German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project

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German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project PAVEL V. OLEYNIKOV German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project PAVEL V. OLEYNIKOV1 Pavel Oleynikov has been a group leader at the Institute of Technical Physics of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center in Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70), Russia. He can be reached by e-mail at <[email protected]>. he fact that after World War II the Soviet Union This article first addresses what the Soviets knew at took German scientists to work on new defense the end of World War II about the German bomb pro- Tprojects in that country has been fairly well docu- gram and then discusses their efforts to collect German mented.2 However, the role of German scientists in the technology, scientists, and raw materials, particularly advancement of the Soviet atomic weapons program is uranium, after the war. Next, it reviews the Soviets’ use controversial. In the United States in the 1950s, Russians of German uranium and scientists in particular labora- were portrayed as “retarded folk who depended mainly tories working on different aspects of atomic weapons on a few captured German scientists for their achieve- development. It discusses the contributions and careers ments, if any.”3 Russians, for their part, vehemently deny of several German scientists and their possible motiva- all claims of the German origins of the Soviet bomb and tions for participating in the Soviet bomb program. The wield in their defense the statement of Max Steenbeck importance of the Germans’ contributions was reflected (a German theorist who pioneered supercritical centri- in the awards and other acknowledgments they fuges for uranium enrichment in the USSR) 4 that “all received from the Soviet government, including numer- talk that Germans have designed the bomb for the Sovi- ous Stalin Prizes in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Their ets is nonsense.”5 The US intelligence community was contributions were particularly numerous in the area of able to make its own judgment on the subject when it uranium enrichment, especially on the technology of debriefed German scientists and prisoners of war return- gaseous diffusion plants. After reviewing these devel- ing from the USSR in the 1950s, but it did not make pub- opments, this article concludes with an evaluation of the lic its evaluation.6 This article attempts to resolve the political and historical significance of the use of Ger- controversy by drawing on both the stories later told by man material and scientists. While the Soviets did not these German scientists and the recently declassified need the Germans’ help to build an atomic weapon, their Soviet accounts of the atomic project. It seeks to deter- contributions certainly accelerated the Soviets’ push to mine the real extent to which German participation in become a nuclear weapon state. the atomic weapons program changed the balance of nuclear power and influenced the course of the Cold War. The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2000 1 PAVEL V. OLEYNIKOV DID THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THE GERMANS special reference tables to calculate what the measure- HAD AN ATOMIC BOMB? ments revealed. In the latter stages of the war in Europe, the US Army In another letter sent from Dresden on May 29, 1945, initiated efforts to investigate whether the advancing Flerov gave more clues that suggest he was looking for Allied troops could be threatened by a German radio- evidence on whether the Germans had conducted an logical weapon.7 However, the Soviets did not appear atomic test. In this letter, Flerov discusses his desire to to share this concern. Whether because the Russians’ in- interview certain individuals being repatriated to the telligence worked better than that of their British or Soviet Union from Soviet-occupied Germany: American counterparts,8 or an atomic bomb was not ...the repatriation has begun. So far there are believed feasible before the test in Alamogordo in July 10-15 thousand people a day crossing the de- 1945, none of the published documents from the early marcation line at three checkpoints. Later this stage of the Soviet atomic project (1943-1945) speaks number will rise to 50 thousand, until all of any such threat from Germany. However, there are former Soviet citizens (1-2 million) will be indirect hints of possible Soviet concern. moved away from here. We have visited some The US forces in Europe conducted an extensive en- of the checkpoints, talked to former prisoners vironmental sampling program to determine the of war. Unfortunately, people from various location of possible atomic facilities. The recently de- locations are mixed in the most peculiar way. classified and published letters of Georgy Flerov to Igor … Kurchatov, scientific director of the Soviet atomic Nevertheless, there should be organized sys- project, show that the Russians also undertook such an tematic filtration of all arriving people based investigation. Flerov, a nuclear scientist, was in Ger- on their location: in such and such area, in such many in May 1945 trying to find out whether the Ger- and such year, particularly because the respec- mans had been able to make an atom bomb. tive [Soviet intelligence] agencies are con- ducting similar filtration in order to determine In a letter sent from Dresden circa May 21, 1945, whom to send to what camp. [Here Flerov Flerov wrote in an ambiguous manner to protect secrecy made a footnote: In each camp we shall have about his plans to use Geiger counters in the search: 1-2 people focusing exclusively on debriefing Today or tomorrow we are going to fly in the people brought from a specific location. After direction that you know. I am taking with me the first superficial questioning, the only Dubovsky’s instrument, but its sensitivity is, people left will be those that we will speak to probably, too low. If we determine on site that personally.] After selection, people are kept for there are objects of interest for examination several days until somebody from us arrives and sensitivity of the instrument is the issue, to speak to them. I’ll send you a cable. Possibly, you can send somebody from the You will have to assign Stoljarenko or staff to help me. I think that as a result of such Davidenko (if he gets back by then) to this search we will be able to find what we need— work. Instruct them to assemble the instrument a person who occasionally was there nearby, in the lightweight option: powered from the as there were a lot of escapees wandering mains by 220 volts.... Along with the instru- through forests at the time. If successful, we ment, let them pack the tables for finding the will get objective confirmation of the fact, tan- 9 appropriate periods.… tamount to as if we personally had been at that Unlike the US airborne Geiger counters, the Soviet site. This must be done right here and right counter was not portable because it was to be powered now, because afterwards all people crossing from 220-volt mains. Flerov was going to search for ra- the border are dispersed through camps in Ger- dioactive isotopes with a short half-life (what he re- many and then are transferred to the Soviet fers to as “appropriate periods”). At the time, the only Union, and then even such an enthusiast as way to determine the presence of an isotope was to take myself would question our ability to catch the consecutive measurements several days in a row and use right people…. 2 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2000 PAVEL V. OLEYNIKOV The second direction is connected to what I east of Stettin: most of the inhabitants had fled, leaving wrote you in the previous letter. In order to behind virtually all their possessions. In order to collect determine finally what was really tested there, all the abandoned wealth, the Soviets formed special tro- we shall of course look after artificial, not phy brigades charged with requisitioning any property natural radioactivity. Unfortunately, a lot of of value to the Soviet Union.13 time has passed since, but I think that with [our The Soviets said the official justification for the tro- instruments] we will be able to attain the re- phy brigades came from agreements reached at the Yalta 10 quired sensitivity. and Potsdam conferences in February and July 1945, Obviously Flerov was not trying to find confirmation respectively. However, the Soviet government did not of reactor criticality because such an event does not cre- generally base its actions on respect for international ate visual effects that could be observed by people in a agreements, and the memoirs of Nikolai Dollezhal14 forest. Therefore, Flerov must have thought that escap- suggest the decision to launch the brigades was made ees could have witnessed something resembling an even before these conferences took place. In May 1945, atomic bomb test, accompanied by a bang and a flash of Dollezhal was assigned the rank of colonel and sent to light. Germany in order to “collect technical archives of en- 15 No documents have come to light that describe the terprises of the chemical machine building industry.” His identification stated that he acted under a decree from results of Flerov’s findings. What is known is that V.A. 16 Stoljarenko (who was mentioned in the May 21 letter) GOKO of January 31, 1945, No. 7431. The papers he received stated that Dollezhal should be “granted unob- indeed traveled to Germany, together with M.I. Pevzner 17 and A.K. Krasin, some time after Flerov, probably to do structed access for inspection of industrial sites.” the Geiger counter survey. Thus, the puzzle of whether While the trophy brigades were generally good at con- Soviet physicists believed the Germans had developed fiscating livestock and grain from the Germans, their an atomic bomb remains unsolved.
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