Atlantic Council GLOBAL ENERGY CENTER

The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

John Roberts

The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

John Roberts

AUTHOR’S NOTE

This paper was written before the July 9, 2015 disclosure that Gazprom had cancelled the contract with Italy’s Saipem for laying the first string of Turkish Stream because of delays in work on the Eastern Route of Russia’s Southern Corridor project, which would provide the gas input for Turkish Stream. This development will delay the implementation of all aspects of Turkish Stream by at least a year. How- ever, it also means that the Russian Government and Gazprom do not need to take any irrevocable deci- sion on whether to proceed with the project until early 2016.

Cover photo credit: Reuters/ Umit Bektas. A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control centre of the ’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, May 18, 2007.

ISBN: 978-1-61977-987-7

This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Indepen- dence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.

July 2015

The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 7

Introduction 8

Question One: How Big a System Is Russia Actually Likely to Build—and When? 8

Question Two: Gazprom Deliveries through Ukraine 13

Question Three: Turkish Stream and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 14

Question Four: The Fallout on the Southern Gas Corridor, the EU, and the Balkans 15

Conclusions 18

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5

The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russia has proposed building a major new pipeline intended to carry gas to customers in both Turkey and the European Union. The project, dubbed Turkish Stream, is controversial for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, it is intended to help Gazprom fulfil its stated intention of terminating gas exports to Europe via Ukraine by the end of 2019. Secondly, it is far from clear that customers in the European Union would accept delivery of gas at Turkey’s border with in place of current deliveries to locations in .

For these reasons, the issue of what Gazprom is actually likely to do in terms of implementing Turkish Stream, as opposed to what Russian officials have declared they intend to do, is of profound significance for European energy security. But Turkish Stream is also important for a third reason, its potential impact on the new pipelines—collectively known as the Southern Gas Corridor—currently being developed to supply Azerbaijani gas to Europe.

Russia will implement its Turkish Stream project, ment of the developers of the Southern Gas Corridor to although it is almost certain that it will limit its actual deliver an initial 6 bcm/y of gas to Turkey and a further pipelaying operations so that in practice the country will, at least initially, only deliver half of the project’s not impacted, but the SGC developers may well have to supposed eventual capacity of 63 billion cubic metres a consider10 bcm of fresh gas tooptions European for delivery customers of additional beyond Turkey volumes, is year (bcm/y). offshore gas projects. such as gas from Azerbaijan’s prospective “next wave” of Sea is likely to start this year, enabling Gazprom to deliver gasPipelaying to Istanbul on the next first year 15.75 by using bcm/y the “string” new line across instead the ofBlack the of gas to Europe via the SGC may have to take a fresh In particular, Azerbaijan and other prospective suppliers existing Trans-Balkan Pipeline across Ukraine. lookIn considering at delivery optionsthese issues, to and throughit may bethe bestBalkans. for the Turkey’s border with Greece, will pose a direct challenge The second 15.75 bcm/y string, which will carry gas to Energy Community—in effect, all of Europe west of Southern Gas Corridor, since it will provide Gazprom European Union and its associates in the European withto the the developers ability to of deliver the European gas into Union the Southern (EU)-backed Gas local cross-border interconnectors rather than such grandioseTurkey, Russia, multinational and Belarus—to projects as consider Eastring, small Tesla, scale, the Vertical Gas Connector, or a revival of Nabucco West. Corridor (SGC)’s final component, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Should Gazprom seek to utilise the TAP itsto deliverown advantage. some 10 bcm/y of gas to European customers, it would, in effect, be turning EU rules on open access to problem.As for Russia, its plans to extend Turkish Stream through The development of Turkish Stream does not necessarily Greece bear watching, but financing them will be a resolve a major problem for Gazprom: how to solve its delivery issues to customers in Central Europe should it question: might Turkish Stream prove to be the precursorAnd lurking to in thea radicalbackground change is the by great Russia’s unanswered rulers concerning their approach to both the delivery and the implement its pledge to terminate deliveries via Ukraine price of Russian gas exports to Europe? fromTurkish the Stream end of 2019.poses challenges for the Southern Gas Corridor and European energy security. The commit-

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 7 The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

ussia will proceed to develop its Turkish The questions that will be addressed are these:

Sea to Turkey. It may not construct the system • How big a system is Russia actually likely to build, and toStream the fullproject 63 billionto carry cubic gas acrossmeters the (bcm) Black a what kind of timetable can be reasonably anticipated? Ryear capacity announced by Russian President Vladimir • Is Gazprom really going to suspend deliveries through

consequences for existing customers in Central Putin when he unveiled the project in Ankara on new set of lines from Russia to Turkey will be built in the Europe?Ukraine in five years’ time and, if so, what are the nextDecember few years. 1, 2014, but there should be no doubt that a • Is Gazprom likely to seek to funnel gas from Turkish Turkish Stream will certainly have an impact on the development of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), the in the Southern Gas Corridor system, for onward Stream into the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, a key element

European Union (EU)-backed set of projects that initially • deliveryWhat would to customers be the consequences within the EU? for the SGC, and aims to carry some 16 bcm per year of gas to Turkey and the EU, and ultimately double that amount to Turkey, the and the European Energy Community, particularly in for prospective customers in the European Union impactEU, and is EU-affiliated a challenge, Europeannot a threat, destinations to the SGC. within The real the European Energy Community. But Turkish Stream’s threat it poses is to European customers of Russian gas the Balkans, should Gazprom opt to take space in the who currently rely on Gazprom to supply them via Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)? Question One: implementing its warning to suspend all transit of How Big a System Is Russia Actually Likely Ukraine, but who cannot—in the event of Gazprom to Build—and When? expect to receive substitute supplies via either Russian gas through Ukraine after 2019—necessarily The scale of Turkish Stream is by no means assured. Yet, while a full 63 bcm per year (bcm/y) system would have profound implications for Europe’s gas balance, particu- itself.Gazprom’s Nord Stream line across the Baltic, the Yamal pipeline through Belarus and Poland, or Turkish Stream larly concerning the possible construction of new Several key questions remain open at this stage. infrastructure in Greece, a more limited system of However, one overriding issue, the question of whether around half this size would also have major implications

There are good reasons to suppose that Gazprom will at improvethe future or relationsdeteriorate between over the Russia, next Ukraine,several years, and the is for European consumers, particularly in the Balkans. least proceed with the construction of a two-string pipeline beyondEuropean the Union scope (andof this the paper. United Russia’s States occupation as well) will of Crimea and its military support for separatist forces in then onwards to a terminal on the Turkish-Greek border at across the to a landfall at Kıyıköy in Turkey, and contribute to an uneasy situation which may have eased the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Ipsala/Kipoi. This would enable it to deliver 31.5 bcm/y into Turkey, with each string—or pipe—under the Black slightly in the wake of a ceasefire agreement that Sea capable of carrying 15.75 bcm/y. Germany.concluded inHowever, the Belarusian it should capital be ofnoted Minsk that on Februarydisputes 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and three-quartersRussia’s Ambassador of toSouth the EU VladimirStream’s Chizhov original—and has noted that, by landing at Kıyıköy, Turkish Stream would utilize concerning the supply of Russian gas to Ukraine and starting point at the Russkaya Compressor station near causestransit yetacross to be Ukraine settled. caused major crises between the surveyed—930-kilometer (km) offshore route from its two countries in 2006 and 2009, with the underlying

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

Map. 1 Turkish Stream and the Southern Gas Corridor

kilometers of the second string and for Saipem to Anapa on Russia’s Black Sea coast. But instead of making carryto the outSwiss complementary company Allseas works to lay on ninethe second hundred string. landfall at Varna, well to the north of the Turkish-Bulgarian border,Chizhov it has would also land highlighted at Kıyıköy, the just fact south that ofTurkish the border. Stream The pipe contracts have already led to an accumulation remains the inheritor of a series of contracts signed in laying vessels, the Saipem 7000 and the Castoro Sei, have Transport company. These include: of pipe in Bulgaria, while two of Saipem’s principal pipe- 2014 by the Gazprom-led (and Amsterdam-registered) the last several months. • remained berthed at the Bulgarian port of Bourgas for However, the full pipe-laying timetable remains unclear. contracts worth €1 billion awarded in January 2014 • for actual pipes for the initial 15.75 bcm/y string; would be laid this year and would be intended to serve asChizhov a substitute said that for the gas first currently string underbeing thedelivered Black Seato contracts worth €800 million awarded in March 2014 • for pipe required for the second string;

contracts worth €2 billion awarded in March 2014 to northIstanbul to viasouth Ukraine, direction) Moldova, across and theTurkish Trans-Balkan Thrace. • Italy’s Saipem to lay the first string; and Gazprom,Pipeline across which Romania, has also Bulgaria,said that thatand (ina pipeline an essentially would be laid across Turkish Thrace (in an essentially east-to- contracts for an unspecified amount, but presumed to be worth at least $1.2 billion, awarded in April 2014

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 9 The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

Map. 2 Existing, Planned or Proposed Long-distance Pipelines in Southeastern Europe

10 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

west direction) to Turkey’s border with Greece, has said - terpart on the Greek side of the border, is the meeting pointThe border for two crossing major between elements Ipsala in andthe Kipoi,Southern its coun Gas repeatedly that the first line would become operational in 2016. Finally, on May 7, 2015, after meeting with Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz in Ankara,- Corridor: the 1,840-km Trans-Anatolian Pipeline sioningGazprom and CEO gas Alexei deliveries Miller viasaid the that Turkish Russia Streamand Turkey will (TANAP), which is being built from Turkey’s border with had reached an agreement The “on next operational day he declared: commis Georgia to its border with Greece, and the 870-km 1 Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will connect with start in December 2016.” 2 TANAP at Ipsala/Kipoi and then carry Azerbaijani gas “Today, Gazprom moved to the construction stage of the essentiallyacross northern be used Greece to substitute to Albania for gas and currently southern being Italy. seaIn practice, part of the what Turkish Gazprom Stream appears pipeline.” to be envisaging is However, since the first string of Turkish Stream will this year, and a tight eighteen-month program to requireddelivered when to Istanbul the second via the string Trans-Balkan is ready to Pipeline,be commis an- constructthe laying ofthe the necessary first subsea onshore string acrossfacilities the in Black Turkey. Sea extension of the onshore line to Ipsala/Kipoi will only be immediate wake of Putin’s initial announcement, there weresioned, reports and that that does Russia not seem had likelycancelled until the 2017. contract In the These will definitely have to include development of the landfall site at Kıyıköy, an intersection with the Trans- - the physical pipe for this line has already been ordered, Balkan pipeline at Lüleburgaz in central Thrace, and the itwith is reasonable Allseas for to laying suppose the thatsecond Gazprom string. will However, more likelysince construction of an 80-km link from Kıyıköy to Lüle be working to secure a postponement of the original burgaz. Almost certainly, these initial works will also to Ipsala, on Turkey’s border with Greece, which Russia contract rather than its outright cancellation. andinclude Turkey a 100-km have extension agreed will of the be line the from location Lüleburgaz for a terminal from which Gazprom will seek to supply - ages it as the base from which it will be able to dispatch As for the development of Ipsala itself, Gazprom envis prospective customers in Greece, the rest of the EU, and second, third, and fourth strings of Turkish Stream’s the Balkans. some 47 bcm/y of gas—the prospective contents of the - ofActual the originalpipe laying South has Streamyet to start. pipeline, However, the Saipemas of June 7000 30, subsea section—to customers in the European Union 2015, both the vessels hired in 2014 to lay the first string and the Castoro Sei securingand the Balkans. contracts However, for the as gas noted and previously, developing construc a clear tion of most of the facilities will be dependent on first , were still at anchor in the Bulgarian delivered onwards. port of Bourgas and were thus clearly available to lay the understanding of how gas reaching Ipsala/Kipoi will be firstWorks string to develop of Turkish a full Stream scale thisexport year. terminal at Ipsala Gazprom cannot afford not to proceed with Turkish might well start within the same timeframe as these Stream. The only question is whether it will lay more initial works, but any completion date would be depen- than two strings and, if so, in what timeframe. Not dent upon the conclusion and timing for subsequent only has it already signed specific contracts delivery of gas delivery contracts for gas to be supplied concerning the first two strings of South Stream and Turkish Stream, but it is also in the middle of an to EU and Balkan customers from the Ipsala terminal. calls the Southern Corridor, to bring gas from the The choice of Ipsala as the terminal is highly significant. northexpensive of Russia $22.5 billiondown program,to the Russkaya which it compressorconfusingly 1 gazprom-turkey-pipeline-launch/“Gazprom, Ankara Agree to Start Turkish. Stream Gas Deliveries in 2 DecIbid. 2016,” RT, May 7, 2015, http://rt.com/business/256509- station on the Black Sea, the jumping-off point for

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 11 The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

Table 1. The Comparative Capacities of Turkish Stream and the Southern Gas Corridor

String One, 15.75 bcm/y: Essentially replaces the existing (Western) Trans-Balkan Pipeline route to Turkey and Greece.

String Two, 15.75 bcm/y: Provides additional supply to Turkey and European markets accessi- ble via Turkey using existing infrastructure or infrastructure currently under development. Turkish Stream String Three, 15.75 bcm/y: Provides additional supply to Turkey and European markets acces- sible via Turkey. But it requires new infrastructure to carry gas beyond Turkey.

String Four, 15.75 bcm/y: Provides additional supply to Turkey and European markets acces- sible via Turkey. But it requires new infrastructure to carry gas beyond Turkey.

Azerbaijan-Georgia (c. 450 km); 8-9 bcm/y using the existing South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and 30-33 bcm/y using the SCP Expansion (SCP-X) line: c. 40 bcm/y

Georgia-Turkey (c. 240 km). The existing SCP will be expanded, and will thus constitute part of SCP-X, but using compression only: 24 bcm/y. Southern Gas Corridor The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) from the Turkish Border with Georgia to Eskisehir (c. Pipeline Component 1400 km): 33 bcm/y. Capacities The TANAP line from Eskisehir to Kipoi (c. 450 km): 20-24 bcm/y.

The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) from Kipoi to Lecce (870 km): 20-24 bcm/y.

Source

: Methinks Ltd. need a new home. The logical new home—as Russian

theTurkish gas Stream.delivered This to program,Russkaya begun is then in forwarded2011 and due to for completion in 2017, only makes sense if much of officials have suggested—is the European Union. There is modest scope for deliveries to two EU member states, export customers beyond the Black Sea. Bulgaria and Romania, by means of reverse-flow through sense in its own right (at least from a Russian perspec- the Trans-Balkan Pipeline. But neither are major Moreover, a two-string system makes considerable markets. Bulgaria’s consumption in 2013 was just 2.6 simply because it utilizes contracts that have already bcm and is expected to grow by only around 0.7 bcm by beentive ofimplemented substituting or are for ready Ukrainian for implementation. transit), and The not 2020. Romania consumed 12.5 bcm in 2013 and is expected to see its consumption rise to around 15-16 bcm/y by 2020. But the country is already producing first 15.75 bcm/y string effectively replaces deliveries around 11 bcm/y and, as and when its new offshore of up to 14 bcm/y, which Gazprom has contracted to prospectivelyNeptun field in to the modest Black exporter Sea comes status. on line, it will move useddeliver to to honor Turkey existing via the regional Trans-Balkan deliveries Pipeline to Gazprom system. first toward self-sufficiency in gas production and then A small portion of this string’s capacity is likely to be Gazprom is therefore likely to seek to book space on the

customers in Bulgaria and Greece. second string will be used to increase supplies to the exploredTrans-Adriatic in greater Pipeline detail to enablein Question it to deliver Three. some 10-12 At least part of the deliveries from the 15.75 bcm/y bcm/y of second string gas to EU markets, an issue

gas-deficient Istanbul area. But there will still be some 10-12 bcm/y of second string content that is going to

12 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

Gazprom and its political masters do not need to make that European consumers required that capacity. This up their minds in a hurry on whether to proceed beyond 4

meant, as Miller argued, that such volumes could5 simply somethe first guaranteed two strings. form In orderof onward to go shipmentahead with beyond a full beWhat dispatched the Gazprom to other CEO markets, did not make such asclear Asia. was whether four-string 63 bcm/y system, they first need to secure this meant that Gazprom is planning to terminate or fourth-string supply to the eventual market in the reduce some existing supply contracts to customers in Ipsala/Kipoi to carry some 31.5 bcm/y of third- and Central Europe. These are contracts that the company major new infrastructure, with options ranging from a revivalEuropean of Union.the Interconnector This will require Turkey-Greece-Italy construction of own planned suspension of transit, or via Turkish would not be able to serve via Ukraine, because of its (ITGI) system or the laying of a second pipe alongside Stream, unless major new infrastructure were devel- oped to carry the gas from Turkey to Central Europe. the developing TAP pipeline to construction of new Gazprom’s warnings that it will end transit across anddelivery the Russian systems authorities through the do Balkansnot need toto aaddress major European hub such as Baumgarten. However, Gazprom these issues (considered in greater detail in Questions Ukraine are questioned by some major Western analysts. upJonathan jointly Sternby the ofEuropean the Oxford Commission Institute and for Russia— Energy which time the relationship between Gazprom and its saidStudies—and of the planned a member phase-out of the of Gas Gazprom Advisory transit Council across set EuropeanThree and customers Four) for atmay least have two once or threeagain years,changed by profoundly, though for better or worse currently remains far from clear. Ukraine: “This is not possible,6 not by 2020—just as Ukraine saying it will phase out (direct supplies of) In sum, Russia can be expected to think very carefully Russian gas is not possible.” before it commits itself to initiating contracts for Strategic Energy & Economic Research (SEER) company, construction of the third and fourth offshore strings of Michael Lynch, President of the Massachusetts-based Turkish Stream and for the attendant infrastructure speaking shortly after Miller’s April 13 remarks, argued the interim, it can argue that moves to proceed with the that, “If you’ve got customers and a line through required for onward shipment to customers in the EU. In Ukraine—and an7 oil price of $50—you’re not going to construction of a four-string system—even if they don’t. cutEqually off the serious gas.” is the question of whether Gazprom first two strings constitute a steady progression towards could be in breach of contract with some customers in Question Two: Central Europe if it were to suspend deliveries of gas via Gazprom Deliveries through Ukraine - nisms. Stern argues that delivery to a hub on the Ukraine in the absence of alternative delivery mecha that his company would halt gas deliveries to Europe current contractual obligations, whereby Gazprom has Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller declared on April 13, 2015, toTurkish-Greek deliver gas borderto locations would notagreed be sufficientwith its toCentral meet 3 Instead, it would redirect transit to Turkish Stream.through HeUkraine coupled when this the statement current contractwith an expiresargument in that2019. Gazprom could easily double the volume of gas European customers. “It is not the obligation of the delivered to Europe, but that there was no indication 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. http://rt. 6 Jonathan Stern, comments made at Gas Conference, 3 “Russia to Stop Gas Delivery via Ukraine by 2019, Push. Ahead with January, 28 2015, author’s notes. Turkish Stream—Miller,” Russia Today, April 13, 2015, 7 Michael Lynch, comments made at ICEED Conference, Boulder, com/business/249273-gazprom-ukraine-gas-transit/ Colorado, April 15, 2015, author’s notes.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 13 The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

additional compression can be put in place to double 8 buyer to get gas to the delivery point; it is the obligation 10 of the seller,” Stern says. capacity to at least 20 bcm/y. - tion of the SGC developers was that they would probably It would appear that both Miller and Putin consider At present, there is no such availability, and the assump delivery to Ipsala and Kipoi as sufficient to honor the anobligations adviser to for the delivery Director to General the European of Russia’s Union, Gazprom since- have to wait until the “next wave” of Azerbaijani gas Export,Kipoi is analso entry evidently point toagrees the EU. with Andrey this Konoplyanik,assessment. lines.projects came on stream in the early- or mid-2020s to fill- Speaking in the same workshop as Stern in Vienna, terizethe extra11 a cluster capacity of plannedprojects inconcerning both the TANAP the planned and TAP or The “next wave” is a loose term used to charac that Gazprom would not actually own the gas molecules onceKonoplyanik they were noted dispatched that, since across EU the regulations border into meant the proposed development of a number of Azerbaijani fields. asThese well includeas a prospective Absheron, Phase Umid, Three Babek, operation Zafar-Mashal, at Shah Shafiq-Asiman, and Deep Level Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli,- hubEU, on the the underlying Turkey-Greece issue border, was “how with togas re-routedelivered the to thatcontracted hub by Gazprom amount tothen Baumgarten” put up for auction from to the customers planned TwoDeniz, development the giant field will being provide developed all the input by British for the Petroinitial leum (BP) and its colleagues, and whose current Phase 9 in the EU. investment16 bcm/y of programs SGC gas. So for far, the however, rest still onlysome the way relatively off. Question Three: small Umid field is under actual development, with Turkish Stream and the Trans-Adriatic Should Gazprom proceed with its second string—for Pipeline which it has already secured physical pipe—it could The issue of whether Gazprom might seek to secure seek to utilize this additional capacity in TAP to carry issue and an issue concerning the comparative capaci- since Gazprom can have such gas available before any some 10-12 bcm/y of Turkish Stream gas to Italy. And tiesspace of on the the two TAP systems. from Kipoi The to political Italy is bothissue aconcerns political non-Russian supplier is likely to be able to do so, there both the right of Gazprom to access a line originally has to be a reasonable prospect that Gazprom will developed to help Europe access new, non-Russian gas indeed seek to send some Turkish Stream gas onward to supplies and the consequences for European customers—and by extension European energy the EU by means of utilizing TAP. All it has to do is secure wouldfirm sales have commitments to put additional and then compression bid for space in on place TAP. in It The capacity element raises the possibility of Gazprom would have to give plenty of advance warning, since TAP security—of Gazprom securing space on TAP. Pipeline capacities are never precise. They depend on the amount of

10 seeking to access the TAP line. At its most basic (see furthercompression compression used. In couldgeneral, be addedTAP officials to increase consider capacity, the upper but it range wouldof capacity be likely in their proven system commercially to be around unproductive. 23-24 bcm/y. Once Technically, capacity table 1), the point is that the TAP line is currently being developed so that it will be available to carry some 10 levels of 23-24 bcm/y are reached (and probably before that, at sobcm/y that, ofas Azerbaijaniand when further gas to gas European supplies markets are available, from around 20 bcm/y), any move to carry further major volumes of gas early 2020 onwards; but with a built-in design capacity through the TAP system would be taken as a sign that it was time to theconsider laying laying of a second a second physical physical pipe pipe across alongside Georgia. the first.This is a quite 11 practicalAny increase proposition of gas exports and has from at least Azerbaijan been tentatively would also considered require

8 Jonathan Stern, comments made at Vienna Gas Conference, would require some two years’ advance notice in order to lay the January 28, 2015, author’s notes. in the context of possible Turkmen gas input into the SGC. But it 9 Andrey Konoplyanik, comments made at Vienna Gas Conference, January 28, 2015, author’s notes. pipe through the Lesser Caucasus Mountains. 14 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

time for the Russian shipments, but that is something Question Four: that it is required to do as and when a customer wants to The Fallout on the Southern Gas Corridor, book space on the line. the EU, and the Balkans In the longer run, the Russians have made it clear that they believe new infrastructure will have to be built on The key issue here is that, while the EU has granted- the Greek side of the Turkish-Greek frontier to carry mentsTAP’s developers of gas from an exemptionShah Deniz from Phase its usual Two insistence (SD2) to Turkish Stream gas to Europe. This particularly applies on open third party access for the initial 10 bcm/y ship to the need for new or expanded pipelines to carry third- operate on the principle of open third party access with and fourth-string gas, but it would, of course, also apply regardcustomers to insubsequent Greece, Albania,deliveries. and Hence, Italy, TAPGazprom’s has to monopolistic practices to its own advantage. where Gazprom to decide not to use TAP. As a result,- opportunity to use EU regulations intended to curb sionsthere ofhas Turkish been aStream. flurry of activity concerning new gas pipelines in the Balkans that could act as onward exten The country most deeply involved, since Turkish Stream Should Gazprom book space on TAP, this could serve to Turkishblock a considerable market (at a volumetime when of potential Turkey was Azerbaijani already ingas a Tsipras discussed possible onward transit of Turkish positionexports, andto receive by limiting a lot thatmore export gas from or confining Russia), it tocould the ends at its border, is Greece. Greek Prime Minister Alexis further undermine the already fragile economics of the focusStream of gas their across talks Greece was a potentialin talks with revival Putin of inplans Moscow for a pipelineon April 8across and with Greece Gazprom to connect in Athens to one on Aprilof the 21. losing One TANAP pipeline across Turkey. - propositions for a Southern Gas Corridor component, sion’s Directorate-General (DG) for Energy, said on the Poseidon pipeline from Greece to southern Italy. Brendan Devlin, an adviser in the European Commis This would connect the existing Turkey-Greece Inter-

March 5 that there were no obstacles to Gazprom using set of pipelines across Greece to the Thesprotia district TAP to ship Turkish Stream gas to Italy. “It doesn’t matter connector between Karacabey and Komotini with a new workswho the like shipper that. It’sis,” theDevlin rules said. that “We we don’t have care set upif it for is bcm/y subsea Poseidon line would carry the gas to Italy. Russian gas, Libyan gas, Azeri gas. The internal market on Greece’s Ionian coast, from whence the proposed 11 is largely idle and would be of no use to Gazprom, since it Russia, or for Gazprom.” Moreover, in the same way that originatesThe 11 bcm/y on theKaracabey-Komotini wrong side of the link,Turkish opened Straits in 2007,from the EU requires Gazprom to implement its rules within the EU, “they are free and welcome to use pipelines in Poseidon system would cost something in the region of the European Union on the same basis. To the question Ipsala-Kipoi, while developing the rest of the ITGI/ ‘Can they use TAP?’—from a regulatory and 12 political perspective, the answer is: ‘Yes,’” Devlin stated. $5-6Greece billion itself for does a 20-30 not bcm/yhave enough system. funds and, under current conditions, there would be little appetite from makeHowever, inquiries it should about be possible noted that, use asof the of May line 2015,to carry no commercial investors for such a project. That would TurkishRussian Streamor Gazprom gas. official had approached TAP even to

reportedmean that to Russia have told would Tsipras essentially that Russia have wasto finance willing the to line itself. In a phone call on May 7, 2015, Putin was EurActiv http://www.euractiv.com/sections/ 12 “Russiaenergy/russia-can-use-trans-adriatic-pipeline-commission- Can Use Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, Commission Confirms,” extension to Turkish Stream, but there was no indication , March 6,. 2015, whetherprovide financingthis was an to offer Greek to pay companies for the entire for aproject possible or

confirms-312688

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 15 The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

simply to provide some seed capital for cash-strapped run. Developers of Greece’s Poseidon project still hold Greece. One core issue that has yet to be publicly valid permits for a landfall in Italy, an issue which still addressed13 is the fact that such a line would have to be expected to be secured this summer. In a few years’ time, third party access, the very issue that prompted Russia remains unsettled for TAP, although a landfall permit is toconstructed abandon South in accordance Stream. The with developers EU rules would governing have to a fresh look at Poseidon/ITGI. not only Greece and Russia, but also the EU, may well take initial application of third party access. The European Commissionrequest exemption does acknowledge from EU regulations that companies concerning devel- Meanwhile, it is reasonable to assume that Gazprom will oping infrastructure should be able to recoup their costs project already well under way in terms of land acquisi- at some stage turn its attention to TAP, since it is a and so exemption for an element of capacity for a speci- tion and the ordering of key materials, including physical

would not necessarily be automatic, since questions what would be the consequences for the Southern Gas pipe. But if Gazprom should decide to book space in TAP, fied number of years should be granted. But this process- Corridor and for gas importing countries in Europe? vidual member states concerning whether such a project aswould ITGI/Poseidon, be raised by were both it Commission to be developed officials by Gazpromand indi - or with Gazprom support, would contribute to the diver- The most pressing issue concerns Azerbaijan. Producers expected to be responsible for the “next wave” of Azerbai jani output would have to find an alternative way to get sification of supply sources for Europe as well as to the capacity, which they generally anticipate would be avail- abletheir for gas their to Europeanuse, would customers,then be taken since by Gazprom. the spare They TAP constructiondiversification of of ITGI/Poseidon, routes. Ironically, it could should do Gazprom worse than opt examineboth to seekthe spacepossibility on TAP that and to alsoassuage to explore European the concerns, not to mention legal niceties concerning the could still get “next wave” gas to Ipsala by means of exemption issue, it should also consider whether to Stream.TANAP, butThey after would that thehave anticipated to seek new TAP alternative pipeline to exitsItaly enlarge ITGI/Poseidon from its historic concept as an would be filled up with a mixture of SD2 gas and Turkish

fromThat themeans, European inter end alia, of thedusting TANAP off system. some previously 8-11 bcm/y system into something on the scale of the discarded projects in southeastern Europe, such as the being20-24 bcm/yable to system accommodate that TAP shouldnon-Russian eventually gas become. supply This would then enable ITGI/Poseidon to join TAP in- jani gas development. Nabucco West project. When TAP was first approved in- sources, such as those from the “next wave” of Azerbai tionJune would2012 as eventually the vehicle be tofollowed carry SD2 by the gas construction to Europe, the of Nabuccofield’s developers West. The reiterated Nabucco hopesdevelopers that TAP’s lost interest construc at Although Russia and Greece did indeed go on to sign a memorandum of understanding in St Petersburg on June - venture for an extension for Turkish Stream across the time, but the idea never quite died. Thus, on March 4, 19, 2015 on development of a €2bn Russian-Greek joint Greece, there was no mention of any onward connection 2015, after holding talks with visiting Azerbaijani Pres ident Ilham Aliev, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko- Borisov said, “We want to unfreeze the Nabucco project to Italy. Moreover, the complexities concerning both sion to support the project’s revival. such a project is unlikely to be developed in the next two through Bulgaria,” and called on the14 European Commis finance and conformity with EU regulations ensure that Aliev, for his part, commented, “We think that we can unite TAP or three years. But it should not be ruled out in the long http://uk.reuters. http://www.todayszaman.com/ Today’s Zaman 14 “Bulgaria Seeks to Revive Nabucco Gas Pipeline after Russia’s 13 business_ankara-moscow-agree-to-run-turkish-stream-“Ankara, Moscow Agree to Run Turkish Stream by End-2016,” South Stream Killed,” Reuters, March 4, 2015, , May 7, 2015,. com/article/2015/03/04/bulgaria-azerbaijan-pipeline- idUKL5N0W61T5 by-end-2016_380091.html 20150304 16 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

and Nabucco. It is not important what you call this route. security issues, let alone cost effectiveness, is that, although initial accounts indicated that it planned to use

Our main goal is that the volumes of Azeri gas enter Europe.” Aliev added, “The15 more EU countries receive transit across the southwestern corner of Ukraine for a ourOther gas, proposals the better are for also all.” under consideration. Slovakia’s roughly 200-km section between Slovakia and Romania gas authority, Eustream, has proposed a project called bypass(utilizing to anensure area a underdirect Kyiv’slink between control), Slovakia subsequent and Eastring, which looks very similar to the Nabucco West descriptions allowed for the construction of a Ukraine concept only located further east in different regions of theRomania, event aof move a Russian that would cut-off isolate is supposed Ukraine, to whilebe at the issue of enabling Ukraine to continue to receive gas in , Romania, and Bulgaria. This would seek to Slovakia or vice versa. Eustream has signed, or says that all, however, the twin questions of who will bear the cost carry some 20 bcm/y of gas, either from Bulgaria to it is about to sign, a memorandum of understanding offorefront such major of regional projects, thinking and just on what energy those security. costs will Above be,

concerning how these lines might kick-start do not (MoU) with partner countries for this project. However, contracted projects is vastly more complicated. provideremain any essentially indication unanswered. of just how the Limitedlines are supposed accounts signing such MoUs is easy; translating them into to operate in a world in which commercial companies, rather than national governments, are the principal Likewise, Hungary has proposed a project for a gas line actors in actually implementing such projects. to connect Greece’s planned new liquefied natural gas Then there is SEEP, the South East European Pipeline. (LNG) terminal at Kavala (or some similar location on its Hungary, a project which the Hungarians have infor- This was a project—although it is better considered a north Aegean coast) with Macedonia, , and mally dubbed the Tesla pipeline, after the concept since it was essentially an intelligent piece of

Serbian-American scientist Nikola Tesla. The foreign market analysis rather than a firm plan for specific ministers of all four countries met in Budapest on April Nabuccoinfrastructure West development—preparedto ensure that they come by up BP within 2010 fully to 7 to further this proposal which, like Eastring, is likely commitment of the respective governments to the commercial2011, largely projects. as a way SEEPof putting attempted pressure to onassess TAP twoand to result in the signing of MoUs to underline the political - main aspects of regional gas development, the volumes sion, such projects would appear to be versions of South project. From the perspective of the European Commis Stream dressed up to look like Nabucco West. It would and the best way to use interconnectors between the take a lot of work, and a lot of commercial commitments that Balkan states themselves required for gasification- from (as yet unavailable) non-Russian gas suppliers, to dominantvarious Balkan pipeline. states in order to provide a sort of capil - lary input into the Balkans, rather than rely on a single cationconvince of supplyBrussels sources that such for projectsgas reaching as Eastring Europe, and rather the Circumstances have changed considerably since then. Greece-Hungary line would truly contribute to diversifi Romania is no longer likely to be a prospective growing would be to improve Gazprom’s prospects of accessing market for imported gas in the timeframe envisaged for marketsthan serve in as central diversification Europe, routes should whose the Russianmain purpose giant implement its stated commitments to end gas transit onthe Russian “next wave” gas remains of Azerbaijani strong. Indeed,gas, but with the theneed prospec for the- other Balkan states to reduce their extreme dependence across Ukraine. them with alternative pipeline access, such as the not necessarily focussed on broader European energy tive loss of supplies for Ukraine, the need to provide One significant indication that Eastring, for example, is Ibid.

15 ATLANTIC COUNCIL 17 The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

and Greece, is stronger than ever. recently-announced connection between Macedonia To the Bulgarians, the IGB, which would be capable of There is another problem concerning the kind of energy carrying some 3-5 bcm/y of gas, would constitute the Romania,first element and possibly in the VerticalHungary. Gas The CorridorVGC can certainly (VGC), a considering. There is always political support for big beproposal considered to link a logical the gas effort networks to try of to Greece, implement Bulgaria, the diversification project that Balkan governments are projects, such as Nabucco West, Eastring, or Tesla European Commission’s (EC) objective of linking up costing several billions of euros. This may be for reasons regional interconnectors so that they form a coherent of political showmanship or, more sinisterly, because of regional system, as was demonstrated by the presence the prospects that big projects yield better opportuni- ties for crony deals and corruption. at initial discussions on the subject in Sofia in February of such senior EU officials as Maroš Šefčovič, the EC Vice President responsible for the Energy Union, and Miguel Significantly, the most immediate practical deals are Energy. problems of a different kind. Devlin, one of the European Arias Cañete, the Commissioner for Climate Action and Commission’srelatively small foremost scale interconnectors. experts on regional But they energy face issues, commented directly on the prospects for inter- Thus, when energy officials from Greece, Bulgaria, and are a host of possibilities, but these are prevented from Romania signed an agreement on April 22 backing the happening,connectors atnot a Brusselsbecause meetingof any physical in March problems, 2015: “There but construction of the IGB, due to start in 2016 and complete because of regulatory constraints, and regulatory in 2018, it was dressed up as if it were the full VGC that constraints are the result of political restraint, imposed was about to be implemented. Moreover, the dilatory by the governments of the region. It’s not a physical Nabuccoapproach West taken and by successive Slovakia’s BulgarianEastring proposal,governments epito to- problem, it’s a failure of political will, and a failure to mizesimplement the confusion the IGB, and that its surrounds support for the both issue a revivalof how toof implement the Third Energy package in its entirety in

examples of projects that16 had not been implemented at take advantage of the giant 50 bcm/y gas terminal that the countries involved.” Devlin then cited five specific all or whose use was stalled because of intergovern- ofGazprom that gas. claims to want to build at Ipsala/Kipoi, and the lack of firm projects to ensure the onward transmission

immediatemental disagreements. gains that couldHe ended be madeby saying with that relatively “a new Conclusions smallproposal efforts for aand huge resources. pipeline” could once again delay the The most obvious conclusion concerning the impact of Turkish Stream on the Southern Gas Corridor is that it

These gains primarily concerned Bulgaria, so it may - may block direct passage of “next wave” Azerbaijani gas well be as a result of Devlin’s comments that Bulgaria’s to southern Italy, but serve to accelerate the gasification energy ministry declared on April 1, 2016, that construc another, to develop a pipeline connection between of the Balkans and the revival of plans, by one route or tion of the €220 million, 182-km Interconnector Turkey and Central Europe. With the European Commis- Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) project, for which the European sion already committed to the development of a variety Union has already pledged €80 million, may start in of gas interconnectors in southeast Europe, the prin- mid-2016. cipal energy security issue confronting the European

EurActiv http://www.euractiv.com/ priorities as to which of the various interconnectors it 16 “Bulgariasections/energy/bulgaria-lacks-political-will-build- Lacks Political Will to Build Interconnectors, Says currentlyUnion in this considers context to is bethe projects development of common of a clear interest. set of Commission,” , March 6, 2015, .

interconnectors-says-commission-312709

18 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

They should be prioritized in order to form the core of a system to ensure that gas utilizing the Southern Gas Turkey’s main importer, the state pipeline company Corridor can be forwarded from Turkey, Greece, or result of agreements reached in early May and that gas import price. Botas, can likewise anticipate a major reduction in the AlbaniaYet there to is a alsomajor another European way hub, in whichsuch as Turkish Baumgarten. Stream The Turkish press, citing Russia’s Kommersant news- paper, anticipates that the four private companies Gas Corridor, but that of all gas supplies to Europe, may influence not only the development of the Southern serving Istanbul with gas delivered via the trans-Balkan including piped imports from Norway and North Africa pipeline (and which account for around 10 bcm/y of and current or prospective LNG imports from the Middle Turkey’s current 27 bcm/y of gas imports from Russia) East,This wayWest concerns Africa, the the Caribbean, pricing issue. and the It is United just possible States. secured in May 2015 an agreement under which the that Gazprom, the rather staid and conservative organi- price set for their purchases from Gazprom in the first zation that has for so long sought both to keep prices quarter of the year was just $300 per thousand cubic- high and to retain as strong a link to oil prices as possible, meters (1000 cm), and the price for the second quarter was just $260/1000 cm. If confirmed, this would consti tute a 40 percent drop on the $374/1000 cm price set Technically,may change Gazpromits policy couldor, more have likely, declared find itself the startsubject of lastThe yearmost for important 2015 deliveries. element here is not so much the theto a construction change in pricing phase policy within initiated weeks—if by not the days—of Kremlin. gas import prices makes precise comparisons impos- Some technical works were, and are, required to take sible,figures but themselves, the sheer scalesince ofthe the opaque price naturecut. The of nominalTurkish accountPutin’s originalof the change announcement of route on from December South 1,Stream, 2014.

cm,price although to be paid the by TurkishTurkey’s state Botas importer for the bulk may of actuallyTurkish notably a fresh survey of the last quarter of the 930-km imports in late 2014 was understood to be $435/1000 sinceBlack pipeSea crossinglaying can and be a carriedfull evaluation out in stages,of the routeeven inof deepthe onshoresea locations, Kıyıköy-Lüleburgaz-Ipsala the Saipem 7000 and the pipeline. Castor ButSei have been paying less in reality. In December 2014, could have been mobilized as soon as weather condi- muchYildiz deeperwas reported cut for importsto be seeking by the a state 10.25 gas percent concern. price cut, but by March, he appeared to be trying to secure a tionsThe main on the reason Black Seathat were this suitable did not to happen lay pipe. was that theSuch terms prices of compare contracts with covering the reported the supply $335/1000 of some 6.6cm that Botas pays for gas delivered from Azerbaijan under Turkey was twinning final approval for the project—the paysapproval for gasthat that Miller it currentlyappears to receives have secured from Russiain Ankara via deliveredbcm/y of by gas pipeline from thefrom first northwest stage of Iran. the Shah Deniz on May 7, 2015—with a major revision of the price it project, and the reported $490/1000 cm for Iranian gas is still not absolutely clear just how much Turkey will There is an emerging school of thought that falling gas eventuallythe existing end Trans-Balkan up paying for and its BlueRussian Stream gas importspipelines. this It year, not least since the pricing formula is structured as prices in Europe and the prospect of US gas reaching a discount on a base price that is not subject to public Europe in the form of LNG from 2016 onwards might disclosure. Nonetheless, press reports indicate that pricing strategy. Russia has never sought to be the low prompt the Kremlin into a radical rethink of Russia’s gas Turkish private companies importing gas from Russia cost provider, but there are at least three strong reasons will benefit from a substantial reduction in prices as a why this might change. The first is the steadily increasing

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 19 The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

pressure of Russia’s so-called independent gas producers—in effect, all the gas companies that are not controlled by Gazprom—to have access to the thatKipoi. prompted But that, Putin of course, to abandon would requirethe original the kind South of Streamcapital concept. expenditure and acceptance of EU regulation present the independents routinely produce around Gazprom-controlled Russian gas export system. At Turkish Stream opens opportunities for Russia, but percent of its exports. Instead, they have to focus on the these opportunities require such an infusion of cash and domestic25-27 percent market, of all which Russia’s generally gas but offersaccount much for barely poorer 5 such a radical change of approach to the provision of gas to Europe that, in all probability, they will serve to

prospectsThe second for is sustainedthat Russia profits. currently has a much greater Russian gas to Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor. capacity to produce gas than it can either consume on its hinder rather than prevent the flow of additional non- own or secure foreign markets both willing and able to purchase it. Russia has the resources to increase produc- deliveredAnd even thosethrough hindrances the Southern may Gassimply Corridor. serve as a driver tion to meet major increases in European demand should for new pipelines in the Balkans to be supplied with gas these respond to possible major gas price reductions.

Third, such an approach would have a strong impact on Russia’s market position in Europe, shrinking the role of non-Russian suppliers and once again making Russia the

circumstances, the challenge to prospective new suppliers seekingprime determinant to access European of gas pricesmarkets in via Europe. the Southern Under such Gas Corridor—whether in Turkmenistan, Iran, northern Iraq,

sincethe eastern Russia could Mediterranean, always undercut or among them. the prospective “next wave” of Azerbaijani producers—would be immense, Such a policy, however, still depends on Russia being able to deliver its own new wave of cheap gas to Europe, which would either require the country to reconsider its plans

new infrastructure to carry gas delivered by Turkish to scrap the transit across Ukraine by 2020 or to develop

theStream cash onwardor the appetite from to Ipsala/Kipoi carry out such into a program. the heart of Europe. And, at present, it does not appear to have either So there is a conundrum. Turkish Stream has the ability - ment of the Southern Gas Corridor, but only if Russia itselfto pose chooses a significant in the short challenge run to to take the advantagefurther develop of the

it commits itself to developing a further set of pipeline one element in the SGC, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, or if bcm/y of Turkish Stream gas westwards from Ipsala/ connections into Europe to carry some its project 47

20 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security and the Southern Gas Corridor

AUTHOR PAGE

John M. Roberts

is a Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council’s Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center. He is also a Senior Partner- lineswith Methinksconnecting Ltd, or aintended consultancy to connect specializing the Caspian in the tointerrelationship China, Russia, India, between and energy,Europe. economic development, and politics. He has particular expertise in the development of energy in the Caucasus and Central Asia and in the pipe energyRoberts on is development.one of Europe’s In assessingleading energy global security energy securityspecialists. issues, He servedhe has regularlyas a Managing toured Editor the Gulf at Plattsand the for Caspian, twelve years and previously with Financial Times Energy, focusing on the development of energy and on the impact of as well as visited the Alaskan North Slope, the Athabasca Tar Sands, China, Norway, and Venezuela. He has also- neantestified and to northern UK parliamentary Iraq. committees on Turkish, Russian, Caspian, and Mideast energy security issues. He is currently researching shale gas development in China and hydrocarbons development in the eastern Mediterra His books include Caspian Pipelines Visions & Mirages: The Middle East in a New Era Beyrouth: L’Été ’82 Pipeline Politics: The Caspian and Global Energy Security, is (1996), (1995), and - (Beirut, Summer of ’82) (1983). His latest book, due to be published in 2015 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in the United Kingdom and by the Brook ings Institution in the United States.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 21

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John E. Chapoton Robert M. Kimmitt Sandra Charles *JonCHAIRMAN, M. Huntsman, Jr. Ahmed Charai Henry A. Kissinger Robert J. Stevens INTERNATIONAL George Chopivsky *Ellen O. Tauscher Franklin D. Kramer John S. Tanner ADVISORY BOARD Philip Lader David W. Craig Clyde C. Tuggle Wesley K. Clark *Richard L. Lawson Karen Tramontano Paul Twomey PRESIDENT AND CEO *Jan M. Lodal Brent Scowcroft Nelson Cunningham *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. Jane Holl Lute Ivo H. Daalder Enzo Viscusi William J. Lynn Melanne Verveer *FrederickEXECUTIVE Kempe VICE Gregory R. Dahlberg CHAIRS Izzat Majeed Wendy W. Makins Charles F. Wald *Paula J. Dobriansky Mian M. Mansha Jay Walker *Adrienne Arsht Conrado Dornier Christopher J. Dodd William E. Mayer Michael F. Walsh *StephenVICE CHAIRS J. Hadley Allan McArtor Mark R. Warner *Richard Edelman Patrick J. Durkin Eric D.K. Melby David A. Wilson *Robert J. Abernethy Thomas J. Edelman Franklin C. Miller Maciej Witucki *Stuart E. Eizenstat Thomas J. Egan, Jr. James N. Miller Mary C. Yates Thomas R. Eldridge *C. Boyden Gray *Judith A. Miller HONORARYDov S. Zakheim *George Lund DIRECTORS *W. DeVier Pierson *Alexander V. Mirtchev *Virginia A. Mulberger Julie Finley Obie L. Moore Lawrence P. Fisher, II *George E. Moose TREASURER Steve C. Nicandros David C. Acheson *John Studzinski Alan H. Fleischmann Georgette Mosbacher Thomas R. Nides Madeleine K. Albright Michèle Flournoy James A. Baker, III SECRETARY *Ronald M. Freeman *Brian C. McK. Henderson *Robert S. Gelbard Harold Brown Laurie Fulton Franco Nuschese Thomas Glocer Frank C. Carlucci, III Joseph S. Nye *WalterDIRECTORS B. Slocombe *Sherri W. Goodman Robert M. Gates Sean O’Keefe Michael G. Mullen Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg Leon E. Panetta Stephane Abrial Ian Hague Mikael Hagström Ahmet Oren William J. Perry Carlos Pascual Condoleezza Rice Odeh Aburdene *Ana Palacio Thomas R. Pickering Colin L. Powell Peter Ackerman John D. Harris, II Timothy D. Adams George P. Shultz Frank Haun Edward L. Rowny John Allen Michael V. Hayden Daniel B. Poneman William H. Webster Michael Andersson Annette Heuser Daniel M. Price Robert Hormats John W. Warner Michael Ansari *Karl Hopkins *Andrew Prozes Richard L. Armitage Arnold L. Punaro Robert E. Hunter David D. Aufhauser *Mary L. Howell *Kirk A. Radke Wolfgang Ischinger Charles O. Rossotti Elizabeth F. Bagley Teresa M. Ressel Peter Bass Stanley O. Roth Robert Rowland *Rafic Bizri Reuben Jeffery, III Harry Sachinis *Thomas L. Blair Robert Jeffrey William O. Schmieder Francis Bouchard *James L. Jones, Jr. *Executive Committee Mem- Myron Brilliant George A. Joulwan bers Esther Brimmer Lawrence S. Kanarek John P. Schmitz *R. Nicholas Burns Stephen R. Kappes Brent Scowcroft List as of June 15, 2015 William J. Burns Maria Pica Karp Alan J. Spence *Richard R. Burt Francis J. Kelly, Jr. James Stavridis Michael Calvey Zalmay M. Khalilzad Richard J.A. Steele James E. Cartwright The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that ­promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in ­international ­affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in ­meeting today’s global ­challenges.

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