats enraged loyalists so much that they turned their anger on their own police force.15 While on this occasion the RUC did protect the nationalist community, it was the actions of the same RUC alongside the B-Specials and enraged loyalists during the battle of the Bogside only ten days later that reinforced among Belfast nationalists the perception that loyalists, including the security forces, could not be trusted. Loyalist triumphalism had given way to the virulent anti-Catholicism of earlier eras and the scene was now set for what Catholics believed was an attempt to finally drive them out of Belfast.16

Lord Scarman provides the most authoritative account of the origins of the violence in Belfast on the night of 14/15 August 1969. His report stated that the violence in Belfast began when a nationalist crowd that had been attempting to protest against police brutality in Londonderry had in frustration thrown stones at the police station and subsequently begun fighting with a loyalist crowd.17 However the RUC quickly lost control of the situation and began using

Shorland armoured cars equipped with Browning machine guns, and it was the unnecessary and unauthorised deployment of these vehicles to Belfast, together with the sight of armed B-

Specials openly fighting alongside loyalists, that both alienated and terrified the Catholics.

The end result was a night-long battle between a very frightened Catholic minority fearful of annihilation and a large force of loyalists intent on driving out the Catholic minority. This was a sectarian battle that according to James Callaghan engulfed the Falls Road in riot and destruction, culminating in continuous fighting in many parts of Belfast.18 However the RUC

14 Taylor, Loyalists, Bloomsbury, London, 2000, pp. 50-54. 15 Scarman Report, 1972, pp. 8-9. 16 M Meehan, Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007. 17 Taylor, 2000, p. 66: Scarman Report, 1972, p. 63. 18 Callaghan, 1973, pp. 48-49. 210

had severely over-reacted to what Catholics perceived as the defence of their territory because the police mistakenly believed that the violence in Belfast was not an isolated incident but part of an IRA-fomented insurrection that had already started in Londonderry.19

Lord Scarman in his report on the violence and civil disturbance in Northern Ireland during

1969 confirmed that this was irrational belief and that the RUC had greatly overacted. As he stated:

The conduct [of the RUC] which we have criticised was due to the belief held at the time by many police, including senior officers, [that] they were dealing with an armed uprising engineered by the IRA. … In fact, the police appreciation that they had on their hands an armed uprising led by the IRA was incorrect … there is no credible evidence that the IRA planned or organised the disturbances.20

On the morning of 15 August the Catholic Falls Road had the appearance of a war zone with death and destruction everywhere. Six people had been killed - five of them Catholics - and as Callaghan stated in the House of Commons on 13 October 174 houses had been destroyed and a further 572 damaged with a further five thousand people losing their homes.21 In addition many hundreds of Catholics were forced to flee their homes for fear of another attack by the Protestants.22 Scarman pointedly blamed the predominantly Protestant RUC for failing to prevent Protestant mobs burning down Catholic houses on the night of 14/15

August and questioned why they did so little to protect the Catholic population.23 As a result the majority of Catholics in vulnerable areas were so fearful of another attack that they evacuated their homes as quickly as possible only taking what possessions they could move easily.24 In spite of this devastation only a small number of British troops were deployed onto the streets of Belfast in the afternoon of Friday 15 August, arriving too late to stop more

19 Evans, 1972, p. 130. 20 Scarman Report, 1972, p. 16. 21 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, London, 788: 47-164 13 Oct 1969. 22 Evans, 1972, pp. 136-137: Hastings, 1970, pp. 146-147. 23 The Scarman Report, p. 16 24 Hastings, 1970, p. 147. 211

Catholic homes being burned.25 Nevertheless after a night of being attacked by loyalists and being shot at by the RUC, the Catholics were relieved to see the British troops.26 In spite of that some Catholics blamed the army for not doing more to stop further loyalist attacks on their community and the destruction of more of their homes.27 The army‟s explanation for their apparent inaction was that it was very thin on the ground and had been ordered to use only minimum force.28 However the army‟s appearance on the streets of Belfast even in such small numbers had at least prevented Catholic areas from being overwhelmed by loyalists.29

While nationalists were relieved by the army‟s intervention, unionists were much more disapproving, reasoning that because the army had protected Catholics it had now sided with them. Unionists believed that the army should have helped the RUC and B-Specials subdue the nationalists as it had done in 1935.30 Frustration with the army‟s actions was unmistakable, with one Unionist Senator reported to have stated in the Stormont dining room:

“If only the bloody British army hadn‟t come in … we‟d have shot ten thousand of them

[Catholics] by dawn”.31 Clearly even established Unionist politicians believed that they had a right to subjugate these disloyal Irish nationalists by lethal force and it was not the army‟s role to prevent them doing so.

After deploying troops to stabilise the situation, the British government finally confronted the

Unionist government. Callaghan still believed that he could quickly impose a political solution to solve the sectarian violence and on 19 August he and Harold Wilson met with

Chichester-Clark and senior members of the Northern Ireland cabinet to discuss the deteriorating situation. It was at this meeting that the famous „Downing Street Communiqué‟

25 Evans, 1972, p. 139: Callaghan, 1973, p. 51. 26 Hastings, 1970, p. 147. 27 ibid, p. 149. 28 Evans, 1972, pp. 137-138. 29 ibid, p. 149. 30 Hepburn, 1990, pp. 80-91. 31 Quoted in Evans, 1972, p. 142. 212

was agreed to.32 In addition to formalising the appointment of the GOC NI as the officer responsible for all security operations in Northern Ireland the Communiqué ended with a

Declaration outlining the basis of the relationship between the two governments.33 In an attempt to placate the Unionists the Communiqué re-affirmed that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom so long as its parliament and people wished and that the border was not an issue. And as a signal to the nationalists that their concerns were being addressed, the Declaration also included an undertaking that the Northern Ireland government would address some of the more pressing social and political issues that had been at the heart of the protest movement. Stormont would be responsible for implementing at least some of the necessary reforms including ensuring that there was equality of employment and that public housing would be allocated fairly. The British government vainly hoped that this strategy would both resolve the current situation in Northern Ireland and allow it to remain distant from Irish affairs.

Despite the communiqué, and even though the Catholic community had suffered the most during August, loyalist resentment at British actions continued to simmer. Loyalists continued to believe that the violence had been inspired by nationalists as part of an IRA insurrection and that the army should have been used exclusively against the disloyal nationalists and not loyalists. From their perspective it was the army that had stopped loyalists from attacking their traditional enemy and as a result the army could not now be trusted. In August and September 1969 the principal threat to the security of Northern Ireland therefore did not come from the nationalist community but from the loyalist majority. As

Freeland was later to state, he believed at this time there was more to fear from extreme

32 Communiqué issued on 20 Aug 1969, 10 Dowing St, London, PRONI, Cab/4/1465. 33 Northern Ireland - Text of a Communiqué and Declaration issued after a meeting held at 10 Dowing St on 19 August 1969, Cmnd 4154, HMSO, London. 213

loyalists than there was from the traumatised nationalists. Events in October were to prove him correct.

The Hunt Report and the Shankill Road incident of October 1969.

Friday 11 October 1969 was to become a very fateful day in the history of the Northern

Ireland „troubles‟. As we have seen, not only was it the day that Sir Arthur Young took up his position as Inspector General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 34 - personally tasked by the

Home Secretary James Callaghan to transform the RUC into a replica of an English county police force; it was also was the day that the Hunt Report on policing in Northern Ireland was published. The way the army dealt with the violent unionist response to these developments reveals important differences between the army‟s approach to loyalist and nationalist unrest.

Coincidentally, James Callaghan was in Northern Ireland on the second of his ministerial visits on this day, and he states - significantly - that the outbreak of violence on 11 October came as a complete surprise to the government because the nationalists in Belfast were quiet and the only area of concern was the Bogside. Despite everything, Callaghan proceeded on the assumption that the nationalists were only potential source of trouble. However when the pubs on the Shankill Road closed the loyalists erupted in an alcohol-fuelled protest against the disarming of their RUC and the disbanding of the B-Specials proposed by the Hunt report. Triggered by an earlier confrontation between nationalist youths and loyalists returning from a march, 35 the drunken mob advanced down the Shankill Road towards the

Catholic Unity Walk flats until it was confronted by a line of RUC officers who linked arms

(a tactic the Metropolitan police had successfully employed during the Grosvenor Square riots) in an attempt to block their path. Even though the mob was initially repulsed, the RUC

34 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, London, 788: 47-164, 13 October 1969. 35 Taylor, 2000, p. 72. 214

recognised that they would need help and called for army support, and it was when the army confronted the mob that loyalists began firing on the security forces killing one RUC officer.

It was this incident that James Callaghan reported in parliament two days later stating that

Constable Arbuckle was a part of this small group of police before the mob murdered him in cold blood.36

Lt Col J. Ballenden, Officer Commanding (OC) 3 Light Infantry and the officer in charge of the army‟s contingent, reported that there were between fifty and seventy police facing a loyalist crowd that had increased to around two thousand by 11 p.m.37 The Times reported on

13 October that loyalist snipers in doorways, windows and on rooftops had shot at the RUC and the troops throughout that night. Not only had they shot and killed Constable Arbuckle but they had also injured a number of other police officers as well as soldiers. Loyalists fired volleys of automatic fire down the Shankill Road aimed directly at the RUC and the army, with a journalist from The Times personally witnessing a police constable being hit by a bullet.38 Sir Arthur Young‟s description of the loyalist mob is especially evocative:

They rose in their wrath to demonstrate against the vile things Hunt had said about their wonderful police. They came in their thousands down the Shankill Road, appearing like animals, as if by magic. Then they marched to burn the Catholics out of the nearby flats. And as they came down the street, they were halted by a cordon of exactly the same police they were marching to defend.39

Lt Col Ballenden was in overall command of the British troops deployed to support the RUC on the night of 11/12 October 1969, and was the author of the official report to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS). His troops had initially been held in reserve but at 11 p.m., and after a request from the RUC they confronted the rioters. They were immediately attacked with

36 Callaghan, 1973, p. 123. 37 Freeland, Report on operations in Shankill Rd, on night of 11/12 October 1969. By Lt Col J. Ballenden, OC 3 LI, Oct, 1969, 79-34-3. 38 More troops go to Ulster after deaths, The Times, London, 13 Oct 1969. 39 Quoted in Evans, 1972, pp. 164-165. 215

rocks and bottles. After twenty minutes of enduring this barrage Ballenden ordered CS gas to be used, and it was then that loyalist gunmen began firing directly at the British troops and the RUC. Between 11 p.m. on 11 October and 12.30 a.m. on 12 October the RUC and the army were subjected to an almost constant volley of gunfire and it was during this period that

Constable Arbuckle was killed and the other police and soldiers injured.40 As Callaghan stated: “What followed was a hail of fire from machine-guns and sustained sniper fire from behind barricades made up of paving stones and overturned lorries.”41 Significantly General

Freeland stated later that was the first shooting incident of the troubles.42

The most notable aspect of the army‟s response was its extreme restraint. Despite the intense and prolonged provocation it was one hour and forty minutes before Lt Col. Ballenden was allowed to order army snipers to return fire.43 Ballenden later reported that the result of the army‟s actions was that four petrol bombers and two loyalist snipers were seen to be hit.44

Ballenden stated that throughout the night there was almost constant gunfire from the loyalists with at least one thousand rounds being fired at his troops from a range of weapons including machine guns, shotguns, .22 rifles and pistols. In response, British troops reportedly only expended a total of sixty-six rounds in return. At the end of the battle

Ballenden confirmed that loyalist gunfire had killed one RUC officer and wounded twenty soldiers and police.45 In the aftermath some fifty to sixty rioters were arrested, and although troops reported shooting six rioters only two deaths were confirmed. What Ballenden had described was the classic British approach to the suppression of riots described in the Army‟s

40 Freeland, Report on operations in Shankill Rd, on night of 11/12 October 1969, By Lt Col J. Ballenden, OC 3 LI, Oct. 1969, 79-34-3. 41 Callaghan, 1973, p. 123. 42 Freeland, Notes in response to Jardine’s questionnaire, MoD, May 72, 79-34-4. 43 Quoted in Thornton, 2007, pp. 73-107. 44 C. Warman, „More troops go to Ulster after deaths‟. The Times, London, 13 Oct 1969. 45 Freeland, Report on operations in Shankill Rd, on night of 11/12 October 1969 By Lt Col J. Ballenden, OC 3 LI, Oct. 1969, 79-34-3. 216

Land Operations Manual on Internal Security issued in 1969.46 Chapter 3, Suppression of

Unlawful Assemblies and Riots, describes the tactics that should be used by military forces to suppress riots. Ballenden had followed the manual‟s instructions and warned the crowd that he was about to fire, personally given the order to fire to selected troops, and contained the area after the riot had been suppressed.47

General Freeland later stated that while he had expected a strong reaction from the

Protestants to the recommendations of the Hunt report he did not believe that they would shoot policemen and soldiers. While the reorganisation of the RUC was a part of the British government‟s plan to give increased civil rights to the nationalist minority, nobody in the

British camp including Callaghan had understood the strength of the loyalist opposition or the backlash it would produce.48 At two o‟clock in the morning Freeland stated that he was compelled to wake Callaghan to advise him about the gun battle in the Shankill Road, 49 however according to Callaghan he was not advised until the next morning, and then by Neil

Cairncross who had taken the decision not to disturb him. Whatever the circumstances it was not until the next day that Callaghan met with Freeland at Army headquarters at Lisburn to discuss the situation; 50 what Freeland described as “a great meeting in my office to try and decide what we were going to do about it.”51 It was at this meeting that Freeland was persuaded by Callaghan to tread softly against the loyalists. This may have been because as

Wood and Bruce have argued, the army was not in a position to confront two hostile opponents at the same time, especially an enraged Protestant community.52Ultimately it was the extremely violent loyalist response to the Hunt report that frightened an already wary

46 Land Operations British Army, Vol 3-Counter Revolutionary Operation: 118, MoD (1969), London. 47 Freeland, Report on operations in Shankill Rd, on night of 11/12 October 1969, By Lt Col J Ballenden, OC 3 LI, Oct. 1969, 79-34-3. 48 Freeland, Transcript-This week-Five Long years - 1974, IWM 79/34/4. 49 ibid. 50 Callaghan, 1973, p. 124. 51 Freeland, Transcript-This week-Five Long years – 1974, IWM 79/34/4. 52 Ian S Wood, God, Guns and Ulster: A History of Loyalist Paramilitaries, Caxton Editions, London 2004; S Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, Oxford Uni Press, 1992. 217

British government and convinced them that at this particular point of time angry loyalists were more of a threat than a traumatised nationalist community and they responded accordingly.

If Callaghan had been surprised by the loyalist violence then Freeland‟s response to what was at that time the largest battle ever to have been fought in Northern Ireland was more straightforward. Freeland simply viewed the army‟s containment of loyalist gunmen in the

Shankill Road as a military operation, and it was this operation that Lt Col Ballenden had described in his report to the Chief of the General Staff. Freeland, while being matter-of-fact about the battle was deeply disturbed about the actions of the loyalists, as he stated: “people who were supposed to be loyal to the crown were [firing on] forces of the crown.”53 The fact that loyalist gunmen had killed one of their own policemen and wounded thirty members of the security forces was serious enough, but Freeland‟s specific concern was that soldiers had been wounded by gunfire. As he later commented: “it was very lucky for all concerned that these soldiers had not all been killed by people supposedly loyal to the British crown.”54 On

18 October 1969 Freeland directly raised his concerns with the army‟s most senior commander, the Chief of the General Staff. In his report Freeland clearly enunciated the risk to both the army and Northern Ireland when he stated:

… soldiers will normally accept the hazard of becoming a casualty in wartime … but when wounded by his own people or seeing his friends wounded or killed, he is liable to become very angry indeed. You [CGS] will have seen the Daily Mirror article which reported an interview with wounded soldiers who threatened revenge. … We shall have to watch discipline carefully because there have already been signs of a deep resentment and rough handling of suspects, particularly by men of 3 LI who suffered casualties last Saturday.55

53 ibid. 54 ibid. 55 Freeland, Letter from Freeland to CGS, 18 Oct 1969, IWM 79/34/3. 218

General Freeland was clearly worried that there was a risk both to the morale and discipline of British troops if they were to again come under fire from their „own people‟. However on this occasion the army displayed admirable restraint responding to an armed attack. This restraint was in marked contrast to how it confronted the nationalist community.

The following morning the army followed normal military procedure and consolidated its hold on the Shankill Road using armoured cars to patrol the area and soldiers on foot searching all individuals. However it did not attempt to contain all of the Shankill Road, but only a limited area.56 Callaghan states that Freeland had wanted to conduct what he termed „a very rigorous search‟ of the entire Shankill Road that morning and had planned to „cordon off‟ the whole area and use a helicopter to warn people that the army was going to search their houses. However Callaghan believed that any army overreaction could further inflame loyalist anger and urged Freeland “to use utmost diplomacy”.57 Callaghan had clearly been able to bring pressure on Freeland to limit the army‟s response to the loyalists attack because of the threat they posed. Even so an army helicopter was used to patrol the area and parts of the Shankill Road were cordoned by the army and houses searched, although not by the army but the RUC.58 However Callaghan was at pains to defuse any potential loyalist unrest because when he reported on the aftermath of the battle in the Commons on 13 October he was very conciliatory. As he stated: “[that only] three streets were cordoned where after a search „with great inconvenience to the innocent citizens‟ the police obtained valuable information and material”.59 However the material mentioned by Callaghan was in fact firearms and a radio transmitter. Max Hastings later argued that by limiting the area searched the authorities had allowed many more weapons to be spirited out of the area.60 The army‟s

56 Hastings, 1970, p. 184. 57 Callaghan, 1973, p. 124. 58 Hastings, 1970, p. 184. 59 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, London, 788: 47-164, 13 Oct 1969. 60 Hastings, 1970, pp. 185-196. 219

actions on this occasion are in stark contrast to the manner in which they responded to what started as a small scale riot in the Lower Falls the following July, when - as we shall see - they surrounded the entire area, instigated a total curfew for more than two days and searched every home.61

However General Freeland was convinced that the army had given the loyalists „a very salutary lesson‟ and it was that lesson that allowed the loyalist areas to remain calm.62

Loyalists had initially reacted with the fury of a righteous people who felt abandoned by their

British government because the army appeared to be favouring the disloyal nationalists. But while the British army acted with great restraint, its actions on that October night did teach the loyalists that if they again attacked the army with guns it would respond in kind.

However, as Bell has argued, the British army was mainly deployed in nationalist areas and this was one of the few occasions when they had to confront loyalist aggression; on other occasions any disagreement with the loyalists was quickly patched up.63 Seldom in the future would British soldiers have to exchange fire with their „own people‟.

January 1970; a time of change.

In January 1970 there was a split within the IRA that resulted in the emergence of the more confrontational Provisional IRA (PIRA) which in turn led senior British army officers in

Northern Ireland to date the start of insurgency to early 1970.64 This split had resulted indirectly from the abject failure of the IRA‟s 1956-1962 Border campaign after which a new

Chief of Staff, Cathal Goulding had been appointed. Goulding was different from his predecessors in that he was a Marxist with an inclination for political action, and as a result

61 Geraghty, 1998, p. 33: Warner, 2006, p. 325. 62 Freeland, Staff College Lecture, 9 Dec. 1970, IWM 79/34/3. 63 J.B Bell, „The Escalation of Insurgency: The Provisional Irish Republican Army's Experience, 1969-1971‟, The Review of Politics, 35(No 3), 1973, pp 398-411. 64 General Michael Grey, IWM 11146, 2007. 220

he began to move the IRA away from its traditional physical force tradition and into the political arena.65 However this was not universally accepted within the organisation, with some members, including Sean MacStiofain, who was on the IRA‟s army council at that time, believing that Goulding was taking the IRA into what MacStiofain called “the never- never land of theoretical Marxism and parliamentary politics.”66 Even though Goulding continued to make public statements about a renewed military campaign he was simultaneously transforming the IRA into a socialist and activist organisation more attuned to the international radical socialism of the 1960s than to the fundamentalist nationalism of the early twentieth century. This revised ideology was based upon a belief that if the Protestant working class could be convinced that they too were being discriminated against by the unionist elite they would join with the Catholic working class to oppose the Unionist state.67

This strategy was to prove utterly naïve, and only confirmed that the southern leadership of the IRA had little understanding of the institutionalised sectarianism of Northern Ireland or the forces that drove the northern Protestants.

Consistent with Goulding‟s strategy the IRA did become involved in the civil rights movement, although this only contributed to the radicalisation of the latter, which in turn deepened mistrust between nationalists and loyalists. However the IRA did not have the military means to defend the political gains it was attempting to secure for the nationalist community; it had a limited number of weapons and those it did have were generally obsolete. 68 When enraged loyalists attacked nationalist areas of Belfast, Goulding‟s IRA was in no position to defend them and it was the fundamental failure of the traditional IRA to protect its community that eroded its support in Northern Ireland and led to the establishment

65 English, 2003, .p 84: Smith, 1995, pp. 72-75. 66 Quoted in Taylor, Provos: The IRA & Sinn Fein, Bloomsbury, London, 1997, p. 59. 67 English, 2003, pp. 83-92: Smith, 1995, pp. 81-83. 68 English, 2003, pp. 81-108: T P Coogan, The IRA, Harper Collins, London, 1995, pp. 367-368. 221

in January 1970 of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), an organisation claiming to be more focused on the immediate needs of the nationalist community in the north.69

During August 1969 Catholic areas of Belfast were not only attacked by loyalist mobs but also by the RUC and B-Specials and it was these unanswered attacks that terminally weakened support for the traditional IRA within the nationalist community. As Martin

Meehan, a long time republican activist, stated in an interview in 2007: “the official IRA

[had] removed all their weapons from the nationalist areas of Belfast and left the Catholics defenceless, the next day the loyalists, the RUC and the B-Specials came into these areas and burned out several streets and killed and injured its citizens.”70 By mid-August at least nine

Catholics had been killed and whole Catholic streets had been destroyed by loyalist mobs.71

Even though the IRA had scrambled to bring what weapons it could back to Belfast, this proved too little and too late, and it was the inability of the Dublin-based IRA to protect the nationalist community in Belfast that galvanised local republicans to begin the process of replacing the existing leadership with northern activists.

In December 1969 the Provisional IRA was born out of a wish to defend its people and to return to the IRA‟s original physical force traditions.72 After quitting from Goulding‟s IRA,

Sean MacStiofain became the PIRA‟s new Chief of Staff and the Provisionals broke completely with the traditional IRA in January 1970 with the formation of a political wing,

Provisional Sein Fein. What remained of the traditional IRA subsequently became known as the Official IRA (OIRA). The PIRA rejected Goulding‟s Marxism and political activism and began returning to its traditional physical force roots.73 While the leadership of the PIRA

69 M Meehan, Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007. 70 ibid. 71 English, 2003, pp. 102-103: Freeland, Minutes of a meeting between CGS and Freeland. 21 Aug. 1969, „As early as 21 August General Freeland confirmed that it was the RUC which was responsible for most of the shooting during that period and therefore Catholic deaths‟, IWM 79/34/3. 72 Smith, 1995, p. 94: M Meehan, Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007. 73 English, 2003, pp. 104-107. 222

came from a traditional IRA background, its members were not constrained by the ideology of the recent past, but saw their role as both to defend the nationalist minority and to reinforce within that community a belief that they had the power to determine their own future.74 If in

August 1969 the nationalist minority had been in a hopeless situation then the emergence of the PIRA in January 1970 gave them hope that loyalists could no longer attack them with impunity.75 The PIRA was thus born out of a northern nationalist minority that was desperate for someone, anyone, to defend them from further onslaughts from vengeful loyalists.

If Northern republicanism had been undergoing structural and ideological changes during the first two phases of the „troubles‟ then the British army in Northern Ireland was also undergoing similar changes. In the army‟s official report into its deployment to Northern

Ireland, Operation Banner, the period between August 1969 and mid-1971 is simply described as one of widespread disorder and it is stated that an insurgency did not start until the summer of 1971.76 Yet senior officers on the ground at the time considered that the insurgency had started with the emergence of the PIRA in January 1970.77 This also demonstrates a clear distinction between the first relatively impartial peacekeeping phase and an unofficial decision to operate in a counter-insurgency mode at the start of 1970, the second phase of its operations.

The troops on the streets of Belfast during the first phase of the army‟s deployment - August to December 1969 - were on the whole seen as peacekeepers and had actively developed friendly relations with local communities.78 Even when there was conflict between the army and the nationalist community, the army had actively cooperated with the OIRA in an attempt

74 Smith, 1995, pp. 84-85. 75 English, 2003, pp. 120-121. 76 Operation Banner, p. 1-3. 77 General Michael Grey, IWM, London, 11146, 2007. 78 Taylor, Brits, Bloomsbury, London, 2001, pp. 37-39. 223

to contain the violence.79 However few of the troops that were initially deployed to Northern

Ireland in August 1969 knew anything about Ireland or the role they were going to perform.

Those that had taken the trouble to gain some understanding of the situation believed the army‟s role was simply to restore order and to protect the Catholic minority from being attacked by the Protestant majority.80 Colonel McBain, an officer with the 1st Battalion the

Light Infantry, was with one of the first units to be deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969 and recalls that when they first went on to the streets their role: “was to protect the Catholics from the Protestants.”81 Another senior officer, Brigadier James Cowen states that he had „read into Ireland‟ before being posted there and accepted that the Catholics in Northern Ireland were second-class citizens who had for many years been discriminated against by the loyalist majority.82

The belief that it was the Catholics who were the victims also appears to have been widespread and have influenced the first British troops deployed into the Catholic areas of

Belfast, with most reports confirming that the troops got on very well with the nationalist community.83 As one „squaddie‟ later stated: “as we patrolled around the Falls Road, Divis

Street and around the Grosvenor Road [we] got on famously with the Catholics [but] when we ventured into any Prod (Protestant) areas [we were] seen as Taig (Catholic) lovers.”84

According to the Commanding Officer (CO) of 1 Para when they took over from the Light

Infantry after the Shankill Road battle of 11/12 October 1969, his orders were to restore normality and he did this by telling his troops to develop and keep a relationship with the

79 Geraghty, 1998, p. xix. 80 Taylor, 1997, p. 56. 81 Col McBain, IWM, London, 11105, 2007. 82 Brig. J. Cowen, IWM London, 18802, 2007. 83 Allen, 1991, pp. 208-210: Lindsay, 1998, pp 12-14. 84 Wharton, 2008, pp. 46-47. 224

local people. He also confirms that the main threat came from the extremist Unionist groups and not the nationalists.85

Lt Col (later General) Michael Grey operated in both Catholic and Protestant areas of Belfast in late 1969 and he states one of his major responsibilities was to establish a close working relationship with the nationalist community including the Official IRA.86 Operation Banner, the British army‟s official report into its deployment to Northern Ireland confirms that troops were directed to establish links with the local communities, especially the Catholic community, and to work with their leaders to help restore order, a direction also confirmed by

General Freeland.87 This may have occurred because the IRA was not active at this time and it was well known that it neither had the will nor the means to challenge the army.88 Overall the relationship between the nationalist community and the army during 1969 was reasonably amicable; in spite of that by the start of 1970 the situation had deteriorated to such a degree that trust was beginning to be replaced with hostility. Those troops who had been first deployed to Belfast in August were still on friendly terms with the nationalist community when they completed their first tour at the end of 1969, yet when the same soldiers returned for a second tour some months later, attitudes had dramatically changed and they were no longer welcomed.89

With the exception of the two resident battalions in Northern Ireland the majority of these troops were on short-term deployments of just four months and were replaced during

December 1969 and January 1970 when their tour of duty ended. This was a decision made by the Ministry of Defence in London because they believed it was the optimum length for

85 Allen, 1991, pp. 207-211. 86 General Michael Grey, IWM, 11146, 2007. 87 Operation Banner, 2006, p. 7-6: Freeland, IWM 79/34/3. 88 General Michael Grey, IWM, 11146, 2007: Operation Banner, 2006, p. 7-6 89 Taylor, 1997, pp. 67-68. 225

such a deployment.90 The troops who left at the turn of the year had come to Northern Ireland as impartial peacekeepers and had been explicitly tasked with developing friendly relations with both communities.91 In Operation Banner the army‟s role is clearly spelt out: “When the army arrived in 1969 civil-military operations were seen as a way of maintaining the confidence of all sections of the community, but particularly the Catholics.”92 While the troops deployed in August 1969 had performed this unenviable role even in the face of provocation, their replacements deployed at the start of 1970 very quickly squandered the trust that the first units had built up. Rather it appears that the newly deployed troops immediately began to act as soldiers on internal security duties and not as peacekeepers.

As we shall see in the next chapter this phase was defined by the same internal security tactics used so recently by the army in Cyprus and Aden. Nevertheless from August to

December 1969, and even though the army had confronted nationalist unrest there was still enough goodwill to retain an amicable relationship between these two parties. Why then did the army change its strategy so dramatically in Belfast at the beginning of 1970 and enter into the second and more confrontation phase of its operations? The answer may lie in the fact that those troops deployed in late December 1969 and January 1970 had not developed a relationship based upon the Catholics need for protection, however it could also be argued that the change was influenced by much more powerful forces. As early as 2 September

1969, four months before the formation of the PIRA, General Freeland was briefing his commanders that there was an entrenched „anti-British‟ feeling within the nationalist community, an opinion he states was formed after his meeting with nationalist leaders in

Belfast. These „hard-liners‟ had informed him that normality had not existed in Ireland since

90 Allen, 1991, p. 212. 91 ibid, pp. 210-212. 92 Operation Banner, 2006, Ref 717. 226

the „hated British army‟ had shot their fathers and grandfathers in 1920.93 Less than three weeks after British troops had been deployed by the British government as impartial peacekeepers to protect the nationalist community General Freeland was telling his commanders that while it was their duty to „hold the ring‟ in an impartial manner it was the nationalist community that was „the problem‟ in Northern Ireland. Freeland went further and told his commanders that even though some right-wing Protestants posed a threat, the „main threat‟ confronting the army was from the IRA and the Civil Rights movement.94

Although the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was at that time the army‟s most dangerous protagonist General Freeland had dismissed this threat and was telling his commanders that the main threat was from the IRA and the nationalist community, and as a result it must be prepared for the time when they would inevitably launch an attack.95 Even at this very early phase in the army‟s deployment to Northern Ireland, purportedly to protect the

Catholics from Protestant attack, the British army commander was informing his leadership group that it was the IRA and other disloyal nationalist groups that they had to be mainly concerned about. Despite the fact that the army‟s political masters had tasked the army to restore order in an impartial manner Freeland was preparing his troops for a threat that eventuality come from the IRA. It was because of this that British troops began training in classic counter-insurgency tactics.

However there is evidence that the escalation from the first to the second stage had already occurred even before Freeland had briefed his commanders. General Freeland described the confrontation between loyalists and nationalists in Percy Street Belfast on 7 September 1969,

96 when he army first used CS gas on nationalist protestors as the event that ended the

93 Freeland, Talk to Commanders - 2 Sept 1969, IWM 79/34/3. 94 ibid. 95 ibid. 96 J. Clare, Troops fire CS gas on crowd in Belfast, The Times, London, 8 Sept 1969. 227

„army‟s honeymoon‟ in Northern Ireland.97 It was shortly after this incident that General

Freeland had come to the conclusion that only the British army was capable of restoring order in Northern Ireland and he was preparing the army for that task. As he informed the Chief of the General Staff in November 1969: “the chronically under-strength RUC was [now] unable to maintain law and order.”98 He judged that this was primarily because the RUC was in the process of becoming an unarmed English-style police force that would be both unwilling and unable to function as a credible internal security force. This would result in the army having to take over the burden of maintaining order on the streets.99 Freeland also judged that Belfast needed army intervention because the situation could rapidly change from ordinary riots into a full-blooded street battle of rapid movement and gunfire. He also stated that such disturbances usually occur at night and when the army confronts this very tough opposition it must be fully prepared to adapt quickly and use all the tools at their disposal including CS gas, baton squads and marksmen with night vision equipment.100 By the end of 1969 the army were no longer acting as impartial peacekeepers but increasingly began to carry out the type of internal security role that they had performed in Cyprus, Aden and other recent internal security operations.

While the army‟s political masters may still have believed that the army‟s role was to keep the peace even-handedly between nationalists and unionists, it is clear that in early 1970 the army‟s commanders were preparing to confront what they believed was a newly energised

IRA. General Michael Grey states that at the start of 1970 the situation began to dramatically change with the emergence of the Provisional IRA and it was then that the insurgency began and the army started to shoot to kill.101 There is no other evidence to support this assessment,

97 Freeland, Study period, 5 Dec 1969, IWM 79/34/3. 98 ibid, Formal Brief to CGS and Freeland, 7 Nov 1969. 99 ibid. 100 ibid, Summary of the GOC’s Study day, 5 December 1969. 101 General Michael Grey, IWM, 11146. 228

and as we have seen, it is at odds with the official report into the army‟s operations in

Northern Ireland, Operation Banner, which describes the period from August 1969 until the summer of 1971 only as a time of widespread public disorder with marches, protests and rioting. Operation Banner categorically states that it was not until after mid-1971 that an

„insurgency‟ took place.102 Therefore there is a significant contradiction between the assessment of those who were directing operations in Belfast at that time and the army officers who reassessed the evidence some thirty-seven years later. Whatever the reasons for this discrepancy, it is clear that by the start of 1970 the army had significantly changed its tactics and strategy and it had done so in the absence of any insurgency by either branch of the IRA. From that point on the army removed any facade of assisting the police in restoring order and began a new phase where the army would use its established internal security tactics to restore order in the same way they had very recently operated in Aden and Cyprus.

Conclusions

In October 1969 it was the loyalists who became the first of Northern Ireland‟s warring communities to attack the army and engage in a sustained gunfight that ended in one policeman being killed and other members of the security forces being injured by loyalist gunmen. However the most significant outcome of this battle was that although it was the first direct attack on the army it was the last major confrontation between loyalists and the army. It could be argued that this was only possible because the army had not over-reacted against the loyalist community but had been constrained by their political masters fearful of a loyalist backlash.

102 Operation Banner, 2006, p. 1-3. 229

The army may have been prepared to accept its role as impartial peacekeepers in late 1969, however by the start of 1970 it had changed from peacekeeping to operating as an imperial internal security force and it was well on the way to becoming a counter-insurgency force.

This change did coincide with the foundation of the Provisional IRA in early 1970, however the Provisional IRA at that time was in no position to fight the army even though it might have wanted to do. In the early 1970s the PIRA lacked both the numbers and the weapons to do so. In fact the reasons for the army‟s changed approach were internal to the army. When the first troops deployed were replaced in December 1969 and January 1970, their replacements did not continue the friendly relations their predecessors had established even if

„hearts and minds‟ - or as the army called it, „community relations‟ - remained the official policy until the imposition of direct rule from Westminster in 1974. Moreover the army‟s leadership was increasingly prepared to confront a resurgent IRA even though the army‟s own account states that an insurgency did not begin until mid-1971.

The army‟s operations in Belfast from August 1969 and until July 1970 can be broken up into three separate phases, each with different contributing factors and outcomes. During the first phase, between August and December 1969 the army in Belfast on the whole acted as impartial peacekeepers and at least earned the grudging respect of the nationalist community.

Conversely the loyalist community increasingly saw the army as failing in their duty to help them keep the nationalist community under control. However even though the violent conflict of 11 October had resulted in loyalists and members of the security forces being killed and injured this was the only time that they came into such violent conflict. The event had been a crisis for both sides, and both had learnt some valuable lessons; the loyalists would never again take on the British army and the British had learnt how dangerous enraged loyalists could be.

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During the second phase of army operations, from the start of 1970 until June of that year, the pendulum swung very much towards confrontation with the nationalists. General Freeland had very early on determined that the RUC were no longer capable of restoring order to the streets of Belfast and that the army had to perform this role. But the army‟s approach was inevitably shaped by its experience of colonial policing; a military concept of policing that bore little resemblance to the civilian variety. Freeland was a product of many internal security operations as were the majority of his officers and senior NCOs who logically applied their very recent experiences in Aden, Cyprus and other colonial actions to Northern

Ireland. While the task of the first wave of troops had been to gain the trust of the nationalist community, those deployed at the start of 1970 obtained no such direction because their leaders had by that time determined that the main threat was coming from a resurgent IRA and that any threat from extreme loyalists could best be contained without confrontation. The events of the next few months would display without any ambiguity that the army was no longer impartial peacekeepers but was in Northern Ireland to support the Unionist government. It was the blatantly confrontational approach of the army in Ballymurphy in

April 1970 and still more its extreme actions during the Lower Falls curfew in July that signalled the start of the third phase of the army‟s deployment and proved to the nationalist community that the army was not in any way neutral but was now targeting them. These actions, which clearly demonstrated the army‟s transition from peacekeeping to counter- insurgency, are the focus of the next chapter.

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Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Chapter 7

Nationalism and the army

If the army had been welcomed as peacekeepers in nationalist areas of Belfast immediately after their deployment in August 1969, then by early 1970 they had become almost completely estranged from the community they had originally come to protect.

Disenchantment had been steadily growing throughout this period but any lingering notion that the army was there to keep the peace was shattered by the actions of the Royal Scots in

Ballymurphy on 30 March 1970. Troops that had initially been deployed to protect Catholics from rampaging protestant mobs instead turned on the Catholic residents of the Ballymurphy estate and subjected them to ethnic and sectarian abuse while driving them back into their ghetto.1 The Royal Scots were not only provocative and discriminatory in their actions but the army‟s use of overwhelming force during the following two nights escalated a relatively minor sectarian disturbance into a major conflict between the nationalist community and the army.2 The army ignored the local sectarian issues that sparked the initial conflict and only targeted one faction, an action that further demonstrated to the nationalist population of

Belfast that the army was no longer neutral but was now actively supporting the loyalist majority. Further, by confronting only those whom their CO had decided were the problem they followed the example of their colleagues in Londonderry in August 1969 who had also ignored the underlying reasons for the disturbances and simply targeted the nationalist communities of the Bogside and Creggan. The army, because of its extensive experience in

1 20 British soldiers hurt in new clash in Northern Ireland, New York Times, New York, 1 April 1970. 2 Troops use tear gas in another night of violence in Belfast, Irish News, Belfast, 2 April 1970.

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colonial warfare had reverted to a traditional counter-insurgency force.3

While the events in Ballymurphy were significant in undermining the relationship between the army and the nationalist community they were also a signal that the army had changed from its initial role as an impartial peacekeeper to a more familiar military mode. However it was General Freeland‟s curfew of the Lower Falls in July 1970 that signalled the beginning of forceful confrontation against the nationalist community. The imprisoning of the residents of the exclusively nationalist area in their homes for almost three days was, as Mockaitis stated, collectively punishing the entire nationalist population.4 In the Lower Falls the British army operated as if it was in Malaya or Cyprus, rather than in a part of the United Kingdom.

Its actions also clearly signalled to both the nationalists and loyalists that the army‟s role was now to restore the authority of the Unionist government at Stormont and that it would use overwhelming force if required. The army‟s response to the increased sectarian conflict during the first half of 1970 significantly damaged an already fragile relationship with the nationalist community and transformed it into total alienation. From that point on the army confronted any civil unrest from nationalists with overwhelming force and it is clear that there was a systematic change of direction by the army that resulted in any nationalist unrest being brutally suppressed while similar loyalist transgressions were ignored.

This chapter will examine the changes in the army‟s approach towards the nationalist community during the second phase of its deployment, January to June 1970, and the start of the third phase in July 1970 and from the available evidence attempt to determine why these changes occurred. Issues that will be examined include why the army routinely responded to nationalists unrest with excessive force when they were not prepared to actively confront

3 Benest in H Strachan, 2006, p. 116: Thornton, „Historical Origins of the British Army's Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorist Techniques‟, 7th Annual Conference of the PfP Consortium. Geneva, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), pp. 1-17. 4 Mockaitis, 1990, p. 17.

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loyalists in the same manner. I will also be examining the start of the crucial third phase of the army‟s deployment in Northern Ireland, July 1970 in an attempt to challenge continued claims that the army was still a neutral peacekeeping force at this stage.5 Finally, I intend to explore whether the emergence of the Provisional IRA in early 1970 required the army to change tactics at this point in time or whether it merely furnished a pretext for the army to adopt an approach it had pre-determined.

Ballymurphy

Even though 1970 had started peacefully, by the end of March there was an increase in sectarian disturbances that coincided with the beginning of the loyalist marching season.

Loyalist triumphalism over the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland had traditionally begun with the loyalist Apprentice Boys parade on Easter Monday with further parades continuing until late October, however the major event in the marching season was a march through Belfast on 12 July to celebrate King William‟s victory at the Battle of the Boyne in

1690.6 The relative calm of the previous months ended abruptly on 31 March when sectarian riots broke out at the interface between the Catholic Ballymurphy estate and neighbouring

Protestant housing estates.7 On the morning of 31 March the Junior Orange order, in a deliberately provocative move, paraded with drums, fifes and accordions for two hours on the edge of the Ballymurphy estate before departing for their march. However it was only when the marchers returned later in the day and were met by a large crowd of Catholic youths intent on responding to the earlier loyalist provocation that rioting began. The Catholic youths, with memories of the loyalist attacks of the previous August doubtless still fresh in

5 Operation Banner, 2006. 6 Parades and Marches, Chronology 1, Key dates in the parading calendar, Cain Web Service, 2010. 7 J. Chartres, Belfast crowds clash with troops, The Times, London, 1 April 1970.

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their minds, began throwing stones and bottles at the returning marchers8, and it was at this point that a company of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Scots were hastily despatched to separate the warring factions. However the army had only deployed seventy troops to separate some four hundred young Catholics from a large number of Protestants, and this proved inadequate.9

At this early stage of the confrontation the Commanding Officer of the Royal Scots merely viewed this as a typical sectarian disturbance between Catholics and Protestants and not part of a deliberate attack on his troops. Eventually however those seventy Royal Scots turned their backs on the Protestants and faced the Catholics from the Ballymurphy estate, and it was at this point that the Catholic youths began attacking the soldiers.10 What began as a typical sectarian fracas between local Catholics and Protestants thus ended as a major confrontation between nationalists and the British army and resulted in more than twenty soldiers being injured before they were eventually forced to withdraw. This first major clash between the two groups may have resulted in a fleeting victory for the nationalists, but the army‟s response was to have major consequences.

The following morning the unionist newspaper the News Letter inflamed the situation by reporting that the incident had been an attack on the Royal Scots by republican crowds who had used bricks, stones and bottles.11 It also criticised the army for not doing enough to protect local Protestants, questioning why it had sent only seventy soldiers, and why the

Royal Scots who had courageously defended local Protestants had been replaced by soldiers of the Light Infantry, who they claimed were sympathetic to the Catholics.12 The Times also appeared to reflect loyalist fears by reporting on 2 April that the riot was one of the worst

8 Evans, 1972, pp. 201-204: Thornton, „The British Army and the origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy‟, Small Wars & Insurgency, 15(No 1), 2004, pp. 83-106. 9 Thornton, 2007. 10 Allen, 1991, p. 212. 11 Managh, Full-scale rioting at Ballymurphy, News letter, Belfast, 1 April 1970. 12 ibid.

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conflagrations since the previous year, reporting that the Royal Scots had to face a hostile crowd of some five hundred Roman Catholics and were targeted with a continuous hail of bricks and bottles.13 On Tuesday 2 April News Letter further inflamed the situation by reporting that republicans had fired at troops, a claim they were forced to withdraw the next day.14

On the night of 1 April there was more rioting between loyalists and nationalists, but on this occasion the army responded with between six hundred and a thousand troops, including a larger force of Royal Scots supported by armoured cars.15 The rioting continued for another night and on both occasions the army ignored the loyalists and singled out the nationalist crowds for attention, using baton charges to drive them back into the Ballymurphy estate. The army further escalated the situation with its unrestrained use of CS gas to disperse rioters.

According to the Sunday Times the gas permeated almost every house in Ballymurphy and affected the innocent as well as the guilty.16 As the historian M.L.R. Smith argues, the army‟s heavy-handed use of CS gas in Ballymurphy eroded Catholic support for the army and promoted the prestige of the PIRA.17 The Sunday Times later commented: “The army never grasped how „radicalizing‟ [an] effect CS gas was. … the 104 canisters used classically demonstrated [that] so general a weapon creates solidarity among its victims [it alienates them] and [on this occasion] it acted as the [best] recruiting tool for the Provisional IRA.”18

The Sunday Times further argued that the army only responded with such overwhelming force on the second night of rioting was because of the criticism it received from Unionists.19

13 Charters, Belfast riot injures 28 soldiers, The Times, London, 2 April 1970. 14 Shots fired in second night of rioting, News Letter, Belfast, 2 April 1970: News Letter, 3 April 1970. 15 Troops use tear gas in another night of violence in Belfast, Irish News, Belfast, 2 April 1970: British troops fire tear gas in fight with Catholics, New York Times, New York, p. 2, 2 April 1970. 16 Evans, 1972, p. 204. 17 Smith, 1995, p. 92. 18 ibid. 19 Evans, 1972, pp. 203-204.

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The striking feature of the three nights of rioting, 31 March to 2 April 1970, between the

Catholics of the Ballymurphy estate and loyalists from nearby Protestant housing estates, was that the British army did not act in a neutral manner but only confronted one side, the nationalists. On the first night of the rioting the army had chosen to confront the Catholics even though the initial confrontation had been between local loyalists and nationalists.20

From a nationalist perspective it was clear that the army was now supporting the loyalist majority, and had become an arm of the Unionist state acting at the behest of sectarian organs like the News Letter.21

A significant factor at Ballymurphy was that the army did not deploy experienced troops to the area but a company of the newly arrived Royal Scots. The Royal Scots regiment was what

Thornton describes as “a predominantly Protestant regiment in make-up and sympathies - certainly in the eyes of the nationalist community in Ballymurphy.”22 By 1969 religion may have become irrelevant in English regiments, but within Scottish regiments religious affiliation remained as important as it was within Northern Ireland society. A senior NCO with the Royal Highland Fusiliers describes how important a soldier‟s religion was within

Scottish regiments and expressed his surprise that any Scottish regiment would be deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969. As he stated: “they‟ll never send a Scottish regiment [to

Northern Ireland because] they were recruited from Glasgow and Ayrshire and were about sixty percent Protestant and forty percent Catholic … [and] it was generally thought that the regiment was too close to the sectarian conflict in Ulster to be posted there.”23 We can only presume that the soldiers deployed on 1 April were predominantly Protestant, because even the loyalist News Letter reported that when they had first arrived in Ballymurphy they had ethnically abused the nationalist residents to such an extent that the regiment was not

20 Deutsch & Magowan, 1973, p. 62. 21 ibid. 22 Thornton, 2007, p. 82. 23 Lindsay, 1998, p. 25.

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welcome in that estate.24 The New York Times also reported that the Royal Scots had enraged the nationalists by calling them „dirty Fenian bastards‟ (something that Catholic members of that regiment are unlikely to have said), and that order was not restored on the first night of rioting until the Royal Scots were replaced by English soldiers.25 A report from John Chartres of The Times recounting what he called the illogicality of the rioting in Belfast describes the effect the sectarianism of the Royal Scots had on the nationalists. As he reported: “when I stood in the crowd of militant youths launching a volley of bottles towards the troops facing them. Someone shouted. Don‟t throw at them; they are English, not the Scots.”26 Chartres may not have understood the reason why the nationalist community had responded this way, but he had clearly witnessed how the sectarian attitude of the Royal Scots had antagonised the people of Ballymurphy. The Royal Scots deployed to Ballymurphy had acted in this way because they and the local Protestants felt a natural affinity with each other.

It has been suggested that the Provisional IRA may have instigated the Ballymurphy riots, but there is little evidence that in April 1970 it was in any position to actively challenge the army.27 General Freeland confirmed that although this had been the first time that Catholics had actively rioted against the army at no stage did either faction of the IRA make an overt appearance.28 On the contrary it appears that the PIRA were neither willing nor able to challenge the army, rather there is evidence that the PIRA attempted to subdue the rioters.29

Thornton has suggested that the army may have fallen into a PIRA trap when it redeployed the Royal Scots as part of a much larger force the second night.30 However M.L.R. Smith argues that even though the PIRA wanted to break any connection between the nationalist community and the army there is little evidence that the PIRA deliberately provoked any

24 Managh, „Full-scale rioting at Ballymurphy‟, News letter, Belfast, 1 April 1070. 25 20 British soldiers hurt in new clash in Northern Ireland, New York Times, New York, 1 April 1970. 26 Charters, Belfast riot injures 28 soldiers, The Times, London, 2 April 1970. 27 Freeland, Opening Address, Study Day, 8 Sept 1970, IWM, 79-34-4. 28 ibid. 29 Taylor, 1997, pp. 72-74. 30 Thornton, 2007, p. 81.

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attacks on the army, “rather the army was sucked into the violence by inter-sectarian feuding.”31 Smith further argues that the PIRA discouraged sporadic and uncontrolled rioting because this might weaken its support within nationalist areas.32

The army hierarchy may or may not have been aware of the sectarian nature of the Royal

Scots when it deployed that predominantly Protestant regiment to confront Catholic demonstrators, but there is little doubt that the soldiers of the Royal Scots fully understand how significant an issue sectarianism was in Belfast, as did the loyalists the army had sided with. As a result, the army‟s actions in Ballymurphy contributed to an increasing perception within the nationalist community in Belfast that the army was no longer neutral but was now against them and siding with the loyalists. And while General Freeland may have succeeded in reducing Unionist pressure when he ordered an overwhelming response to the first night‟s riots but the military victory at Ballymurphy had come at a cost; the increased hostility of the nationalist community and increased support for the PIRA within that community, even if the

PIRA was not yet strong enough to directly challenge the army. The army was to pay an even bigger price when it again confronted the nationalists a few weeks later and that price was the total alienation of the nationalist community in Belfast and the end of any semblance of neutrality by the army.

The Lower Falls Curfew

There are varying accounts of the events that occurred in Belfast‟s Lower Falls Road between

3 and 5 July 1970, but it is clear that the actions of the army had a far more significant effect on the overall situation in Northern Ireland than the gun battle between the army and loyalists in October 1969. From official accounts we can gain an impression of an army that was under

31 Smith, 1995, p. 92. 32 ibid, p. 93.

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considerable local political pressure to restore order in nationalist areas, and from the people of the Lower Falls we can begin to understand how appallingly they were affected. There are also a few independent reports of the curfew that give a somewhat more objective account of what occurred. But it is generally accepted that what began as a small-scale arms search quickly escalated into a confrontation between the army and some nationalist youths, with the army grossly overreacting to what by all accounts was a minor disturbance. Furthermore, the army exacerbated the situation by confining all of the residents of this nationalist ghetto to their own homes for almost three days while it aggressively searched for weapons. The army further compounded an already grave situation by using very large amounts of CS gas to saturate the entire area killing innocent locals.

What the army in its press release called „the operation in the Falls‟ started at 4.30 p.m. on

Friday 3 July and ended at 9 p.m. on Saturday 5 July 1970. During this time the army cordoned the entire area, fought a gun battle, restricted all movement and searched every home for arms.33 The army may have termed this event simply as an „operation in the Falls‟ but it is more commonly referred to as „the Falls Road Curfew‟ or more emotionally by the nationalists as „the rape of the Falls‟.34

The Falls Road curfew cannot be considered in isolation, because it occurred during a period of considerable unrest, and in the middle of the 1970 loyalist marching season. General

Freeland was among those who believed loyalist marches increased the risk of sectarian clashes and had wanted them banned, although he eventually bowed to pressure from the

Unionist-dominated Joint Security Committee and supported its decision to allow the marches to go ahead.35 Adding to the already high level of unrest was extensive rioting on 27

June following the arrest of the radical republican Bernadette Devlin, which resulted in

33 Freeland, Personal Papers, Press Release by HQ NI, IWM, 79-34-4. 34 Warner, 2006. 35 Freeland, Transcript - Five Long Years, IWM 79-34-4, 1974.

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sustained clashes between nationalists and the army.36 However the temperature of sectarian unrest was raised even further when on the same night loyalists attacked the very isolated

Catholic Short Strand. Crucially, neither the army nor the RUC protected this community and it was left to a few members of the Provisional IRA to repel the attacking Protestants.37

The Short Strand is a small enclave of six thousand Catholics surrounded by sixty thousand

Protestants with at its core the Catholic church of St Matthew. At 11 p.m. on the night of 27

June a Protestant crowd covered by loyalist gunmen attacked the church, and what followed was a confused but successful defence of the church by members of the Provisional IRA during which four loyalists and one nationalist were killed. The Short Strand gun battle went on for five hours without any intervention from the army or the RUC and no significant attempt was made to assist this beleaguered community.38 General Freeland‟s excuse was that the army did not come to the assistance of the nationalists in the Short Strand because he did not have enough troops available.39 However there are also reports that the army was aware of the predicament of the isolated nationalist community and had deliberately blocked access to the area to prevent IRA reinforcements getting to the Short Strand.40 Billy Kelly, an active nationalist, was in the Short Strand that night and claims that not only did loyalists attack this area intent on driving out the Catholic population, but on the same night they also attacked the Catholic Ardoyne and New Lodge Road areas of Belfast while the army stood by and watched.41 Whether or not Kelly‟s information is accurate, the end result of the night‟s events was that the nationalist community had been forced to rely upon the PIRA to defend it from a protestant attack and as a result it was now further convinced that the army was either unable or unwilling to protect them, and from then on they could only depend on the PIRA.

36 20 New rioting flares in Northern Ireland: 4 dead and 100 hurt, New York Times, New York, 28 June 1970. 37 Thornton, 2007, p. 86. 38 Evans, 1972, pp. 209-212: Thornton, 2007, p. 85. 39 Freeland, Staff College lecture, 9 Dec 1970, IWM, 79-34-3. 40 Geraghty, 1998, p. 31. 41 Billy Kelly, Interview by B Treanor, 10 Oct 2007.

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The Falls Road curfew started innocuously enough on the afternoon of Friday 3 July when an

RUC search team accompanied by soldiers from the Royal Scots arrived at a house on Balkan

Street to search for arms.42 The official Duty Officer‟s Log of 39 Brigade timed at 4 p.m. on

3 July records that they “received a message from the 1st battalion of the Royal Scots that the

RUC after a tip from a housewife were going to search a house in Balkan Street for weapons and explosives”.43 The army had again deployed to another staunchly nationalist area the same regiment that they had used in Ballymurphy at the start of April, and whose overt sectarianism had escalated the situation there.44

In September 1970 Sean O‟Fearghail, from an overtly republican perspective, produced Law

(?) and Order, an account of the events derived from the testimony of local residents.45 While

O'Fearghail‟s account is obviously biased it was produced from interviews of local people shortly after the curfew, and according to Warner46, it is one of only two detailed studies of the Falls curfew. O‟Fearghail states that on Friday 3 July two RUC officers accompanied by soldiers entered number 24 Balkan Street at approximately 4.30 p.m. and began searching the house for weapons, and it was when the army were leaving that two young men threw stones and the troops replied with CS gas. The army then sent in reinforcements to extricate the first troops, but they used more CS gas to disperse the increasing crowds, which further inflamed the local population. It was while these troops were attempting to leave that one of the protestors was killed by an armoured personnel carrier.47 O‟Fearghail believes that it was the

42 Geraghty, 1998, p. 33: Warner, 2006, p. 325. 43 Quoted in Warner, 2006, 39th Brigade, Duty Officer’s Log, 3 July 1970. WO 305/4238, p. 325. 44 Thornton, 2007, p. 82. 45 S O'Fearghail, Law (?) and Order: The Belfast Curfew of 3-5 July 1970, Central Citizens' Defence Committee, 1970, p. 45. 46 Warner, 2006, p. 325. 47 Evans, 1972, p. 215: Taylor, 2001, p. 49.

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army‟s unrestricted use of CS gas that further escalated an already volatile situation into a riot that only ended when the troops withdrew.48

However the official accounts are at odds with O‟Fearghail‟s version of events, and although the army agreed that the search started at 4.30 p.m. it claimed that „heavy organised rioting‟ occurred just six minutes after the search party left with a „large cache of arms‟; specifically twelve pistols, ammunition, some explosives and a Second World War German carbine.49 A

„Press Briefing‟ dated 21 September 1970 goes further, and states that two separate crowds started throwing bottles and stones at the troops when the troops were withdrawing at 5.30 p.m.50 What is accepted by all sides is that as the initial search party attempted to withdraw they became surrounded and more troops were deployed to assist the original search party who in turn were also surrounded and needed additional troops to help them escape.

As the rioting steadily increased so did the number of troops, who began using increasing amounts of CS gas to discourage further attacks. Just after 8 p.m. the army reported that it was being fired at by the IRA.51 At approximately 9 p.m. the Commander of 39 Brigade,

Brigadier Hudson ordered his troops to regroup and surround the affected area. At the same time locals, fearing another army attack, continued to build barricades. 52 There is some question as to the professionalism of the troops deployed to the Lower Falls that day because, as Geraghty explains, some of the soldiers had just disembarked in Belfast before being sent directly to the Lower Falls. These troops were very inexperienced and this action was their first incident of urban warfare or being fired at.53 This may help to explain why the army responded with such overwhelming fire. The army also saturated the area with a large

48 O'Fearghail, 1970. 49 Freeland, Press Release by HQ NI, IWM, 79-34-4. 50 ibid, Press Briefing, 21 Sept 1970. 51 Quoted in Warner, 39th Brigade, Commanders Diary, 3 July 1970, WO 305/4238, 2006, p. 325. 52 Evans, 1972, pp. 215-217, O'Fearghail,1970: Quoted in Warner, 2006, 39th Brigade, Duty Officer’s Log, 3 July 1970, WO 305/3772: Geraghty, 1998, pp. 33-34. 53 Geraghty, 1998, p. 35.

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number of CS gas canisters, some of which penetrated houses, with the result that no resident in the Lower Falls - guilty or innocent - could escape the choking gas.54 Subsequent army records show that they fired 1452 rounds of ammunition, 218 CS gas grenades and 1355 CS gas cartridges in just two days 55 far more than the original army reports of just fourteen rounds.56

At 10 p.m. General Freeland ordered a compete curfew of the area, and with the exception of a two-hour break the following evening the residents of the Lower Falls were restricted to their homes while the army searched for further weapons.57 A helicopter hovering above the area ordered the residents to go home and stay indoors and advised them that anyone on the streets would be arrested.58 The army used some three thousand troops, including the Royal

Scots, to secure the area.59

After the event an army press release claimed that: “The army was obliged to re-assert control of the area against elements that were determined to fight a battle. Street fighting ensued against gunmen who were not subdued until the early hours of the morning.”60

O'Fearghail‟s record of the same events is again at odds with the army‟s version, because according to his account the troops had no difficulty occupying the whole area and no shots were fired directly at them. He goes on to state that soldiers almost immediately began to search houses for arms, and in the process kicked down doors without reason. He describes numerous occasions when all the adults in a house were arrested and charged with possession of weapons even if only a single round of ammunition was found. O'Fearghail also alleges that in some cases people were arrested for possession of ammunition and explosives that the

54 Evans, 1972, p. 218. 55 Quoted in Warner, 39th Brigade, Duty Officers Log, 4 July 1970, WO 305/3783, 2006, p. 325. 56 Geraghty, 1998, pp. 37-38. 57 Quoted in Warner, 39th Brigade, Duty Officers Log, 4 July 1970, WO 305/3783, 2006, p. 326. 58 Freeland, Internal Security Operations in Northern Ireland – The Curfew in the Falls Operation, 3-5 July 1970, IWM. 79-34-4. 59 Warner, 2006, p. 326: Freeland, Press Release by HQ NI, IWM 79-34-4: Thornton, 2007, p. 87. 60 Freeland, Press Release by HQ NI, IWM, 79-34-4.

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locals claimed had been planted by the army.

However it was the abusive treatment of those who came in contact with the troops and the damage done to the houses during these searches that especially angered O'Fearghail and other nationalists. Joshua Dowds, a traditional republican activist, was in the Lower Falls throughout the curfew and believes that the actions of the army and in particular the Royal

Scots were completely disproportionate. He was in his home when members of the Royal

Scots Regiment came in and dragged everybody outside while they pulled floorboards up, and basically wrecked the whole house. It was actions like these that he alleges completely alienated the local community from the army and drove many young men towards the IRA.61

O'Fearghail also details how three innocent locals were intentionally killed by the army even though they had not been involved in any disturbances. In his booklet he describes and illustrates numerous cases of physical abuse, wanton destruction and systematic looting by the troops.62

On 21 September 1970 the army issued a press briefing refuting some of O‟Fearghail‟s accusations. The briefing claimed that while there was the possibility of some misconduct by troops, these had been thoroughly investigated and charges against individual soldiers could not be substantiated.63 In another press release the same month the army accepted that considerable damage had been done during the operation, but argued that even though there were almost three hundred complaints from affected residents, even after the “fullest possible investigation no evidence has emerged which would justify taking action against any individual.”64 Freeland‟s sustained defence of his troops‟ actions in the Lower Falls served only to strengthen nationalist perceptions of the army‟s partiality, because at no time did

61 Joshua Dowds Interview by B Treanor, 12 Oct 2007. 62 O'Fearghail, 1970, p. 45. 63 Freeland, Press Briefing Monday 21 Sept. 1970, IWM, 79-34-4. 64 Ibid, Press Release by HQ NI.

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Freeland accept that his troops had acted wrongly. As he stated: “There is no doubt that considerable damage was done in the course of this operation by soldiers … [but] there is also no doubt in my mind that damage [that] has been ascribed to the troops … was not in fact done by them.”65 Freeland also dismissed the allegations made in O'Fearghail‟s booklet because he believed that they were only part of a sustained campaign to discredit the army and therefore not credible. He goes on to say: “The troops under my command take no part in

… sectarian differences … [and] are under instructions to maintain public order with the strictest impartiality.”66 Freeland‟s claims are refuted not just by republicans, but by the personal account of Major Roger Coleman, who was part of the force deployed to the Lower

Falls, supports nationalist accusations of the army‟s wanton violence and destruction of property. He describes the way the troops operated in the Lower Falls: “We went in hard because … as a soldier you are trained to be aggressive. We saw that the people had to be browbeaten. … we had to go into the Lower Falls … they were all Catholics. Smashed our way in broke down doors and didn‟t any take evidence”.67

Freeland also rejected the idea that O'Fearghail‟s account would adversely affect relations with the Catholic community because he believed that this community did not want what he termed extremists in their area.68 Freeland‟s inability to accept that the army had made a serious blunder in the Lower Falls and that its operations had alienated the nationalists further demonstrates his basic misreading of the army‟s role in Northern Ireland. As in the past the

British army had taken sides in an internal security operation outside Great Britain and was beginning to pay the price of its failure to remain neutral.

Thornton describes the curfew as typical of a systematic cordon-and-search operation in the

65 ibid. 66 ibid. 67 MAJ Roger Coleman, IWM, 13915, 2007. 68 Freeland, Press Brief. 21 Sept 1970, IWM, 79-34-4.

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time-honoured tradition of the British army, and associated with colonial counter-insurgency campaigns. He contends that cordon-and-search operations like the Lower Falls curfew are very different from intelligence-based searches for weapons or fugitives, rather they are typically used by the British army to punish an entire community and not just those who are suspected of harbouring arms.69 This concept is supported by Edgar O‟Ballance, who was a

Major in the British army before becoming a writer, and who contends that the army‟s actions in the Falls Road were designed to intimidate the nationalist population as well as search for weapons. In his words the Lower Falls was a „psycho-social target‟ for the British army.70

The army operated in this manner because, as we have seen in Chapter 4 all of its recent experience was as a counter-insurgency force in Cyprus and Aden and it knew no other method of operation. It was also in Cyprus that Freeland had gained his reputation as a typical British „counter-insurgency‟ technician who strongly advocated the use of massive searches, cordons, roadblocks and checkpoints during counter-insurgency campaigns.71 The army‟s operation in the Lower Falls was not a policing action of the type acceptable within

Great Britain but a typical British army counter-insurgency operation of the type it so often carried out in Aden, Cyprus and Malaya.

Freeland himself explained “that such a big operation was mounted because the situation in

Belfast was extremely serious. … the week before … there had been a very serious battle around [St Matthew‟s church in the Short Strand] and things looked very bad. And the

Security Committee decided that very firm action had to be taken when anything blew up after that.”72 The Falls Road curfew thus represents what Thornton has described as

Stormont‟s decision “to get tough on the Catholic rebellion” although the evidence supports

69 Thornton, 2007, p. 87: A Jackson, 2006. 70 O'Ballance, 1981, p. 135. 71 Thornton, 2007, p. 85. 72 Freeland, Transcript-Five Long Years. BBC 1974, IWM, 79-34-4.

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the contention that General Freeland fully supported the decision.73 The Security Committee had been under increasing pressure from its hardliners to take the initiative against the IRA and the decision to meet head-on the next occurrence of nationalist unrest with a strong show of force was the culmination of the continual pressure the Unionist government had been putting on Freeland.74 Unionist anger at the army‟s perceived unwillingness to tackle the IRA was so great that one Northern Ireland MP even sought to have General Freeland removed from his position as GOC NI.75 Unionists resented Freeland‟s apparent lack of action against the IRA, whom they perceived was causing the unrest and made their views well known to the newly appointed British Conservative Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, when he made his first visit to Northern Ireland on 30 June 1970. The Unionists told him very bluntly that the restoration of „law and order‟ was fundamental to the survival of their government and the army had to be seen to deal toughly with thugs and gunmen.76 According to

Maudling‟s biographer, Lewis Baston, the Stormont Cabinet had „given him an ear-bashing about the situation‟ but his only response was that he would discuss the situation with the police and General Freeland.

Freeland‟s immediate response to Maudling‟s concerns was that the army had only two courses of action, either it could fire on rioters or it could use overwhelming force to keep order. He also told Maudling that the army was responding to Stormont‟s concerns by increasing searches for arms and restricting movement in affected areas, and that it also planned to use helicopters for observation and crowd control; what Baston described as a blueprint for the Falls curfew.77 Freeland, while not explicitly requesting Maudling‟s approval for these tactics, was certainly advising him that the army was going to respond to

73 Thornton, 2007, p. 86. 74 Taylor, 2001, p. 49. 75 Quoted in Warner, 2006, House of Commons Debate, Northern Ireland, Hansard, Vol 76, col 1619, p. 326: Taylor, 2001, p. 49. 76 Warner, 2006, p. 330: P Evans, „Three MPs walk out of Maudling talks‟, The Times, London, 30 June 1969. 77 Baston, 2004, p. 366.

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any future nationalist unrest with overwhelming force.

Baston argues that James Callaghan would not have allowed himself to be manipulated in this manner by Freeland. 78 As we have seen Callaghan had actively restrained Freeland from systematically punishing the loyalist community of the Shankill Road in October 1969.79

Nevertheless Maudling, because of his ignorance of the Northern Ireland situation and his unwillingness to get involved, said and did nothing and therefore gave the army the imprimatur to get tougher with the nationalists. The now unrestrained General Freeland responded to the disturbance in the Lower Falls with an overwhelming show of force. As

Taylor says: “there was to be no repetition … of the fiasco of St Matthew‟s church … the army returned fire and in the gun battles that followed shot dead four civilians, none of whom was a member of the IRA.”80 The army went in hard in the Lower falls because it was not going to allow the IRA to again demonstrate its ability to defend the nationalist community as it had done so successfully in the Short Strand. The army had to be seen to be in control.

The legal basis of curfew

The curfew on the Falls Road again highlights the legal complexities of the army‟s position in Northern Ireland. A number of commentators have questioned whether the curfew was in fact legal81, mainly because no „curfew‟ under the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts

(SPA) had been proclaimed. Others state categorically that it was illegal.82 As we have seen in Chapter 4 the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts gave both the Unionist government

78 Ibid. 79 Callaghan, 1973, p. 124. 80 Evans, 1972, p. 219: Freeland, Press Briefing, 21 Sept 1970, IWM, 79-34-4. 81 Evans, 1972, p. 218: Warner, 2006: Thornton, 2007: O'Fearghail, 1970. 82 Smith, 1995, p. 92: D Benest in Strachan, 2006, p. 131.

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and the army almost unlimited powers.83 Campbell and Connolly confirm that although

Stormont had the power to impose a curfew and had done so before, on this occasion there had been no prior approval as was required in law. In fact on 4 July, the day after the curfew had been imposed, the Northern Ireland Cabinet deferred consideration on whether the curfew should be retrospectively legalised. The curfew, or „restriction of movement‟ as

Freeland consistently called it, 84 had no statutory basis in law but had been imposed by

Freeland under his own authority and therefore he did not gain any authorisation from either

Stormont, Westminster or the Ministry of Defence.85

An Internal Security Operations report titled „The Curfew in the Falls Operation, 3-5 July‟ states that at 10 p.m. on 3 July an announcement was made that the Falls area was under curfew; that people were to go home and remain indoors, and if they did not they would be arrested. This document also confirmed that the decision had been made by the Director of

Operations, General Freeland, based upon what he perceived was a need to protect innocent people from getting hurt and to clear the streets so that troops could go about their work unimpeded. However the document goes on to state that these „restrictions‟ were not a curfew imposed in accordance with Regulation 19 of the Special Powers Acts [but] imposed by the military commander under his Common Law right and duty, in circumstances of rioting amounting to insurrection”.86 The only retrospective legal authority obtained for the curfew was from the Resident Magistrate in Belfast, Albert Walmsley, who determined that the army commander had the right to impose a „restriction on movement‟. Walmsley based his decision on an 1832 case in Bristol when Lord Chief Justice Tindal declared that under

83 Quoted in Donohue, 2001, pp. 21-23: Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, CAIN (2009). 84 Freeland, Transcript-Five Long Years. BBC 1974, IWM, 79-34-4. 85 Conclusions of Joint Security Committee, DEFE 13/730, Quoted in Campbell & Connolly, „A Model for the 'War Against Terrorism'? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew‟, Journal of Law and Society, 30(No 3) 341-375, 2003, p. 353. 86 Freeland, Internal Security Operations in Northern Ireland - The Curfew in the Falls Operation, 3-5 July 1970, IWM, 79-34-4.

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Common Law the army had that right when suppressing a riot.87

However Freeland‟s action had led to serious questions being asked in Whitehall as to what exactly was the army‟s legal standing in Northern Ireland. D.R.E Hopkins of the Home

Office was in favour of the army acting under the auspices of common law88, whereas D.A.

Nicholls favoured using the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts. 89 A legal opinion provided on 5 July 1970 by A.J. Donaldson, Director of Law Reform at the Home Office, titled „The Power to Order Curfew‟ gave some clarification to the situation. Donaldson confirmed that the curfew was not made under the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts, but rather that “the army already possessed the power to impose restrictions of the kind it did” and that it had that right under „martial law‟. Donaldson quoted from an 1883 ruling: “Martial law is the assumption by officers of the Crown of absolute power, exercised by military force, for the suppression of an insurrection and the restoration of order and authority.” 90

Donaldson also stated that in spite of the wide powers given to officers of the Crown acting under this law including the right to the use of force, “extending to the destruction of life”, under martial law they are not justified in using cruel and excessive means or inflicting punishment after resistance is suppressed.91 Donaldson concluded that if the army‟s right to impose these restrictions were to be challenged in court, their actions could be covered by suitable indemnifying legislation.92

Political responses and interpretations

Westminster was clearly unsettled by the events of the previous few days, but the government

87 Ibid: „Freeland‟s Curfew order as right, rules city Magistrate‟, Belfast Telegraph, Belfast, Sept 1970. 88 Home Office Minute from Hopkins to Nichol, 7 July 1970, DEFE 24 980, 1970. 89 ibid, Memo, Nicholls to Cumming-Bruce HQ NI, 9 July 1970. 90 Legal Opinion, Director Law Reform, 5 July 1970, DEFE 24 980. 91 ibid, p. 2. 92 ibid, p. 5.

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at least was publicly supporting Freeland‟s actions in Parliament. Lord Balniel, Conservative

Minister of State for Defence, did his utmost to defend the army‟s actions even though he was unsure whether the army had acted under the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts or

Common Law. On 6 July the Northern Ireland MP Gerry Fitt asked what measures were taken by the Security Forces in the Falls area of Belfast between 3 and 5 July, and under what powers they were taken. Lord Balniel replied:

After a successful search for arms in the Falls Road area, the Army came under heavy attack from grenades and firearms and a street battle developed. More forces were deployed to remove obstructions and clear the area so that action could be taken by troops against hostile fire. During this period orders were repeatedly given to clear the streets under pain of arrest. The restrictions on movement thus imposed were maintained until 5 p.m. on Saturday and reintroduced from 7 p.m. on Saturday until 9 a.m. on Sunday. No formal curfew was imposed.

Any searches carried out on Friday were in direct pursuit of persons engaged against the security forces. On Saturday searches were carried out only after production of a search certificate. Members of Her Majesty's Forces are empowered under Regulation 4 made under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922- 1943, to search any premises which are under suspicion of being used for purposes prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order. Restrictions on movement were imposed in the interests of the safety of the population as a whole and to restrict the operations of armed criminals.93

And in an answer to Michael Foot‟s argument that it was highly provocative to search for arms in the Catholic area when no comparable search was made in the Protestant area Lord

Balniel also replied:

I completely repudiate any suggestion that the military forces have acted in any way other than impartially. Having seen them, I am deeply impressed by the impartial way in which they have conducted their extremely difficult task. 94

93 Northern Ireland, House of Commons, Hansard, London, vol 803 cc328-34, 06 July 1970. 94 ibid.

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His response to complaints from the Northern Ireland MP Gerry Fitt that he was unable to gain access to his constituents in the Lower Falls while others, including reporters and

Stormont ministers obtained army permission was also less than convincing.95 However

Westminster‟s concern with the fallout from the Lower Falls operation culminated on 13 July when the British Cabinet directed the Ministry of Defence to ensure that in the future any similar operations had to have prior approval.96

James Callaghan, who was by now in Opposition, was also highly critical of the role that the new Home Secretary Reginald Maudling played in the events of July, even though there did not appear to be any fundamental change in policy direction. At least in retrospect Callaghan was concerned that Maudling appeared to give very little attention to Northern Ireland, and as a result was content “to leave responsibility to the men on the spot”. 97 Callaghan claims that this was a mistake and also contends that Maudling had little understanding of Northern

Ireland and even more crucially he was not interested in learning from Callaghan‟s own experiences as Home Secretary. As Callaghan stated: “our only conversation in the early days took place as we marched side by side from the Commons to the House of Lords to hear the

Queen‟s speech at the opening of Parliament.”98 Callaghan emphasises that when Labour was in power there was “scarcely a day passed without [a minister] on the phone querying the army‟s actions because Labour knew that these actions had political consequences.”99

Callaghan strongly believed that because “the army was not getting enough day-to-day guidance from the [Conservative] government” the result was that it was left without political direction.100

95 Legal backing for army actions, 9 July 1970, DEFE 24 980 (1970). 96 Quoted in Campbell & Connolly, 2003, Conclusions of Joint Security Committee, DEFE 13 730, p. 354. 97 Callaghan, 1973, p. 144. 98 ibid, p. 144. 99 ibid. 100 ibid, pp. 144-146.

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Conversely the Stormont government was pleased with the change of government at

Westminster and believed that they had gained an ally who would let them have more control of events and give the Joint Security Committee a much freer ability to decide tactics.101 The unionists were angry at what they perceived was the army‟s unwillingness to tackle the IRA, and they left Maudling in no doubt that they believed the army was siding with the nationalists and not protecting loyalists, at least not in the way the RUC and B-Specials had done. Earlier the Unionist MP, Joshua Cardwell had claimed in the Northern Ireland House of

Commons that in one incident the army had stood by for almost an hour and-a-half while IRA snipers fired on loyalists.102 Some unionists even suggested that the army might be able to do its duty “in the manner it was supposed to” if General Freeland was replaced.103

Although Maudling was in Northern Ireland on 30 June and met both with a range of

Unionist leaders and General Freeland there is no evidence that Maudling gave any explicit direction to Freeland for him to take the fight to the nationalists. But nor is there evidence that he made any attempt to veto Freeland‟s plans. Freeland was quoted in the Sunday Times the following year as saying that freedom from direct political oversight meant that “there are not so many back seat drivers”.104 Callaghan took from this statement that General Freeland was pleased with the additional freedom that Maudling‟s hands-off approach had given him.

The day after his meeting with Maudling, Freeland, as Director of Operations had begun the relaxation of the rules governing soldiers‟ use of firearms in Northern Ireland. The original instructions, contained in the Yellow Card issued in September 1969, restricted soldiers to opening fire only when they were attacked, 105 however now the revised instructions allowed soldiers to fire on “anyone seen carrying a weapon in an area in which firing is taking place

101 Quoted in Callaghan, 1973, p. 144. 102 Warner, 2006, pp. 330-332. 103 Northern Ireland, House of Commons Debate, vol. 76, col 1619, quoted in Warner, 2006. 104 Quoted in Callaghan, 1973, p. 144. 105 Yellow Card, 25 Sept 1969, DEFE 24 980 1970.

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… anyone seen carrying a weapon … [or] who refuses to halt when called upon to do so … or against anyone with a petrol bomb.”106 In mid-1970 then, Freeland was preparing the army to confront an increasingly hostile nationalist community, while also attempting to mollify the equally aggressive loyalists.

The political vacuum under Maudling.

The overall security situation in Northern Ireland was dramatically altered by the election of the Heath Conservative government in June 1970 and the appointment of Reginald Maudling as Home Secretary. Whereas Callaghan had eventually become an activist on Northern

Ireland Maudling not only showed little understanding, but at such a crucial time shirked his ultimate responsibility and allowed others to make the running. As a result political control from Westminster was considerably weakened and the army was allowed to transform itself from being impartial peacekeepers to a counter-insurgency force carrying out the wishes of the Unionist majority. In 1974 Freeland claimed that because of the general election in June

1970 “the Conservative government took a long time to get to grips with the Irish situation” and that there “was a vacuum [of] about six months before one felt there was a grip [and] that one was moving forward politically … the thing was drifting.” Freeland further observed that

Maudling appeared surprised at the situation: “I wouldn‟t say that he was completely ignorant

… but he didn‟t appear to have a great grip of the situation. … After all what Englishman does understand that scene”107 What Freeland needed at this point of time was clear political guidance, but this was what was crucially missing. It would seem that after the event

Freeland was prepared to admit that he had little confidence in Maudling or the Conservative

106 Minute CGS to Sec of State Defence 1 July 1970 & Minute from HQ NI to MOD July 70, DEFE 24 980 1970. 107 Freeland, TV Interview. Five Long Years 1974, IWM 79-34-4.

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government. He even wrote to James Callaghan in September 1973 shortly after the publication of A House Divided, thanking Callaghan for his generous remarks about his part in the emergency. As he effusively stated “Your brilliant handling of the crisis in 1969 will not be forgotten, at least by all the soldiers involved.”108

However in A House Divided Callaghan was very critical of Maudling‟s failures and

Freeland‟s comments are highly significant even if they appear overly effusive and an attempt to re-write the history of his own attitudes. He wrote to Callaghan: “I must agree that the change of government was a set-back in June 1970”.109 Freeland further claims that the

Conservative government took a long time to get to grips with the situation and states: “I felt a lack of guidance and interest rather than a let up in „back seat driving‟. … I longed for the

British government to take complete control of security and provide a Minister as chairman of the Security Committee. The Catholic minority, who had no voice in the security field would then have no ground for complaining of bias against them.”110 It is therefore apparent from Freeland‟s comments that from the election of the Conservatives in June 1970 until the end of that year the British army in Northern Ireland received no worthwhile political support and was given no political direction. The British government therefore allowed the army to develop its own agenda for the internal security of the province; an agenda based upon the army‟s experiences of counter-insurgency operations in Malaya, Cyprus and Aden and the assumptions about the nature of nationalist unrest that we have examined in earlier chapters.

Conclusions

In early 1970 the army‟s leadership increasingly believe that the main threat to security in

108 ibid, Letter to James Callaghan, 7 Sep. 1973. 109 ibid. 110 ibid.

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Northern Ireland was from a resurgent IRA and that it must be tackled in the same manner as the rebels in Malaya, Cyprus and Aden, however a re-examination of the same events by the army later acknowledged that an insurgency did not begin until mid-1971. Nevertheless it was how the army tackled the sectarian disturbance at the interface between the Catholic

Ballymurphy estate and nearby Protestant estates that quickly evolved into a clash between the nationalist community and the British army, which exacerbated an already fragile relationship. The Lower Falls curfew, when all the residents of the area were confined indoors while troops violently searched their homes for weapons, finally destroyed any notion that the army was a neutral force. In military terms the operation might have been successful, however in political and social terms the outcome was disastrous, because by alienating that community it contributed greatly to the alienation of the entire nationalist community and eliminated any potential for a political solution in the immediate future.

It is apparent that in hindsight senior army officers believed that the insurgency began with the formation of the Provisional IRA in January 1970, although at this time neither faction of the IRA had actively confronted the army and it was not until the army invaded the Lower

Falls in July 1970 that both factions responded to what they perceived was an unprovoked attack on the nationalist community in the Lower Falls. This event signified the start of a third counter-insurgency phase that finally ended any pretence that the army was an impartial peacekeeper. The army may have had a legitimate excuse for searching that Balkan Street house for weapons, but the way it responded to what initially had been a minor disturbance was clearly a significant overreaction and could only have been intended to both punish the entire nationalist community for their perceived support for the IRA and also to placate a loyalist community that they considered even more of a threat. The army may have seen the

„operation in the Falls‟ as a straightforward military security operation, but on those residents directly impacted by the army‟s brutal imposition of its power saw the curfew as an attempt

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to continue their subjugation under Unionist rule.

Overall it would appear that by July 1970 when Northern Ireland‟s sectarianism was reaching a violent peak Westminster began to abdicate its politically control over the army. While

Callaghan was Home Secretary and Labour was in power the army was politically constrained, but with the election of the Conservative government in June 1970 General

Freeland‟s political chain of command had virtually disappeared and he was left to confront the Unionist dominated Joint Security Committee on his own. If Callaghan‟s mistakes were derived from his naivety, Maudling‟s appear to have been a combination of ignorance and a lack of will to get involved. As had happened in earlier operations the army was deployed to

Northern Ireland in 1969 with little understanding of either the problem confronting it or the people they were to confront. The result of this cultural and political vacuum was that

General Freeland and the army were able to confront disloyal British subjects in Ireland with the same unrestrained military force they had been allowed to use in Malaya, Cyprus and

Aden and many other imperial confrontations. Neither Westminster nor the British army treated Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, but as a politically dysfunctional place apart.

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Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970

Conclusions

This thesis has shown that the army did not follow the directions of its political masters and act as an even-handed „peacekeeper‟ between the warring parties in Northern Ireland. Instead, it adopted a hostile stance to the nationalist community very soon after its deployment.

Moreover, having identified the nationalist community as the fundamental source of the problem in Northern Ireland, the army evolved rapidly towards a modus operandi appropriate to colonial policing, and actively commenced counter-insurgency, even before a republican insurgency had begun. However this is not the view usually taken of these events or of the army‟s role. The commonly accepted view is that the army acted in a neutral manner towards the nationalist community from its initial deployment until the surfacing of the Provisional

IRA (PIRA) in January 1970. It is also generally accepted that the public emergence of the

PIRA signalled the start of its insurgency against the British state that in turn forced the

British army to adopt aggressive counter-insurgency tactics. This thesis has demonstrated that these generally accepted perceptions are erroneous and that the army did not perform as impartial peacekeepers but instead treated Northern Ireland as if it was an external British dependency with rebellious „natives‟ rather than as an integral part of the United Kingdom.

The army has received widespread praise for the so-called honeymoon period in Belfast during 1969, however as I have shown in chapter six, there were clear indications from the beginning that this state of affairs could not last. In Londonderry the army did not even pretend to be neutral, but almost immediately treated the nationalist community as the guilty party. In Belfast the Londonderry model soon began to be applied even if the army‟s response to the loyalist attack in October 1969 gave the appearance of impartiality. However when this

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incident is critically analysed and, more importantly, compared to the army‟s actions against nationalists during the first half of 1970 there is clear evidence that that any semblance of army neutrality had by this time dissipated.

The Provisional IRA may have wanted to engage the army in another guerrilla war from its formation at the beginning of 1970, but until the end of that year it was in no position to do so. Rather, it was the army that actively engaged this new republican movement, and what it judged as its equally disloyal political base, the nationalist community. As we saw in chapter seven, it was the army‟s demonstrable hostility towards that community, especially during

1970, that destroyed what little empathy there was towards the army among rank-and-file nationalists. The PIRA may have been guilty of fomenting anti-army sentiment, but it is the army that must bear the ultimate blame for allowing itself to be drawn into such a conflict.

Crucially, its commander and senior leadership were willing participants in this strategic change owing to their own predilections, and in the absence of an informed and engaged political leadership. However this did not occur in a vacuum, it was the culmination of a long and antagonistic association between the British army and Irish nationalism.

The 1922 agreement had allowed Britain to distance itself from the Irish question by giving a belligerent Irish Free State home rule, and an acquiescent Northern Ireland autonomy. This agreement may have enabled Britain to abdicate its essential responsibilities, but its major failure was that it obscured the fundamental problems within Irish society. When the underlying sectarian conflict within Northern Ireland violently erupted in 1968 this was the culmination of nearly five decades of ongoing conflict between the nationalist minority and the agents of British state control. The Unionist government did not use the army as the primary agent for enforcing its coercive control over the nationalists, that was left to the

Royal Ulster Constabulary and its exclusively loyalist auxiliary the B-Specials. However the army‟s role since partition was principally to demonstrate to the nationalist minority that

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Britain remained the ultimate authority in the province, and to this end it had regularly and actively supported the Unionist state when it was threatened by republican violence.

The dysfunctional nature of the Northern Ireland state was not just a result of Lloyd George‟s expedient resolution to the Anglo-Irish war; it was the end of the latest phase in the long conflict between the native Irish and a Britain determined to coercively control what it judged were a disloyal people. Unfortunately for the six counties of Ireland that formed the statelet of Northern Ireland, the 1922 agreement established a Protestant and ideologically radical

Unionist government determined to maintain its links to Britain at all costs while still containing a large nationalist minority. Taken together with an unswerving drive to protect its own strategic interests, Britain after 1922 felt able to ignore what was happening in Ireland and to abdicate its constitutional and ethical responsibilities for Northern Ireland‟s nationalist minority. As I demonstrated in the first chapter of this thesis, successive British governments deliberately ignored the plight of a people that were systematically discriminated against by the unionist government. However it was the actions of the Attlee government in 1949 that strengthened unionist control and entrenched the sectarian nature of the Northern Ireland state.

This was to remain the situation until the Labour government of Harold Wilson was elected in 1964, with a reforming agenda that coincided with a world-wide social revolution challenging the status quo of many conservative governments. Harold Wilson, like Attlee before him, may have led a social-democratic government with a reforming agenda, but like his predecessors Wilson did all he could to avoid getting involved in the „Irish bog‟. As chapter two demonstrated, even when confronted by clear evidence of deliberate sectarianism by the Stormont regime, Wilson and his Home Secretary, James Callaghan, failed to react in ways that would have been demanded within Great Britain. Such was their desire to avoid taking any responsibility for that distant part of the United Kingdom they used established

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Westminster traditions to abdicate British responsibility, while delegating all accountability to the well-meaning but ineffective Unionist Premier, Terence O‟Neill. Callaghan, as his predecessors had done before him, ignored the increasingly volatile situation until it was beyond political solutions. Conciliation had again failed and all that was left was to send in the British army to attempt to impose a military solution upon the Irish.

What confronted the army in Londonderry on 14 August 1969 was not just a major civil disturbance but the final act in a conflict between the RUC and an increasingly belligerent nationalist population. Londonderry is a particularly significant ingredient of the social and political narrative of Northern Ireland because, while having a nationalist majority, it was a potent symbol of loyalist triumphalism. Unionist manipulation of electoral boundaries had resulted in decades of blatant discrimination which in the late 1960s led to increased nationalist protest and conflict with the RUC. Finally, nationalist frustration became so great that even the normal coercive strategies of the RUC and their auxiliary, the B-Specials, were unable to contain the unrest. However the RUCs reaction to this nationalist protest was so overwhelmingly violent that The Times of London was moved to link its actions to those of the Chicago police a month earlier. More importantly the overt sectarianism of the RUC and the Unionist government finally forced the British government to recognise the severity of the problem facing Northern Ireland. Nevertheless Harold Wilson continued with the established British policy of avoiding any responsibility for Irish issues; merely issuing demands that Stormont deal with the situation, but still allowing the state of affairs to deteriorate beyond the point of no return. Even when Wilson was confronted with the eye- witness reports from his own MPs, he and his government could not be persuaded to take action.

In August 1969 the British government was finally forced to confront the reality of Northern

Ireland, with some three hundred soldiers of the British army deployed to replace an

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exhausted RUC and to face for the first time a more confident and belligerent nationalist protest movement. Although the army initially allowed the barricaded nationalists some degree of autonomy, it quickly began to impose its authority; however as we saw in chapter three, the army‟s historical experience led it to choose methods that changed the troops from impartial peacekeepers into the willing replacements of the despised RUC. James Callaghan had publicly stated that the army was to act in an impartial manner both to protect the nationalist minority from loyalist attack and to restore order, but in Londonderry this did not occur. Instead the army instinctively reacted to the civil disorder as it had done in Cyprus, and used military tactics to subdue what it viewed as disloyal and unruly natives. This increasingly confrontational approach was to have major ramifications throughout the province, but especially in the capital city of Belfast when the next day an unwilling British government finally authorised the deployment of additional troops. In Belfast they did not have to confront nationalist unrest but to stop loyalists attacking nationalist enclaves in what

Catholics increasingly believed was a loyalist pogrom.

Eventually James Callaghan did recognise the severity of the problem and sent senior British police officers to assess the RUC. However by sending Robert Mark and Douglas Osmond to

Northern Ireland in August 1969, and then Lord Hunt a few weeks later, he did too little too late. In chapter two we saw that Callaghan‟s naïve attempt at transforming the para-military

Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) into an idealised version of an English county police force demonstrated the inability of the British elite either to understand Irish conflicts or to recognise that apparently reasonable British solutions to what they perceived was the Irish question would inevitably fail. Callaghan may have been irrationally persuaded by his close association with the British police federation that the RUC could be transformed from the armed and sectarian arm of the Unionist government into an unarmed representative police force - the mythical English bobby. However by pursuing such a narrow strategy while

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ignoring more fundamental causes of the increasing unrest, Callaghan and the British government again demonstrated their inability either to understand the underlying issues or to deliver a viable outcome. Underlying Callaghan‟s rationale appears to have been a crude dichotomy between whether Northern Ireland should be considered the same as Great Britain, and its people policed under established British laws, or whether it should be seen as a place apart that could and should be treated as Ireland had always been treated, as a nation inherently disloyal to Britain. To this end the Ministry of Defence, the army hierarchy, and increasingly the government, dismissed the need to operate within British liberal-democratic principles. The army therefore needed access to powers similar to those available to it in

Malaya and Cyprus. Stormont already had such powers, the Northern Ireland Special Powers

Acts.

I have shown in chapter four that the Ministry of Defence and the army hierarchy fully understood the army‟s obligations and limitations under its common law duty when it came to aiding the civil power in Northern Ireland, but they became obsessed with ensuring that the army would have access to the Northern Ireland Special Powers Acts (SPA). The SPA was so all-encompassing that it enabled the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs to authorise almost anyone he considered suitable to take whatever action was considered appropriate for the defence of the Northern Ireland state. The army was specifically included in this suite of

Acts and had the same powers as the RUC, including stopping and arresting anyone it deemed could be a threat. While the SPA had been initially proclaimed in the 1920s as a defence against the IRA, the Unionist government had consistently used it to coercively contain all nationalist threats, real or perceived. It is clear that the army, while content to operate within the constraints of established British laws when giving aid to the civil power in Great Britain, believed that if it were to be deployed in Northern Ireland it would need access to the Special Powers Acts. This suite of Acts gave the army the freedom to operate as

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if Northern Ireland was just another overseas British dependency rather than an integral part of the United Kingdom. However it was not just the British army that was intent on retaining access to the Special Powers Acts, with a few exceptions all of the British political and bureaucratic elite wanted to retain access to this overwhelmingly powerful suite of laws. The army in Northern Ireland was commanded by General Sir Ian Freeland, a veteran of many

British counter-insurgency operations who was appointed as GOC NI because of his experience and seniority. Crucially, many of his officers and senior NCO‟s were also hardened and experienced veterans of Britain‟s colonial insurgencies. Chapter five demonstrated that Freeland‟s experience taught him that what his troops confronted in

Northern Ireland was not merely a civil disturbance that had escalated out of control, but a breakdown in internal security as had occurred in Cyprus. His political masters in London may have been somewhat inept and he may have been at the mercy of an irrational and unionist-dominated Joint Security Committee, but it appears that he mostly complied with unionist demands to take firm action against the nationalist minority, whom unionists blamed for the unrest. Freeland‟s troops therefore treated the nationalist community in the same manner as they had previously treated the Greek Cypriots and other disloyal inhabitants of

British possessions, even though nationalist anger was not initially targeted against the army but against the Unionist government and its representatives. The army, however, had replaced the despised RUC and willingly accepted its role of restoring unionist authority, even though that was not the task assigned to it by the British government. This had occurred partly because of a general political vacuum, but the Army‟s relish for the task can only be explained in terms of its own natural propensities and attitudes.

In chapter six we saw that the army‟s deployment in Northern Ireland from August 1969 until the end of 1970 does not constitute a single phase as later claimed, but rather three phases.

The first phase of the army‟s operations in Northern Ireland, from August to December 1969,

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was in many ways similar to the early phase of many other internal security operations, in that there was no firm strategy or apparent political direction. This may help explain why the army apparently applied differing and contradictory tactics in Londonderry and Belfast. In

Londonderry the army had immediately confronted nationalists while in Belfast it appears to have applied, at least initially, a classic hearts and minds campaign. The result was that while the army in Londonderry was almost immediately viewed as a proxy for the despised RUC, in Belfast the beleaguered nationalists immediately welcomed the army because it had saved them from loyalist attack. This helps to explain why an alcohol-fuelled loyalist mob instigated the first armed attack on the British army during those troubles - an attack that was met with extraordinary restraint on the army‟s part. Even though the army had been deployed in nationalist areas and had to confront local unrest, there was an underlying belief among nationalists that the army had saved them from loyalist attack. This meant that the army still retained the support of the majority of that community, and during 1969 the nationalist community in Belfast had not openly attacked the army. However as I have shown, after the

Provisional IRA (PIRA) was founded in January 1970 the relationship between the army and the nationalist community rapidly began to deteriorate and the army‟s approach to nationalist unrest became much more confrontational. If the army‟s less aggressive approach towards the nationalist community in Belfast from August to December 1969 can be seen as somewhat impartial the emergence of the PIRA in January 1970 clearly marked the transition between the first and second phases of the army‟s actions. The PIRA may have wanted a confrontation with the army and did foment unrest, but there is little evidence that the PIRA was in any position to instigate any major confrontation. Conversely it is clear that the army leadership did want to confront the IRA and the evidence confirms that even though the army‟s official policy in Belfast was to encourage friendly relations with the nationalist community the

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second wave of troops deployed in December 1969 and January 1970 pursued an overtly aggressive policy.

The army‟s changed approach is exemplified by its actions in Ballymurphy in April 1970, when in response to a local sectarian disturbance it deployed an inappropriate Scottish regiment and subsequently used overwhelming force against the local nationalist community while ignoring the equally blameworthy loyalists. Whether the deployment of the predominantly Protestant Royal Scots who instinctively sided with the loyalists was the result of mere ineptitude by army commanders is unclear. More likely what led to this more aggressive approach was a growing belief by General Freeland and his senior officers that the main threat to the security of Northern Ireland was from a resurgent PIRA who were known to be active in Ballymurphy. After January 1970 then, the army clearly changed from peacekeepers to an internal security force applying military tactics in a civil environment.

The event that signalled the end of the second phase and the start of the third counter- insurgency phase was the Falls Road curfew in early July 1970. This may have started as a straightforward if insensitive arms search by the same Royal Scots that had triggered the

Ballymurphy conflict, but it rapidly grew into a major military confrontation. What the army perceived as a legitimate cordon and search operation was seen by the beleaguered residents as an armed invasion, after which General Freeland kept them in their homes for almost three days while the army searched every building for arms, causing considerable damage as they went. In addition the army fired almost one thousand five hundred rounds of ammunition and almost double that quantity of CS gas during an operation which resulted in three innocent locals being killed and many others arrested.

The Falls Road curfew was not just a simple military operation as claimed by the army, but a demonstration to the nationalist community that it was in control. It was also designed to

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placate radical unionists. The unionist-dominated Joint Security Committee had been demanding a more aggressive approach against what they perceived as disloyal nationalists and Freeland had finally given in. Freeland now had the freedom to deliver this emphatic message because of the recent election of the Heath Conservative government, which meant that during this period he had almost no political oversight. While Freeland had been restrained by an assertive James Callaghan during the loyalist attack in October 1969, the

Conservative Reginald Maudling was clearly unwilling to give him political direction or to take control of the situation. The political vacuum created by Maudling‟s indifference had allowed General Freeland to act as he saw fit, and he instinctively allowed the army to subdue the unruly natives in the Lower Falls as it had done in so many other places in the past. Freeland clearly judged the nationalist community not only as the cause of the trouble, but also as disloyal because of his belief that British people would not have opposed the legitimate authority of the state. However what Freeland failed to understand or deliberately chose to ignore was that the Northern Ireland state had failed to earn legitimacy in the eyes of a large minority.

The common error that British governments of all persuasions made, up to and including

1970, was to assume that nationalist unrest in Northern Ireland was not necessarily a rebellion against the British state but was often simply the action of a desperate people fighting for the same democratic rights enjoyed by all other citizens of the United Kingdom.

However the historical interaction between Britain and Ireland had resulted in a failure to fully understand each other and a basic distrust between the two peoples. From a British perspective nationalist protest was seen as a threat against the state, while Irish nationalists viewed the continued sectarianism of the Stormont regime as a systematic and deliberate failure of the British government. British abdication of its constitutional responsibilities for the minority in Northern Ireland had not only allowed the institutionalised sectarianism to

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continue but to be strengthened. What had occurred in 1968 and 1969 was the culmination of decades of frustration within the nationalist community and not the start of a rebellion against the unionist state. However difficult it may have been to find a successful strategy, it is clear that successive British governments failed to look one, but rather, avoided getting involved in the Irish question. Even in early 1969 the Wilson Labour government could have taken a more forceful approach towards the Stormont regime but again avoided its constitutional responsibilities and as a result was left with little option other than to deploy the British army to Northern Ireland to restore order.

The Unionist government had habitually used its para-military Royal Ulster Constabulary to coercively restrain what they perceived was a republican threat but was in reality simply protest against political exclusion and social discrimination. Therefore when the army was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969 purportedly to aid the civil power, it was aiding a sectarian para-military force and not an unarmed British civil police force that enjoyed the overwhelming support of its citizens. In addition the army was fundamentally a military machine experienced in using force in the internal security of British colonies, it was not trained for or experienced in civil policing. Furthermore its commander, General Sir Ian

Freeland, while having some understanding of the situation, was a veteran counter- insurgency professional who believed that strong military tactics were needed to contain unrest. He also believed that what was happening in Northern Ireland was a rebellion against the state, because in a democratic society such as England the civil population was law- abiding and accepted the rule of law. From a very early juncture Freeland believed that his duty was to restore the authority of the Unionist government as he had in Cyprus and other colonial environments when he attempted to restore government authority. Unfortunately

Freeland‟s inconsistent and contradictory tactics proved counterproductive and instead of reducing the disorder they only increased it. While the army‟s symbolic hearts and minds

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campaign in Belfast may have had some success in limiting nationalist unrest this also increased an irrational resentment within the unionist community.

The British government‟s fundamental error was to allow the Unionist government to retain control over the security of the province. The army may have been answerable to the British government but it operated within the constraints of the Stormont security regime and this was a regime that had only one goal and that was to retain unionist control over Northern

Ireland. The divided and complex political situation might have placed General Freeland in an invidious position, but he had an instinctively British attitude towards law and order that required him to operate in the manner he did. Neither Freeland, nor the army hierarchy, nor the British political establishment ever viewed Northern Ireland as anything other than a place outside Great Britain, and as a result the army was given the imprimatur to operate in the same manner as it had done so recently in Cyprus. Northern Ireland‟s slide into an all-out insurgency in 1971 was inevitable because the army began its deployment from the perspective that its role was simply to restore the order of the Unionist government.

From the beginning the army had targeted the nationalist community, who in turn had responded with increased belligerence which further increased the conflict between them.

The first phase of the army‟s deployment could be described as a limited attempt at peacekeeping, but by the start of the second phase in January 1970 the army had clearly hardened its attitude towards the nationalist community and now identified them as the sole cause of the unrest. The army was evidently operating as a colonial internal security force with more and more vigour being applied to the „disloyal‟ element while leaving the „loyal‟ population to manage their own affairs. Even though the army later acknowledged that no insurgency occurred before mid-1971, it is clear from the evidence that from the start of 1970 the army increasingly targeted the nationalist community. The army was also operating in a full scale counter-insurgency mode by early July 1970 when it used overwhelming force to

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attack and cordon the entire Lower Falls area. By then General Freeland may have had inadequate political oversight from the Heath Conservative government, but even with

Callaghan‟s self-proclaimed close supervision the army had used the previous nine months to steadily increase its control over the nationalist minority. General Freeland had been directed to protect the nationalist minority from loyalist attack and to restore order in an impartial manner, but instead he had approached his task from a prejudiced perspective. As early as

September 1969 Freeland had told his commanders that they had to be prepared for an inevitable attack from the IRA. However the outcome of his actions was that the British army increasingly viewed the nationalist community not only as disloyal British subjects but an enemy of the type that it had encountered in Cyprus and Aden. Therefore the logical course of action was to use coercive force to control them. It was this that made insurgency inevitable.

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