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Space Debris Mitigation Mechanism in Japan -The Case of JAXA

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Space Debris Mitigation Mechanism in Japan -The Case of JAXA 5 a a W Ç / W!ó! Ü b/h tÜh { [ {! "# { ë %& a ' & ! %(() W!ó!*W + +,5 a C . / +,+ L . / 1+2C ! + . 3 . 4 4 4 4 4 ! 4 , 1%2C . b!{! 5 { 4 4 W 3 b!{5! 4 4 4 4 +))5, 1&2L!5/ D! 4 47 4 ! Ü { 4 4, 1"2í 4 7 Ü b D! 4 , 192b. 4! 3 47 4 4 L{h 4 4 , 152L 7 ! 4 . 4 4 , Ç ! 7 ! 4 ! , % Environm ent Num ber of debris Num ber of debris Chain 5,000 13,000 reaction 1996 1999 2001 2007 > 2008 NASA US US USA Safety Governm ent FCC STD s STD Practice s s STD s i i i i s s s s r r r r e e e e b b b Proposal for the b n n n n e e e e i i i NASDA IADC Debris i l l s s l l s s D D D D l l l l - - - - s s e e s s e Japan Debris M itigation e a a e e a a e e e e e e n n n n d d d d d Standard d d d i i n n i i c c n n c STD c r r r r i i i i l l l l o o o o a a a a s s s s e e a a e e i i a a i i u u u u i i i i p p p p t t t t r r r r d d d d d d d d G G G G i ዟዪዡዯ i i i a a S S a a S S b b b b n n n n u u u u n n n n e e e e w w w w n n n France Standard n - - - - a a C a C a C C o o o o G G a a G G a a r r r r N N N N t t D D t t D D i i i i D D D D e e e e L L t L L t t t S S S S n n e e U U n n e e U U t t t t A A A A a a a a c c c c o o o o n n n n I I I I i i i i g g g Russian g a a a a I I I I i t i t i i t t ያ ያ ያ ያ p p t t p p t Space Agency t a a a a i i i Russia i N N N N S S S S g g g g ዯ ዯ STD ዯ ዯ i i i i M M M M t t U U t t U U i i i i ዥ ዥ ዥ ዥ M M M ዡዯዝ M European European Code of Conducts Debris for Space Debris M itigation Com m unity Handbook Standardization Spread to other Agreem ent am ong all Agreem ent in UN as a Next step to prevent DΫ D D D 3& in NASA & NASDA aΫdvanced agencies advanced nations international fram ework catastrophic event Fig.-1 International Fram ework for Debris Control +,5 a C . / W +,% W!ó! 4 7 1+2W 7 3 4! 4 3 W!ó!, 1%2W!ó! 4 ! . W!ó! 5 a { 4 4, Ç 4 4 :! 47 a t ! ;4 3 W!ó!, 1&2Ç < . 4 4 7 .4 3 { 3 w7 . 4, 1"2h ; . ! :! 4 W!ó! 5 { 4 4 t3 4 { 3 :! , 192L ! . 4 ! ! 7 W!ó! { 4 4, " b { 5 a D W!ó! {! " { ! w$ . &/ ' W!ó! $ ( L!5/ { 5 W!ó! { 5 W!ó! {! " { ! a a { { D { 5 a t! { ! t { W!ó! W!ó! { I+,!- ,. t / Ç" h [ { $ t $ a 1 t / Ç" Fig.-2 Debris Mitigation Framework in Japan (JAXA related activities) 9 +,5 a C . / W +,& / ! 7 1+2/ 7 3 4! 4 . LÇÜ Ü b D! 4 W!ó! 4 4 L{h 4 4 , 1 7 ! . 2 1%2[! 7 4 7 W!ó! {Ç5 1&2/ 7 D9h LÇÜ 4 1"2h ; . 12 . / W!ó! 12 3 3 / ! 7 12 4! 7 ! 4 W!ó! 4 4, 5 $ " Üb /h tÜh { D$ " &Ü{9C- {Ç{/ 4( L!5/ í D3 $ " W!ó! L{h 7Ç/,87{/937 ! í D:- h 5/í D ! ; $ The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies commercial activities b9/- bÇ{- a I$! a /" " { h L /-4 9 /-4 /" " /" " ! " " " " " " $ " " " ! $ " $ Fig.-3 Debris Mitigation Framework in Japan (including commercial activities) @ %, W!ó! 5 a { 4 4 W!ó! 5 { 4 4 :! 4 ! , İÇ < Ç :! ı t 7 /! 4 Ç 4 IJ D9h w4! 4 ij [9h 3 , a ; ! < 4 Ĵ 4! 3 a ; 4 4 3 # L!5/ { 5 b { 5 a D a W!ó! { 5 a D { L{h { 5 w { Management Requirements Basic Management Phased Scope Tailoring Definition Requirements Plan Planning Planning and Implementation of Debris Mitigation Measures Refraining from P revention Removal disposal option Minimization of Releasing Parts of after of re-entry or the damage by on- or Objects Break-ups Operation natural decay orbit collisions Removal Collision Avoidance from GEO at Launch Removal Collision Avoidance from LEO in S/C Operation Protection from Fig.-4 Structure of JAXA Debris Mitigation Standard Tiny Debris) ", / . W!ó! { 4 4 Japanese space systems fully comply with the following mitigation requirements. a) On-orbital break-ups: There is no case of explosion. b) Preservation of GEO region: Japanese satellites including commercial ones have shown good compliance. c) Collision avoidance: For launch vehicles, collision avoidance for manned system is considered to set the launch time. For operating spacecraft, all JAXA satellites are analyzed daily for collision probability, and results are made known to the relating departments. +( GEO Observation Facility in Japan (BSGC) ++ Fig.-5 Reorbit of Japanese GESs which were launched after 1990 Collision Avoidance for Manned Spacecraft Collision Avoidance at launch for Operating Spacecraft radars to support Japanese Collision Avoidance Operation 8 3 W!ó! :! 4 / < TIRA Radar / FGAN, Kamisaibara (KSGC) Radar 4 4 4 , Germany / Japan Space Forum [2] 2cm at 1000km Detestability: 1m at 577km Fig.-6 Collision avoidance operation in launch operation, and orbital ope+r%ation. 9, h ! However there are some problems to be addressed. a) Mission related object released into orbit: All the fasters are designed not to release any parts. However, in multiple payloads launching, the support structure to sustain payload will be released, which is customarily allowed in the world due to its short orbital lifetime. b) Preservation of LEO region: It is hard to limit orbital lifetime to be less than 25 years for scientific satellites (whose orbits are relatively high to avoid effects of the atmosphere), small satellites (which do not have a propulsion system) , and orbital stage of launch vehicle. JAXA will gradually apply its requirements more strictly to inside and outside payload customer. +& In multiple payloads launching, the support structure to sustain payload will be released, which is customarily allowed in the world due to its short orbital lifetime. Support structure is released Fig.-7 Example of unavoidable mission related objects. +" 5, / ! (1) Current JAXA Space Debris Mitigation requires not only limitation of debris generation but also protection from debris, and measures to ensure the ground safety from the re-entry. (2) Although there aren't enough governmental regulations or laws, the contractors of JAXA, applicants for piggy back payloads, and commercial space users show good compliance with JAXA standard, or UN Guidelines in other words. (3) However there are a few areas in which industries and space users can’t perfectly comply with UN Guidelines. For example, a) There are unavoidable cases to release objects, for example, support structure in multiple payloads launching. b) Requirement to limit orbital lifetime is not easy to meet in the case of small satellites and orbital stages. +9.
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