consolidated corporate tax base and a base tax corporate consolidated acommon proposing Dublin rules, the reforming by and Asylum” Migration on Pact a“New forging union, banking the strengthening and further (EDIS) Scheme Insurance Deposit European the introducing by (EMU) Union and Monetary Economic deepening as such objectives announced having reins, up the take to going apparently is Commission failed, VDL the mostly Juncker Commission’s ambitious proposals the where Incases Commission. Juncker the of those resemble frequently that proposals policy EP, in the lines embraced VDL party four across alliance abroad secure had to Having lead anto ambitious Commission. aims she that appears It (EP). Parliament European in the agenda her outlined (VDL) Leyen der von Ursula Commission European of the 16On President-elect July policy, social policy, taxation and Common policy, policy, social taxation policy, energy in climate (QMV) voting majority qualified and expanding tax digital actual progress. for actual required moderation the may harm it but leadership, visionary in showing well may work Leyen der von from commitment and related of ambition level The Commission. next for the consequences has This proposals. into translated were they when ambitions important of the anumber blocked Yet, Council the States. and Member EP the by supported initially be to seemed Juncker President of Commission ambitions the that is emerges that A paradox performance. predecessor’s her from lessons possible explores brief policy This Council. in the ambitions for its support may have overestimated Commission Juncker the because remarkable, ways in some are ambitions Her Commission. Juncker of the those resemble frequently that proposals policy embraced Leyen der von Commission. an aims ambitious leading at Leyen der von Ursula President-elect appears It Lessons from the Juncker the CommissionLessons from Results and Ambitions 2019 OCTOBER Having had to secure a broad alliance in the , Parliament, European in the alliance abroad secure had to Having 1 reforms. fundamental institutional initiating potentially to areas policy major deepening from high and range pitched are ambitions her EU. Thus, of the future the on discussion abroad initiate to effort disappointing Juncker’s to compared be can which change, treaty to lead possibly would that of Europe” Future the on “Conference a proposes VDL Furthermore, 2024. to (EBCG) Guard and Coast Border European the of for deadline full staffing the extending and Rights” of Pillar Social European the implementing “fully by for instance further, things take aims to she successful, partially only was Commission Juncker the where Incases (CFSP). Policy and Security Foreign Brussels: European Parliament, 2019. Parliament, European Brussels: 2019-2024 Commission European next the for Guidelines Political Europe. for Agenda My More: , “ Leyen, der von Ursula A Union that Strives for for Strives that A Union 1 ”, ”,

Adriaan Schout, Jan Marinus Wiersma & Adriaan Nunes Policy Brief Clingendael Policy Brief

Her ambitions are in some ways remarkable, is just about right. In general, visionary because the Juncker Commission may have leadership is bound to provoke resistance overestimated support for its ambitions in the from Member States, so that in the end Council. This policy brief explores possible a more group-oriented broker role results in lessons from her predecessor’s performance. more effectively cementing agreements. From the start, the Juncker Commission was very ambitious, presenting itself as the Apart from possible personal drivers to show “last-chance Commission” and underlining leadership, any president-elect would be that in the aftermath of the crisis the expected to show ambition simply because Commission had to “deliver” to regain the the most pregnant problems have to be trust of Europe’s citizens. By wanting to solved. Acknowledging the circumstances of make a difference and focusing on being the past few years of vying pressures such “big-on-big”, Juncker also sought to lead as high youth unemployment, concerns over a “very political Commission”.2 climate change, and, for various reasons, marked forms of populism, the tension But has the public avowal of ambition turned between the need for and dislike of high out to be a successful strategy? Evidently, EU ambitions is evident. A discussion on the ambitions may be useful in opening up effectiveness of high Commission ambitions discussions and “promoting the general is required when moving from one president interest of the Union”, as the Commission’s to the next, but the discussion is also of task is defined in the Treaty on European longer-term relevance as (multi-)annual Union.3 Yet a paradox is apparent in the agendas are a recurring theme. Even though arena of European negotiations. As a rule, the Council almost unanimously backed rotating presidencies are wise to downplay VDL’s nomination and restated its desire ambitions even though national politicians for an EU that acts ambitiously (“big on tend to be full of ideas and hobby horses big and small on small” reads the Council’s (a politician is a politician), whereas the “New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024”5), it is president of the Commission seems to debatable whether, once the real decisions be expected to be ambitious and to be have to be made, the Council will in the big-on-big. As discussed elsewhere in end agree. relation to leadership styles of the rotating presidencies of the Council4, visionary (or transformational) leadership can be effective The challenge of evaluating the if objectives are few in number, carefully Commission presidency prioritised and meticulously prepared so that within the limited priorities selected the pitch (realistic goal and tone of the proposal) As is the case with public organisations generally6, evaluating a presidency is not a straightforward affair given conflicting expectations and differences between 2 Adriaan Schout and Hedwich van der Bij, “The immediate and longer-term outcomes Juncker Commission and public support for the (including immediate measurable effects, EU: Doing good or doing the right thing?” in effects that involve long gestation periods, Hug, A. (Ed.), Europe and the people: Examining and changes in attitude that demand long the EU’s democratic legitimacy, ed. Adam Hug time-frames). Moreover, ambitions also play (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2016). Adriaan Schout, “Commission president Juncker: ‘Good intentions but wrong profile’”, Internationale Spectator, 14 June 2017. 3 Treaty on , Title III: Provisions on the Institutions, Article 17. 4 Schout, A. (1998), “The Presidency as juggler; 5 , “A New Strategic Agenda 2019- managing conflicting expectations”, EIPASCOPE, 2024”, 20 June 2019. no. 2, June: pp. 2-10. Schout, A. (2008), “Beyond 6 E.g. Powell, V. (1987), Improving Public Enterprise the Rotating Presidency”, in Hayward, J. (ed.) Performance: Concepts and Techniques (Geneva: Leaderless Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. International Labour Office).

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a complicated role in policy processes.7 Commission’s output to date was conducted Ambitions are needed to create awareness by the European Parliamentary Research of, and support for, new developments and Service. It concluded that the Juncker to stimulate debates about new values Commission tabled 94% of its planned that are needed. Yet we also see that high proposals, amounting to a total of 547 tabled ambitions tend, for instance in the EU, to proposals, of which 66% were adopted, while become merely symbolic, as in the case 21% of tabled proposals are still in process.12 of oft-repeated environmental ambitions EU scholars have also begun to publish end- and reduction targets.8 What is more, the of-term assessments.13 Von Ondarza (2019), process has been for instance, concludes that the Commission typified by a number of high ambitions has become more focussed and internally that keep on being blocked because coherent even though many of its legislative of conflicts between Member States. proposals failed and the Commission Monetary integration is an example of a politicisation clashed with its control tasks. policy area that, from the 1960s onwards, However, the assessments do not address has been caught in a stalemate between the usefulness of high ambitions in relation northern Member States demanding solidity to results achieved. (convergence) and southern Member States wanting solidarity.9 Some policies simply This policy brief builds on an earlier study tend to move forward slowly. on the output of the Juncker Commission14 in which a selection was made of successful A number of assessments are already policy proposals that were realised, “partial available. Juncker’s self-assessment, successes” and proposals that were either presented at Sibiu, stated: “We have withdrawn or parked (“failures”). achieved a lot together: we agreed on 348 proposals, 90% of them through unanimity; unemployment and deficits are down The apparent legitimacy of compared to 2014 and growth is up. Juncker’s ambitions matters and this is our way to the future.”10 He also presented the Commission’s account of the “Top 20 EU achievements 2014-2019”, For various reasons it was to be expected such as the ban on single-use plastics that Juncker would lead an ambitious and ending roaming charges.11 The most Commission. The multitude of crises that hit comprehensive assessment of the Juncker the EU, some of them before Juncker took office, heightened the political sensitivity of European integration. The euro crisis tested Member States’ resolve to bail 7 Moran M., M. Rein, R. Goodin (eds) (2008), out fellow Member States in financial The Oxford Handbook of Political Policy, Oxford University Press: Ch. 1 “Introduction”. Dryzek, J., B. Ripley (1988), “The ambition of policy design”, Review of Policy Research, 7:4, 705-719. 12 Étienne Bassot and Wolfgang Hiller, “The Juncker 8 Jordan, A., A. Schout (2006), The coordination of Commission’s ten priorities: An end-of-term European Governance: exploring the capacities for assessment”, Brussels: European Parliament networked governance, Oxford: Oxford University Research Service, 2019. Press. 13 See, for instance: Nicolai von Ondarza, 9 Szász, A. (2001), De Euro, Alphen aan de Rijn: “A Redefinition of ‘Spitzenkandidaten’: The Next Haasbroek. Needs a Common Political 10 European Commission, “President Juncker at the Mandate”, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, EU27 leaders’ Sibiu Summit” 9 May 2019. 2019. See also: Steven Blockmans, ed., “What 11 European Commission, “The Top 20 EU Comes After the Last Chance Commission? Policy achievements 2014-2019”, Brussels: European Priorities for 2019-2024”, Brussels: Centre for Commission, 2019. Also at Sibiu, the European European Policy Studies, 2019. Commission published an account of its “unfinished 14 The wider study looked at 23 cases, for which business”, see: European Commission, “Unfinished 18 interviews were conducted with Brussels business: the Top 10 EU issues awaiting final negotiators at the end of 2018 and in early 2019 agreement”, Brussels: European Commission, 2019. (Schout, A., A. Nunes 2019).

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turmoil, to implement painful reforms and Times of Change” in designing his political to respond to persistent high levels of guidelines (and later the Commission’s work (youth) unemployment. The migration crisis programmes).15 The Council’s approval of heightened demands for solidarity while ambitious Commission projects was later mounting tensions between east and west repeatedly reaffirmed, for example at the demanded solutions at the political level. Gothenburg Social Summit in November The magnitude of the impact these crises 2017,16 when the Council granted the had on the EU and its Member States cannot Commission a mandate for tabling proposals be overstated, raising fundamental questions that would significantly expand the EU’s role about the feasibility of the Union. Difficulties in social policy. over rule of law and climate change sharpened the profile of the Commission as a political actor. Moreover, the international Reasons for resistance context had also become more volatile and the election of US President Trump added It is far from clear, however, that the to the need for drastic soul-searching in the Council was altogether pleased with the EU regarding its internal posture. Finally, Commission’s ambitions when it came Juncker himself has the reputation of being to the implementation of the agenda. a committed European and warm supporter Member States blocked cooperation with of, among other things, “completing” EMU. the Commission on, roughly, four recurring grounds: However, highlighted the desire – fear of losing sovereignty (including of Member States to retain room for questions of subsidiarity and conferral manoeuvre and for the EU to respect national and fear of integration by stealth), idiosyncrasies. Even within Member States, – reluctance to show solidarity tensions have heightened. Political discourse (transfers – monetary and otherwise – has become increasingly polarised and between Member States), Member States have seen the rise of far- – doubts about proportionality (relating to right parties (the Forum voor Democratie the cost of Commission proposals), (FvD) in the , the Front National/ – a disinterest in wide-ranging institutional National Rally in (RN), Alternative reform discussions. für Deutschland (AfD) in and Lega Nord in , to name just a few). It is in this The Juncker Commission was most context of mounting tensions between North successful in advancing ambitious proposals and South, and East and West, that Juncker in policy areas where Member States did argued for the “last chance” Commission and not fear having to shoulder substantial costs employed “big on big and small on small” as or losing sovereignty and in which, despite his motto. the major sensitivities involved, Member States shared the ultimate objectives or Juncker also had an unprecedented level recognised the need to make progress (see of democratic legitimacy as Commission Table 1). This includes much of the Juncker president. He had been elevated to the office Commission’s work on “small on small”, the of European Commission president through Digital Single Market and the European Fund the Spitzenkandidaten process, which for Strategic Investment (EFSI), which can meant that he and his agenda had stood at be regarded as part of the Commission’s the forefront of the campaign of the most traditional role of regulating and fostering successful party (European People’s Party – the internal market. Even though issues are EPP) during the 2014 EP elections. Moreover, Juncker’s ambitious agenda drew legitimacy from the European Council, based not only 15 European Council, “Strategic Agenda for the on his nomination for the Commission Union in Times of Change”, Brussels: European presidency by the Council (eventually Council, 2014. supported by 26 out of 28 Member States), 16 European Parliament, Council of the EU and the but also by drawing on the Council’s own European Commission, “European Pillar of Social 2014 “Strategic Agenda for the Union in Rights”, Gothenburg: European Commission, 2017.

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sensitive, advancing the internal market While these proposals hardly succeeded is in the end a shared objective. However, in their originally intended form, they may it is noticeable that in some instances the lay the foundation for further integration in extent to which the Commission’s legislative their respective policy areas. Observers have advances have translated into real added long recognised the EU’s tendency to “fail value is questionable.17 forward” and “integrate by default”18: the tendency of the EU to agree to incomplete The Commission achieved minor structures, which are prone to fail in crisis successes in developing a European situations and therefore necessitate further Pillar of Social Rights, the Energy Union, integration at a later stage. Whether this a “fully operational” EBCG, the European phenomenon will occur in the above- Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF)/ mentioned cases remains to be seen, but Budgetary Instrument for Competitiveness judging by the discussions so far Member and Convergence (BICC), climate change States will continue to block transfers of policy and the proposals for the 2021-2017 sovereignty or engagement in risk sharing. Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). In such cases, the Commission was evidently More substantial successes are probably overly ambitious. unlikely in the foreseeable future. Resistance resulted from Member States’ concerns Ambitious initiatives that were more or less over issues of sovereignty, solidarity and fully blocked and failed concerned EMU, proportionality. In the case of social security taxation, migration and asylum policy, coordination, Member States argued that CFSP, the attempt to spark debate about according to the principle of subsidiarity, institutional reform, and the discontinuation national governments were best placed to of seasonal time change. EDIS and Sovereign shape their welfare systems. Member States Bond-Backed Securities (SBBS), both also rejected the notion of QMV in social ambitious proposals pertaining to EMU, policy, fearing that majority decision-making were met with resistance by Member States would lead to creeping integration, meaning who felt that they were misplaced attempts the loss of sovereignty and transfer of to create financial solidarity and that the competences to the EU. For similar reasons, appropriate remedy would be economic Member States were opposed to the notion and financial reforms at Member State of a fully operational EBCG, with a planned level. Another ambitious EMU proposal, total of 10,000 operational staff, although the creation of a European Monetary Fund it has remained unclear what authority (EMF), was blocked primarily by Member they would have. The notion of mutual States who were afraid of losing sovereignty support was acceptable, but the institutional in the form of decision-making power over creation of a “fully operational” border the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). and coast guard was a bridge too far. The In matters of taxation, Member States Energy Union, the Budgetary Instrument for feared losing sovereignty as well as income, Convergence and Competitiveness (BICC), as the Commission appeared to be aiming climate change policy and the Multiannual for integration through majority decision- Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations met making, the harmonisation of tax bases resistance not least due to Member States’ (Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base unwillingness to shoulder or share high – C(C)CTB), a Digital Tax and a Financial financial and economic costs. In the case of BICC, this resistance was reinforced by Member States’ reluctance to show solidarity with fellow Member States who seemed 18 Erik Jones, R. Daniel Keleman and Sophie unwilling to pursue necessary economic Meunier, “Failing Forward? The Eurocrisis and reforms. the Incomplete Nature of European Integration”, Comparative Political Studies 25, no. 1 (2015). See also: Adriaan Schout, “The EU’s existential threat: Demands for flexibility in an EU based 17 Schout, A. D. Bevaqua (2018), “EU Added Value – on rules”, in: EU60: Re-founding Europe. Fact-based policy or politicised facts?”, Clingendael The responsibility to propose, Istituto Affari Policy Brief. Internazionali, 2017.

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Transaction Tax (FTT). Both the Digital Finally, the Commission’s attempt to spark Tax and the FTT were also opposed on the a post-Brexit referendum debate about the grounds that they might incur an undue and future of the EU27 and their institutions possibly unintended tax burden for crucial failed due to a lack of interest in a wider stakeholders (auto manufacturers, pension debate about the EU on the part of the funds). Member States. This lack of interest can be regarded as the result of all the Member Interrelated ambitious proposals in the States’ concerns outlined above: there was policy area of migration and asylum policy no consensus among Member States about included an emergency relocation scheme, the degree to which they might give up a permanent relocation scheme and revision sovereignty, engage in projects aimed at of the Dublin rules for asylum applicants. solidarity or shoulder the financial burden These proposals failed because a significant of increased integration. Moreover, a lesson portion of Member States felt that asylum from the veto of the Constitutional Treaty in policy should not be determined by the 2005 in the Netherlands was that it is better principle of solidarity – or at EU level. Instead, to talk about concrete policy objectives than they understood migration and asylum policy to engage in encompassing institutional to be a matter of national sovereignty. debates that can be regarded as navel- gazing for EU specialists. Foreign policy proved similarly controversial, for similar reasons. Small Member States Opposition to Commission proposals also fear that majority decision-making on appeared to have been strong especially questions of CFSP would lead to their foreign from smaller and/or more peripheral policy interests – and therefore an integral Member States, though there were numerous aspect of their national sovereignty – being exceptions to this rule (e.g. Germany on overridden. These fears were especially sensitive fiscal and economic matters or pronounced when Juncker suggested in the UK on CFSP). Some of the most active the media that – in the very long run – opposition came from those Member States a “European army” could be created, that are part of a strategic alliance, namely something VDL had also indicated as the Visegrád Four and the New Hanseatic defence minister.19 Some Member States League. Put more provocatively, the question consider themselves neutral and in other is raised as to whether the Commission countries there is serious resistance to the was mostly in line with French preferences: notion of a European army. National political “Whose Commission is this?”. leaders felt obliged to qualify Juncker’s suggestions. This shows that a Commission president has to be careful when flagging ideas and has to be aware of the effects it has on the support for his ideas in the Member States and among the wider public.

19 Dave Keating (3 September 2015), Juncker calls for a European army, Politico.

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Table 1 Successes, partial successes/partial failures and failures

Successes Partial successes/ Failures partial failures – “Small on small” – European Pillar of Social Rights – European Monetary Fund (legislative framework, consist- (EMF)/European Minister for – Digital Single Market (legis­ ing of 26 initiatives) Economy and Finance lative framework, consisting of 30 initiatives) – Energy Union (the third of – European Deposit Insurance Juncker’s ten political priorities, Scheme (EDIS) – European Fund for Strategic consisting of 45 initiatives) Investment (EFSI) – Sovereign Bond-Backed Securi- – Fully Operational ­European ties (SBBS) ­Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) – Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in matters of taxation – European Investment Stabilisa- tion Function (EISF)/Budgetary – Common (Consolidated) Corpo- Instrument for Convergence rate Tax Base (C(C)CTB) and Competitiveness (BICC) – Digital Tax – Climate change policy – Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) – Multiannual Financial Frame- work (MFF) 2021-2027 – 2nd Emergency Refugee Relo- (­package) cation Scheme Policy proposals – Permanent Refugee Relocation Scheme

– Revision of the Dublin Rules

– “European Army”

– (QMV) in matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

– White Paper on the Future of Europe

– Discontinuation of seasonal time change – General support for the – Member States fear the – Member States lack motivation ­objective Commission is overstepping for solidarity – Willingness to commit boundaries of subsidiarity – Member States argue that the ­despite reservations – Political resistance related to Commission is overstepping costs boundaries of subsidiarity – Member States fear creeping – Political resistance related to integration costs – Member States fear creeping integration – Member States lack interest in wide-ranging institutional Drivers for success/failure debates

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Conclusions and implications

Are high ambitions conducive to a successful the pitch of the ambitions in proposals European Commission? The Juncker is important for success. But the pitch Commission was highly ambitious, and as tends to suffer from the high ambitions a corollary “very political” both in terms of that the Commission, EP and Council policies and in engaging Member States in impose on themselves at the start of the far-reaching institutional debates. A paradox Commission and this “can-do” atmosphere that emerges from the discussion is that subsequently overtaxes the willingness of the ambitions of Commission President Member States to go along with ambitions. Juncker seemed to be initially supported As such, visionary (or transformational) by the EP and Member States. In fact, the leadership appears to create opposition, Council formulated the objectives in the whereas group-oriented leadership seems Strategic Agenda and chose the motto more effective.20 This also settles the of being “big on big and small on small”. paradox noted at the beginning: leadership The Council nevertheless blocked a number expectations are apparently high for of the important ambitions when they the Commission but low for the rotating were translated into proposals. This raises presidency, yet trying to be an honest broker questions not only about the wisdom of an is no less relevant for the Commission. ambitious Commission President but also about the Council supporting a motto such This has consequences for the VDL as “big on big” whereas the real successes Commission. We see a similar level of were in being small on small. ambition and related commitment from Commission President-elect Von der Leyen In addition, a considerable amount of the to the level we saw with President Juncker: proposals that concerned solidarity (such “We should not be shy about being proud of as sharing of costs and risks, relocating where we are or ambitious about where we refugees) and deeper integration (e.g. in want to go.”21 The parallels with the start of taxation, EMU, asylum and migration, and the Juncker Commission are clear: being “big CFSP) ended up being blocked by the on big” and promising a new institutional Member States. Moreover, efforts to engage discussion including hints at treaty change, in institutional reforms and the future of as well as an overhaul of asylum and EU discussions did not pay off (including migration, EMU, taxation and CFSP, may discussions on easier voting procedures). work well in showing visionary leadership, but it may harm the moderation required for A deliberately moderate approach did actual progress. help to make limited advances in sensitive policy areas where Commission proposals Hence, modesty is a virtue and the Council encountered Member State resistance, may be well advised to consider this when namely in the MFF negotiations and the formulating a Strategic Agenda and a motto EISF/BICC. Hence, a careful selection of for the new Commission President.

20 For details, see Schout, A., S. Vanhoonacker (2006), “Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the EU: Revisiting Nice”, Journal of Common Market Studies 44/5: 1051-1077. 21 Jean-Claude Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change – Political Guidelines for the next European Commission”, Strasbourg, 15 July 2014.

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About the authors

Dr. Adriaan Schout is Senior Research Fellow and Coordinator Europe. He combines research and consultancy on European governance questions for national and European institutions.

Jan Marinus Wiersma is Senior Visiting Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. His work focuses on enlargement issues, EU neighbourhood policy, economic and social policies of the EU and institutional issues.

Adriaan Nunes is Junior Researcher at the Clingendael Institute, where he deals with a broad range of EU-related subjects. He focuses on the appointment of the new European Commission, the interinstitutional balance and the position of the Member States in the EU.