Doc 35: GRU Messages

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DOCID: 4129962 · From rlbensl Mon Aug 5 15: 50: 29 1996 To: wpcrowe@nsa Subject: gru messages Cc: rllerne@nsa,~'pcav~@nsa Classification: c""'S'R~ent-Length: 2204 X-Lines: 33 Content-Length: 2 07 X-Lines: 57 Bill, This morning I did quick review of the London KGB and London GRU which GCHQ redacted and sent to Rona for simultaneous release (part of our 5th release) • ;(b)(S) The KGB translations look the same as those we hold. GRU material sent to us is greatly different from what we held. We hold 65 GRU London <--> Moscow translations of 1940-41 messages. GCHQ sent us Cmy quick count) 159 messages on that lane and those years. Most of the translations re-translations that we do not have seem to have been made c. 1967 However, mmessages we did not have at all or have incomplete versions show: + GRU spy ring called the "X Network", apparently in the British armed forces + A u/i GRU radio-equipped personality covername STANLEY (same c/n as Kim Philby but this is not Philby -- I think a message describes this STANLEY as being from a Canadian working class family. I might have a guess at the ident). · + GRU interview of Klaus Fuchs in the UK and his description•of early atomic bomb research + The X Network learned that UK had broken a Soviet code (nfi) + A u/i source doing technical work in a UK intelligence organization (NFI) + A British Colonel clandestinely working with GRU + Discussion of the crypto systems being used by GRU London + Several other apprently important u/i sources and more info abt GRU using clandestine comms. [the London GRU of 1945-47 looks approx like what we hold, but I did not study carefully] At least two 1945 KGB messages (and these we do have in file) have information about apparently important but u/i U.S. connected agents. Another 1945 KGB msg mentions the work of the u/i female agent TINA who is providing valuable documents re the atomic bomb. @'pproved for Release by NSA on 07-03-2014, FOIA Case# 4277) DOCID: 4129962 (truenames in text and footnotes). Their call. Their footnotes do contain the idents STANLEY = Philby and HICKS = Guy Burgess. We will put a couple UK messages in the book for the Oct conference. Lou .

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