The British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970
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Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970 Brian Treanor Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences Australian Defence Force Academy University of New South Wales 2011 ORIGINALITY STATEMENT „I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.‟ Signed …………………………………………….............. Date …………………………………………….............. i ABSTRACT This thesis argues that confrontation between the nationalist community and British troops in Northern Ireland was virtually inevitable, despite the celebrated „honeymoon period‟ that followed the deployment of troops in August 1969. The thesis will show that the army‟s attitudes, experience and culture led it to move rapidly from a neutral, „peacekeeping‟ posture to counter-insurgency operations before an insurgency had begun. It will also show that the deployment itself was the culmination of a series of ill-conceived and usually counterproductive decisions by British governments torn between a deeply-ingrained fear of becoming involved in Irish conflicts and a belief that Irish problems could be solved by exporting British norms and institutions. Such poor decisions continued after the deployment and helped to create a vacuum that the army filled with a strategy derived from its own recent experiences of colonial policing operations. The settlement of 1921-22 led British authorities to believe that the Irish question had been permanently removed from British politics. However Britain‟s abdication of its constitutional responsibilities for Northern Ireland allowed the Unionist government to institutionalise sectarian discrimination while limiting the Westminster government‟s options for future intervention. When the province erupted into violence in 1968 Britain continued to hope that the problem could be resolved without British intervention. But when the Stormont government coercion against nationalist protest led to endemic sectarian violence, the British government found it had no choice but to send in the army. While this British army was experienced at using force to restore order in colonial conflicts it was utterly unsuited to aid the civil power within the United Kingdom. Moreover, key elements of the army nursed a latent hostility to any manifestation of Irish nationalism. The result was that early attempts at maintaining good relations with the nationalist community in Belfast did not last, and because of its confrontational approach the army quickly became associated with the despised Unionist government. This process culminated in July 1970 when the newly-elected Conservative government gave the army its head, allowing it to instigate a counter-insurgency campaign before any insurgency existed. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS While I am alone responsible for this thesis, it was carried out over a number of years and could not have been completed without the invaluable help from a number of people. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all those who helped and supported me throughout this endeavour. In particular I am immensely grateful to the enduring support of my thesis supervisor Dr David Blaazer from the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of new South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra. Dr Blaazer was not only a constant source of advice and encouragement throughout this whole process but his unwavering enthusiasm and professionalism in the face of life‟s trials was the vital component I needed to complete such a demanding task. I also wish to thank my co- supervisor Dr John Connor for arranging access to the papers of General Sir Ian Freeland at the Imperial War Museum in London because without access to these unique records the thesis would be a much lesser work. I was very grateful that I was able to undertake this research at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Australian Defence Force Academy. The head of the School, Professor David Lovell, and his staff supported me above and beyond the call of duty during my extended stay and I thank them for their on-going support. The UNSE@ADFA is a very exceptional academic institution and supports its post- graduate students in ways that much larger institutions are unable to do. This is especially true with regard to the Academy Library with its unique collection and staff who were friendly, efficient and always willing to source even the most obscure request. I also wish to thank my family both in Australia and Ireland for their sustained support and assistance during a project that many must have wondered would even be completed. Michael was always there for me with encouragement during the many times when my tribulations seemed insurmountable. Timothy may not have appreciated how important the research project he carried out for me in London was but without his diligence and hard work at the Imperial War Museum I would not have been able to access General Freeland‟s papers which have proved so essential to this thesis. My family in Ireland also need to understand how essential their input to this work was. Chris, Paul and Mairead I thank you for your on-going support and assistance over the last few years. Chris has survived more personal trials than anyone should have to confront but like most Irish women she has an indomitable spirit that saw her through and it is to her that I dedicate this thesis. However my overwhelming thanks must go to my wife Suzanne who was a pillar of strength and support to me through even the darkest of times. Without her I would never have completed this thesis. Sue I thank you for staying with me through an endeavour you must have thought had consumed me. You will be happy to know that this journey is now over and we can now start another and hopefully more enjoyable phase in our life together. iii CONTENTS Page Introduction 1 Chapter 1 A Place apart; Britain and Ireland before 1968. 30 Chapter 2 The Wilson Government and the Return of the Irish 65 Question. Chapter 3 Ireland, Insurgency and the British army. 100 Chapter 4 The British army and the Northern Ireland Special 140 Powers Acts. Chapter 5 The army in control. 178 Chapter 6 Belfast; a city at war. 206 Chapter 7 Nationalism and the army. 232 Conclusion 259 Bibliography 272 iv Making a Bad Situation Worse: the British Army and Irish Nationalism, 1968-1970 Introduction This thesis will argue that when the British army was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969 it did not follow the direction of its political masters and operate as an impartial force to keep the peace. Even though the British government‟s requirements were clearly spelt out by the Home Secretary James Callaghan when he directed the army to act in an even-handed manner 1 it almost immediately identified the nationalist community as the source of the trouble and began confronting them as if they were colonial rebels. However impartial policing quickly evolved into a counter-insurgency operation well before any republican insurgency existed. The army‟s actions in the province‟s two major cities, in particular Londonderry were not those of impartial peacekeepers but of a military force confronting rioters it judged were disloyal to the Crown. Frank Kitson comes closest to describing the army‟s real modus operandi in Northern Ireland when he stated in Low Intensity Operations that: “keeping the peace and duties in aid of the civil authority were polite terms to describe a mild form of countering subversion.”2 In Londonderry the army had immediately confronted the nationalist community with force and even though the army‟s actions in Belfast were initially less confrontational there was conflict between it and the nationalist community as early as September 1969. The army had actively confronted elements of the nationalist community even though it had not come under any direct attack from that community or from its traditional defenders the IRA, on the 1 J Callaghan, A House Divided, William Collins, London, 1973, p 43. 2 F Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency & Peacekeeping, Natraj, Dehra Dun (India), 1992, p. 25. 1 contrary the IRA in Belfast had worked with the army to help stabilise the situation.3 In spite of these clashes an amicable relationship had developed in Belfast, however this began to fracture very shortly after the initial deployment when the arrogant and aggressive actions of some troops began to be challenged by members of the nationalist community.4 In Londonderry the army had immediately identified the nationalist community as the source of the problem but in Belfast there was a short hiatus before the nationalist community was judged in the same light and the same level of force began to be used against all of the nationalist community. However this is not the view usually taken of these events or of the army‟s role because the commonly accepted view is that the army acted in a neutral manner towards the nationalist community from its initial deployment until the emergence of the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in January 1970. It is also generally accepted that the public emergence of the PIRA signalled the start of its insurgency against the British state that in turn forced the British army to adopt aggressive counter-insurgency tactics.