DOCSLIB.ORG

Two Decades of Better Regulation in the EU

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Two Decades of Better Regulation in the EU DECEMBER 2018 Two decades of Better Regulation Policy Brief in the EU Commission – Towards evidence-based policymaking?* Executive summary and deliver integrated policy assessments is discussion: Towards a a remarkable achievement. Considering that in the 1990s the Commission apparatus solidification of Better was highly fragmented and political, this Regulation world-leading standard when it comes to impact assessments is particularly Context: towards a new impressive and the Commission is constantly Commission in 2019 looking for ways to improve its BR policy. The European Commission is a recognised The past decades have seen continuous leading organisation when it comes to efforts by the Commission to complement shaping EU laws and policies, and to political decision-making with independent, setting the standard of good governance accessible and scientifically sound (to be understood here especially as ‘better assessments of policies throughout the regulation’ – BR). As concluded earlier, the policy cycle. Schwieter & Christian Schout Adriaan mechanisms developed in the Commission to ensure regulatory quality have, already In 2019, after the European Parliament for some time, been among the highest in elections, a new Commission will succeed the world.1 By any standards, its ability to the Juncker team. This makes it relevant to assess the current state of play as regards BR under the (‘very political’) Commission * This paper is part of three papers on EU Agencies, Juncker and to discuss possible adaptations. EU Added Value and the EU’s Better Regulation This paper is accompanied by a paper on the policy that, together, give insight into the state extent to which EU agencies have delivered of the EU’s efforts to strengthen evidence based on the expectations that they would offer policy making in the EU. These papers are: independent fact-based policy analyses,2 Schout, A. (2018), EU agencies after 25 years: and a paper on European Added Value of a missed opportunity to enhance EU governance, EU policies.3 Together, these documents The Hague: Clingendael Policy Brief, and: indicate that the Commission’s Better Schout, A., D. Bevacqua (2018), EU Added Value – Regulation policy has come far indeed but Fact-based policy or politicised facts? The Hague: also that issues have remained as regards Clingendael Policy Brief. They can be found on the Clingendael website. fact-based policymaking in day-to-day policy 1 Schout, A. & Sleifer, J. (2014) ‘Expertise at the crossroads of national and international policy making: a public management perspective’ in Ambrus, M., K. Arts, E. Hey & H. Raulus (eds.) 2 Schout, A. (forthcoming) EU agencies after 25 years: The Role of ‘Experts’ in International and European a missed opportunity, The Hague: Clingendael Decision-making Processes Cambridge: Cambridge Policy Brief. University Press. OECD (2018), OECD Regulatory 3 Schout, A., D. Bevacqua (2018), EU Added Value – Policy Outlook 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris, Fact-based policy or politicised facts? The Hague: https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264303072-en. Clingendael Policy Brief. Clingendael Policy Brief making. Given the enormous breadth of the 1) Better regulation is a complex objective. themes EU agencies, EU added value, and BR methodology assists, first of all, the regulatory quality of EU legislation, the the College of Commissioners in their findings can only be tentative and more decision-making by offering fact-based in-depth and sectoral research is required. evidence that supports their political Moreover, the Commission Juncker is still decisions on what the most effective and finalising its current strategic agenda.4 efficient ways are to address problems. The political objectives of the Union’s In essence, this paper on BR, and the action are multiple and vary across papers on EU agencies and EU Added policy areas and over time. Hence, the Value, point to a paradox that on the one BR framework needs to collect evidence hand the Commission is, and is regarded on a large array of impacts. At the as, a politicised body (also e.g. when it same time, BR processes, such as data comes to its independent macroeconomic analysis and consultations, serve a supervision of member states5) while on variety of overlapping purposes including the other hand, the Commission aims at creating transparency, facilitating evidence-based policy making (based on ex communication, and laying the basis for ante assessments and ex post evaluations). ex-post evaluations. The multifarious Trying to combine a political as well as an methodologies contribute to better independent role creates, as also appeared assessments of whether new policies in interviews with policy experts outside the and the existing stock of legislation are Commission and with politicians, a credibility fit for purpose. Yet, as underlined in the problem for the EU Commission. This, literature, the BR agenda has become a ultimately, leads to questions regarding the collection of varied goals, including policy available systems of checks and balances: simplification, prioritisation, consultation, if the Commission is partly political how rationalisation, communication and cost can we ensure the credibility of fact-based reduction, which has led to criticism of policymaking (e.g. in its claims of Added inconsistent objectives and of growing Value or in its supervisory tasks)? politicisation of BR. The multifarious nature of assessments and evaluations The point put forward here is that, if only underline the need to safeguard the for reasons of credibility, a decision has reputation of the BR framework. to be made about separating political 2) Implementation of BR procedures and and analytical tasks. This point is far from principles remains a challenge: new. However, with the growing role of a. The Commission has incorporated the Commission and following its further BR guidelines in its rules of politicisation (see below), the legitimacy procedures, including a new (semi-) of its checks and balances have grown in internal quality control mechanism importance. (the regulatory scrutiny board). However, the European Parliament General findings and discussion and in particular the Council are This scrutiny of the Commission slow in applying BR methodologies. communications and initiatives and of the As a result, the quality control focuses literature over the past two decades shows on Commission proposals, not on the following: the final policies that result from the negotiations. b. Major Commission initiatives are not accompanied by impact assessments and the literature points to major 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta- questions regarding the quality of political/files/political-guidelines-short_en.pdf. impact assessments (including about 5 ‘EU Fiscal Board blames Commission of ineffective recommendations’, https://www.euractiv.com/ methodological issues). section/economic-governance/news/eu-fiscal- c. Costs of assessments are an obstacle board-blames-commission-of-ineffective- in a diversified EU of close to recommendations/. 30 member states. 2 Clingendael Policy Brief d. Within the Commission, adherence to Discussion and points of attention IAs has been variable. for the next EU Commission: As a result, the Commission has created Solidifying trust a world-class BR system6 but questions 1) One way to increase trust could be to remain as regards the application. create a truly independent quality control 3) Juncker’s priority to be ‘big on big and system by carrying out quality control small on small’ seems to have been on IAs and on ex-post evaluations of successful in focusing attention on policies independently of, and outside, the specific policy areas but it competes Commission. Moreover, tasks that require with demands for more legislative independent assessments and monitoring detail from member states, European should be separated from more political Parliament, industry sectors, international components of BR such as stakeholder regulatory standardisation organisations engagement. and from within the Commission. As regards control on impact Further assessment is required to see assessments, this implies placing the whether the level of detail in Juncker’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board outside legislative packages has indeed gone the Commission. In relation to ex post down. There is also a trade-off between evaluations of policies, the role of the full-cycle evidence-based policymaking European Court of Auditors could be and reducing the volume of legislation: elaborated. the former may require updating old This discussion about a truly independent legislation, which may conflict with the quality control is not new. The OECD Commission’s objective to reduce overall underlines the importance of keeping regulatory burden and its predefined quality control closely connected to political strategic agenda. policymaking. Also the Commission Moreover, what is ‘small’ is ultimately has insisted on keeping quality control a political assessment. Views on the within its own organisation – and for importance of, for example, EU legislation understandable reasons.8 However, to on parental leave differ between member ensure trust, we would emphasise the states. importance of independent and external 4) As concluded by Russel and Radaelli checks and balances. (2015), the EU’s Better Regulation A separate RSB, however, creates the Agenda is in danger of becoming another danger that it can be easily ignored. case of ‘[scaling] up in ambitions and Hence, its relevance needs to be assured
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Davor Jancic the Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing Or Democracy Boost?
    Davor Jancic The barroso initiative: window dressing or democracy boost? Article (Published version) (Refereed) Original citation: Jancic, Davor (2012) The barroso initiative: window dressing or democracy boost? Utrecht Law Review, 8 (1). pp. 78-91. ISSN 1871-515X © 2012 The Author This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51580/ Available in LSE Research Online: August 2013 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This article is published in a peer-reviewed section of the Utrecht Law Review The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy Boost? Davor Jančić* 1. Introduction: refurbishing EU parliamentary democracy Although historically five years is a negligible period of time, in European integration it can spark impor- tant developments. Such is the case with the so-called Barroso Initiative (the Initiative), named after João Manuel Durão Barroso, incumbent second-term President of the European Commission. The purpose of his Initiative is to reinforce the democratic basis of the Union by involving national parliaments of the Member States more closely in the EU policy-making processes beyond the texts of the founding treaties.
    [Show full text]
  • The Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Enforcement in the EU Legal Order
    The Principle of Subsidiarity and its Enforcement in the EU Legal Order The Role of National Parliaments in the Early Warning System Katarzyna Granat HART PUBLISHING Bloomsbury Publishing Plc Kemp House , Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford , OX2 9PH , UK HART PUBLISHING, the Hart/Stag logo, BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2018 Copyright © Katarzyna Granat , 2018 Katarzyna Granat has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identifi ed as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright © . All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright © . This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 ( http://www. nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 ) except where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ , 1998–2018. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
    [Show full text]
  • Review of the Juncker Commission
    AT A GLANCE Plenary – October II 2019 Review of the Juncker Commission Prior to his election as President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker set out the policy priorities that would serve as the political mandate for the Commission's 2014-2019 term of office. Although the new Commission will not take office on 1 November as scheduled, Juncker is due to make a statement during the October II plenary session on his term as President, and a debate will review the work of his Commission. Background In July 2014, President-elect Juncker published an Agenda for jobs, growth, fairness and democratic change to mark a 'new start for Europe'. The aim of those political guidelines was to make a difference and deliver concrete results for citizens on ten priorities, ranging from the digital single market and energy union, to justice and fundamental rights, migration and security. Changes and challenges Since the Juncker Commission took office in November 2014, every year has brought its share of changes and challenges. For example, 2015 started with a series of terrorist attacks, followed later that year by record-high numbers of migrants and asylum-seekers arriving in the European Union. In 2016, the UK's referendum vote to withdraw from the EU, and the election of a new administration in the United States, required the EU to adapt its priorities in several areas, from security and defence to trade. Furthermore, ensuring energy independence, guaranteeing the respect of the rule of law in Member States and strengthening economic and monetary union were additional challenges influencing the agenda and ultimately forcing the Commission to adapt, through its annual work programmes and State of the Union addresses, its response and initiatives to an ever-changing environment.
    [Show full text]
  • Factsheet: Delivering on the Capital Markets Union
    Delivering on the CAPITAL MARKETS UNION #CMU | #InvestEU WHAT IS THE CAPITAL MARKETS UNION? The Capital Markets Union aims to get money - investments and savings - flowing across the EU so that it can benefit consumers, investors and companies. It is part of the Juncker Commission’s ambition to sustain growth in Europe. The Capital Markets Union aims to break down barriers that block cross-border investments in the EU and make it easier for companies and infrastructure projects to get the finance they need, regardless of where they are located. It also sets out to foster sustainable finance by directing investment to environmentally friendly projects. WHY CAPITAL MARKETS UNION MATTERS? More integrated financial markets create a cushion to absorb sudden shocks, and allow risk to be shared by private actors across EU borders, making the Economic and Monetary Union stronger and more resilient. This, in turn, can create an incentive for market participants to use the euro, therefore reinforcing its international role. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT ISSUES? Start-ups and small and High fixed costs EU households Investors European businesses medium-sized enterprises of up to 15% of save heavily, face many highly depend on banks need more funding for the amount raised but do not barriers for their financing (50% innovation and growth makes access make the when inves- of total financing), with (market-based sources of to stockmarkets most of their ting in other few alternative funding finance are currently less especially costly for savings EU countries sources than 15%) small businesses “The Capital Markets Union has a key role to play in strengthening Europe's Economic and Monetary Union and the euro.
    [Show full text]
  • EU Commission Consultation Regime Quittkat, Christine; Finke, Barbara
    www.ssoar.info The EU Commission consultation regime Quittkat, Christine; Finke, Barbara Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Quittkat, C., & Finke, B. (2008). The EU Commission consultation regime. In B. Kohler-Koch, D. d. Bièvre, & W. Maloney (Eds.), Opening EU-governance to civil society: gains and challenges (pp. 183-222). Mannheim: Universität Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168- ssoar-195380 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use.
    [Show full text]
  • The Power of Initiative of the European Commission: a Progressive Erosion?
    The Power of Initiative of the European Commission: A Progressive Erosion? Paolo PONZANO, Costanza HERMANIN and Daniela CORONA Preface by António Vitorino Studies & 89 Research Study & The Power of Initiative 89 of the European Commission: Research A Progressive Erosion? PAOLO PONZANO, COSTANZA HERMANIN AND DANIELA CORONA Preface by António Vitorino Paolo PONZANO is a senior fellow at the European University Institute and a special adviser of the European Commission. Former collaborator of Altiero Spinelli at the Institute for International Affairs in Rome, he has worked for the European Commission from 1971 to 2009. He was formerly Director for Relations with the Council of ministers, subsequently for Institutional Matters and Better Regulation. He was also Alternate Member of the European Convention in 2002/2003. He published several articles and chapters on the EU institutions. He teaches European Governance and Decision-Making at the University of Florence and at the European College of Parma as well as European Law at the University of Rome. Costanza HERMANIN is a researcher in the department of social and political science of the European University Institute, where she is about to complete her PhD. Her research interests comprise EU social and immigration policy, EU institutional affairs, and human rights and immigration policy in Italy. She has been visiting fellow at several places (WZB, CERI, Columbia, Berkeley). She is the co-editor of a forthcoming book on “Fighting Race Discrimination in Europe” (Routledge, 2012). She has been publishing on Italian and English speaking journals. Daniela CORONA is currently research collaborator at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence where she completed her PhD.
    [Show full text]
  • José Manuel Barroso's Leadership of the European Commission
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kassim, Hussein Working Paper A new model presidency: José Manuel Barroso's leadership of the European Commission WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP IV 2013-502 Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Kassim, Hussein (2013) : A new model presidency: José Manuel Barroso's leadership of the European Commission, WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP IV 2013-502, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103427 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence
    [Show full text]
  • THE JUNCKER COMMISSION: an Early Assessment
    THE JUNCKER COMMISSION: An Early Assessment John Peterson University of Edinburgh Paper prepared for the 14th Biennial Conference of the EU Studies Association, Boston, 5-7th February 2015 DRAFT: Not for citation without permission Comments welcome [email protected] Abstract This paper offers an early evaluation of the European Commission under the Presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker, following his contested appointment as the so-called Spitzencandidat of the centre-right after the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election. It confronts questions including: What will effect will the manner of Juncker’s appointment have on the perceived legitimacy of the Commission? Will Juncker claim that the strength his mandate gives him license to run a highly Presidential, centralised Commission along the lines of his predecessor, José Manuel Barroso? Will Juncker continue to seek a modest and supportive role for the Commission (as Barroso did), or will his Commission embrace more ambitious new projects or seek to re-energise old ones? What effect will British opposition to Juncker’s appointment have on the United Kingdom’s efforts to renegotiate its status in the EU? The paper draws on a round of interviews with senior Commission officials conducted in early 2015 to try to identify patterns of both continuity and change in the Commission. Its central aim is to assess the meaning of answers to the questions posed above both for the Commission and EU as a whole in the remainder of the decade. What follows is the proverbial ‘thought piece’: an analysis that seeks to provoke debate and pose the right questions about its subject, as opposed to one that offers many answers.
    [Show full text]
  • Building on the Spitzenkandidaten Model Bolstering Europe’S Democratic Dimension
    Road to Sibiu #EURoad2Sibiu Building on the Spitzenkandidaten Model Bolstering Europe’s Democratic Dimension February 2017 What started out as an experiment in 2014, has the potential to be reproduced and What is now widely referred innovation. Critics have questioned its impact on the strengthened, with clear to as the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ institutional balance of the EU, expressing concerns democratic benefits for process was over a politicisation of the European Commission, the Union. born in unique circumstances. After six years and challenging the extent to which the process of financial and economic crisis that transformed the truly addresses contemporary challenges in the EU’s European landscape and left many Europeans deeply democratic dimension. concerned about their future and that of their children, faith in the European project and in its ability to foster In the run-up to the May 2019 elections, the debate a long-term return to growth and upwards convergence over the Spitzenkandidaten innovation has been among all Member States was severely dented. The reignited, garnering support across the European percentage of citizens with a positive view of the institutions and the Member States. Most recently the EU was on a downward slope, falling from 48% in Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar and Croatian Prime September 2006 to 35% in September 2014. Minister Andrej Plenković endorsed the innovation in separate speeches delivered to the European Parliament The need for reinvention was clear. Faced with on 17 January and 6 February 2018 respectively. unprecedented criticism, European leaders recognised that extracting the EU from the crisis would not be What started out as an experiment in 2014, has the enough to win back the hearts and minds of European potential to be reproduced and strengthened, with clear citizens, and that a renewed effort was needed to democratic benefits for the Union, confirming it asthe strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the European right choice for a Europe which is not afraid of House.
    [Show full text]
  • A Fischler Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy? Johan F.M
    CENTRE FOR W ORKING D OCUMENT N O . 173 EUROPEAN S EPTEMBER 2001 POLICY STUDIES A FISCHLER REFORM OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY? JOHAN F.M. SWINNEN 1. Introduction 1 2. A (Very) Brief History of the CAP and Agenda 2000 3 2.1 The CAP 3 2.2 Agenda 2000 4 2.3 Did Agenda 2000 go far enough 5 3. The Pressures for Further CAP Reform 6 3.1 WTO 6 3.1.1 Export subsidies 9 3.1.2 Domestic support 10 3.2 Other trade negotiations 13 3.3 Eastern Enlargement 14 3.3.1 Enlargement and WTO 15 3.3.2 Production and Trade Effects 16 3.4 Food Safety 19 4. Reform + Reform = More or Less Reform 20 5. The Future of the Direct Payments 22 6. Direct Payments and Enlargement 23 6.1 Direct Payments for CEEC Farmers 23 6.2 Budgetary Implications 25 7. Budget Pressures and CAP Reform 27 8. Direct Payments and WTO 29 9. Timing 30 10. The Pro- and Anti-Reform Coalitions 33 10.1 Enlargement and Reform Coalitions 36 11. Lessons from the History of CAP Reforms 37 12. A Hint of the 2004 Fischler Reforms ? 39 References 43 Tables and Figures 46 CEPS Working Documents are published to give an early indication of the work in progress within CEPS research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the field. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated.
    [Show full text]
  • The Commission: Boxed in and Constrained, but Still an Engine of Integration
    The Commission: Boxed In and Constrained, but still an Engine of Integration Stefan Becker, Michael Bauer, Sara Connolly and Hussein Kassim In the debate about the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the EU’s institutional balance, an- tagonists have often argued past each other. Supporters of the new intergovernmentalism contend that the European Council has supplanted the European Commission in policy lead- ership, while scholars who hold that the EU executive has been a winner of the crisis high- light the new management functions it has acquired. This article argues, first, that an accu- rate assessment of the institutional balance requires a more global evaluation of the Commis- sion, acknowledging external and internal dynamics. Second, it contends that the Eurozone crisis did not cause a Commission retreat. Rather, the crisis accelerated a process already underway that finds its origins in a different dynamic: the presidentialization of policy control undertaken by Commission President Barroso. The adoption of fewer legislative proposals by the Commission during the crisis was due to the ability and choice of a strong president to focus the attention of the institution on crisis-related areas of policy, not the displacement of the institution by the European Council. The broader lesson is that rather than marking a further step in the decline of the Commission, the crisis reveals how the centralization of power within the institution and its expanded management duties have enhanced its capacity to take strategic action. The Commission’s role as an engine of integration will therefore en- dure, but in a different guise. Keywords: European Commission, Economic Governance, Eurozone Crisis, New Intergov- ernmentalism Introduction At the very moment the Lisbon Treaty entered into force – and thereby brought a decade of constitutional debate in the European Union (EU) to an end – the Eurozone crisis put the new institutional balance to the test.
    [Show full text]
  • Does Subsidiarity Ask the Right Question?
    2. The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an internation- al agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its con- clusion may affect common rules or alter their scope. Does Subsidiarity Ask the Right Question? But subsidiarity is not the only principle in the EU Treaty that relates to the distribution of Jörgen Hettne Senior Researcher, SIEPS powers between the EU and Member States. Article 5 TEU contains in fact three fundamen- Fredrik Langdal Researcher, SIEPS tal principles, which each impose limitations on the institutions of the Union: the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality. The meaning of these principles can be summarised as follows. The principle of conferral controls when the EU is able to act, the principle of subsidiarity when the EU should act and the principle of proportionality how the EU should act. In contrast to the principle of conferral, the principles ubsidiarity was formally introduced in the European Union (EU) with the Maastricht of subsidiarity and proportionality are therefore not concerned with the issue if the EU has the Treaty, which entered into force on 1 November 1993. By introducing this principle, power to do something or not, but rather impose certain conditions on how these powers should SMember States wanted to impose a check on how EU institutions used their powers. The be used. While the principle of subsidiarity regulates whether and to what extent the powers are principle of subsidiarity implies a preference for decisions to be taken as close as possible to to be exercised, the principle of proportionality shall ensure that they do not give rise to actions the people affected, but if more efficient outcomes can be reached at the central level, then that are more extensive than is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Union.
    [Show full text]