Russian Chess on Gas Politics: Evaluation of Turkish Stream

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Russian Chess on Gas Politics: Evaluation of Turkish Stream RUSSIAN CHESS ON GAS POLITICS: EVALUATION OF TURKISH STREAM by Oğuzhan Akyener and Çağrı Şirin HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RUS- INTRODUCTION SIAN GAS EXPORT TO EU Turkish Stream Pipeline Project (TSP) is the result of the altering Russian gas supply pol- Initially, existing key gas pipelines feeding icies toward European Union (EU). Due to the Europe will be described shortly in the flustering disputes over Ukraine, initial step concept of the historical overview of Russian was planned as to bypass Ukraine with a new gas export to EU. Latter, the previous steps before the Turkish Stream and South Stream "Due to flustering dis- standalone pipeline that will transit Russian gas to Eastern Europe. However, increasing Pipeline will be adverted. After mentioning the infrastructural situation, customer char- putes over Ukraine, initial conflicts between EU and Bulgarian govern- ment made Russia take a step forward with acteristics of Ukraine and the third energy package of EU will also be analyzed. step was planned as to a new standalone pipeline project, which is named as Turkish Stream. bypass Ukraine with a EXISTING KEY PIPELINES TO FEED THE EUROPE In the concept of Turkish Stream, Russia is new standalone pipeline planning to transport the gas through Black Russia gas export to Europe started before Sea and Turkey and sell it in the Greek border that will transit Russian 1940’s with the small volumes of export to of Turkey. This means, Russia will not have Poland. While considering the small portion to deal with the transportation of her gas in- gas to Eastern Europe." of consumption volumes, location of the ex- side EU’s borders. Being a self-assured seller, isting resources (which are affecting the trans- Russia also wishes that Balkan countries on portation costs), lack of existing transporta- the demanding side to provide their own gas tion systems, prices and economical items, export securities. This shift in Russia’s gas gas trade between Russia and Europe could sale and/or transportation policies may be an not find a chance to tighten. After the new important indicator for the future gas politic giant discoveries in 1970s, new pipeline proj- analysis of the region. ects and more politically stabilized and indus- In another aspect, doability of TSP will re- trialized Europe’s trade volumes increased. sult in facing with too many milestones such As seen in Map 1 below, the first key pipe- as commercial, technical, political, market, line from Russia to Europe is the Brother- etc. All these items require careful analysis "The first key pipeline hood Pipeline (PHP), which is active since that will help coherent evaluation of Turkish 1967 (despite the prevention attempts of Stream. from Russia to Europe is USA). PHP is also known as Urengoy-Pom- ary-Uzhgorod Pipeline and has a capacity of the Brotherhood Pipeline In this study, after giving the historical over- view of Russian gas export to EU, which is 100 bcma and a 4500 km length. As depict- (PHP), which is active the determiner for TSP, doability of TSP will ed, PHP and its extensions by transiting and be evaluated from the technical, commercial, feeding Ukraine, meet an important portion since 1967 (despite the marketing, political and resource aspects. In of many European countries’ gas demands, addition to this evaluation, after mentioning such as Germany, France, Czech Republic, prevention attempts of the main risks for successful completion of Slovakia, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy and Hungary. USA)." TSP, other possible options will also be evalu- ated for any cases of TSP that may not be suc- Second key pipeline from Russia to Europe is cessful. Having the result of this evaluation, the northern lights pipeline, with a capacity of the future of regional gas politics and Turkey’s 51 bcma and a length of 7400 km. This pipe- situation will be analyzed. line consists of five major trunk routes with ENERGY POLICY TURKEY Page 108 different capacities and different construction However, in the aftermath of the indepen- "For several decades, times. However, the main line from Torzhok dence of the two countries, gas conflicts be- to Ivatsevich is completed in 1970s.1 Due to, tween Russia and Ukraine started to emerge.3 Ukraine represented a supplying gas to Poland and Lithuania and reliable transit platform its main purpose being to directly supply the Conflicts mainly are about the gas prices those Russia offered for Ukrainian domestic Brotherhood Pipeline i.e. her potential being for Russian gas export linked to the Brotherhood, Northern Lights market. Although Ukraine buys the gas with a may not be accepted in the category of the cheaper price than the other European coun- to Europe. However, most important gas import pipelines of Eu- tries, hence she knows that Russia is depen- rope. dent on her to transit gas to Europe, which in the aftermath of the can be accepted a vital item for Russia’s for- Third key pipeline, as shown in the map above eign politics, Ukraine every time tried to use independence of the two is the Yamal – Europe Pipeline (YEP). YEP this situation for the due gas pricing negotia- was activated in 1996 to feed Germany. After tions and deals. From the other side, Ukraine countries, gas con- some upgrades in the compressor stations, the also is dependent to Russian gas while consid- flicts between Russia total volume of YEP has extended up to 33 ering her energy consumption distribution. bcma and its average length is 4200 km. These situations and the unsolved disputes and Ukraine started to several times resulted in Ukraine not paying Fourth key pipeline is Nord Stream (we mean her debts to Russia and Russia cutting her gas emerge." “nord stream1”) with a total 55 bcma capac- supplies to Ukraine. Sometimes Russia erased ity and 1224 km length. Nord Stream Pipe- the piled up debts of Ukraine, however, the line (NSP) is activated in late 2011 to feed situation has never changed. Germany. However, only half portion of this 55 bcma capacity can be utilized due to the From the gas transit region to Europe, this sanctions of EU’s third energy package. conflicts and disputes directly affected the gas transits to Europe. As happened in 2006 and UKRAINE: A BAD CUSTOMER 2009, Russia cut off supplies to Ukraine and Ukraine diverted the European transit vol- By considering the location, existing pipe- umes to her domestic market, which result- line capacities and gas storage capabilities, ed in gas crises in a few European Countries. Ukraine is the most important route for Eu- As a result of this situation, Russia has been "In 2006 and 2009, rope’s gas supply security politics. For several following a new strategy of diversifying her decades, Ukraine represented a reliable tran- gas transit routes away from Ukraine. South Russia cut off supplies sit platform for Russian gas export to Europe. Stream, Turkish Stream and newly proposed to Ukraine and Ukraine diverted the European transit volumes to her domestic market, which resulted in gas crises in a few European Coun- tries." Map 1: Russia to Europe gas pipelines.2 Page 109 FIRST ISSUE RUSSIAN CHESS ON GAS POLITICS: EVALUATION OF TURKISH STREAM Figure 1: Russian exports to Europe via Ukraine and other routes.4 Nord Steram2 gas pipeline projects can be lines, South Stream Pipeline Project (SSP) accepted as the results of this new strategy. was launched by Russia to feed the South- However, rest of the paper will focus on the ern and Eastern European markets, in the SSP & TSP. same concept of bypassing Ukraine. SSP was "With SSP; Bulgaria, The volumetric results of this new strategy planned to be a 900 km long offshore pipe- can be observed from Figure 1 above. As it line with a capacity of 63 bcma. Nearly 42 Serbia, Hungary, Austria, can be seen, Russian exports to Europe via bcma of this 63 bcma was planned to be the existing volume being transported through Slovenia, Croatia, Ukraine are decreasing and via other routes are increasing. However, a new project such existing pipeline structure transiting Ukraine. as TSP is needed for long term solution. The remaining portion will be the new gas Bosnia-Herzegovina volumes for the due customers. As seen in Map 3, with SSP; Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Italy markets were In addition, the South Eastern European countries, red colored in Map 2, are more de- Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegov- planned to be the poten- pendent on the Russian gas transiting through ina and Italy markets were planned to be the Ukraine, the route diversification strategy of potential markets. tial markets." Russia is very important for that region. Final investment decision of the SSP was made SOUTH STREAM PIPELINE in December 2012 and the whole project was planned to be activated in 2020. However, As indicated above, there are four gas pipe- SSP created controversy due to non-compli- lines, which are the most important structures ance with the European Union competition for Russia to feed the due European coun- and energy legislation, such as the Third En- tries’ gas hunger. In addition to these four ergy Package, which stipulates the separation Map 2: Percentage of missing gas supplies in 2009 gas crises.5 ENERGY POLICY TURKEY Page 110 OĞUZHAN AKYENER AND ÇAĞRI ŞİRİN Map 3: South Stream Pipeline project.6 of companies' generation and sale operations EU’s goal to create a liberalized gas market "Gazprom has been from their transmission networks. Project was in Europe via the unbundling of vertically cancelled by Russia in December 2014 fol- integrated gas companies, the imposition of working on shifting her lowing obstacles from Bulgaria and the EU third party access rules and publicized tar- price mechanism from (due to the TEP), the 2014 Crimean crisis, iffs, marked the start of this progression.
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